Multiracial Identities in Multiracial Contexts:

The Conditional Political Effects of Race, Identity, and Environment

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Abstract

Racial context and social identity have been used to explain political attitudes and behavior for decades. However, previous research has often ignored how they interrelate. Furthermore, the theories often used to guide this research rarely provide consistent hypotheses about the behavior and attitudes of different racial groups. This paper uses a unique 1996 survey to examine the effects of racial context and racial identity on non-Hispanic whites', blacks', Latinos', and Asian Americans' vote choice on an anti-affirmative action initiative in California (Proposition 209). Contrary to power threat and social identity theories, neither racial context nor racial identity alone has an effect on the vote for members of all racial groups. Instead, the mechanism by which context matters is conditional on racial identity, such that racial identity is most consequential in segregated settings, and the effects of racial context are very different for citizens of different races.

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Groups and the places where they live often overlap in our minds. When we think of Florida, for example, our stereotype is of grandparents living in retirement communities; the Castro in San Francisco is a picture of the gay community, Harlem a snapshot of the Black community, and Salt Lake City an image of the Mormon community. An even more extreme example of a geographically-situated community is the Amish; it is almost impossible to think of them independent of the rural areas in which they live. The cliché that "birds of a feather flock together" has a grain of truth that explains why communities may be geographically-based: many people choose to live close to people to whom they feel close, e.g. members of their ingroup.

The fact that members of some groups live clustered together in neighborhoods and towns has political ramifications; what is unknown is how universal these effects are across groups (Huckfeldt et al. 1993, 1995). In this paper, we focus on the political effects of groups and contexts with respect to race, particularly because the impact of the racial make-up of where people live has long been a research topic in political science. Over fifty years ago, V.O. Key argued that the impact of racial context in the South explained much of whites' political attitudes and behavior in that region (1984 (1949)), and research has continued to focus on the political effects of different qualities of one's environment (Branton and Jones 2005; Gay 2004; Oliver and Wong 2003).

Despite this long history of research on how the racial makeup of an individual's geography may affect her policy decisions, some of the most prominent theories of context (and subsequent empirical tests) are tailored to single racial groups in the U.S. For example, the "power threat theory" pertains to *whites'* political attitudes and behavior, and how they are affected by blacks living nearby (Blalock 1967; Tolbert and Grummel 2003).[1] This theory of

[1] When we mention "whites" in the text, we are referring specifically to non-Hispanic whites or Anglos. In addition, we use the shorthand of "racial" context and identity instead of "ethnic/ racial" context and identity.

threat has been applied in a variety of areas, regardless of whether whites are in the numerical minority locally (Key 1949) or when they are in the majority (Taylor 1998). Another important argument that has been used to explain effects of racial context on *blacks'* political opinions and actions is the "social density hypothesis": according to Welch et al. (2001), the more blacks around whom an African American individual lives, the greater her sense of racial solidarity, as expressed in racial attitudes and policy preferences.

While the research on these theories is compelling, their more generalized application to other racial groups is untested. In other words, it is unclear, for example, whether the power threat theory could be applied to African Americans, the social density theory to whites, or either theory to Latinos and Asian Americans. Furthermore, predictions become more uncertain when the context in question is no longer simply biracial (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Oliver and Wong 2003). Finally, demographic changes in the United States are leading to projections that the country will be majority minority in about the next fifty years. Thus, the change in status of which group constitutes a "majority" at the national level – which has thus far played a critical historical role in the power threat theory, for example – should lead to revisions in the theories about racial context.

Implicit in theories about how individuals react to the geographic make-up of where they live is a story of identity reinforcement and maintenance. If a white individual reacts negatively to black neighbors living in her community, for example, her group membership and identity as a white person is made salient. Alternatively, if a black woman who lives among African Americans is an ardent supporter of shopping only in stores owned by blacks, her racial identification is also central to her decisionmaking. In other words, context and group identity *ought* to interact to affect political opinions and actions (Ethier and Deaux 1990, 1994; Walsh 2004). However, they are rarely considered *together* as factors involved in people's political judgments about racial politics.

Therefore, in this paper we have three empirical goals:

1) To test whether the domain of various context theories can be expanded to apply to other racial groups;

2) To examine the effects of a multiracial context on multiple racial groups in a state that was on the cusp of becoming majority-minority; and

3) To analyze the extent to which an individual's racial identity and the context in which she lives work together to affect her vote choice.

In particular, we focus on the attitudes of whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans about Proposition 209, an initiative on the California ballot in 1996 to end affirmative action in the state. Thus, in a diverse context where no single racial group currently constitutes a majority[2], we can test the applicability of the theories across racial groups, and study how theories of individuals' racial identification work together with those concerning racial context. One of the puzzles raised in our analyses to follow is that hypotheses generated from the different theories are not necessarily true for all groups.

Our overarching goal is to spur scholars to think more about these theories and their potential ranges. We certainly do not believe that a single, unifying theory about all aspects of racial politics is at all desirable or realistic; however, if our theories about context apply only to single racial groups, the advancement of our understanding of political phenomena is limited (theoretically and temporally). Not only have our conceptualization and measurement of race and ethnicity shifted dramatically over time (Gould 1994; Haney-Lopez 1996; Skerry 2000; Waters 1990, 1999), the composition of the nation's demography has also undergone drastic metamorphoses as a result of immigration. There is no reason to believe that the changes will not continue. A theory about the political behavior of whites living in an area with just white and black residents can make only a limited contribution, especially if it conflicts with a theory about the political behavior of blacks living in that same area. Furthermore, theories of racial identities

[2] In 1996, whites were the majority group in the state, but just barely.

are often tested in isolation from those of racial context. In order to gain a better grasp of the political effects of context more generally – so that we might have insight, for example, on how "white" Arab Americans and Asian Americans would interact in a majority black city – and how identities and geography work together to affect politics, we need to begin exploring whether (and for which groups) the domain of these theories can be expanded.

Policy Motivations

Research on racial context has serious policy and political implications. It addresses questions of why or whether we should care about integration, not only of schools, but also of residential neighborhoods (see, for example, Holmes 2001; Schmitt 2001). Even if "separate" were equal, the value of diversity, in and of itself, is now being debated as a public good.[3]

In addition, work on racial context and identity crucially affects the issue of redistricting and the Supreme Court rulings on that topic (*Hunt v. Cromartie* 2001; *Shaw v. Reno* 1993). After all, much of the contemporary debate over representation has focused on race and how members of different racial groups are placed in districts (Lublin 1997; Swain 1993; Tate 2003). Many white Americans wonder why racial minorities tend to live and work together in ethnic enclaves or communities, while at the same time, concerns about segregation and housing discrimination continue to trouble many non-white Americans. Whatever the reason for this demographic balkanization (Farley 1999; Massey 2000), it has been argued that segregation reinforces group allegiances or encourages separatist politics. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for example, seems to share this concern in her opinions in the racial redistricting cases. She writes in *Shaw v. Reno* (1993):

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[3] The defendants in the suits against affirmative action at the University of Michigan (*Grutter v. Bollinger* and *Gratz and Hamacher v. Bollinger*) cited diversity as such a good in their legal filings (www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal).

> A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race…and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group….think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.

O'Connor's fear is that the *perception* of similarity due to concentration by race may lead to the *reality* of similarity based on race, and thus to the polarization of the American electorate. However, even after numerous decisions by the Supreme Court, it is still not clear what a "community of interest" is, and how it relates to one's race, one's neighbors, or one's fellow partisans.

Theoretical Motivations

Power Threat Theory. Power threat theory focuses on how white prejudice and discrimination against blacks can arise from the environments in which they live (Blalock 1967; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Evans 1985; Glaser 1994; Mendelberg and Oliver 2000; Taylor 1998; Voss 1996; Wright 1977). In describing the power threat theory, Blalock explained that the larger a threatening minority or subordinate group, the greater the possibility for competition over scarce resources, and the greater the potential for political mobilization and discrimination by members of the majority group. For example, whites who live in the Black Belt in the South were more likely to support racist candidates and discriminatory policies (Key 1949). Implicit in the argument about context's effects is that the awareness of a threat occurs in the community in which one lives, and that it affects all whites in the geographic area.

The power threat theory directly addresses how members of the majority may feel threatened by the competition[4]; it is less clear from whom members of a minority or subordinate group perceive threat in their context (e.g., from majority group members or other minorities), and how their attitudes may differ depending on whether they constitute a numerical majority or minority in their local community (e.g., blacks living in Detroit versus Ann Arbor, MI). Much like group conflict theories more generally (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Levine and Campbell 1971), the power threat theory predicts that intergroup hostility will result from real or imagined competition for scarce resources, like jobs and political power. The predictions, however, are hazy: when will a group feel threatened, and by whom? Do African Americans in Los Angeles, for example, feel they are in competition with Latinos, Asian Americans, whites, or all three? Will a minority group feel threatened by a group that is the numerical majority locally, by the dominant group in the nation as a whole, or by a group newly arriving in the area (Green et al. 1998)?

Our analyses below indicate that Latinos, for example, do not react like Anglos to the presence of African Americans in their community, but neither do the Latinos react to blacks in the same way they react to the presence of other Latinos or minorities writ large.

Social Density. Racial density theory pertains to how geographic proximity in a community and contact with ingroup members leads to racial solidarity. People have many different identities, and the salience or importance of one's racial identity may obviously be affected by one's situation or context (Lau 1989). The idea that people's identities and cohesiveness as a group are strengthened by context and interactions has resulted in a number of different possible explanations for racial solidarity (Shingles 1981; Tate 1993). Welch et al. (2001) find that Lau's social density arguments best explain racial solidarity among African

[4] The power threat hypothesis has also been used to explain Europeans' attitudes about immigrants (Quillian 1995).

Americans: as numbers of a person's ingroup in her surroundings increases, the greater the sense of cohesion and solidarity she feels with her fellow group members. In contrast, Welch and her colleagues find little support for an identity supremacy hypothesis – that identity is such an important aspect of one's life that it is neither strengthened nor diminished by one's surroundings – or the social salience hypothesis –that an individual's identity as an outgroup member is particularly salient to her when she is a numerical minority, and that she will therefore express a greater solidarity with her group as a result of constantly being placed in contrast with the majority outgroup.[5]

One question, however, about the social density hypothesis is whether it applies to other groups besides African Americans. If whites, for example, also expressed greater racial solidarity

[5] Social salience in a local context may strengthen one's own racial identity, but it can also lead to greater empathy or sympathy with the outgroup as a result of social contact. The social contact hypothesis predicts interracial harmony when blacks live with whites, for example, partially as a result of learning on the part of members of both groups. Social scientists often pose the social contact hypothesis as the foil to the power threat or group conflict theories (Allport 1954; Sigelman et al. 1996; Taylor 2000). However, the conflict and contact hypotheses are not necessarily competing. Contact is not seen as an easy or universal panacea for racial tensions. As theorized by Allport, the contact hypothesis states that there will be positive effects of intergroup contact if certain conditions are met. Intergroup contact lessens group conflict only when the groups are of equal status, when they share common goals, when there is intergroup cooperation, and when contact is supported by laws or customs. To these four conditions, Pettigrew added a fifth, which stated that the situation held potential for friendships (1998). One can imagine that when groups are of unequal status, with competing goals, that contact will lead to perceptions of threat instead of harmony — in this way, "group conflict" and "social contact" theories agree.

living among more ingroup members, this could fit with Oliver and Wong's (2003) findings that whites who lived in more *homogeneous* areas had more negative stereotypes about blacks and Latinos (assuming that racial solidarity is correlated with negative attitudes about the outgroup, which is something that social identity theorists would predict (see below)). However, this would contradict the power threat theory, which predicts the opposite – and for which Welch et al. find some supporting evidence in their study: whites' prejudice (and feelings of threat) increase as a result of the racial proximity of African Americans.

Again, our analyses show differing levels of support for the social density hypothesis, depending on the racial group in question.

Social Identity Theory. Social identity theorists focus on studying the creation of group boundaries and the ingroup biases and favoritism that follow (Brown 1986; Tajfel 1970, 1981). In other words, group identification leads to support for public policies that benefit the ingroup and opposition for policies that benefit the outgroup (Conover 1984, 1987; Dawson 1994; Miller et al. 1981; Tate 1993). After all, a major function of group identification is an enhancement of self-esteem, self insight, and social support through *comparisons* with other groups, including the denigration of outgroups (Brewer 1991; Deaux 1993; Helms 1993; Phinney 1990; Turner et al. 1994; Van Knippenberg and Ellemers 1993).[6]

Social identity theory does not differentiate between groups by numerical status in society, so it should apply to whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians equally. However, below, we present some evidence that the racial identity of whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians are not relating in similar ways to their political attitudes, even when it comes to their support for a policy that could benefit their ingroup.

[6] However, the importance of self esteem as a motivation for social identity may be exaggerated (Abrams and Hogg 1990).

It is commonplace to say that behavior is a function of personality and environment, yet it is rare for research actually to bring together both personal identities and the racial contexts in which individuals live. In the next section, we test whether the different theories we just mentioned apply equally well across groups and contexts, using as our case the vote on a ballot initiative to end state-wide affirmative action programs. In particular, we focus on the racial composition of whites', blacks', Latinos', and Asians' geographic communities or neighborhoods, their racial identification, and their relationship to vote choices.

Given the changing demographics in California over the last couple of decades – and its status as one of the few minority-majority states at this time – how are Californians of different races reacting to their surroundings in the political arena? We find that no theory is applicable across all groups.

Data

We use data from a survey conducted in California, a state that provides a good case in which to examine the political effects of communities and their diversity; in the last decade, there have been a number of statewide initiatives that have forced voters to make judgments that concern racial minorities explicitly. California is also a good state for studying racial and ethnic context effects because more than a quarter of its residents are foreign born, and more Asian Americans and Hispanics live in California than any other state. Between 1980 and 1990, the proportion of non-Hispanic whites in the population declined from 76 to 57 percent.[7] Yet, despite

[7] While whites made up only 57 percent of the adult population in 1996, they made up 77 percent of the voting population. And, blacks made up 6 percent of the population and 6 percent of the voting population. In contrast, Asians were 10 percent of population and 6 percent of the voting population, and Latinos were 27 percent of the total population and 11 percent of the voting (Field Poll 1997, 8).

the diversity of California overall, the profiles of different regions of the state vary widely. Counties like Los Angeles, San Diego, and Alameda are as diverse as the state as a whole, but others are virtually all white.

California is also a good case study because of its use of direct democracy. In surveys, respondents are usually asked their policy preferences. These preferences may in turn influence their choice of a political candidate in the voting booth, but it is difficult to interpret a vote for a candidate as a vote on a particular issue. An initiative vote allows us to focus on a specific policy that can be seen to have benefits and costs for racial groups, as opposed to a vote for a candidate, which is affected (and complicated) by partisanship, candidates' personalities, their previous experience, and the like. In the case of the survey we use here, respondents state a policy preference on which they could cast a vote within one week.

For this analysis, consolidated precincts serve as the measure of geographic community. Precincts are, after all, drawn for the very purpose of serving as measures of one's geographic community or neighborhood (and to help politicians drawing the lines represent individuals with similar interests and preferences).[8] We are interested in the extent to which the racial make-up of the community where one lives affects one's political judgments.[9]

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[8] The "consolidated precinct" was created in order to merge Census block group data with registration data; these data were combined in order to draw a sample of registered voters of different races who live in the same locales. (Census data do not provide registration information, and the statement for registration does not contain racial data.) The mean number of individuals living in the consolidated precincts is 1412, the mode is 1191, and 50% of the consolidated precincts range in population from 850 to 1730.

[9] Given the size of precincts and results of zoning, probably most Californians who work do so outside of the precinct in which they live. Thus, the context of their workplace may also affect their attitudes and beliefs. However, while self-selection may be more of a problem when

We focus on Proposition 209, which passed in 1996. Labeled the California Civil Rights Initiative by its proponents, CCRI was upheld in the courts and ended all state-level affirmative action programs. We think this vote is particularly important and uniquely suited for our analyses, not only because it was a harbinger of campaigns that were to come at the national level and in many other states and cities, but also because the debate was racially divisive.[10]

Previous research on initiatives and racial context has tended to suffer from the fallacy of ecological inference, where results derived from county-level units of analyses are interpreted as individual-level motivations (see, for example, Tolbert and Hero 1996). This is a problem because so-called contextual effects may in fact be only a reflection of the variation in the composition of the aggregate-level units of analysis and really have nothing to say about the motivations of individuals at all (Achen and Shively 1995).

To avoid this problem, we use data from a phone survey designed to gather information on both individual attitudes and contextual variables at the precinct level.[11] The survey of 1500 registered voters examined the effects of community diversity on attitudes about Proposition 209

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examining the effects of residential contexts, it is also likely that the neighbors with whom respondents choose to live will have a stronger impact than county-level context (which includes millions of other residents). In the analyses section, we will discuss in more detail the issue of self selection, as well as make comparisons to county-level research on racial context and Prop 209.

[10] The racial animosity arose despite the fact that the most prominent spokesperson in favor of the initiative was black, and that women's organizations tried to emphasize that this was a gender issue as well as a racial one (Chavez 1998).

[11] See Cain et al. 2000 for more details about the survey.

as well as race relations more generally.[12] The survey design oversampled minority populations, while ensuring a diversity of geographic contexts to complement the diverse sample of registered voters.[13] The timing of the survey – which was in the field one week before the election (from October 26 to November 2, 1996) – ensured that the most respondents possible had knowledge about the initiative and the debate surrounding it, and the sample of registered voters made the connection between expressed vote choice and actual behavior closer than for a sample of the general population.[14] However, because the survey oversampled areas where minorities were concentrated in order to have sufficient numbers of different racial groups to study (and therefore the sample was not intended to be representative of California as a whole), and because the survey was in the field a week before the election, its findings for support for CCRI were not identical to those in exit polls. According to VNS's California General Election Exit Poll for November 5, 1996, 62% of Whites, 27% of Blacks, 30% of Latinos, and 45% of Asians voted in favor of Prop 209. In the survey analyzed here, the comparable numbers were 58, 22, 31, and 31 (see Table 1).

In addition to asking voters' intentions on 209,[15] the survey also contained a measure of racial identification, which we use in the analyses that follow. Respondents were asked the following:

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[12] Because the clustering in the sample is minimal – only one respondent lived in each of 93% of the precincts – multilevel modeling is not required or feasible.

[13] The white respondents lived in precincts ranging from 0 to 98% black. Black respondents lived in precincts that were 0 to 99% black; Hispanics in precincts ranging from 0 to 87% black; and Asians in precincts 0 to 73% black.

[14] The registration lists also served as the sampling frame for the survey.

[15] Respondents were asked the following: "Proposition 209, referred to as the California Civil Rights Initiative, sometimes known as CCRI, would prohibit state and local governments from

> When it comes to social and political matters, some people think of themselves mainly as black, white, Latino, Asian or Jewish, and that is very important to how they think of themselves. Other people don't give much thought to these things. When it comes to social and political matters, how important is your race and ethnicity to how you think of yourself?

Consistent with previous research on group closeness measures, blacks, Latinos, and Asians were more likely to express a racial identification than whites. 15 percent of whites, as opposed to 56 percent of blacks, 42 percent of Latinos, and 30 percent of Asians said that their race and ethnicity was "very important" to how they thought of themselves (see Table 1 for the full distribution).

Analyses

The main question to be answered is how one's community and racial identification affect voting on Prop 209, but we first address each variable separately. From social identity theory – independent of any considerations of context – we hypothesize that the greater one's racial identification, the greater the ingroup bias. In other words, white identifiers should be more opposed to affirmative action – a policy widely believed to inflict costs on members of their ingroup – and black and Hispanic identifiers should be more supportive of affirmative action – as potential recipients of the policy's benefits. Depending on how Asian American identifiers view the effects of affirmative action on their racial group, they would either oppose Proposition 209 or

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using race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as criteria for either discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to individuals or groups in hiring, promoting, granting admissions to college or selecting public contractors. If the election were being held today, would you vote yes or no on this initiative?" The question wording reflects the text included about the initiative in the ballot pamphlet issued by the California Secretary of State.

support it[16]: if they believed affirmative action benefits Asians, for example, then social identity theory would predict opposition to 209. Given that a majority of Asian American respondents in the survey believed affirmative action was still necessary for their ingroup, we expected that those Asians with a stronger sense of racial identification would oppose Proposition 209 and support affirmative action.[17]

In our models predicting vote preference for Proposition 209, we included controls for education, age, gender, party identification, and ideology. Previous research has shown these factors to be predictive of affirmative action attitudes (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schuman et al. 1998). Furthermore, we are interested in the effects of racial context and racial identity, *controlling* for these other factors, because otherwise the relationships we find could be spurious.[18]

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[16] While civil rights organizations, including the San Francisco-based Chinese for Affirmative Action, argued that Asian Americans should oppose Proposition 209, reports of its potential effects (and many of the initiative's proponents) indicated that Asians would be the main beneficiaries if 209 passed (Burdman 1996).

[17] Among Asian respondents, 57% said that affirmative action was still necessary for Asians. Even greater majorities of Asians believed that affirmative action was still necessary for blacks, Latinos, and women (64, 69, and 67%, respectively. See Cain et al. 2000 for details).

[18] In particular, we needed to take into account partisanship and ideology to control for the geographic self-selection of whites in our sample: we found that white liberals and Democrats were much more likely to live among African Americans than white conservatives or Republicans, and white liberals and Democrats were also more likely to vote against Proposition 209. If we did not include political predispositions as independent variables in the model, we might, for example, mistakenly conclude that white racial identity had a strong relationship with attitudes about 209, when in fact racial identity has no effect independent of partisanship and

As can be seen in Figure 1, racial identification has little effect on attitudes about Prop 209 for whites, blacks, and Hispanics (i.e., the coefficients are indiscernible from zero) [19]; when vote preference is regressed on racial identity, controlling for education, age, party identification, ideology, and gender, the effects of racial identity are statistically insignificant.[20] This result is surprising given social identity theory, which would have predicted a positive relationship for whites and a negative one for blacks and Latinos. Instead, those whites with a greater sense of identification with their ingroup were no more likely to support the end of affirmative action via Prop 209 than white respondents who have a weaker or no sense of identification with their racial ingroup, *ceteris paribus*. Blacks' and Latinos' vote preferences, too, were unaffected by their racial identification.

As the data show, the hypothesis for Asian Americans is supported: the greater the racial identification of an Asian respondent, the greater her opposition to Proposition 209. Thus, it appears that there is support for social identity theory among Asians, but not among white, black, or Hispanic respondents. The fact that the same theory does not apply to all groups is disturbing. And, although the slopes for racial identification are negative for all groups, this similarity is not

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ideology. However, we want to point out that there is no question of a problem with multicollinearity. Among white respondents, party identification and %black are only correlated at -.23, and the correlation between ideology and %black is even smaller: -.17. (As a point of comparison, the correlation between party identification and ideology is .41.)

[19] See the Appendix for the logistic regression results.

[20] Figure 1 is based on results of logit models with age, education, gender, PID, and ideology set at their mean. All variables were recoded to run from 0 to 1. Age is a continuous variable; education is a 3-category variable, where 0=high school degree or less, .5=some college, and 1=BA or advanced degree; PID is a 3 category variable where 1=Republican; ideology is a 3-category variable where 1=conservative; and for gender, 1=female.

comforting: social identity theory would certainly not predict that white identifiers would be more supportive of affirmative action than non-identifiers.

It is clear from this figure that a gap in attitudes about Prop 209 does exist between non-Hispanic whites and blacks, and that the vote preferences of Latinos fall between those of whites and blacks. It should be noted that the models were run for each race separately, partly because the effects of the controls were not uniform across groups. For example, both party identification and ideology played a role in determining whites' vote intention on Proposition 209, as did partisanship for Latinos. However, neither political predisposition affected the opinions of African Americans or Asian Americans.

Racial identity has mixed success in predicting Proposition 209 attitudes. Is the effect of racial context uniform across groups? Social identity theory does not explicitly address questions of context, but given the power threat theory, one would expect whites in communities with more blacks to be more supportive of the initiative. Fears of competition over jobs or school admissions would lead whites to oppose policies like affirmative action, which would help members of the outgroup. Theories of social density and contact, on the other hand, would predict, respectively, that whites who live among more whites will show greater racial solidarity (and therefore oppose policies they believe would hurt their ingroup), and whites who lived among more blacks would interact more with outgroup members and, as a result, become more sympathetic to a policy that would benefit African Americans.

Again, as we mentioned earlier, studies of the power threat theory have not examined how blacks should respond to their racial contexts. Social density arguments would lead blacks living among more ingroup members to be more aware of their group interest in opposing the initiative (Bledsoe 1995). Power threat (and social salience) theory would predict the opposite: blacks living among more white neighbors would be more aware of their group differences, perceive that they are threatened by whites, and be more opposed to the initiative. We hypothesize that Hispanics and Asian Americans would behave much as African Americans,

given that they, too, potentially benefit as groups from affirmative action policies. That is, the policy stances of Hispanics and Asians, like blacks, would all either be predicted by theories of social density or of power threat.

Figure 2 shows that the racial context of one's community has no effect on attitudes about the 209 vote, controlling for the same factors as in the previous model. As the percentage of blacks living in a precinct increases, there is no change in respondents' propensity to support 209. This is true for blacks, whites, Latinos, and Asians. We also reran the model using percent minority as the contextual variable and obtained similar null findings. Separate analyses of Latinos and Asians using percent Hispanic and percent Asian as the contextual variables, respectively, also produced similar results: whether context was defined solely by one's ingroup, African Americans, or all minorities, racial context had no effect on respondents' vote preference.[21]

This lack of results is surprising. First, it contradicts the findings of previous research by Tolbert and Grummel, who found that the percentage of minorities in a census tract predicted whites' vote for Prop 209 (2003). This may be true of census tracts at the aggregate level, but not when we look at individuals as the unit of analysis. Second, these results do not fit with what we might expect given Blalock's power threat theory, which states that as the proportion of blacks (or minorities) living in a community increases, whites feel more threatened, and in this case, should be more likely to vote for Prop 209. The social density theory is not supported either: whites who lived in segregated communities were no less likely to sympathize with outgroup

[21] While the coefficient for context's effects on Asians' preferences for vote 209 is negative and large, it is indistinguishable from zero, most likely as a result of their concentration in precincts with fewer African Americans. For %minority and %Asian, the effect of racial context is much smaller – .28 and .76, respectively – and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

members and vote for 209 than whites who lived among more minorities.[22] It appears that minority racial group members also are not affected by context: blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans who lived among more whites were not feeling threatened or feeling a greater sense of racial solidarity as predicted by the power threat theory, nor were they "learning" to become more anti-affirmative action via social contact with and living near more whites. Living among either more ingroup members or other racial minorities also has no effect on vote intentions, so there is also no support for the social density hypothesis; the latter would have predicted that Asians who lived among more Asians, for example, would show greater racial solidarity, support policies that benefit their ingroup, and therefore oppose Proposition 209. This did not happen when we ran the analysis.

If behavior is a function of both the individual and the environment, it is possible that they are not working independently to affect voting preferences, but that they are interacting with one another. We expect that either greater community diversity could prime one's social identity – given the presence of a "threat" posed by outgroup members – or that living among more people like oneself could strengthen one's identity, consistent with the social density hypothesis. Figure 3 shows the results of a model regressing respondents' level of racial identification on racial context.[23] The positive slopes show that there is a positive relationship between %black and racial identification. We can now begin to understand what impact context could have on political behavior: while there is no effect of the racial context of one's community on vote

[22] These results are not unique to the precinct-level analysis of context. Campbell et al. (N.d.) found no effect of racial context (measured as %black, %Hispanic, or %minority) on whites' vote choices on Proposition 209; they used exit poll data and *county*-level contextual data in their analyses, which also failed to find support for the power threat theory.

[23] An ordered logit model produced similar results. We discuss the OLS results (and present them in the appendix) because of ease of interpretation.

choice, context does significantly prime one's racial identification. The greater the percentage of blacks living in a community, the greater the racial identification of blacks ($p<.05$), whites ($p<.10$), and Latinos ($p<.10$).

This means that for whites, living in a diverse or heterogeneous community leads to a greater sense of white racial identification. This finding does provide support for the power threat hypothesis (and the social salience hypothesis).[24] Conversely, for blacks, living in a homogeneous context increases racial identification, and this finding coincides with the research by Bledsoe et al. that racial solidarity is higher in black neighborhoods as a result of social density (1995). Obviously, blacks in majority white precincts are not feeling threatened, as power threat ideas would predict; otherwise, we would expect black identification to rise as the percentage of whites living in a precinct increased. This is not the case. *So, even though the lines in Figure 3 slope in similar directions, they imply different conclusions for whites and blacks*.

This relationship holds true (and is even stronger) when %minority is the contextual measure used for black respondents. This raises an interesting question of interpretation: if racial identification is stronger in areas with more blacks, this finding supports the social density hypothesis. However, if racial identification is also seen as more important in areas with more Latinos and Asians, then either support is provided for the idea of social salience – among other minorities, although not among whites – or if the social density hypothesis were still to apply, then there must be a superordinate identity as a racial minority that is triggered.

The effects of context on Latinos' racial identification resemble those for blacks and whites: the greater the percentage of blacks living in a respondent's precinct, the greater a Latino's racial identification. In order to tease out whether these effects are a result of reactions

[24] When %black in the model is replaced with %minority, the same relationship is obtained: the perceived threat or increased salience of white identity is related to both measures of racial context.

to blacks as an ingroup (using a superordinate identity as a racial minority) or as an outgroup, we reran the model using both percent minority and percent Hispanic. For neither of these different measures of context was the relationship between context and racial identification distinguishable from zero, which hints at the idea that social salience (or possibly power threat theory) explains the increased racial identification of Latinos in areas with greater numbers of African Americans. For Asian Americans, no measure of racial context – %black, %minority, or %Asian – affected their racial identification. This lack of contextual effect provides no support for the power threat or social density hypotheses.

Figure 3 also makes clear that racial identification is more important for racial minority group members than majority group members; blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are all more likely to think that their racial identification is important when it comes to politics than are whites. This identity asymmetry is consistent with previous findings.

Overall, this figure suggests an answer to the puzzle posed by the flat lines in the first two figures, which is that *the context of one's community conditions the effect of racial identification*, at least for whites, blacks, and Latinos.

What happens to the relationships between context and identity and Prop 209 support or opposition when we look at the predictive power of the interaction between communities' racial contexts and the racial identification of their members? The top left corner of Figure 4 presents the results for the white respondents in the sample. There is an interaction effect, and the analysis indicates support for the power threat theory among white identifiers. Although the interaction is not statistically significant, this is largely a result of the distribution of whites: the majority of our sample of whites lives in precincts where blacks make up less than 10 percent of the population. In a world where whites do not tend to live with many blacks, racial identity does not have an effect on whites. As the community in which whites live becomes more diverse, those respondents who are more racially identified are more opposed to affirmative action, controlling for partisanship, ideology, and demographic characteristics. The context of one's community

could activate racial identification as a politically relevant orientation when neighborhoods include more outgroup members.

The top right corner of Figure 4 shows the same interaction for black respondents. While the crossing lines may seem strange, we should emphasize that the majority of the black respondents live in communities that are majority black (to the right of the intersection). Conditioning on the racial context of one's community, racial identification significantly affects blacks' voting behavior, which is a different conclusion than that provided by the first figures. Blacks who have a strong sense of racial identity and live in majority black communities are less likely to support 209 than their black neighbors who think their race is not important in how they think of themselves. When social density triggers racial identity, racial solidarity as expressed as policy preferences is exhibited; and, in areas with fewer blacks, racial identifiers are more likely to have contact with whites and be more sympathetic to their opposition to affirmative action. Obviously, this is evidence that Blalock's theory is not at work for African American racial identifiers, since we might otherwise assume that black identifiers in *white* neighborhoods would be the most opposed to Prop 209. On the other hand, for those African American respondents with a weaker sense of racial identification, it does appear that the power threat theory is at work: living among more whites leads to greater opposition to Proposition 209.

The story for Latinos bears a little resemblance to that of African Americans (see the bottom left corner of Figure 4). Latinos with a greater sense of racial identification are less likely to support the initiative than those with a weaker sense of racial identity, confirming the results of Figure 1. However, the interaction between context and identity does not affect their vote choice. While living among more African Americans affected Latinos' racial identification, it does not interact with identity to affect their vote preference.

For Asian respondents shown in Figure 4 (bottom right), it appears that there is a strong interaction effect, and that racial identity is behaving in ways that are unexpected given the previous figures. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the vast majority of Asians in the

sample are living in precincts that are 20% African American or less. Therefore, in areas with small percentages of blacks, Asians with a greater sense of racial identification are significantly *less* likely than Asians with a weaker sense of racial identity to support Proposition 209. As high racial identifiers live among more blacks, they are more in favor of Prop 209, which is support for the power threat theory; among low racial identifiers, there is some support for the contact theory, with more exposure to African American neighbors leading to greater opposition to the initiative.

We can draw two conclusions from these results: (1) racial identity is most consequential in the most segregated settings, and (2) context effects are very different for whites, blacks, and Asians who are strong race identifiers, and less so for Latinos. Figures 1 and 2 indicated that social identity, power threat, and social density theories could not be used to predict attitudes across racial groups consistently. Figure 4 further indicates the piecemeal interpretations one could make: the power threat theory can likely explain the policy preferences of highly racially identified whites and Asians, and the attitudes of blacks with a weaker sense of racial identity; the social density (and social contact) theory works for highly racially identified blacks, and the contact theory may also be applicable for Asians with a weaker sense of racial identity. This hodgepodge of applications of these theories is less than ideal, and we return to this issue in the conclusion.

In a hypothetically integrated world, with precincts that are around 7% black (a figure representing California's African-American population, according to the 1990 census), there would be a relatively small gap in vote choice between whites and blacks who have a strong sense of racial identity. In a hypothetically segregated world, where whites live with whites and blacks live with blacks, for example, this gap between strong racial identifiers is much larger. Only by taking into account the context of one's community can we see how racial identification affects the vote and vice versa. Communities affect individuals' self-identification, and together they influenced the vote to end affirmative action programs in California.

What would we expect to happen with the continuation of white flight and de facto segregation? If it is true that context is a major source of group identity and solidarity, then one would expect to find fewer and fewer whites who have opinions like those of blacks as fewer whites live in communities with blacks.

Conclusion

Identity and context are clearly important concepts in research on racial politics in the U.S. And, for concepts so important in political theory and practical politics, there is a surprising lack of empirical research on the effects of both together, especially given the common acceptance that behavior is a function of the individual *and* her environment. This paper provides a beginning for a discussion of how one's geographic community can interact with one's racial identification to affect political judgments. In addition, it provides a look at how identity, context, and their interaction may differ in their effects on whites, blacks, Asians, and Latinos.

We find that racial contexts, conditioned on racial identification, affected people's vote intention on Prop 209. In other words, whites and Asians who had a strong racial identification and lived in communities with more blacks were *more* likely to oppose affirmative action programs than whites and Asians living with fewer blacks. African Americans who felt a strong sense of racial identity and who also lived in communities with more blacks were more likely to support affirmative action programs than their counterparts who lived among fewer blacks. The effects of identity and context were different for Latinos: context did not appear to affect Latinos' attitudes about Proposition 209, but living around more African Americans was related to increased racial/ethnic identification among Latinos. However, unlike for white respondents, this increased racial identification among Latinos led to greater opposition to Prop 209, not greater support. Where and with whom people of different races lived influenced their voting

preferences on the initiative, although not in a simple, direct fashion.[25]

Recent research has argued that socioeconomic context can be more important in predicting racial attitudes than racial context (see, for example, Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). We reran all of the models presented in Figures 1 through 4, using the percentage of the population with a college degree instead of the racial context measure. %BA had no statistically significant effects for any of the models, for respondents of any race. In other words, the analyses we have presented here are a result of the interaction of *racial* context and *racial* identity, where racial context is not merely a proxy for the socioeconomic characteristics of the precincts.

The analyses we present in this paper lead us to believe that current theories about context, identities, and their interactions need to be revised in order to understand why a theory applies to one racial group, but not another. The purpose of this paper was to test the domain of these theories and how well they travel, not to propose a new theory. Nevertheless, it is worth discussing what an ideal theory would tell us. When ought we expect racial identity and context to predict political attitudes and behavior and why; what are the effects, causes, and linking mechanisms?

A theory should tell us what outcomes can and cannot be explained. Racial context and identity obviously do not predict everything, but should they predict anything that could fall under the heading of "racial attitudes and actions"? Theories of power threat, racial solidarity, and social identity do not clearly delineate a limited number of circumstances to which they can be applied, but previous research has shown that the effects of racial context are not universal across all prejudicial beliefs, racial policy preferences, and political behaviors. For example, Glaser (1994) finds that racial context affects policy preferences, but not prejudice, and Campbell

[25] All of the analyses were rerun using % minority instead of %black. Although the size of the coefficients and levels of statistical significance varied, the overall story presented in the original analyses remained the same.

et al. (N.d.) find racial context effects for voting on a California initiative concerning immigration, but not one about affirmative action. Our current theories do not help explain when we should expect solidarity or threat to have an impact on politics and when they will have no effects.

The causes of these political effects are also not clear. While the study of racial identity as a concept has benefited from the prolonged attention of social psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists, racial context is more of a moving target. Which "context" ought to matter? If we envision the context in which an individual lives as a container, one question that needs to be addressed is whether the actual container matters, or only that which is perceived. For example, is the relevant cause the *actual* percentage of blacks living in a person's county or the percentage she *thinks* lives around her? Current theories imply context matters only to the extent that she sees it.

An ideal theory should also tell us how big the container is --- V.O. Key looked at county-level context, for example, while Quillian examined country-sized contexts --- and whether it matters if a racial group is in the numerical majority nationally, at the state level, or locally. The power threat theory has been applied to whites when they are in the majority (nationally) and in the minority (in the Black Belt), but the theories are silent about how feelings of solidarity or threat would affect, for example, Latinos in New Mexico (where they constitute a plurality, but are still a minority at the national level) or Asian Americans in Monterey Park, CA (where they constitute a majority, but are minorities at both the state and national levels). Furthermore, it is unclear whether being in the plurality versus the majority matters, and also how group status defined numerically (e.g. majority vs. minority) may affect politics differently than group status defined hierarchically (e.g. dominant vs. subordinate).

An ideal theory should also explain how the contents of the container affect the political outcomes in question. For example, current theories do not tell us whether racial context refers to the numbers of a single "important" outgroup living around an individual, perhaps defined

historically (e.g., blacks around a white woman); the numbers of *all* her outgroups (e.g., blacks, Latinos, and Asians nearby); the numbers of the majority group (e.g., Asians if she lives in Monterey Park); or the numbers of her own ingroup (i.e. whites).

Finally, the theory needs to address how racial identification and context interact, and why identity is a more salient factor in political judgments for some groups than others. From our results in Figure 2, it appears that racial context is related to racial identification. However, the findings are quite disparate: the presence of outgroups affect whites' racial identity, the presence of both ingroup and outgroup members affects blacks, and the presence of only one outgroup (i.e., blacks) affects Latinos. An ideal theory would explain the mechanism by which individuals interpret their contexts to feel solidarity or threat. While the power threat theory lays out a compelling story for why whites will feel threatened by blacks, it says nothing about other scenarios. We do not want theories that are tailored to explain single cells in a table, such that more diverse contexts lead to greater support for affirmative action only among racially identified Latinos on the third Wednesday of every month that has 31 days.

Overall, if we are given information about respondents' races, the importance they attribute to their racial identity, and the size of groups living in their surrounding area, an ideal theory would allow us to predict consistently (1) whether identity and/or context would have political effects, and (2) if so, how each would affect the opinions and actions of Americans of *all* races. While our example above about Wednesdays is silly, theories about racial context and identity have very serious policy implications. After all, judicial debates about what constitutes a "community of interest" will soon grapple with questions of multiracial communities, multiracial identities, and their conflicting or shared interests.

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Appendix

Analyses for Figure 1: Effect of Racial ID on Prop 209 Vote

Whites

	B	SE	p		
Racial Identity	-0.224	0.335	0.503		
Age	0.986	0.501	0.049	Log likelihood	-233.29
Education	-0.457	0.289	0.114	N	407
Ideology	1.137	0.334	0.001		
PID	1.498	0.272	0.000		
Sex	-0.478	0.232	0.039		
constant	-0.705	0.402	0.079		

Blacks

	B	SE	p		
Racial Identity	-0.466	0.581	0.422		
Age	1.775	0.916	0.053	Log likelihood	-74.40
Education	-1.093	0.591	0.064	N	148
Ideology	0.755	0.575	0.189		
PID	0.929	0.881	0.291		
Sex	0.074	0.416	0.859		
constant	-1.633	0.811	0.044		

Latinos

	B	SE	p		
Racial Identity	-0.554	0.360	0.124		
Age	0.497	0.692	0.472	Log likelihood	-152.75
Education	-0.540	0.398	0.175	N	256
Ideology	0.028	0.369	0.941		
PID	0.757	0.361	0.036		
Sex	-0.061	0.290	0.832		
constant	-0.601	0.492	0.222		

Asians

	B	SE	p		
Racial Identity	-0.952	0.451	0.035		
Age	1.095	0.794	0.168	Log likelihood	-117.59
Education	-0.090	0.411	0.826	N	194
Ideology	0.236	0.453	0.602		
PID	0.252	0.410	0.539		
Sex	0.050	0.318	0.875		
constant	-0.731	0.617	0.236		

Appendix (continued)

Analyses for Figure 2: Effect of %Black on Prop 209 Vote

Whites

	B	SE	p		
%Black	0.119	0.604	0.844		
Age	1.072	0.491	0.029	Log likelihood	-244.66
Education	-0.429	0.283	0.129	N	425
Ideology	1.122	0.329	0.001		
PID	1.492	0.269	0.000		
Sex	-0.512	0.227	0.024		
constant	-0.797	0.386	0.039		

Blacks

	B	SE	p		
%Black	-0.432	0.731	0.554		
Age	1.712	0.916	0.062	Log likelihood	-76.33
Education	-1.124	0.592	0.057	N	153
Ideology	0.727	0.579	0.209		
PID	0.681	0.873	0.436		
Sex	0.061	0.415	0.882		
constant	-1.716	0.753	0.023		

Latinos

	B	SE	p		
%Black	-0.661	0.950	0.487		
Age	0.572	0.662	0.388	Log likelihood	-162.57
Education	-0.489	0.385	0.204	N	269
Ideology	0.002	0.352	0.996		
PID	0.857	0.345	0.013		
Sex	-0.053	0.279	0.850		
constant	-0.919	0.396	0.020		

Asians

	B	SE	p		
%Black	-2.061	1.681	0.220		
Age	1.079	0.778	0.166	Log likelihood	-120.24
Education	-0.075	0.402	0.853	N	195
Ideology	0.319	0.442	0.471		
PID	0.190	0.401	0.636		
Sex	0.066	0.316	0.835		
constant	-1.186	0.540	0.028		

Appendix (continued)

Analyses for Figure 3: Effect of %Black on Racial Identity

Whites

	B	SE	p		
%Black	0.154	0.091	0.090		
Age	0.077	0.068	0.256	Adj R2	0.015
Education	-0.033	0.040	0.402	N	481
Ideology	0.041	0.047	0.383		
PID	-0.089	0.039	0.021		
Sex	-0.020	0.032	0.542		
constant	0.363	0.055	0.000		

Blacks

	B	SE	p		
%Black	0.206	0.091	0.025		
Age	-0.049	0.124	0.695	Adj R2	0.009
Education	-0.052	0.074	0.481	N	171
Ideology	-0.021	0.075	0.777		
PID	-0.085	0.112	0.450		
Sex	-0.069	0.055	0.213		
constant	0.719	0.099	0.000		

Latinos

	B	SE	p		
%Black	0.266	0.151	0.078		
Age	-0.107	0.108	0.324	Adj R2	0.011
Education	-0.106	0.061	0.086	N	297
Ideology	-0.080	0.060	0.184		
PID	-0.031	0.062	0.613		
Sex	-0.057	0.046	0.217		
constant	0.765	0.066	0.000		

Asians

	B	SE	p		
%Black	0.103	0.196	0.599		
Age	-0.171	0.120	0.155	Adj R2	0.000
Education	-0.049	0.061	0.427	N	223
Ideology	-0.100	0.066	0.128		
PID	0.041	0.061	0.504		
Sex	-0.006	0.047	0.892		
constant	0.727	0.079	0.000		

Appendix (continued)

Analyses for Figure 4: Effect of %Black and Racial Identity on 209 Vote

Whites	B	SE	p		
%Black	-0.154	0.666	0.817		
Age	0.955	0.505	0.059	Log likelihood	-232.84
Education	-0.446	0.291	0.126	N	407
Ideology	1.167	0.338	0.001		
PID	1.535	0.276	0.000		
Sex	-0.477	0.234	0.041		
Race ID Important	0.053	0.418	0.900		
Race ID Important * %Black	1.473	1.541	0.339		
constant	-0.822	0.402	0.041		

Blacks	B	SE	p		
%Black	2.135	1.238	0.085		
Age	1.936	0.979	0.048	Log likelihood	-69.81
Education	-1.288	0.619	0.037	N	148
Ideology	0.659	0.602	0.274		
PID	0.630	0.905	0.487		
Sex	0.100	0.434	0.817		
Race ID Important	2.544	1.006	0.011		
Race ID Important * %Black	-4.650	1.597	0.004		
constant	-3.065	0.997	0.002		

Latinos	B	SE	p		
%Black	-0.390	1.245	0.754		
Age	0.508	0.700	0.468	Log likelihood	-151.92
Education	-0.603	0.403	0.134	N	256
Ideology	0.050	0.370	0.893		
PID	0.771	0.367	0.036		
Sex	-0.050	0.291	0.862		
Race ID Important	-0.563	0.339	0.096		
Race ID Important * %Black	0.092	1.891	0.961		
constant	-0.687	0.454	0.130		

Asians	B	SE	p		
%Black	-4.829	2.632	0.067		
Age	1.212	0.794	0.127	Log likelihood	-116.40
Education	0.078	0.418	0.853	N	194
Ideology	0.258	0.458	0.573		
PID	0.193	0.412	0.640		
Sex	0.017	0.325	0.959		
Race ID Important	-0.807	0.405	0.046		
Race ID Important * %Black	6.489	3.551	0.068		
constant	-1.013	0.565	0.073		

Table 1

Prop 209 Vote and Racial/ Ethnic Identification by Race

	Whites	Blacks	Latinos	Asians
Vote yes on Prop 209	58%	22%	31%	31%
Racial and Ethnic Identification is…				
Very Important	15	56	42	30
Somewhat Important	20	18	24	35
Not Very Important	27	12	15	19
Not at all Important	39	14	19	16

Figure 1

Main Effects of Racial Identification on
Vote for Proposition 209



Data from the California Civil Rights Initiative Survey, November 1996.
Note: Predicted scores based on a logit model with controls for education, age, party identification, ideology, and gender. N= 407 whites, 148 blacks, 256 Latinos, and 194 Asians.

The rug plot along the x-axis indicates the distribution of responses for the measure of racial identification. The points have been jittered in the rug plot to show the density of observations. The dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2

Main Effects of Racial Context
on Vote for Proposition 209



Data from the California Civil Rights Initiative Survey, November 1996.
Note: Predicted scores based on a logit model of 560 precincts with controls for education, age, party identification, ideology, and gender.
N= 425 whites, 153 blacks, 269 Latinos, and 195 Asians.

The rug plot along the x-axis indicates the distribution of respondents across precincts. The points have been jittered in the rug plot to show the density of observations. The dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3

Effects of Racial Context on Racial Identification



Data from the California Civil Rights Initiative Survey, November 1996.
Note: Predicted scores based on OLS regression of 631 precincts with controls for education, age, party identification, ideology, and gender.
N= 481 whites, 171 blacks, 297 Latinos, and 223 Asians.

The rug plot along the x-axis indicates the distribution of respondents across precincts. The points have been jittered in the rug plot to show the density of observations. The dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4



Data from the California Civil Rights Initiative Survey, November 1996.
Note: Predicted scores based on a logit model with controls for education, age, party identification, ideology, and gender.
N= 407 whites, 148 blacks, 256 Latinos, and 194 Asians.

The rug plot along the x-axis indicates the distribution of respondents across precincts. The points have been jittered in the rug plot to show the density of observations. The dotted lines represent those respondents for whom their racial identity is somewhat, not very, or not at all important. The solid lines represent those respondents for whom their racial identity is very important.