

**CRIM.5780 – 201**  
**Intelligence Analysis: Policy and Practice**

Spring 2019  
Thurs.: 6:30p.m. – 9:20p.m.

## **Instructor**

**Professor:** Dr. Christopher Linebarger  
**Email:** Christopher.Linebarger@uml.edu  
**Course Website:** Blackboard  
**Office:** HSSB 435  
**Office Hours:** Tues. & Thur.: 1:30 – 3:00 p.m.

## **Description**

Intelligence is at the core of the national security enterprise. Successful intelligence can provide policy-makers with advanced warning of new developments in international relations and allows them to make informed decisions. The importance of intelligence has been highlighted ever since 9/11 and in the subsequent conflicts, and we are reminded of its potential for controversy in recent events. This course therefore introduces graduate students to the theory, practice, and history of intelligence. Intelligence Studies is a relatively new field of academic inquiry, typically situated at the interdisciplinary boundary between political science, history, public administration, and security studies. Our goal, therefore, is to explore the fundamental basics of the theory and practice of intelligence, and to examine a variety of crucial issues that frequently arise, with particular reference to American, British, and Russian intelligence services. The course will offer in-depth study of intelligence collection, analysis, covert action, counter-intelligence, intelligence failure, and will explore case studies of each.

As this is a graduate level course, the professor will only occasionally offer lectures in the traditional format. Rather, this course is comprised primarily of student-driven seminars. Each seminar will include critical discussion and analysis of readings, presentations of case studies, and assessment of intelligence services. Students should take care to read and digest all the assigned readings – they are a core component of the seminar and must be studied in order to have a successful semester. Active and informed participation in the class is also necessary for students to get everything they can out of the material.

# Learning Objectives

This is a graduate level seminar in which students are expected to independently research the topics covered in the course and to form their own opinion. As such, all students are expected to be fully prepared for each class session, to have completed all assigned readings, and to actively participate in class discussions.

On completion of the course, students should be able to:

- Analyze the role and limits of intelligence in key aspects of national security policy-making;
- Evaluate the efficacy, legality and morality of intelligence activities;
- Demonstrate understanding of the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers;
- Demonstrate understanding of the reasons for intelligence failures and how lessons can be learned from previous mistakes; and,
- Demonstrate understanding of the relationship between intelligence and counter-intelligence.

# Required Readings & Course Material

There is one basic textbook that is required for this course. Students should purchase this book and read the relevant sections as assigned every week. Additional readings consisting of journal articles and webpages can be found in the Blackboard Learn system. These are listed on the course calendar below.

- Mark Lowenthal. 2014. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. 7th Edition. Washington DC: CQ Press. ISBN-13: 978-1608716753.

# Assignments

There are five major components to the class (with grade percentages):

1. Attendance & participation (15%);
2. Film Reaction Paper (10%);
3. Presentation (15%);
4. Intelligence memo and briefing (40%); and,
5. Final exam (20%).

# 1 – Attendance & Participation (15% of grade)

As this is a graduate level seminar, it is my intention to emphasize discussion. Because discussion is impossible without your presence, attendance is expected. Roll will be taken throughout the semester. A midterm attendance grade will be posted so that you can make any needed course corrections before the end of the term.

Your base attendance and participation grade will be based upon the proportion of times you attend out of the total number of class sessions. Then, I will adjust that grade up or down depending on your participation. To maximize this part of your grade, it is highly recommended that you come to class prepared (e.g., having done the assigned readings) and be willing to participate in discussions. Merely showing up and occupying a seat will not constitute full participation. **Note, moreover, that missing more than three classes will result in a “0” for Attendance and Participation.**

My hope is that the classroom will have an atmosphere in which ideas and opinions will be welcomed and addressed. As such, please note that you will be graded on a number of criteria beyond simple participation, under the rubric of “professionalism,” and as such you are expected to act in a professional manner.

Other ways to lose participation points include but are not limited to: being a disruption to others (e.g., side conversations with friends, reading for other classes, texting, browsing the internet), leaving class early without my explicit prior approval, repeatedly failing to answer a question if called upon, and not participating in classroom discussions and exercises in a productive manner.

Please note that leaving class before it is dismissed and then not returning is extremely rude. Perhaps most importantly, it is highly disrespectful to the learning environment of your fellow students. If you engage in this behavior, you will be marked as absent for the day. If you must leave class early, please obtain my explicit prior approval. If you are sick and must leave early, please email me afterwards.

## **2 – Film Reaction Paper (10% of grade)**

No classes will be held on the week of March 28. In lieu of class, there will be a writing assignment due on date specified on the calendar below. Your task is to watch a film and then respond to it. A link to the film will be made available as we draw closer to the date in question. You are then to write a short essay (1000 words) that responds to a prompt that the professor will provide.

Please submit the assignment through the submission system in Blackboard by 11:59 PM on the due date.

To make sure your essay respects the word-count, use the “review” tab in Microsoft Office and click on “word count,” make sure to un-tick “Include, textboxes, footnotes...”). A word count should appear at the end of your assignment.

The prompt asks for your opinion, but your thoughts should be informed by the readings, lecture, and/or discussions that we undertake in the prior weeks.

The assignment should cite the readings that we have covered to date (citations should be in APA format). Include a bibliography.

The bibliography should not be included in the word count.

## **3 – Presentation (15% of grade.)**

Every student will be assigned to a group in order to make brief presentations of about 20 minutes in length. Topics for each presentation are listed on the course calendar below. Every student in the group has to talk for an equal amount of time. The teams should meet before the presentation and decide what they are going to say. Construct a set of PowerPoint slides for your presentation. A link will be available in Blackboard for you to turn in your assignment. The due date is 30 minutes before the start of class. The group should bring a backup copy of their presentation on a flashdrive.

Your presentation is to include:

1. A 20 minute PowerPoint (or equivalent) lecture to the class.

This lecture will provide: (1) a succinct historical background to the question; (2) an analysis of the role that intelligence played; (3) how the case was resolved; and (4) lessons to be learned for intelligence professionals in the future.

2. At the end of the presentation, you will then provide at least one discussion question for each of that week's readings. The group will lead a class discussion, providing at least one discussion question for each of that week's readings. Include a slide that contains these questions.

These questions should not be simple factual questions about the contents of the readings, but should be critical questions designed to elicit analysis, thought, and critical discussion. These questions should not be political or judgemental in nature but, rather, designed to foster objective analysis and critical discussion.

Be brief and analytical; organize your argument around the main points you want to make. Good slides are typically minimalist in appearance. You may also make use of video and other media in your presentation if you so choose (but this is not required), so long as they are brief. Please keep any such media rated “PG.”

Grades are assigned based on individual performance, not group performance. Thus, individuals who “freeride” on the efforts of their group-mates, or who fail to attend class on their assigned date, cannot expect to receive full credit. In the event that a group-member stops attending class, drops the course, or fails to contribute, simply proceed as normal and adapt your presentation — I will not reassign students to another group except in unusual circumstances.

Please include a slide of references at the end of your presentation.

The quality of your questions will count as part of your grade in this assignment. Do not try to sneak in political opinions disguised as questions into your presentation (this is called “trolling”). The strength, quality, and criticality of your questions will be graded.

Each student in the class is expected to participate in the discussion and respond to their peer’s questions; your participation here will be factored into your overall participation grade.

## 4 – Current intelligence memo & briefing (40% of grade)

The major assignment for the class is to write a current intelligence memo and present a briefing. *Due dates are listed on the course calendar below.*

Current intelligence memos and briefings are common in the intelligence and national security sectors, including the military service branches. They provide information on current events that may affect the safety of US citizens and/or American national interests around the globe. They will typically focus on a theme (e.g., cyber security), an incident (e.g., a terrorist bombing), a group or individual (e.g., ISIS), or a particular region of the world (e.g., Afghanistan).

There are two aspects to this assignment:

1. **The current intelligence memo (70% of assignment).** A 15 page paper presenting information on a current event, in which you make an argument about the state of an international threat to US interests.
2. **The briefing (30% of assignment).** A 10 minute presentation on the current threat you have selected, in which you work to convince your audience that the threat requires action.

Both aspects are detailed below.

### The current intelligence memo

You are to write a memo, approximately 15 double-spaced pages in length. The assignment is to “imagine” that you are a low level analyst inside the CIA tasked with briefing a senior level policy maker (i.e., the National Security Advisor or the President). Your job is to pick out the most important and relevant details in your topic. The memo should be timely, clear, and “actionable.” Topics will be assigned during the second class session.

A successful memo will answer a number of questions in the fewest words possible:

- What's new?
- Why is it happening?
- What does it mean?
- How do we know?
- What might happen next?
- What opportunities are there to shape the future?

The memo should summarize your “key findings” at the beginning. After that, further elaboration of the findings is contained in the body of the memo, followed by an estimate of future developments and implications, or descriptions of the gaps in our knowledge. This format is sometimes called “BLUF” (Bottom Line Up Front), in which the conclusions are presented first, followed by amplifying information. Memos must be accurate, objective, concise, contain no personal opinions, and be written with grammar and wording following defined rules, and should be free of policy recommendations.

## **The briefing**

You are then to give a 10 minute presentation. Your task is to clearly and concisely persuade your audience of the importance of your topic. There will then be no more than 5 minutes devoted to Q & A from the audience. Participation by students in the Q & A is required, and will inform part your overall participation grade. Adherence to time will be strictly enforced and is a critical part of your grade.

## **Additional memo and briefing policies**

Additional policies for the memo and briefing assignment are as follows:

- You must use scholarly sources (journal articles, academic books, government reports, etc.). The aim of the exercise is to gain practice at original research and to learn how to recognize a good source on which to base an argument. As such, questionable websites and encyclopedias are not permitted for use as references. Generally, questionable websites include anything with a “.com” or a “.org” top level domain. Citing or giving attribution to Wikipedia is expressly forbidden.
- The paper should be written in 12 point font, with one inch margins, and in the standard fonts.
- The title should stand as your first key judgement, or else convey a new development.
- Employ the BLUF format.
- Employ APA format.
- A full bibliography must also be included at the end of the essay, listing all sources in alphabetical order. The bibliography must be excluded from the page count.
- Ensure that you use the language of analytical certainty.
- Provide analytical judgements, utilizing a “what” or “so what” perspective.
- Provide the information needed to address issues and make decisions
- Accuracy. Information should be checked for validity and reliability.
- Brevity. Do not provide excessive background information; get to the point.
- Be objective (don’t make use of many adjectives or adverbs).
- Discuss what comes next, implications, opportunities, and threats as appropriate.
- Late submissions will only be tolerated in exceptional cases (such as a medical or family emergency). Without proper documentation, papers that are submitted late will receive an automatic 10 percent reduction per day. Essays submitted more than 72 hours after the deadline will not be accepted and will receive a zero.
- The aim of the paper is to gain practice at building an argument and to learn how to recognize good research. As such, students must provide attribution throughout their paper

for each fact, assertion, or argument. Attribution is given with citations and a bibliography. All quotations should be cited, of course, but overly-extensive use of quotes to inflate your word-count will result in a lower grade.

- Plagiarism, which is defined as claiming the work of others as your own, is totally unacceptable. As well, using the language of another source with only a few word changes is a form of plagiarism, even if you provide a properly cited reference. Attempting to artificially construct a paper by pasting together the words of others, with little or not original writing of your own, is simply another form of plagiarism and will be treated as such.

## **5 – Final exam (20% of grade)**

There will be a single “take home” final exam in this class. The exam will be distributed in class; it will be due in class on the date specified on the calendar below. The exam will require you to write essay responses to a set of questions.

# Grading Rubrics

## Written material

All written materials submitted for this class are assessed on the following categories:

- **Argument:** Stated in introduction? Convincing? Original?
- **Analysis:** Critical discussion/evaluation of facts? Conclusions logical?
- **Coherence & Structure:** Line of argumentation? Contradictions? Terms used consistently? Logical Structure?
- **Research:** Enough relevant sources? Quality of sources? Primary sources?
- **Language and form:** Grammar/punctuation? Page numbers? Paragraphs? Referencing? Bibliography? Respecting word-count?

## Presentations

All presentations are assessed on the following categories:

- **Attention to audience:** Presenter engages audience and holds their attention with enthusiasm, poise, eye contact, articulation, and clear focus.
- **Argument:** There is a clear thesis plainly articulated up front and elaborated with specific and appropriate examples; transitions are clear and create a succinct and even flow.
- **Timing:** Was timing respected? Did the presenter go over or under the allotted time?
- **Content:** Were the main aspects of the topic covered? How good is the argument presented? How good is the evidence and the material used? Is it factually correct?
- **Visuals:** Were the slides used effectively? Too many slides? Slides too wordy?

## Points

Each one of these categories, in both written and oral assignments, will then be graded according to whether it has:

- **No issues** (-0%);
- **Minor issues** (-3%);
- **Moderate issues** (-5%);
- **Major issues** (-7%); or,
- **Significant issues** (-10%).

## **Course Grades**

Grades are assigned according to the following scale:

<b>Letter Grade</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
A	93–100%
A-	90–92.9%
B+	87–89.9%
B	83–86.9%
B-	80–82.9%
C+	77–79.9%
C	73–76.9%
C-	70–72.0%
D+	67–69.9%
D	64–66.9%
F	0–63.9%

## **UMass Lowell Policies**

### **Academic Integrity Policy**

Please visit: <https://www.uml.edu/Catalog/Undergraduate/Policies/Academic-Policies/Academic-Integrity.aspx>, and familiarize yourself with UMass Lowell Integrity policy. Students should follow accepted ethical and moral standards in their academic work. A violation is subject to administrative dismissal.

### **Student Disability Services**

UMass Lowell is dedicated to assisting students with disabilities by providing sensible accommodations in all courses. Students with documented disabilities should contact the Student Disability Services at: <http://www.uml.edu/studentservices/Disability/default.aspx> or by calling: 978-934-4574.

# Course Calendar & Assigned Readings

The following calendar is only a guide. Dates and topics are subject to change. Any changes will be announced in-class well ahead of time. It is your responsibility to keep up to date with any schedule alterations.

The recommended readings are *not required* for the class. They are listed simply to provide additional context, to suggest material that could be useful for writing your papers or preparing your presentations, and to provide you with direction if a particular topic interests you enough to pursue it in the future.

Each week of class contains a list of suggested cases for presentation. You are not required to keep to this list, but please be sure that your presentation analyzes a case related to that week's topic.

## Week 1, January 24: Introduction & What is Intelligence?

### Required readings:

- Lowenthal, "What is Intelligence?"
- R.A. Random. 1993. "Intelligence as a Science." *Studies in Intelligence*. 2(2). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no2/html/v02i2a09p\\_0001.htm](https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no2/html/v02i2a09p_0001.htm)
- Arthur S. Hulnick. 2006. "What's wrong with the intelligence cycle?" *Intelligence and National Security*. 21(6).
- Michael Warner. 2002. "Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence" *Studies in Intelligence* 46(3). <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html>

### Recommended readings:

- Loch Johnson. "Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. 16(4).
- Winn L. Taplin. 1989. "Six General Principles of Intelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. 3(4): 475–491.
- Thomas F. Troy. 1991–92. "The 'correct' definition of intelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. 5(4): 433-454.

## **Week 2, January 31:** Intelligence Studies

*Student presentation, Group A:* What role did intelligence play during the American Revolution, and how effective was it?

*Required readings:*

- Lowenthal, “The Development of US Intelligence”
- Lowenthal, “The US Intelligence Community”
- Richard Best. 2015. “Intelligence and US National Security policy.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. 28(3).
- Len Scott. 2007. “Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View” *Intelligence and National Security*. 22(2).

*Recommended readings:*

- Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku. 2012. “Escaping from American intelligence: culture, ethnocentrism and the Anglosphere.” *International Affairs* 88(5).
- Loch Johnson. 2003. “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence.” *Comparative Strategy*. 22(1).
- Len Scott and Peter Jackson. 2004. “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice.” *Intelligence and National Security*. 19(2).
- Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich and Wesley Wark (eds.), *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (London: Routledge 2009)
- Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper 1995)
- Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz. 2010. *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology* [3rd Edition]. Oxford University Press.
- John Ranelagh. 1986. *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*. Simon & Schuster.

## **Week 3: February 7:** The disciplines of intelligence collection

*Student presentation, Group B:* What is OSINT and how does it compare with the other “INTs”?

*Required readings:*

- Lowenthal, “Collection and the Collection Disciplines”
- Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes. 2001. “Introduction on the Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War.” *Intelligence and National Security* 16(1).
- Frederick P. Hitz. 2005. “The Myths and Current Reality of Espionage.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18(4)
- “Open Source Intelligence: A Strategic Enabler of National Security.” *CSS Analyses in Security Policy* 3(32).
- Browse the National Cryptologic Museum: <https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/museum/>

*Recommended readings:*

- Jeffrey T. Richelson. 2001. “MASINT: The New Kid in Town.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 14(2).
- CIA Inspector General report concerning the Alrich Ames case. [https://fas.org/irp/congress/1994\\_rpt/ssci\\_ames.html](https://fas.org/irp/congress/1994_rpt/ssci_ames.html)
- Affidavit in *USA v. Robert Philip Hanssen*. [https://fas.org/irp/ops/ci/hanssen\\_affidavit.html](https://fas.org/irp/ops/ci/hanssen_affidavit.html)
- Robert Louis Benson. N.d. “The VENONA Story” Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History.
- Clayton D. Laurie. 2001. “Congress and the National Reconnaissance Office.” Chantilly, VA: Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office. Available online: <http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/programs/docs/prog-hist-04.pdf>
- Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev. 1999. *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – the Stalin Era*. New York: Random House.
- Jeffrey T. Richelson. 2002. “Restructuring the NRO: From the Cold War’s End to the 21st Century.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 15(4).

## **Week 4, February 14:** Intelligence analysis

*Student presentation, Group C:* What were the main difficulties CIA analysts faced when estimating when judging the presence or absence of WMD in Iraq?

*Required readings:*

- Lowenthal, “Analysis”
- Sherman Kent. 1968. “Estimates and Influence.” *Studies in Intelligence*.<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/4estimates.html>
- Mark Lowenthal. 2008. “Towards a reasonable standard for analysis: how right, how often, on which issues?” *Intelligence and National Security* 23(3).
- Charles Weiss. 2008. “Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and Other Professions.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 21(1).

*Recommended readings:*

- Dany Shoham and Raphael Ofek. 2012. “The 2007 U.S. NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Colossal Failure.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 25(2).
- Bruce D. Berkowitz. 2008. “US Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Collapse: Reality and Perception.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. 21(2).
- Michael Herman. 2011. “What Difference Did It Make?” *Intelligence and National Security*. 26(6).
- John McCreary and Richard A. Posner. 2008. “The Latest Intelligence Crisis.” *Intelligence and National Security* 23(3).
- Ernest R. May, ed. 1984. *Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Ed. 1999. Benjamin B. Fischer. *At Cold War’s End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991*. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence.

## **Week 5, February 21:** Intelligence analysis, part II

*Student presentation, Group C:* What were the main difficulties CIA analysts faced when estimating Soviet military and economic strength?

*Required readings:*

- Abbot E. Smith. 1969. "On the Accuracy of National Intelligence Estimates." *Studies in Intelligence* 13(4). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol13no4/html/v13i4a04p\\_0001.htm](https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol13no4/html/v13i4a04p_0001.htm)
- Stephen Marrin. 2007. "Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities." *Intelligence and National Security*. 22(6).
- Robert Jervis. 2006. "Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 29(1).
- Richard Shultz. 2018. "Post-9/11 wartime intelligence analysis." *Intelligence and National Security*.

## **Week 6, February 28:** The intelligence-policy nexus

*Student presentation, Group D:* What were the bomber and missile “gaps” of the 1950s and 1960s? How were they resolved?

### *Required readings:*

- Lowenthal, “The Role of the Policy Maker”
- Mark Lowenthal. 1992. “Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers” *The Washington Quarterly* 15(1).
- Richard Betts. 2003. “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits.” *Paradoxes of strategic intelligence: Essays in honor of Michael I. Handel.*
- Stephen Marrin. 2011. “The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis.” *Intelligence and National Security*. 26(2–3).

### *Recommended readings:*

- Stephen Marrin. 2017. “Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy.” *Intelligence and National Security*.
- Douglas A. Borer, Stephen Twing, and Randy P. Burkett. 2013. “Problems in the Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Rethinking Korea, Tet, and Afghanistan.” *Intelligence and National Security*. 29(6).
- Lawrence Freedman. 1997. “The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The Politicization of Estimates, 1966-1977.” *Intelligence and National Security* 12(1).
- Richard A. Best, Jr. 2008. “What the Intelligence Community Got Right about Iraq.” *Intelligence and National Security* 23(3).
- Dennis M. Gormley. 2004. “The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons.” *Survival* 46(3).
- Glenn Hastedt. 2013. “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience.” *Intelligence and National Security*. 28(1).
- Joshua Rovner. 2013. “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” *Intelligence and National Security*. 28(1).

## **Week 7, March 7:** Intelligence failure(s)

*Student presentation, Group E:* What led to the attacks on Pearl Harbor? Can those events be described as an intelligence failure?

### *Required readings:*

- Richard Betts. 1978. "Analysis, war and decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable." *World Politics* 31(1).
- Amy Zegart. 2005. "September 11 and the adaptation failure of US intelligence." *International Security* 29(4).
- Erik J. Dahl. 2013. "Why Won't They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway." *Intelligence and National Security*. 28(1).
- Amy Zegart. 2007. "9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure." *Intelligence and National Security*. 22(2).

### *Recommended readings:*

- Mark Phythian. 2006. "The Perfect Intelligence Failure? US Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction." *Politics and Policy*. 34(2).
- James J. Wirtz. 1991. "Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War." *Political Science Quarterly*. 106(2).
- Jonathan Renshon. 2009. "Mirroring Risk: The Cuban Missile Estimation." *Intelligence and National Security*. 24(3).
- William J. Daugherty. "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. 14(4).
- Richard K. Betts. 1980. "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed." *Political Science Quarterly*. 95(4).
- Richard K. Betts. 1998. "Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas." Parameters. <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Articles/98spring/betts.htm>.

**SPRING BREAK: March 14: NO CLASS**

## **Week 8: March 21: Counter-intelligence and security**

*Student presentation, Group F:* Who were the Rosenbergs? What did they do, how did they do it, and why is their case an enduring point of controversy?

### *Required readings:*

- Lowenthal, “Counterintelligence”
- James. M. Olson. 2001. “A Never-ending necessity: ten commandments of counterintelligence.” *Studies in Intelligence*. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall\\_winter\\_2001/article08.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall_winter_2001/article08.html)
- Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow. 1997. “Cold war spies: Why they spied and how they got caught.” *Intelligence and National Security*. 12(2).
- John Ehrman. 2011. “The Dreyfus Affair: Enduring CI Lessons.” *Studies in Intelligence* 55(1).

### *Recommended readings:*

- Gene Poteat. 2014. “Counterintelligence, Homeland Security, and Domestic Intelligence.” *Intelligencer*.
- Justin R. Harber. 2009. “Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat from Non-State Actors.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 22(2).
- Lisa A. Kramer and Richards J. Heuer Jr. 2007. “America’s Increased Vulnerability to Insider Espionage.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. 20: 50–64.
- David Major and Peter C. Oleson. 2015. “Espionage Against America.” *Intelligencer*.
- Miron Varouhakis. 2011. “An Institution-Level Theoretical Approach for Counterintelligence.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 24(3).
- Carole A. Foryst. 2010. “Rethinking National Security Strategy Priorities.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 23(3).
- Robert L. Benson. n.d. “The Venona Story.” Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency.
- Paul R. Pillar. 2004. “Counterintelligence After Al Qaeda.” *The Washington Quarterly* 27(3).

**Week 9: March 28:** Professor at conference.

- The professor is at a conference this week. As such, there is no regular class session. Instead, you are to watch a film at home. A link to the film will be made available prior to this class.
- Your assignment following the viewing of this film is to write a 1000 word reaction paper to the following prompt: "Was the CIA held sufficiently accountable for the failures leading up to 9/11?"
- The reaction paper is due ***March 31 at 11:59 PM.***

## **Week 10: April 4: Covert Action**

*Student presentation, Group G:* What was Operation TP-AJAX? How effective was it and what were its long term consequences?

*Required readings:*

- Lowenthal, “Covert Action”
- David F. Rudgers. 2000. “The Origins of Covert Action.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 35(2).
- William J. Daugherty. 2004. “Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs since Reagan.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17(1).
- Loch Johnson. 1989. “Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America’s Secret Foreign Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 33(1).

*Recommended readings:*

- James A. Barry. 2007. “Managing Covert Action.” *Studies in Intelligence* 36(3).
- Dov H. Levin. 2016. “When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results.” *International Studies Quarterly* 60(2).
- William J. Daugherty. 2015. “Argo/Our Man in Tehran.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 28(1).
- John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze. 1980. “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered.” *International Security* 4(4).
- Elizabeth E. Anderson. 1998. “The security dilemma and covert action: The Truman years.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 11(4).
- Frederick L. Wettinger, 2003-04. “(C)overt Action: The Disappearing ‘C.’” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16(4).
- Steve Coll. 2004. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin.
- William J. Daugherty. 2004. *Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency*. University Press of Kentucky.
- Bob Woodward. 1988. *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- George Crile. 2003. *Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History*. Atlantic Books.

## **Week 11: April 11:** Intelligence ethics, reform, and oversight

*Student presentation, Group H:* What were MKULTRA and COINTELPRO, and what lessons can be learned from them?

*Required readings:*

- Lowenthal, “Oversight and Accountability”
- Lowenthal, “Ethical and Moral Issues in Intelligence”
- Amy Zegart. 2011. “The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight.” *Political Science Quarterly* 126(1).
- Loch Johnson. 2008. “The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability.” *Intelligence and National Security* 23(2).

*Recommended readings:*

- Amy Zegart. 2006. “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11.” *Political Science Quarterly* 121(1).
- Michael Quinlan. 2007. “Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an ethical theory.” *Intelligence and National Security* 22(1).
- Patrick C. Neary. 2010. “The Post-9/11 Intelligence Community: Intelligence Reform, 2001-2009: Requiescat in Pace?” *Studies in Intelligence* 54(1).
- William Colby and Richard Helms. *Oral History: Reflections of DCI Colby and Helms on the CIA’s “Time of Troubles.”* <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol151no3/reflections-of-dci-colby-and-helms-on-the-cia2019s-201ctime-of-troubles201d.html>
- U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States [Rockefeller Commission]. *Report to the President.* [http://history-matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents\\_church\\_reports\\_rockcomm.htm](http://history-matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents_church_reports_rockcomm.htm)
- Amy Zegart and Julie Quinn. 2010. “Congressional Intelligence Oversight: The Electoral Disconnection.” *Intelligence and National Security* 25(6).
- Matthew B. Walter. 2006. “Reforming Congressional Oversight of Intelligence.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 19(4).

**Week 12: April 18:** Presentations, part I

- No readings.
- *Presentations & Paper due by the start of class on April 18*

**Week 13: April 25:** Presentations, part II

- No readings.
- *Final exam distributed*

**Week 14: May 2:** Final exam week

- *Final exam due*

## Further Reading

- Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich and Wesley Wark (eds.), *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (London: Routledge 2009)
- Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper 1995)
- Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz. 2010. *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology* [3rd Edition]. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN-13: 978-0199733675.
- Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press 2007)
- Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2010).
- Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996)
- David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: Oxford University Press 2010)
- Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Washington DC: Potomac Books 2002)
- AFIO's "Guide to the Study of Intelligence." [http://www.afio.com/40\\_guide.htm](http://www.afio.com/40_guide.htm)

This syllabus is a guideline and is subject to change.

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