

# Lecture 2: Machine Models, Basic Computability Theory Models of Computation

<https://clegra.github.io/moc/moc.html>

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# Course overview

Monday, July 7 10.30 – 12.30	Tuesday, July 8 10.30 – 12.30	Wednesday, July 9 10.30 – 12.30	Thursday, July 10 10.30 – 12.30	Friday, July 11
<i>intro</i>	<i>classic models</i>		<i>additional models</i>	
<b>Introduction to Computability</b>  computation and decision problems, from logic to computability, overview of models of computation relevance of MoCs	<b>Machine Models</b>  Post Machines, typical features, Turing's analysis of human computers, Turing machines, basic recursion theory	<b>Recursive Functions</b>  primitive recursive functions, Gödel–Herbrand recursive functions, partial recursive funct's, partial recursive = = Turing-computable, Church's Thesis	<b>Lambda Calculus</b>  $\lambda$ -terms, $\beta$ -reduction, $\lambda$ -definable functions, partial recursive = $\lambda$ -definable = Turing computable	
	<i>imperative programming</i>	<i>algebraic programming</i>	<i>functional programming</i>	
				14.30 – 16.30
				<b>Three more Models of Computation</b>
				Post's Correspondence Problem, Interaction-Nets, Fractran
				comparing computational power

# Overview

- ▶ exercise calculable predicate

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- ▶ Turing machine
  - ▶ Turing's analysis of computations done by (human) computers
  - ▶ formal definition
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- ▶ Post machine
- ▶ Turing machine
  - ▶ Turing's analysis of computations done by (human) computers
  - ▶ formal definition
  - ▶ video
- ▶ Elementary recursion theory
  - ▶ an unsolvable problem
  - ▶ Halting problem
  - ▶ recursively enumerable, and recursive sets
  - ▶ universal language
  - ▶ Chomsky hierarchy

# Calculable functions?

## Questions/Exercises

- ① Suppose  $P(a, b)$  is a calculable predicate.  
Why does  $(\exists x)P(a, x)$  not have to be calculable?
- ② Let  $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  defined by

$$n \mapsto \begin{cases} 0 & \dots n = 0 \text{ \& Goldbach's conjecture is false} \\ 1 & \dots n = 0 \text{ \& Goldbach's conjecture is true} \\ n+1 & \dots n > 0 \end{cases}$$

Is  $f$  calculable?

- ③ Can computation problems for mappings  $F : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^m$  always be represented by decision problems?

# Calculable functions?

## Questions/Exercises

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Why does  $(\exists x)P(a, x)$  not have to be calculable?

# (Comput.) Yes-or-no-questions/Decision problems

Suppose  $A \subseteq E$ , where  $E$  a set of finitely describable objects.

A **decision method for  $A$  in  $E$**  is a method by which, given an element  $a \in E$ , we can decide in a **finite number** of **steps whether or not**  $a \in A$ .

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A **decision method** for  $A$  in  $E$  is a method by which, given an element  $a \in E$ , we can **decide** in a **finite number of steps whether or not**  $a \in A$ .

The decision problem for  $A$  in  $E$  is **solvable** (the set  $A$  in  $E$  is **(effectively) calculable**) if there exists a decision method for  $A$  in  $E$ .

# Reading recommended (for today)

① Post machine: Page 1 + first paragraph on page 2 of:

- ▶ Emil Post: *Finite Combinatory Processes – Formulation 1*, Journal of Symbolic Logic (1936), [2].

② Turing machine motivation:

Turing's analysis of a human computer:

Part I of Section 9, pp. 249–252 of:

- ▶ Alan M. Turing's: *On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem*, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (1936), [3].

# Emil Post



Emil Leon Post (1897–1954)

# Post about ...


... a result of his from 1921 similar to the Incompleteness Theorem:

Theorem (Gödel, 1931 (paraphrased here))

*Every axiomatisable, consistent first-order-logic system of number theory is incomplete: it contains true, but unprovable formulas.*


*"For full generality a complete analysis would have to be given of all possible ways in which the human mind could set up finite processes for generating sequences."*

# Post machine (1936)




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
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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Determining whether the box he is in, is or is not marked.”


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
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
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
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  - ▶ Stop.

# Exercise

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Construct a Post machine that adds one to a natural number in unary representation.

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(Credits due to: [Vincent van Oostrom](#))

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- ▶ stopping condition

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# Turing computability



Alan Turing (1912 – 1954)

# Turing's analysis of a human 'computer'

Section 9 in Turing's 1937 paper 'On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem' [3].

A direct appeal to intuition in analysing human computation:

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- ▶ number of 'states of mind' of the computer is finite

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
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*"It is my contention that these operations include all those which are used in the computation of a number."*

# Turing machine



memory tape

# Church–Turing Thesis

## Thesis (Church–Turing, 1937)

*Every effectively calculable function is computable by a Turing-machine.*

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- ▶  $\delta : (Q \setminus F) \times \Gamma \rightarrow Q \times \Gamma \times \{L, R\}$  is a **partial function**, called the **transition function**;
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# Turing machine: definition notions

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Let  $M = \langle Q, \Sigma, \Gamma, \delta, q_0, \#F \rangle$  be a Turing machine.

A **configuration** of  $M$  is elements  $w_1 q w_2 \in \Gamma^* \times Q \times \Gamma^*$  such that the first letter in  $w_1$  and the last letter in  $w_2$  are different from  $\#$

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- ▶  $M$  accepts  $w$  if  $q_0w \vdash_M^* uqv$  for some accepting config.  $uqv$ .

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## Definition

Let  $M = \langle Q, \Sigma, \Gamma, \delta, q_0, \#F \rangle$  be a Turing machine.

A **configuration** of  $M$  is elements  $w_1qw_2 \in \Gamma^* \times Q \times \Gamma^*$  such that the first letter in  $w_1$  and the last letter in  $w_2$  are different from  $\#$

- ▶  $uqv'$  with  $a \in \Sigma$  is an **end-configuration** if  $\delta(q, a)$  is undefined.
- ▶  $uqv'$  is **accepting configuration** if  $q \in F$ .

$\vdash_M \dots$  next-move-relation

$\vdash_M^*$  ... reflexive, and transitive closure of  $\vdash_M$

Let  $w \in \Sigma^*$ .

- ▶  $M$  halts on (input)  $w$  if  $q_0w \vdash_M^* uqv$  for some end-config.  $uqv$ .
- ▶  $M$  accepts  $w$  if  $q_0w \vdash_M^* uqv$  for some accepting config.  $uqv$ .

$L(M) := \{w \in \Sigma^* \mid M \text{ accepts } w\}$  is the **language accepted by  $M$** .

# Recursively enumerable/recursive languages

## Definition

Let  $L \subseteq \Sigma^*$  a language.


$L$  is called **recursively enumerable** if

- ▶  $L = L(M)$  for some Turing machine  $M$  with input symbols  $\Sigma$ .


$L$  is called **recursive** if

- ▶ there is a Turing machine  $M$  with input symbols  $\Sigma$  such that
  - ▶  $L = L(M)$
  - ▶  $M$  **halts** on all of its inputs.


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
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
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# Exercises

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Construct a Turing machine that adds one to a natural number in binary representation.

(In the film this Turing machine is executed five times consecutively.)

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## Exercise

Construct a Turing machine that, if started on the empty tape, writes the sequence

010110111011110111110...

on the tape, but does not halt.

(Compare your machine with Turing's machine for this purpose.)

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- ▶ loop (unbounded)
- ▶ stopping condition

# Variants of Turing machines

- ▶ TM's with semi-infinite tapes (infinite in only one direction)
- ▶ TM's with multiple tapes
  - ▶ Input/Output Turing machines (with input- and output tapes)
- ▶ non-deterministic TM's:  $\delta \subseteq ((Q \times \Gamma) \times (Q \times \Gamma \times \{\text{L}, \text{R}\}))$
- ▶ tape-bounded TM's (by  $f(n)$  for inputs of length  $n$ )
- ▶ oracle Turing machines
- ▶ Turing machines with advice
- ▶ alternating Turing machines
- ▶ ...
- ▶ interactive/reactive TM's

# Elementary Recursion Theory

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## Theorem

There exist unsolvable decision problems.

# Exercise: Halting Problem

## Exercise

Try to adapt the diagonalisation argument to show that for the **Halting Problem**

$$H = \{ \langle\langle M \rangle, w \rangle \mid M \text{ halts on input } w \}$$

it holds:

- ▶  $H$  is **not recursive**

and show that:

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# Properties of r.e./recursive sets (I)

For  $L \subseteq \Sigma^*$ ,  $\bar{L} := \Sigma^* \setminus L$  is called the complement of  $L$ .

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- ▶ the accepting states of  $M$  are made non-accepting in  $\bar{M}$ .
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It follows that  $\bar{L} = L(\bar{M})$ , and that  $\bar{M}$  halts on all inputs. □

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*If both of  $L$  and  $\bar{L}$  are r.e., then  $L$  is recursive.*

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To decide, for a given  $w \in \Sigma^*$ , whether  $w \in L$ , build a Tm  $M$  that executes  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  on  $w$  in parallel, and such that:

- ▶ if  $M_1$  accepts  $w$ , then also  $M$  accepts  $w$ .
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Since for all  $w$ , either  $w \in L$  or  $w \in \bar{L}$ , it follows that either  $M_1$  or  $M_2$  halts on  $w$ , and hence  $M$  halts on all inputs.

Hence  $L = L(M)$  is recursive.

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- ▶  $\textcolor{brown}{L}_u$  is not recursive:


Suppose that  $\textcolor{brown}{L}_u$  is recursive. Then  $\bar{L}_u$  is recursive, and hence there exists a Tm.  $\textcolor{violet}{M}$  such that  $\bar{L}_u = L(\textcolor{violet}{M})$ .

$\textcolor{violet}{M}$  can be used to build a Tm.  $\textcolor{red}{M}'$  that accepts the diagonalisation language  $\textcolor{green}{L}_d$ , entailing  $\textcolor{brown}{L}_u = L(\textcolor{red}{M}')$ .


[picture of  $\textcolor{red}{M}'$  to be given]

But then  $\textcolor{brown}{L}_u$  would actually be r.e., in contradiction with what we proved before.

# Finite-state automaton



# Formal-languages Chomsky hierarchy



# Summary

- ▶ Post machine
- ▶ Turing machine
  - ▶ Turing's analysis of computations done by (human) computers
  - ▶ formal definition
  - ▶ video
- ▶ Elementary recursion theory
  - ▶ an unsolvable problem
  - ▶ Halting problem
  - ▶ recursively enumerable, and recursive sets
  - ▶ universal language
  - ▶ Chomsky hierarchy

# Recommended reading

## ① Recursive and primitive-recursive functions:

Chapter 4, Recursive Functions of the book:

- ▶ Maribel Fernández [1]: *Models of Computation (An Introduction to Computability Theory)*, Springer-Verlag London, 2009.

# Course overview

Monday, July 7 10.30 – 12.30	Tuesday, July 8 10.30 – 12.30	Wednesday, July 9 10.30 – 12.30	Thursday, July 10 10.30 – 12.30	Friday, July 11
<i>intro</i>	<i>classic models</i>		<i>additional models</i>	
<b>Introduction to Computability</b>  computation and decision problems, from logic to computability, overview of models of computation relevance of MoCs	<b>Machine Models</b>  Post Machines, typical features, Turing's analysis of human computers, Turing machines, basic recursion theory	<b>Recursive Functions</b>  primitive recursive functions, Gödel–Herbrand recursive functions, partial recursive funct's, partial recursive = = Turing-computable, Church's Thesis	<b>Lambda Calculus</b>  $\lambda$ -terms, $\beta$ -reduction, $\lambda$ -definable functions, partial recursive = $\lambda$ -definable = Turing computable	
	<i>imperative programming</i>	<i>algebraic programming</i>	<i>functional programming</i>	
				14.30 – 16.30
				<b>Three more Models of Computation</b>
				Post's Correspondence Problem, Interaction-Nets, Fractran
				comparing computational power

# References

-  Maribel Fernández.  
*Models of Computation (An Introduction to Computability Theory).*  
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On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.  
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<http://www.wolframscience.com/prizes/tm23/images/Turing.pdf>.