Verification of Chase-Lev work-stealing deque


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May 14, 2023

Context: scheduler for task-based parallelism

- ▶ Cilk (C, C++)
- ▶ Threading Building Blocks (C++)
- ► Taskflow (C++)
- ► Tokio (Rust)
- Goroutines (Go)
- ▶ <u>Domainslib</u> (OCAML 5)

Work-stealing



Chase-Lev work-stealing deque

- 1. The Implementation of the Cilk-5 Multithreaded Language. Frigo, Leiserson & Randall (1998).
 - lock
- 2. Thread Scheduling for Multiprogrammed Multiprocessors. Arora, Blumofe & Plaxton (1998).
 - non-blocking
 - one fixed size array, potential overflow
- 3. A dynamic-sized nonblocking work stealing deque. Hendler, Lev, Moir, & Shavit (2004).
 - non-blocking
 - list of small arrays, no overflow
- 4. <u>Dynamic circular work-stealing deque.</u> Chase & Lev (2005).
 - lockfree
 - circular arrays, no overflow

Why is it interesting?

- Demonstration of Iris on a (simplified) real-life concurrent data structure.
- ▶ Rich ghost state to enforce a subtle protocol.
 - ▶ logical state ≠ physical state
 - external future-dependent linearization point
- ▶ Nontrivial use of prophecy variables.

The rest of this talk

- ▶ Specification using logically atomic triples.
- ▶ Rough idea of how the data structure works.
- ▶ Why we need prophecy variables.

Specification


Physical state

Logical state

Prophecy variables


$Specification -- {\tt chaselev_make}$

Specification — chaselev_make




Enforces a protocol (using an Iris invariant).

Specification — chaselev_make



Asserts the list of values that t logically contains.

Specification — chaselev_make



Specification of a concurrent operation (\simeq transaction): standard triple + logically atomic triple

$$\frac{\{P\}}{\langle \forall \overline{x} \cdot P_{\text{lin}} \rangle}$$

$$e, \mathcal{E}$$

$$\langle \exists \overline{y} \cdot Q_{\text{lin}} \rangle$$

$$\{\lambda res \cdot Q\}$$

P: private precondition

Q: private postcondition

 P_{lin} : public precondition

 Q_{lin} : public postcondition

For a concurrent data structure:

```
\left\{\begin{array}{c} \text{chaselev-inv }t\;\iota\;*\;\text{chaselev-owner }t\;\right\}\\ &\left\langle\forall\,vs\cdot\;\text{chaselev-model }t\;vs\;\right\rangle\\ &\left\langle\exists\cdot\;\text{chaselev-model }t\;(vs+[v])\;\right\rangle\\ &\left\{\lambda\left(\right)\cdot\;\text{chaselev-owner }t\;\right\} \end{array}
```

t is an instance of Chase-Lev deque.

This operation is reserved to the owner of t.

v is atomically pushed at the owner's end of t.

```
\left\{\begin{array}{c} \text{chaselev-inv } t \; \iota \; * \; \text{chaselev-owner } t \end{array}\right\} \\ & \left\{\begin{array}{c} \forall \, vs \; \cdot \; \text{chaselev-model } t \; vs \end{array}\right\} \\ & \left\{\begin{array}{c} \text{chaselev-pop } t, \; \uparrow \; \iota \end{array}\right. \\ & \left\{\begin{array}{c} \exists \, o \; \cdot \; \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{c} vs = \left[\right] * o = \texttt{NONE} * \texttt{chaselev-model } t \; \left[\right] \\ \exists \, v, vs' \; \cdot vs = vs' \; + \; \left[v\right] * o = \texttt{SOME} \; v * \texttt{chaselev-model } t \; vs' \end{array}\right] \right\} \\ & \left\{\begin{array}{c} \lambda \, o \; \cdot \; \text{chaselev-owner } t \end{array}\right\} \end{array}
```

```
chaselev-inv t \iota * \text{chaselev-owner } t
                       \forall v s \cdot \text{ chaselev-model } t v s
                            chaselev_pop t, \uparrow \iota
vs = []*o = \texttt{NONE}* \text{chaselev-model } t \ [] \exists v, vs' \cdot vs = vs \ + [v]*o = \texttt{SOME} \ v* \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs'
                         \lambda o \cdot \backslash \text{chaselev-owner } t
        t is an instance of Chase-Lev deque.
```

```
\left\{\begin{array}{c} \text{chaselev-inv }t \; \iota \; * \; \text{chaselev-owner }t \end{array}\right\} \left\{\begin{array}{c} \forall \, vs \cdot \; \text{chaselev-model} \; t \; vs \\ \hline \\ \text{chaselev_pop } \; t, \quad \iota \end{array}\right. \left\{\begin{array}{c} \exists \, o \cdot \; \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{c} vs = \left[\right] * o = \texttt{NONE} * \; \text{chaselev-model} \; t \; \left[\right] \\ \exists \, v, vs' \cdot vs = vs' + \left[v\right] * o = \texttt{SOME} \; v * \; \text{chaselev-model} \; t \; vs' \end{array}\right]\right\} \left\{\begin{array}{c} \lambda \, o \cdot \; \text{chaselev-owner} \; t \end{array}\right\}
```

This operation is reserved to the owner of t.

```
\left\{\begin{array}{c} \text{chaselev-inv } t \; \iota \; * \; \text{chaselev-owner } t \\ \\ & \left\langle \forall \, vs \cdot \; \text{chaselev-model } t \; vs \; \right\rangle \\ \\ & \text{chaselev_pop } t, \; \uparrow \iota \\ \\ & \left\langle \exists \, o \cdot \; \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{c} vs = \left[\right] * o = \texttt{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t \; \left[\right] \\ \\ \exists \, v, vs' \cdot vs = vs' + \left[v\right] * o = \texttt{SOME} \; v * \text{chaselev-model } t \; vs' \end{array}\right] \right\rangle \\ \\ & \left\{\lambda \, o \cdot \; \text{chaselev-owner} \; t \; \right\} \\ \end{array}
```


Either 1) t is seen empty or 2) some value v is atomically popped at the owner's end of t.

Specification — chaselev_steal

Specification — chaselev_steal

```
chaselev-inv t \iota
                                               \forall vs \cdot \text{chasel} \text{ ev-model } t vs
                                                     chaselev steal t, \uparrow \iota
 \exists o \cdot \bigvee \left[ \begin{array}{c} vs = []*o = \texttt{NONE}* \text{chaselev-model } t \ [] \\ \exists v, vs' \cdot vs = v :: vs' * o = \texttt{SOME} \ v* \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs' \end{array} \right] 
                                                                \{\lambda \phi \cdot \text{True}\}
                                 t is an instance of Chase-Lev deque.
```

Specification — chaselev_steal



Either 1) t is seen empty or 2) some value v is atomically popped at the thieves' end of t.

Specification

Physical state

Logical state

Prophecy variables



data: infinite array storing all values



data: infinite array storing all values

front: monotone index for thieves' end


```
CHASELEVFRONTLBGET
                                    \neg \gamma.front
                                     \gamma.front
data: in
                    Chaselev Front Valid
                     • front_1
front: m
                                        \circ front_2
                               front_2 \leqslant front_1
                     ChaselevFrontUpdate
                                                     \gamma.front
                                           \bullet front
                     front \leq front'
```



data: infinite array storing all values

front: monotone index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end




data: infinite array storing all values

front: monotone index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)




data: infinite array storing all values

front: monotone index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

model: list of contained values



data: infinite array storing all values


front: monotone index for thieves' end


back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

model: list of contained values

hist: monotone list of history values





data: infinite array storing all values

front: monotone index for thieves' end


back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

model: list of contained values

hist: monotone list of history values

hist₊: monotone list of extended history values



data: infinite array storing all values

front: monotone index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

model: list of contained values

hist: monotone list of history values


hist₊: monotone list of extended history values


Specification


Physical state


Logical state

Prophecy variables













 \longrightarrow linearization





Specification

Physical state

Logical state

Prophecy variables

Prophecy variables

The future is ours: prophecy variables in separation logic. Jung, Lepigre, Parthasarathy, Rapoport, Timany, Dreyer & Jacobs (2020).

```
\{\, \mathsf{True} \,\} \  \, \mathsf{NewProph} \,\, \{\, \lambda \,\, p \cdot \exists \, prophs \cdot \mathsf{proph} \,\, p \,\, prophs \,\}
```

```
atomic e
\operatorname{proph} p \ prophs
WP \ e \ \begin{cases} \lambda w \cdot \forall \ prophs' \cdot \\ prophs = (w, v) :: \ prophs' \rightarrow \\ \operatorname{proph} p \ prophs' \rightarrow \\ \Phi \ w \end{cases}
WP \ \operatorname{Resolve} e \ p \ v \ \{\Phi\}
```

Back to The future is ours (Jung et al.)

```
let rdcss rm rn m1 n1 n2 =
  let p = NewProph in
  let descr = ref (rm, m1, n1, n2, p) in
let complete descr rn =
  let (rm, m1, n1, n2, p) = !descr in
  let id = NewId in
  let m = !rm in
  let n_new = if m = m1 then n2 else n1 in
  Resolve (CmpXchg rn (inr descr) (inl n_new)) p id ;
  ()
```

Prophecy variables with memory

```
{ True } NewProph { \lambda p \cdot \exists \gamma, prophs \cdot proph p \gamma || prophs  }
                                                     atomic e
                                     proph p \gamma past prophs
      \text{WP } e \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \lambda w \cdot \forall \ prophs' \cdot \\ prophs = (w, v) :: prophs' - * \\ proph \ p \ \gamma \ (past + [(w, v)]) \ prophs' - * \\ \Phi \ w \end{array} \right\} 
                                    WP Resolve e p v \{ \Phi \}
```

Prophecy variables with memory

 $\frac{\text{proph } p \ \gamma \ past \ prophs}{\text{proph-lb} \ \gamma \ prophs}$

```
\frac{\text{ProphecyValid}}{\text{proph }p \text{ } \gamma \text{ } past \text{ } prophs_1} \qquad \text{proph-lb } \gamma \text{ } prophs_2} \exists \text{ } past_1, past_2 \cdot \bigwedge \begin{bmatrix} past = past_1 + & past_2 \\ & past_2 & + prophs_1 = prophs_2 \end{bmatrix}
```

Conclusion

- Coq mechanization is available on github: https://github.com/clef-men/caml5_alienation
- ► Simplified Chase-Lev deque (one infinite array)

 Real-life Chase-Lev deque (multiple circular arrays)

 ✓
- Proof looks more complex than the sketch. In particular, transitions between logical states are not really formalized.
- We plan to verify more primitives (Domainslib, Taskflow) based on Chase-Lev deque. This is thanks to modularity of IRIS specifications.

Thank you for your attention!

Implementation — chaselev_make

```
let chaselev_make _ =
  let t = AllocN 4 () in
  t.front <- 0;
  t.back <- 0;
  t.data <- inf_array_make ();
  t.prophecy <- NewProph;
  t</pre>
```

Implementation — chaselev_push

```
let chaselev_push t v =
  let back = !t.back in
  inf_array_set !t.data back v ;
  t.back <- back + 1</pre>
```

Implementation — chaselev_steal

```
let rec chaselev_steal t =
  let id = NewId in
  let front = !t.front in
  let back = !t.back in
  if front < back then (
    if Snd (
      Resolve (
        CmpXchg t.front front (front + 1)
       ) !t.prophecy (front, id)
    ) then (
      SOME (inf_array_get !t.data front)
    ) else (
      chaselev_steal t
  ) else (
    NONE.
```

Implementation — chaselev_pop

```
let chaselev_pop t =
  let id = NewId in
  let back = !t.back - 1 in
 t.back <- back :
  let front = !t.front in
  if back < front then (
   t.back <- front
  ) else (
    if front < back then (
      SOME (inf_array_get !t.data back)
    ) else (
      if Snd (
        Resolve (
          CmpXchg t.front front (front + 1)
        ) !t.prophecy (front, id)
      ) then (
        t.back <- front + 1;
        SOME (inf_array_get !t.data back)
      ) else (
        t.back <- front + 1;
        NONE.
```

Infinite array

Invariant

```
chaselev-inv t \iota \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \exists \ell, \gamma, data, p \cdot \\ * \begin{bmatrix} t = \ell * \text{meta } \ell \ \gamma \\ \ell. \text{data} \mapsto_{\square} data * \ell. \text{prophecy} \mapsto_{\square} p \\ \text{chaselev-inv-inner } \ell \ \gamma \ \iota \ data \ p \end{bmatrix}^{t}
```

Invariant

```
chaselev-inv-inner \ell \gamma \iota data p \stackrel{\Delta}{=}
 \exists front, back, hist, model, priv, past, prophs.
       inf-array-model data (hist + model) priv
       | \bullet model | *|model| = (back - front)_{+}
       wise-prophet-model p \gamma.prophet past prophs
       \forall (front', \_) \in past \cdot front' < front chaselev-state \gamma \ \iota \ front \ back \ hist \ model \ prophs
```

State

```
chaselev-state \gamma \iota front back hist model prophs \stackrel{\triangle}{=}
\bigvee \begin{bmatrix} \text{chaselev-state}_1 \ \gamma \ front \ back \ hist \\ \text{chaselev-state}_2 \ \gamma \ \iota \ front \ back \ hist \ model \ prophs \\ \text{chaselev-state}_3 \ \gamma \ front \ back \ hist \ prophs \\ \text{chaselev-state}_4 \ \gamma \ front \ back \ hist } \end{bmatrix}
```

State 1 (empty)

State 2 (non-empty)

chaselev-state₂ γ ι front back hist model prophs $\stackrel{\Delta}{=}$

```
front < back
 \bullet (hist + [model[0]]) 
 * |hist| = front 
* match filter (\lambda(Jrom , \_), J)

| [] \Rightarrow [\bullet - \cdot \circ -]^{\gamma.\text{winner}}
| (\_, id) :: \_ \Rightarrow
| (\_, id) :: \_ \Rightarrow
| [\bullet - \cdot \circ -]^{\gamma.\text{winner}}
| (\_, id) :: \_ \Rightarrow
| (\_, 
                                                                                                                       match filter (\lambda(front', \_) \cdot front' = front) prophs with
```

State 3 (emptyish)

```
chaselev-state<sub>3</sub> \gamma front back hist prophs \stackrel{\Delta}{=}
```

State 4 (super empty)