


# Miscellaneous

50.037 Blockchain Technology  
Paweł Szalachowski

# **Proof-of-Stake (aka Virtual Mining)**

# Energy Consumption



Source: <https://powercompare.co.uk/bitcoin/>

# Proof-of-Stake (PoS)

- Any proof-of-resource can be translated to *proof-of-money*
- So why not remove this intermediary and “mine” with cryptocurrency stakes?
  - Miners instead of buying hardware, buy stake and vote with it
    - Sybil attacks eliminated
- Energy-friendly, more efficient, reduce ASIC-caused centralization, any cryptocurrency holder is a stakeholder

## PoW



## PoS



# Peercoin

- <https://peercoin.net/assets/paper/peercoin-paper.pdf> (2012)
- Hybrid PoW/PoS with stake denominated by coin-age
  - coin-age = (amount of UTXO) × (# of blocks it remains unspent)
- Block mining as in Bitcoin:  $H(\text{header}) < T$ 
  - T is adjusted based on how much coin-age they are willing to consume
    - Blocks include a special coin stake Tx which spends some transactions to reset their coin-age to zero
    - The sum of the coin-ages consumed in the coin stake transaction decides how difficult the proof-of-work puzzle is to make a given block valid
- Miners can balance PoW/coin-age but it is much easier to find a solution consuming some coin-age

# PoS

- Pure PoS: vote proving that you control some stake
  - Richest participants always stay richest
- The nothing-at-stake-problem
  - An adversary tries to create a fork of  $k$  blocks (would fail with high probability)
  - In PoW mining that would cost the adversary a lot of resources, but with PoS?
  - Rational miners would constantly attempting to fork the chain
  - Mitigations: checkpoints, punishments, etc ...
- Some of these systems are getting close to classic BFT consensus protocols
  - Similar setting and problems

# PoS

- Not tested as PoW, new attack vectors likely to be found
  - Stake centralization
  - 51% miner can control the chain forever
  - No new powerful miner can emerge, like in PoW
- Is that a permissionless system anymore?
  - Someone needs to give us stake
- Active research: Ethereum's Casper, Algorand, ...

# Atomic Cross-chain Swaps



# Atomic Swaps

- In Bitcoin, it is easy to move tokens controlled by different entities
  - Txs are confirmed on the blockchain
- Can we swap one type of coin for another?
  - Alice wants to sell a quantity **a** of altcoin to Bob in exchange for a quantity **b** of his bitcoin
  - Tx should be atomic and without a trusted intermediary
    - Easy to solve w/ a trusted intermediary (exchange), but w/o?

1. Alice generates a refundable deposit of  $a$  altcoins as follows:
  - 1.1 Alice generates a random string  $x$  and computes the hash  $h=H(x)$
  - 1.2 Alice generates **DepositA** as shown below, but doesn't publish it yet
  - 1.3 Alice generates **RefundA**, and gets Bob's signature on it
  - 1.4 Once Bob signs **RefundA**, she publishes DepositA (but doesn't publish **RefundA**)
2. Bob generates a refundable deposit of  $b$  bitcoins as follows:
  - 2.1 Bob generates **DepositB** as shown below, but doesn't publish it yet
  - 2.2 Bob generates **RefundB**, and gets Alice's signature on it
  - 2.2 Once Alice signs **RefundB**, he publishes **DepositB** (but doesn't publish **RefundB**)
3. Case 1: Alice goes through with the swap
  - 3.1 Alice claims the bitcoins by time  $T_1$ , revealing  $x$  to Bob (and everyone) in the process
  - 3.2 Bob claims the altcoins by time  $T_2$
 Case 2: Alice changes her mind, does not claim the altcoins, does not reveal  $x$  to Bob
  - 3.1 Bob claims his altcoin refund at time  $T_1$
  - 3.2 Alice claims her Bitcoin refund at time  $T_2$

#### DepositA [Altcoin block chain]

Input: Alice's coins of value  $a$   
 ScriptPubkey: Redeemable by providing either ( $sigA$  and  $sigB$ ) or  $sigB$  and  $x$  s.t.  $H(x) = \langle h \rangle$



#### RefundA [Altcoin block chain]

Input: DepositA  
 Output: AddrA  
 Timelock:  $T_2$   
 ScriptSig:  $sigA, sigB$

#### DepositB [Bitcoin block chain]

Input: Bob's coins of value  $b$   
 ScriptPubkey: Redeemable by providing either ( $sigA$  and  $sigB$ ) or  $sigA$  and  $x$  s.t.  $H(x) = \langle h \rangle$



#### RefundB [Bitcoin block chain]


Input: DepositB  
 Output: AddrB  
 Timelock:  $T_1$   
 ScriptSig:  $sigA, sigB$

# State Channels

# Payments in Bitcoin


- Issues
  - Scalability and Tx latency
  - Micropayments
    - High fees if done “on-chain” w/o trusted parties
- Idea: 2nd layer scalability
  - So far we discussed “on-chain” scalability (1st layer)
  - Consider micropayments: do we need to settle all Tx's on chain?
  - Payment channels: “off-chain” Tx's with the final balance recorded on-chain
    - Can be generalized to any state (state channels), e.g., smart contracts

# Payment Channel (unidirectional)



# Payment Networks

- Payment Networks (e.g., Lightning <https://lightning.network/>)
  - Do we need to establish many p2p channels? Multiple “hops”
  - Low fees, fast, high throughput, buyers are protected, sellers need to watch the blockchain
- Many off-chain solutions
  - Not only payments, smart contracts too
    - Plasma, Arbitrum, ...



# Data Feeds for Smart Contracts



# Problem

- How to empower smart contracts so they can process data from external infrastructures?
- A lot of data available via HTTPS (HTTP over TLS)
  - It would be great to use it in smart contracts
  - Use a proxy? Need to trust it
- TLS does not provide non-repudiation for app data
  - Cannot prove to a third-party authenticity of received data




# TownCrier

- <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/168.pdf>
- A proxy between a blockchain and HTTPS websites
  - but implemented with Intel's SGX
- Pros: easy integration, website operators do not have to deploy
- Cons: needs to trust Intel (single point of failure) and SGX (recent attacks)




# TLS-N

- <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/578.pdf>
- TLS with non-repudiation
  - Efficient Merkle-tree-based authentication on TLS layer
- Pros: more general and powerful solution, extra features (like privacy)
- Cons: significant changes to the TLS spec, TLS servers have to be updated, difficult/expensive integration with smart contracts (TLS records are signed)




# PDFS

- <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.06641.pdf>
- Data providers sign (via TLS) their contract locations with API allowing:
  - A. Update the contract with a new root of a database (append-only)
  - B. Prove that given data is authentic (is in the database), can be paid
  - C. Query for data if provider seems unavailable
- Pros: direct TLS authentication, easy integration and data format, extra features
- Cons: website operators have to deploy



# Do you need a blockchain?

(<https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/375.pdf>)



# Reading

- Textbook 10.5
- + inline references