

## Exercise 4: Liveness Analysis

Perform liveness analysis on the following piece of code

```
1: var x,y,z;  
2: x = a + b  
3: y = x + 1  
4: z = x  
5: if (x > 0) {  
6: z = x + 1  
} else {  
7: x = 2  
}  
8: y = z + x  
9: output y;
```

- drawing its control flow graph,
- computing the constraints for each block, and
- computing the least solution of the constraints.

[Optional] Do the results of liveness analysis on this code enable any optimization opportunities? If so, describe the optimization.

# LANGUAGE BASED TECHNOLOGY FOR SECURITY

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Duration 40 minutes – Answers can be written either in English or in Italian.

## Exercise 1: Dynamic Information Flow

Consider the following function under an information flow security policy over the lattice  $L \leq H$ .

```
bool function f(x) {  
  y = true;  
  z = true;  
  if x then y = false;  
  if (!y) then z = false;  
  return !z;  
}
```

We assume to consider a dynamic information flow mechanism where the typed security policy  $\Gamma$  is *dynamic*. We also assume that the first two assignments to variables  $y$  and  $z$  are low-level assignments (namely, the corresponding types and values are at the low level  $L$ ).

- Discuss the dynamic information flow policies associated to the execution of the function  $f$  above. Consider two cases:

1. Function  $f$  is called with the **true** value at the security level  $H$ ;
2. Function  $f$  is called with the **false** value at the security level  $H$ ;

## Exercise 2: Static Taint Analysis

Consider the following program

```
x = getInput();  
a = x;  
b = a*a;  
d = 10;  
if d < a then y = 0 else y = a+1;  
if d > b then y = y+1 else y = b-1;  
print(y);
```

- Discuss how static taint analysis is applied to discover whether the previous program fragments presents taint flow. Specifically define and illustrate the constraints generated by the static taint analysis.

## Exercise 3: Security Polices

Consider an intermediate programming language designed to enable near-native code execution. We assume that the language includes standard instructions and is equipped with new feature to enable data flow reasoning about tainted data.

1. Design the *Security automaton* specifying the taint security policy associated to the *jump instruction* `jmp e` where  $e$  is an expression.
2. Exploit the security automata defined in the previous question to instrument the code below:

```
x = getInput(0);  
y = x + 8;  
jmp y;
```