

# CLIP OS 5: Beta release

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Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (ANSSI)

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## About the ANSSI

- ► Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information
- French authority in the area of cyberdefence, network and information security
- ▶ Provides its expertise and technical assistance to government departments and businesses and plays an enhanced role in supporting operators of vital importance.

# CLIP OS?

- Linux distribution developed by the ANSSI
- ► Initially only available internally
- ▶ Now open source, mostly under the LGPL v2.1+
- ► Code and issue tracker hosted on GitHub<sup>12</sup>:
  - ► Version 4: available as reference and for upstream patch contribution
  - ▶ Version 5: currently developed version, beta released in December 2019

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ANSSI CLIP OS 5: Beta release

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://github.com/CLIPOS

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>https://github.com/CLIPOS-Archive

# CLIP OS?

## Not yet another Linux distribution

► Not a generic/multi-purpose distribution

## Targets three main use cases

- ▶ Mobile office workstation
- Remote administration workstation
- ► IPsec gateway

# Hardened OS

- ▶ Based on Gentoo Hardened
- ► Hardened Linux kernel and confined services
- ▶ No interactive root, account available:
  - ⇒ "Unprivileged" admin, audit and update roles
- ► Automatic updates using A/B partition model (similar to Android 7+)
- Multilevel security:
  - Provide two isolated user environments
  - Controlled interactions between isolated environments

5.0 Alpha features & security

## 5.0 Alpha: Initial features


- ► Functional core (boot to command line shell)
- ► Strict split between:
  - ► Read Only: system executables, configuration and data
  - ▶ Read Write: runtime configuration, logs, user and application data
- ► Initial boot chain integrity:
  - ► Secure Boot (bootloader, initramfs, Linux kernel and its command line)
  - Read-only system partition protected by DM-Verity
- ▶ Initial hardware support: QEMU/KVM virtual machine

5.0 Beta features & security

**5.0 Beta features & security** / TPM 2.0 Support


#### Goal:

 Transparent (no user interaction) encryption of writable system state partition




## Implementation:

Complements existing Secure
 Boot support and Boot Chain
 Integrity



- Seal the encryption key and provide it at boot time if machine in known-good state:
  - Rely on PCR 7: records measure of Secure Boot state
  - ► Expected Secure Boot state ⇒ we booted a trusted EFI binary (kernel + initramfs + cmdline)



- ▶ Using other PCRs is easy (e.g. PCR 0 to measure firmware integrity), but requires some care to handle updates
- ► Use Intel's implementation of the TPM2 Software Stack, from the initramfs: tpm2-tss library *via* tpm2-tools binaries (may change)

# **5.0 Beta features & security** / Update support

## **Update model**

#### Goals:

- Client side:
  - safe: applied while the system is online and in use
  - ▶ in-background: happen transparently to the user
  - ▶ atomic: list only valid options during boot
  - ▶ rollback: temporary fallback to a working version

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- Server side:
  - client identification and version reporting
  - update channels

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
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#### Threats:


- ► Compromised update server
- Active man-in-the-middle attacker
- Active local attacker






## CLIP OS system layout:

- ▶ UEFI boot only, following the Boot Loader Specification
- ► A/B partition setup using Logical Volumes for system Read-Only partitions (for example: Core)
- ► Single partition setup for stateful partitions




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
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
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- Verify download integrity




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- ► Install the Core partition in the currently unused Logical Volume or create a new one if only one exists
- ▶ Install the EFI binary with a name following the Boot Loader Specification
- ► Reboot the system to automatically boot the new version

## **Update support: Server**

#### Initial version:

- Static files served over HTTPS
- ► Versioned directory layout

```
https://update.clip-os.org/
+-- dist
| +-- 5.0.0-alpha.2
| +-- clipos-core, clipos-core.sig
| +-- clipos-efiboot, clipos-efiboot.sig
+-- update
+-- v1
+-- clipos
+-- version
```

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#### Planned:

- ► Client statistics and version reporting
- ► Channel support

# **Update support: Security**

#### Implemented:

- ► Client in Rust
- ► HTTPS with TLS 1.2+ only
- ► Root CA pinning
- ► Payload signatures using minisign
- ► Runtime rollback resistance (payload version stored with signature)

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- ► Client in Rust
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#### Unaddressed issues:

- ▶ Offline rollback resistance
- ► Update signing key compromise


# **Update support: Planned improvements**

- ► Reduce client privileges (unprivileged network procecessing, etc.)
- Incremental updates using casync
- Bootloader update
- ► Free disk space checks

# **5.0 Beta features & security** / IPsec support

# **IPsec support**

- Isolation using network namespaces
- ► IPsec access using XFRM interfaces (similar to Wireguard)



# **IPsec support**

- ► Latest strongSwan release (5.8.1):
  - Strict compile time configuration
  - ► Strict default strongSwan configuration
  - Confined unprivileged strongSwan daemon
- ► IPsec DR conformity in progress:
  - ► All available compile time and runtime configuration changes applied
  - ▶ All items requiring code changes and code review postponed to 5.0 stable
- ► IPsec aware nftables based firewalling:
  - Currently static rules generated at install time
  - Dynamically generated / template based rules postponed to 5.0 stable

# **5.0 Beta features & security** / Linux kernel maintenance

## linux-hardened

- Set of hardening patches initially maintained by Daniel Micay, many of them extracted from grsecurity/PaX
- Now maintained internally, in collaboration with Arch Linux
- ► Tends to shrink due to *upstreamization*, but some features regularly require time-consuming adaptations
- ► ASLR improvements, memory sanitizing, slab cookies, a bit more \_\_ro\_after\_init, etc.

## Patches merged upstream

Former out-of-tree patch sets merged and maintained in CLIP OS but now available upstream:

- Lockdown (in v5.4, as an LSM)
- ► STACKLEAK (since v4.20)

## Running a recent kernel

#### Pros:

- Quickly benefit from new features
  - ► Kernel hardening (e.g. init\_on\_free, STRUCTLEAK\_BYREF\_ALL)
  - Security mechanisms (e.g. dm\_verity, nf\_tables)
- ▶ Receive more stable backports, especially security fixes
- ► Constant but easier (and less error-prone) work to keep in sync
  - As opposed to CLIP OS v4: massive work required once upon a time to jump from one LTS to another

#### Cons:

- ► "Stable" kernels are far from being stable (but neither are LTS ones)
  - We uncover bugs, either in new features or due to uncompromising combinations and configurations that nobody seems to use nor test
  - Several bugs reported to upstream, as well as missing backports

## **5.0 Beta features & security** / Other features

## Other features

- ► Virtual testbed using Vagrant:
  - ► Includes test support for updates and IPsec
- ► Initial admin & audit roles (available over SSH)
- ► X260 hardware profile
- etc.

## **Project infrastructure**

Project infrastructure / Code review (Gerrit)	
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## Code review (Gerrit)

#### Gerrit:

- ▶ Powerful, Git-based, code review web application
- ► Deployed at: review.clip-os.org

# Project infrastructure / Continuous Integration (GitLab CI)

## Continuous Integration (GitLab CI)

#### Why GitLab?

- ► Lots of features (Git LFS, container registry, artifact storage, etc.)
- ► Compatible with offline development environment requirements (DR/CD)
- Gerrit deployment now optional
- Good documentation, lots of high profile users
- ► GitLab CI integration

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#### Why GitLab CI?

- ▶ Jobs described with simple YAML file & (Bash) scripts
- Container based:
  - mostly Docker for now
  - podman support in GitLab 12.6 (expected on 2019-12-22)
- ► Scheduler / worker split

## Continuous Integration (GitLab CI)

#### Public CI with GitLab.com (gitlab.com/CLIPOS/ci):

- ► Weekly "from scratch" builds
  - Build Debian based work container
  - ▶ Build everything else from scratch
  - ► Takes approximately 2 hours 20 min
- ► Daily "incremental" builds
  - ► Re-use container image
  - Re-use SDKs from latest successful build
  - ▶ Re-use binary packages from latest successful build
  - ► Takes approximately 35 min
- ▶ Build results (artifacts) available at files.clip-os.org
- Now very easy to try the latest version of CLIP OS in QEMU: docs.clip-os.org/toolkit/quick-try.html

5.0 stable: Roadmap

## Roadmap: 5.0 stable

- ► Confined user environments (GUI)
- Multilevel support (Vserver-like LSM)
- ► Automated installation using PXE
- Fix all remaining issues required for qualification

## Conclusion

#### CLIP OS 5 Beta:

- ▶ All the building blocks to create an IPsec gateway are now available
  - ▶ IPsec DR compatibility in progress, planned for final 5.0
- ▶ All the building blocks to create a server are now available
  - ▶ Update, IPsec client, Remote administration over SSH, etc.

Focus is now on user environments (GUI) and multi-level support:

- ► Use case 1: Mobile office workstation
- ▶ Use case 2: Remote administration workstation

## Thanks!

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Website: clip-os.org

Sources: github.com/CLIPOS

S Bugs: github.com/CLIPOS/bugs