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**DETROIT 2022**

# You Like It Or Not; You Need It!

## PKI And Certificate Management



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
PKI and Certificate Management – **Vocabulary and Refresher**

**Case Study** - Hybrid **Common yet Complex** Scenario and Demonstration

**5 PKI Design Decisions** – You must know!

# PKI and Certificate Management – Vocabulary & Refresher

# Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)



# Public Key Infrastructure

## What it Provides?

- Unique Cryptographic Identity to Endpoints
- Encryption of data over Network's communication channels

## How it Provides?

- By governing issuance and management of digital certificates

## Key Components

- Digital Certificate (X.509 certificates)
- Certificate Authority (CA)
- Registration authority (RA)
- Verification Authority (VA)
- Certificate database/ Store

PKI is a **Framework**  
not a specific  
**Technology!**



# Cryptography - Public & Private Keys

Cryptography is the science of secret writing with the intention of keeping the data secret. Cryptography is classified into **symmetric cryptography**, **asymmetric cryptography**, and hashing.

- Symmetric or Private Key Cryptography


- Same key is used for encryption and decryption
- Comparatively faster but less secure
- RC4, AES, DES, 3DES, and QUAD

PKI uses Public Key  
Cryptography  
Framework


- Asymmetric or Public Key Cryptography

- Different Set of keys used for encryption and decryption
- Comparatively slower but tough to break
- RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECC algorithms

## Private key (Symmetric encryption)



## Public key (Asymmetric encryption)



# Digital Certificates

## What it is?

- A digital certificate is a **digital document** that binds the identity to a public key infrastructure (PKI)
- Used in many Internet protocols, including TLS/SSL, which is the basis for HTTPS - the secure protocol for browsing the web

## How to Generate?

- Many options that provide widely accepted international standard **X.509 standard** for example:
- OpenSSL tool
- LibreSSL tool
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Party RA/ VA e.g. Let's Encrypt, DigiCert etc.
- Cloud Services e.g. AWS CM, Google CM,


## Key Activities

- Digital Certificates lifecycle management requires:
  - Certificate Generation and Issuance
  - Certificate Distribution/ Deployment
  - Certificate Revocation
  - Certificate Renewals/Rotation
  - Certificate Scanning and Monitoring





# Sample Certificate



## Windows Certificate View

Use certmgr.msc to open on your windows box

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in certificate.pem
```

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

75:16:c7:f8:49:48:f2:22:e3:9d:1f:5e:27:00:a9:21:4f:1e:f3:16

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: CN = client.example.com

Validity

Not Before: Jun 27 11:38:03 2020 GMT

Not After : Jul 27 11:38:03 2020 GMT

Subject: CN = client.example.com

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:b8:41:c9:0a:c5:2b:82:f3:d6:5f:43:24:d6:3f:

e3:34:d5:05:1c:25:14:52:1c:6f:e8:62:11:44:53:

91:4e:a1:22:46:83:16:60:25:e5:05:52:09:44:dc:

78:93:fc:d0:ac:76:3f:02:39:60:c2:4e:a3:fd:23:

3d:a8:10:39:f3

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

Public Key Info

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

96:8C:28:0D:B6:78:A8:8C:5C:6B:D2:A2:37:A8:2C:60:A1:70:00:5C

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

keyid:96:8C:28:0D:B6:78:A8:8C:5C:6B:D2:A2:37:A8:2C:60:A1:70:00:5C

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

30:45:02:20:37:e6:ba:45:bb:ce:cf:ed:f6:a8:e3:a0:2a:76:


d0:07:cb:12:55:e0:f4:82:f4:68:44:ad:77:66:e7:6e:71:7e:

02:21:00:e4:83:37:35:04:7a:10:27:a3:db:cb:76:8e:6f:20:

## Linux Certificate View


Use OpenSSL or other compatible utilities

# Certificate Encoding and Files





# Certificate Hierarchy (Chain)

- Hierarchy of certificates from Root CA to leaf certificate is called “Certificate hierarchy” or “Chain of trust”
- It can be single-layer or multi-layered certificate authorities for protecting Root CA (from middle man attacks etc.) and separating concerns




# Case Study – Hybrid **Common yet Complex** Production Scenario










# Case Study - Steps and Tools to Setup PKI

For this case study scenario:

- Utilize Public CA services - Used for external facing websites and interfaces
- [DigiCert](#), [Let's Encrypt](#), [GoDaddy](#) or [Cloud provided services](#) etc.

- Private and Intermediate CA – Used for internal trust establishment and communication
- [OpenSSL](#), [Cert-manager](#), [SPIFFE/ SPIRE](#) etc.

- Plan Certificate lifecycle management - Issuance, distribution, rotation, revocation etc.
- [SPIFFE/ SPIRE](#), [AWS](#) or [GCP Certificate Manager](#) etc.



Private CA




Note: Consider your security requirements and plan your PKI

# Demo!

# SPIFEE and SPIRE

SPIFEE – Secure Production Identity Framework For Everyone


SPIRE - is a production-ready implementation of the SPIFFE APIs



# 5 PKI Design Decisions – You must know!

# 1 - Design (or Know) your certificates chain and hierarchy


Single Root CA Authority






# 1 - Design (or Know) your certificates chain and hierarchy

## Multiple Intermediate CAs



# 1 - Design (or Know) your certificates chain and hierarchy

Geographical or Departmental  
Distribution



**Design Wisely!**  
Based on Size,  
Criticality, Levels of  
Security, Operational  
Capacity

## 2 - Where to terminate your certificates?


- Wise to probe where to terminate certificates in your application context:

### Network Layer

- Terminating TLS at API Gateway
- Terminating TLS at Load balancer
- Terminating TLS at Ingress controller

### Compute layer

- Terminating TLS at VM (e.g. EC2)
- Terminating TLS at Pod/ Container



# 3 - TLS version mis-matches & design decision

- How to deal with TLS version mis-matches (in complex hybrid systems)?
  - For example what if TLS and mTLS needs to co-exist
  - TLS – Works on one way trust verification
  - mTLS – Establishes two way trust. It further enhances the security with two way trust and handshake
    - Some infrastructure services provide mTLS by default such as Istio service mesh. It automatically configures workload sidecars to use mutual TLS when calling other workloads
- In such cases know the ways to co-exist
- Example: Use mTLS mode for peer authentication:
  - **STRICT** – Strictly enforce same protocol across
  - **PERMISSIVE** – Use for mTLS to TLS relaxation (on port or service)
  - **DISABLE** – connection is disabled and not tunnelled

```
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
  namespace: foo
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: PERMISSIVE
---
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
  namespace: foo
spec:
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: finance
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT
```

# 4 – Certificate Revocation Methods & Design

## CRL (Certificate Revocation List)

- CRL contains a list of revoked certificates essentially, all certificates that have been revoked by the CA or owner and should no longer be trusted

## OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol)

- OCSP service checks for certificate status
- An OCSP response contains one of three values: “good”, “revoked”, or “unknown”

## OCSP - Stapling (Online Certificate Status Protocol – Stapling)

- Its an enhancement to the standard OCSP protocol.
- It eliminates the need for a browser to send OCSP requests directly to the CA.
- Instead, the web server caches the OCSP response from the CA and when a TLS handshake is initiated by the client, the web server “staples” the OCSP response to the certificate it sends to the browser.

### Relevance:

- CRL Design is often overlooked aspect of PKI design
- Consider - How to revoke certificates and keep all informed when required?

### Recommendations:

- For internal Private CAs – you might want to use CRL and custom automation
- For Public CA – OCSP or OCSP Stapling can be used

# 5 - Certificate Automation and Monitoring

- This is an areas which is many a times unplanned in PKI setup
- What & How much to automate Operations? – Try to strike the balance.
- Few Suggestions:
  - Create and Using Certificate Template
  - Utilize certificates rolling deployment – to avoid downtime due to certification renewal or expiry
    - Use tools that automatically take care of certification lifecycle such as:
      - Cloud provider services - AWS or Google Certificate manager
      - SPIFFE/SPIRE that takes away burden of certification regeneration and rotation etc.
  - Use tools for Monitoring, Tracing and Alerting for better and easy certificates management





SSL Certificate

All ▾

https://freenas.jorge...

-2.93 day

https://veeamone.jor...

9.98 year

https://veeamtech.dd...

2.60 week

https://www.jorgedel...

34.81 week

tcp://veeamtech.ddn...

2.61 week

tcp://veeamtech.dd...

2.60 week

SSL Certificate ▾

SSL Expiry in

tcp://veeamtech.ddns.net:8086/

2.60 week

tcp://veeamtech.ddns.net:8086

2.61 week

https://www.jorgedelacruz.es:443/

34.81 week

https://veeamtech.ddns.net:3000/

2.60 week

https://veeamone.jorgedelacruz.es:1239/

9.98 year

https://freenas.jorgedelacruz.es:443/

-2.93 day



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