

09. – 12.12.2019  
Frankfurt am Main




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# Kubernetes-Security: 3 Dinge, die jeder Entwickler wissen sollte

#ittage  
@jschnatterer








# Plenty of security options

securityContext runAsNonRoot runAsUser privileged  
procMount allowPrivilegeEscalation  
readOnlyRootFilesystem PodSecurityPolicy RBAC NetworkPolicy seccomp  
Linux Capabilities AppArmor SELinux Falco Open Policy Agent  
gVisor Kata Containers Nabla Containers Service Mesh  
KubeSec KubeBench

# 3 Things Every Developer Should Know About K8s Security

# 0. Role Base Access Control (RBAC)





🌐 <https://memegenerator.net/instance/83566913/homer-simpson-boring>

- RBAC active by default since K8s 1.6
- ... but not if you migrated!

- Try


```
curl --cacert /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt \  
-H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)" \  
https://${KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST}/api/v1/secrets
```

- If not needed, disable access to K8s API

```
automountServiceAccountToken: false
```




# Demo



- legacy-authz
- RBAC


# 1. Network Policies (netpol)



A "firewall" for communication between pods.

- Applied to pods
  - within namespace
  - via labels
- Ingress / egress
  - to/from pods (in namespaces) or CIDRs (egress only)
  - for specific ports (optional)
- Enforced by the CNI Plugin (e.g. Calico)
- ⚠️ No Network Policies: All traffic allowed

# 💡 Helpful to get started



- GitHub: <https://github.com/ahmetb/kubernetes-network-policy-recipes>
- Securing Cluster Networking with Network Policies - Ahmet Balkan
- YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gGpMmYeEO8>
- Interactively describes what a netpol does:

```
kubectl describe netpol <name>
```

# Recommendation: Whitelist ingress traffic

In every namespace except kube-system:

- Deny ingress between pods,
- then whitelist all allowed routes.

# Advanced: ingress to kube-system

 Might stop the apps in your cluster from working

Don't forget to:

- Allow external access to ingress controller
- Allow access to kube-dns/core-dns to every namespace

# Advanced: egress

- Verbose solution:
  - Deny egress between pods,
  - then whitelist all allowed routes,
  - repeating all ingress rules. 😞
- More pragmatic solution:
  - Allow only egress within the cluster,
  - then whitelist pods that need access to internet.



# Net pol pitfalls

- Whitelisting monitoring tools (e.g. Prometheus)
- Restart might be necessary (e.g. Prometheus)
- No labels on namespaces by default
- egress more recent than ingress rules and less sophisticated
- Policies might not be supported by CNI Plugin.

Testing!

🌐 <https://www.inovex.de/blog/test-kubernetes-network-policies/>


# More Features?

- Proprietary extensions of CNI Plugin (e.g. cilium or calico)
- Service Meshes: similar features, also work with multiple clusters  
→ different strengths, support each other

 <https://istio.io/blog/2017/0.1-using-network-policy/>



# Demo



- nosqlclient
- web-console



## Wrap-Up: Network Policies

My recommendations:

- Ingress whitelisting in non-kube-system namespaces
- Use with care
  - whitelisting in kube-system
  - egress whitelisting for cluster-external traffic

## 2. Security Context

Defines security parameter per pod/container → container runtime

⬇️ Secure Pods - Tim Allclair

▶️ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLwmJh-j3rs>

# Recommendations per Container

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  annotations:
    seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/pod: runtime/default
spec:
  containers:
  - name: restricted
    securityContext:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 100000
      runAsGroup: 100000
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    capabilities:
      drop:
      - ALL
    enableServiceLinks: false
```

# Recommendation per Container in Detail

# Enable seccomp

- Enables e.g. docker's seccomp default profile that block 44/~300 Syscalls
- Has mitigated Kernel vulns in past and might in future 
- See also k8s security audit:  
 <https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/non-events/>
- See also k8s security audit:  
 <https://www.cncf.io/blog/2019/08/06/open-sourcing-the-kubernetes-security-audit/>

# Run as unprivileged user

- `runAsNonRoot: true`  
Container is not started when the user is root
- `runAsUser` and `runAsGroup > 10000`
  - Reduces risk to run as user existing on host
  - In case of container escape UID/GID does not have privileges on host
- Mitigates vuln in runc (used by Docker among others)  
 <https://kubernetes.io/blog/2019/02/11/runc-and-cve-2019-5736/>

## No Privilege escalation

- Container can't increase privileges
- E.g. sudo, setuid, Kernel vulnerabilities

## Read-only root file system

- Starts container without read-write layer
- Writing only allowed in volumes
- Config or code within the container cannot be manipulated
- Perk: More efficient (no CoW)

# Drop Capabilities

- Drops even the default caps:  
🌐 <https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/3152f94/oci/caps/defaults.go>
- Mitigates CapNetRaw attack - DNS Spoofing on Kubernetes Clusters  
🌐 <https://blog.aquasec.com/dns-spoofing-kubernetes-clusters>

## Bonus: No Services in Environment

- By default: Each K8s service written to each container's env vars  
→ Docker Link legacy, no longer needed
- But convenient info for attacker where to go next



## Security context pitfalls

# Read-only root file system

Application might need temp folder to write to

- Run image locally using docker, access app
-  Run automated e2e/integration tests
- Review container's read-write layer via

```
docker diff <containerName>
```

- Mount folders as `emptyDir` volumes in pod

# Drop Capabilities

Some images require capabilities

- Find out needed Caps locally:

```
docker run --rm --cap-drop ALL <image>
# Check error
docker run --rm --cap-drop ALL --cap-add CAP_CHOWN <image>
# Keep adding caps until no more error
```

- Add necessary caps to k8s resource
- Alternative: Find image with same app that does not require caps, e.g. nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged

# Run as unprivileged user

- Non-root verification only supports numeric user. 😕
  - `runAsUser : 100000` in `securityContext` of pod or
  - `USER 100000` in `Dockerfile` of image.
- Some official images run as root by default.
  - Find a **trusted** image that does not run as root
    - e.g. for mongo or postgres:  
 <https://hub.docker.com/r/bitnami/>
    - Derive from the original image and create your own non-root image
      - e.g. nginx:  <https://github.com/schnatterer/nginx-unpriv>

- UID 100000 might not have permissions. Solutions:
  - Init Container sets permissions for PVCs
  - Permissions in image → chmod/chown in Dockerfile
- Application requires user for UID in /etc/passwd
  - New image that contains a user for UID e.g. 100000 or
  - Create /etc/passwd in init container and mount into app container
- runAsGroup - beta from K8s 1.14. Before that defaults to GID 0 😞  
🌐 <https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/213>

# Tools


Find out if your cluster adheres to these and other good security practices:

-  [controlplaneio/kubesec](#) - manageable amount of checks
-  [Shopify/kubeaudit](#)
  - a whole lot of checks,
  - even deny all ingress and egress NetPols and AppArmor Annotations

- Be prepared for a lot of findings
- Create your own good practices



# Demo





# Wrap-Up: Security Context

My recommendations:

- Start with least privilege
- Only differ if there's absolutely no other way

# 3. Pod Security Policies (PSP)



- enforce security context cluster-wide
  - additional options for blocking pods trying to
    - enter node's Linux namespaces (net, PID, etc.)
    - mounting docker socket,
    - binding ports to nodes,
    - starting privileged containers
    - etc.
  - more effort than security context and different syntax 😕
- Still highly recommended!

# Recommendation

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
  name: psp-restrictive
spec:
  defaultAllowPolicy: "Deny"
  privilegedContainerPolicy: "Deny"
  hostPathVolumePolicy: "Deny"
  hostNetworkPolicy: "Allow"
  hostPortPolicy: "Allow"
  seLinuxLabelPolicy: "Deny"
  seLinuxLabel: "allow"
  supplementalGroupsPolicy: "Allow"
  supplementalGroups: [1000]
  runAsUserPolicy: "Deny"
  runAsUser: "root"
  runAsNonRootPolicy: "Allow"
  runAsNonRoot: "true"
  readOnlyRootFilesystemPolicy: "Deny"
  readOnlyRootFilesystem: "true"
  hostPIDPolicy: "Deny"
  hostIPCPolicy: "Deny"
  hostPortsPolicy: "Deny"
  hostPorts: [1024, 65535]
  hostIPC: "true"
  hostPID: "true"
  hostNetwork: "true"
  hostPath: "true"
  hostPortsRange: [1024, 65535]
```

 <https://github.com/cloudogu/k8s-security-demos/blob/master/4-pod-security-policies/demo/01-psp-restrictive.yaml>

# Too much ground to cover for 45 min!



See Demo Repo on last slide

# Summary

- Enable RBAC
- Don't allow arbitrary connections between pods, e.g. via NetPols
- Start with least privilege for your containers
  - using either securityContext or
  - PodSecurityPolicy

# What for?

- Increase security
- Reduce risk of data breach
- Don't end up on  @haveibeenpwned

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🌐 <https://cloudogu.com/schulungen>

K8s Security series on JavaSPEKTRUM starting 05/2019

See also 🌐 <https://cloudogu.com/blog>

🐦 @jschnatterer

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Demo Source: 🐳 <https://github.com/cloudogu/k8s-security-demos>

