

# Estimating models of plant location choice

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## Zooming in on an example

<u>Plant Location</u>	<u>Parent</u>	<u>Share</u>	<u>New or Acquired</u>	<u>Product Line</u>	<u>Employees</u>	<u>Opened or Acquired</u>
Chattanooga, TN	Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., Ltd.	100%	New	Super-absorbent polymer material	27	1989
Charlotte, NC	Nippon Automatic Fine Machinery Co., Ltd.	100	New	Packaging machinery	4	1988
Bennington, VT	Nippon Seiko K.K. Torrington Co. Kawasaki Steel Corp.	50 50 100	New Acquired	Automotive steering systems Silicon wafers	120 120 16	1985 1990
San Diego, CA	Nippon Seiko K.K. Electrolux Autoliv AB	50 50	New	systems	338	1975
Clarinda, IA	Nippon Seiko K.K.	100	New	Ball bearings	275	1973
Ann Arbor, MI	Nippon Seiko K.K.	100	Acquired	Ball bearings	50	1988
Clarinda, IA	Nippon Seiko K.K. Amatsuji Steel Ball Manufacturing Co., Ltd.	60 40	New	Precision balls for bearing applications	20	1988

<b>Year</b>	<b>Product</b>	<b>Location</b>
1973	Ball bearings	Ann Arbor, MI
1975	Ball bearings	Clarinda, IA
1988	Precision balls	Clarinda, IA
1989	Steering systems	Bennington, VT

## **Motivation for estimating location choice models**

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## Government policies aim to shape location decisions


**Does it work?** We need estimated models of facility location choices to conduct counterfactuals.

1. China's special economic zones
2. "Million dollar plants"
3. 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (industrial policy for green energy)

## China's FDI special economic zones

- Starting in 1980, China designated a series of incentive zones to attract foreign investment
- Reductions in income taxes, tariffs on imported inputs, land user fees.
- Other privileges include ease of establishment, autonomy of operations, preferential access to inputs, streamlined bureaucracy.
- Head and Ries (1996, JUE), estimated that **these zones increased investments by 30%, comprising a static increase of 13%, and a 17% additional gain via agglomeration.**
- Possibly an underestimate.

# Shenzhen (the first SEZ), then and now



Shenzhen  
1980

pop. 30,000



Shenzhen  
2017

pop. 18mn (2024)

# Bidding for Industrial Plants: Does Winning a 'Million Dollar Plant' Increase Welfare?

Michael Greenstone & Enrico Moretti

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WORKING PAPER 9844


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
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Increasingly, local governments compete by offering substantial subsidies to industrial plants to locate within their jurisdictions. This paper uses a novel research design to examine the consequences of successfully bidding for a plant on county-level labor earnings, property values, and public finances. Each issue of the corporate real estate journal *Site Selection* includes an article titled *The Million Dollar Plant* that describes how a large plant decided where to locate. These articles report the county where the plant chose to locate (i.e., the 'winner'), as well as the one or two runner-up counties (i.e., the 'losers'). The losers are counties that have survived a long selection process, but narrowly lost the competition. We use these revealed rankings of profit-maximizing firms to form a counterfactual for what would have happened in the winner counties in the absence of the plant opening. We find that a plant opening is associated with a 1.5% trend break in labor earnings in the new plant's industry in winning counties (relative to losing ones) after the opening of the plant (relative to the period before the opening). Property values may provide a summary measure of the net change in welfare, because the costs and benefits of attracting a plant should be capitalized into the price of land. We find a positive, relative trend break of 1.1% in property values. Further, we fail to find any deterioration in local governments' financial position. Overall, the results undermine the popular view that the provision of local subsidies to attract large industrial plants reduces local residents' welfare.


# Winning counties trend better than losers



Wagebill



Property Values



Total factor productivity (2010, JPE)

# Policies promoting EV production in the US (2022–2024)

- Consumer subsidy for passenger vehicles up to \$7,500 ( $\approx$  15%–20%)
  1. no production contingencies (before IRA, most of EU, Canada)
  2. require vehicle **assembly** in North America (after IRA)
  3. require battery **cells** manufactured in North America (by full IRA)
- Tax credit for US battery production: 20–30% of battery cost
- Tariffs on China-made EVs (25%  $\rightarrow$  100%)
- Dept. of Energy loans (e.g. \$6.6bn for Rivian in Georgia)
- 13 states have zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandates

## Top 10 models excluded by Rule 1 from the IRA buyer credit

Rank	Brand	Model	2022 Sales (US)	Assembly location announcements
1	Hyundai	Ioniq 5	23741	Adds from Korea to <b>Savannah, GA</b>
2	Kia	EV6	21978	Adds EV9 from Korea to <b>West Point, GA</b>
3	BMW	i4	11462	Stays in Germany
4	Polestar	2	8758	Polestar 3 to <b>Ridgeville, SC</b>
5	Porsche	Taycan	8425	Stays in Germany
6	BMW	iX	7394	Stays in Germany
7	Kia	Niro	7262	Stays in Korea
8	Audi	e-tron	7233	Stays in Belgium
9	Hyundai	Kona	4719	Stays in Korea
10	Volvo	C40	4693	Stays in Belgium

# Hyundai Ioniq Savannah, GA plant (December 2022)



# Hyundai Ioniq near Savannah, GA plant (October 2024)




Hyundai EV Plant, Ellijebell, Georgia

October 21, 2024 | 4:39 p.m.

BLACKSKY


# Hyundai Metaplant has multiple production stages



# Actual manufacturing investment by year of announcement

Billion 2023 USD

in clean energy (EVs, batteries, solar, wind)




Source: Rhodium Group/MIT-CEEPR Clean Investment Monitor

Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)

# Cancellations of announced clean manufacturing investments

Billion 2023 USD

Batteries      Critical minerals      Electrolyzers      Fueling equipment  
Solar      Wind      Zero-emission vehicles



Source: Rhodium Group/MIT-CEEPR Clean Investment Monitor

## **A brief history of location choice estimation**

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# An abbreviated—and very selective—review of methods

Models of static, granular plant location choice:

1. Multinomial choice (conditional logit)
2. Binary choice (logit/probit)
3. Combinatorial discrete choice for interdependent decisions.
  - (a) Jia–AFT-AES, solve pb via super/sub-modularity
  - (b) Multi-stage and multi-product problems solved by MILP
  - (c) SMM estimation

# Conditional logit

- When ?
  - (a) Each investment  $i$  is an independent multinomial choice,  $y_{il}$ , between  $L_i$  options.  $y_{il^*} = 1$  and  $y_{il} = 0$  for all  $\ell \neq \ell^*$
  - (b) With single sourcing, conditional on “activated” supplier facilities, input sourcing is also a conditional logit problem.
- How?
  - (a) Estimated via “clogit” in Stata
  - (b) Guimaraẽs, Figueirido, Woodward (2003, REStat), pointed out that likelihood of Poisson is the same as clogit, except for a constant.
  - (c) With chooser fixed effects, we can estimate the multinomial choice model in R using `fixest::fepois` (very fast)
- Issues:
  1. The **smaller problem**: non-independence of choices (IIA) → Nested logit
  2. The **bigger problem**: interdependence (substitutes and complements)


# Binary choice

- When?
  - (a) Each investment  $i$  is an independent binary choice,  $y_{i\ell}$  is evaluated for each of the  $L$  options, multiple 1s are allowed.
  - (b) This approach makes sense for investments serving autarkic markets, non-traded services, such as retailers . . .
  - (c) . . . assuming no chain effects
- How?
  - (a) Head and Mayer 2019 used binary choice for decision of each car brand to open dealership network in a country (No Renaults in Canada)
- Issues:
  1. The smaller problem: if many FEs, incidental parameter bias (BIFE)
  2. The bigger problem: interdependence (substitutes and complements)

## Combinatorial discrete choice: Supermodularity

- Multinomial / binomial choice: evaluate profits  $L$  times for each  $i$ .
- Combinatorial problem: evaluate  $2^L$  possible configurations (a lot).
- Jia (2008) solves the interdependence problem by adapting Tarski's (1955) fixed point theorem and Topkis's (1978) monotonicity theorem
- Her method allows her to solve the problem of Wal-mart choosing store locations in the presence of “chain effects”: Nearby stores split the costs of operation, delivery, and advertising to achieve scale economies.
- The complementarity between nearby stores leads to super-modular profits.
- Supermodularity implies far fewer than  $2^L$  evaluations.

# Squeezing: How supermodularity can reduce evaluations



1. Configurations  $i = 1 \dots 8$  of  $[y_i^W, y_i^C, y_i^E]$
2. Evaluate 7 and 8: If  $\pi_8 < \pi_7$  then position  $y_i^E = 0$  for all  $i$ .
3. No need to evaluate  $i = 2, 3, 4$  (blue dashed rectangle)
4. Evaluate 1 and 5: If  $\pi_1 < \pi_5$  then position  $y_i^W = 1$  for all  $i$ .
5.  $i = 6$  is out; select larger of  $\pi_7$  and  $\pi_5$  (**evals = 4  $\ll$  8 = BF**)

## Combinatorial discrete choice: Submodularity

- The one-stage facility location problem is one in which a plant in one location **substitutes** for plants in nearby locations, because it offers an alternative way to serve the same markets.
- When both fixed costs and transport costs are important, we have the **concentration vs proximity** tradeoff.
- Arkolakis, Eckert, and Shi develop an algorithm that serves submodular profit functions as well as supermodular ones.
- As with Jia's algo, the AES squeezing algo dramatically cuts the number of configurations to evaluate.

## UFLP is a limit case of AES, allows comparison to MILP

- AES cost function for variety  $\omega$  (general case)


$$c_n(\mathcal{L}, \omega) = \left[ \sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{L}} c_{\ell n}(\omega)^{-\theta} \right]^{-1/\theta}, \quad \text{where } c_{\ell n} = w_\ell \tau_{\ell n}(\omega) / z_\ell(\omega).$$

- Limit case as  $\theta \rightarrow \infty$  :  $c_n(\mathcal{L}, \omega) = \min_{\mathcal{L}} c_{\ell n}(\omega)$ .
- Perfect substitution implies single-sourcing (least cost plant)
- Plug minimized cost into the profit function (taking  $P_n$  as given).

$$\pi(c_{\ell n}) \propto c_{\ell}^{1-\sigma}$$

- Firm chooses  $\mathcal{L}$  to maximize the sum of all destination-specific profit
- Randomness: cost shocks ( $w_\ell$ ) and locations on grid ( $\tau_{\ell n}$ )
- Simulate  $L$  potential locations,  $N$  consumer markets

# Facility location problem: setup



## Single stage FLP can also be formulated as a MILP

$$\max \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{\ell \in L} \pi(c_{\ell n}) x_{\ell n} - \sum_{\ell \in L} \phi_\ell y_\ell \quad \text{subject to}$$

$$\sum_{\ell \in L} x_{\ell n} = 1, \quad n \in N$$


$$x_{\ell n} \leq y_\ell, \quad n \in N, \ell \in L$$

$$x_{\ell n} \geq 0, \quad n \in N, \ell \in L$$


$$y_\ell \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \ell \in L$$

- Mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem
- Consumers, production sites located randomly on the unit square
- Costs depend on distance from  $\ell$  to  $n$  and a random  $\ell n$  shock

## Example of solved facility location problem



# Comparing AES, MILP, and brute force




## Multi-stage production calls for MILP

- One mechanism for submodularity: plants at same stage  $k$  are substitutes
- Two mechanisms for supermodularity:
  1. plants at different stages  $k \leq K$  complement each other
  2. distribution  $(K + 1)$  facilities complement production plants

⇒ Parametric restrictions to ensure global sub- or super- may not exist for our model and we prefer not to rely on them.
- Multi-stage profit maximization problems are easy to formulate as MILP.

# Optimization over Paths with Constraints



Firm chooses

- models  $m$  to sell in  $n$  s.t. market entry cost  $\phi_{nm} \rightarrow z_{nm} = \{0, 1\}$ ,
- plants to open at each  $k$  s.t. plant fixed cost  $\phi_{\ell k} \rightarrow y_{\ell k} = \{0, 1\}$ ,
- the **optimal path**  $\ell_{nm} \forall n, m$  through open facilities

The cyan, magenta, orange lines: paths chosen by 3 car models

Gray squares are **activated** facilities. Colour squares are entered markets.

# From Paths to Profits

- Key requirement for integer programming to work: variable profit can be written as a function of paths and a market aggregator
- Delivered MC  $c(\ell_{nm})$  depends on the path chosen  $\ell_{nm}$  and variable cost parameters (to be estimated)
- Quantity demanded,  $q$ , is determined by firm's  $c(\ell_{mn})$ , its appeal  $\xi_{mn}$ , market size, and an index of costs and appeal of competitors
- Variable profits for tuple  $(m, n)$  if path  $\ell_{mn}$  is chosen:  $\pi(c(\ell_{mn}), A_n)$
- $A_n$  is a function of path costs of all models in market  $n$ , including gas vehicles.

## MMM UFLP: objective, variables ( $x, y, z$ ), & constraints

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}} \quad & \sum_{m \in M_f} \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{\ell_1 \in L_1} \sum_{\ell_2 \in L_2} \pi(c(\ell_{mn}), A_n) x_{mn\ell_1\ell_2} \\ & - \sum_{g_1 \in G_1} \sum_{\ell_1 \in L_1} \phi_{fg_1\ell_1} y_{fg_1\ell_1} - \sum_{g_2 \in G_2} \sum_{\ell_2 \in L_2} \phi_{fg_2\ell_2} y_{fg_2\ell_2} - \sum_{m \in M_f} \sum_n \phi_{mn} z_{mn} \end{aligned}$$

subject to

$$\sum_{\ell_1 \in L_1} \sum_{\ell_2 \in L_2} x_{mn\ell_1\ell_2} \leq z_{mn}, \quad n \in N, m \in M_f \quad (1)$$

$$\sum_{\ell_1 \in L_1} x_{mn\ell_1\ell_2} \leq y_{fg_2(m)\ell_2}, \quad n \in N, m \in M_f, \ell_2 \in L_2 \quad (2)$$

$$\sum_{\ell_2 \in L_2} x_{mn\ell_1\ell_2} \leq y_{fg_1(m)\ell_1}, \quad n \in N, m \in M_f, \ell_1 \in L_1 \quad (3)$$

$$x_{mn\ell_1\ell_2} \geq 0, \quad y_{fg_1\ell_1} \in \{0, 1\}, \quad y_{fg_2\ell_2} \in \{0, 1\}, \quad z_{mn} \in \{0, 1\}. \quad (4)$$

## What does activate ( $y_{fg_k \ell_k} = 1$ ) mean in the BEV industry?


- A plant is active if it has paid the indivisible fixed cost required to produce positive amounts **for a client  $f$** (car maker)
- Paid for each group  $g_k$  of potential outputs
  - ▶ For cells,  $g_1(m)$  maps models to a combination of cell **material** categories and **shapes**, e.g. Tesla Model S uses “Nickel-Cobalt-Manganese/Cylinder”
  - ▶ For vehicles,  $g_2(m)$  gives the **platform**, e.g. “GEN III” for Tesla Model 3 and Model Y, “MEB” for VWs such as ID.4, ID.3, Audi Q4, and Skoda Enyaq.

# Fixed costs pertain to location-firm-groups

Battery cells grouped by  
material category ↓ & shape →




Vehicle assembly grouped by platform ↓




$g_1(m)$  assigns models to cell groups,  $g_2(m)$  assigns models to assembly groups

# Computation time $\approx$ linear in number of paths ( $L_1 \times L_2 \times N \times M$ )



# High success rate of linear relaxation



## What range of problems does our method handle?

1. No restrictions on complementarity or substitution between facilities (super vs sub modularity)
2. Firms with multiple products, grouped by characteristics
3. Endogenous market entry to multiple markets
4. Market interdependence between firms (via price index)
5. Because our focus is the **GVC supply side**, we simplify other aspects via CES demand, constant markups, efficient bargaining across firms.
6. The method permits many generalizations (e.g. more stages, multiple inputs at a given stage)

## Necessary industry characteristics for this framework

1. Inputs from different plants are perfect substitutes (no love of variety) if all dimensions of the product are specified  $\implies$  disaggregated sourcing data needed (ours comes from IHS Markit)
2. Constant marginal costs; plants are “uncapacitated”: no long run capacity constraints
3. Together 1+2  $\implies$  single sourcing from the least-delivered-cost plant

## **Estimation of the model applied to BEV value chain**

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## Six EV features that fit with the MUFLP framework

1. Cells account for over **1/4 of final cost** (3/4 of battery cost, which are 1/3 of vehicle)
2. Cells production is usually close (median **distance of about 500km**) to vehicle assembly
3. Cell factory **investment cost** are huge: avg. \$2.5bn (based on 83 news articles), assembly plants average \$0.8bn (198 articles).
4. Cell plants serve few clients (often VI or JV); large **fixed costs to add clients**
5. **Multi-sourcing declines with product detail** to a few percent for both cells and assembly.

## Challenges in solving the model

- Our estimation requires solving the MUFLP millions of times
    - ▶ Many sets of draws of path and fixed cost shocks (100)
    - ▶ Global optimization requires many starting parameter sets (1000),
    - ▶ Many iterations to fit the parameters (4700)
- ⇒ need some **dimension reduction**: lower number of locations and parameters
- We cannot estimate 1000s of fixed costs and path costs, so we parameterize them in terms of observables.

# Mapping the cell and vehicle plants in 2022

6 Cell Plants in 2022, Total 34.1GWh




6 Cell Plants in 2022, Total 64.8GWh



74 Cell Plants in 2022, Total 374.2GWh




17 Assembly Plants in 2022, Total 812k BEVs




52 Assembly Plants in 2022, Total 1392k BEVs



170 Assembly Plants in 2022, Total 5893k BEVs



# The top 15 EV makers and their location alternatives



# Data

**Data** (from S&P) contains universe of cell, assembly locations and flows for all EV models since 2015. We calibrate the model to 2022.

We focus on

- **Top 15 EV makers** and their **137 BEV models**, together 77% of world sales and 99% outside China
- Locations are across **24 countries**, together 97% world sales, 99.9% world battery production and 99% world EV production
- Entry is defined at geographic aggregates and product group level, **12 potential locations** for a median of **2 cell groups** per firm, and **15 potential locations** for a median of **4 assembly platforms** per firm  
→  $2^{24+60}$  total configurations

# Estimation roadmap

**Step 1:** Estimate **bilateral trade costs** for cells and vehicles

Conditional on active facilities ( $y, z$ ) for each firm, estimate discrete choice sourcing ( $x$ ) via sequential (cells, assembly) nested logit for Cobb-Douglas production

**Step 2:** Use CES demand structure to map **variable profits in levels** to function of path observables and remaining parameters

**Step 3:** Estimate **marginal cost of production, fixed costs, and endogenous market demand shifters** by matching moments of the data to the simulated model (SMM) subject to market equilibrium as constraints (MPEC)

## Step 1: Variable costs of paths

- Variable costs

Cells costs:  $c_{m\ell_1\ell_2}^1 = w_{\ell_1}^1 \tau_{\ell_1\ell_2}^1 \varepsilon_{m\ell_1\ell_2}^1,$

Vehicle path costs:  $c(\ell_{mn}) = (w_{\ell_2}^2)^{\alpha_{22}} (c_{m\ell_1\ell_2}^1)^{\alpha_{12}} \tau_{\ell_2n}^2 \varepsilon_{m\ell_2n}^2.$

- Conditional on active facilities  $(y, z)$ , each firm sources cells and vehicles to minimize:

$$\ln c(\ell_{mn}) = \alpha_{22} \ln w_{\ell_2}^2 + \ln \tau_{\ell_2n}^2 + \alpha_{12} (\ln w_{\ell_1}^1 + \ln \tau_{\ell_1\ell_2}^1) + u(\ell_{mn})$$

# Sequential Nested Choice estimation of variable costs

- Stage  $k = 1$ : Battery cell sourcing
  - ▶ **Chooser:** Assembly plant in  $\ell_2$  for model  $m$
  - ▶ **Choice:** Battery cell plant in  $\ell_1$
  - ▶ **Choice set:** Plants  $L_1(m)$  making the model's cell type for that maker
  - ▶ **Determinants:** trade costs ( $\beta_\tau^1$ ), fixed effects of supplier countries
- Stage  $k = 2$ : Vehicle sourcing
  - ▶ **Chooser:** dealership network in country  $n$  sourcing model  $m$
  - ▶ **Choice:** EV assembly plant in country  $\ell_2$
  - ▶ **Choice set:** Plants that assembles the model's platform
  - ▶ **Determinants:** trade costs ( $\beta_\tau^2$ ), fixed effects of supplier countries, inclusive cost from cell stage  $\rightarrow -\beta_\Phi^2$

# Nested Logit Choice probabilities

Stage 1 (cells) estimating equation is

$$\mathbb{P}_{\ell_1|\ell_2}^1 = \exp \left[ \text{FE}_{\ell_1}^1 + \text{FE}_{\ell_2}^1(m) + \beta_D^1 \ln D_{\ell_1\ell_2} + \beta_t^1 \ln (1 + t_{\ell_1\ell_2}^1) \right],$$

Stage 2 (vehicle assembly) estimating equation is

$$\mathbb{P}_{\ell_2|n}^2 = \exp \left[ \text{FE}_{\ell_2}^2 + \text{FE}_n^2 + \beta_D^2 \ln D_{\ell_2n} + \beta_t^2 \ln (1 + t_{\ell_2n}^2) + \beta_\Phi^2 \text{FE}_{\ell_2}^1(m) \right],$$

Inclusive cost:  $\text{FE}_{\ell_2}^1(m) = -\ln \sum_{\ell \in L_1(m)} \exp[\text{FE}_\ell^1 + \beta_D^1 \ln D_{\ell_1\ell_2} + \beta_t^1 \ln (1 + t_{\ell_1\ell_2}^1)]$

# Nested Logit Sourcing Results

	Cells	Vehicles
Border	-0.953 <sup>a</sup> (0.319)	-1.04 <sup>a</sup> (0.254)
log distance	-0.382 <sup>a</sup> (0.021)	-0.112 <sup>c</sup> (0.062)
RTA	0.458 (0.320)	0.869 <sup>a</sup> (0.214)
Inc. cost of cells		-0.234 <sup>a</sup> (0.084)
log GDP per capita	0.213 <sup>c</sup> (0.118)	0.206 <sup>b</sup> (0.087)
log(1+tariff)	-8.49 <sup>a</sup> (2.34)	-8.56 <sup>a</sup> (1.74)
Observations	7,945	15,793
Squared Correlation	0.322	0.265

- Home plants (border =0) are  $\approx 3$  times more likely to be chosen
- Trade agreements also important
- Tariff elasticities are large ( $\theta_1 \approx \theta_2 = 8.5$  )
- Coef on inclusive cost  $\rightarrow$  cell cost share of about 23%
- GDP/cap effects based on within-country variation since regression includes country fixed effects

# Path cost changes $\implies$ level of variable profits

Log path costs (Logit, SMM):

$$\ln c(\ell_{mn}) = \frac{1}{\beta_t^2} \left\{ \text{FE}_{\ell_2}^2 + \beta_D^2 \ln D_{\ell_2 n} + \beta_t^2 \ln (1 + t_{\ell_2 n}^2) \right. \\ \left. - \underbrace{\beta_\Phi^2}_{\text{IC coef.}} [\text{FE}_{\ell_1}^1 + \beta_D^1 \ln D_{\ell_1 \ell_2} + \beta_t^1 \ln (1 + t_{\ell_1 \ell_2}^1)] \right\} + \underbrace{u(\ell_{mn})}_{-\text{Gumbel}(0, -1/\beta_t^2)} .$$

Expected variable profits levels using observed market shares  $s_{mn}^\circ$  (for observed paths  $\ell_{mn}^\circ$ ) and cost change of potential path costs relative to the observed path,  $\hat{c}_{mn\ell} = c(\ell_{mn})/c(\ell_{mn}^\circ)$ :

$$E[\pi_{mn\ell}] = \frac{1}{\eta} s_{mn}^\circ R_n (\hat{c}_{mn\ell})^{1-\eta} A_n$$

where  $A_n = E[(\hat{P}_n)^{\eta-1}]$  captures endogenous change in market demand

# Endogenous market demand

- CES demand for all cars (EV and ICE) with demand elasticity  $\eta = 4$
- Firms only know **their own** cost differentials  $\hat{c}_{mn\ell^*}$  but not other firms
- Assume
  - ▶ Constant **total** car expenditures  $R_n$
  - ▶ Monopolistic competition and constant markup
  - ▶ Paths of EVs do not affect ICE prices:  $\hat{P}_n^{ICE} = 1$
- Change in the price index satisfies:

$$\hat{P}_n^{1-\eta} = s_n^{\circ,ICE} + \sum_m s_{mn}^{\circ} \hat{c}_{mn\ell^*}^{1-\eta}$$

- Minimize SMM objective subject to solving for the expected market demand  $\hat{A}_n$  using sample mean across  $J$  simulations *as constraints*:

$$\hat{A}_n = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J (\hat{P}_{n,j})^{\eta-1} = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \left( s_n^{\circ,ICE} + \sum_m s_{mn}^{\circ} \hat{c}_{mn\ell^*,j}^{1-\eta} \right)^{-1}$$

## Completing the parameter set

- Last parameters needed are the fixed costs  $\phi_{fg_k \ell_k}$ , of activation ( $y_{fg_k \ell_k}$ ).
- Distribution of fixed costs draws by location-stage:

$$\phi_{fg_k \ell_k} \sim \text{LogNormal} \left( \ln [\mu_{fg_k \ell_k} \times R_W^{\text{EV}}], \sigma_k \right),$$

$$\text{with } \mu_{fg_k \ell_k} = \exp \left[ \ln \rho_{\mathcal{N}(\ell_k)}^k + \rho^{\text{HQ}, k} \ln D_{h(f)\ell_k} + \rho^{\xi, k} \ln \tilde{\xi}_{fg_k} \right],$$

- Means expressed as a fraction of worldwide EV revenues,  $R_w^{\text{EV}}$ .
- The expectation of the fixed cost draws,  $\rho_{\ell_k}^k$ , depends on
  - ▶ distance to headquarter (HQ) w/ elasticity  $\rho^{\text{HQ}, k}$ ,
  - ▶ platform inferred quality w/ elasticity  $\rho^{\xi, k}$ .
  - ▶ continent-stage means,  $\rho_{\mathcal{N}}^k$ , for  $\mathcal{N} \in \{\text{As, Eu, Am}\}$
- To avoid selection bias in the sourcing equations, the SMM also estimates continental variable cost differences:  $\text{FE}_{\mathcal{N}}^k$  for  $\mathcal{N} \in \{\text{As, Eu}\}$

## Simulated method of moments (SMM)

Target 47 moments formed by stage  $k = 1, 2$  & continent  $\mathcal{N} \in \text{Am}, \text{As}, \text{Eu}$

1. Number of production lines ( $\sum_{\ell_k \in \mathcal{N}} y_{fg_k \ell_k}$ ) [6]
2. Share of continent  $\mathcal{N}$  spending on EVs from continent  $\mathcal{N}'$  [18]
3. Number of models offered in continent  $\mathcal{N}$  [3]
4. Shares of production lines (firm HQ continent by production continent) [18]
5. Standard deviation of realized fixed cost from news articles [2]

Let  $v(\cdot)$  be the difference between simulated moments and data. SMM solves


$$\min_{\mathbf{FE}, \rho, \sigma} v(\mathbf{FE}, \rho, \sigma)' W v(\mathbf{FE}, \rho, \sigma),$$

where  $W$  is a weighting matrix. The simulated moments average over  $J = 100$  sets of draws of path cost and fixed cost shocks.


# Simulated Method of Moments Estimates

Par.	$\mathcal{N}$	Description	Est.	SE	
FE <sup>1</sup>	As	Var. cost adv. (C)	4.91	(1.16)	• Asia and EU have lower cell variable costs than US
FE <sup>1</sup>	Eu	(by region, Am = 0)	5.94	(0.94)	
FE <sup>2</sup>	As	Var. cost adv. (V)	-0.21	(0.4)	• but their assembly costs are higher.
FE <sup>2</sup>	Eu	(by region, Am = 0)	-0.25	(0.48)	
$\rho^1$	Am	Fixed cost	0.30	(0.21)	• US and EU fixed costs (FC) of assembly are 5–6 times those in Asia (0.16/0.03, 0.18/0.03)
$\rho^1$	As	of cell plant	0.12	(0.05)	
$\rho^1$	Eu	(by region)	0.54	(0.2)	• Proximity to V HQ lowers FC.
$\rho^2$	Am	Fixed cost	0.16	(0.12)	
$\rho^2$	As	of assembly	0.03	(0.05)	• Plants making higher quality have higher FC.
$\rho^2$	Eu	(by region)	0.18	(0.09)	
$\rho^{HQ, dist, 1}$		FC HQ dist. elas. (C)	0.47	(0.08)	• Fixed costs of open facilities ≈ 7% of world revenue.
$\rho^{HQ, dist, 2}$		FC HQ dist. elas. (V)	0.78	(0.07)	
$\rho^{\xi_{fg1}}$		FC quality elas. (C)	3.40	(0.39)	• Fixed costs of open facilities ≈ 7% of world revenue.
$\rho^{\xi_{fg2}}$		FC quality elas. (V)	2.76	(0.44)	
$\sigma_1$		FC dispersion (C)	2.12	(0.31)	• Fixed costs of open facilities ≈ 7% of world revenue.
$\sigma_2$		FC dispersion (V)	1.99	(0.27)	


# Calibrated Fit to Data: Production Lines by Continent



# Calibrated Fit to Data: Inter-Continental Market share (revs)



# Calibrated Fit to Data: Production lines by headquarters



## Reflections of an SMM newbie

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- Irony: the “hard” problem of combinatorial discrete choice was the easy part; SMM was brutal.
- The computer resources for SMM are massive due to high number of sims ( $J$ ) and starts (TikTak)
- It only gets worse when you try to bootstrap ( $B \times J = 400$  cores)
- Selection and weighting of moments allows uncomfortably high “researcher degrees of freedom”
- Nostalgia for simple methods of my youth

## Counterfactual: BEV Policies


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## Policies we evaluate

1. **Subsidy to EV buyers** 20% subsidy to all consumers from a given continent for all vehicles.
2. **Subsidy contingent on V** Only cars assembled in the same continent as the buyer are eligible for the 20% subsidy.
3. **Subsidy contingent on VC** Both cell production and vehicle assembly must be in the same continent as the buyer to be eligible for 20% subsidy.
4. Production subsidies of 20% for continental cells.
5. Tariffs of 20% on imported cells and vehicles.


# Predicted Impact of North American BEV Subsidies

Production Lines ( $\sum_f y_{g\ell}$ )



Change in number of production lines wrt baseline


BEV Expenditures ( $\sum_m p_{mn}q_{mn}$ )



% change total expenditure on EVs wrt baseline


# Predicted Impact of European BEV Subsidies

Production Lines ( $\sum_f y_{g\ell}$ )



Change in number of production lines wrt baseline

BEV Expenditures ( $\sum_m p_{mn}q_{mn}$ )



% change total expenditure on EVs wrt baseline

## What drives increased EV spending?

- The calibrated demand elasticity converts a **uniform** subsidy  $s$  into an expenditure increase of  $(1 - s)^{1-\eta} - 1 = (1 - 0.2)^{1-4} - 1 = 95\%$ .
- But since EVs compete with each other their actual increases are smaller  
(Price index adjusts)
- New facilities permit new paths and closures cut off paths: **delivered marginal costs  $c_{mn}$**  change.
- Many models **not eligible** under policies 2 (cont. on V) and 3 (cont. on VC).
- We decompose the implied contributions of subsidy and path cost changes.

## Contributions of subsidies and cost reductions to EV sales

Policy	Eligible share		Cost index change		Shifters		EV Exp. change $\bar{R}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\text{EV}}$
	path	revenue	subsidy $\tilde{t}_{\mathcal{N}}$	costs $\tilde{c}_{\mathcal{N}}$	variety $\bar{s}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\text{EV}}$	demand $\hat{A}_{\mathcal{N}}$	
1: Unconditional	100.0	100.0	-20.0	-4.5	2.5	-16.5	86.4
2: Continental V	43.4	90.5	-17.4	-3.4	1.9	-13.6	71.1
3: Continental V+C	21.5	68.3	-14.7	2.2	0.8	-6.2	32.3
4: Subsidy C	18.3	46.0	-2.7	0.5	0.9	-1.0	5.1
3+4	28.1	77.9	-19.2	3.2	1.2	-8.8	46.2
5V: Tariff V	63.1	12.5	3.1	1.1	-0.9	1.9	-9.8
5: Tariff V+C	85.5	53.9	4.8	1.7	-1.2	3.1	-16.1

The unconditional buyer subsidy yields the largest reduction in path costs and biggest increase in EV takeup

## What we've learned so far

- Increasing returns (fixed costs) and multiple production stages generate complex, jumpy policy responses
- MILP can be effective for solving optimization problems that combine substitution and complement patterns across locations
- With IRS, protectionist policies potentially align with emissions goals.
- Precise estimation of the core parameters presents challenges. But we have moderate confidence that
  - ▶ A **clean consumer credit** would have done more to promote EV adoption
  - ▶ Non-environmental objectives (e.g. national security benefit of domestic battery capacity) needed to justify upstream restrictions.