Exploiting and Mitigating Second-Order SQL Injection Attacks in a Self-Made Blog Platform

Philip Björnerud and Claudia Del Peso

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Abstract

Despite being an old technique and a well known issue in database applications, SQL is one of the most common attacks today. The goal of the project is to explore how second-order SQL injection attacks occur and the prevention measures we can implement to secure vulnerabilities. This will be done by creating a database application vulnerable to this type of attacks and explore how it can be exploited by an attacker. By doing so, we aim to understand SQL attacks and the measures we can take to prevent them.

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1 Introduction

In today's society applications on the web have become an essential tool in our daily lives, providing us with not only convenient but also crucial services for us, ranging from lightfast communication to remote work. As we grow dependent on these services, it becomes crucial to implement robust security measures.

Web security refers to the defense against potential and harmful attacks and exposures that could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and other security risks. The CIA tried, is a fundamental principle of web security. Confidentiality ensures that only trusted users have access to sensitive information, Integrity ensures that data cannot be modified by unauthorized users, and Availability ensures that data is available to authorized users.

Despite the crucial importance of web security and the implementation of the CIA triad, there still exist vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious users. According to OWASP Top 10:2021 [6], SQL injection attacks still persist in today's web applications and are ranked third place on the OWASP Top 10. A study showed that 94% of the tested applications were vulnerable to some form of injection with a maximum incidence rate of 19% and an average incidence rate of 3%, with 274k occurrences [6].

SQL injections is dangerous vulnerability that can result in data breaches, unauthorized access, and data loss, all which can have severe consequences. Despite being a well-known vulnerability, SQL injection attacks continue to be dominant in web applications. SQL injection attacks are possibles because of the lack of user input sanitation or validation, lack of prepared statements, insufficient or no use of stored procedures, and bad security designs.

The goal of this project is to create a database web application that is vulnerable to advanced SQL injection attacks and explore how they could be exploited by an attacker. This will give insight into how SQL injection attacks are performed and the damage they cause. We will also investigate countermeasures such as parameterized queries, stored procedures and other security measures.

1.1 Project Objectives

The objective of this project is to explore second-order SQL injection attacks. We will showcase common pitfalls developers may face when building their own web applications, in our case a static/-dynamic blog application. Second-order SQL injection attacks can be hard to detect and prevent, as the injected payload may not appear dangerous from the beginning. This type of attack is often underestimated, and under-explored in comparison to traditional SQL injection attacks, leaving a crucial knowledge gap that needs to be studied. With this project we hope to achieve the following goals:

1. Develop a deeper understanding of how second-order SQL injection attacks work and their impact on web applications.
2. Identify common vulnerabilities in custom self-made web applications.
3. Demonstrate the danger of second-order SQL injection attacks through practical demonstrations
4. Provide and implement effective countermeasures against second-order SQL injection attacks.
5. Increase awareness of second-order SQL injection attacks and the importance of implementing security measures.

1.2 SQL Injection Attacks

Web applications often rely on backend databases to store, retrieve, and modify data. One of the most popular technologies to interact with databases is SQL (Structured Query Language). SQL queries are a selection of statements used to interact with databases and perform operations like inserting, updating or deleting data. Databases may contain private information, ranging from user credentials to credit card information, username and password to credit card numbers, which makes proper validation essential to prevent attackers from executing malicious queries which may cause damage to the database

and web application.

In an SQL injection attack, the attacker is able to insert malicious SQL code into a SQL statement that is later executed by the database. This is achieved by manipulating user input in a way that alters the structure and meaning of an SQL statement [1]. When an attacker is able to inject their own queries into an SQL statement, the application executes unintended commands which allows the attacker to extract, manipulate and delete sensitive information.

Consider an example where an application retrieves a users information given their username and password. The SQL statement used to achieve this is

```
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='[username]' AND password='[password]'
```

In this query, the user inputs their username and password, and the input data is wrapped in single quotes denoting it is a string value. If the input is not wrapped in single quotes, the query will fail because the database management system would interpret the input as an SQL keyword or expression, rather than a value [2]. For example, a valid query that is sent to the database is

```
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='Ava' AND password='password1'
```

If the input field is not properly validated the attacker can input data in a way that alters the meaning of the query. For example, an attacker can input `' OR 1=1--` as username and `random` as the password input resulting in the SQL statement:

```
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '' OR 1=1-- AND password = 'random'
```

Here, the input value for the username contains a payload. This payload changes the meaning of the query, the username input is now empty and rest of the input is interpreted as an SQL expression. The attacker has modified the query so that the condition is always true, returning all rows in the users table. The double-dash symbol is used to comment out the rest of the SQL statement which prevents syntax errors.

Though SQL injection attacks like this one, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to the data stored in the database and perform attacks such as modifying and deleting data.

In our project, we focused on second-order code injection, a kind of SQL injection attack where the attacker injects a payload into an application, but the code is not immediately executed. Instead, the payload is stored in the database and is activated by an action at a later time [5]. This differs from first-order SQL injections, where the payload is executed immediately.

We will show this through one of the attacks we performed on our web application. As with many web applications, you will be asked to register an account. An attacker might register an account using ***admin'***– as a username and ***hacker*** as a password. The application successfully validates the input and stores the username and password resulting in the SQL statement:

```
INSERT INTO users (username, password) VALUES ('Admin'' --', 'hacker')
```

At this stage, the payload has been inserted in the database but no malicious action has occurred yet. The malicious action occurs when the attacker updates the password. The web application has the following SQL statement:

```
'UPDATE users SET password='[new_password]' WHERE username='username';
```

Since the hacker is logged in with the username `Admin' --` the query looks like this:

```
'UPDATE users SET password='HACKED' WHERE username='Admin' --';
```

As mentioned before, the double-dash in SQL represents a comment, meaning that all code after it will be ignored. Because the application did not properly validate the username input, the database

updates the password of the `Admin` account instead of the hacker account [3].

This kind of attack can be hard to detect because, as in this case, the input where the payload is inserted is not the same as where the damage occurs. In later sections, we will explain all the measures developers can take to avoid this vulnerabilities.



Figure 1: Login and Registering interface

2 Blog application overview

2.1 The application

For the implementation of the project we built a blog application built using several technologies.

HTML and CSS were used to create the user interface, where HTML provides the structure and content of the web page, and CSS is responsible for the styling of the page. The dynamic functionality of the page is supported with JavaScript. This technology allows us to interact with web page and perform asynchronous requests to the server. Together they build the foundation of the client-side of the application.

To handle server-side functionality, including serving dynamic content to clients, we made use of Node.js. It is a JavaScript runtime built on the V8 engine, allowing JavaScript to run on the server-side. In this project, Node.js was used to handle all the web application functionality, including processing requests, communicating with the SQLite database, and responding with the appropriate HTML, CSS, and JavaScript code to display the updated content.

Finally, for storing all the websites data we used SQLite, the recommended choice for small projects because it is easy to set up and use. It is also self-contained and does not require a separate server to run. It was the perfect choice do build a simple application while still allowing us to experiment with SQL injection attacks. In this project, SQLite is used to store all the user data (including username and password) and all the blog post data (including content, likes and images).

The application is a simple blog website where users can register, log in and create and view other users posts. When first using the website you will come across the login interface, as seen in picture 1, where you are required to login using your credentials or register for a new account. When creating a new profile, users must input their username and password, which are then, stored in the database. To make the website interesting to use, there are predefined user accounts including Ava with the username `Ava` and password `password1`, Jarvis with the username `JARVIS` and password `password2`, and Skynet with the username `Skynet` and password `password3`.

Once registered, users can use their credentials to log in, and will be referred to the blogs main page.



Figure 2: Blog's main page

As seen in picture 2, users are greeted with their username and all the other user's blog posts. We also predefined some blog posts to show the interface and functionality of the application. It is important for the project to note that, for each post, we see the username of the person who posted it. This username coincides with the login username. Posts are sorted in descending order based on the number of likes they received, with the most popular post displayed at the top. The functionality is intended so that each user can only like a post once by clicking on the heart icon. To keep the application simple we did not implement a commenting functionality, but liking posts is enough to achieve the goal of the project.

The application includes an administrator account with higher privileges than the rest of the users. We also predefined the admins account, where the username is `Admin` with password `dontHack`. The administrators privileges are the ability to remove any post created by any user. Picture 3 shows the blog's main page from the administrators point of view.

Users can create their blog post by giving it a title and a body. They can also update their password at any given time. Finally, they can log out by clicking logout button as shown in picture 4.

2.2 Code description

The previous section briefly mentions the technologies used to build the project, but the aim of this this section is to dive deeper into the structure of the code and how it was designed to be able to perform SQL attacks. The code for the project is divided into several files, each with it's own function.

There is a public directory containing the files responsible for the structure, content and styling of the web application. The file *index.html* contains content for the login and registration page (see picture 1), while *blogpost.html* contains the content for displaying all the blog posts stored in the database (as seen in picture 2). The Javascript function `fetchPost` JavaScript function sends a GET request to the server endpoint "/blogposts" to retrieve all the blog posts from the database. The response is then parsed as JSON and each post is displayed on the page.

The *db.js* file contains all the code for the databases that store all the information contained in the web application. The *db.js* file contains an in-memory SQLite database structure with three tables: `users`, `blog_posts`, and `blog_post_likes`.



Figure 3: This is the administrator's view of the blogs page



Figure 4: Blog functionality to create a blog post and change your password

1. **users** table: This table stores information about users. It has four columns:
    - `id`: An integer primary key.
    - `username`: A text field that stores the username.
    - `password`: A text field that stores the user's password.
    - `likes_count`: An integer field that stores the number of likes a user has, with a default value of 0.
2. **blog_posts** table: This table stores information about blog posts.
    - `id`: An integer primary key.
    - `user_id`: An integer field that directs to the user who created the blog post.
    - `title`: A text field that stores the title of the blog post.
    - `content`: A text field that stores the content of the blog post.
    - `likes`: An integer field that stores the number of likes the blog post has, with a default value of 0.
    - `timestamp`: A date-time field.
    - `number_likes`: An integer field that stores the number of likes on the blog post.

    Four blog posts are inserted into this table, with some random AI-generated text about the AI robot's perspective on humans
3. **blog_post_likes** table: This table stores information about the likes given to blog posts by users
    - `id`: An integer primary key.
    - `user_id`: An integer field that directs to the user who liked the blog post.
    - `post_id`: An integer field that directs to the liked blog post.
    - A unique constraint is set on the combination of `user_id` and `post_id`, thus, each user can only like a blog post onetime.

The `app.js` runs the server-side application using the express framework. There are several `app.post`, and `app.get` methods that handle HTTP requests made by the client. However, we will focus on the database queries in each of the "app.post", and "app.get" methods.

1. **User registration**: The `/register` route handles user registration. It first checks if the username already exists in the database using `SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?`. If it does not exist, it adds the new user into the USER table using `INSERT INTO users (username, password) VALUES (?, ?)`.
2. **User login**: The `/login` route handles user authentication. It first checks if the provided username and password match against the database with the query `SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? AND password = ?`, if it does, we construct a session for the user.
3. **Dashboard**: The `/dashboard` routes get all blog posts from the database and show them to the user using the query `SELECT * FROM blog_posts`. It also includes a form for creating a new blog post and updating the user's password.
4. **Create and submit a blog post**: The `/submit-blog-post` route handles the creation of a blog post. It first checks if the user is logged in or not, then it inserts the new post into the blog_posts table in the database using the following query `INSERT INTO blog_posts (user_id, title, content) VALUES (?, ?, ?)`.
5. **Update password**: The `/update-password` route allows a user to update their password using the following query `UPDATE users SET password = ? WHERE id = ?`.
6. **Like a blog post**: The application allows users to like blog posts, which are shown in our

main dashboard viewpoint. If a user likes a post, the query `INSERT INTO blog_post_likes (user_id, post_id) VALUES (?, ?)` is used to store the like, and the following query `UPDATE blog_posts SET likes = likes + 1 WHERE id = ?` updates the like count in the blog_posts table.

For further insight into the code, you can visit our Github repository where you can browse the code and try the attacks yourself [4].

3 Vulnerability Setup

3.1 Intentional Security Flaws

In order to illustrate second-order SQL injection attacks, we intentionally omitted certain security measures in our blog application. However, this intentional "mistake" could also occur in a real-world scenario. People tend to make mistakes, which could be due to various reasons, such as time pressure, complicated code design, or taking over code from someone else. The following code snippet is an intentional security flaw:

```
function escapeSingleQuotes(str) {
  return str.replace(/'/g, "''");
}

app.post("/update-password", (req, res) => {
  const username = req.session.user.username;
  const newPassword = escapeSingleQuotes(req.body.new_password);


 const quer2 = `UPDATE users SET password='${newPassword}' WHERE username='${username}'`;

  db.exec(quer2, (err) => {
    if (err) {
      res.status(500).send("Error updating password");
    } else {
      res.redirect("/dashboard");
    }
  });
});
```

In the code above, the vulnerability in this code lies in the fact that it permits a malicious second-order SQL injection attack. This occurs due to poor input validation and sanitation, when a new user creates a new account, especially when handling the username field. Our example of intentional security flaws is followed by

1. An malicious user registers a new account with a malicious SQL command in the username field. For example, the attacker could use a username like userTest'; DROP TABLE users; –, which is not being sanitized or validated, and the registered username is stored in the database.
2. When the attacker updates the password for this malicious user account, the "escapeSingleQuotes()" function is used to escape single quotes in the new password, but it does not sanitize or validate the username, which is retrieved from the database.
3. The "app.post("/update-password", ...)" function constructs an SQL query using the unsanitized username, which introduces the malicious SQL command into the query.
4. The malicious SQL query command is then executed when the query is run, causing (potentially) damage.

In summary, a second-order SQL query will work because of the way the SQL query is created when updating the password in the "/update-password" function. The unsanitized username which is retrieved from the database is directly inserted into the query. Thus allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands by injecting them into the username field during registration and then updating its password. In the Drop all users example



(a) How the users database looks like after registering with a process SQL command



(b) This image shows how we have successfully modified the admins password!

Figure 5: This images show the state of the users database during different stages of the attack

4 Attack Demonstration

This section demonstrates how an attacker can exploit the SQL injection vulnerabilities in our blog application. The attacks perform different malicious actions but follow the same procedure. First, the attacker registers a new account with a malicious SQL command in the username field, and then the attacker updates their password to trigger the second order SQL injection attack.

We created the application so that the user can insert the payload through the username input field when registering an account, and activate the payload when updating their password. As an attacker, we would have to investigate which input fields are vulnerable to this kind of attack before performing malicious actions.

4.1 Getting Administrator access

As mentioned, the administrator has more privileges than a normal user, so by gaining admin access we can use those privileges to cause attacks. Instead of trying to get the admins password we will demonstrate how a malicious user can exploit the second-order SQL injection vulnerability to change the password of the admin account in the blog application. This attack is carried out by entering a specific SQL command as the username during the registration process.

The specific SQL command is `Admin' --`. As mentioned in the previous section, this will terminate the string that contains the username and comment everything in the query after `Admin'`. Picture 5a shows that we have successfully created an account with username `Admin' --`.

The second scenario involves the attacker updating their password to trigger the second-order SQL injection attack. After logging in with their account, the attacker can navigate to the password update page and enter the password `HACKED` in the "new password" field. When the attacker clicks "submit" to update their password, the application will actually be changing the ***Admin*** password. On picture 8c we can see how we have successfully updated the Admin's password, as explained in section 1.2. The attacker now knows the Admin's password!



Figure 6: This is how the web application looks after the attacker has deleted the user database



Figure 7: The first post now has 100 more

4.2 Deleting databases and adding likes

Now that we figured out how to use the vulnerabilities to perform malicious actions we can follow the same pattern to do different attacks. For example, we can drop the users database. We follow the same steps as in **??**, but now we register by setting the username to the SQL command `'; DROP TABLE users --`.

As mentioned in previous sections, the semicolon will end the first SQL query, and it will allow to insert the malicious query which drops the users table. When updating the account password, the query is executed and will delete the entire users table fro the database, deleting all user data. This result can be seen in picture

We also mentioned that each user can only like a post once, but an attacker that wants to have the most likes can bypass this restrictions using SQL injection attack. This attack modifies the number of likes on a specific blog post by adding a desired amount of likes. To execute this attack, a malicious user can input the ID of the blog post they want to modify, and the desired amount of likes to add. The attacker just needs to register an account with the username `'; UPDATE blog_posts SET number_likes = number_likes + 10 WHERE id = 1 -`. We can see in picture 7, that after updating the users password the post with id=1 has now 100 more likes!

4.3 Deleting hacker accounts

Finally, if you are an attacker and want to delete all evidence that you were messing with the web page, you will want to delete you user account. This is easily done by creating a new account where the username is the SQL query

```
' ; DELETE FROM users WHERE ROWID = (SELECT MAX(ROWID) FROM users) OR username = "<user>"
-
```

This query will remove the last element in the user database along with any user you pass in. In picture 8 we can see how we remove all the accounts the accounts the hacker created to perform attacks. At the end, there is no trace of the attacker.

(a) How the users database looks like when we have performed an attack to increase likes but before removing all traces



(b) This image shows how the users database looks when we have registered an account with the query to remove all traces

(c) This image shows how the users database looks when we have performed attack to remove all attackers accounts

Figure 8: How the database looks in the different stages of the attack

5 Security Countermeasure and Discussion

5.1 Input Validation and Sanitation

The main cause of SQL injection is insufficient input validation [3] and at the same time it is one of the simplest forms of preventing SQL attacks. Input validation means checking user input to see it fits the format and data type.

One of the simplest implementations is making sure an input that asks for an numeric value does not accept inputs that contain characters. Another example is validating dates or email addresses, making sure that no invalid date or email address is passed as input. When having a string input, the simplest action to take against this kind of attacks is to remove or escape any characters that could be interpreted as SQL expressions. Even though this measures seem simple enough they are very vulnerable to human error. Most of SQL injection vulnerabilities are due to human error [3] so other forms of prevention should be considered.

Input sanitation refers to removing or filtering characters that could be used to execute SQL code, to name a few examples: semicolons, single quotes, double dash and commands used in SQL attacks. So if user inputs single quote we replace it with string it can replace it with space or escape it to prevent it being interpreted as SQL query.

Even tough you should not rely only on this methods for your web application security it is a good first wall of defense. This measures will be more effective when implemented on the server side.

In our web application, filtering out single quotes and double dashes would have prevented the attack mentioned in Section 4.1. However, prohibiting all this character will limit the application a lot since many of this characters are used in text in a non malicious way.

5.2 Prepared Statements

A more secure measure is using prepared statements. This refers to SQL statements that separate the SQL logic statements from the input values. Instead of using string concatenation to build a query, parameterized queries use a base query, which is precompiled, and placeholders for the input values, which are then replaced by the user input at runtime. This way, the parameters do not influence the execution of the query. Parameterized queries are an effective way to prevent SQL injection because they ensure that input is sanitized and don't rely on string concatenation of SQL logic and user input.

In our web application, implementing prepared statements would prevent against the types of attacks we have performed. At the moment, the code for updating a password looks as follows

```
function escapeSingleQuotes(str) {
return str.replace(/'/g, "''");
}
        app.post("/update-password", (req, res) => {
  const username = req.session.user.username;
  const newPassword = escapeSingleQuotes(req.body.new_password);

  const quer2 = `UPDATE users SET password='${newPassword}' WHERE username='${username}'`;
  db.exec(quer2, (err) => {
    if (err) {
      res.status(500).send("Error updating password");
    } else {
      res.redirect("/dashboard");
    }
  });
});
```

This code does not contain prepared statements. The user input is concatenated with the query logic. This is what allows the attack, since the payload `Admin' --` is inserted directly into the query and executed. Because the username attribute comes from the database we do not perform input

validation because we assume it is safe. The following code shows an updated version that uses prepared statements:

```
        function escapeSingleQuotes(str) {
return str.replace(/'/g, "''");
}
        app.post("/update-password", (req, res) => {
  const username = req.session.user.username;
  const newPassword = escapeSingleQuotes(req.body.new_password);

  const updateQuery = 'UPDATE users SET password = ? WHERE username = ?';
  db.run(updateQuery, [newPassword, username], (err) => {
    if (err) {
      res.status(500).send("Error updating password");
    } else {
      res.redirect("/dashboard");
    }
  });
});
```

Here, the logic is separated from the user input. The `?` character acts as a placeholder in the queries. Now, the input is treated as data and not as executable SQL commands, so now the payload `Admin' --` is interpreted as a string, so updating the password will update the hackers password. This successfully prevents the attacks mentioned in Section 4. In picture 9 we can see how, even though we tried the same attack as in 4.1, the attack was not successful. When we tried to change the Administrators password we were only able to change ours.

Figure 9: The first post now has 100 more

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, SQL injection attacks pose a significant threat to the security of database web applications. Particularly, second-order SQL injections, which evade detection by injecting and storing the payload in the database and activating it indirectly. For this reason, it is crucial to have a good knowledge of what SQL attack are and how they work. Awareness of the attack will encourage more developers to implement simple but effective countermeasures to help mitigate this problem. One of the mistakes we did when implementing our web application was not validating the data we got from the database. We trusted that this information was safe. By not validating the username obtained from the database, and not using prepared statements, the attacker was able to attack our website. So it is important to secure on the client and server side.

Fortunately, there are several effective countermeasures that can help mitigate SQL injection attacks. One simple but effective measure includes input validation and sanitation. While simple, this measure will prevent many of unwanted side effects. It is important to be aware of when and where these measures can be applied, as they are not appropriate for every input value. Parameterized queries are also a simple but effective measure. It successfully prevents payload to be executed as part of the SQL logic, minimizing the insertion of payload into databases.

However, it is important to note that web security is always changing. It is important to stay up to date on security measures and tools to prevent and detect web-based vulnerabilities.

7 Future work

While our project successfully illustrates second-order SQL injection vulnerabilities, some future works could be:

1. Expand Attack Scenarios: The current setup allows us to show some second-order SQL injection attacks, but in reality, the possibilities are much more vast. So an extension of these or maybe even more advanced attacks could be interesting.
2. Implement Educational Features: We believe that this web application could be used by other students as learning material, which could be beneficial for students to further understand advanced SQL injection attacks.
3. Incorporate More Security countermeasures: As we continue to introduce more attacks to our blog application it is equally important to introduce more security countermeasures, as the attacks gets more advanced.

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