

# Mortgage market design and wealth inequality: Evidence from interest-only mortgages in Denmark

*Young Scholars Nordic Finance Workshop*


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# Introduction and research question

## *Motivation*

In many countries, households who borrow are forced to make debt repayments

- In the United States and Denmark, debt repayments are similar in magnitude to pension savings

**Research question:** How do mandatory amortization payments affect wealth inequality?

1. Forced amortization may raise savings rates and **reduce wealth inequality**
2. Forced amortization payments constrain portfolio choice and may **increase wealth inequality**
3. (Forced amortization are undone by refinancing or higher borrowing)

**This paper:** Study savings behavior around switching to an interest-only mortgage across the wealth distribution + heterogeneous agent model

# Roadmap

Background

Motivation

Data and empirical strategy

Results

- Savings behavior

- Effect on net wealth

Model

# Introduction of IO mortgages

Interest-only mortgages introduced on October 1, 2003

- Allow for a 10-year period with no amortization
- Mortgage loan still has to be repaid in 30 years
- Since 2013, higher fees for IO mortgages

Other dimension of mortgage borrowing unchanged


- Regulatory loan to value ratios unchanged at 80% + 15% bank debt
- Variable rate mortgages introduced in 1997

# Interest-only mortgages by wealth percentile

Year-by-year

## Background

Interest-only mortgage share



# Roadmap

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# Stylized framework (Bernstein & Koudijs, 2020)

## Motivation

To fix ideas, consider a stylized decomposition of net savings including capital gains


$$\underbrace{S}_{\text{Net savings}} = \underbrace{\Delta b}_{\text{Amortization}} + \underbrace{S_f}_{\text{Financial savings}}$$

What would happen to net savings if we add more choice over amortization?

1. Nothing, the individual is content with amortizing (Amortizer)
2. The individual could reduce net savings (set  $\Delta b = 0$ ) (Consumer)
3. Net savings could increase because return on  $S^f$  is higher than the return on  $\Delta b$  (Saver)

# Graphical illustration of net savings

## Motivation





## Decomposing savings after the reform

Change in savings for **Amortizer** (keep amortizing mortgage):

$$\Delta S^A = 0$$

Change in savings for **Consumer** (switch to IO mortgage):

$$\Delta S^C = -\Delta b$$

Change in savings for **Saver** (switch to IO mortgage):

$$\Delta S^S = \Delta S_f^S - \Delta b$$

# Key point

## Motivation

Aggregate change depends on the share  $\alpha$  of each type:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta S &= \alpha^S \Delta S^S + \alpha^C \Delta S^C + \alpha^A \Delta S^A \\ &= \alpha^S (\Delta S_f^C - \Delta b) - \alpha^C (\Delta b)\end{aligned}$$

Interest-only mortgage will increase net savings if the increase in savings by Savers outweigh the decrease in amortization by consumers

→ The key is to identify savings behavior by households who switch to an interest-only mortgage in a credible way

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# Assumption behind empirical strategy

## *Empirical strategy*

Fundamental problem of estimating causal effect of IO mortgage  $\gamma$ :  $Y_0$  is not observed

$$\gamma = \overbrace{E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid T = 1)}^{\text{Treatment effect}}$$

From the stylized framework: *Amortizer* can be used to impute  $Y_0$

- Amortizers are not affected by the reform
- Absent spillover effects (house price effects? *Bäckman & Lutz, 2021*)

Covariates, individual FE and municipality-year FE to help address selection concerns

# Danish register data from 1996 to 2016

## *Data and empirical strategy*

Combine standard register (income, demographics, labor market, education) with mortgage data from 2009

- We use the origination date to track the mortgage back in time
- E.g. we observe the mortgage in 2009 and know that it was originated in 2004

## Sample selection

- Individual-level data
- Select individuals aged 18-75
- Drop entrepreneurs
- Keep only homeowners

# Variable definitions

## *Data and empirical strategy*

### Financial savings:

$$\underbrace{S_{i,t}^f}_{\text{Financial savings}} = \underbrace{S_{i,t}^l}_{\text{Liquid savings}} + \underbrace{p_{i,t}^p}_{\text{private pension contributions}}$$

### Amortization:

$$\underbrace{\Delta b_{i,t}}_{\text{Amortization}} = \underbrace{-(b_{i,t} - b_{i,t-1})}_{\text{Debt today minus debt yesterday}}$$

### Total savings:

$$\underbrace{S_{i,t}}_{\text{Total savings}} = \underbrace{\Delta b_{i,t}}_{\text{Amortization}} + \underbrace{S_{i,t}^f}_{\text{Financial savings}}$$

# Empirical strategy

## *Empirical strategy*

Comparison of savings behavior around first time that we observe refinancing

- Treated: refinance to an interest-only mortgage
- Control: refinance to a traditional mortgage

Estimated using:

- Two-way fixed effect estimator
- Wooldridge (2021)
- Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021)

# Empirical strategy - TWFE

## *Empirical strategy*

Estimate a semi-dynamic specification with indicator for first refinancing to an interest-only mortgage  $\mathbf{1}[T_{i,t} = \tau_i]$  at time  $\tau$  :

$$S_{i,t} = \underbrace{\alpha_i}_{\text{Individual FE}} + \underbrace{\sum_{\tau=0}^{10} \gamma_{\tau} \mathbf{1}[T_{i,t} = \tau_i]}_{\text{Event study coefs.}} + \underbrace{\sum_{\tau=0}^{10} \lambda_{\tau} X_i}_{\text{Controls} \times \text{treat-time}} + \underbrace{\delta_{k,t}}_{\text{Mun-Year}} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Cluster on individual level



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
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# Baseline results using TWFE

## Results


$$S_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \sum_{\tau=0}^{10} \gamma_{\tau} \mathbf{1}[T_{i,t} = \tau_i] + \sum_{\tau=0}^{10} \lambda_{\tau} X_i + \delta_{k,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$



# Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) event study coefficients (no covariates)


## Results

Components of savings



# Financial savings: Average Treatment Effect by wealth group

## Results



# Amortization response – Back of the envelope calculation

## *Result*

A borrower with an annuity contract and a 3 percent interest rate has amortized 27 percent of the mortgage after 10 year

Initial mortgage debt at origination for IO holders: 960,000 kr.

- Would have reduced mortgage by  $\approx 260,000$  DKK

Initial mortgage debt at origination for amortizing mortgages: 680,000 kr.

- Would have reduced mortgage by  $\approx 183,000$  DKK

# What is the effect on net wealth?

*Net wealth*

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta S &= \alpha^S \Delta S^S + \alpha^C \Delta S^C + \alpha^A \Delta S^A \\ &= \alpha^{IO} (\Delta S^{IO} - \Delta b^{IO}) \\ &= 0.5 \times (72,000 - 260,000) = -94,000\end{aligned}$$

Or 9,400 DKK per year.

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# Model setup

## *Model*

**Merton (1992)** partial equilibrium environment of risky and non-risky asset (“mortgage”)


- Agents then chooses between amortization and investment in the risky asset.
- Heterogeneity through uninsurable idiosyncratic risk for risky asset

Production supply closes the model in a general equilibrium setting



# Mortgage debt as a share of assets

## Background



# Two constraints decay in wealth to imitate amortization requirement

## Model

**Savings constraint:** agents forced to save a fraction of their income every period

- Reduces inequality: Less wealthy agents are forced to save, which raises their wealth.
- Reduces inequality: The inflow of savings into risky assets drives down the risky return and reduces the optimal risky share

**Portfolio constraint:** upper threshold on the portion invested into the risky asset

- Increases inequality: by hindering some from investing optimally (more) in the risky asset.
- Small impact on interest rate

# Conclusion

Interest-only mortgages reduce amortization payments with little offsetting effect on savings

- We find similar effects as in [Bernstein & Koudijs \(2020, R&R QJE\)](#)


New evidence that mortgage market design impacts portfolio composition and savings

- [Fagereng \*et al.\* \(2018, Econometrica\)](#) argues that positive correlation between wealth and return to wealth reflects skill and asset allocation
- [Bach \*et al.\* \(2017, AER\)](#) argues that heterogeneity in returns reflects risk aversion
- [Epper \*et al.\* \(2018, AER\)](#) documents that patience predicts saving and wealth

Thank you!

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


## Appendix slides

# Interest-only mortgages in Denmark


Outstanding debt

## Background




# Mortgages in Denmark

## Background



# Outstanding debt


## Background





# Interest-only mortgages by wealth, year by year

## Background



Graphs by year

## Quick facts in our data

1. First year payments reduced by  $\approx 20$  percent (depends on interest rate)
2. Amortizing mortgages are paid off over time, interest-only mortgages are not
3. Large majority of borrowers choose either IO or amortizing (not combination)


# F-tests for pre-treatment coefficients [Back](#)

## Results

Specification	F-statistic (1)	P-value (2)
<b>Liquid savings</b>		
Baseline	2.701*	0.019
Mun-year	1.682	0.135
Demographics	1.647	0.144
Financial	1.191	0.311
<b>Financial savings</b>		
Baseline	4.445***	0.000
Mun-year	2.738*	0.018
Demographics	2.215*	0.050
Financial	1.008	0.411
<b>Total savings</b>		
Baseline	1.851	0.099
Mun-year	1.484	0.191
Demographics	2.118	0.060
Financial	1.346	0.241

# Results by wealth group


## Results



# Effect by year-of-refinancing (Wooldridge, 2021)

## Results

Financial savings



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