

## SEED Buffer Overflow (SetUID)

- 1. Testing the shellcode (assembly code)
  - a. In the shellcode folder, compile the program with **make**. Run a32.out and a64.out and describe your observations.



When I typed **make**, two output files (a32.out and a64.out) were created; when I ran each of these with ./\*.out, I noticed that they both spawned user shells.


- 2. Understanding the vulnerable code
  - a. In the code folder, compile the program with make.




When I typed **make**, eight output files (stack-L1, stack-L2, stack-L3, stack-L4, stack-L1-dbg, stack-L2-dbg, stack-L3-dbg, and stack-L4-dbg) were created.

## 3. Launch an attack on the 32-bit program.


a. Investigation






I created a file 'badfile' using the **touch** command, then used gdb to step through the program stack-L1-dbg. Finally, I got the ebp value, buffer, and exited gdb.

## b. Launch an attack



I modified the exploit.py file with the provided 32-bit shellcode, a new shellcode starting position (517 - len(shellcode)), return address (0xffffcb68 + 120), and offset (0xffffcb68 - 0xffffcafc = 0x16c = 108 + 4 = 112).

4. Launch an attack on the 32-bit program without knowing the buffer size.





Given the constraints of this task, I know that the range of the buffer size is somewhere between 100 and 200. Therefore, if I make the payload size (equivalent to the program's buffer size) 300 bytes, I have created a sufficiently large attack surface within the memory space to cover the range.

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- 5. N/A
- 6. N/A


## 7. Defeating dash's countermeasure






Unsurprisingly, when running a32.out and a64.out, either of which spawned a shell with root privileges with setuid(0) or spawned a shell with user privileges without setuid(0). After setting /bin/sh to point back to /bin/dash, I prepended the shellcode in the payload with instructions to setuid(0) to match the effective and real UIDs.

8. Defeating address randomization




Unsurprisingly, after enabling address randomization the exploit no longer spawned a shell. After running the bash script that keeps the program in a loop until the addresses match up, a shell spawned.

- 9. Experimenting with other countermeasures
  - a. Enabling/disabling Stack Guard protection



With -fno-stack-protector enabled the exploit spawned a shell as expected; however, after disabling it, no shell was spawned as a stack smashing error was detected.

b. Enabling/disabling non-executable stack protection



With -z execstack enabled the exploit spawned a shell as expected; however, with -z noexecstack, no shell was spawned as a segmentation fault was detected.