Volatility

martes, 6 de abril de 2021

What is the build version of the host machine in Case 001?

Desde < https://tryhackme.com/room/volatility>

```
C:\z>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f PIMF\Investigation-1.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 kdbgscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Instantiating KDBG using: Kernel AS WinXPSP2x86 (5.1.0 32bit)
Offset (V)
Offset (P)
                                 : 0x80545ae0
                                 : 0x545ae0
KDBG owner tag check
                                 : True
Profile suggestion (KDBGHeader): WinXPSP3x86
                                 : 0x80545ab8 (Major: 15, Minor: 2600)
Version64
Service Pack (CmNtCSDVersion) : 3
Build string (NtBuildLab)
                                 : 2600.xpsp.080413-2111
                                 : 0x8055a158 (17 processes)
PsActiveProcessHead
                                 : 0x80553fc0 (109 modules)
: 0x804d7000 (Matches MZ: True)
PsLoadedModuleList
KernelBase
Major (OptionalHeader)
Minor (OptionalHeader)
                                 : 1
                                 : 0xffdff000 (CPU 0)
KPCR
```

At what time was the memory file acquired in Case 001?

```
C:\z>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f PIMF\Investigation-1.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
        : volatility.debug
                              : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
          Suggested Profile(s): WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
AS Layer1: IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
                      AS Layer2 :
                                  FileAddressSpace (C:\z\PIMF\Investigation-1.vmem)
                       PAE type :
                                  PAE
                                  0x2fe000L
                            DTB :
                           KDBG:
                                  0x80545ae0L
          Number of Processors :
    Image Type (Service Pack):
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000L
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA:
                                  0xffdf0000L
           Image date and time :
                                  2012-07-22 02:45:08 UTC+0000
    Image local date and time : 2012-07-21 22:45:08 -0400
```

What process can be considered suspicious in Case 001?

```
:\z>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f PIMF\Investigation-1.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 psscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P)
                   Name
                                       PID PPID PDB
                                                               Time created
                                                                                                Time exi
0x00000000002029ab8 svchost.exe
                                               652 0x079400e0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
                                       908
0x0000000000202a3b8 lsass.exe
                                        664
                                               608 0x079400a0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x0000000000202ab28 services.exe
                                       652
                                               608 0x07940080 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
                                              1484 0x079401e0 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
0x0000000000207bda0 reader_sl.exe
                                      1649
0x000000000020b17b8 spoolsv.exe
                                               652 0x079401c0 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
                                       1512
0x0000000000225bda0 wuauclt.exe
                                       1588
                                              1004 0x07940200 2012-07-22 02:44:01 UTC+0000
                                              652 0x07940140 2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000 1464 0x079401a0 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
0x000000000022e8da0 alg.exe
                                       788
0x000000000023dea70 explorer.exe
                                       1484
0x000000000023dfda0 svchost.exe
                                       1056
                                               652 0x07940120 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x000000000023fcda0 wuauclt.exe
                                              1004 0x07940180 2012-07-22 02:43:46 UTC+0000
                                       1136
                                               652 0x07940160 2012-07-22 02:42:35 UTC+0000
0x00000000002495650 svchost.exe
                                       1220
0x00000000002498700 winlogon.exe
                                        608
                                               368 0x07940060 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x000000000024a0598 csrss.exe
                                        584
                                               368 0x07940040 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x000000000024f1020 smss.exe
                                        368
                                                 4 0x07940020 2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
0x000000000025001d0 svchost.exe
                                       1004
                                               652 0x07940100 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x00000000002511360 svchost.exe
                                        824
                                               652 0x079400c0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x000000000025c89c8 System
                                          4
                                                 0 0x002fe000
```

What is the parent process of the suspicious process in Case 001? What is the PID of the suspicious process in Case 001? What is the parent process PID in Case 001?

```
\z>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f PIMF\Investigation-1.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
                                                      Pid
                                                           PPid
                                                                   Thds Hnds Time
0x823c89c8:System
                                                                           240 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000
0x822f1020:smss.exe
                                                      368
                                                                            19 2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
. 0x82298700:winlogon.exe
                                                                           519 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
                                                      608
                                                             368
... 0x81e2ab28:services.exe
                                                      652
                                                             608
                                                                     16
                                                                           243 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
... 0x821dfda0:svchost.exe
                                                                            60 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
                                                     1056
... 0x81eb17b8:spoolsv.exe
                                                     1512
                                                             652
                                                                           113 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
... 0x81e29ab8:svchost.exe
                                                      908
                                                             652
                                                                           226 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
... 0x823001d0:svchost.exe
                                                     1004
                                                             652
                                                                     64
                                                                          1118 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
.... 0x8205bda0:wuauclt.exe
                                                     1588
                                                            1004
                                                                           132 2012-07-22 02:44:01 UTC+0000
.... 0x821fcda0:wuauclt.exe
                                                     1136
                                                            1004
                                                                      8
                                                                           173 2012-07-22 02:43:46 UTC+0000
... 0x82311360:svchost.exe
                                                                           194 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
                                                      824
                                                             652
                                                                     20
... 0x820e8da0:alg.exe
                                                      788
                                                             652
                                                                           104 2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
... 0x82295650:svchost.exe
                                                     1220
                                                             652
                                                                           197 2012-07-22 02:42:35 UTC+0000
... 0x81e2a3b8:lsass.exe
                                                      664
                                                             608
                                                                           330 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
                                                                     24
                                                                     9
                                                      584
                                                             368
                                                                           326 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
 . 0x822a0598:csrss.exe
0x821dea70:explorer.exe
                                                     1484
                                                            1464
                                                                           415 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
 0x81e7bda0:reader_sl.exe
                                                                            39 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
```

What user-agent was employed by the adversary in Case 001?

```
C:\z>grep -i user-agent PIMF\Investigation-1.vmem -a
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; en-US)
User-Agent: RPC
User-Agent: RPC
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; en-US)
  ഥ∆0| $Lw‼യ⊡G?过▶$Lwਊയog|¤$Lwഏയായ@vPassportConfigoPassportURLsoonAuthent
orizationMax-ForwardscccIf-Unmodified-SinceIf-RangecccIf-None-MatchccIf
W-Authenticate⊡⊡⊡User-Agent⊡Title⊡⊡Server⊡Retry-AfterRefererOrig-Uri⊡⊡
$\text{$\D}$ \displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displaysquare=\displa
o#w◆aabaaaabaaaaa®Pa§|$aaaaaaaaaaa¢®aa)▲wa=ha)▲waaaaaaPa§T$aat-a:
 va▼a4< t+< u♥Faaha↑▼wVa§a‼aat↓aaaaaadWPa♥a0aaaa•aa00aåa4< t+<
 :♥aab⇔aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaat %a8#u♥a_@a8u®aaaaaaa♦a♦aat Pa§a¢SaaaaaaPaaH
  aaYaahaaatxtbinary3aaanaaaUJ♥aa⇔aaaaa⊜;aÿaaaa⊜⇔a∧qaaa@≻⊜a$qaaaaaa
aaaa⊜aa⇔aaqaaaaa3aaaPVa§T$ac⇔asqaaaa⊜a§d$aac⊜aaaWqaaaaaaafa?aaaa
 >TRANSLATE:poppoppoppTranslate:'p‼_poppod∰>USER-AGENT:poppoppoppUser-
LOW: DDDDDDAllow:
                                    ▶@do]ი @Xo]იტ@Blo]ი @@@o]ი ®@00ე]ი9◆@ s-queuename s
  ethod cs-version cs-username s-port s-ip c-port c-ip s-computername s-
 \aaaaaa'a\a5a\aaaaaaaa\aaa\aHTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
GETPOSTHTTP/1.0HTTP/1.1multipart/form-databoundary=name="HostRefererUser
♦¤0♦0Control Countaaaav♦a+♦0SourceIdaaaavk♦♦a0aaaa04a04a04a0414X14aaaavk
GETPOSTHTTP/1.0HTTP/1.1multipart/form-databoundary=name="HostRefererUser
jVas¶aSaaaaaC¶u♦ac♦aaCQaa~
                                                                             +aaaaacQaC♦@u♦aat!j♦aaaaaaPj)aaaaaaaa
 :\z>D_
```

What is the last suspicious bank domain found in Case 001?

```
C:\z>grep -oi "[a-zA-Z]\\{6\}\.[a-zA-Z]\\{3\}\.[a-zA-Z]\\{2\}" PIMF\Investigation-1.vmem -a | sort -u
QwMSFT.VSA.IE
anamex.com.mx
anesco.com.pa
ankefg.com.cy
astnet.tkb.co
correo.com.uy
ecform.cvc.va
ecform.dln.va
ecform.mmn.va
ecform.ssn.va
habank.com.cy
ibanka.seb.lv
inbank.com.cy
indows.Net.Ne
indows.Net.ra
jquery.min.js
lytics.msn.co
online.ibl.co
online.lkb.lv
online.usb.co
rosoft.Jet.OL
rosoft.MMC.Fr
rpbank.com.au
search.msn.co
ublica.org.mx
kicano.org.mx
```

What suspicious process is running at PID 740 in Case 002?

ffset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start	Exit
x823c8830	System	4	0	51	244		0		
x82169020	smss.exe	348	4	3	19		0	2017-05-12 21:21:55 UTC+000	90
x82161da0	csrss.exe	596	348	12	352	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:00 UTC+000	90
x8216e020	winlogon.exe	620	348	23	536	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:01 UTC+006	90
x821937f0	services.exe	664	620	15	265	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:01 UTC+000	90
x82191658	lsass.exe	676	620	23	353	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:01 UTC+000	90
0x8221a2c0	svchost.exe	836	664	19	211	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:02 UTC+006	90
x821b5230	svchost.exe	904	664	9	227	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:03 UTC+000	90
x821af7e8	svchost.exe	1024	664	79	1366	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:03 UTC+000	90
x8203b7a8	svchost.exe	1084	664	6	72	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:03 UTC+000	90
x821bea78	svchost.exe	1152	664	10	173	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:06 UTC+000	90
x821e2da0	spoolsv.exe	1484	664	14	124	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:09 UTC+006	90
x821d9da0	explorer.exe	1636	1608	11	331	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:10 UTC+000	90
x82218da0	tasksche.exe	1940	1636	7	51	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:14 UTC+006	90
x82231da0	ctfmon.exe	1956	1636	1	86	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:14 UTC+006	90
x81fb95d8	svchost.exe	260	664	5	105	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:18 UTC+006	90
x81fde308	@WanaDecryptor@	740	1940	2	70	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:22 UTC+000	90
x81f747c0	wuauclt.exe	1768	1024	7	132	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:52 UTC+006	90
x82010020	alg.exe	544	664	6	101	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:55 UTC+006	90
x81fea8a0	wscntfy.exe	1168	1024	1	37	0	0	2017-05-12 21:22:56 UTC+006	90

What is the full path of the suspicious binary in PID 740 in Case 002?

```
C:\z>grep -i \@WanaDecryptor@ PIMF\Investigation-2.raw -a --color

$j\@\Color #13_\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha\color #18_\alpha=\alpha=\alpha\color #19_\alpha=\alpha=\alpha\color #19_\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha\color #19_\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha=\alpha
```

What is the parent process of PID 740 in Case 002? Tasksche.exe

What is the suspicious parent process PID connected to the decryptor in Case 002? 1940 $\,$

From our current information what malware is present on the system in Case 002? wannacry

What DLL is loaded by the decryptor used for socket creation in Case 002?

```
C:\z>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f PIMF\Investigation-2.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 dlllist -p 740 | cut -d\ -f4 | sort -u
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
@WanaDecryptor@ pid:
@WanaDecryptor@.exe
ADVAPI32.dll
                            740
                   Size LoadCount Path
Base
Command line : @WanaDecryptor@.exe
GDI32.dll
IMM32.DLL
LPK.DLL
MFC42.DLL
MSCTF.dll
MSVCP60.dll
Normaliz.dll
OLEAUT32.dll
RICHED20.dll
RICHED32.DLL
RPCRT4.dll
SHELL32.dll
SHLWAPI.dll
Secur32.dll
Service Pack 3
USER32.dll
USERENV.dll
USP10.dll
WININET.dll
 WS2HELP.dll
WS2 32.dll
X86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.2600.6028_x-ww_61e65202
iertutil.dll
kernel32.dll
msctfime.ime
msls31.dll
msvcrt.dll
ntdll.dll
ole32.dll
urlmon.dll
uxtheme.dll
WS2_32.dll
```

What mutex can be found that is a known indicator of the malware in question in Case 002?

C:\z>volati Volatility					igation-2.rawprofile=WinXPSP2x86 handles -p 1940
Offset(V)			Access		Details
0xe1005468	1940	0x4	0xf0003	KeyedEvent	CritSecOutOfMemoryEvent
0xe147f350	1940	0x8	0x3	Directory	KnownD11s
0x81fbce00	1940	0хс	0x100020	File	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Wi
0x8217cfa0	1940	0x10	0xf037f	WindowStation	WinSta0
0xe15a9d50	1940	0x14	0xf000f	Directory	Windows
0xe1b8a450	1940	0x18	0x21f0001	Port	V-1
0x82251428	1940	0x1c	0x21f0003	Event	
0x82365c80	1940	0x20	0xf01ff	Desktop	Default
0x8217cfa0	1940	0x24	0xf037f	WindowStation	WinSta0
0x821aa390	1940	0x28	0x100003	Semaphore	
0x821aa358	1940	0x2c	0x100003	Semaphore	Acceptance Control
0xe1a05938	1940	0x30	0x20f003f	Key	MACHINE
0x82233f18	1940	0x34	0x100020	File	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Intel\ivecugmanpnirkt615
0xe1a67d48	1940	0x38	0x8	Token	# #
0xe149f908	1940	0х3с	0x2000f	Directory	BaseNamedObjects
0x821883e8	1940	0x40	0x120001	Mutant	ShimCacheMutex
0xe16644e0	1940	0x44	0x2	Section	ShimSharedMemory
0x822386a8	1940	0x48	0x100001	File	\Device\KsecDD
0x823d54d0	1940	0x4c	0x1f0003	Semaphore	shell.{A48F1A32-A340-11D1-BC6B-00A0C90312E1}
0x823a0cd0	1940	0x50	0x100020	File	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Wi
0x8224f180	1940	0x54	0x1f0001	Mutant	MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA
0x822e3b08	1940	0x58	0x1f0001	Mutant	MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA0
0x82234450	1949	0x5c	0x1f0003	Event	

What plugin could be used to identify all files loaded from the malware working directory in Case 002? (reading the documentation) windows.filescan



