



Onboard Cybersecurity Diagnostic System for Connected Vehicles

Sumanth Reddy Dadam Wayne State University

Di Zhu North Carolina State University

Vivek Kumar and Vinod Ravi Wayne State University

Venkata Sai Srikar Palukuru

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Abstract

Today's advanced vehicles have high degree of interaction due to numerous sensors, actuators and also with complex communication within the control units. In order to hack a vehicle, it has to be within a certain range of communication. Here, we discuss the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) regulations for next generation BEV/HEV, its vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats that come with hacking. We propose three cybersecurity attack detection and defense

methods: Cyber-Attack detection algorithm, Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Method and, Feistel Cipher Block Method. These control methods autonomously diagnose a cybersecurity problem in a vehicle's onboard system using an OBD interface, such as OBD-II when a fault caused by a cyber-attack is detected, All of this is achieved in an internal communication network structure. The results discussed here focus on the first detection method that is Cyber-Attack detection algorithm.

Index Terms

hybrid electric vehicle, onboard diagnostic, autonomous connected vehicle, cybersecurity, control algorithm, battery

electric vehicle

Introduction

Most of the vehicles have been isolated from the internet until recently. For vehicle diagnostics OBD-II port is the only special case. These ports currently rely on the physical protection provided by the Network Architecture. But with rapid changes. Current generation vehicles already permit smartphones pairing with the car's infotainment system via Bluetooth. And also adding to that many modern vehicles that are connected to the internet are enabling unlocking, starting, passenger monitoring services in the car. In today's vehicles we observe cars with OTA flash services that have complex network interfaces for software updates.

These days, autonomous vehicles (AV) driving without the intervention of a driver use onboard ECU applications to identify driving conditions. AVs now have the ability to diagnose and check for any hazard causing events using various kinds of sensors installed in the vehicle. These complex diagnostic functions are achieved with Electronic Control Units (ECUs), ECU's play a critical role in today's vehicle and hence its rationality along with complex sensors, actuators

and onboard system software ought to be ensured in order to protect for vehicle safety.

A handful of extensively advertised attacks has demonstrated vulnerability, consisting of a 2014 occurrence entailing an OEM. Hackers successfully exposed vulnerabilities by finding a password to a Wi-Fi hot spot as well and then used of vehicle main screen and infotainment system. Adding to that they were able to access the vehicle's interior computer network which led them take control of functions ranging from the door locks, window wipers to other Body control parts. This event recalled 1.4 million vehicles and worked as a cautioning to the market that vehicle networks are no longer islands unto themselves.

From the regulation's perspective, regulatory agencies have started to address cybersecurity threats by establishing regulations that are not specific to one category of vehicles and also conducting cutting edge research right into cybersecurity dangers for next generation vehicles covering all category vehicles, as well as giving standards. In 2012, the National Highway Web Traffic Safety And Security Management (NHTSA) [1] set up a new team to research

drive state. The fault-tolerant capability has been achieved by analyzing the characteristics of the CAN signals. The robustness of the detection can be further improved by adding a second layer of check where in the second-step detection rule includes a rule for detecting a sign of an abnormality assumed to be an attack by performing state transition analysis or time-series (sequence pattern) analysis using a series of received electronic control commands (CAN IDs) as discussed in the time based CAN intrusion detection methods. The performance of the time-based methods and Feistel Cipher block method with improved deep learning models can improve the use case and efficiency of the detection. These methods and its algorithm performance results will be further discussed in future works.

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