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# Protocol Summary

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PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user's password. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

# Disclaimer

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The Clemmos Academy team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

# Risk Classification

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Impact		
High	Medium	Low

Impact				
	High	H	H/M	M
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the [CodeHawks](#) severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

## Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond to the following commit hash:

```
2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990
```

## Scope

```
./src/  
└─ PasswordStore.sol
```

- Solc Version: 0.8.18
- Chain(s) to deploy contract to: Ethereum

## Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsiders: No one else should be able to set or read the password.

## Executive Summary

tools, hours etc comment l'audit s'est passé

## Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

# Findings

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## High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone, and no longer private

**Description:** All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only accessed through `PasswordStore::getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

We show one such method of reading any data off chain below.

**Impact:** Anyone can read the private password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

**Proof of Concept:** The below test case shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

1. Create a locally running chain

```
make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool We use `1` because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract

```
cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You'll get an output that looks like this:

```
6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

```
cast parse-bytes32-string
6d7950617373776f7264000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

And get an output of

```
myPassword
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

[H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password

**Description:** The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function allows only the owner to set a new password.`

```
function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
  @>    // @audit - There is no access controls
        s_password = newPassword;
        emit SetNetPassword();
}
```

**Impact:** Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severely breaking the contract intended functionality.

#### Proof of Concept:

► Code

```
function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public {
    vm.assume(randomAddress != owner);
    vm.prank(randomAddress);
    string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
    passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);

    vm.prank(owner);
    string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
    assertEq(expectedPassword, actualPassword);
}
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function.

```
if(msg.sender != owner){
    revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
}
```

## Informational

[I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` netspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the netspec to be incorrect

**Description:**

```
/*
 * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
@> * @param newPassword The new password to set.
 */
function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
```

**Impact:** The netspec is incorrect.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Remove the incorrect netspec line.

```
- * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```