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Left-Right Orientations in New Democracies: Cognition, Contents, Consequences

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by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Left-Right Orientations in New Democracies:
Cognition, Contents, Consequences

by

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Political beliefs and behavior in established Western democracies are often summarized in terms of a left-right dimension. This study examines the extent to which the same spatial schema can be applied in the context of Central and Eastern European and East Asian new democracies. Theoretically, I explore the universality of the left-right framework by investigating its validity in countries that lack the historical and social background in which ideological divisions in many advanced democracies are rooted. Empirically, I investigate the degree to which left-right semantics are understood by the mass publics and provide a meaningful guide to their vote choice.

Using cross-national data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (1999-2004), I analyze three key themes: 1) are publics in new democracies able and willing to identify themselves on a left-right scale? 2) what attitudes and issue preferences, if any, shape how publics understand left and right? 3) how much does proximity on the left-right spectrum influence publics' party selection? On the first

theme, results reveal that while overall citizens in these new democracies are more hesitant to indicate left-right positioning compared to established Western democracies, the spatial schema still represents a relevant point of reference. On the second theme, evaluation of the former authoritarian regime exerts greater influence on publics' understanding of left and right than all other sets of issues, including views on economic, social/religious, and post-materialist questions, as well as appraisal of democratic principles and procedures, in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast, in East Asia left-right orientations are far less anchored in policy or attitudinal terms. On the third theme, ideological proximity labels in former communist countries on average exert a smaller impact on voting behavior than in established Western democracies, but is nevertheless a useful predictor of party choice, whereas with respect to East Asian cases results again raise doubts about the functioning of left-right labels as useful heuristics. It is also vital to note considerable intra-regional variations in all these results.

Chapter 1: The Left-Right Schema – An Overview

Introduction

Contestation is one of the defining features of democracy (Dahl 1971). While much attention focuses on whether electoral competition is free and fair, this is but one aspect of the broader question regarding the quality of democracy. Rather than procedural processes that render contestation legitimate, this study concentrates on substantive mechanisms that make contestation meaningful. That is, the degree to which publics are able to understand major issues and distinguish among the choices they are offered. I examine the proposition that a left-right spatial schema plays a significant role in facilitating such understanding and distinction, and test whether the contents of these labels are related to specific national or regional contexts or rooted in a set of universalistic cleavages such as class and religion. While acknowledging that political competition rarely evolves around one single axis, a flexibly defined left-right dimension may capture the primary axis of contestation (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1995a). Previous comparative studies analyzing dimensions of political competition are often based on expert identification of party stances on various issues (Laver and Hunt 1992; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006) or coding of manifesto texts (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). This study attempts to address the same question at the individual level, by discussing mass publics' cognition, understanding, and utilization of the left-right schema.

Semantics of left and right have long characterized, indeed shaped, political competition in most established Western democracies, guiding both voter choices and elite strategies. As authoritarian rule came to an end in many parts of the world in the 1980s and 1990s, the question naturally arises concerning the relevance of the

left-right schema in these newly democratized countries. Are divisions between left and right rooted in historical legacies and social contexts unique to the West, and hence inapplicable to other regions of the world? Or is the definition of these terminologies sufficiently broad and elastic to assimilate political conflicts everywhere? If the latter is true, then do left and right in new democracies carry different connotations from those long used and understood in established democracies? Finally, does left-right positioning in new democracies influence voting behavior to a similar extent as in established democracies? These are the main themes this study proposes to address.

The uni-dimensional spatial conceptualization of politics, positioning parties and issue dimensions in terms of left and right, has important functions of both orientation for individual voters and communications for the political system (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989).[1] Left-right identification is important because it helps voters organize and store political information, and decide which party to vote for and which issue preferences to hold. Instead of learning detailed policy platforms offered by each party, voters can rely on ideological labels as simplifying heuristics (Sniderman et al. 1991) that provide information about where parties stand on various issues, and choose parties closest to their own locations on the left-right scale (Downs 1957). One possible advantage of these semantics is their flexible quality as "a universal solvent" absorbing all major political conflicts, allowing salient new issues to be integrated into the left-right dimension (Barnes, 1997:131). Thus, while conceding that the concepts of left and right might be an oversimplification, Inglehart labels such generalization "an almost inevitable one, which in the long run tends to assimilate all important issues" (1990:292). Inglehart

[1] For detailed treatises on the spatial theory of politics, see Ordeshook (1976), Budge and Farlie (1977), and Enelow and Hinich (1990).

and Klingemann emphasize that the left-right dimension captures "the most important issues of a given era" (1976:244).

Assuming that the elastic quality of the left-right schema renders it translatable across borders, one still confronts the question of whether these labels would be equally pertinent for mass publics in new democracies as they are in established ones. The usage of spatial semantics to denote political leanings can be traced back to the French Revolution (Laponce 1981), and came to represent different stances in elite discourse in early Western European democracies. Left and right in these countries encapsulate cleavages derive from specific historical developments such as the Protestant reformation and the industrial revolution (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), which did not occur or only took place under vastly different circumstances in most new democracies. Furthermore, whereas the process of democratization unfolded over an extended period in many established democracies, transition from authoritarian rule often progressed at a much more rapid pace in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly with the end of communist rule in the former Soviet bloc. In view of these differences between old and new democracies, what role would one expect the left-right schema to play in the latter?[2]

In fact one can argue that the schema may be even more relevant in newer than older democracies, since the former cases are more likely to see the establishment, merger, splinter, or disappearance of parties in quick succession. Examples of frequently changing parties can be found in long-standing democracies (e.g., Pierce 1981), but are more often observed in countries where the electoral market was opened suddenly and unexpectedly. In these developing democracies, left-right

[2] One view is that the relevance of the left-right dimension varies tremendously across regions. For instance, Simon speculates that the dichotomy between left and right "works more or less from a western European point of view" in Central and Eastern Europe, but not in the former Soviet republics (2000:124).

identification could be more crucial for political orientation and vote choice if enduring party identifications are weaker, because it provides a reference point amidst shifting constellations of parties (e.g., Szczerbiak 2008). In addition to its significance for party system institutionalization, the structuring of ideological orientations may also be related to regime stability in terms of both diffuse and specific support for democracy, which are affected by the type of cleavages that define left-right competition (Deegan Krause 2000).

Yet in comparison with the large quantity of studies on left and right in established Western democracies (e.g., Castles and Mair 1984; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989; Inglehart 1984; Klingemann 1979; Knutsen 1995b, 1997, 1999; Hooghe et al. 2004; van der Eijk et al. 2005), the components and consequences of this schema in new democracies have commanded less scholarly attention so far (exceptions include Kitschelt et al. 1999, Markowski 1997, Tworzecki 2003 on Eastern Europe; Mainwaring 1999, Moreno 1999, Zechmeister 2010 on Latin America; Dalton and Tanaka 2007, Lee 2007 on East Asia).[3]

This research addresses three broad topics: First, to what extent are publics in new democracies cognizant of the left-right schema, and how do levels of cognition vary according to socio-demographic and political factors? Second, what variables, including issue preferences, value orientations, and attitudes toward different aspects of democracy, structure publics' understanding of left and right? Third, what impact does left-right orientation have for voting behavior, and do governments' ideological positions match those of their electorates?

Theoretically, this dissertation explores the universality of the left-right schema by investigating its validity in countries that lack the historical and social background

[3] For global studies of how experts and general publics understand left and right, see Huber and Inglehart (1995) and Dalton (2006), respectively.

from which ideological divisions in Western democracies are derived. Empirically, it investigates the extent to which left-right semantics are understood by the mass public and serve as a meaningful guide for party choice. The cases include all new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia available in the dataset (see details below), which offer useful contrasts for hypothesis testing because they cover a considerable range of democratic experience and party system institutionalization.

Literature Review

The literature review is arranged in parallel to the organization of the following chapters. It focuses in part on established democracies where most studies on the left and right have been conducted, but also discusses works that have examined how this concept applies in the context of new democracies. The first section introduces the left-right schema and explains reasons for hypothesizing its relevance beyond established democracies. This is followed by a discussion on left-right cognition, including differences among socio-demographic subgroups as a measure of how deeply the schema has become embedded in political debate. The third section focuses on issue and value dimensions that scholars have found to play significant roles in structuring left-right orientations. Finally, the relationship between left-right orientation and party choice and the question of ideological congruence between governments and citizens are discussed.

Utility of the Left-Right Schema

The concepts of left and right permeate political discourse because they best suit the need to provide "an overarching duality" that summarizes all political conflicts. The advantages of these semantics are that they form a continuum containing a center position, can be visualized, and are thus understandable and translatable across

cultures (Laponce 1981:24-7). Holm and Robinson point out that ideological labels are sufficiently general to accommodate both citizens with detailed policy preferences and others who simply wish to save time from information gathering, and allow voters to "align themselves straightforwardly with respect to a dimension of perception potentially affecting their vote" (1978:236-7). Sigelman and Yough believe that "party systems throughout the world can meaningfully be profiled in terms of polarization along the left-right continuum" (1978:356). Tomkins even claims that "the history of the continuing conflict between left and right… is in many ways the history of the development of civilized man" (1965:27).

While labels of left and right have long been associated with "economic policy conflicts – government regulation of the economy through direct controls or takeover… as opposed to free enterprise, individual freedom, incentives and economic orthodoxy" (Budge and Robertson 1987:394-5; see also Downs 1957; Lipset 1960), they are not solely defined by this dimension.[4] Huber and Inglehart characterize the schema as an "amorphous vessel whose meaning varies… with political and economic conditions in a given society" (1995:90). According to Sani (1974:207), it is general rather than specific, and flexible rather than rigid. Its absorptive capacity permits the application of the schema beyond political contexts that first gave rise to its usage. For example, Castles and Mair (1984) demonstrate similarities in the ideological range of parties across countries, and Huber and Inglehart (1995) find that left and right are widely used even in poor, undemocratic countries. Similarly, Mauser and Freyssinet-Dominjon (1976:223) conclude that voters' consensus that the left-right opposition constitutes the primary axis of competition is not predicated on their agreement concerning the precise contents of

[4] Dalton (2006) shows that publics in many Asian and African countries do not link the left-right dimension with preferences on economic issues.

these terms.

As least as important to the left-right schema's utility in summarizing stances on various political issues is its capacity to assimilate new issues as they become salient (Inglehart 1984; Knutsen 1999). For instance, Inglehart (1990) maintains that the broadly defined left-right dimension encompasses not only traditional economic debates over social equality and the distribution of resources, but also a 'new politics' dimension associated with post-materialist values. Instead of rendering the concepts of left and right obsolete, the new post-materialist axis of competition extends their semantic space (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989:228-9). Barnes (1971) argues that new issues tend to be superimposed on old cleavages rather than cross-cutting them, and Ray and Narud (2000) illustrate the trend toward increasing alignment between previously independent left-right and center-periphery cleavages. Another indication of the schema's validity lies in its persistence. Rusk and Borre cite the example of a new dimension, championed by new parties, emerging to disrupt previous patterns of voting behavior, only to predict that future competition is "likely to gravitate… toward a more or less one-dimensional solution based on left-right politics" as these parties either weaken or regroup along the left-right dimension (1976:157-9).

Having discussed why the left-right dimension is useful, one must establish that these semantics are meaningful, and not mere proxies for demographic characteristics or party identification. Results from a three-nation study lead Fuchs and Klingemann to list three features that animate the this dimension: "The semantic space of left-right is inhabited by a limited repertory of generalized meaning elections with largely binary associations" (1989:233). In a seminal article examining nine European countries, Inglehart and Klingemann identify both a partisan and an ideological component to the left-right dimension, and argue that party affiliations exert a greater impact than issue preferences on one's left-right self-placement (1976:260). However,

in a later study Fuchs and Klingemann find that publics increasingly understand the left-right schema in value-related rather than partisan terms (1989:232). Knutsen (1995b, 1999) extends these findings to demonstrate how these two components are compounded by showing high correlations between values and party choice.

The left-right dimension is not without its critics, however. Stokes (1963) asserts that a spatial interpretation of party competition fails to meet the criteria of uni-dimensionality, stability of structure, ordered dimensions, and common references among elites and mass publics (see also Conover and Feldman 1981). Along similar lines, Kornberg et al. point a "lack of congruence between elite and mass perceptions of party locations" on the left-right scale (1975:184). Kim and Fording (1998:75) contend that while left and right are conceptualized relative to a middle position, the location of this middle ground likely varies across both time and country. Another concern regarding the usefulness of left and right involves the degree to which these orientations coincide with party identification, particularly in less advanced countries or those characterized by a small number of actors in the party system (Knutsen 1997). The premise that left-right orientations are "more important in their labeling function than in their ability to denote ideological orientation" (Arian and Shamir 1983:147) would raise doubts about their heuristic utility.[5]

Even scholars who emphasize the value of left-right cues recognize that a single scale is often insufficient to encapsulate all aspects of political contestation (e.g., Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976), and this study certainly does not make such a presupposition. What it does assume is that stances on many issues cluster in a predictable pattern (Hinich and Munger 1994), which enables publics to rely on a simplified, uni-dimensional heuristic to interpret complex and multi-dimensional

[5] Empirically, one must also be aware that different survey instruments to measure left-right positions do not produce equally valid results (Kroh 2007).

political reality (Huber and Inglehart 1995:74). In sum, despite chronological and cross-national differences in issues salient to the public, there is sufficient justification for basing this study on the assumption that left and right provide meaningful devices in organizing and communicating not only the most important issues at each given time but also reflect more persistent general values.

Left-Right Cognition

Meaningful as the concepts of left and right may be, to what extend do mass publics comprehend and utilize them? Converse (1964:218) classifies survey respondents into five "levels of conceptualization", and finds that no more than one-sixth of the American public used ideology as the basis of evaluating parties and candidates.[6] Studies in other established democracies reveal mixed results. Butler and Stokes (1969) and Lambert et al. (1986) confirm Converse's finding that only very modest percentages of survey respondents were able to correctly place parties along, and attach definitions to, left and right in Britain and Canada, respectively. In contrast, Klingemann (1972) observes that eight out of ten Germans could indicate both self and party left-right locations, and Dalton (1988) reports similarly high percentages across most of Western Europe. Moreover, both Barnes (1971) and Sani (1974) cite evidence that party rankings along the spectrum given by Italian respondents concurred with views of experts, and confirm that voters did indeed cast their ballots for parties closest to their own positions as Downs predicted.

Even low cognition rates do not necessarily mean that concepts of left and right have no relevance to the public. Voters do not require an in-depth knowledge of all elements encompassed by left and right to render this dimension meaningful to them; understanding a selection of elements would be sufficient (Fuchs and Klingemann

[6] This is the sum of respondents categorized as "ideologues" and "near-ideologues".

1989:207). If one broadens the criteria for classifying "ideologues" from people who employ concepts of left and right as their primary means of evaluating political objects to include those who are simply able to distinguish political symbols and identifying them in spatial terms, a higher proportion of the public can be deemed cognizant (Klingemann 1979a:234).[7] Noting the distinction between an individual's sophisticated understanding of left-right semantics and her simple recognition of the schema (Badescu and Sum 2005; Klingemann 1979a), this study focuses on the latter. As Barnes points out, while publics may not be fully aware of what the left-right schema entails, it is not difficult to discern "meaningful gradations among parties along numerous dimensions," which can in turn be reduced to a left-right summary (1971:162; see also Sani 1974). Also, one should keep in mind that voters' preferences depend not on where parties are objectively located on the left-right spectrum, but rather on their subjectively perceived placement (Butler and Stokes 1969; Klingemann 1972).

One should also consider ideological learning, namely that understanding of left and right could increase with reiterated usage, especially in newer democracies where these semantics may be less familiar to publics not accustomed to open party competition and policy debates. For example, while citing non-responses from slightly less than half of respondents in Russia on the question of left-right distinction, Colton notes that as the more politically aware segment of the population grows, there is a "likelihood of ideology's assuming a greater role in mass politics in the future" (1998:189). This corroborates findings by Evans and Whitefield (1998), who report a significant crystallization of opinion in Central and Eastern Europe as voters began to understand and identify with left and right labels. Comparing left-right positions in

[7] At the same time, Klingemann (1979a:245) also states that since most people who identify with the left-right schema lack sophisticated knowledge of its contents, it cannot serve as an explanation for mass political action.

nine post-communist countries with established democracies, McAllister and White find that "voters in the emerging democracies appear to understand the concept and to align themselves on it" (2007:204). Dalton corroborates this by showing comparable percentages of survey respondents in older and newer democracies placing themselves on the left-right scale (2006:6-7).

To see how deeply rooted left-right cognition is among the public, one may probe which population strata are mostly likely to recognize and utilize the spatial schema. Since interpreting abstract concepts of left and right require high cognitive abilities, it is not surprising that "the extent of both recognition and understanding increases with the level of education" (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989:209). Colton (1998:173) also finds education exerting a major influence in a transitional society, adding that this is attributable to cognitive sophistication rather than substantive knowledge of issues. Holm and Robinson (1978:241) report that those in younger cohorts and with higher educational attainments are more likely to cast their votes consistent with not only party identification but also ideological positioning. In contrast, Jacoby (1991:189) shows that ideological heuristics exert limited influence for voters with low levels of education and conceptualization. In a five-country study, Klingemann offers detailed evidence that the determinants of ideological conceptualization are education and political interest, and that these two factors have independent effects (1979b:268). While the variable of interest here is simply self-identification with the left-right scale rather than sophisticated understanding thereof, one expects to find the same socio-demographic influences at work.[8]

With reference to the aforementioned point concerning ideological learning, one may expect that age would correlate positively with left-right cognition, since longer

[8] It is worth noting that while the linkage between left-right orientations and policy preferences strengthens with educational level, the same issues define the spectrum for all educational strata (Langford 1991).

exposure to political information should result in higher likelihood of developing the capacity to process such information. However, in a comparative study of five Western democracies, Klingemann (1979b:256) does not find a significant relation between age and ideological thinking even when controlling for education. In contrast, social status and gender do exert an impact, with those in higher social strata and males displaying greater ideological conceptualization. Testing for relationships between age and the proclivity for center self-placement, Knutsen finds mixed results rather than any clear trends. While he notes gender differences, the extent of their impact varies by country (1998b:311-2). Kumlin (2001) reports that usage of ideological schema is not distinguished by socio-demographic profile where party systems are firmly rooted, because even the least sophisticated voters can identify with left and right. Whether these findings from studies of established democracies are equally valid in new democracies will be tested in the next chapter.

Content of Left-Right

With regard to what the labels of left and right stand for, Lipset states that "more than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes... in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right" (1960:223-4). A quarter century later, Inglehart summarizes the question slightly differently as "whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction," proposing that variation in specific issues notwithstanding, the principle of more or less equality usually lies at the center of political conflicts (1984:37). Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal work traces historical developments leading to the formation of four main political cleavages: center versus periphery, state versus church, urban versus rural, and owner versus worker. Combinations of these

cleavages, particularly the latter that derives from the industrial revolution, have long defined left and right in most Western democracies. Economic and class conflict is predominant not only in industrialized democracies, however, but also defines the main axis of competition in many less developed countries (Huber and Inglehart 1995). Similarly, Knutsen observes that economic issues remain predominant in structuring left-right identification at both mass and elite levels (1995b:171).[9]

Downs's (1957) spatial model assumes that the extent of government intervention in the economy forms the main conflict defining the left-right continuum. Knutsen expounds on four issues comprising of this dimension: "state versus private ownership of the means of production; a strong versus a weak role for government in economic planning; support versus opposition on redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor; and support versus resistance on expanding social welfare programmes" (1995b:165). Caul and Gray's finding from a fifteen-country study on the consistency parties gave to "traditional left/right ideological issues" in their platforms from the early 1950s to the late 1980s (2000:219) offers evidence that party competition revolved around the left-right dimension. However, increasing diversity of occupations in postindustrial societies may alter the space of party competition (Kriesi 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006) and loosen the linkage between left-right identification and vote choice (Hellwig 2008). These developments have also given rise to political groupings variously labeled new left and right (e.g., Gitlin 2003; Kitschelt 1995; Rydgren 2005), which are distinguished by value and lifestyle rather than economic preferences.

Religiosity and attitudes toward moral issues constitute another key cleavage in shaping party systems in established democracies (Rose and Urwin 1970), and several

[9] Rohrschneider and Whitefield show that in ex-communist new democracies "by far the most important conflict between parties is centered on distributional issues" (2009:290).

cases studies in post-communist countries reveal the same phenomenon (e.g., Mészáros et al. 2007; Szczerbiak 2008). Kitschelt (1992) theorizes that, in contrast to patterns found in the West, linkage between authoritarian values and the left on one hand, and libertarianism and the right on the other, are likely to emerge in the post-communist setting. Also, ethnic homogeneity and security of sovereign statehood are likely to shape cleavages in ethnically diverse and newly independent nations, respectively (Evans and Whitefield 1993). These divides can play significant roles alongside, and may often supersede, economic interests in structuring left-right orientations. In countries where extensive market reforms have taken place, social liberalism, ethnic divisions, and issues concerning democratization are likely to form salient cleavages in Catholic, ethnically heterogeneous, and incompletely democratized countries, respectively (Evans and Whitefield 2000:61). Alternatively, Lawson cites an example of tri-polar competition among the left, the liberal right, and the conservative right, with religiosity a shared feature between the two rights (2003:10).

The emergence of a new cleavage dividing materialists from post-materialists (Inglehart 1977, 1990; see also Evans et al. 1996; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990), raises questions about changes in the meaning of the left-right dimension. This new value dimension does not necessarily align with the traditional economic definition of left and right in only one direction: Whereas post-materialists are identified on the left in most parts of the world, including East Asia as well as the West, in Eastern Europe "post-materialists are more likely to locate themselves on the Right end of the scale" (Dalton 2006:14). One may also question the salience of post-materialist issues outside of the group of advanced industrialized democracies where large proportions of the population were not socialized in a free, secure, and prosperous environment.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that the contents of left and right have not

remained constant. Huber and Inglehart (1995:75) argue that the continuing salience of the left-right cleavage masks a weakening of the linkage between this schema and class or economic conflicts. A similar axis of conflict focuses on values of frugality, piety, conformity, and authority, distinguishing those who retain these traditional orientations from more libertarian sectors of society (Flanagan 1980; Flanagan and Lee 2003). One manifestation of a new value-based cleavage cross-cutting economic interest is the segmentation of the middle class into left-libertarians and right-authoritarians (Kriesi 1998; see also Hooghe et al. 2004).

Rather than envisaging the increasing irrelevance of the left-right schema due to the new value cleavage, Inglehart forecasts that "the new axis of polarization… may be assimilated into a new synthesis" (1984:68). Fuchs and Klingemann concur with this view, stating that they "consider it likely that the left-right schema will be retained even if the conflict structures of advanced industrial societies are changing" (1989:234), and thus predicting the integration of the post-materialist cleavage into the left-right dimension. Findings by Huber and Inglehart's (1995) expert survey offer some evidence supporting this conclusion across countries in different regions with varying levels of democratic development.[10]

While studies on left-right orientations often focus on the aforementioned economic, social/religious, and post-materialist factors, one must ask whether other issue dimensions could structure how publics in new democracies understand left and right. In view of the temporal proximity of democratization, one factor likely to exert an influence in defining left and right involve issues related to transition from authoritarian rule, or what one can label a "regime divide" (Moreno 1999). This

[10] Knutsen describes and investigates five hypotheses regarding the relationship between old and new cleavages in structuring the left-right dimension: transformation of the schema, irrelevance or persistence of traditional issues, new issues supplementing old ones, and parties' adoption of a centripetal stance (1999:242-4).

entails both assessment of the democratic system and comparison between the past and present forms of government. For example, several studies identify a highly salient regime divide shaping patterns of competition in Eastern European new democracies (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1998; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009).

More specifically, one can examine the regime divide through different possible manifestations: first, disagreement over the regime type, namely the merits of democracy in comparison with other forms of government; second, differential appraisal of how well or poorly democracy has performed in various policy areas, such as the economy and law and order; finally, divergent views on the assessment of former and current regimes. The first two questions correspond to the regime principles and regime performance levels of Norris's (1999) classification of political support. The last question relates to how citizens judge their new political system through improvements compared with conditions they had previously lived under (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999).

The Left-Right Schema and Party Competition

The relationship between voters' party identification, issue orientation, and left-right position merits elaboration. If voters simply place themselves on the same locations along the continuum as their preferred parties to rationalize their vote choice, then the left-right dimension would be redundant because one could simply look at partisanship. At the other extreme, if voters' left-right self-placement changes substantially with each issue on the political agenda, then ideological identification would also lose its distinct analytical usefulness. Empirical evidence shows that while left-right self-placement certainly reflects both party ties and reaction to current issues (Inglehart 1984:63), there is more to this dimension. Pierce's conclusion from a French study, that "left-right perceptions are related to, but cannot be equated with,

partisan preferences" (1981:133), receives corroboration from similar findings from other countries. While partisanship is often a major component of individual left-right placements (Butler and Stokes 1969; Converse and Pierce 1986), the two concepts are not synonymous, since issue orientations play a key role independent of party affiliation in determining one's ideological positioning (Huber 1989).

In order for the left-right schema to serve as meaningful heuristics, voters must be capable not only of locating themselves along the continuum, but also of translating this into their vote choice by selecting ideologically proximate parties on the ballot paper. Surveys have not only shown the ability of many Western publics to locate parties along the left-right spectrum, but also a consistency in how parties are ranked among supporters of each party (Laponce 1970; Sani 1974). Also, these placements are accompanied by relatively low standard deviations, indicating a high degree of consensus among voters on the positions of both themselves and their preferred parties (Klingemann 1972). Furthermore, comparative studies reveal that the impact of left-right orientation on vote choice increases when there is consensus among voters on party locations along the left-right spectrum (Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). These findings confirm observations from earlier studies that voters can clearly identify both their own position and the location of each party relative to all its competitors in left-right terms.[11]

In addition to voter demands, party elites may also act on the supply side by influencing which cleavages become predominant among a multiplicity of issues (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010; Schattschneider 1960; Zuckerman 1975), impelling voters to take a stance along this particular dimension. Historical context, specifically salient issues at the time of mass enfranchisement, exerts a decisive

[11] Pesonen (1973:129-30) notes that voters who express stronger party identification tend to see wider, i.e. more polarized, party spaces.

influence on which cleavages come to structure party competition (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). While socio-economic differences exist in any society, they do not automatically constitute foci of political conflicts. Similarly, not all political conflicts acquire the same degree of salience that elevate them to form primary cleavages defining left and right (Erdmann 2007; Rosas and Zechmeister 2000). Neto and Cox draw attention to the fact that "a given set of social cleavages does not imply a unique set of politically activated cleavages" (1997:150), and Zielinkski (2002) illustrates the mechanism through which social structural differences lead to political cleavages. Przeworski cites the specific example that "the relative salience of class as a determinant of voting behaviour is a cumulative consequence of strategies pursued by political parties of the left" (1985:101). In short, party elites play an important role in mediating the heuristic value of left-right identification, since they can selectively mobilize issues that highlight (or downplay) ideological conflicts.

Following the same logic, one may also attribute shifting perceptions of party positions to elites' strategic choices. While most parties are bound by philosophical roots and traditional support bases, and risk losing credibility by "leap-frogging" other parties along the left-right spectrum (Klingemann et al. 1994), they can effectively alter public perception by emphasizing different issues (Van der Brug 2004:212). For example, a leftist party can attempt to "move" to the center in the public's mind by stressing its policies on law and order, without abandoning its stances on other issues that positioned it on the left. In short, "parties can restructure the social and attitudinal underpinnings of a party system" through their choice of which issues to focus on (Enyedi 2005:714).[12] It is also important to keep in mind that parties occupy a range, rather than a single point, along the left-right spectrum. Kroh emphasizes that

[12] Pelizzo argues that the ideological stance parties project does not denote their left-right position but rather their movement along the spectrum (2003:84-6).

minimum ideological overlap *among* party ranges, and maximum overlap *within* the range of each party, facilitate "rational" voting behavior based on left-right proximity (2009:231). However, it is also possible that parties choose not to differentiate themselves in policies, instead cultivating clientelistic party ties or running personality-centered campaigns. Such a strategy diminishes the utility of left-right identification for vote choice, since a proximity model of voting does not apply when party positions are unimportant or indistinguishable.

This focuses attention not only on strategic choices of individual parties, but at least equally significantly, patterns of competition in the party system as a whole. Inglehart and Klingemann observe that "the intensity of polarization is more important than the number of parties in determining the salience of the left-right dimension" (1976:270), because a system in which parties adopting and stressing distinctly different issue stances allows voters "more sophisticated decisions at a lower cognitive cost" (Lachat 2008:688).[13] Freire (2008) finds that higher polarization is associated with greater likelihood of socio-economic preferences and partisan identification being anchored in left-right terms. Dalton (2008:912) demonstrates that the same logic also applies in terms of voting behavior, as the relationship between left-right placement and vote choice becomes stronger as party systems are more polarized. Thus, the degree to which contestation is meaningful, and spatial heuristics pertinent, hinges on whether publics are offered clear choices (cf. Wessels and Schmitt 2008).

The extent to which cues of left and right guide voting behavior in new democracies will be the focus of chapter 5. With respect to former communist countries, which have attracted the most scholarly attention, some claim that decades

[13] Sigelman and Yough (1978:360) propose two explanations for polarization, one based on the existence of socio-economic cleavages, the other due to governing elites' toleration of contending forces.

of authoritarian rule meant that a large majority of voters in the immediate post-transition years lacked familiarity with party competition in free elections (e.g., Bunce and Csanádi 1993). Other researchers assert that parties themselves often could not create sufficient space for policy differentiation due to constraints imposed by economic liberalization (Innes 2002), thus raising questions concerning the representative link between voters and parties (Miller and Klobucar 2000; Rose and Mishler 1998). However, other studies find programmatically oriented voters and party systems (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007; Tóka 1998), suggesting that voter-party linkages have formed despite considerable party system changes. Moreover, voters are both cognizant of party positions and vote for ideologically proximate parties (e.g., Brader and Tucker 2001; Tworzecki 2003). These findings provide justification for expecting at least modest levels of left-right voting in new democracies.

The left-right dimension thus provides not only a valuable frame of reference that voters can use in determining their vote choice without incurring the high cost of political information gathering, but also a structure to the party system as a whole. Party elites also have incentive to utilize left-right terms when communicating to voters. Since the preceding pages have shown that the left-right schema encompasses the most important political conflicts, one may go as far as inferring that low levels of left-right cognition, inconsistent ranking of parties along the continuum, or mismatches between locations of voters and their preferred parties, could be interpreted not only as indicators of low party system institutionalization but also as contributors thereto.

Data and Cases

Before proceeding to examining cognition, contents, and consequences of the

left-right schema in new democracies, it is first necessary to introduce the data that will be used for empirical investigation in the remainder of this study. Analysis will be based primarily on the World Values Survey (WVS). While individual country surveys are available to explore conditions particular to each case, for the purpose of comparability the WVS contains the fullest range of questions that allow hypotheses testing (see next paragraph). In addition to its breadth of coverage, the fourth wave of the WVS is appropriate because by the time it was conducted (1999-2004), a democratic form of government had already been in place for a number of years in most countries covered in this study, allowing publics sufficient opportunity to evaluate democracy not only as a set of abstract principles, but also through concrete experiences.[14]

While other comparative datasets are available, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) focuses only on a specific topic each year (e.g., social inequality in 1999 and the role of government in 2006, among topics relevant to this study), while questions contained in the Comparative Study of Electoral Studies (CSES) mostly pertain only to vote choice and party identification and include few items economic and social issue preferences as well as attitudes toward various aspects of democracy. Moreover, neither of these datasets includes as many countries as the WVS.[15]

In addition to respondents' left-right placements and demographic profiles, analysis in the empirical chapters will utilize the following categories:

- views on the economy (confidence in unions and big business, attitudes toward income inequality, public ownership, government responsibility for the economy);
- religiosity (confidence in churches, frequency of religious attendance, importance

[14] The more recent fifth wave of the WVS (2004-2009) is not used because by data has only been released for less than half of the countries included in this study at the time of writing. Data for all waves available at http://worldvaluessurvey.org.

[15] Eight of the nineteen new democracies countries covered by this study are included in the 1999 ISSP dataset, and ten countries in 2006. Eight countries are represented in the first wave of CSES (1996-2001), and ten in the second wave (2001-2006).

of God) and morality (acceptance of homosexuality and abortion);

- post-materialism (respect for authority, direct participation,[16] environmental protection, gender equality);
- democratic principles (assessment of democratic system and authoritarian alternatives);
- democratic performance (opinion on whether democracy is bad for the economy, indecisive, bad for maintaining order, and being a preferable system despite its shortcomings);
- comparative regime evaluations (appraising past and present political systems);
- nationalism (national pride, willingness to fight for one's country).

Question wordings are listed in the appendix.

This study will cover countries in both Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia that transitioned from dictatorship in the late 1980s and 1990s. Since the former group of nations is considerably more well-represented in the WVS than the latter, and has witnessed more substantial variation in the pace of political and economic transformation, I divide it into two sub-regions. The first category includes countries that moved on a faster track toward political democratization and economic liberalization, culminating in early accession to the European Union (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; henceforth CEE), and the second comprises of the remaining post-communist (but not post-Soviet) countries in the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia; henceforth Balkan). The East Asian cases are Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. To provide points of reference, I compare each transition region with a group of established Western democracies comprising of

[16] Measures of direct participation include willingness to sign petitions, participate in boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, building occupations.

fifteen member states of the European Union prior to its eastern enlargement (henceforth EU 15). Table 1.1 lists all countries with survey years and sample sizes.

Despite large volumes of literature devoted to the so-called third wave of democratization, most studies focus on cases within a single region. Even the relatively sparse inter-regional comparisons (Diamond et al. 1997; Linz and Stepan

Table 1.1: Countries covered in study

	sample size	***survey year***
Central & Eastern Europe (CEE)		
Czech Republic	1908	1999
Estonia	1005	1999
Hungary	1000	1999
Latvia	1013	1999
Lithuania	1018	1999
Poland	1095	1999
Slovakia	1327	1999
Slovenia	1006	1999
Balkan		
Albania	1000	2002
Bosnia	1200	2001
Bulgaria	1000	1999
Croatia	1003	1999
Macedonia	1055	2001
Romania	1146	1999
Serbia	1200	2001
East Asia		
Indonesia	1004	2001
Philippines	1200	2001
South Korea	1200	2001
Taiwan	780	1995
Western Europe (EU 15)		
Austria	1522	1999
Belgium	1912	1999
Denmark	1023	1999
Finland	1038	2000
France	1615	1999
Germany	2036	1999
Greece	1142	1999
Ireland	1012	1999
Italy	2000	1999
Luxembourg	1211	1999
Netherlands	1002	1999
Portugal	1000	1999
Spain	2409	2000
Sweden	1014	1999
UK	994	1999

1996) are often organized around individual country chapters. While providing an overarching theoretical framework for analysis, the structure of these works necessarily underscores developments unique in each nation. In contrast, the present study emphasizes cross-national and regional comparability by organizing chapters thematically. This naturally raises the question regarding the validity of selecting two parts of the world with seemingly limited commonalities. One can detect two broad similarities, however. First, all countries covered in this study were under lengthy, continuous autocratic rule, rather than alternating between democratic and non-democratic regimes such as the case in Thailand, Turkey, and several Latin American nations. This means that authoritarian rulers had sufficient time to both radically alter economic and social conditions, and shape the political culture of more than one generation. Second, both Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia embrace sizeable intra-regional differences in levels of economic development as well historical and cultural traditions. This provides a natural testing ground to address variations in patterns of left-right issue composition.

In addition to the pragmatic consideration of geographical contiguity, there are two theoretical distinctions justifying the classification of regions in this study. First, one can distinguish the nature of preceding authoritarian rule between regimes that sought legitimization in contrasting ideologies. While both the CEE and Balkan new democracies lived through left-leaning communist dictatorships, their East Asian counterparts endured right-leaning anti-communist rule. These divergent experiences likely affect the relationship between left-right orientations on one hand, and attitudes toward democracy and regime evaluations on the other, a subject that will be examined in chapter 4.

Secondly, among the post-communist cases, the aforementioned distinction between countries which joined the European Union during its initial eastward

enlargement and others which did so at a later date or are still in the process of negotiating accession reflects not only aspiring members' ability to comply with the copious chapters in the *acquis communautaire*, but also their level of political and economic development. For example, when we compare the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in the survey year, almost every Balkan country lies within the range of US$1000 – 2000, while the equivalent statistic for all CEE countries exceeds $3000.[17] The averages for these regions are $2045 and $5038, respectively.[18] This clear differentiation in levels of economic well-being may exert some influence on the impact of economic factors on shaping left-right understanding, to be discussed in chapter 3.

While grouping by region provides a convenient means of comparing and contrasting general patterns, it often conceals considerable cross-national differences. Therefore, in addition to making observations at the regional level, I will also highlight and discuss notable findings from individual countries, as well as emphasize similarities between particular countries in different regions (e.g., newly independent nations or societies featuring ethnic heterogeneity), in the hope that broad strokes do not obscure finer details that may be equally enlightening.

Summary

The literature review in this chapter began by presenting the utility of the left-right schema as a useful shortcut for summarizing and communicating political information, and establishing that it serves a heuristic function beyond either short-term issue preferences or party identification. While acknowledging criticisms

[17] The only exception is Croatia, which boasts a GDP per capita (slightly above $5000) more in line with the CEE region.
[18] Data from the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD); accessible at http://data.un.org.

that a single dimension often cannot encapsulate all aspects of political contestation, the schema captures the most salient axis of competition. Next, I distinguished between ideological sophistication and cognition, stressing that publics need not be able to define and comprehend detailed contents of left and right in order to use these spatial labels. Factors such as education, age, and political interest differentiate levels of left-right cognition among various population segments. This is followed by a discussion on what issues structure understanding of left and right, from traditional cleavages focusing on distribution of economic resources to more recent axes of contestation such as post-materialism. It is notable that the emergence of new issues has not rendered the spatial schema obsolete, affirming its absorptive capacity. I also described issues unique to new democracies that may exert some influence on how publics understand left and right. Finally, the relationship between left-right orientations and party choice is explored, including a discussion on the ability of elites to strategically shape both what cleavages become salient and how publics perceive party locations on the spectrum. The linkage between higher polarization and greater importance of left-right orientation for vote choice has also been noted.

Many studies cited in this chapter focus on established Western democracies, accurately reflecting both the historical significance of the left-right schema and the preponderance of scholarly attention in these countries, but the growing literature using the ideological spectrum to analyze political behavior in other regions suggest that left and right may serve as useful heuristics in new democracies as well. The remainder of this dissertation will discuss each of the themes described above: chapter 2 compares old and new democracies in terms of what percentages of citizens recognize left and right, which segments of the population show greater awareness of the ideological schema, and how ideological self-placements are distributed; chapters 3 and 4 investigate factors that shape popular understanding of what the labels of left

and right stand for, beginning with preferences on economic, social/religious, and 'new politics' issues, then turning our attention to attitudes toward different aspects of political system support, namely appraisals of democratic principles and performance as well as evaluations of past and present regimes; chapter 5 examines the relationship between citizens' left-right orientations and vote choice, and also explores the degree to which the ideological position of elected governments match that of the general public.

Chapter 2: Cognition and Distribution of Left-Right Self-Placements

Our inquiry begins by addressing the question whether citizens identify with the concepts of left and right. The validity of this study rests on the willingness and ability of substantial majorities among publics to locate themselves along the left-right spectrum. Simply selecting a position on this scale does not imply that citizens possess a sophisticated understanding of what their chosen position stands for, and it is almost certain that some self-placements are random. The extent to which respondents' positions are structured by issue preferences and affective identities will be discussed in later chapters. Using data from two waves of the World Values Survey (1994-1999 and 1999-2004), this chapter focuses on patterns of left-right cognition in new democracies, including variations according to socio-demographic indicators and the distribution of ideological orientations.

It is also important to examine left-right distribution because this reveals the degree of polarization in each country. Particularly with respect to new democracies where the political system has yet to generate a deep reservoir of diffuse support, a preponderance of citizens locating themselves on extreme positions raises concerns about the long-term stability of the regime. Yet it is precisely in new democracies where we may see more extreme placements, because political conflicts are more likely to involve questions linked to regime legitimacy and institutional structures, and the norm of political negotiation has a much shorter history. If so, a large proportion of voters could be dissatisfied and demanding radical change regardless of government composition, and differences of opinion may be entrenched and irreconcilable at least in the short term. In contrast, a greater concentration of citizens in the center facilitates compromise solutions to political disagreements, and therefore augurs well for democratic competition. At the same time, too much consensus may

deprive citizens of meaningful choices at elections, as parties become undifferentiated in their attempt to maximize votes by converging to the publics' median position.

Another obvious indicator of distribution is the average left-right scores across countries. In the context of new democracies, this not only reflects popular sentiments at a given point in time, but may also shed light on whether and how legacies of authoritarian rule influence political orientations. The sample examined here covers new democracies that transitioned from regimes whose raisons d'être (at least nominally) ranged from propagation of to resistance against communism. This allows us to explore, for example, whether left-wing dictatorships socialized a majority of the population into left-leaning positions, or had the opposite effect of turning many citizens to the right as an expression of anti-authoritarian beliefs. The availability of data from multiple survey waves permits comparison of changes in average left-right positions over time.

This chapter addresses four questions: 1) how widespread is cognition of the left-right schema in new democracies, 2) how do cognition levels vary among different segments of the public, 3) how are publics distributed along the left-right spectrum, and 4) how have these distributions changed (or remained the same) over time.

Literature Review

As I discussed in chapter 1, Converse's (1964) seminal account asserts the pessimistic view that a large majority lack adequate conceptual sophistication to comprehend what labels of left and right entail. Other studies reporting only modest percentages of survey respondents able to offer self-placement on the left-right spectrum in both established and newer democracies (e.g., Butler and Stokes 1969; Lambert et al. 1986; Mainwaring 1999) seem to corroborate this skepticism. However,

citizens can often distinguish political objects, including parties and policies, in terms of left-right semantics, particularly with respect to symbols and issues they find most salient. Thus, Fuchs and Klingemann (1989) argue that understanding a selected number of elements in which definitions of left and right are anchored is sufficient for voters to utilize the schema. Both Barnes (1971) and Sani (1974) point out that parties' perceived left-right locations structure individual vote choice even when voters cannot explain the specific contents of these spatial terms. Noting the distinction between an individual's sophisticated understanding of left-right semantics and her simple recognition of the schema (Badescu and Sum 2005; Klingemann 1979a), this study follows the latter, minimalist view in defining cognition.

While political competition in established democracies is often conducted and understood in terms of left versus right, with most parties identified with one side of the spectrum or the other through reiterated experiences of campaign platforms and performance in office, publics in most new democracies lack the benefit of such familiarity. Thus one has reason to expect lower levels of left-right cognition in countries that only underwent democratic transition recently. However, examination of empirical evidence has yielded more encouraging results. McAllister and White's (2007) finding from their study of post-communist countries demonstrates that voters in new democracies are no less capable of aligning themselves on the left-right spectrum than their counterparts in more established democracies.[19] Mair (2007) shows that, on average, the proportion of respondents who did not place themselves on the left-right scale is somewhat higher in Eastern than Western Europe, though the gap was small in 2002-2003. Dalton's (2006) study points to considerable variations in cognition levels, but one notes that some of the lowest scores are found in

[19] For example, see the study by Todosijević (2004) describing not only a high rate of cognition in Hungary, but also a close match between elites and masses on parties' left-right locations.

non-democratic regimes rather than transitional societies. It is worth noting here that, particularly in the immediate aftermath of transition when previously held conceptions of left and right might have become obsolete, a 'don't know' response may denote uncertainty or detachment *in the context of the new political system* rather than ignorance about ideology in general.

In addition to overall percentage of 'don't know' responses, we can also explore how prevalent left-right orientations are across socio-demographic groups. In established democracies, we expect that age would correlate positively with left-right cognition, since longer exposure to political information should result in higher likelihood of developing means to process such information. However, Klingemann does not find a significant relation between age and ideological thinking when controlling for education. In contrast, social status and gender do exert an impact, with those in higher social strata and males found capable of greater ideological conceptualization (1979b:256). Testing for relationships between age and the proclivity for centrist self-placement, Knutsen reports mixed results. While he notes gender differences, the extent of their impact varies by country (1998b:311-2). Highly educated citizens are likely to display higher cognitive capability in identifying with left and right (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989:209; see also Jacoby 1986).

In addition, if left and right indeed delineate the contours of political competition in a given country, we expect to find higher levels of cognition among more politically engaged citizens, as indicated by interest in politics. Another measure of citizens' sense of political engagement is partisan attachment. Those who express support for a party are likely to feel a larger stake in the outcome of political competition, and thus pay greater attention to issues and identities that structure left

and right in each country.[20] This leads some scholars to argue that party identification comprises a significant component of left-right orientation (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). The World Values Survey does not directly probe respondents' party identification, but does contain a question on voting intention. Even if answers to this question represent temporary support rather than enduring affiliation, it is still reasonable to hypothesize that respondents who indicated a partisan preference would be more familiar with left and right than those who did not support any party or did not intend to vote.

In societies where these spatial labels have long been familiar vocabularies, we would expect less differentiation in non-response rates by age, gender, education, income, and size of resident communities, since even segments of the population least interested in and informed about political competition are likely to possess some idea (even if far from well-defined) of left and right due to long periods of exposure (Kumlin 2001). In contrast, even if citizens in new democracies have experienced nominal elections under authoritarian regimes, such rituals did not often entail parties or candidates offering clearly differentiated platforms, thus inhibiting the development of left-right consciousness.[21] Under such circumstances, we may observe significant differences in levels of left-right cognition between those with greater political sophistication or exposure (e.g., high education or urban residence) and other segments of society. Alternatively, one can also contend that ideology constituted an important means through which authoritarian regimes attempted to legitimize their rule, and the terms right and left could be presented not as heuristics summarizing competing visions, but instead as crude labels stereotyping enemies of

[20] One may argue a reverse causal relationship, namely that left-right orientations generates party support. This argument was discussed in chapter 1.

[21] The same logic suggests that democratization widens the left-right range in a country by allowing the public to espouse previously suppressed ideological positions (e.g., Shin and Jhee 2005).

the nation. This would result in higher left-right cognition, and less variations among different socio-demographic strata, if only at the expense of in-depth understanding of what these semantics represent.

While levels of cognition provide the most basic information on the utility of the left-right schema in individual countries, the distribution of self-placements along this spectrum offers greater insight into general political attitudes. Chapter 5 will analyze the crucial question concerning the link between left-right orientations and vote choice. For now we focus on two simpler measures: the percentages of extreme and centrist placements. A high proportion of respondents located at both polar positions suggests sharp conflicts over issues that structure the contents of left and right in each country, and reduces the probability of cooperation across the ideological divide. Alternatively, a concentration of voters at one extreme – either left or right – implies that the other pole is considered unpalatable by much of the public, perhaps for historical reasons. Dalton (2006) mentions that proportions of extreme self-placements are higher in new democracies. This may have repercussions for the quality of governance by diminishing the likelihood of compromises.

We should note the possibility that citizens who locate themselves in the center may not truly adhere to centrist political stances, but merely wish to conceal unfamiliarity with the scale. Converse and Pierce argue that a center self-placement "is an obvious selection for a person who is neutral, uncommitted, and even thoroughly indifferent to or ignorant about this generic axis of dispute," because centrist respondents were less likely to offer ideological definitions distinguishing left and right (1986:128-9). The same logic means that one expects non-response to increase if no neutral midpoint on the scale is available. However, by showing that their frequency of political discussion and involvement is not lower than those who are located elsewhere on the scale, Knutsen demonstrates that those identifying with

center positions are not lacking in cognitive awareness (1998b:306-11).

Levels of Left-Right Cognition

We begin by comparing the percentage of respondents in each country unable or unwilling to offer a position on the left-right scale (figure 2.1). On average, slightly more than one-fifth of respondents in both CEE and Balkan countries profess no left-right identification (21.2% and 21.6%, respectively). In contrast, the equivalent figure in the EU 15 states is only half as high (11.1%). While this appears to confirm the expectation that publics in newer democracies are less familiar with the left-right dimension, behind these averages lie two reasons to treat such a conclusion with caution. First, variation *within* each region is invariably greater than that *among* regions, which emphasizes the need for country-specific rather than region-based analysis. The percentage of 'don't know' responses was 6% or lower in the new democracies of Albania and the Czech Republic, while exceeding 15% in the established democracies of Austria, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and Spain. Second, non-response rates in East Asia are among the lowest in the entire sample (6.1%),

Figure 2.1: Percentage unable or unwilling to indicate L-R self-placement



most notably in the case of Korea where, incredibly, all respondents were able to offer a self-placement.

To check the accuracy of these results, we compare them against rates of non-response to a similarly worded question from the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which were conducted during the period 2001-2006. CSES data is available for twelve out of the EU 15 countries,[22] and ten out of seventeen new democracies.[23] The overall correlation between the two surveys is a surprisingly low 0.32, but this conceals tremendous regional variations. In Western European, CEE, and Balkan countries, the correlations are 0.64, 0.86, and 0.78, respectively, offering evidence that results reported in figure 2.1 are valid. The unexpectedly negative, albeit weak, correlation in East Asia (-0.26) is mostly attributable to an enormous gap between non-response rates in Taiwan shown in the two surveys: only 3% in WVS, but over 50% in CSES. Indeed, whereas the overall correlation for all new democracies is a very low 0.19, if we exclude the single case of Taiwan, the figure for the remaining cases reaches a respectable 0.61.[24]

Since authoritarian regimes suppressed parties and policies bearing labels of either left or right that might challenge the dominant ideology, we can hypothesize that the longer a country remained under a dictatorship, the lower left-right consciousness would be, while living under a democratic system should encourage ideological awareness. Furthermore, it is also possible that an attitude of political disengagement or cynicism developed during authoritarian rule due to inability to affect decision-making, and this outlook persisted even after transition, so that

[22] Belgium (2003), Denmark (2001), France (2002), Germany (2002), Ireland (2002), Italy (2006), Netherlands (2002), Portugal (2002), Spain (2004), Sweden (2002), UK (2005).
[23] Albania (2005), Bulgaria (2001), Czech Republic (2002), Hungary (2002), Philippines (2004), Poland (2001), Romania (2004), Slovenia (2004), South Korea (2004), Taiwan (2001).
[24] Correlation between non-response rates in WVS and the second wave of the Post-Communist Citizen survey (1999) for ten CEE and Balkan countries in our sample (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) is 0.62.

respondents choose not to concern themselves with political labels such as left and right.[25] This is difficult to test with respect to the new democracies in our sample because they saw authoritarian collapse during approximately the same period, and therefore have nearly the same length of democratic experience. One piece of evidence in support of this proposition is that among fifteen EU member states at the time of the survey, we find relatively high percentages of 'don't know' responses in both Portugal and Spain, which have a shorter history of democracy.[26] Yet despite similar lengths of communist rule in CEE and Balkan countries, we observe widely different levels of cognition.

The absence of a relationship between the length of democratic rule and levels of left-right cognition can be viewed in historical perspective. It is important to remember that the decades of communism did not simply constitute an interlude between periods of democratic governance; in fact most of these countries had little experience of genuine democratic competition before the onset of World War II and the establishment of communist regimes. The same is true in most East Asian cases. For example, the series of military regimes in Korea were preceded by one-man rule under Rhee Syngman and a chaotic, short-lived experiment with a parliamentary system, and Suharto's prolonged period in power in Indonesia followed that of another strongman, Sukarno. Interestingly, some of the highest levels of left-right cognition are found in countries with a history of parties competing and alternating in power before democratic breakdown, such as Czechoslovakia during the inter-war period and the Philippines before the Marcos presidency. Yet this explanation cannot account for other cases such as Albania and Taiwan, which had no prior democratic

[25] This implies that respondents who did not indicate a left-right self-placement are not necessarily less cognitively capable or politically sophisticated. In fact one cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents chose not to answer this question in the belief that political competition is not uni-dimensional, though this is likely to comprise a small minority in the sample.

[26] However, this was not true of Greece, where nearly nineteen of twenty respondents located themselves on the left-right scale, the third highest figure among EU 15 countries.

tradition.

Instead of the span of authoritarian rule, an alternative explanation may look at its severity, since more totalitarian dictatorships sought eradication of all dissent, while less harsh regimes may have allowed limited competition that encouraged publics to develop and utilize schemas as such the left-right dimension. Repressiveness is almost impossible to quantify, but among communist regimes, some were generally deemed more tolerant than others. In East Asia, some authoritarian rulers permitted opposition forces to contest and win seats in local (Taiwan) and national parliamentary (South Korea) elections. Romania and the Baltic states, where publics lived through more autocratic rule than many other ex-communist countries, do indeed have highest percentages of respondents unfamiliar with the left-right scale.[27] However, heavy-handed governance in Albania and the former Czechoslovakia did not seem to result in diminished left-right awareness.

It is also possible to posit a link between level of cognition and the length of independent nationhood, since daunting tasks of nation-building, frequently involving valence issues, may initially take precedence over left-right competition over positional issues. If so, we would expect lower proportions of respondents indicating left-right placements in newly (re-)founded countries. Indeed, 'don't knows' comprise a quarter or more of respondents in the three Baltic countries as well as parts of the former Yugoslavia. However, the non-cognition rate is lower in newly independent Slovakia, and quite high both Bulgaria and (especially) Romania, which can trace continuous sovereign statehood to the late nineteenth century. Similarly, there is no distinguishable pattern for countries where the very definition of what constitutes the nation is contestable. While acknowledging that the sample is too small for

[27] The fact that among non-democratic Soviet successor states in Europe, non-cognition rates are at or exceed one-third in Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine lends further support to this hypothesis.

generalization, the extremely high levels of left-right awareness in Korea and Taiwan stand in stark contrast to a much lower percentage in former Yugoslav republics.

Finally, some may hypothesize that left-right cognition would be lower where parties have been organizationally consolidated rather than undergoing frequent changes (e.g., formation of new parties or merger between existing ones), thus obviating voters' need for heuristics in determining how to cast their ballots.[28] This cannot be confirmed, however, since cognition of left and right is not lower in many new democracies where major parties/blocs with continuous histories since transition (e.g., Czech Republic, Hungary, Taiwan) than those characterized by fluctuating party fortunes (e.g., Indonesia and the Baltic states). Among established democracies, the lowest non-response rates are found in countries with relatively stable party systems combined with high fragmentation (Netherlands, Sweden).[29]

Socio-Demographic Correlates of Cognition

Does the level of left-right cognition differ among various segments of the public, and if so, are there systematic differences across countries according to socio-demographic strata? Table 2.1 lists bivariate correlations between left-right cognition and five socio-demographic variables – age, gender, education, income, and community size.[30] Among these factors, education attains statistical significance in all new democracies except Albania, Bosnia, and the Philippines, and stands out as the most substantively important variable in a majority of cases. Education is also

[28] For example, Laponce (1981) argues that France's unstable multiparty system led to the entrenchment of the left-right dimension as useful political cues, in contrast to the stable two-party systems in the UK and US.

[29] The proposition that left-right cognition would be higher in presidential systems due to polarizing tendencies inherent in presidential elections finds some support from our sample, though the cases are too few, and biased toward Asian new democracies, to offer any definite conclusion.

[30] South Korea is excluded from the table since all respondents identified a position on the left-right scale.

Table 2.1: Correlates of Left-Right Cognition

	age	*gender*	*education*	*income*	*town size*	*pol. interest*	*party vote*
Czech Republic	0.00	-0.11 **	0.13 **	0.10 **	0.05	-0.24 **	0.12 **
Estonia	0.00	-0.06	0.13 **	0.16 **	0.05	N/A	0.11 **
Hungary	-0.07 *	-0.10 **	0.15 **	0.10 **	0.09 **	N/A	0.22 **
Latvia	-0.02	-0.14 **	0.13 **	0.08 *	0.04	N/A	0.12 **
Lithuania	-0.03	-0.06	0.22 **	0.14 **	0.13 **	-0.34 **	0.26 **
Poland	-0.06 *	-0.13 **	0.24 **	0.08 **	0.09 **	-0.33 **	0.30 **
Slovakia	-0.04	-0.10 **	0.18 **	0.10 **	0.07 **	N/A	0.24 **
Slovenia	-0.02	-0.17 **	0.21 **	0.20 **	0.15 **	-0.26 **	0.29 **
Albania	0.02	-0.10 **	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.19 **	<see note>
Bosnia	0.09 **	-0.12 **	0.04	-0.01	0.08 **	-0.18 **	0.11 **
Bulgaria	-0.19 **	-0.16 **	0.40 **	0.25 **	0.30 **	-0.37 **	0.31 **
Croatia	-0.02	-0.17 **	0.19 **	0.02	0.05	N/A	0.07
Macedonia	-0.06	-0.08 **	0.25 **	0.11 **	0.01	-0.18 **	0.27 **
Romania	-0.16 **	-0.25 **	0.32 **	0.24 **	0.18 **	N/A	0.18 **
Serbia	-0.06 *	-0.23 **	0.27 **	0.19 **	0.04	-0.40 **	<see note>
Indonesia	-0.13 **	-0.16 **	0.20 **	-0.06	0.14 **	-0.17 **	<see Note>
Philippines	0.02	-0.09 **	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09 **	-0.08 **	<see Note>
Taiwan	-0.17 **	-0.05	0.16 **	0.09 *	0.14 **	-0.08 *	<see Note>

Table 2.1 (continued)

Austria	-0.07 **	-0.23 **	0.19 **	0.14 **	0.10 **	-0.31 **	0.14 **
Belgium	0.03	-0.15 **	0.16 **	0.11 **	0.05 *	-0.27 **	0.23 **
Denmark	0.08 *	-0.10 **	0.16 **	0.06	0.01	-0.34 **	0.31 **
Finland	0.11 **	-0.05	0.06	0.08 *	-0.03	-0.14 **	0.35 **
France	0.09 **	-0.08 **	0.08 **	0.09 **	0.09 **	-0.23 **	0.30 **
Germany	0.03	-0.16 **	0.16 **	0.15 **	0.00	-0.28 **	0.28 **
Greece	0.07 *	-0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.16 **	0.24 **
Ireland	0.12 **	-0.14 **	0.06	0.05	0.03	-0.20 **	0.06
Italy	-0.01	-0.12 **	0.14 **	0.13 **	0.06 **	-0.27 **	0.33 **
Luxembourg	0.19 **	-0.15 **	0.17 **	0.15 **	0.01	-0.34 **	0.31 **
Netherlands	-0.03	-0.11 **	0.13 **	0.13 **	0.04	-0.22 **	<see note>
Portugal	0.00	-0.08 *	0.05	0.13 **	0.03	-0.21 **	0.29 **
Spain	-0.03	-0.16 **	0.13 **	0.08 **	0.00	-0.24 **	0.24 **
Sweden	0.10 **	0.03	0.03	0.12 **	-0.01	N/A	0.20 **
UK	0.08 *	-0.13 **	0.18 **	0.22 **	0.01	-0.26 **	0.11 **

Note: bivariate correlations; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

correlate of party vote unavailable where more than 95% of respondents identified party they intended to vote for

significantly correlated with non-response in Western Europe, although in contrast to the transitional regions, other socio-demographic variables often exert equal or greater substantive impact. While in both old and new democracies highly educated respondents were more likely to offer self-placements on the left-right scale, the fact that cognitive capacity plays a more substantial role in new democracies suggest that left-right awareness is less pervasive among less educated citizens in these countries than their counterparts in Western Europe.

If the influence of education across almost all countries is in accord with expectations, the equally frequent (albeit usually less substantial) significance of gender may come as a surprise, especially with regard to the persistence of gender differentiation in cognition levels in established democracies. Among new democracies, the impact of gender exceeds all other socio-demographic variables in Albania, Bosnia, the Philippines (by a small margin), and Latvia. Intriguingly, the former three cases of suggest that the difference between men and women is greater where education is not strongly related to left-right cognition; Ireland and Portugal among established democracies offer corroborative evidence of this linkage.

Compared with other socio-demographic variables, age and community size are not as consistently and strongly correlated with left-right cognition. These two columns of table 2.1 also show clear contrasts between older and newer democracies. Urban dwellers are more likely to indicate a position on the left-right scale than rural residents in a majority of countries across all three transitional regions (the Philippines poses a puzzling exception), but the city-country distinction is largely absent in Western Europe. This offers some support for the proposition that while political awareness has penetrated even into regions that tend to be farther away from arenas of political contestation in established democracies as a result of long and reiterated experience among the entire electorate, this process has yet to fully unfold

in many countries where democratic competition is a relatively new phenomenon.

Age is more significantly correlated with cognition in Western Europe (except Austria) than in new democracies. Older cohorts in these countries have longer exposure to political competition, and are more likely to be socialized during a period when long-term ideological affiliations held greater sway on political preferences than shorter-term factors that increasingly dominate electoral competition in recent years. In new democracies, not only do older cohorts lack similar experience, but their own socialization experience under authoritarian rule may constitute a barrier to understanding and adapting to conditions of open political contestation structured by opposing views. Instead, where age turns out to be significant, the coefficients invariably have an opposite sign from what we observe in Western Europe. This indicates that younger cohorts, who are presumably more highly educated and, even more importantly, grew up in an environment where debate over left and right is more pragmatic than normative, have less difficulty adjusting to new contours of political competition and vocabularies used therein.

Interest in politics can be expected to correlate with cognition even more strongly than education, since it has a more direct bearing on what the left-right dimension encapsulates. This is indeed what we see in older and newer democracies alike where data is available. The consistency of not only statistically significant but also substantively robust correlations suggests that, despite lack of data from several CEE and Balkan countries, this variable exerts greater influence on the likelihood of left-right cognition than socio-demographic characteristics. At the same time, the relationship between cognition and political interest is weaker in East Asia compared with other regions. The last column of table 2.1 offers further evidence affirming this logic linking political engagement to left-right cognition. Leaving aside cases where the proportion of 'non-partisan' respondents is below 5 percent due to lack of

variation, the relationship between expressing vote intentions and offering left-right self-placements is significant in almost every country.[31] This correlation appears equally robust in both old and new democracies, suggesting a consistently positive impact of party identification on raising levels of ideological awareness. However, this also suggests that the process of partisan de-alignment which has been observed in many countries can lead to lower rates of left-right cognition in the years ahead.

This brief discussion on demographic and political correlates of left-right cognition sheds some light on both similarities and differences between established and new democracies. Regardless of the length of democratic experience, highly educated strata in almost every country are more inclined to locate themselves along the left-right scale, and the same is true for citizens with higher income (these two variables are strongly correlated in most cases) and males. Urban residents are more aware of left and right than their rural counterparts in new democracies, while this distinction rarely surfaces in the EU 15 countries. Where age differences are significant, older cohorts are more familiar with the left-right scale in established democracies, but the opposite is true in transitional countries, presumably due to divergent socialization experiences. Finally, to the extent that data are available, political interest is usually a better predictor of cognition than any socio-demographic variable.

Distribution of Left-Right Self-Placements

Expectations regarding a greater propensity toward extreme positions in new democracies find some confirmation in figure 2.2. On average, only 6.7 percent of respondents in EU 15 countries are located in the left- and right-most categories,

[31] The 'party vote' variable is a coded dichotomously between respondents who named a party they would vote for and those who either answered 'don't know' or intended to cast a blank vote.



while the equivalent figures for CEE, Balkan, and East Asian regions are 9.6, 14.8, and 14.2 percent, respectively. The only established democracies in our sample with extreme identifiers exceeding 10 are France and Portugal, whereas this is true for about two-thirds of all new democracies. Similar to the measure of left-right cognition, intra-regional variations exceed inter-regional disparities. Countries with recent experiences of war or widespread civil unrest tend to have a high percentage of extreme self-placements, suggesting that experiences of sharp confrontation may have the effect of polarizing the population. Examples include Albania (riots following the collapse of pyramid schemes), Indonesia (financial crisis and the fall of the Suharto regime), and Macedonia (civil war with ethnic Albanian insurgents). However, this is less true of Serbia and especially Croatia, which was also involved in the wars of Yugoslav succession and suffered massive dislocation.

Under the reasonable assumption that democracies are not governed by extremists, a high proportion of publics holding extreme views denotes a significant number of strongly discontented citizens. We must note that one cannot point to

evidence of polarization without looking at the balance between rightists and leftists within the "extremist" classification in each country. Among the entire sample, only Albania comes close to a scenario of intense bipolarization, with the extreme right and left categories each containing nearly 10 percent of respondents. In other countries with high percentages of extreme positions, radical leanings tend to be one-sided.

In both ex-communist regions where we observe this phenomenon, rightists usually outnumber leftists, for example in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Romania. The same disparity also is also found in Estonia and Latvia, despite the low proportion of extremists overall. There is not a single case where the percentage of extreme leftists significantly exceeds rightists. This raises the question of whether the left label still carries negative connotations linked with past authoritarian rule and is therefore deemed illegitimate, while rightist identification is associated with advocacy of democratization and the market economy.

Aversion to vestiges of the former authoritarian regime may explain in part why extreme positions on one end of the left-right spectrum considerably exceed the other in several CEE and Balkan countries, but this cannot account for the remarkable popularity of the extreme right in many East Asian cases. In both Indonesia and the Philippines, where the US helped maintain long-standing dictatorships under Suharto and Marcos in the name of anti-communism, one in six respondents had no qualms placing themselves in the right-most position, far surpassing those on the left end of the scale. Similarly high proportions of extreme positioning (on either left or right) are not seen anywhere else in our sample. In Taiwan, rightists outnumber leftists by more than ten to one, the legacy of long KMT one-party rule notwithstanding.

In these countries, 'left' as a political label seems as ostracized after transition as it was under the previous, undemocratic regime, whereas 'right' appears untainted by decades of authoritarianism. It lies beyond the aim of this chapter to investigate

reasons behind this paradox, but two suggestions are plausible: either citizens in some new democracies do not perceive a regime divide in terms of left and right (which would belie the high level of cognition in the Philippines and Taiwan), or they evaluate past regimes more in terms of economic achievements rather than political repression.

Another way of looking at left-right distributions is the measure of centrist self-placements (5 and 6) on the scale (figure 2.3). Regional averages mostly hover around 50 percent, with little difference separating old and new democracies. While we might expect to find the largest proportion of centrists in countries with the least number of extremists, it is notable that figure 2.3 is not an exact mirror image of figure 2.2. The extreme case of Albania again starkly demonstrates its bipolarization alluded to earlier. Bulgaria and the Czech Republic seem to offer evidence that relatively high numbers in the extreme categories correspond to fewer centrists, while Bosnia and Macedonia prove the reverse. Figures in Indonesia and the Philippines also show that large extreme placements do not mean that only small proportions are left in the center categories.

Figure 2.3: Percentage of centrist L-R placements



Finally, figure 2.4 displays mean left-right self-placements for each country. Compared to the slightly left-of-center mean score for the EU 15 (5.28), averages for CEE (5.46) and Balkan (5.44) regions fall almost exactly in the middle of the ten-point scale, while most East Asian countries lean much further to the right, resulting in a mean of 6.25. Mean standard deviations are similar in all regions except the Balkans, where self-placements are less concentrated in the center. It is notable – and perhaps not coincidental – that the two cases where national averages are more than 1 unit away from the midpoint are Indonesia and Taiwan, with the Philippines just slightly under this benchmark. In view of high extreme right identifications in these countries noted above, these populations' embrace of the right, or distaste for the left, no longer comes as a surprise.[32]

These average country positions are likely to fluctuate over time, meaning that the ranking of countries within each region (as shown in figure 2.4) may not remain

Figure 2.4: Average L-R self-placement



[32] This shows that even within Asia, Shin and Jhee's proposition that "the democratization of a right-wing dictatorship shifts the masses to the left" (2005:394) is not applicable beyond the South Korean case that the authors analyzed.

the same in future surveys. Nevertheless, one can search for patterns explaining why publics in some new democracies lean more to the left (or right) than in neighboring states. One plausible hypothesis relates to the degree of repression practiced by the former regime: more stringent authoritarian rule could provoke greater backlash against its ideological stance. This may account for the relatively rightist inclinations observed in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Romania, and the leftist leaning of many South Koreans. If, as the data seems to suggest, the same argument can even be extended to countries with longer democratic histories such as Greece and Spain, one can infer that the impact of authoritarian legacy on ideological dispositions may be more than a short-term phenomenon. However, this proposition fails to account for the decidedly right-leaning publics in Indonesia and Taiwan, which saw massive purges of political opponents by the Suharto and Chiang regimes under the name of anti-communism.

One may propose a related, though sequentially distinct, explanation for differences among new democracies shown in figure 2.4 by focusing on events during and immediately following democratic transition, and hypothesize that a quick and complete break with the past would entail more wholesale repudiation of the former regime's ideological underpinning. This may partially account for the difference between the Czech Republic and Poland despite the deep unpopularity of communist rule in both countries. The fact that democratization proceeded under the aegis of reformed communists in left-leaning Slovenia supports this conjecture, though the case of right-leaning Romania suggests otherwise. In East Asia, the first post-authoritarian presidents in Indonesia, Taiwan, and South Korea all belonged to the former ruling party, but only publics in the two former cases inclined to the right. In short, evidence supporting either hypothesis is far from conclusive.

Changes and Continuities over Time

If we assume that familiarity with the left-right dimension in new democracies increases with time, as publics become more accustomed to political contestation involving competing policies and identities encapsulated by this schema, then we should expect a decline in non-response. Similarly, experience of democratic politics, particularly in countries where institutional structures render coalition governments more likely, may have the effect of moderating opinions, not only due to the necessity of alliance-building and compromise for electoral or policy objectives, but also because fundamental questions concerning the nature of the regime and institutional rules are for the most part no longer under contention. If so, we should observe a reduction in the proportion of extremists, and a corresponding increase in center placements.

To test these propositions, we compare percentages of non-responses, extremists, and centrists between the third (1994-99) and fourth (1999-2004) waves of the World Values Survey. Where data is already available, I also include the fifth wave (2005-8) to provide a longer-term perspective (table 2.2). Contrary to expectations, the proportion of respondents unable or unwilling to indicate a self-placement on the left-right scale did not drop notably in any country over time. Indeed, it went up by more than ten percent between the third and fourth waves in Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania, corroborating Badescu and Sum's (2005) observation that, in contrast with western Europe, "the proportion of people able to place in order main parties on a left-right scale… has decreased" in former communist countries. This trend is repeated among the few countries with more recent data, including sizeable increases in non-cognition rates in Indonesia and Slovenia. These changes are all the more drastic in view of the brief interval between the two waves. As I alluded to above, an important reason may be the replacement of polarizing conflicts at the time

Table 2.2: Changes over Time

	non-response			*extreme*			*centrist*			*L-R average*		
	W3	*W4*	*W5*	*W3*	*W4*	*W5*	*W3*	*W4*	*W5*	*W3*	*W4*	*W5*
Albania	7.8%	5.2%		3.1%	18.8%		29.0%	24.3%		5.07	5.34	
Bosnia	7.7%	12.6%		9.4%	12.0%		48.3%	58.2%		5.14	5.09	
Bulgaria	16.3%	32.7%	28.9%	14.8%	17.1%	12.5%	40.2%	38.9%	44.8%	5.8	5.85	4.75
Croatia	10.5%	24.1%		6.4%	8.5%		53.0%	64.8%		5.22	5.27	
Macedonia	32.1%	22.7%		12.9%	20.4%		46.7%	50.8%		5.11	5.21	
Romania	24.4%	44.6%	48.7%	11.5%	14.5%	14.6%	45.5%	49.4%	42.5%	5.32	5.83	5.99
Serbia	25.3%	30.9%	28.0%	15.7%	12.5%	12.9%	41.3%	45.7%	43.1%	4.83	5.52	5.92
Czech Republic	11.2%	7.9%		13.6%	13.0%		39.1%	39.7%		5.95	5.96	
Hungary	15.2%	22.9%		9.6%	7.4%		50.8%	63.8%		5.11	5.10	
Poland	23.9%	22.0%	28.2%	14.7%	14.1%	14.3%	46.6%	46.7%	50.3%	5.71	5.35	5.89
Slovakia	11.8%	16.0%		10.2%	7.7%		46.3%	46.0%		5.3	5.14	
Slovenia	26.3%	27.9%	37.1%	6.2%	8.7%	13.2%	64.4%	61.2%	48.8%	5.2	4.99	5.27
Estonia	24.7%	31.5%		4.6%	5.7%		58.1%	57.6%		5.42	5.93	
Latvia	22.1%	33.1%		4.4%	8.3%		55.9%	55.6%		5.41	5.83	
Lithuania	26.0%	37.8%		12.6%	11.8%		48.6%	50.0%		5.79	5.41	
Indonesia		18.2%	28.5%		17.5%	23.4%		47.7%	45.6%		6.62	6.65
Korea	1.1%	0.0%	0.2%	10.8%	10.6%	4.6%	38.1%	37.8%	33.3%	5.2	5.35	5.69
Philippines	2.1%	4.3%		14.5%	20.7%		56.2%	48.5%		6.08	6.45	
Taiwan	3.1%		1.3%	8.1%		13.7%	52.8%		50.9%	6.57		6.16

Source: Waves 3 (1994-99), 4 (1999-2004), 5 (2005-08) of the World Values Survey

of democratization by less contentious issues. There does not appear to be any relationship between the initial level of left-right cognition and changes between the two periods, though we can note that countries with the lowest non-response rates in the third wave (Albania, the Philippines, South Korea) saw little change in the fourth wave.

These observations raise the question of why ideological learning has not taken place in many new democracies. One possible explanation is that such the process of learning takes place across a longer time span (for example, through generational replacement), and consequently one cannot detect its effect within the short period covered by the surveys we use. However, one may also hypothesize developments in the opposite direction, namely that new cohorts entering the electorate would have greater difficulty identifying themselves in terms of left and right, due to their socialization during a less ideologically charged period than the Cold War era. If this proposition proves valid, we have little reason to expect rising left-right awareness with the passage of time. Also, since the previous section shows a strong link between party support and left-right cognition, it is possible to speculate on the effect of party system fluctuations, as frequent changes create confusion among citizens whose left-right positioning is tied to partisanship. However, this proposition seems doubtful when we consider on the one hand countries such as Slovenia where few new actors have entered parliament but large proportions of the population did not identify with the left-right schema, and on the other hand cases where cognition is high despite constant changes in party labels, as exemplified by South Korea.

The distribution of extremist opinions between the third and fourth waves saw very little change in almost all cases. Albania once again proves an outlier, as a surge in extremism (toward both ends of the spectrum) took place between 1998 and 2002,

perhaps in reaction to massive riots, UN intervention, and the war involving ethnic Albanians in neighboring Kosovo that shook this Balkan nation during this short span. Instability, including the threat of war, may also have motivated a greater proportion of the public to adopt extreme positions in Macedonia, though we not observe a similar trend in Serbia, which was involved in four wars during the 1990s. Nowhere do we detect a sizeable shift from extreme right to extreme left or vice versa. This holds true in most countries covered by the fifth wave as well, with the exception of Bulgaria, where the change is attributable mainly to the decline of the extreme right rather than swelling ranks of the extreme left. Indonesia continues to stand out as the most glaring example of the extreme right's popularity; nearly one in five respondents identified with this category.

The proportion of centrist placements is also marked by consistency in most countries. Large-scale change took place only in Croatia and Hungary, where the trend moved in the anticipated upward direction. The percentage of extremists in both of these cases saw little change between the two waves, offering further proof that extreme and center placements are not necessarily inversely proportional. Continuity rather than change also characterizes the share of moderate respondents between the fourth and fifth waves, the only outlier being Slovenia where we detect a movement toward a more polarized polity.

In short, propositions regarding changes in left-right response rates and distributions in new democracies are not confirmed. Neither left-right cognition nor centrist orientation show ascendant trajectories over time; in fact non-response rates increased considerably within just two or three years in a number of countries, although the brevity of this time span cautions against drawing definitive conclusions. Furthermore, comparison with older EU countries shows that even in many established democracies, up to one-fifth of the public still do not identify with left or

right despite decades of political socialization. A fall in non-response rates in CEE and Balkan countries, if this occurs at all, is likely to be very gradual (except in Indonesia, figures for most Asian countries leave no room for further decline). Neither should we anticipate convergence toward lower levels of extremism seen in the west, at least not in the short term.

Comparing means across the third and fourth wave WVS survey,[33] it is hardly surprising that some countries demonstrate a consistently leftist orientation (Hungary, Slovenia), while others retain a preference for the right (the Czech Republic, and especially the Philippines). Interestingly, we note sizeable shifts in public opinion from left to right in Serbia, and a comparably large swing in the opposite direction in Bulgaria. What warrants greater interest are patterns of change or continuity. Countries witnessing a rightward shift outnumber those where public sentiments moved leftward, but while the former trend is observed across all regions, the latter trajectory is confined to CEE countries. Left-right averages in a number of countries moved closer to the center (e.g., Lithuania from the right, Albania from the left), but we cannot speak of centripetal movements overall. Bosnia, already among the most left-leaning countries in the mid-1990s, shifted further leftward (albeit by a slight margin) in subsequent years, while a similar movement on the right took place in the Philippines in more drastic fashion. Finally, cases of initial swing in mean left-right positions toward one direction followed by opposite movement in subsequent years (Poland, Slovenia), offers a caveat about reading too much into short-term changes.

The question of party locations on the left-right spectrum will be addressed in chapter 5; it suffices to mention here that changes in publics' average left-right positions do not appear to correspond with shifts in the strengths of parties comprising

[33] This excludes Indonesia and Taiwan from the analysis. The third wave was not conducted in the former, and the fourth wave did not include the latter.

government at the time of the survey. For example, many Slovenians moved leftward despite having its first elected center-right government since independence,[34] and more Koreans shifted toward the right notwithstanding arguably the most left-leaning president in the country's history.

Summary

This chapter has discussed previous works on left-right cognition and its socio-demographic correlates, and compared these indicators between established democracies and three transitional regions. Furthermore, I have presented data on distributions of left-right self-placements and changes over time, highlighting both similarities and differences between and among old and new democracies. The most notable, if not unexpected, finding regarding publics' willingness to indicate a left-right self-placement is that *intra*-regional variations considerably exceeds *inter*-regional ones. Cognition in established Western democracies is in general slightly higher than in ex-communist countries, though it is in some East Asian cases where we find publics most mindful of the spatial dimension of politics.

Among socio-demographic variables, highly educated citizens and males are more likely to locate themselves on the left-right scale in most countries, and income is also significant in a majority of cases, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The same is true for urban residents in new democracies, but there is no evidence of an urban-rural distinction in Western Europe. Only with regard to age do we observe opposite trends: older citizens in established democracies show greater awareness of left and right, probably due to both generational and life-cycle effects, whereas younger cohorts are more cognizant in new democracies where this variable is

[34] A center-right coalition was formed due to parliamentary maneuvers in June 2000, but the subsequent election later that year returned a center-left coalition to power.

significant. Lastly, high political interest and having a preferred party are highly correlated with left-right cognition almost everywhere, exerting a stronger impact than any socio-demographic factor in both old and new democracies alike (with the exception of East Asian cases).

It is in the distribution of left-right placements where we note a marked distinction between old and new democracies: the combined proportion of respondents located in the extreme right and left categories remain below ten percent in almost all Western European countries, but exceeds this benchmark in a majority of new democracies, with particularly high figures in the Balkans and East Asia. Recent political upheavals may offer case-specific explanations for the preponderance of extremist views, but the very fact that such instability took place raises questions about the extent of democratic consolidation in these countries. Contestation over regime principles and institutional structures tends to polarize opinion more than disputes over specific policies, due to both higher stakes and fewer compromise options. Thus, high polarization likely carries negative implications for the functioning of democracy. At the same time, it should be noted that a similar proportion of citizens – approximately fifty percent – define themselves as centrists in both old and new democracies.

Finally, changes between the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey (and also the fifth wave, in the few countries where data is available) provide no evidence of either increases in left-right cognition or centripetal trajectories over time. In fact, non-response rates rose significantly in a number of countries. While the time span between the two waves – only two or three years in a number of countries – makes observations of stability rather than change more likely, this (non-)trend should nevertheless sound a note of caution to those who expect political awareness or distribution of preferences in new democracies to simply converge with features

found in established democracies with the passage of time. As for the balance of opinion in new democracies, we do not observe any uniform trend. Movement toward the center in a few cases is juxtaposed to centrifugal tendencies in others, while mean scores in a majority of countries remain largely unchanged.

Having analyzed left-right cognition and distribution in new democracies, and addressed similarities and differences with reference to established democracies, the next logical step is to take up the question: what do publics mean when they speak of left and right? Chapter 3 will discuss understanding of these semantics in terms of issue stances with regard to economic and social/religious preferences, and chapter 4 will examine how attitudes toward various questions pertaining to democratic principle and performance, as well as evaluation of past and present regimes, structure left-right orientations.

Chapter 3: Defining the Left-Right Schema:
Demographic, Economic, Social/Religious, and Post-Materialist Factors

Having explored the extent and variations in public identification with the left-right schema in Eastern European and East Asian new democracies, and factors which influence levels of cognition, our next step is to investigate the substantive contents behind these spatial labels. This chapter examines the extent to which policy and attitudinal differences long associated with the left-right dimension, including not only economic but also social/religious and post-material issues, help to structure left-right orientations in new democracies. The next chapter will explore the impact of factors particular to the context of new democracies, namely evaluations of democracy and regime comparisons.

The preceding chapter shows that these ideological terms are familiar to the majority of citizens even in countries where open political competition is a relatively new phenomenon. At the same time, neither prevalent usage nor cognition patterns reveal what meanings publics attach to these spatial labels. To validate the assertion that the left-right schema encapsulates major axes of political conflict, it is necessary to investigate what these salient issues are. Furthermore, examining how public understanding of left and right differs both within and across regions may yield insights on linkages between societal conditions and the predominance of certain cleavages over others. For example, is contestation centering on issues of economic distribution more likely in countries with wider wealth gaps, and do moral questions more often dominate political debate where higher proportions of the population are religious?

This chapter focuses on the impact of three sets of issues that have received extensive scholarly interest as factors shaping public understanding of left-right

orientations. We begin by providing theoretical background and explaining variables for empirical testing. The first empirical section provides a simple base model consisting of socio-demographic characteristics, against which the explanatory value of other models can be measured. Next, we analyze the economic dimension, including attitudes toward major actors across the classic owner versus worker divide as well as preferences regarding the government's role in the economy. The following section examines the social dimension, in terms of both religious attachment and views on moral issues which have generated controversy in many countries. Attention in the last section turns to the post-materialist, or libertarian, dimension, specifically gender equality, environmental protection, rejection of authority, and political participation beyond the ballot box. All sections end with a discussion on possible macro-political characteristics that affect the explanatory capacity of each model in accounting for citizens' left-right orientations.

Factors Structuring Left-Right Orientations

Socio-demographic attributes

Before launching into discussions of how preferences on each issue dimension may structure left-right orientations, it is worth noting that some political divides can be rooted in the question of who someone is rather than what someone believes in. In other words, some respondents' left-right positioning may be attributable in part to socio-demographic characteristics. Age is often found to be strongly related to ideological orientations, with older cohorts who have greater stakes in preserving the *status quo* aligned to the right, while younger generations who are in subordinate positions in terms of both political and economic resources have greater incentive to demand change and challenge authority – inclinations that are often associated with the left. This 'haves' versus 'have-nots' dichotomy would also suggest that women,

long excluded from the public arena and still underrepresented in the highest echelons of politics and business, have greater cause to seek changes to existing inequalities and thus identify with the left. However, scarcity of exposure beyond the confines of domesticity is frequently concomitant with greater religiosity, which is linked with a conservative worldview.

Social class, often cited as a critical determinant of left-right orientations, interacts with both education and income in a mutually causal relationship. Thus, one expects education and income to serve as likely predictors of self-placements along the spatial spectrum. Higher education increases cognitive capacity and raises awareness of problems in society, but they may search for solutions in either a left- or right-leaning direction. Individuals who have accumulated or preserved wealth under existing political and economic systems have reason to maintain the current order, while those with little to lose would attempt to pursue changes in anticipation of improving their material well-being. In most countries it is precisely those individuals receiving the highest levels of education who earn the highest income (the arrow of causation points in the other direction as well, creating a self-perpetuating upper class), leading to possibly contradicting incentives for cognitively mobilized leftists. One potential solution lies in the distinction between cultural and economic capital. For individuals endowed with both, the predominance of cultural capital exerts a pull toward the left, while an emphasis on economic capital is linked to preference for the right (Lamont 1987; see also Achterberg and Houtman 2006, Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004).

Expectations for the effects of both education and income can account for cases where rural-urban differences coincide with the left-right axis. Rural residents are typically older, receive less education and earn lower incomes, and in addition are more likely to find a greater presence of religion in their daily lives, not least as a

form of communal socialization. All these characteristics incline citizens in the countryside toward more conservative attitudes than their urban counterparts. That rural dwellers lean toward the right is part of received political wisdom in many countries. The analytical question here is whether the rural-urban divide exerts an influence on left-right orientations independent of other socio-demographic factors.

How may the impact of socio-demographic on left-right identification in new democracies differ from patterns found in established democracies? We highlight two possible contrasts. First, if age is positively associated with a propensity toward preserving the old order, older cohorts who have lived most of their lives under, and probably had higher stakes in, the previous authoritarian regime may be less willing and able to manage challenges and opportunities brought by democratic transition. Where the previous regime was rightist, the linkage hypothesized above would hold true; but where the previous regime professed a leftist ideology, we expect a reverse relationship, namely that older generations would lean further to the left than younger cohorts.

Second, the effect of education and income may exert a smaller impact on ideological orientations in new democracies where policies pursued by previous authoritarian regimes reduced educational and wealth disparities. Some scholars thus hypothesize that social structure variables would not be as important in demarcating left from right and influencing vote choice in new democracies (Muelemann 2004; White et al. 2000), and also that class cleavages which structure political competition in many Western democracies would not play as prominent a role – at least not until inequality has grown sufficiently wide for citizens to identify themselves (or for political elites to mobilize voters) along class lines. However, Whitefield contends that "social factors - especially age, education, religion, ethnicity, and occupational class - significantly shape ideological perspectives" in post-communist countries

(2002:191). Similarly, Van der Brug reports that "the effect of social structure on the vote is equally strong in former communist countries as in more established democracies in Western Europe" (2010:602).

Economic issues

A number of seminal works dealing with the left-right schema deem these semantics synonymous with an economically defined cleavage, treating this association as so self-evident that no empirical validation was necessary. To cite two classic examples, Downs presents his spatial model under the assumption that the left-right spectrum is structured by opinions on the role of government in the economy, and refers to this relationship as one that "might be nearly universally recognized as accurate" (1957:116). Lipset (1960:223-4) likewise observes a straightforward association between one's income level and ideological preference. Scholars a quarter-century later recognize a diversification in issues underlying the left-right schema, but continue to identify the divide between preferences for government regulation and free enterprise as fundamental in shaping political competition (Budge and Robertson 1987; Fuchs and Kligemann 1989).

Empirical studies confirm that economic issues constitute the most important axis of political competition in both old and new democracies (Huber and Inglehart 1995). Knutsen further maintains that economic issues have not weakened as an ideological anchor in the 1980s and 1990s (1995b:173). In other words, the legacy of traditional economic cleavages persists despite changing social class structure (cf. Kriesi 1998). These findings suggest the universality of economic conflicts to democratic competition, an endemic quality which leads us to expect that questions of distribution would play as significant a role in former communist and East Asian democracies as in advanced Western societies.

However, in view of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) proposition that political cleavages derive from particular historical events, and specifically that class conflicts pitting owners against workers was a product of the industrial revolution in Western Europe, one has little reason to assume *a priori* that the same cleavage would characterize political competition in countries which did not follow a similar historical trajectory, or at least did so at a different stage of political development. One important reason lies in the agency of parties. Since parties are bound by long-standing policy positions and risks losing credibility if they attempt to shift their stances radically, parties founded at a period when industrial conflict represented the paramount political issue and enshrining the promotion of certain class interests as their fundamental objectives may help perpetuate the salience of economic cleavages. Since this argument is far more applicable to established Western democracies than newly democratized countries in Eastern Europe and East Asia, one may expect economic issues to exert less influence on how voters in the latter regions understand left and right.

This is supported by Benoit and Laver's conclusion from expert surveys that defining locations along the left-right spectrum primarily in economic terms constitutes "a particularly western way of looking at things," and risks overlooking "the existence of important 'local' policy dimensions" (2006:133). Extending the argument that left and right are defined by historical context, it is important to examine particular events and trends in the past when exploring the contents of spatial semantics in new democracies. The most notable development involves regime change, a topic that will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. What concerns us here is the legacy of history on the likelihood and bases of an economically anchored left-right schema.

Little consensus exists over this subject. For example, with regard to new

democracies in Eastern Europe, Innes notes a lack of social base (i.e., class conflict) for economic competition as a legacy of communism (2002:96-9). Also referring to legacies of the former rule, Sitter posits that any economic cleavages in post-communist countries would be less rooted in social structure than what the Lipset-Rokkan model suggests because groups are disaggregated (2001:74). In contrast, Whitefield argues that communist rule did not eradicate social cleavages (2002:184-6), and that with the exception of ethnicity, cleavages in eastern and Western Europe do not differ substantially (2002:197). Rohrschneider and Whitefield find that in ex-communist democracies "by far the most important conflict between parties in centered on distributional issues" (2009:290), and Bielasiak demonstrates that the pro- versus anti-market debate is the most prominent factor shaping left-right contents (1997:27). Furthermore, the salience of economic issues varies considerably within the former communist bloc: Klíma (1998) and Pettai and Kreuzer (1999) find that they define left and right in the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, while McManus et al. (2003) and Mészáros et al. (2007) reach opposite conclusions in Poland and Hungary, respectively.

Moreover, both the mode of transition from authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1992) and patterning of social groups (Evans and Whitefield 2001; Evans 2006) affect the salience of economic cleavages in defining left and right in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the role of economic issues in shaping ideological orientations among East Asian electorates has been subject to debate. McAllister finds no evidence of a class cleavage in this region (2007:246), but Lee and Lim (2006) and Lin et al. (1996) indicate an increasing emphasis on class in South Korea and Taiwan, respectively, and Wilson and Inoguchi (2008) point out that Asian publics are not unlike Europeans in making demands for government provision of welfare.

Even if one assumes the significance of economic conflicts in structuring

political competition, the specific issues that appear most salient to the public obviously vary across countries as a function of both objective circumstances and elite mobilization strategies. For instance, transition from command to market economy in former communist countries invites debate over the scope and pace of privatization, while societies that saw economic growth under a developmental state model may face demands for building and strengthening a social welfare net. At the risk of overlooking details idiosyncratic to individual states, it is necessary to identify factors that permit cross-country comparison.

Examining the contents of left and right in Western Europe, Freire distinguishes among social, value, and partisan factors, and further identifies three components of the former: structural, organizational, and identity-based (2006:360-3). Following a similar approach, we separate two aspects of economic cleavages. One is associated with attitudes toward groups representing opposite sides of the traditional class conflict, namely labor unions and large businesses. In established democracies, labor unions have long provided the core constituency, as well as organizational and financial support, to leftist parties, and recent decades saw many center-right parties campaigning (and governing) on an agenda of limiting union power. Changes in occupational structures have diminished the political influence of unions in many countries, but unions still play important, and sometimes formal, roles in influencing the policy direction of leftist parties. The association between large businesses and the right is less explicit than that between labor unions and the left, but where the left-right schema is anchored in economic terms, voters are likely to recognize rightist parties as more friendly to private enterprise. Attacks from the left focusing on issues of inequality may serve to reinforce the impression among the electorate on close ties between corporate interests and the right.

The other aspect of economic cleavages encompasses preferences on issues of

resource distribution. The normative argument behind expanding the state's role in the economy lies in promoting equality, and the most direct manifestation of inequality is seen in income disparity. In contrast, arguments favoring a limited economic role of government assert the efficiency of market mechanisms and the incentive for innovation through free competition. Consequently, income disparity is perceived not as a condition demanding state remedy, but an accepted outcome resulting from individual effort. The former view is grounded in the philosophical belief in the power of the state to shape society for the better, while the latter subscribes to faith in the individual's capacity to make right decisions. The extent of government responsibility for individual well-being has been a long-standing point of contention, with very tangible implications especially in countries that underwent rapid transition from planned to market economies. Large-scale privatization of publicly owned enterprises has been the hallmark of this transition, so one can expect the issue of public versus private ownership to be salient in many voters' minds.[35] One should note here that while the pursuit of equality is often concomitant with changing existing economic structures, and both are in turn associated with the left, in the post-communist context change often means moving *away from* equality, so the leftist label cannot be attached to both (Markowski 1997:223).

Social/religious issues

If spatial semantics truly capture the main cleavages across countries, they must absorb not only issues described above, but also additional axes of political conflict. According to many scholars, the most important non-economic dimension of competition comprises of questions related to social values, including those based on

[35] Interestingly, Tavits and Letki find that "in post-Communist countries, the leftist parties are more likely to pursue rightist policies of fiscal responsibility and economic reform than the rightist parties themselves" (2009:566) in order to overcome the stigma of their authoritarian legacy.

religion. In addition to Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) discussion of the church versus state cleavage, several other works of their era emphasize the role of religion in shaping voting behavior. For example, Lijphart finds that "among the determinants of party choice, religion emerges as the victor" above class (1979:442; see also Rose and Unwin 1970). However, whereas religious cleavages once referred mainly to different faiths, recent studies have focused on the clash between religious and secular views, as summarized by Esmer and Petterson that "there is evidence that the degree of religiosity may explain even more of the variance in electoral choice than religious denomination" (2007:492). Nicolet and Tresch (2009) differentiate between the political ramifications of religious "belonging" and "believing", and we follow this distinction by examining the influence of confidence in religious institutions, frequency of religious attendance, and personal belief in the importance of a divine being.

It should be noted that while issues explicitly involving a religious versus secular divide rarely dominate the political agenda, a religious/moral divide continues to influence political behavior (Knutsen 1995b:190-6; Oskarson 2005). A cleavage that cuts across faiths, dividing citizens holding religiously inspired socially conservative views against those who are more socially tolerant and tend toward secularism (e.g., Broughton and ten Napel 2000:203; Manza and Wright 2003:306), implies that it revolves around issue stances rather than denominational ties. The specific moral issues that underlie social/religious cleavages obviously differ across societies, however, and selecting any particular question inevitably risks neglecting salient and controversial topics in one country or another. We decide to use attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality as indicators of social tolerance, because discussion concerning the acceptability of these lifestyle choices has provoked strong views from both sides of the debate, and often elicited ecclesiastical intervention. Scholars have

also adopted one or both of these measures as proxies for social liberalism. Where a social/religious cleavage structures ideological orientations, we expect that citizens who have greater faith in religious institutions, attend services more frequently, attach greater important to God, and disapprove of abortion and homosexuality would tend to identify with the right.

Similar to economic cleavages, one may argue that policies under authoritarian regimes which discouraged or restricted religious practices would limit the impact of social/religious variables on how publics understand left and right (cf. White et al. 2000). But it bears keeping in mind the distinction between formal confessional affiliation and private beliefs. The latter can be maintained in the absence of the former (Nicolet and Tresch 2009). Also, while religious authorities frequently express opinions on moral questions such as abortion and homosexuality, citizens may form opinions on these issues independent of religious influences. Moreover, the assumption that decades of government policies aimed at suppressing organized religion would create largely atheistic societies probably underestimates the tenacity of faiths. What does distinguish social cleavages in new democracies is the relationship between economic and social dimensions, as exemplified by Laver and Benoit's finding that "in the post-communist countries, positioning on social liberalism is typically orthogonal to positioning on economy policy" (2006:121).

In the absence of rigid class structures reinforced by party loyalties, and due to policies under former authoritarian regimes aimed at curbing inequality of resource distribution, elites in new democracies may have difficulty identifying a strong social basis for economic cleavages. In contrast, mobilizing religious or moral values often offers elites a more readily available route to garner support. Note that traditional morality needs not be rooted in formal religion, though the two are often strongly related. Moreover, uncertain conditions characterizing regime transitions may

encourage segments of the population to seek refuge in the certainty of traditional social values. One must also keep in mind that new democracies examined here are influenced by diverse religious and cultural heritages. Whether certain religious traditions proves more politically relevant than others – e.g., Evans and Whitefield's (2001) argument that among post-communist states, the authoritarian-libertarian cleavage is most likely to become salient in Catholic countries – can be empirically tested.

Post-materialist issues

This dimension is sometimes represented by an authoritarian-libertarian spectrum (e.g., Evans and Heath 1995; Evans et al. 1996; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Lee 2007; Middendorp 1989), pitting adherents of traditional morality and social order against advocates of greater tolerance for diverse lifestyles. Identification with parties rooted in industrial cleavages has declined in established democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Franklin et al. 1992), and changing employment sector composition challenges both long-standing definitions of class and its relationship to vote choice (e.g., Kumlin 2001; Kriesi 1998). The same forces propelling these trends also engender new sets of demands regarding non-economic objectives aimed at improving quality of life.

These demands can be categorized as "post-materialist", and have modified the traditional understanding of the left-right schema by extending its semantic coverage (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989:228). In other words, spatial labels remain important heuristics for facilitating political communication and informing vote choice, but have become increasingly multi-dimensional to incorporate libertarian or post-materialist issues (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Van Deth and Geurts 1989). The extent to which this newly salient dimension has supplemented, or even overtaken,

long-standing economic cleavages is subject to debate (e.g., Knutsen 1999). According to Welzel, "post-materialist values do not simply replace materialist ones. Instead, post-materialist values are added to still existing materialistic values" (2007:194). Also, while a decline in the salience of economic cleavages may accompany the rise of post-materialist issues, the same cannot be said of pre-industrial cleavages such as religion (Inglehart 1984:57; see also Inglehart and Baker 2000).

We choose four specific questions to which post-materialists pay particular heed: gender equality, environmental protection, respect for authority and direct participation.[36] Elevating the status of women and showing greater concern for the ecological consequences of economic development typify post-materialists' other- (rather than self-) regarding orientation, while deemphasizing respect for authority and going beyond conventional channels of representation exemplifies their distrust of existing political orders seen as hierarchical and restrictive. While some post-materialists may resist both the traditional mold of politics in general and an economically grounded left-right dimension in particular, and post-materialist issues may cross-cut class cleavages, Inglehart (1990) states that they tend to align with leftist parties and causes.

According to the value change hypothesis, since socialization processes take place during one's formative years, and post-materialist values are cultivated only after survival and security needs are well satisfied, new politics issues are most likely to be salient in countries that have long experienced national security and economic prosperity (Duch and Taylor 1993; Inglehart 1990, 1997). New democracies examined in this study vary widely with regard to levels of both security and prosperity, but even the most advanced among them lag behind established democracies in Western

[36] One can also argue that these issues represent a cleavage anchored by traditional and modern values without reference to post-materialism. Alternatively, it is possible to consider gender equality as belonging to the same dimension as moral questions, since both tap into a traditional social outlook.

Europe in terms of these conditions. Thus, we expect post-materialist issues to play a less prominent role in new democracies than in Western Europe.

Empirical Analysis

Socio-demographic attributes

Our empirical examination begins with a base model, drawing on commonly used socio-demographic variables to account for left-right orientations. I use respondents' ideological self-placement as the dependent variable. Independent variables include age, gender, educational attainment, income, and community size. While how socio-demographic characteristics structure respondents' ideological positioning may hint at a country's salient political divides (for instance, a center vs. periphery cleavage if community size turns out to be significant), we are primarily interested in finding out how much one can predict an individual's left-right placement based simply on her demographic profile. This allows us to gauge the explanatory power of each set of factors to be tested later in comparison to the amount of variation accounted for by this base model. Coding for all variables is listed in the appendix.

It comes as little surprise that socio-demographic variables do not emerge as powerful predictors of left-right orientations, as shown by regression results in table 3.1. On average they account for 2.5 percent of variance in both the Balkan and EU 15 countries, and less than 2 percent in the CEE states. These averages conceal considerable intra-regional disparity. In the two post-communist regions, socio-demographic variables are most relevant for structuring left-right orientations in Bulgaria (4.9 percent), the Czech Republic (5.0 percent), and Serbia (5.7 percent), while playing a miniscule role almost everywhere else. In contrast, results in East Asia show that, with the exception of the Philippines, these variables exert a relatively large impact on ideological moorings, accounting for as much as 6.7 percent of

Table 3.1: Socio-demographic factors structuring left-right orientations

a) EU 15

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland
gender	0.02	0.02	-0.10 **	0.00	0.03	-0.05	0.01	0.04
age	0.08 *	0.09 **	0.03	0.11 **	0.09 **	0.13 ***	0.08 *	0.18 ***
education	-0.04	-0.04	-0.09 *	0.12 **	-0.05	-0.09 **	-0.08 *	-0.02
income	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.12 **	0.04	0.07 *	0.02	0.02
town size	-0.10 **	-0.07 **	-0.07 *	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	0.06	-0.07
adjusted R squar	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04

	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	UK
gender	0.00	0.02	-0.09 **	-0.03	0.07 **	-0.02	0.06
age	0.03	0.12 *	0.05	-0.07	0.20 ***	0.07	0.21 ***
education	-0.03	0.02	-0.18 ***	-0.09	-0.02	0.14 ***	0.05
income	0.03	-0.01	0.16 ***	0.06	0.08 **	0.12 **	0.06
town size	-0.09 **	-0.05	-0.08 *	0.08	-0.10 ***	-0.01	-0.01
adjusted R squar	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.03

Table 3.1 (continued)

b) CEE

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
gender	0.05 *	-0.06	-0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.06
age	-0.11 ***	0.02	-0.10 *	0.12 **	0.17 **	0.06	-0.02	-0.01
education	0.05 *	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	-0.05	0.03	-0.10
income	0.14 ***	0.20 ***	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.12 **	0.05	-0.08
town size	0.04	-0.01	-0.07	0.00	0.06	0.04	0.00	-0.05
adjusted R square	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02

c) Balkans

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
gender	-0.08 **	-0.07 *	-0.04	-0.03	-0.09 *	0.00	-0.04
age	-0.05	-0.06	-0.13 **	-0.03	-0.07	-0.17 ***	-0.24 ***
education	0.06	-0.09 **	0.05	-0.13 **	-0.06	-0.08	0.05
income	0.02	0.07 *	0.08	0.01	0.08 *	-0.03	-0.06
town size	0.01	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.00	-0.09	0.00
adjusted R square	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.06

Table 3.1 (continued)

d) East Asia

	Indonesia	Philippines	South Korea	Taiwan
gender	0.14 ***	-0.03	-0.01	0.12 **
age	-0.03	0.05	0.20 ***	0.12 **
education	0.13 **	-0.06	-0.07 *	-0.10 *
income	0.17 ***	0.04	0.03	0.04
town size	-0.08 *	-0.02	N/A	-0.07
adjusted R square	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.05

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.005$; $p < 0.01$

variance in Indonesia. No relationship exists between either national wealth (as measured by GDP per capita) or length of democracy and the amount of variance explained.

Among socio-demographic variables, age most frequently emerges as significant, while gender and community size rarely do. It is worth noting that whereas older cohorts lean significantly to the right in two-thirds of established democracies, and also in a number of East Asian cases, in the Balkans this variable always has a negative coefficient, meaning that older cohorts are characterized by a leftist orientation. The results suggest an important socialization effect in each transitional region, as citizens who grew up under the former authoritarian regime were more likely to identify with its guiding ideology. The fact that the few cases where town size has an effect on left-right positioning are almost all found in Western Europe suggests that the urban-rural cleavage described by Lipset and Rokkan is not replicated in new democracies. Higher income earners lean to the right as one would expect, though this variable achieves statistical significance in less than half the countries in each region. In each of the following sections, and especially in the full model presented at the end of the next chapter, we will see whether these findings

constitute mere proxies for views on economic or social/religious issues, to which we now proceed.

Economic issues

The next stage of our analysis adds the five economic variables to our socio-demographic base model (see appendix for question wording and coding). It should be noted that variables on three issues related to the state's economic role are not combined into a composite index because not all questions were included in the questionnaire administered in each country. More importantly, testing each variable separately allows one to detect possible inter- and intra-regional differences concerning which specific economic questions appeared most salient in the minds of the electorate.

Results for the EU 15 (table 3.2) show how economic cleavages structure public positions on the left-right scale in established democracies. Economic variables make sizeable contributions to explaining ideological orientations in a majority of countries, exceeding 10 percent in six cases. Confidence in labor unions and, where the question was asked, distrust in big business both exert strong influence on leftist identification in most countries. Question unavailability in some countries does not greatly hinder the conclusion that issues of income equality and private ownership also sharply distinguish two sides of the ideological spectrum in a majority of cases, while government versus individual responsibility is rarely a significant factor. These patterns serve as a standard for comparison with new democracies in the three regions discussed below.

Table 3.3a displays results for the economic model of left-right orientations in eight CEE countries. The absence of several key items from the surveys administered in half of the cases prevents direct comparison of the utility of this model within the

Table 3.2: Economc factors structuring left-right orientations in established democracies

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland
confidence in labor unior	0.22 ***	0.15 ***	0.19 ***	0.19 ***	0.25 ***	0.24 ***	0.04	-0.04
confidence in big busines	-0.08 *	N/A	N/A	-0.12 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.13 ***	-0.17 ***	N/A
income inequality	0.05	0.05	N/A	0.21 ***	0.17 ***	N/A	N/A	0.01
private ownership	-0.06	N/A	N/A	-0.27 ***	-0.11 ***	-0.14 ***	N/A	-0.12 **
individual responsibility	-0.06	-0.03	-0.23 ***	-0.09 **	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.00
adjusted R square	0.08	0.04	0.12	0.26	0.16	0.12	0.04	0.05

	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	UK
confidence in labor unior	0.17 ***	0.09	0.11 ***	0.14 ***	0.17 ***	0.20 ***	0.17 ***
confidence in big busines	-0.19 ***	-0.03	N/A	0.01	-0.21 ***	N/A	-0.21 ***
income inequality	0.12 ***	0.10 *	0.33 ***	N/A	0.08 *	N/A	0.21 ***
private ownership	-0.13 ***	N/A	-0.15 ***	0.01	-0.07	N/A	-0.07
individual responsibility	-0.05	-0.10 *	-0.02	0.05	-0.08 *	-0.26 ***	-0.08
adjusted R square	0.13	0.03	0.22	0.02	0.13	0.15	0.17

Table 3.3: Economc factors structuring left-right orientations in new democracies

a) CEE

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
confidence in labor unions	0.14 ***	-0.01	0.10 **	-0.04	-0.06	-0.03	0.08 *	0.04
confidence in big business	-0.03	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.19 ***	N/A	N/A	N/A
income inequality	0.15 ***	0.15 ***	N/A	N/A	0.08	0.10 **	N/A	0.02
private ownership	-0.23 ***	-0.04 **	N/A	N/A	-0.20 ***	-0.15 ***	N/A	N/A
individual responsibility	-0.10 ***	0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.05
adjusted R square	0.19	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.02

b) Balkan

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
confidence in labor unions	-0.06	-0.03	0.00	0.13 ***	0.02	-0.05	0.03
confidence in big business	0.03	0.04	N/A	-0.09 *	-0.08 *	N/A	-0.01
income inequality	0.26 ***	-0.03	0.19 ***	0.02	0.04	0.22 ***	0.08 *
private ownership	-0.15 ***	0.02	N/A	-0.04	0.01	-0.08	-0.20 ***
individual responsibility	-0.07 *	-0.06 *	-0.12 **	-0.09 *	-0.11 **	-0.10 *	-0.05
adjusted R square	0.13	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.11

Table 3.3 (continued)

c) East Asia

	Indonesia	Philippines	South Korea	Taiwan
confidence in labor unions	0.01	-0.10 **	0.13 ***	-0.04
confidence in big business	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	-0.04
income inequality	0.15 ***	0.08 **	0.00	-0.01
private ownership	0.07	0.06 *	0.02	0.10 *
individual responsibility	0.12 ***	0.02	-0.02	-0.02
adjusted R square	0.10	0.03	0.07	0.05

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.005$; $p < 0.01$

region. Not unexpectedly, these are also the countries where the economic model adds little (Hungary, Slovakia) or nothing (Latvia, Slovenia) to the socio-demographic base model. In contrast, where all questions are available, the model performs quite well, increasing the variance explained by 9 percent in Lithuania and 14 percent in the Czech Republic. Lack of uniform questionnaires notwithstanding, it is still possible to gauge some trends common to the entire region. Attitudes toward labor unions are rarely significant, at least in part because union membership has long been associated with compulsion and subordination to the state apparatus rather than a means of aggregating and articulating workers' interests. In some cases we even observe a negative relationship.

An important legacy of communist rule, namely state ownership of industry, has given rise to much sharper division of opinion. In every case where the question is asked, views on privatization clearly divide left and right. Since the transition from planned to market economy was a massive task confronting policymakers in each CEE country, one can assume that the cleavage demarcating left from right over the scope and speed of privatization in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland would be found in the remaining four cases as well. The same does not apply to income equality, the significance of which varies within the region. This may be

due to the poverty gap in each country, a point we shall return to later. Among views toward the three economic issues, government versus individual responsibility is least relevant. One plausible explanation can be found in the fact that, in six of the eight CEE countries, the mean score on this ten-point scale is close to or above 6, implying that a consensus deriving from the legacy of communist rule persists regarding the state's responsibility for basic welfare provision. It is probably no coincidence that the Czech Republic, the only country where the average voter leans well in favor of greater individual responsibility, is also the only case where this variable attains significance.

The explanatory power of economic variables in the Balkan countries also varies considerably from one country to another, ranging from close to zero in Bosnia to 11.8 percent in Albania (table 3.3b). Unlike the cases above, however, this disparity is not attributable to questionnaire differences. Similar to their CEE neighbors, and presumably for similar reasons, trust in labor unions in Balkan countries does not separate left- and right-leaning respondents in most cases. The question on confidence in large businesses, more frequently available in this region, also has no impact at all on left-right orientations. In short, the organizational aspect of the economic model is largely irrelevant for ideological identification in the Balkans.

On the three economic issues, government responsibility stands out as the most consistent predictor of left-right positioning (significant in all countries except Serbia), though its substantial impact is often not large. Compared to CEE countries, opinion on private versus public ownership in the Balkans encompasses more diverse views. The slower pace of transition to a full market economy in the region as a whole may in part reflect stronger attachment to public control of industries. This issue is significant for ideological placement in Albania, one of two countries in this region where, similar to the Czech Republic, the average preference leans strongly toward

private ownership. However, in the other case, Macedonia, this issue does not have any ideological bearing.

It is important to keep in mind that, depending on the pace and scope of economic reforms already undertaken, calls for faster or more extensive privatization do not carry the same connotation across states. Countries where stances on income equality distinguish left and right are not the richest, but instead coincide with states possessing long-standing rather than newly established (and disputed) territories. While war does not eliminate – in fact it often enhances – the gap between rich and poor, inequality is unlikely to be a highly salient issue when personal and national security are under threat.

We can note two patterns in East Asia (table 3.3c). First, economic variables do not add much to the base model in any country, complete questionnaires notwithstanding. Second, where economic factors are significant, they frequently carry opposite signs to those observed in both established and new democracies in Europe. For example, greater confidence in labor unions is associated with a leftist orientation, consistently in the EU 15 and also in a number of post-communist cases (as well as in South Korea), but Filipino respondents who regard unions more positively lean significantly toward the right. Where the issue of individual versus government responsibility predicts ideological positioning, those preferring the former in European countries invariably place themselves on the left, but the reverse is true in Indonesia. Furthermore, coefficients on the private versus public ownership issue are positive in every East Asian case (though not always significant), meaning that respondents favoring greater government control over industries identify with the right.

Only when it comes to income inequality do we find the expected pattern, with respondents believing in wider income differences as a means of offering incentive

placed well to the right. It may not be coincidental that this issue is significant in the two poorer East Asian states. Paradoxically, the average Korean simultaneously favors greater government responsibility and less public oversight over industry. Overall, however, we do not detect clear linkages between average scores on issue preferences and the significance or otherwise of each variable in accounting for left-right orientations in this region, a result that corroborates Dalton's (2006) finding that economic preferences do not structure ideology in Asia.

Do views on the three economic issues differ systematically among older and newer democracies? This does not appear to be the case with regard to income equality. Concerning private versus public ownership, seven out of eight countries with average positions least in favor of private enterprise are new democracies, though one must point out that in none of these cases is the mean more than one point away from the midpoint of the scale. Perhaps the most telling contrast lies in views toward government responsibility, a question available for all countries covered in this study. Among the twelve countries with the lowest means (i.e., stressing personal responsibility), all but one are established democracies. Among the twelve countries with the highest means (i.e., stressing the role of government), all but one are new democracies. This suggests the persisting legacy of authoritarian regimes which actively intervened in the economy (including developmental states) and thus socializing populations into expectations of greater government responsibility.

On average, economic variables are better predictors of left-right orientations in the two ex-communist regions than in East Asia, adding an average 4.3 percent to the base model in the Balkans, 3.7 percent in CEE countries, compared with only 1.8 percent in the latter (though the first two numbers are influenced by very high percentages in Albania and the Czech Republic, respectively). However, the most striking contrast lies between the EU 15 (8.9 percent above the base model) and all

new democracies. In other words, both organizational and attitudinal dimensions of economic issues have a much greater effect in differentiating left and right orientations in established democracies.[37] Yet rather than drawing the conclusion that longer democratic experience somehow promotes the salience of economic cleavages, three alternative propositions rest on firmer theoretical (and intuitive) foundation.

First, economic issues may increase in salience as countries become more industrialized and economically developed. Resources required to create and sustain large-scale labor unions and businesses would not be available in pre-industrial societies, and arguments over ownership and responsibility would be largely moot absent a degree of concentration of the means of production. Second, economic cleavages form as class divisions widen. The theory of relative deprivation suggests that, regardless of the actual level of economic development, it is the gap between the haves and have-nots that generate tensions, so countries with wider poverty gaps are likely to see sharper conflicts over economic distribution. Third, economic (or any other types of) conflict does not naturally emerge as a result of socio-demographic trends alone, but require political mobilization. This hypothesis emphasizes the role of agency, specifically the strategies pursued by political elites in highlighting or exploiting certain social facts over others. Economic cleavages become more salient where elites choose to focus on these issues.

To test these propositions, we examine the relationship between the added percentage of variance explained by economic variables and macroeconomic indicators. For the first hypothesis, we employ GDP per capita for the year in which surveys were conducted in each country.[38] The average GDP per capita is US$1930

[37] One possible explanation is that political competition in new democracies over economic issues has been characterized by a centripetal pattern (Sitter 2001:87), and the consequent limitation on policy alternatives blurs left-right distinctions.
[38] Data from the World Bank.

in the Balkans, $4209 in East Asia (albeit with wide intra-regional variation, from more than $10000 in South Korea to less than $1000 in Indonesia and the Philippines), $4969 in CEE countries, and $24786 in the EU 15. The squared root of this figure is used to reduce the effect of outlying cases on the overall relationship. This yields a moderately strong correlation of 0.406. Using an alternative indicator of development, the Human Development Index,[39] produces a stronger correlation at 0.441[40] (HDI ranges from 0.936 in Sweden to 0.682 in Indonesia). These results reveal that economic factors are more likely to structure ideological orientations in highly developed countries.

For the second hypothesis, the standard measurement of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which varies between 0 and 1, with higher values denoting a wider gap between rich and poor. Mean Gini index values for each region are as follows: 0.298 in CEE countries, 0.307 in the Balkans, 0.314 in the EU 15, and 0.396 in East Asia. A correlation of -.0.187 suggests no relationship between inequality and the impact of economic variables on left-right orientations. Indeed, economic issues are significant in some countries with a low Gini index such as the Czech Republic and Finland, while having no effect in some countries with wider wealth gaps such as Macedonia and Portugal.

To assess the role of elite mobilization, we use data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, which codes official party platforms according to the salience parties accord to each issue area. We compile an index using elections which took place from three years before to three years after the survey date in each country (no data for Asian cases are available), with higher values denote more frequent mentions of economic policies,[41] and test whether economic variables account for greater

[39] Data from UNDP annual reports.
[40] These two indices are highly correlated at 0.935.
[41] We include mentions of the following items in the category of economic policies: free enterprise,

variance in left-right orientations where parties place more emphasis on economic issues when appealing to voters. There is no evidence supporting this hypothesis, with a bivariate correlation of 0.001. A slightly positive relationship exists between the explanatory value of the economic model and the frequency with which parties refer to labor and professional groups in their manifestos (Pearson's $r = 0.141$).

Social/religious issues

We can identify two separate dimensions of social values, one centered around attachment to religious institutions, practice and belief, and the other on views toward moral questions. Organizationally, we measure confidence in religious institutions and frequency of attending religious services. Attitudinally, respondents are asked about the importance of God in their lives and their opinions about homosexuality and abortion. Testing the two questions separately rather than constructing a composite index allows us to evaluate the relative weight views on homosexuality and abortion exert on left-right positioning.

As table 3.4 shows, social/religious factors play an important role in distinguishing ideological orientations in Western Europe. Where religion forms a basis of the left-right divide, personal beliefs (importance of God) is more frequently significant than organizational attachment (confidence in church). The actual practice of religion (attending services) has minimal influence. Attitudes toward at least one of the once ostracized (and in many cases outlawed) lifestyle choices exert sizeable impact on ideological positioning in all but one of the EU 15 states. These results suggest that, even in one of the most secularized regions of the world, religion and

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incentives, market regulation, economic planning, other economic goals, Keynesian demand, nationalization, economic orthodoxy, welfare state expansion and limitation, privatization, government control of economy, publicly owned industries, and privatization vouchers. Percentages for all party platforms devoted in each topic are summed, then divided by the number of manifestos coded.

Table 3.4: Social/Religious values structuring left-right orientations in established democracies

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland
confidence in churches	0.04	-0.07	-0.07	-0.13 **	-0.17 ***	0.01	-0.25 ***	-0.11 *
attend religious service	-0.04	-0.02	-0.07	0.00	-0.09 **	0.01	-0.05	0.03
God important	0.09 *	0.08 *	0.04	0.15 ***	0.06	0.20 ***	0.16 ***	0.18 ***
homosexuality	-0.10 **	-0.07 *	-0.14 **	-0.16 ***	-0.13 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.11 *
abortion	-0.15 **	-0.10 **	-0.03	0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.04	0.01
adjusted R square	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.22	0.09

	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	UK
confidence in churches	-0.04	-0.09	-0.13 ***	-0.09	-0.19 ***	-0.08 *	-0.06
attend religious service	-0.03	-0.07	0.00	-0.08	-0.03	N/A	-0.03
God important	0.13 ***	0.15 **	0.05	0.14 **	0.17 ***	0.01	0.10
homosexuality	-0.07 *	0.01	-0.05	0.05	-0.14 **	-0.16 ***	-0.12 *
abortion	-0.12 ***	-0.09	-0.10 *	-0.15 **	-0.12 **	0.05	0.16 ***
adjusted R square	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.22	0.06	0.06

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01

traditional social values continue to shape citizens' left-right positions.

While religion also structures left-right orientations in the CEE countries (table 3.5a), this region stands in stark contrast to Western Europe. Confidence in church emerges as the most significant factor in six of the eight countries, whereas personal belief toward God occupies a less prominent place. In some cases such as Poland, the role of the Catholic church as a bulwark against communist rule and a refuge for dissidents may render it a political as well as a confessional actor in the minds of the public, but trust in church is also found to be significant in countries such as Slovenia where the clergy adopted a more collaborative stance during communist rule. In short, one cannot consider the salience of this variable as simply proxy for a persisting regime divide. Nor can one account for the insignificance of personal belief by citing a history of enforced atheism under communist rule. While the region includes countries with relatively low scores on the percentage of respondents attaching importance to God in their lives (Czech Republic, Estonia), Poland has one of the highest scores in the entire sample.

Another marked contrast with the EU 15 countries lies in the role of moral questions. Whereas homosexuality arouses a deeper divide in Western Europe, attitudes toward this issue do not constitute a cleavage at all in the CEE countries. Where moral questions attain significance, abortion forms the bone of contention. It should be added that while publics in this region harbor slightly greater reservation regarding homosexuality and abortion, there is much more intra- than inter-regional variation. Traditional views predominate in some CEE countries (e.g., Hungary, Latvia), but in other cases respondents' averages resemble those found in Western Europe (e.g., Czech Republic, Slovenia). No relationship exists between the balance of public sentiments on these issues in each country and the explanatory value of this model on respondents' left-right placements.

Table 3.5: Social/religious values structuring left-right orientations in new democracies

a) CEE

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
confidence in churches	-0.18 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.13 *	0.05	-0.23 ***	-0.22 ***	-0.17 ***	-0.22 ***
attend religious service	-0.04	-0.01	-0.10 *	-0.09 *	-0.06	-0.04	0.02	0.04
God important	0.08 *	-0.08	0.10	0.13 *	0.06	0.04	0.09	0.15 *
homosexuality	0.03	-0.01	-0.07	0.03	0.10 *	0.04	0.06	-0.06
abortion	0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.14 **	-0.15 ***	-0.13 ***	-0.07
adjusted R square	0.10	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.11	0.11	0.08	0.13

b) Balkan

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
confidence in churches	-0.02	-0.12 ***	-0.29 ***	-0.07	0.11 **	0.02	-0.22 ***
attend religious service	N/A	N/A	0.03	-0.15 ***	N/A	-0.07	N/A
God important	0.17 ***	0.13 ***	0.03	-0.05	0.17 ***	0.06	0.00
homosexuality	0.01	-0.05	0.11 **	-0.02	0.05	0.09 *	0.06
abortion	0.11 ***	-0.05	0.07	-0.15 ***	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08
adjusted R square	0.05	0.06	0.15	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.10

Table 3.5 (continued)

c) East Asia

	Indonesia	Philippines	South Korea	Taiwan
confidence in churches	-0.11 **	0.00	0.02	0.01
God important	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.08
homosexuality	0.07	-0.01	-0.07 *	-0.09 *
abortion	-0.05	0.14 ***	-0.02	0.02
adjusted R square	0.08	0.02	0.06	0.05

* Question on frequency of religious service attendance not asked

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.005$; $p < 0.0$

Patterns found in the Balkans fall between those in the EU 15 and CEE countries, as both organizational and personal religious attachment are important factors structuring left-right orientations in some countries (table 3.5b). This is the most religiously diverse region in our sample, with some countries predominated by national Orthodox churches (Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia), others divided between Orthodox and Muslim faiths (Bosnia, Macedonia), and also includes majority Muslim (Albania) and Roman Catholic (Croatia) states. Analysis of how each religion may exert different impact on ideological identification lies beyond the scope of this study; suffice it to observe that we discern little evidence that any one religion appears more likely to engender political cleavages than others.

The most notable feature about the impact of moral questions on left-right orientations in the Balkans is that, while opinions on homosexuality and abortion rarely distinguish left from right, where these issues are significant the coefficients often have signs opposite to those observed in both EU 15 and CEE countries. Respondents most tolerant of homosexuals are more likely to place themselves toward the right in Bulgaria and Romania. Similarly, those who believe that abortion should always be allowed are identified with the right in Albania. These results are in accord

with Kitschelt's (1992) hypothesis that, in direct contrast to Western Europe, authoritarian and libertarian views are associated with left and right in post-communist settings, respectively. To elaborate, those seeking to preserve the old order, including both a strong state role in the economy and traditional social values, represent the left, and compete against right identifiers who profess beliefs in greater individual responsibility and socially liberal, cosmopolitan values. Comparing results for the two post-communist regions, this hypothesis finds stronger confirmation in some Balkan countries than their CEE neighbors.

Compared with the three other regions discussed above, social/religious variables make little contribution to anchoring left and right in East Asia (table 3.5c). Frequency of attending religious services was not asked in surveys conducted in these countries, but results from the variables available do not suggest that the inclusion of this item would add much explanatory power to the model. Despite the small number of cases, this region is no less diverse in religious composition than the Balkans, including countries with Buddhist (South Korea, Taiwan), Muslim (Indonesia), and Roman Catholic (Philippines) majorities. Except for Indonesia, however, neither organizational nor personal religious attachment contributes to structuring political competition. While the examples of South Korea and Taiwan may suggest that affiliation with polytheistic faiths such as Buddhism attenuates the political consequences of religion, more cases would be required to test this proposition.

Views on moral issues also exert little influence on ideological orientations, though disapproval of homosexuality inclines respondent toward the right in South Korea and Taiwan. The relationship between opinion on abortion and left-right positioning in the Philippines mirrors the aforementioned case of Albania, with moral permissiveness associated with the right. On average publics in East Asia adopt more conservative views on these moral questions. However, with the exception of

Indonesia, political parties utilizing rhetoric based on religious or traditional social values are conspicuous by their absence in this region. At the same time, one may ponder whether disagreements over other aspects of traditional morality, such as the Confucian emphasis on filial piety, could constitute more salient divides in this region.

Assessing the explanatory power of religious and moral issues, we once again observe that these factors are most potent in anchoring left-right orientations in established European democracies, adding 7.0 percent to the base model. The equivalent figures for the CEE, Balkan, and East Asia regions are 6.5, 4.6, and 1.0 percent, respectively. Comparing the two models analyzed so far, both economics and social values perform equally well in the EU 15 states, and equally poorly in East Asia. Traditional values do not contribute more to accounting for ideological contents than economic factors in any East Asian country, but perform better in four out of seven Balkan states (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Macedonia), and six out of eight CEE countries (all except the Czech Republic and Estonia). Overall a social/religious values explanation is superior to an economic model in CEE, most notably in Poland and Slovenia.

Under what circumstances are social/religious values most likely to have an impact on ideological orientations? Unlike economic factors, there are no macro-level indicators measuring the degree to which populations in each country esteem or emphasize religious and/or moral traditions. One possible proxy for this is the percentage of the public claiming to be "religious". The World Values Survey contains an item asking if respondents consider themselves religious; answer categories include religious, not religious, and atheist. A positive relationship between the proportion choosing the first response (65.8 percent in Western Europe, 67.6 percent in East Asia, 68.9 percent in CEE countries, and 74.5 percent in the Balkans) and the

added explanatory power of the social/religious model would affirm the hypothesis that religious and moral issues are more likely to structure salient political cleavages in less secular societies. However, the bivariate correlation is only 0.165, suggesting little relationship between these two measures. Indeed, among countries with highly religious populations, the social/religious model works well in some cases such as Poland and Lithuania, but much less so in others such as Macedonia and Romania.

In contrast to economic items, the Comparative Manifestos Project contains relatively few categories on social issues. Nevertheless, the bivariate correlation of -0.297 between the explanatory value of the social/religious model in parties' emphasis on questions of traditional morality and order is unexpected, since this suggests that the more these issues are stressed by political elites, the less they structure publics' understanding of left and right. Interestingly, focusing on new democracies alone (CEE and Balkan countries only; the dataset does not cover Asian cases) yields a Pearson's *r* of 0.108, a positive though very weak correlation.

Post-materialist issues

To capture the effect of post-materialism, four dimensions are tested: gender equality, concern for the environment, direct political action, and rejection of authority. Since the two questions regarding gender inequality address different aspects (economic and political), and the correlation between them is only 0.382, there is justification for keeping these items as separable independent variables. In contrast, factor analysis shows the two questions on respondents' willingness to make monetary contributions for environmental protection have strong loadings on the same factor, so an additive variable is created combining these two items. The variable for direct political action consists of a composite index adding scores for the five means of participation: signing petitions, joining boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations,

Table 3.6: Post-materialist values structuring left-right orientations in established democracies

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland
respect authority	-0.09 **	-0.14 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.08 *	-0.19 ***	-0.16 ***	-0.11 **	-0.17 ***
pay more for environmen	0.10 **	0.05	0.11 **	0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.17 ***
political action	0.15 ***	0.23 ***	0.30 ***	0.35 ***	0.24 ***	0.12 ***	0.26 ***	0.13 ***
jobs for men first	-0.06	-0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.13 ***	-0.09 **	-0.06
men make better leaders	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
adjusted R square	0.06	0.08	0.15	0.16	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.12

	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	UK
respect authority	-0.09 ***	-0.01	-0.19 ***	0.09 *	-0.06	-0.05	-0.19 ***
pay more for environmen	0.10 ***	0.05	0.12 ***	-0.10 *	0.00	0.11 **	0.04
political action	0.30 ***	0.22 ***	0.31 ***	0.17 ***	0.28 ***	0.27 ***	0.19 ***
jobs for men first	-0.10	-0.10 *	-0.05	0.00	-0.08 *	0.03	-0.01
men make better leaders	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.02	-0.05	N/A
adjusted R square	0.12	0.07	0.21	0.04	0.13	0.13	0.10

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01

taking part in strikes, and occupying buildings or factories.

The most striking feature when one glances at the results for the effect of post-materialism on left-right orientations in established European democracies (table 3.6) is the uniformly significant, and in most cases substantial, impact of direct political action. This suggests that unconventional means of participation is not directed against specific governments of either the center-left or center-right, but instead constitute a behavioral pattern stemming at least in part from left-wing ideological roots. Resistance against authority also contains a distinct leftist character in most Western European countries. In contrast, in a majority of cases environmental protection is not significantly associated with placement on the spatial spectrum, either validating environmentalist parties' claim to have risen beyond competition in traditional left-right terms, or suggesting that ecologically friendly measures have already generated consensus among both left and right identifiers.

In comparison with their western neighbors, the effect of post-materialism in the CEE countries is far less uniform (table 3.7a). No single post-materialist issue consistently influences left-right positioning. Another notable contrast lies in the direction of ideological inclination on the environmental dimension: respondents who express willingness to bear extra financial burden for the environment lean toward the left in Western Europe, but toward the right in those CEE countries where this variable is significant (Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia). One plausible explanation lies in the contrasting alignment between economic and social axes of competition in these two regions. For example, Dalton finds that while post-materialists lean to the left in most regions of the world, Eastern Europe is an exception (2006:14-15). In this region, leftist views tend to be associated with traditionalist or authoritarian attitudes, while rightist views are linked with socially liberal proclivities. Since concern for environmental protection is in line with other- (instead of self-) regarding tendencies

Table 3.7: Post-materialist values structuring left-right orientations in new democracies

a) CEE

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
respect authority	-0.05 *	-0.06	-0.08 *	0.01	-0.17 ***	-0.02	0.03	-0.04
pay more for environmen	-0.08 **	-0.03	0.01	-0.15 ***	-0.04	0.00	-0.09 **	0.02
political action	-0.02	-0.04	0.09 *	0.00	-0.08	-0.08 *	-0.10 **	0.13 ***
jobs for men first	0.03	0.05	-0.06	0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
adjusted R square	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.03

b) Balkan

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
respect authority	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.10 **	-0.01	0.06
pay more for environmen	-0.05	0.03	-0.02	0.05	-0.03	-0.14 **	-0.04
political action	-0.21 ***	-0.08 *	-0.07	-0.02	0.02	-0.06	-0.23 ***
jobs for men first	0.06	0.05	-0.02	-0.07	-0.03	-0.13 **	0.05
men make better leaders	-0.12 *	-0.13 ***	N/A	N/A	-0.03	N/A	-0.07
adjusted R square	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.11

Table 3.7 (continued)								
c) East Asia								
	Indonesia		Philippines		South Korea		Taiwan	
respect authority	-0.03		0.01		0.00		-0.04	
pay more for environment	N/A		-0.08	*	-0.01		0.05	
political action	-0.04		0.02		0.16	***	0.16	***
jobs for men first	-0.01		-0.04		0.03		0.00	
men make better leaders	-0.17	***	-0.06	*	-0.10	*	-0.01	
adjusted R square	0.09		0.01		0.08		0.07	
Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01								

characteristic of social liberals, in the CEE context environmentalists would be aligned to the right. Another, more politically motivated, elucidation is that disregard for the ecological damages of industrial development pursued by former communist governments motivated opponents of the authoritarian regime to adopt pro-environment positions.

Difference in the direction of coefficients for the direct political action variable within the CEE region also warrants attention. Unconventional participation exerts some influence on left-right orientations in Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary. Yet whereas leftists are more inclined to express political demands through direct action in the former two countries (similar to patterns observed in Western Europe), the same applies to rightists in the latter two cases. In view of the ideological composition of cabinets in these four countries at the time of the survey, it is unlikely that these results simply reflect short-term protest against the incumbent government. Since all four (and other CEE countries also) share a common history of communist rule, legacies of resistance against the previous regime are also unlikely to offer a solution to this puzzling contrast.

Similar to the CEE region, which post-materialist issues influence left-right

orientations vary among Balkan countries (table 3.7b). Where direct political action is significant (Albania, Bosnia, Serbia), respondents involved or expressing willingness to participate through unconventional means are identified with the right, probably due in part to a legacy of opposition against communism. In the case of former Yugoslav republics, there may be an added dimension of antagonism toward the successor regime, namely the nominally left-wing government under Milosevic in the 1990s. However, this proposition would raise the question of why protest actions have no effect on ideological distinctions in Croatia, the third country involved in the wars of Yugoslav succession (along with Serbia and Bosnia). No relationship exists between the mean scores of willingness to engage in direct political action and the significance or otherwise of this variable on ideological positioning.

Results showing that environmental concerns exert little impact in the Balkans are hardly surprising when one considers both the economic struggles and, in some cases, exigencies of post-war reconstruction in these countries. Perhaps less expected in view of the region's political history is the insignificance of the question on respect for authority. It is possible that respondents interpreted authority in the context of relations in the family or workplace, rather than from a political perspective. Also, it is noteworthy that views toward gender differences contribute to demarcating left and right in a few cases.

Table 3.7c shows that in East Asia, opinions on the question of whether men make better political leaders than women exert a strong influence on left-right placements in Indonesia, and also have some effect in the Philippines and South Korea. The unavailability of this item in most other countries covered in this study render direct comparison difficult, but the fact that many female political leaders in East (and also South) Asia attain prominence due in large part to family ties make views on this question of more than theoretical interest. For example, all three female

chief executives (in Indonesia and the Philippines) and another strong female presidential contender (in South Korea) that this region has produced are from leading political families. The insignificance of the respect for authority variable cannot resolve the "Asian values" debate involving the assertion that Asian publics accept economic development at the price of political authoritarianism, but suggests that attitudes regarding authority do not form a salient political cleavage.

All four East Asian countries saw waves of political activism bringing about democratic transition, and each of the replaced authoritarian regimes can be identified as right-wing on the basis of its strong anti-communist stance. Possibly as a legacy of the democratization process, respondents inclined to take direct political action, including demonstrations and strikes, lean significantly to the left in South Korea and Taiwan. This hypothesis mirrors the aforementioned explanation for the association between unconventional participation and rightist orientations in new democracies once ruled by leftist authoritarian regimes. Another possibility is that, similar to established European democracies, direct political action has become part of the left's repertoire. Only testing for correlations over time can determine the validity of these propositions.

The confirmation that post-materialist issues play a much larger role in structuring left-right orientations in Western Europe than in new democracies is not unexpected, since historical trajectories in the three newly democratized regions, entailing delayed economic growth and experiences or threats of foreign domination, provide much less fertile ground for fostering post-materialist attitudes. Whereas issues of gender equality, environmental protection, direct political action, and attitudes toward authority contributes as much to defining the contents of left and right in established democracies (additional 8.5 percent of variance explained compared to the base model) as the economic and traditional values models, these

variables have minimum impact in the CEE (1.1 percent), Balkan (1.7 percent), and East Asian (2.0 percent) regions. Indeed, it is striking that whereas post-materialist variables add at least 4 percent to the base model in all but one among the EU 15 states, this is true for only one of the nineteen new democracies (Serbia) examined here.

One naturally expects the explanatory power of this model in each country to be related to the proportion of post-materialists, since post-materialist values cannot distinguish ideological orientations, or carry other political consequences, if few among the public subscribe to them in the first place. The World Values Survey contains an item separating respondents into three categories of post-materialism, and a much higher percentage of respondents was classified "post-materialist" in Western Europe (18.5 percent) than in each of the three newly democratic regions (6.7 percent in CEE, 7.0 percent in the Balkans, and only 5.0 percent in East Asia). As anticipated, the added explanatory power of the model is highly correlated with the size of this category in each country (0.653). Also, since secure and prosperous conditions facilitate the growth of post-materialist values, we hypothesize a positive association between the efficacy of this model and quality of life. This is also strongly confirmed by a 0.738 correlation with the Human Development Index. The latter relationship suggests that post-materialist issues may emerge as new axes of political competition if the next generation in new democracies grows up under more secure and prosperous conditions.

Another reason that post-materialist issues play little role in shaping political competition in new democracies probably lies in a relatively low level of elite mobilization. The Comparative Manifestos Project dataset includes categories on environmental protection and culture, which capture some aspects of post-materialist goals. Correlating the frequency of these issues appearing in party platforms with the

explanatory value of the post-materialist mode yields Pearson's *r* of 0.492, meaning that the more political elites stress quality of life issues, the greater their effect on structuring left-right orientations. At the same time, it should be noted that this relationship is much more robust in established than in new democracies.

Summary

After discussing three theoretically grounded hypotheses and testing their impact on anchoring left-right orientations in both old and new democracies, I investigated the influence of economic, social/religious, and post-materialist issues and attitudes on structuring left-right orientations in new democracies, using established Western European democracies as points of reference. Concerning economic issues, opinions on government ownership of industries exert a substantial effect delimiting left and right in CEE countries where this item is available in the survey questionnaire, while government responsibility for the economy is significant in most Balkan cases. In contrast to Western Europe, attitudes toward labor unions and large businesses have little effect on ideological positioning. Regarding the social-religious dimension, confidence in churches distinguishes left from right in most CEE and a number of Balkan countries, while tolerance of abortion has a sporadic effect. Unlike Western Europe, personal faith is significant only in less than half of the cases in each region. No clear patterns emerge in the East Asian region for either of these models. Post-materialist or libertarian values do not prove an important anchor of left-right orientations in most new democracies.

What can we say about the relative efficacy of the three models examined above? Table 3.8 compares the contribution of each model to all thirty-four nations across four regions. Both the economic and post-materialism models make sizeable improvements upon the base model in about half of the EU 15 states, and overall all

Table 3.8: Increase in explained variance over base model

	base model	economic model	social/ religious model	post-materialist model
Established Democracies				
Austria	1.8%	6.3%	4.8%	4.6%
Belgium	1.4%	2.5%	4.5%	7.0%
Denmark	2.1%	9.5%	3.5%	12.9%
Finland	3.6%	22.4%	6.7%	12.1%
France	1.2%	15.1%	8.2%	9.2%
Germany	3.2%	9.0%	5.0%	5.6%
Greece	1.3%	2.5%	21.0%	8.0%
Ireland	3.5%	1.0%	5.9%	8.2%
Italy	0.6%	12.2%	6.5%	11.4%
Luxembourg	0.6%	2.0%	6.6%	6.5%
Netherlands	5.6%	16.2%	4.9%	15.3%
Portugal	0.5%	1.7%	6.5%	3.0%
Spain	5.3%	8.0%	16.3%	7.4%
Sweden	3.7%	11.7%	1.8%	9.4%
UK	3.4%	13.7%	2.4%	6.9%
EU 15 average	***2.5%***	***8.9%***	***7.0%***	***8.5%***
New Democracies				
Czech Republic	5.0%	14.1%	5.4%	0.7%
Estonia	3.2%	3.4%	1.6%	0.2%
Hungary	0.8%	0.7%	5.7%	1.3%
Latvia	1.0%	0.0%	1.5%	1.4%
Lithuania	1.9%	8.9%	9.3%	2.6%
Poland	1.3%	2.3%	10.0%	0.1%
Slovakia	0.2%	0.7%	7.3%	1.5%
Slovenia	2.1%	0.0%	11.0%	0.9%
CEE average	***1.9%***	***3.8%***	***6.5%***	***1.1%***
Albania	1.2%	11.8%	3.5%	2.8%
Bosnia	1.0%	0.2%	5.2%	1.5%
Bulgaria	4.9%	3.8%	9.6%	0.0%
Croatia	1.4%	1.8%	5.6%	0.0%
Macedonia	1.0%	1.5%	3.0%	0.6%

Romania	2.5%	5.8%	0.8%	2.5%
Serbia	5.7%	5.5%	4.3%	4.9%
Balkans average	***2.5%***	***4.3%***	***4.6%***	***1.8%***
Indonesia	6.7%	2.8%	1.2%	2.7%
Philippines	0.6%	2.3%	1.7%	0.8%
South Korea	5.3%	1.2%	0.3%	2.2%
Taiwan	4.7%	0.7%	0.7%	2.1%
East Asia average	***4.3%***	***1.8%***	***1.0%***	***2.0%***

three models prove more powerful in Western Europe than in other regions. Among CEE countries, social/religious values are the most important variables in Slovenia, Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary, while economic factors exert the largest impact on structuring ideology in the Czech Republic and Lithuania. In Estonia and Latvia, none of the models performs well. The same can be said for Macedonia. In the remainder of the Balkans, economic issues have the largest impact on left-right orientations in Albania, and also make some explanatory contribution in Romania and Serbia. Social/religious values are most important in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Bosnia. East Asia stands out as a region where none of the three models succeeds in accounting for publics' left-right positioning.

Contrasting the three transitional regions with Western Europe, results in this chapter complement works on weaker partisanship in new democracies (e.g., Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Scully 1995) by showing the relative fragility of an important mechanism that facilitates political choice. Assuming that the left-right dimension does constitute a "super-issue", publics in new democracies seemed less disposed to comprehend political debate in terms of contrasting policy preferences. This may cause concern about the conduct of political competition on a personalistic or clientelist rather than a programmatic basis. Yet while one may infer from table 3.8

that left-right orientations are significantly better structured in established than in new democracies, such a conclusion would be premature without considering a crucial factor separating these two groups of countries, namely democratization itself. Since this was a recent experience in the CEE, Balkan, and East Asian countries at the time the survey was conducted, most respondents can readily contrast conditions under both authoritarian and democratic regimes. This regime comparison, and evaluation of democracy associated with it, may constitute a cleavage unique to new democracies. It is to this topic that we turn in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Defining the Left-Right Schema

– Attitudes toward Democracy and Comparative Regime Evaluations

Findings in the preceding chapter suggest that understanding of what left and right stand for is more firmly anchored in issue preferences in established democracies than countries that only recently transitioned from authoritarianism. This is true not only for industrial (state role in the economy) and post-industrial (post-materialism) cleavages, but also pre-industrial ones (religious/moral values) as well. However, these findings do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that left-right orientations are simply less well-structured in new democracies. Instead, if cleavages derive from historical trajectories, then one should examine developments that have potentially shaped patterns of political competition today. The most obvious juncture common to all cases under examination – indeed probably the only feature that countries in our diverse sample have in common – is the experience of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. This chapter examines the impact of democracy on how publics understand of left and right, and tests three models: favorability toward a democratic system, approval of democratic procedures, and comparisons between past and present regimes. It then presents a full model, incorporating issue dimensions analyzed in the preceding chapter, the three models examined in the present chapter, as well as the potentially salient question of nationalism, that accounts for left-right orientations in new democracies.

Regime Divide as a Salient Cleavage

In contrast to established democracies, where a large majority of the public have spent all their lives under the current political system and probably come to take it for granted, citizens in newly democratized countries have personally experienced at least

two regime types. This allows them to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of each regime *relative* to one another. In other words, they may regard democracy not as a natural form of government, but as one among several possible regime type choices (Rose and Mishler 1996; Rose et al. 1998).[42] Whereas dissatisfaction with the political system in mature democracies may lead to alienation and occasional violence, a similar phenomenon in new democracies is likely to become manifested in calls for more fundamental changes in the nature of the regime.

Regime change is inevitably a momentous process, leaving a deep impression in the public mind that is unlikely to fade soon. During the course of transition, the highest stakes involve the redistribution of power (Moreno 1999:17). Even where citizens actively seeking a return to the *ancien régime* only comprise a small minority, some segments of the population invariably benefited more from authoritarian rule – or expect to see their benefits dwindle under the new democratic regime – than others. For example, market reforms that accompanied democratization in many ex-communist countries opened previously unavailable opportunities for young, highly educated urban segments of the population, but eroded the financial security of older and less skilled citizens. Therefore, the emerging cleavage between winners and losers of transition – part of what one can refer to as the regime divide – is likely to represent not so much competition between advocates of the past and present systems, but rather disagreement over both historical appraisal of the former and legitimacy of the latter. Where the regime divide exerts a significant influence on structuring left-right orientations, the professed ideological stance of the former regime determines the direction of respondents' self-placements: a leftist dictatorship yields

[42] This has been referred to as the "Churchill hypothesis", derived from Winston's Churchill's assertion that "democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." See Jasiewicz (1999) for a review, and Park and Shin (2005) for its application to East Asian new democracies.

identification of pro-democratic attitudes with the right, and vice versa.

The regime divide has been empirically confirmed as highly salient in structuring cleavages in a number of former communist countries (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1995, 1998; Fowler 2004; Kitschelt, Dimitrov and Kanev 1995; Lipsmeyer 2009; Miller, White and Heywood 1998; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009; Tucker 2006). Both preference for a democratic system as opposed to non-democratic alternatives and evaluation of its performance also vary considerably across East Asian democracies (Shin and Wells 2005). At the same time, one should keep in mind that transition from authoritarian rule is neither a uniform nor linear process, with starting points, modes, and durations varying from one case to another. Both the nature of the previous non-democratic regime and the mode of transition can affect subsequent patterns of political competition (Kitschelt 1995).[43] For example, the regime divide may be less sharp where transitions took place through pacts between former rulers and opposition groups (e.g., Kang 1998 on the case of South Korea), or where transition was brought about largely by elements within the former regime itself rather than opposition forces (e.g., Maxfield 2006 on the Romanian case).

Dimensions of Regime Divide

According to a schema proposed by Norris (1999), attitudes regarding democracy can be classified at different levels, from the most diffuse support in the form of allegiance to one's political community, to the most specific support toward individual political parties or personalities.[44] The three levels in the middle are regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions. First, we focus on

[43] Rivera (1996) argues that transition mode has less impact on post-democratization party competition than the authoritarian legacy of communist rule.

[44] The most diffuse level, political community, refers to identification with one's country. While not necessarily germane to the topics of attitudes toward democracy and comparison regime evaluations that this chapter focuses on, questions on nationalism/patriotism will be discussed later and included in the full model for explaining left-right orientations.

regime type as an ideal form, where "the object of the attitude is not the functioning of a particular system of democracy but the very idea of democracy" (Fuchs, Guidorossi, Svensson 1995). While we do not expect citizens to be familiar with various criteria for democracy, they can at least distinguish this type of regime from alternatives such as military dictatorship or theocracy. This follows Linz's (1988) argument that democracy must be evaluated relative to other forms of government, as well as Sartori's (1987) assertion that "we cannot… prove democracy, but we can convincingly argue that democracy is preferable." It is important to note that while pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian opinions often overlap, respondents are free to give positive (or negative) evaluations to *both* democracy and one or more alternative regime types.

We specifically examine three types of alternatives to democracy. Almost all new democracies included in this study experienced strongman or military rule, in some cases simultaneously (e.g., Jaruzelski in Poland, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan in South Korea). One can also argue that many authoritarian regimes encompassed features of technocracy, from assertions of scientific socialism by communist governments to the legitimacy that dictatorships in East Asia claimed on the basis of economic development. Personal experience should make respondents in these countries well qualified to assess the strengths and weaknesses of different regime types. Each variable is (re-)coded so that higher scores denote greater support for democracy. Where regime type preferences contribute to defining publics' understanding of left and right, we expect that the more citizens favor alternatives to democracy, the more they would lean toward the ideological pole associated with the former authoritarian regime.[45]

[45] For example, Klíma observes that culpability for installing an authoritarian regime was attributed to the entire left in the Czech Republic (2000:226).

If the principles underlying democracy, including rejection of other regime types, find widespread acceptance among citizens in most countries, the same may not hold true for appraisal of how democracy actually performs. The gap between expectations and experience may be particularly wide in societies that have only recently undergone democratization, since citizens may hold unrealistically hopes and thus become quickly disappointed by inexperienced elites confronted with numerous daunting legacies of authoritarian rule. Hofferbert and Klingemann (1999) report that democratic support in ex-communist new democracies is based more on "virtues of omission" than "virtues of commission", meaning that citizens prefers the new regime simply because it is no longer autocratic, and not due to any improvements in living conditions that it has brought about. To test the degree to which evaluations of democratic procedures forms a salient political cleavage, with losers of transition as critics of performance deficiencies and winners taking the opposite stance, we examine assessments on whether democracy is indecisive, leads to bad outcomes in terms of economics and public order, or remains the preferable system of governance despite its shortcomings.[46]

The preceding paragraphs assume that citizens perceive a diametric opposition between former authoritarian rule and the present democratic government, but in reality the contrast may be less clear-cut because many respondents take a more nuanced view of both regimes. Also, benefits accruing to transition winners, and costs incurred by transition losers, may not be attributable to democratic qualities of the new regime (or deficiencies thereof), but to other features such as changes in economic conditions or social status not directly related to democratization. Therefore,

[46] This classification of attitude toward democracy into two principles and performance approximately corresponds to Easton's (1965) theory of diffuse and specific system support, respectively. See also Mishler and Rose's (2001) contrast between "realist" and "idealist" concepts and measures of democracy.

the presence and salience of a regime divide can also be identified by comparing assessments of past and present regimes rather than opinions on features presumed to characterize them. Both Rose and Munro (2003) and Tucker (2006) report that a substantial proportion of citizens perceive parties in terms of old versus new regime backers.

If a regime divide influences left-right orientation, we expect that transition winners would rate the present regime highly and align themselves at the opposite side of the spectrum from the avowed ideological position of the former regime. For example, in former communist countries rightists would evaluate the present system positively while giving a low score to the political system in the past, and leftists would view the previous system in a more favorable light. If this hypothesis is valid, we expect respondents who give high marks to the former regime to align toward the left in CEE and Balkan countries, and identify with the right in the East Asian cases. The reverse should hold true for respondents who approve of the present regime.

Empirical Analysis

Democratic Principles

We follow the same method used in the previous chapter, namely regressions with respondents' left-right self-placements as the dependent variable. Question coding is available in the appendix. Since the three non-democratic regime types are not highly correlated with the democratic system variable,[47] I use each independent variable separately rather than constructing a composite index. Table 4.1 displays results for the EU 15 countries to provide a standard for comparison. With the

[47] Correlations between the democratic system variable (recoded so that higher values indicate greater adherence to democratic principles) and each of the non-democratic alternatives are – strong leader: 0.213; technocracy: 0.029; army rule: 0.175. Combining these three variables into an additive index yield substantially similar results, though doing so reduces the explained variance by more than 1% in a number of countries (Bosnia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Sweden).

Table 4.1: Regime type preferences structuring left-right orientations in established democracies

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland
strong leader	-0.10 **	-0.09 **	-0.05	-0.03	-0.15 ***	-0.17 ***	-0.10 *	-0.01
expert rule	-0.15 ***	-0.05	-0.08 *	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	0.04
army rule	0.00	-0.08 **	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07 *	0.01	-0.24 ***	-0.07
democratic system	-0.05	-0.08 **	-0.14 ***	-0.03	-0.05	0.03	0.02	0.09 *
adjusted R square	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.11	0.04

	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	UK
strong leader	-0.15 ***	-0.02	-0.12 **	-0.09	-0.10 **	0.09 *	0.01
expert rule	-0.03	0.04	-0.06	0.03	-0.05	-0.16 ***	-0.05
army rule	-0.11 ***	0.05	0.02	-0.13 **	-0.15 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.09
democratic system	0.01	0.04	-0.07	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.07
adjusted R square	0.05	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.10	0.08	0.04

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01
results for demographic variables not shown (same for subsequent tables)

exceptions of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the majority of Western European publics have lived under a democratic system throughout their lifetime, leading one to expect that questions pertaining to regime type choice would have low salience because alternatives to democracy are largely unrealistic. In twelve out of fifteen countries attitudes toward a democratic system is unrelated to left-right self-placement, as respondents on both sides of the ideological spectrum agree on the merits of democracy.

Contrary to expectations, opinion on the suitability of alternative regime types turn out to significantly divide left from right in many established democracies, with right-leaning respondents less averse to having strongman and military rule in seven countries each. In some cases historical legacy obviously exerts a lasting impact, such as attitudes toward dictators in Germany and Italy, and evaluation of military rule in Greece and Spain. The significance of these variables in countries without similar authoritarian experience, such as Belgium and Sweden, is less readily explicable. The overall picture that emerges is that even in established democracies, regime preference can still distinguish left-right orientations.

As table 4.2a shows, attitudes toward the legitimacy of having a democratic system distinguish ideological orientations in half the CEE countries (and always have positive coefficients even where coefficients are not statistically significant), while assessment of alternative regime types has little impact in most cases. As expected, stronger preference for democracy as an ideal form of government is associated with rightist identification. Searching for an explanation for which countries manifest a regime divide over democratic principles, one may cite the effect of Soviet rule or intervention: both Estonia and Latvia were constituent republics in the Soviet Union, while Hungary and the Czechoslovakia saw attempts at liberalizing communist rule

Table 4.2: Regime type preferences structuring left-right orientations in new democracies

a) CEE

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
strong leader	0.04	0.09 *	-0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	0.11 **	0.00
expert rule	0.02	0.07	0.07	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.00	-0.04
army rule	-0.01	-0.02	-0.12 **	-0.02	-0.05	0.07	-0.06	-0.05
democratic system	0.21 ***	0.15 ***	0.13 ***	0.11 *	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.02
adjusted R square	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02

b) Balkan

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
strong leader	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.10 *	-0.05	0.03	0.05
expert rule	0.01	0.03	-0.07	0.07	0.07	0.02	-0.03
army rule	-0.10 *	-0.18 ***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.09 *
democratic system	0.19 ***	-0.05	0.21 ***	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.14 ***
adjusted R square	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.09

Table 4.2 (continued)

c) East Asia

	Indonesia	Philippines	South Korea	Taiwan
strong leader	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	0.00
expert rule	-0.06	0.03	0.03	-0.06
army rule	-0.06	-0.03	0.00	-0.03
democratic systen	-0.12 **	0.11 ***	-0.02	-0.04
adjusted R square	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.05

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <

brutally suppressed by Soviet-led invasions in 1956 and 1968, respectively. However, even if one can argue that Slovakia did not have as prominent role in the Prague Spring as its Czech neighbor, and therefore did not have as strong a sense of victimhood, this hypothesis cannot account for the insignificance of the democratic preference variable in Lithuania.

Among attitudes toward non-democratic regime types, both the significance and direction of the coefficient for army rule in Hungary are surprising, since this country has not experienced a military government since the Horthy regency during the interwar period. The alignment on the right of respondents opposed to strongman rule in Slovakia may capture opposition to the Meciar government more than former communist rule. It should be noted that, with the exception of the Czech Republic, questions involving democratic principles do not offer much explanatory leverage over ideological orientations. Even transition losers do not question the desirability of democracy as an ideal, as suggested by high average scores on this item across all countries in this region.

Results for Balkans countries (table 4.2b) bear many similarities with their northern neighbors. Respondents emphasizing the intrinsic merits of having a democratic system lean significantly toward the right in Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Since this region contains several cases of delayed or interrupted transition compared with CEE countries, and particularly considering the Yugoslav succession wars that engulfed several newly independent states (the entity of Yugoslavia being linked to communist rule), one may anticipate that the regime divide would figure more prominently in shaping left-right identification, but evidence in support of this

hypothesis is mixed at best. Given the history of dominant leaders during the communist era in many Balkan countries, such as Hoxha in Albania, Ceausescu in Romania, and Tito in the former Yugoslavia, it is perhaps surprising that attitudes toward strongman rule do not emerge as a major cleavage.[48] Neither can one find generalizable elucidations for the impact of opinions on army rule on ideological positioning, since coefficients for this variable point in opposite directions: respondents averse to military government aligned on left in Albania and Bosnia, but on the right in Serbia. The latter result may be related to opposition to the nominally socialist Milosevic government.

Questions on democratic principles have equally modest impact on left-right orientations in East Asia (table 4.2c). Contrary to patterns observed in former communist countries, but in line with what one would anticipate in view of the staunchly anti-communist stance taken by Suharto's Golkar-led regime, pro-democratic opinion in Indonesia lean toward the left. Less intuitive is the significantly positive coefficient for the same variable in the Philippines, meaning that those who have greater faith in a democratic system identify with the right, memories of the right-wing Marcos dictatorship notwithstanding. One may surmise that this implies the regime divide was no longer a salient cleavage fifteen years after transition, but another possibility is that respondents did not perceive either the former regime or the pro-democratic forces that overthrew it in left-right terms in the first place. The latter proposition will be discussed below. Considering the length and intensity of opposition to authoritarian rule in both South Korea and Taiwan, as well as the explicit pro-US and pro-business policies pursued by former military-dominated regimes in both countries, it is surprising that none of the democratic principle variables plays a significant role in structuring left-right orientations in these two countries.

Overall, the model examined here does not provide much explanatory leverage. Democratic principles variables add little to the base model shown in the previous chapter, ranging from a miniscule 0.6 percent in East Asia to a still very modest 2.2 percent in the Balkans (and only 1.5 percent in CEE countries). Counter-intuitively, the average added explanatory value of this model is actually slightly higher in established Western European democracies (3.2 percent). A major reason that

[48] The exception in Croatia is probably more attributable to opposing views on the Tudjman government than a regime divide derived from evaluations of communist rule.

ideological orientations in new democracies are not anchored in questions over regime type preferences is a prevailing consensus that democracy represents the best form of government. In every single country, respondents preferred democracy to all alternatives by a sizeable margin. Military rule is ranked lowest among the four options in all cases except Indonesia, and government by strongman is also widely rejected. In contrast, technocracy found greater acceptance, particularly in the Balkans (but in none of the East Asian countries). This is in line with Rose et al.'s (1998) finding that expert rule does not load on the same factor as other non-democratic regime types. Instead of perceiving this form of government as a violation of democratic principles, many respondents may interpret it as a means of overcoming partisan bickering and achieving greater efficiency.

In seeking to explain cross-country variation in the impact of regime type preference on left-right orientations, one may hypothesize that the impact of democratic principles variables on respondents' ideological positioning is predicated on the actual extent of democratization in each country. The sharper the change that citizens experience, the greater the contrast they could draw between democratic and non-democratic regimes. If, on the other hand, the way a country was governed at the time of the survey was not very different from the past, either because the polity was not strongly authoritarian before or because it has not progressed far along the path of democratization, then respondents may perceive less clear distinction between various regime types. To test this proposition, we utilize the Polity IV democracy score,[49] and the average of Freedom House's political and civil liberty scores.[50] Specifically, we use the difference between the score in the survey year (year *n*) and the score from a decade ago (year *n*-10) as proxy for the extent of regime transformation. Changes in neither Polity IV nor Freedom House scores show meaningful correlations with the amount of variance explained by democratic principles variables (r= 0.167 and 0.121, respectively), however, so this hypothesis is not validated.

One may also hypothesize that the amount of variance explained by regime type preferences varies directly with the quantity of elite discourse on this issue: the more parties stress issues pertaining to democracy (and implicitly contrasts this with its alternatives), the more likely that questions on democratic principles would influence

[49] Countries are rated on a 0 to 10 scale for each year, 0 denoting a complete autocracy and 10 a full democracy. Data available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.
[50] Countries are rated on a 1 to 7 scale for each year, with lower scores indicating greater freedom. Data available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439.

publics' left-right orientations. The Comparative Manifestos Project, which codes party platforms by topic, contains two categories that relate to regime type preference: democracy and human rights. We use data during the period from three years before to three years after the survey date in each country, and correlate this indicator with the added explanatory value of our model. This yields a Pearson's *r* of 0.081, meaning that there is little relationship between elite mobilization and the salience of regime type preferences as an ideological anchor.

Democratic Performance

Next, we examine whether assessment of how democracy functions forms a salient cleavage.[51] Once again we use EU 15 countries as a point of reference. Table 4.3 shows that the item that most directly reflects performance, namely whether citizens consider democracy the most preferred system despite its shortcomings, does not influence publics' left-right in most cases. Even where this variable is statistically significant, the substantive effect is small. Where other performance measures are significant, left-leaning citizens are less prone to consider democracy indecisive or bad for maintaining law and order, though there are no apparent patterns concerning in which countries these issues tend to be salient. Compared with regime type choices, in most Western European countries the democratic performance model makes very limited contribution to structuring left-right orientations. This observation is counter-intuitive, because one would expect that publics in this region would have come to accept democratic principles as the only game in town after decades of stable democratic rule, while possibly expressing reservations about how the system performs under changing circumstances (e.g., state of the economy).

In CEE countries, democratic performance variables exert similar impact on left-right orientations as those concerning regime type preferences (table 4.4a). In contrast to the EU 15 countries, in a majority of cases it is the question on whether democracy is still preferred despite its shortcomings, instead of opinions on specific deficiencies, which influences ideological positioning. Similar to findings reported for democratic principles variables, respondents holding more favorable views of how

[51] Variables are presented separately instead of in a composite index. Responses to the question of whether democracy is still the best system despite its shortcomings (recoded; see appendix) do not correlate highly with opinions on other variables – bad for economy: 0.190; indecisive: 0.128; bad for keeping order: 0.187. Combining these three variables into an additive index yield substantially similar results, though doing so reduces the total explained variance by more than 1% in a number of countries (e.g., Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal).

Table 4.3: Democratic performance structuring left-right orientations in established democracies

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland
bad for economy	-0.07	0.13 ***	-0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03	-0.07	0.06
indecisive	-0.02	-0.08 *	-0.11 **	-0.18 ***	-0.04	-0.10 **	-0.04	0.08
bad for keeping order	-0.07	-0.19 ***	-0.07	0.06	-0.18 ***	-0.02	-0.16 ***	-0.04
dem. still preferred	-0.01	-0.07 *	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.10 *
adjusted R square	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.05

	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	UK
bad for economy	0.03	-0.02	0.09 **	-0.03	0.07 *	-0.06	0.01
indecisive	-0.08 *	-0.05	-0.09 *	0.06	-0.04	-0.14 ***	0.04
bad for keeping order	-0.13 ***	0.03	-0.09 *	-0.19 ***	-0.09 **	-0.02	-0.12 *
dem. still preferred	-0.03	0.03	-0.06	-0.08	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01
adjusted R square	0.03	0.00	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.04

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.005$; $p < 0.01$

Table 4.4: Democratic performance structuring left-right orientations in new democracies

a) CEE

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
bad for economy	0.13 ***	0.10	-0.06	-0.04	-0.09	-0.03	0.01	-0.05
indecisive	0.04	0.03	0.13 *	-0.03	0.12	0.08	-0.01	0.01
bad for keeping order	0.03	0.09	-0.03	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.06
dem. still preferred	0.24 ***	0.11 **	0.06	0.12 **	0.10 *	0.11 **	0.15 ***	0.01
adjusted R square	0.15	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02

b) Balkan

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
bad for economy	0.12 **	0.09	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.10	0.06
indecisive	0.03	-0.16 ***	0.13 *	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.01
bad for keeping order	0.02	-0.01	0.18 **	-0.12 *	0.07	0.03	0.11
dem. still preferred	0.25 ***	-0.11 ***	0.16 ***	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.10 *
adjusted R square	0.11	0.03	0.20	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.10

Table 4.4 (continued)

c) East Asia

	Indonesia	Philippines	South Korea	Taiwan
bad for economy	-0.01	0.02	-0.08 *	0.04
indecisive	0.02	0.05	-0.01	-0.07
bad for keeping orde	0.02	-0.05	0.00	-0.03
dem. still preferred	0.09 *	0.07 *	-0.03	-0.12 **
adjusted R square	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.06

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.

democracy works placed themselves significantly to the right compared with critics. In view of economic restructuring that accompanied transition from authoritarianism, particularly incidences of "shock therapy" reforms in this region which resulted in skyrocketing inflation and worker redundancy, it is interesting to note that views on whether the economy performs badly under democracy had no influence on left-right identification outside of the Czech Republic. One possible explanation is that opinion on the suitability of democracy already accounts for any link between assessment of how the new system impacts the economy and ideological orientations. Testing whether attitudes on the quality of democratic performance derive from improvement or deterioration in personal well-being lies beyond the scope of this analysis, but one may reasonably surmise that transition losers are more likely to express dissatisfaction not toward principles of democracy, but rather toward how it operates in practice.

Findings for democratic performance variables in the Balkans are also comparable to those for regime type preferences (table 4.4b). Similar to CEE countries, where we find variables in this model to be significant, the question that specifically solicits opinions on the relative attraction of democracy is more important for structuring left-right orientations than assessment of the system's potential shortcomings. In contrast to the expected association between positive views toward system performance and rightist identification found in Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, the negative coefficient in Bosnia for this variable stands out as a notable exception. In view of conditions in the country at the time of the survey (some of which persist to this day), namely the partition between Croat-Muslim and Serb regions as well as

heightened inter-ethnic tensions, the contrast to democracy most salient to many Bosnians may be chauvinism and revanchism rather than communism. The former often eludes absorption by the spatial schema, but if publics associate ultra-nationalism with the extreme right, then the finding for Bosnia becomes more understandable.

In comparison to the two ex-communist regions, we observe much more limited effect of democratic performance variables on left-right orientations in East Asia (table 4.4c). Only in Taiwan do we find results confirming the hypothesis that respondents who profess stronger faith in the functioning of the democratic system align to the left in a country ruled until very recently by a right-wing authoritarian regime (and had not yet experienced a government alternation at the time of the survey). Less intuitively, in two other countries with histories of rightist dictatorships, Indonesia and the Philippines, critics of how democracy operates lean significantly toward the left. Although in both cases the substantial effect is relatively small, the very fact that any revulsion against the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships did not seem to translate into more positive evaluations of democratic performance raises a conundrum. At the same time, this result offers a possible explanation to the puzzle of why, on average, citizens in these countries place themselves further to the right than all other cases in our sample: whether appraisal of the former regime remains controversial or not, it does not form an important political cleavage, and therefore has little impact on ideological positioning.

The utility of the democratic performance model – attributable mostly to the variable on whether democracy is still regarded as the best system despite its shortcomings – varies both across and within regions. It adds 4.8 percent to the base model in the Balkans, 2.8 percent in CEE countries, and only 0.6 percent in East Asia. In contrast to the regime type choice model, this model has less explanatory value in the EU 15 countries (only 2.1 percent). More important than these region averages are intra-regional variations: evaluation of how democracy operates is vastly superior to the base model in accounting for left-right positioning in Albania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic; adds some explanatory power in Estonia and Serbia; but has almost no leverage in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and all East Asian cases except Taiwan. It is also worth noting that, in line with expectations, citizens held a more positive view regarding the idea of democracy than its actual functioning, though mean scores for each country on the two questions evaluating the absolute (principles) and relative

(performance) merit of democracy are very similar in all three regions.

In search of patterns that may account for the additional explained variance by democratic performance variables, we once again utilize the two indices measuring changes in the quality of democracy. Following the same procedure as the previous section, the correlation with the difference over ten years (up to the survey date) in Polity IV scores is only 0.165, though the correlation with the difference in Freedom House scores stands at a higher 0.348. The latter suggests that the model capturing evaluations of how the democratic system works does indeed have stronger explanatory leverage in countries that experienced greater improvement in quality of governance in the past decade. We do not find a relationship between the explanatory power of democratic performance variables and the degree of elite emphasis on topics germane to democracy. Using the same categories from the Comparative Manifestos Project as in the previous section, we find a correlation of -0.165. If any link exists at all, it is the counter-intuitive one that the more parties stress topics related to democracy and human rights, the *less* influence democratic performance assessments exert on respondents' left-right positioning.

Comparative Regime Evaluations

Finally, we turn to publics' appraisal of past and present political systems as a possible manifestation of a regime divide which structures ideology. Since the EU 15 countries did not experience recent regime change, the meaning of questions on how respondent assess the former and current regimes is dissimilar to new democracies, so we forego comparisons with established democracies. Results for CEE countries (table 4.5a) show comparative regime evaluations to be a remarkably consistent and powerful predictor of left-right orientations. Negative assessment of the former communist system is strongly associated with rightist self-placement in every single case, and disapprobation of the present system is a reliable predictor of leftist sentiments everywhere except Slovenia. Even when left-leaning voters in Slovenia are not more critical of the present regime, a regime divide still exerts a considerable impact on ideological positioning through contrasting appraisal of communist rule. It is also interesting to observe that in a majority cases assessment of past communist rule exerts more substantial influence on left-right orientations than evaluation of the current system (the exceptions are Estonia and Hungary), and that it is precisely in some of these countries that the regime comparison model proves most robust (Czech

Table 4.5 Comparative regime evaluations structuring left-right orientations

a) CEE																
	Czech Rep		Estonia		Hungary		Latvia		Lithuania		Poland		Slovakia		Slovenia	
rate current system	0.09	***	0.25	***	0.24	***	0.14	***	0.13	**	0.24	***	0.08	**	-0.02	
rate past system	-0.58	***	-0.18	***	-0.15	***	-0.21	***	-0.45	***	-0.31	***	-0.30	***	-0.22	***
adjusted R square	0.37		0.13		0.09		0.08		0.23		0.17		0.11		0.07	
b) Balkan																
	Albania		Bosnia		Bulgaria		Croatia		Macedonia		Romania		Serbia			
rate current system	-0.04		0.12	***	0.27	***	0.09	*	0.17	***	0.21	***	N/A			
rate past system	-0.38	***	-0.13	***	-0.44	***	-0.22	***	-0.09	*	-0.21	***	-0.40	***		
adjusted R square	0.15		0.05		0.34		0.07		0.05		0.11		0.20			
c) East Asia																
	Indonesia		Philippines		South Korea		Taiwan									
rate current system	-0.09	*	N/A		N/A		0.07	*								
rate past system	N/A		0.02		0.05		0.20	***								
adjusted R square	0.07		0.01		0.05		0.09									
Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01																

Republic, Lithuania, Poland).

Similar to their northern neighbors, comparative regime evaluations are also a powerful predictor of left-right positions in the Balkans (table 4.5b). In every single case, respondents who lean toward the left rate the former communist regime much more positively than their rightist compatriots. The reverse is true regarding evaluation of the present regime in most countries (except Albania). The divergent trajectory between CEE countries where parties/alliance organized by former dissidents gained power at the first wave of open elections, and Balkans states where many communist successor parties retained power in part due to weaker and more fragmented opposition, is not reflected in any differences in the strength of comparative regime evaluation variables between the two regions. One may also note that the substantive explanatory power of this model is more modest in most newly independent states which once formed Yugoslavia. This is likely due to greater salience of issues involving state sovereignty and ethnicity. Nationalism does not intrinsically reside at either side of the spatial spectrum, and can be appropriated by either elites on the left (Serbia) or right (Croatia).

Unavailability of questions on either past or present system evaluation renders testing of the regime comparison model difficult in East Asia (table 4.5c). However, if results discussed in the preceding paragraphs serve as an accurate guide, one has reason to surmise that differential assessment of the two political systems is not nearly as powerful a predictor of left-right orientations in East Asia as in other new democracies. Appraisal of the former regime is significant in every single former communist country, but out of the three Asian cases where this item was included in the survey, it fails to distinguish left from right self-placements in the Philippines and South Korea. One possible explanation lies in the longer time span that has elapsed between democratization and the survey date: the gap is a decade or less in all ex-communist countries, but fourteen years in South Korea and fifteen in the Philippines. The passage of time may dilute a once-sharp regime divide.

Another plausible elucidation is the nature of the new governments that assumed power following the end of authoritarian rule. For example, Roh Tae-woo, the first president in the democratic Korean Sixth Republic, was at the heart of the authoritarian Chun Doo-hwan government, and his successor Kim Young-sam won the presidency by allying himself with the successor to the party created by the former military regime. In other words, the break with past non-democratic regimes was less

clear-cut compared to cases in former communist countries, so competition among parties and politicians revolved around factors (e.g., based on region or personality) not related to any regime divide. Indeed, when one takes contextual considerations into account, it is the sharp regime divide in Taiwan that stands out as an exception, since a change of government had not yet taken place in this country when the survey was conducted, so both the present and past political systems respondents were asked to evaluate were under the same ruling party.

The salience of regime evaluation variables does not appear to be a function of how positively or negatively past and present political systems are assessed in each country. In fact, there are almost no cases where the present regime enjoys a much more favorable rating than its predecessor (only in Albania and the Czech Republic is the former rated more than 0.5 points higher than the latter on a ten-point scale), while the past regime is much preferred to the current one (by more than two points) in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Lithuania. One cannot rule out the possibility that the two regimes are not assessed according to the same criteria since citizens have higher expectations, and therefore use more exacting standards, for the present system. Nevertheless, the extent of disillusionment with the current regime can be gauged by the fact that in every single CEE and Balkan country, the average rating falls below the midpoint of five. No relationship exists between this gap in relative appraisal and the utility of the regime comparison model in explaining left-right orientations.

It is important to note the difference between evaluation of the present regime and attitudes toward democracy based on both ideals and performance. Respondents generally endorsed both measures of democracy, but harbored much greater skepticism regarding the current system. On average, publics in both CEE and (especially) Balkan countries rated the former regime higher than the present one (either one or the other item was not included in questionnaires administered in most East Asian countries so comparisons cannot be made). In fact, among the fifteen ex-communist countries, only publics in Albania, the Czech Republic, and Estonia found the current system more satisfactory (Latvians saw little difference between the two regimes). That Bosnian, Macedonian, and Serbian respondents perceived serious deterioration of conditions (a decline of more than 2 units on a ten-point scale) is understandable in view of the turmoil and destruction their countries suffered in the years immediately prior to the survey date; that they were joined by Lithuanian citizens presents a greater puzzle.

Comparative regime evaluations prove much stronger predictors of left-right orientations in former communist states, adding 13.5 percent to the base model in CEE and 11.3 percent in Balkan countries. Especially worth noting is the model's contribution in the Czech Republic (32 percent), Bulgaria (29 percent), and Lithuania (21 percent). Overall, it offers a far more compelling explanation of respondents' left-right self-placements in these two regions than any other model, including factors analyzed in the previous chapter. Corroborating Enyedi's observation that "conflicts related to the pace of transition and to the fate of the representatives of the old regime still dominate the public sphere of many post-communist countries" (2008:298), attitudes toward both communist rule and the subsequent democratic political system – particularly the former – constitute a highly salient cleavage that overshadows other issue dimensions in defining public understanding of ideology in new European democracies. These result also confirm Evans and Whitefield's argument that competition in Eastern Europe takes places around an "ideological of opposition to communism" rather than specific policies (1995:507). In stark contrast, the comparative regime evaluations model has little impact on the East Asian cases, adding only 1.2 percent to the base model. As discussed above, in addition to question unavailability and survey timing, more nuanced (rather than wholesale) change between the past and current political systems may account for its limited explanatory value.

More than questions on democratic principles or performance, the regime comparison variables more directly assess the salience of regime divide. One can thus expect a more robust relationship between the explanatory power of this model and indices measuring improvement in the quality of democracy in each country: the further a country moved from autocracy toward mature democracy, the greater the salience of past and present system evaluations as an anchor of left-right orientations. Following the same approach as the previous two sections, the added explanatory power of the model correlates with the Polity IV scores at 0.372, and with the Freedom House scores at 0.571. We can therefore conclude that the robustness of the regime comparisons model is in part a function of the degree of enhanced democratic quality.

An alternative explanation is that comparative regime evaluations become a salient cleavage as a function of agency, namely mobilization by political elites. If this is true, we should expect that the more attention parties give to issues pertaining to the

previous regime in their platforms,[52] the greater the impact of comparing past and present regimes on structuring left-right orientations. Using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, we find a bivariate correlation between these two indicators of 0.010, which offers no support for this proposition. Most party platforms did not mention communism or communists at all, but memories and legacies of former authoritarian regimes may still be so ubiquitous that a large majority of the electorate hardly need reminders from elites to know where they stand on this dimension of the regime divide.

Nationalism

One factor that does not strictly fit into any of the models analyzed above, but may nevertheless shape political competition in new (as well as established) democracies, concerns the role of nationalism. Nationalist issues are especially likely to inflame debate in countries with sizable ethnic minorities, or those with large communities abroad belonging to the titular nationality. Newly independent states are also more susceptible to a nationalist/ethnic cleavage, due to often delicate relations with neighboring countries which once belonged within the same territorial entities. Questions of nationalism and ethnic relations have been salient in several CEE countries (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1998, 2001), and turned former neighbors into enemies in a series of devastating wars in the Balkans (e.g., Cohen 2001). Inter-ethnic tensions also came to the fore with democratization in Indonesia and Taiwan, in the former case involving secessionist movements. Thus, one can expect nationalism to structure left-right orientations in a number of new democracies.

Unlike the economic, social, post-materialist, or regime divide models, however, the specific configuration of inter-ethnic distributions and relations in each country defies investigation through generalizable questions in cross-national surveys. Some ethnic minorities are better integrated into their country of residence than others; some can rely on the backing of a co-ethnic "motherland" (for example, Russians in Estonia and Latvia and Hungarians in Slovakia) while others have none (e.g., the large Roma population in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia); some even exert control over sectors of society disproportionate to their numbers (e.g., Chinese business owners in

[52] Issues include both positive and negative mentions of the communists both during transition and in the present, as well as references to rehabilitation and compensation for victims of former communist regimes. Data is available for CEE and Balkan countries only.

Indonesia). Inability to quantify these contextual factors adds empirical difficulties to the already daunting theoretical challenge of incorporating nationalist issues into the left-right schema (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976).

Two questions in the World Values Survey that can be used as proxies of nationalism solicit respondents' willingness to fight for their country in the event of war, and their degree of national pride. Unfortunately the former item was not included in questionnaires used in about half the cases in our sample, including most CEE countries. The latter question may not convey the same meaning to all respondents in countries where the very concept of nationhood was (and remains) subject to debate (e.g., Bosnia, Taiwan). Furthermore, the distinction between response categories (e.g., the difference between "very proud" and "quite proud") may be susceptible to the influence of cultural norms. Most importantly, neither of these two items directly alludes to the question of ethnicity, which is at the center of the cleavage we are interested in testing.

With these considerable reservations in mind, regression tests are conducted for the nationalism model. Results for all three regions (not shown) demonstrate that willingness to fight for one's country and feelings of national pride add little explanatory power to the base model (1.2 percent in CEE countries, 0.6 percent in the Balkans, 0.5 percent in East Asia). In fourteen out of nineteen new democracies in our sample, the added explanatory value is less than 1 percent. The former item is almost never significant. Where the latter question attains statistical (though not necessarily substantive) significance, respondents expressing a higher sense of national pride lean to the right in Croatia, the Czech Republic, and the three Baltic states, and to the left in Albania, Indonesia, Macedonia, Serbia, and South Korea. As a benchmark for comparison, it is worth mentioning that among the EU 15 countries, respondents more willing to fight in wars lean significantly to the right in four out of seven countries where this question was asked, and greater national pride is significantly linked with rightist orientation in nine out of fifteen cases. Nevertheless, these questions help explain only an additional 2.0 percent compared with the base model.

In CEE and some Balkan countries, communism never shed the negative image of being externally imposed, so it is unsurprising that anti-communism was often tinged with a nationalist overtone. The explicit appeal to exclusive ethnic solidarity by the Socialist Party of Serbia probably accounts for the association between leftist orientation and nationalism in that country, though several other communist successor

parties have also taken up the nationalist cause (e.g., Ishiyama 1997; Urban 2003). The same cannot be said of neighboring Macedonia, however, where it is the center-right VMRO-DPMNE rather than the communist successor Social Democratic Union that has emphasized promoting the interests of the titular nationality, leaving the linkage between leftist views and national pride as a conundrum.

One should also note that responses to questions on nationalism can be influenced by a country's degree of ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity if minorities feel less affinity to the national entity than majority populations. While recognizing that we cannot draw any direct link between minority status and lesser patriotism, it is probably not coincidental that among the ten cases with the lowest average level of national pride within our sample, seven contain significant minorities: Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Taiwan. The score for Latvia is also relatively low, and only Macedonia stands out among countries marked by ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity as having a national pride score in the medium range of our 34-nation sample. These comparisons do not necessarily mean that nationalism would shape political competition, though this is often the case through political entrepreneurs' deliberate mobilization. What is less clear is whether and how nationalism could structure popular understanding of left and right, as the two axes may well be orthogonal.

A Full Model for Explaining Left-Right Orientations

Having examined the impact of eight sets of variables – socio-demographic, economic, social/religious, post-materialist, democratic principles, democratic performance, comparative regime evaluation, and nationalism – it is now time to include all these variables in a full model. For the sake of parsimony, variables that the analysis so far has shown to exert little influence on structuring left-right orientations are omitted from the multivariate regression. Also, questionnaire items not asked in more than a third of all countries in our sample are excluded. This leaves us with the following variables:

- socio-demographic: gender, age, education level, income;
- economic: confidence in labor unions, income equality, private ownership, individual responsibility;
- social/religious: confidence in churches, importance of God, homosexuality, abortion;

- post-materialist: unconventional participation, environment;
- democratic principles: rule by strongman, military rule, democratic system;
- democratic performance: economy, indecisiveness, order, desirability of democracy despite its shortcomings;
- regime comparison: ratings of present and past political systems;
- nationalism: national pride.

Since the effects of each variable on individual countries have already been discussed at some length in the preceding pages, the important task here is to scrutinize regional patterns in the results.

As table 4.6 shows, appraisal of the former communist regime is the most salient cleavage defining left and right in CEE countries, substantially structuring ideological orientations in every case. At the time of the survey nearly a decade had elapsed since the end of authoritarian rule, but despite both the passage of time and the efforts of many communist successor parties at fundamental organizational and policy restructuring, disagreements over the understanding and interpretation of recent history persist as a highly visible line of division between opposite ideological camps. Pacts between parties from different sides of this demarcation during the 1990s, such as the participation of center-right SLS and SKD in governments led by the communist successor LDS in Slovenia, and the agreement of tolerance between center-right ODS and center-left CSSD in the Czech Republic, did not appear to dilute the regime divide. Appraisal of the current regime is also significant in most countries, reinforcing the conclusion that the distinction between transition winners and losers which helps to define the meaning of left and right derives not from assessment of democracy in either abstract or more concrete forms, but instead from comparative evaluations of past and present political systems. Few items on democratic principles and performance remain influential in structuring left-right orientations once current and former regime ratings are taken into account.

Next to the regime comparisons, confidence in church also emerges as a significant anchor of left-right orientations in most CEE countries, with those expressing greater trust in churches leaning toward the right. This result highlights the durability of churches as a central institution in the lives of ordinary citizens, notwithstanding decades of official atheism. At the same time, we note that it is this institutionalized form of religion, rather than either personal faith in God or opinions regarding moral questions, which underpins a social/religious cleavage. In view of the

Table 4.6: Full model of factors structuring left-right orientations - CEE

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
gender	0.04 *	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.06	0.04	-0.01	-0.08
age	-0.10 ***	0.02	-0.17 ***	0.06	0.13 *	0.08 *	-0.05	-0.07
education	-0.07 **	-0.05	0.01	-0.05	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.02
income	0.07 **	0.15 ***	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.04	-0.07
confidence in unions	0.09 ***	0.05	0.12 **	-0.01	-0.07	0.03	0.12 ***	0.09 *
income equality	0.07 **	0.13 ***	N/A	N/A	0.06	0.08 *	N/A	0.05
private ownership	-0.06 **	-0.08	N/A	N/A	-0.20 ***	-0.06	N/A	N/A
individual responsibility	-0.04	0.09 *	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.01	-0.05
confidence in church	-0.12 ***	-0.12 *	-0.14 **	0.04	-0.17 **	-0.16 ***	-0.17 ***	-0.19 **
God is important	0.03	-0.04	0.10	0.12 *	0.10	0.03	0.06	0.13 *
homosexuality	-0.04	-0.08	-0.08 *	0.01	0.08	-0.03	0.03	-0.04
abortion	0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.12 *	-0.12 **	-0.09 *	-0.04
pay more for environme	0.03	0.00	0.04	-0.08	0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.02
direct political action	0.02	-0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.03	-0.08 *	0.09 *
strong leader	-0.03	0.04	-0.03	0.01	-0.10 *	-0.05	0.07	0.01
army rule	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07	-0.01	-0.10 *	0.01	-0.08 *	-0.05
democratic system	0.03	0.03	0.10 *	0.04	-0.09	-0.06	-0.09 *	-0.01
bad for economy	0.04	0.07	-0.02	-0.07	-0.20 **	-0.07	-0.02	-0.06
indecisive	-0.02	-0.02	0.10 *	0.00	0.14 *	0.09 *	-0.05	-0.02
bad for keeping order	0.00	0.02	-0.08	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.07	0.06
dem. still preferred	0.03	0.06	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.08 *	0.01
rate current system	0.06 **	0.21 ***	0.20 ***	0.09 *	0.09 *	0.21 ***	0.06	-0.03
rate past system	-0.48 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.18 ***	-0.44 ***	-0.27 ***	-0.24 ***	-0.16 ***
proud of country	-0.05 *	-0.05	-0.02	-0.13 **	0.00	-0.04	0.04	-0.05
adjusted R square	0.41	0.17	0.15	0.09	0.34	0.24	0.18	0.16

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01

dramatic shift from planned to market economy, including extensive debate and upheaval surrounding privatization, it is surprising that we do not find economic issues playing a greater role in shaping ideological orientations. The omission of some economic questions from the survey questionnaire in a number of countries notwithstanding, the data available suggest that issues of income inequality and private ownership, which figured prominently in policy debates during the initial period of transition, influenced left-right orientations in only about half of CEE countries, and always had a lesser substantive effect than assessment of the past regime. One possible reason is that economic reforms are so closely linked with the new political system that views on the former are subsumed by assessment of the latter.

Results of the full model in the Balkans (table 4.7) reveal patterns quite similar to those discussed above. Once again, evaluations of past and present political systems are the most consistent and substantive factors structuring left-right orientations across the region, though in contrast to CEE countries, in a few cases (Bosnia and Macedonia) opinions on authoritarian rule are not significant. To the extent that the end of communist rule in a number of Balkan states did not lead to as drastic a change in the political composition of new ruling elites as in CEE countries (for example, prominent figures in communist governments such as Ion Iliescu and Slobodan Milosevic continued to occupy leading executive positions), one may expect respondents to perceive less contrast between the former and current regimes, but results show that those who rate communist rule highly tend to have an unfavorable view of the current system, and vice versa. There is also little evidence that a slower pace of democratization in some Balkan countries means that democratic principles and performance would remain under contention for a longer period, and thus form important cleavages distinguishing left and right.

Another similarity with CEE countries is the salience of confidence in church in separating left from right in a majority of Balkan countries, while other aspects of religious and moral issues are only significant in a few cases. Considering the ethnic conflagrations that engulfed many parts of this region during years immediately preceding the survey date, it confounds expectations that we do not find a cleavage based on nationalism. One likely explanation is that national pride is prevalent, thus forming a consensus view rather than a topic of political contestation. Another possibility is that left-right orientations only distinguishes attitudes toward certain

Table 4.7: Full model of factors structuring left-right orientations - Balkan

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
gender	-0.01	-0.08 **	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07	-0.02	-0.01
age	0.02	-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.16 **	-0.11 **
education	-0.01	-0.04	-0.12 *	-0.14 ***	-0.06	-0.18 **	-0.04
income	-0.03	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.08	-0.08	-0.09 *
confidence in unions	-0.04	0.06	0.08 *	0.12 **	0.00	-0.01	0.05
income equality	0.16 ***	0.02	0.08 *	-0.02	0.06	0.19 ***	0.04
private ownership	-0.06	0.03	N/A	-0.06	-0.01	0.00	-0.07
individual responsibility	-0.09 *	-0.03	0.02	-0.08 *	-0.08 *	-0.08	-0.04
confidence in church	-0.02	-0.11 **	-0.16 **	-0.08	0.08 *	0.00	-0.18 ***
God is important	0.10	0.09 *	0.02	-0.02	0.15 ***	0.07	0.00
homosexuality	-0.01	-0.03	0.11 **	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01
abortion	0.05	-0.06	0.06	-0.11 *	-0.06	-0.09	-0.07 *
pay more for environment	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.09 *	0.01	-0.09	0.01
direct political action	-0.14 **	-0.06	0.02	-0.07	0.03	-0.02	-0.14 ***
strong leader	-0.07	0.07 *	0.00	-0.10 *	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
army rule	-0.11 *	-0.17 ***	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04
democratic system	0.05	-0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.04	-0.05	0.03
bad for economy	0.09	0.07	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	0.10	-0.01
indecisive	0.02	-0.16 ***	0.03	0.11	0.03	-0.01	-0.01
bad for keeping order	0.03	0.05	0.09	-0.14 **	0.04	0.04	0.06
dem. still preferred	0.16 ***	-0.09 *	0.04	-0.03	-0.07	0.03	0.02
rate current system	-0.08	0.13 ***	0.19 ***	0.07	0.18 ***	0.21 ***	N/A
rate past system	-0.21 ***	-0.06	-0.38 ***	-0.18 ***	-0.03	-0.17 ***	-0.28 ***
proud of country	0.09	0.04	0.03	-0.05	0.03	-0.01	0.04
adjusted R square	0.28	0.13	0.39	0.11	0.08	0.15	0.25

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01

designated outside groups rather than all non-nationals (for example, Slovene rightists are significantly more hostile toward Serbs, but views toward Croats do not differentiate left and right). The task of testing this hypothesis must be left to analysis of individual country data containing questions on specific ethnicities.

Unlike the two ex-communist regions, no single issue dimension stands out as a strong anchor of left-right orientations in East Asia (table 4.8). Analysis of the dimension found to be most salient in structuring ideology in other new democracies, namely comparative regime evaluations, is hindered by frequent question unavailability. While views on whether democracy is still considered the best system despite its shortcomings remain significant in the full model in three out of four cases, one must note that the coefficients do not point in the same direction: respondents with greater confidence in democratic performance lean to the left in Taiwan, but to the right in Indonesia and the Philippines. One may surmise that memories of violent communist insurgency in the latter two countries contributed to discrediting the idea of left to an even greater extent than dictatorship tarnished the rightist label. If this hypothesis is valid, it would either confirm the persisting dominance of an ideological paradigm established by authoritarian regimes even after democratization, or challenge the assumption of a simple binary classification between the ideological preferences of supporters and opponents of authoritarian regimes.

Another dimension that plays a significant role in shaping left-right positioning is national pride, though once again one cannot make any generalizations since coefficients have opposite signs: leftists feel prouder of their nation in Indonesia and South Korea, while the opposite is true in Taiwan. We cannot ascertain the extent to which this variable captures conflicts often shown to be salient in these countries, such as the center (Java) versus periphery cleavage in Indonesia, regionalism in South Korea, and identity questions in Taiwan. Confidence in church, which emerges as the second most salient factor anchoring left-right orientations in the other two regions, has no impact outside of Indonesia. It is no coincidence that, in contrast to many ex-communist countries, the only country in East Asia where parties explicitly appeal to voters on religious or moral values in Indonesia.[53] The inability to identify uniform patterns of which issues structure left and right in East Asia suggests a need for

[53] Baswedan (2004) identifies six "Islam-friendly" parties in Indonesia, including three which refer specifically to Islam in their platform (PBB, PPP, PKS), and another two which "derive support from Islamic organizations while appearing pluralistic" (PKB, PAN).

Table 4.8: Full model of factors structuring left-right orientations - East A

	Indonesia		Philippines		South Korea		Taiwan	
gender	0.12	**	-0.02		-0.02		0.06	
age	-0.02		0.06		0.16	***	0.12	*
education	0.06		-0.06		-0.06		-0.03	
income	0.15	***	0.02		0.04		0.06	
confidence in unions	0.01		-0.10	**	0.10	**	-0.03	
income equality	0.13	***	0.09	**	-0.01		-0.02	
private ownership	0.07		0.05		0.02		0.05	
individual responsibility	0.08	*	0.01		-0.01		0.00	
confidence in church	-0.13	***	0.03		0.01		0.01	
God is important	0.06		0.04		0.04		0.05	
homosexuality	0.09	*	-0.01		-0.06		-0.05	
abortion	-0.07		0.13	***	-0.02		0.03	
pay more for environmer	N/A		-0.07	*	-0.03		0.05	
direct political action	-0.06		0.03		0.15	***	0.13	**
strong leader	-0.05		0.00		0.01		0.01	
army rule	-0.04		-0.02		0.02		0.03	
democratic system	-0.14	***	0.09	**	-0.02		0.00	
bad for economy	0.03		0.02		-0.09	*	0.05	
indecisive	0.00		0.05		0.01		-0.05	
bad for keeping order	0.08		-0.03		0.01		0.00	
dem. still preferred	0.14	***	0.02		-0.02		-0.09	*
rate current system	-0.10	**	N/A		N/A		0.05	
rate past system	N/A		0.02		0.05		0.16	***
proud of country	0.10	*	-0.02		0.11	**	-0.09	*
adjusted R square	0.14		0.05		0.09		0.10	

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01

greater caution in treating states in this geographical area as a political region than either the CEE or Balkan countries.[54]

As in previous sections, the performance of the full model can be gauged by looking at the added percentage of variance in left-right self-placements that it contributes on top of the base model (table 4.9). This figure stands at 17.2 percent in CEE countries,

[54] This is in line with Blondel and Inoguchi's finding that "citizens of East and Southeast Asia do not have a truly common political culture" (2006:101-2).

19.8 percent in the Balkans, but only 5.2 percent in East Asia (the equivalent figure for the EU 15 is slightly above 25 percent, but such comparison is problematic since respondents in established democracies do not have authoritarian regimes as a reference point). In other words, we can explain about one-fifth of the contents of left right in ex-communist countries in Europe – not a very high percentage, yet significant nonetheless in view of the amorphous nature of spatial labels – but know a lot less about what underlies ideological orientations in East Asian new democracies. Table 4.10 lists the contribution of the full model in each new democracy, as well as the total amount of variation explained (i.e. including the base model). By the first measure, it is hardly surprising that four out of five countries where the full model has the least added value are found in East Asia.

Summary

This chapter has investigated the extent to which factors specific to conditions in new democracies, namely attitudes toward democratic principles and performances as

Table 4.9: Increase in explained variance over base model

established democracies	base model	democratic principles model	democratic performance model
Austria	1.8%	4.2%	1.2%
Belgium	1.4%	3.4%	4.1%
Denmark	2.1%	2.9%	2.5%
Finland	3.6%	1.2%	2.0%
France	1.2%	4.9%	2.9%
Germany	3.2%	2.0%	0.6%
Greece	1.3%	9.2%	4.2%
Ireland	3.5%	0.7%	1.9%
Italy	0.6%	4.6%	2.6%
Luxembourg	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	5.6%	2.4%	2.0%
Portugal	0.5%	2.1%	3.6%
Spain	5.3%	4.9%	0.8%
Sweden	3.7%	4.7%	3.2%
UK	3.4%	0.6%	0.3%
EU 15 average	***2.5%***	***3.2%***	***2.1%***

Table 4.9 (continued)

new democracies	base model	democratic principles model	democratic performance model	regime comparison model
Czech Republic	5.0%	4.3%	10.2%	31.9%
Estonia	3.2%	3.6%	4.8%	9.4%
Hungary	0.8%	2.9%	0.6%	8.2%
Latvia	1.0%	0.4%	0.9%	6.6%
Lithuania	1.9%	0.0%	1.4%	21.4%
Poland	1.3%	0.3%	2.4%	15.9%
Slovakia	0.2%	1.2%	2.7%	10.3%
Slovenia	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	4.6%
CEE average	***1.9%***	***1.6%***	***2.9%***	***13.5%***
Albania	1.2%	3.5%	9.7%	14.1%
Bosnia	1.0%	3.4%	2.1%	3.6%
Bulgaria	4.9%	4.3%	15.5%	29.2%
Croatia	1.4%	0.9%	0.2%	5.5%
Macedonia	1.0%	0.0%	0.2%	3.8%
Romania	2.5%	0.0%	2.0%	8.6%
Serbia	5.7%	3.4%	4.1%	14.0%
Balkans average	***2.5%***	***2.2%***	***4.8%***	***11.3%***
Indonesia	6.7%	1.3%	0.3%	0.6%
Philippines	0.6%	1.0%	0.4%	0.0%
South Korea	5.3%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%
Taiwan	4.7%	0.1%	1.3%	4.0%
East Asia average	***4.3%***	***0.6%***	***0.6%***	***1.2%***

well as evaluations of past and present regimes, affect left-right orientations. Opinion on the desirability of democracy as a regime type and appraisal of its performance despite various shortcomings are more likely to distinguish left from right in new democracies than in established ones. This is in line with what our expectations, since a large majority of the population in the former group of countries had experienced decades of authoritarian rule, while in most Western European states democracy has long become so deeply entrenched that consideration of alternative systems is merely academic. It is also unsurprising that in most cases respondents who expressed greater faith in democratic principles and performance are identified with the side of the

Table 4.10: Accounting for Left-Right Orientations in New Democracies

	additional contribution of full model	total variance explained*
South Korea	3.2%	8.5%
Philippines	4.7%	5.3%
Taiwan	5.5%	10.2%
Macedonia	6.6%	7.6%
Indonesia	7.3%	14.0%
Latvia	8.1%	9.1%
Croatia	10.0%	11.4%
Bosnia	11.5%	12.5%
Romania	12.7%	15.2%
Estonia	13.6%	16.8%
Slovenia	13.8%	15.9%
Hungary	14.3%	15.1%
Slovakia	17.5%	17.7%
Serbia	19.4%	25.1%
Poland	22.5%	23.8%
Albania	26.5%	27.7%
Lithuania	32.1%	34.0%
Bulgaria	33.9%	38.8%
Czech Republic	36.1%	41.1%

* include variance explained by demographic variables

left-right spectrum opposite to the professed ideological foundation underpinning past authoritarian rule, though there are a few notable exceptions (e.g., Bosnia, the Philippines).

We can also conclude based on results discussed above that left and right are no less well-structured in CEE and Balkan new democracies than in established western democracies. But whereas these spatial semantics are defined primarily by economic (confidence in unions, state role in the economy) and post-materialist issues (especially direct political participation) in Western Europe, assessment of past and present regimes constitute the most salient political cleavage in former communist states, sometimes supplemented by attitudes toward religious institutions. Whether the overwhelmingly important regime divide currently shaping public understanding of left and right will gradually fade as a new generation with no experience or memory

of communist rule ascends the political stage provides an important topic for future research. In the meantime, the preceding analysis raises questions about the utility of the left-right schema in East Asian countries, since respondents' self-placements along the spatial spectrum do not appear firmly rooted in attitudes toward any set of issues.

One can make a normative argument that the less impact opinion on democratic performance and (especially) regime type choice has on left-right orientations, the more firmly rooted democracy is, since both sides of the political spectrum have come to accept its legitimacy and suitability. Evidence from most Western European states seems to support this assertion. Yet one should exercise some caution in treating the absence of a cleavage over democracy as either a necessary or sufficient condition for democratic consolidation. Looking at the full model, countries where none of the democratic principle or performance variables retain significance after controlling for other sets of factors are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. One may assert that CEE countries on this list are among the more successful examples of democratic transition, but the same claim appears more problematic for some Balkan cases.

Making contrasts across regions, one of the more striking findings is the low explanatory leverage of each cluster of variables for East Asian cases even by the modest standard of new democracies. This is particularly ironic when one recalls the high left-right cognition rate in this region. One possible explanation is that while ideological labels are not anchored in economic, social, or regime divides, they nevertheless remain meaningful by encapsulating views on other important dimensions of policy contestation. For example, debates over security policy or the scope of national sovereignty may be salient in a region where tensions from the Cold War era still linger and separatist movements continue to pose a challenge to central government authority. The national pride question in the WVS survey does not seem to capture these potential axes of competition; in fact it would be difficult for any cross-national survey to design questionnaire items that adequately reflect these issues. Another, perhaps for straightforward, reasoning is simply that the low variance explained in East Asian countries shows a lack of policy-based structuring, so that publics who profess to recognize left and right labels do not possess a coherent understanding of these terms. One way to gauge the validity of these contrasting propositions is to test the level of left-right voting, analyzed in the next chapter.

Analyzing cognition and contents of the left-right schema in new democracies

reveals interesting insights into the utility – and limits – of applying this concept of Western origin to broader contexts. Moreover, results from East Asian cases in particular hint at the possibility that labels of left and right may not have equal absorptive capacity over the same set of issues in different regions. Finally, in addition to knowing left and right and attaching some definition to these terms, one cannot speak of this schema as politically meaningful unless it influences actual behavior. Chapter five takes up this task by testing the relationship between left-right orientations and party choice.

Chapter 5: Left-Right Orientations and Party Choice

The preceding two chapters have explored factors anchoring how publics in new democracies in Central Europe, Balkans, and East Asia understand left and right, showing substantial variations both between and within each region. In order to further validate the heuristic value of the schema, it is necessary to demonstrate that in addition to recognizing and attaching meaning to these spatial labels, citizens also follow patterns of behavior consistent with their left-right orientations, that is, citizens' ideological preferences guiding their political action. This chapter examines this question, focusing on how left-right orientations influence individual behavior with regard to the most common form of political participation, namely voting. Specifically, I investigate the degree to which vote choice in new democracies is associated with objective measures of party locations along the left-right spectrum. In addition to left-right cognition and understanding, the extent to which publics opt for ideologically proximate parties (henceforth left-right voting) constitute an important test of the utility of spatial heuristics. I also explore the congruence between publics' and governments' left-right positions to assess whether electorates' aggregate preferences are reflected in decision-making authorities.

Left-Right Orientations and Vote Choice

Many empirical works on the left-right dimension emphasize a partisan element underlying the schema. For example, Inglehart and Klingemann's seminal study finds that partisan component is stronger than ideological leanings in shaping left-right orientations (1976:260, 269), a tendency particularly notable among less politically sophisticated citizens. Although later works point to the decline of this partisan influence (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989:232), it stills plays a predominant role in how publics locate themselves in the political space, especially in countries with fewer parties (Knutsen 1997:199-200, 210). While general consensus exists that perceptions of left and right are related, but not equivalent, to partisan preferences (Pierce 1981:133; see also Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993, Knutsen 1997), there has been a continuous debate over the direction of causation between party identification and left-right orientations.

Similar to studies on the left-right schema described in chapter 3, many early works on party identification focused on the role of social structural factors such as

class as determinants of vote choice. However, with increasing proportions of electorates in established democracies professing no partisan affiliation (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Franklin et al. 1992), one can reasonably expect that issue preferences, and by implication left-right orientations which encapsulate them, would come to exert greater influence when voters decide which party or candidate to support (e.g., . Updating Franklin et al.'s study, Van der Brug finds that "in the period between 1989 and 2004 left-right distance had a substantially stronger effect on party preferences than religion and social class," and that the level of structural voting in new Eastern European democracies is similar to the West (2010:595-6). Numerous other scholars also document the strong impact of the left-right schema in shaping the behavior of both parties and voters (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann 1989; Hix 1999; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). At the same time, one can infer from studies identifying ideological convergence among parties (Kirchheimer 1966; Thomas 1980) that a centripetal tendency blurs partisan distinctions and thus renders the task of choosing spatially proximate parties more cognitively demanding.

While the direction of the causal arrow between party identification and left-right orientations may vary from one country to another, in the context of new democracies, we lean toward the proposition that left-right orientations are more likely to be causally prior. This assumption derives from two interrelated facts: First, publics in new democracies could hardly have developed and consolidated party identification where party systems did not exist, whereas labels of left and right were not unfamiliar terms during authoritarian rule (even if only for propaganda purposes).[55] Second, in the period immediately after transition to democracy, voters were often faced with a large range of parties to choose from, but had little information concerning specific policies each party espoused. Thus voters had reason to resort to the generic and simplifying device of the left-right schema as a criteria for selecting among unfamiliar choices.

Another crucial prerequisite is that citizens can distinguish among policy packages different parties offer, a condition confirmed by Rohrschneider and Whitefield's conclusion of "programmatic consistency to party competition" under which "issue positions are connected in predictable and stable ways" in former

[55] However, Freire argues that the formation of left-right orientations among publics depends on an environment allowing free, plural party competition (2008:198).

communist countries (2009:681).[56] Furthermore, Miller et al. show that citizens' attitudes toward parties are associated with stable policy preferences rather than more ephemeral factors such as personality (2000:486). Evidence of programmatic party competition provided by these studies leads us to expect that Sartori's observation that citizens vote for the party (perceived as) closest on the left-right scale (1976:388; see also Granberg and Holmberg 1988) is applicable in countries with nascent party systems. Brader and Tucker (2001), Kitschelt et al. (1999), and Tworzecki (2003) all confirm the ability of Eastern European voters to both identify ideologies and support parties whose ideologies are closest to their own. Tavits shows that even for new parties, which by definition lack track records to which voters can refer when judging their left-right locations, spatial distance significantly predicts levels of support (2008:64). Evans and Whitefield (1998) demonstrate a strengthening linkage between left-right orientations and party support as voters become more familiar with parties.

In contrast to the ex-communist bloc, thematic studies comparing East Asian new democracies are conspicuous by their absence.[57] Clarity and consistency of programmatic differences among parties help voters utilize left-right distance as a determinant of vote choice, but this prerequisite is often not met in East Asian countries. For example, parties in South Korea "have consciously avoided taking positions on socioeconomic issues" and focused on party leaders instead (Kim 2000; see also Kong 2000). In addition, the mode of democratic transition did not mark a clean break with the past (S. Lee, 2007), thus obscuring the regime divide so manifest in Eastern Europe. Issues relating to democratization and the need to end one-party dominance attracted attention in Taiwan during the immediate post-transition period (Cooper 1998), but did not remain salient for long. Parties in the Philippines lack doctrinal cohesion and run candidate- rather than policy-centered campaigns (Landé and Waxman 1996; Putzel 1999). A "reluctance of Indonesians to form parties of the left or the right" (Mujani and Liddle 2010:46) completes the picture of a region where one does not expect high levels of left-right voting.[58] Dalton and Tanaka's (2007)

[56] Tavits and Letki (2009) show that in Eastern Europe, it is leftist parties that are more committed to pursuing fiscal austerity and tighter budgets when in power. Their generalizable conclusion is counter-intuitive, but it does not contradict the assumption that parties are programmatically consistent.

[57] A notable feature of volumes studying democracy and party systems in this region is their organization of chapters by country rather than topic (e.g., Diamond and Plattner 1998; Hsieh and Newman 2002).

[58] The impact of left-right orientations on voting behavior in new democracies in other parts of the world is also subject to debate. In Latin American cases, for example, Seligson (2007) finds a significant relationship between survey respondents' left-right self-placements and which party they

study on left-right party locations in East Asian countries as identified by the public shows a relatively narrow ideological range for the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan during the period proximate to the WVS survey date. This makes the task of differentiating parties, and thus choosing among them based on ideological propinquity, more difficult.

One important caveat lies in the possibility of mismatch between parties' perceived and actual policy stances. While such incongruence may occur in all competitive party systems, the probability is likely to be higher in new democracies where voters have not had sufficient opportunities to evaluate a given party's policy promises or performance. In other words, voters may have greater difficulty accurately discerning the locations of new parties along the left-right spectrum. We also expect that smaller parties, which usually receive less media coverage, present voters with a greater challenge in terms of spatial placement.

In chapter 2 I showed that cognition of the left-right schema within each country can be affected by age and, most frequently, education. The logic behind these results, namely experience and cognitive capacity, may also make a difference in the extent to which voters taking ideological propinquity into account when choosing a party. In a seminal study more than a quarter century ago Klingemann (1979b) identifies education and political interest as main determinants of ideological conceptualization, and later works confirm the crucial importance of political sophistication for left-right voting (e.g., Ensley 2007; Palfrey and Poole 1987; Pattie and Johnston 2001; Zaller 1992). Using more recent cross-national data, Kroh (2009) confirms that education and political knowledge facilitates left-right voting.[59] Similarly, Jacoby (1986) finds that while less sophisticated voters rely on concrete references, ideological labels carry greater weight among more sophisticated segments of the electorate. Segments of the electorate who pay more attention to politics, and who identify with a party, are more likely to understand and follow ideological cues when they go to the polling booth.[60]

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vote for, and Azpuru (2010) confirms this in a longitudinal case study. However, Echegaray (2005) argues that ideology only plays a marginal role, a view corroborated in single-country studies by Domínguez and McCann (1995) and Weyland (2003).

[59] Stressing how polarization strengthens the impact of ideology on vote choice, Lachat (2008) concludes that "the level of political sophistication and party identification condition voters' responsiveness to this contextual factor."

[60] While not a topic examined in this study, electoral rules may partially account for differences in levels of left-right voting among countries. For example, Klingemann and Wessels (2009) point out that ideological distance is more important for the choice of party lists than choice of candidates.

Left-Right Congruence between Publics and Governments

A separate albeit related measure of the impact of left-right orientations on election outcomes is the extent of match between publics' and governments' ideological positions. This indicates the degree to which citizens' aggregate left-right preferences are reflected in policy-making bodies. The degree of congruence between publics and their governments carries important implications for the functioning of democracy, since "the responsiveness of government policy to citizens' preferences is a central concern in normative democratic theory" (Page and Shapiro 1983:175; see also Miller et al. 1999; Shapiro et al. 2009). While early studies of this topic mostly focus on agreement or otherwise between individual legislators and their constituents (most notably Miller and Stokes 1963; see also Jackson and King 1989; Shapiro et al. 1990), it is the degree of congruence between parties and voters that carries greater implications for the quality of policy representation, and a party's positions usually match those of its supporters (Converse and Pierce 1986; Iversen 1994; Powell 1982; Przeworski et al. 1999).

A large volume of literature investigating the impact of electoral rules on representation has developed in recent years. While some scholars find proportional rules lead to better representation than majoritarian systems (Budge and McDonald 2007; Powell 2006; Powell and Vanberg 2000), others report that institutional differences have little net impact on congruence (Blais and Bodet 2006).[61] Golder and Stramski (2010) distinguish between congruence at legislative and executive levels, and find that while the distance separating citizens and legislatures is smaller under proportional systems, there is "no significant difference in the level of ideological congruence between citizens and their governments in proportional and majoritarian democracies" (2010:104). Following this conclusion, and also on account of having limited variation within the sample of countries, I do not treat countries with proportional and majoritarian rules separately in the analysis below.

Ideological congruence can serve as an indicator of policy responsiveness to aggregate left-right preferences. Theories of responsible party government (e.g., Adams 2001; Blondel and Cotta 2000; Castles and Wildenmann 1986; Converse and Pierce 1986) rests mainly on three fundamental conditions: first, parties present

[61] Powell (2009) argues that these divergent findings are due to the period effects, specifically that congruence is more weakly related to electoral rules today than in the past.

different policy alternatives; second, voters choose parties which are closest to their own policy preferences; and third, parties possess the cohesion and discipline to enact their policy promises if they acquire power (Thomassen 1994:251-2).[62] Based on these propositions, one can hypothesize that higher levels of left-right voting correspond to closer programmatic congruence between voters and the governments they elect, provided that the proportion of seats parties receive accurately reflect their vote shares.[63] It also warrants noting that voter-government congruence should be higher where voters are presented with clearer choices in terms of distinctions among parties (Wessels and Schmitt 2008). However, Powell (2011) hypothesizes that greater party system polarization reduces congruence because the position of the plurality or median legislative party that forms or participates in government is likely to be more distant from the median voter.

As evidence that ideological congruence shape voter-party linkages, studies have shown that in established European democracies, a party's voters and elites share similarities in both left-right positions and preferences on specific issues (Holmberg 2000; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Moreover, Dalton et al. (2010) report that post-election governments match voters' left-right positioning much more closely than pre-election governments not only in Western Europe but also many new democracies covered in this study. These findings lend support to the proposition that voters choose a party on the basis of policy agreement, and are likely to decide whether to continue supporting this party by assessing its willingness and ability to fulfill its programmatic promises (if it enters government). This places a constraint on parties, and therefore governments, which may be tempted for non-policy reasons to seek radical departures from the platforms they present to voters at election time. However, the match between the views of a party's leaders and supporters varies across policies areas (Dalton 1988). Instead of examining specific issues, I follow Huber and Powell (1994:293) in using the left-right dimension as a common benchmark for measuring voter-elite congruence, since studies have shown a stronger voter-party correspondence in left-right terms than on individual policies such as employment and

[62] One can also include the specific criterion that voters must have both clear preferences and sufficient knowledge to differentiate among party programs.

[63] This proposition might not be valid if governments comprise of parties which form a coalition solely for office-seeking purposes. However, Warwick (2001) demonstrates a close correspondence between the left-right positions of coalition governments and the positions of individual coalition members, suggesting that the coalition formation process results in ideologically cohesive governments that voters can identify in left-right terms.

border control (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997:177-80; see also Holmberg 1997).

Many scholars who follow this approach compare mass and elite surveys to gauge the degree of congruence (e.g., Belchoir 2010; Dalton 1988; Holmberg 2000; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997).[64] In the absence of data on elite views, we turn to coding of party positions by country experts in surveys conducted by Benoit and Laver (2006). These data were collected during the early 2000s, which closely correspond to the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) used in this study, thus obviating concerns regarding shifts in party positions between the two survey dates. Following Huber and Powell (1994), we investigate whether the collective left-right orientations of the electorate are mirrored by government positions. A model of responsible party government entailing parties presenting alternative policy packages and voters choosing the party closest to their own issue preferences would lead us to expect an electorate with a left-leaning mean position should seek representation by a leftist government, and the same on the right.

Measuring Party Positions on the Left-Right Scale

We need to identify the left-right position of both citizens and their governments to test the degree of ideological congruence. Since left-right locations are "the single most important indicator of party policy" (Klingemann et al. 2006:3), it comes as little surprise that questions regarding the most appropriate measure of parties' left-right position have created a sub-discipline of its own. The three common methods involve 1) public surveys, 2) expert judgments, 3) party manifesto coding. The reliability of the first method depends heavily on voters' political sophistication and familiarity with various actors on the electoral scene, which imposes a challenge particular in countries with new or volatile party systems. Also, party identifiers are susceptible to projection and persuasion effects (Feldman and Conover 1983; Visser 1994) which may artificially narrows the left-right distance between a voter and her preferred party. In addition, McDonald and Budge point out that "voters in surveys report that they are on the left, in the centre, or on the right within the context of their own country's political space, rendering their self-placements suspect for any comparative analysis"

[64] However, this approach raises doubts that party positions identified by the two groups are "not conceptually analogous", i.e. voters and elites do not necessarily perceive either the contours of policy spaces or parties' stances on various issues through a similar lens. In addition, for any given party, the range of its supporters' views usually exceeds that of its leaders, thus reflecting different distributions (Pierce 1999:14).

(2005:115). Nevertheless, even programmatically oriented voters are unlikely to consult experts or analyze party manifestos before marking their ballots, but instead consider the *perceived* ideological distance between themselves and various parties. If such subjective perceptions guide vote choice, it makes sense to measure party positions through public surveys.

Expert surveys avert concerns over politically unsophisticated publics. Furthermore, it is much more probable that experts would exercise their judgment with reference to a supranational common theoretical frame shard than even the most politically engaged voters could. Castles and Mair's (1984) pioneering work demonstrates the comparability of parties' left-right positions across many established European democracies. Huber and Inglehart (1995) extend this method to a larger sample, including a number of new democracies, and report commonalities in expert interpretations of what left and right stand for in diverse regions, most importantly the salience of economic issues. Laver and Hunt (1992) conduct a comprehensive expert survey on both a wide range of issues and the relative salience of different policies. Noting the absence of a single "true" dimensionality structuring the policy space of any country, Benoit and Laver asked experts to locate parties on a number of potentially salient issues in order to "identify and measure the main axes of political competition in each country… based on patterns of correlation between party positions on different policy dimensions" (2006:103). However, scholars have drawn attention to some limitations to expert surveys, including logistical problems of infrequency and lack of uniform questionnaire format and, of greater theoretical concern, that this approach "depends too much on parties' long-term reputations" and therefore "lack important variation" over time (Klingemann et al. 2006:83).[65]

Coding of party manifestos has become the most widely used method of measuring parties' left-right positions, as advocates of this method argue that it yields more impartial indicators and presents the "only (comparable) means of estimating party left-right positions over a long time period in a large number of countries" (Gabel and Huber 2000:95). With the availability of data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), a large volume of work began identifying a common left-right dimension through factor or principal components analysis (e.g. Bowler 1990; Budge and Robertson 1987; Laver and Budge 1992; Warwick 1992). Also using

[65] For a comparison of identifying parties' left-right position through expert survey and coding of party manifestos, see Benoit and Laver (2007).

CMP data, Kim and Fording (1998) argue that a common dimension that permits comparison of party ideology can also apply to the measurement of voter ideology. Specific steps devised to calculate party positions vary: Budge et al. (1987) conduct a two-step factor analysis, starting with seven policy domains from each of which one or two factors are extracted. Laver and Budge (1992) utilize principal component analyses to identify twenty policy dimensions, and subtract the score from a "left scale" thus constructed from a "right scale". Gabel and Huber (2000) propose a "vanilla" method which factor analyzes all issues to extra a common "super-issue". Other variations include Klingemann's (1995) analysis which includes domestic issues only, and Franzmann and Kaiser's (2006) distinction between positional and valence issues.

Lack of consensus on methods to measure parties' left-right positions through manifesto coding reflects the fact that the CMP project "set out to measure the *relative emphasis* placed on an issue by a party in a manifesto, not the party's *substantive position* on this issue" (Laver and Garry 2000:620; original italics). If manifestos are primarily about valence issues (Robertson 1987:50-1), or characterized by parties selectively emphasizing different issues (Budge 2001: 221), one can question the accuracy of deriving left-right positions from manifesto contents.[66] Parties often use manifestos as a means of projecting a favorable image of itself in an attempt to expand its base of support. Thus one can easily imagine, for example, that a party with an established reputation of extremism would stress policies that make it seem moderate to the electorate, in the knowledge that support from its extremist core constituency can be taken for granted (Bartolini and Mair 1990:199). Another problem involves the discrepancy between party rankings from left to right derived from CMP data and how voters and experts view the party system, an inconsistency referred to as lack of face validity (e.g., Dinas and Gemenis 2010; Hug and Schulz 2007; Pelizzo 2003). Other works report relatively low correlations between manifesto-based estimates of party positions and left-right indicators obtained through expert surveys (Klingemann et al. 2006:77-9; see also Benoit and Laver 2007) or computerized word scores (Budge and Pennings 2007).

Methods

[66] Pelizzo (2003) argues that scores derived from manifesto coding measure not party position but rather party movement.

With this in mind, we proceed to examine the extent to which individuals' left-right self-placement affects party choice. The WVS contains a question on which party respondents would vote for if an election were held tomorrow. For each party, I establish its left-right position by the "objective" measure taken from the aforementioned expert survey (Benoit and Laver 2006). Country experts were asked to rate parties on a scale of 1 to 20, both in generic left-right terms and on specific policies. We convert the generic expert scores to the same scale used in WVS. I use the formula LRwvs = [(LRexp – 1) / 19 * 9] + 1, where LRwvs is the ten-point left-right scale for WVS and LRexp is the twenty-point scale marked by experts, so that 1, 10.5 (midpoint), and 20 on the expert survey translate to 1, 5.5 (midpoint), and 10, respectively, on the measure used below.[67]

Since expert surveys were not conducted in any East Asian case in our sample, we use a measure from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset as a substitute. Respondents were asked to rate each party on a left-right scale, and I convert the average placement to a ten-point scale compatible with WVS data. While using the evaluation of experts and general publics rests on different theoretical foundations, empirically these two measures yield very similar results. For example, the correlation between expert and public evaluations in the eleven Western European countries where a CSES survey (module 2) was carried out[68] is a remarkable 0.991, and in the seven out of fifteen former communist countries[69] the equivalent figure is 0.968. This suggests that the substitution of public assessments for expert judgments in three East Asian cases (no CSES data is available for Indonesia) is justifiable on pragmatic grounds to ensure comparability of results.

For each country, we measure respondents' left-right orientations against objectively identified locations for the party they supported, and compute the level of left-right voting in each country by correlating their left-right self-placements with

[67] Taking party name changes or mergers into account, in almost all cases most parties for which respondents indicated an intention to vote for can be matched with parties listed on expert surveys. The total percentage of votes for these matched parties are as follows: CEE region – Czech Republic (89.2), Estonia (85.5), Hungary (91.5), Lithuania (88.6), Poland (85.4), Slovakia (87.4), Slovenia (90.0); Balkan region – Albania (89.3), Bosnia (89.0), Bulgaria (89.2), Croatia (91.5), Macedonia (92.0), Romania (84.6), Serbia (92.4). Unfortunately the equivalent figure in Latvia is only 45.2 percent, meaning that most parties that respondents supported cannot be matched with the expert survey, so this country is not included in the analysis below.

[68] Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.

[69] Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia.

expert scores for the parties they intended to vote for.[70] In addition to the electorate as a whole, we divide each national sample into dichotomous age and education categories to test the effect of period of socialization and cognitive capacity on the degree to which voters opt for ideologically proximate parties. Since education bolsters ideological conceptualization, we anticipate a closer association between left-right self-placement and party choice among the highly educated strata, defined as respondents who have at least completed secondary school. Age may have a contrasting impact in older and newer democracies: where among the former group of countries older cohorts may be characterized by closer ideology-party ties due to decades-long observation of (and participation in) party competition, their counterparts in transitional societies lack similar experiences.

It is necessary to point out an important limitation of this procedure, namely that not all parties for which respondents expressed voting intention in the WVS are included in the expert survey. In most countries, major parties capturing a large majority of votes are included in each survey, though in a few cases the emergence of new parties or the disappearance of previously existing parties means that no match between the two dataset can be identified. The proximate dates between the WVS and expert surveys should provide reassurance that party positions did not alter significantly during the period between these two surveys.

We use the same expert surveys to identify the position of governments in office during the survey period on the left-right scale. For single-party governments, this position is simply that of the governing party; in cases of coalition governments, we calculate a position by averaging the locations of all participating parties for which expert coding is available, weighted by each partner's seat share as a proportion of all seats controlled by the coalition.[71] Note that this calculation does not take the number of coalition seats as a proportion of the entire legislature into account, since we are only interested in the left-right position of the government.[72] Bosnia is excluded from

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[70] This procedure necessarily excludes respondents who expressed no party support, but this should have no bearing on overall levels of left-right voting in each country because this segment of the electorate is the least likely to turn out.

[71] For example, the coalition government in Estonia formed after the 1999 election comprised of the Fatherland Union (Pro Patria; 18 seats), Reform Party (17 seats), and Moderates (17 seats), together controlling 53 out of 101 seats in parliament. Using the aforementioned conversion formula, expert scores for these parties are 7.2, 9.7, and 4.8 on the left-right scale, respectively. We can calculate the government position as follows: [(18 * 7.2) + (18 * 9.7) + (17 * 4.8)] / 53 = 7.3.

[72] Expert coding is not available for a number of small government parties or parties that subsequently disappeared or merged with others. For example, the mean government left-right position in France

the analysis because the country is effectively governed as two separate political units where party systems do not resemble one another (in contrast to Belgium, where party families are easily identifiable despite distinct party systems), and both the rotating presidency and cabinets are formed on the basis of legally stipulated inter-ethnic collaboration rather than ideological common ground.

Findings: levels of left-right voting in old and new European democracies

To what extent are left-right orientations associated with vote choice? The left panel in table 5.1 shows correlations between respondents' left-right self-placements and the expert-judged locations of parties each respondent supported in the EU 15 states. One should note that experts and publics did not necessarily *place* parties in the same positions on the left-right scale.[73] However, what is important for this study, and for voters who take ideological proximity into consideration when casting their ballots, is that parties are similarly *ranked* along the left-right spectrum.

Another important observation is the large between-country variations in levels of left-right voting, ranging from Sweden where individual positions on the ideological spectrum offer a reliable guide in predicting party choice, to Ireland where such relationship is largely absent. It lies beyond the scope of this study to investigate factors behind differences in the strength of voter-party ideological linkages, but it is not difficult to surmise that countries where parties are clearly identified as belonging to one side or another of the left-right demarcation see higher correlation coefficients.[74] For example, governments in Sweden always comprise either the "bourgeois" parties on the right or the Social Democrats (at times supported by the Left and Green parties) on the left, and coalitions spanning the ideological divide are not considered realistic. The same can be said for France, where a (semi-)presidential system encourages bipolarization, and Italy and Spain, which saw party system consolidation between right and left parties/coalitions at the expense of centrist alternatives.

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does not include the Radical Party of the Left (PRG) and the Citizen and Republican Movement (MRC), and calculation for Slovakia does not include the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). Since these excluded parties are minor coalition partners, their omission should not significantly affect the calculation of mean coalition position.

[73] This highlights a tendency for electorates to perceive parties as less extreme than experts do. Examples include Agalev and Vlaams Blok in Belgium and the Communist Party and Greens (though not the National Front) in France.

[74] Dalton (2008, 2011) shows that the extent of voting based on ideological proximity is positively correlated with the degree of party system polarization.

Table 5.1: Left-Right Voting

Austria	0.43	Czech Republic	0.72
Belgium	0.45	Estonia	0.23
Denmark	0.60	Hungary	0.41
Finland	0.70	Lithuania	0.34
France	0.67	Poland	0.55
Germany	0.55	Slovakia	0.43
Greece	0.70	Slovenia	0.42
Ireland	0.23	*average*	*0.44*
Italy	0.73		
Luxembourg	0.38	Albania	0.73
Netherlands	0.59	Bosnia	0.31
Portugal	0.54	Bulgaria	0.66
Spain	0.65	Croatia	0.34
Sweden	0.75	Macedonia	0.29
UK	0.40	Romania	0.32
average	*0.56*	Serbia	0.29
		average	*0.42*
		Philippines	0.02
		South Korea	0.19
		Taiwan	0.30
		average	*0.17*

Note: Entrees are correlations between respondents' left-right self-placement and expert-judged score for the party each respondent supported; same for tables 5.2-5.4

In contrast, in countries where party competition is mainly structured by cleavages not associated with the left-right schema, such as the legacy of the civil war in Ireland and language rights and regional autonomy in Belgium, lower congruence between voters' and parties' left-right positions is unsurprising. The exception of Britain may be attributable to Labour and Liberal Democrats exchanging their left-right positions, causing some confusion in voters' minds. The low correlation in Austria is probably accounted for by the fact that while experts placed the Freedom Party (FPÖ) well to the right of the People's Party (ÖVP), the medians and ranges of their supporters' self-placements are essentially indistinguishable. In the case of Luxembourg, one possible explanation for lower left-right voting than what one may expect is the discrepancy between the Democratic Party's (DP) placement by experts (rightist) and its own voters (centrist). One should also note that among Western

European countries, ideologically inspired voting behavior is quite high in two out of three countries that experienced transition from authoritarianism within the last half-century, Greece and Spain, demonstrating that shorter democratic experience needs not deter publics from identifying and choosing parties based on spatial propinquity.

Compared with EU 15 countries, the right panel of table 5.1 reveals that left-right orientations constitute a less effective guide for vote choice in most ex-communist new democracies. With the exceptions of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Poland, knowing voters' left-right self-placements is of limited value in helping one predict how they might mark their ballot. Citizens in new democracies are no less capable of identifying where parties stand than their Western European counterparts despite having less experience with competitive elections and parties. The difference lies in the extent to which they utilize this information as voting cues. Interestingly, and in contrast to most Western European cases, where sizeable discrepancies between expert and public party placements are observed, it is not always the former who identified parties as taking more extreme positions. For example, voters supporting the Democratic Party in Albania on average placed their party more than a full point to the right than experts did, and the same is true for the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in Poland on the left side of the spectrum.

The utility of left-right labels as heuristics corresponds with the availability of parties, particularly parties in a position to form cabinets, which voters can identify on both sides of the spectrum. Voters have a clearer choice when they perceive greater difference between leading parties, and probably find left-right voting more daunting when the main competitors are seen as relatively centrist, that is, less clearly distinguished from one another in ideological and programmatic terms. In each of the four countries with the highest level of left-right voting, major parties anchor both left and right: the Socialist Party and Democratic Party in Albania; the Bulgarian Socialist Party and Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria; the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) and Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic; the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in Poland. Except for the KCSM, all these parties were the most or second-most popular parties cited by survey respondents. In contrast, the utility of left-right orientations for voting behavior is noticeably lower where the largest party was perceived as centrist, such as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the Center Union and Liberal Union in

Lithuania, and the Social Democratic Party (PDSR) in Romania, and where one side of the spectrum was not represented by any major party at all from voters' viewpoints, as exemplified by the absence of a large leftist party in Croatia and Estonia, and of a large rightist party in Serbia.

It is worth noting that parties often categorized as radical right, such as the Greater Romania Party (PRM), are often not perceived as such by their electorate, though the paucity of cases precludes generalization. This offers one possible explanation for the lower voter-party ideological linkage in many new democracies: some parties, particularly those advocating nationalist or minority ethnic agendas, do not always easily fit into the left-right schema as seen by many voters. In the context of former communist countries, the persistence of the regime cleavage (as discussed in the previous chapter) may result in dissonance between past history and current program. For instance, judging on the basis of party policy alone, experts placed the small Labor Union (UP) in Poland toward the left end of the spectrum, but the public, probably taking the party's partial origins in the Solidarity movement into account, saw it as much closer to the center. Similar discrepancy can be expected for successors to former regime parties which adopted authoritarian, nationalist stances (for example, the Serbian Socialist Party), with publics likely to perceive them as left-wing on account of their origins while experts may place them further toward the center or even center-right on programmatic grounds.

Finally, former communist countries where vote choice is more closely related to the degree of match between self- and party placements on the left-right spectrum are the ones where spatial semantics are best explained by publics' policy preferences. Referring back to table 4.9 in chapter 4, countries for which the full model explains the greatest amount of variance in individual left-right orientations are precisely those where we find the highest correlations on the right panel of table 5.1 – the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Albania, and Poland. The exception of Serbia is probably due to the fact that the majority of Serbian voters in the WVS survey indicated an intention to vote for the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which was an amalgam of opposition forces that blurred ideological differences rather than a single party. The explanation of party changes applies to Lithuania, the other exception, where party mergers which took place between the mass and expert survey dates, meaning that the correlation is probably artificially deflated due to temporal discrepancy. In contrast, where left and right are less structured by attitudes (e.g., Croatia, Macedonia), the ideological linkage

between voters and parties is much weaker. This allows us to deduce that, if data for East Asian new democracies were available, one is unlikely to find electorates in these countries relying on left-right proximity as an important cue for vote choice.

The three Asian cases are notable for very low levels of left-right voting. Taiwan, where ideological self-placement has some impact on vote choice, is comparable to ex-Yugoslav republics (except Slovenia) where left-right orientations exert limited influence. Spatial labels provide little guidance to voters in South Korea, and none at all in the Philippines. It should be noted that since voting intention was not asked in the fourth wave WVS questionnaire in South Korea in 2001, the result reported here is taken from the fifth wave conducted in 2005. This is an important distinction, since the Korean political landscape underwent a dramatic overhaul during this interval due to the formation and electoral success of the Uri party. This development seemingly clarified most parties' left-right profiles and widened a previously crowded ideological space, but we see scarce evidence that left-right orientations have consequently become a major determinant of vote choice. The Philippine case typifies what Sanchez (2009) describes as a party non-system, where party competition is amorphous and largely non-programmatic, thus rendering standard taxonomies such as ideological distance irrelevant. Left-right voting cannot take place where the public is unable to discern party stances.

Comparing correlations shown for new democracies in table 5.1 also suggests that the mode and pace of political and economic change probably did not play a decisive role in shaping publics' propensity for following ideological cues at the ballot box. Countries whose democratic credentials (Croatia, Serbia, Slovakia) or even national sovereignty (Bosnia, Macedonia, Taiwan) were in doubt all display low levels of left-right voting, but the same is true in a country often portrayed as a great transition success story, Estonia. Furthermore, Bulgaria, which did not make sufficient progress to gain European Union accession at the same time as the eight CEE countries, and even more starkly, Albania, where widespread riots shook the foundations of government as late as 1997 (only a few years before the survey date), both saw higher levels of ideologically consistent voting behavior comparable to (in fact often exceeding) established democracies in Western Europe.

Next, we proceed to the question of whether the extent of congruence between voter ideology and party choice varies systematically by age, education, and level of political interest. For the former variable, we divide respondents into two categories

of above and below 40. Since surveys in ex-communist new democracies were conducted approximately a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, respondents older than age 40 had spent most of lives under communist rule, whereas young cohorts saw at least half of their adult lives in a post-communist setting.[75] While a dichotomous classification of age is necessarily a crude measure, in view of the small number of respondents who indicated both their ideological self-placement and voting intention (particularly among the young in CEE countries), a more precise categorization by cohort risks insufficient sample sizes. Similarly, we create two education categories, one for respondents who had schooling up to technical or vocational secondary school, the other for those receiving higher degrees. While the

Table 5.2: Left-Right Voting by Age

	old	young		old	young
Austria	0.43	0.44	Czech Republic	0.75	0.63
Belgium	0.42	0.48	Estonia	0.24	0.22
Denmark	0.62	0.58	Hungary	0.46	0.32
Finland	0.75	0.64	Lithuania	0.42	0.29
France	0.69	0.61	Poland	0.62	0.43
Germany	0.54	0.55	Slovakia	0.46	0.40
Greece	0.74	0.68	Slovenia	0.47	0.31
Ireland	0.22	0.19	*average*	*0.49*	*0.37*
Italy	0.70	0.76			
Luxembourg	0.45	0.27	Albania	0.75	0.72
Netherlands	0.63	0.53	Bosnia	0.35	0.27
Portugal	0.58	0.49	Bulgaria	0.73	0.40
Spain	0.62	0.68	Croatia	0.30	0.40
Sweden	0.70	0.83	Macedonia	0.30	0.29
UK	0.43	0.30	Romania	0.39	0.19
average	*0.57*	*0.53*	Serbia	0.38	0.11
			average	*0.46*	*0.34*
			Philippines	-0.04	0.06
			South Korea	0.17	0.12
Note: old = age 40 and above; young = below 40			Taiwan	0.29	0.29
			average	*0.14*	*0.15*

[75] One should keep in mind that not all countries democratized immediately after the end of the former regime, most notably in the former Yugoslav republics.

structure of education systems varies widely among countries, we follow this division on pragmatic (sample size) grounds.[76] We also create a dichotomous measure of political interest by combining two "interested" and two "disinterested" response categories from the survey.

The left panel of table 5.2 shows the correlation between respondents' left-right placement and the position of their preferred parties in the EU 15 countries by age, while the right panel contains the same information for new democracies. In some established Western democracies such as Finland, Great Britain, and Luxembourg, older voters are much more inclined to rely on ideological cues when choosing a party, while in other cases (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland) little difference separates the two age categories. These variations notwithstanding, respondents with longer experience of electoral politics, which in most cases has featured the same party actors over time, display greater propensity for ideological voting. Longitudinal data is required to determine whether this observation is rooted in a generational or life-cycle effect, but one can probably safely assume that reiterated interaction with parties fosters familiarity and strengthens the voter-party linkage. The exceptional cases where this linkage is stronger among younger cohorts may actually reinforce this proposition, since voters in these countries face either a new party system (Italy), new federal institutions (Belgium), or a new democratic regime (Spain). However, the extent of ideological voting found among Swedish youth – the highest of any cohort in our entire sample – presents a puzzle.

Contrary to expectations, the right column of table 5.2 highlights a much closer relationship between left-right orientations and party choice among older than younger cohorts in ex-communist new democracies, suggesting that despite the absence of political socialization under conditions of free party competition during most of their lifetimes, older voters are nevertheless more likely to utilize distance on the left-right spectrum as a guide to vote choice. Not only does our hypothesis find no support beyond a single case (Croatia; results for the Philippines can be discounted since neither old nor young vote on the basis of left-right distance), the age gap is considerably wider in post-communist countries compared to their Western neighbors. Searching for a plausible explanation to account for age effects on left-right voting in

[76] Demarcating low and high education by whether respondents have received an academic high school diploma or above would leave less than 20% of the sample in the "highly educated" category in 18 out of 30 countries examined here.

East Asia poses a greater challenge, not only because ideological distance has a weak influence on vote choice, but also due to differences within this region.

With the exceptions of Albania, Estonia, Macedonia, and Taiwan, where little difference is found between older and younger voters, in almost all other cases respondents below the age of 40 are significantly less prone to following ideological cues when deciding how to mark their ballot. Bulgaria offers the most striking example of this gap, and in Romania and Serbia, where we also observe sizeable differences between the two groups, labels of left and right do not serve a heuristic function at all for younger voters (correlations do not reach statistical significance at the 95% level). It is also worth noting that the disparity in the utility of left-right positions as guide to party choice among different age groups does not seem to vary as a function of the overall level of ideological voting in a given country.

One plausible explanation for this unexpected finding may lie in the prism through which publics in new democracies place themselves and various parties along the left-right scale. As detailed in chapter 4, evaluations of the former and current regimes exert the most significant influence in structuring left-right orientations among citizens in ex-communist countries. As publics identify their own left-right positioning in relation to the regime divide, it is logical to assume that they would follow the same criteria when locating parties in the political space. Older cohorts with longer and more poignant memories of communist rule likely harbor stronger feelings toward the regime divide, and therefore display greater adherence to parties on their own side of what they deem an entrenched cleavage. In contrast, younger age groups have less experience of communist rule, and (in most countries) none at all of the former regime's most repressive years, so they may be less inclined to vote along this cleavage. If this hypothesis is valid, we expect the importance of left-right proximity as a guide to vote choice to decline with the passage of time – unless and until issues more salient to younger cohorts come to re-define popular understanding of left and right.

Comparing the level of left-right voting by educational level, the left panel of table 5.3 shows considerable differences in most EU 15 countries between respondents with an academic secondary degree or above and those with less schooling. Both the magnitude and consistency of the gaps between the two groups (Finland, France and Greece being the only exceptions), in comparison to differences separating older and younger cohorts, point to an unambiguous confirmation of our

Table 5.3: Left-Right Voting be Education

	low edu	high edu		low edu	high edu
Austria	0.35	0.57	Czech Republic	0.70	0.73
Belgium	0.29	0.53	Estonia	0.22	0.25
Denmark	0.52	0.70	Hungary	0.31	0.58
Finland	0.70	0.72	Lithuania	0.55	0.30
France	0.65	0.69	Poland	0.54	0.55
Germany	0.45	0.61	Slovakia	0.39	0.53
Greece	0.73	0.70	Slovenia	0.25	0.53
Ireland	0.15	0.32	*average*	*0.42*	*0.50*
Italy	0.65	0.79			
Luxembourg	0.31	0.45	Albania	0.72	0.75
Netherlands	0.50	0.66	Bosnia	0.27	0.39
Portugal	0.51	0.63	Bulgaria	0.66	0.60
Spain	0.63	0.69	Croatia	0.26	0.41
Sweden	0.61	0.82	Macedonia	0.27	0.34
UK	0.29	0.45	Romania	0.30	0.32
average	*0.49*	*0.62*	Serbia	0.37	0.21
			average	*0.41*	*0.43*
			Philippines	0.09	-0.01
			South Korea	0.17	0.17
Note: low education = secondary technical school and below			Taiwan	0.29	0.30
			average	*0.18*	*0.15*

hypothesis. One can conclude that in established democracies, cognitive capacity not only increases the probability that respondents can place themselves on the left-right scale, but also the likelihood that these placements correspond to their party choice.

However, the right column in table 5.3 reveals that this conclusion does not apply to several new democracies. While in a number of new democracies highly educated segments of the population are much more inclined to vote for ideologically proximate parties (e.g., Hungary, Slovenia), in many other cases education makes little difference (Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania, South Korea, Taiwan). Most surprisingly, in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Serbia, voters with no more than a technical/vocational secondary degree follow left-right cues more closely than better educated citizens. Overall, the impact of education on ideologically based voting behavior is much smaller – and far less uniform – in new democracies than in Western Europe. This raises an intriguing future research topic on the possibility that it is not

how many years of schooling one has received, but instead what curricula one is taught in schools, which affects individual levels of ideological conceptualization. An ideology-laden education for the purpose of indoctrination probably did little to cultivate students' critical thinking capacity and enable them to distinguish among parties in terms of left-right proximity, hence the smaller (and in a few cases, counter-intuitive) impact of education in most new democracies compared to the EU 15 countries on enhancing voter-party ideological linkage.

Lastly, table 5.4 shows the impact of political interest on the level of left-right voting. In conformity with our hypothesis, in most EU 15 countries (all except Germany and Portugal) respondents professing greater interest in politics are much

Table 5.4: Left-Right Voting by Level of Political Interest

	low interest	high interest		low interest	high interest
Austria	0.26	0.46	Czech Republic	0.69	0.73
Belgium	0.31	0.58	Estonia	N/A	N/A
Denmark	0.37	0.68	Hungary	N/A	N/A
Finland	0.65	0.79	Lithuania	0.54	0.23
France	0.57	0.77	Poland	0.48	0.59
Germany	0.58	0.54	Slovakia	N/A	N/A
Greece	0.67	0.73	Slovenia	0.29	0.48
Ireland	0.16	0.29	*average*	*0.50*	*0.51*
Italy	0.66	0.80			
Luxembourg	0.24	0.46	Albania	0.70	0.79
Netherlands	0.39	0.65	Bosnia	0.27	0.35
Portugal	0.55	0.50	Bulgaria	0.58	0.69
Spain	0.62	0.69	Croatia	N/A	N/A
Sweden			Macedonia	0.18	0.37
UK	0.33	0.45	Romania	N/A	N/A
average	*0.45*	*0.60*	Serbia	0.26	0.32
			average	*0.40*	*0.51*
			Philippines	-0.01	0.04
			South Korea	0.15	0.26
			Taiwan	0.22	0.37
			average	*0.12*	*0.22*

Note: Political interest measured on 4-point scale; "very interested" and "somewhat interested" are combined into "high interest"; "not very interested" and "not interested at all" are combined into "low interest"

more likely to mark their ballots with left-right proximity in mind than those who care little about , and are thus presumably less familiar with, political developments. Political interest is correlated with educational level, so the effects of these two variables likely overlap to some extent (unfortunately sample sizes for each country are too small for testing four separate categories). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in a majority of cases the difference in political interest have a slightly greater influence than the age gap in distinguishing levels of left-right voting.

More politically interested respondents in new democracies are also more likely to vote along left-right lines, but since the question on political interest was not asked in several countries, general conclusions are more difficult to draw. Even if we exclude the obvious outlying case of Lithuania, the interest gap in left-right voting in new democracies is still on average smaller than in Western Europe. A quick glance through the right panel of table 5.4 may suggest that this gap seems wider in countries where the link between respondents' left-right orientation and vote choice is not strong, such as Macedonia, Slovenia, South Korea, and Taiwan; in fact the coefficients for politically disinterested respondents are not statistically significant in Macedonia and South Korea. But results in Bosnia and Serbia contradict this observation. Any attempt at generalization would be precarious due to the limited number of cases.

To verify that the association between individual left-right orientations and parties' left-right positions does not merely reflect socio-demographic influences, I run multivariate regression to explain vote choice with age, gender, education, income, and town size as independent variables in addition to voters' left-right self-placement. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 display results for established and new democracies, respectively. While each socio-demographic factor attains statistical significance in at least one country in both tables, what the results clearly demonstrate is the consistency of left-right orientations. These orientations exert a not only statistically significant but also substantively strong impact on party choice. In a large majority of cases, the standardized coefficient for this variable far exceeds all others. The only exceptions are Estonia and South Korea, where age exerts a slightly greater influence than left-right orientations on vote choice, and the Philippines, where self-placement has no effect at all. In some cases left-right self-placement emerges as the only significant factor (France, Great Britain and Spain in Western Europe; Albania and Slovenia among new democracies). The uniformity of these results demonstrate that, regardless

Table 5.5: Explaining Left-Right Voting in Established Democracies

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland
age	-0.06	0.06	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.06 *	0.07 *	0.11 *
gender	-0.11 ***	-0.06 *	0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.05 *	0.06	0.04
education	-0.14 ***	-0.11 **	-0.05	0.11 ***	-0.02	0.00	0.04	-0.03
income	0.05	0.05	0.09 **	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.08
town size	-0.03	0.04	-0.07 *	-0.01	-0.05	-0.07 **	0.05	-0.18 **
L-R self-placement	0.42 ***	0.44 ***	0.59 ***	0.69 ***	0.66 ***	0.54 ***	0.69 ***	0.20 ***
adjusted R square	0.21	0.21	0.38	0.50	0.44	0.31	0.49	0.09

	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	UK
age	-0.04	0.08	0.09 **	0.13 *	0.01	0.08 **	0.06
gender	-0.08 **	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.06 *	0.03
education	-0.01	-0.07	0.01	0.11	0.07	0.09 **	0.01
income	-0.01	0.12 *	0.07 *	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02
town size	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01	0.06
L-R self-placement	0.72 ***	0.37 ***	0.57 ***	0.54 ***	0.65 ***	0.72 ***	0.38 ***
adjusted R square	0.53	0.15	0.36	0.29	0.42	0.57	0.16

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.005$; $p < 0.01$

Table 5.6: Explaining Left-Right Voting in New Democracies

	Czech Rep	Estonia	Hungary	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
age	-0.14 ***	-0.22 ***	-0.03	-0.07	-0.08 *	0.01	-0.10
gender	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.11 *	0.03	0.07	-0.09
education	0.06 *	0.04	-0.02	0.17 *	-0.04	-0.12 **	-0.07
income	0.01	0.12 *	0.04	0.06	0.04	-0.06	-0.05
town size	0.07 **	0.00	-0.13 **	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.10
L-R self-placement	0.68 ***	0.20 ***	0.40 ***	0.36 ***	0.54 ***	0.44 ***	0.39 ***
adjusted R square	0.55	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.30	0.21	0.19

	Albania	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Romania	Serbia
age	-0.01	-0.07	-0.11 **	0.01	-0.15 **	-0.01	-0.13 **
gender	0.00	0.07	-0.01	0.07	-0.08	-0.01	-0.06
education	0.01	-0.17 ***	0.21 ***	-0.14 **	-0.08	0.21 **	-0.07
income	0.00	0.06	-0.01	-0.09	-0.10	0.09	0.03
town size	0.01	-0.15 ***	0.15 ***	-0.15 **	-0.12 *	-0.05	0.08 *
L-R self-placement	0.73 ***	0.30 ***	0.59 ***	0.32 ***	0.28 ***	0.33 ***	0.27 ***
adjusted R square	0.53	0.15	0.56	0.18	0.14	0.15	0.10

Table 5.6 (continued)

	Philippines	South Korea	Taiwan
age	0.13 **	0.16 ***	0.16 **
gender	-0.07	0.00	0.02
education	0.20 ***	-0.01	0.04
income	0.04	-0.07 *	0.05
town size	-0.07	0.08 **	-0.11 *
L-R self-placement	0.02	0.13 ***	0.27 ***
adjusted R square	0.04	0.07	0.11

Note: standardized coefficients shown; *** p <0.001; ** p <0.005; p <0.01

of the *extent* to which left-right orientations determine voting behavior in each country, they are not mere proxies for socio-demographic characteristics.

Findings: left-right congruence between electorates and governments

In addition to whether voters choose parties on the basis of left-right proximity, another important line of inquiry, tied to the quality of democratic representation, involves the extent to which government positions along the left-right spectrum reflect collective public preferences. In other words, does one find more right- (left-)wing governments in countries where the population as a whole lean toward the right (left)? Correlating aggregate public left-right positions with those of governments in established democracies, at first sight Figure 5.1 suggests that the answer is negative, with a coefficient of -0.179. However, if we exclude the Spanish case as an outlier, the line of central tendency now runs in the expected direction, with a coefficient of 0.298. This suggests that, on an aggregate level, government positions weakly mirror the electorate at the time surveys are conducted in each country. This relationship is strongly influenced by the cases of France, where a Socialist Party-led coalition held the reins of power in a self-proclaimed center-left nation,[77] and Ireland, where the center-right Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat coalition governed one of the most right-leaning publics in Western Europe.

Two other patterns are worth noting: First, and not surprisingly, government

[77] One must keep in mind that France is a semi-presidential system, and the leftist government was in power under *cohabitation* with a rightist president.

stances span a far wider range than average voter positions. Whereas barely one point separate the most right- and leaning publics in the EU 15 countries on a ten-point scale, some governments comprised of parties located toward either end of the spatial spectrum. Second, we observe several governments clustering around the midpoint of the left-right scale (Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK), and another group of governments with a clear leftist hue (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden), but very few explicitly right-wing executives (only Ireland and Spain).

Figure 5.1: Public and Government Left-Right Positions - Established Democracies



While one may expect single-party governments to present a more distinct ideological stance than coalition governments that are by definition the outcome of compromises, figure 5.1 does not show different patterns for these two types of cabinets. While some single-party governments did lean clearly toward a polar position on the left-right spectrum (Spain and Sweden), others firmly occupied the middle ground (Britain and Greece). As mentioned in the literature review, many studies of voter-government congruence focus on differences between proportional and majoritarian systems, but the number of countries utilizing the latter electoral rule is too small for making such comparison here. One should also be reminded that the results only reflect the distribution at a single point in time, liable to significant changes over a relatively short span.

The absence of any discernable association between average voter and governments positions on the left-right spectrum is replicated in former communist countries (figure 5.2),[78] with a correlation coefficient of -0.130. The Czech Republic stands out as a striking example, with the most right-leaning electorate in our entire sample governed by the most left-leaning government.[79] Leaving out this outlier increases the correlation between citizen and government positions for the remaining twelve cases to 0.210. This is in the expected direction, although the relationship is even less robust than in Western Europe. While the span of public opinion is approximately the same as in Western Europe, a marked contrast is found in the preponderance of rightist governments. If the leftist label was tainted by association with former communist rule during the immediate period following regime transition, by the turn of the century significant portions of citizens no longer felt this semantic shackle. The predominance of right-wing governments was not a lasting phenomenon, but even more than in Western Europe, one can detect cycles of left- and right-leaning parties alternating in power in former communist countries. A related observation concerns the paucity of centrist governments, suggesting that coalitions bridging left and right, such as those seen in Austria, Belgium, and Finland, are rare in Eastern Europe (the only notable exception being a coalition between the center-left Liberal Democracy of

[78] East Asian cases are not included because they have presidential systems in which government formation does not depend on a legislative majority.

[79] It should be noted that the minority Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) government was tolerated by the right-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS). However, the two parties did not form a coalition or reach policy agreements, so only the party forming the cabinet was considered when calculating the government's left-right position.

Figure 5.2: Public and Government Left-Right Positions - New Democracies



Slovenia and the center-right Slovenian People's Party). This in turn points to a more deeply entrenched ideological divide than in most established democracies.

We should note that the far from strong relationships between the left-right positions of voters and governments displayed in figures 5.1 and 5.2 are less robust in comparison to findings from other studies that show higher levels of ideological congruence (e.g., Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2004; Powell and Vanberg 2000). What accounts for the dissimilar results? One possibility concerns the different methods employed. As mentioned in a previous section, whereas many studies use elite surveys or manifesto coding to locate party positions, the analysis above relies on

expert judgments of party positions. More significantly, the timing of WVS surveys does not correspond to election dates. Voters are likely to pay greater heed to and acquire more information about political issues immediately preceding or following elections due to intense media coverage and party mobilization efforts, and consequently devote more attention when responding to questions on preferred party choice and left-right self-placements. This is likely to enhance the rate of left-right voting and, assuming the government is not based only on the backing of a small minority of the electorate, the congruence between the public and the government. Surveys conducted when elections are distant from voters' minds are less propitious for producing such findings. Another possible explanation, especially applicable in countries with less consolidated party systems, is that some parties may have shifted positions between the survey and election dates.

Summary and Conclusions

Left-Right Voting

In addition to recognizing and attaching meaningful content to labels of left and right, a further condition for establishing the significance of these spatial semantics lies in their utility as heuristics for political behavior. The preceding pages have explored the degree to which vote choice in ex-communist new democracies is influenced by individual voters' proximity to parties on the left-right spectrum, matching WVS respondents' self-placements against both "objective" party locations along the same scale derived from expert judgments. Results reveal higher levels of voting based on left-right propinquity in Western Europe than in CEE and Balkan new democracies, and a weak to non-existent relationship in East Asian cases, though this conclusion is tempered by sizeable variations within each region.

I also compared the extent of ideological voting across different age cohorts and educational levels. Contrary to expectations, older voters tend to follow left-right cues more than younger voters not only in Western Europe where they are steeped in decades of ideological competition, but even more so in new democracies where they lack such experience. The impact of education is relatively uniform in the expected direction in Western Europe, but diverges among post-communist countries. Only with regard to the impact of political interest do we find expected patterns across both old and new democracies, with more politically attentive segments of the electorate displaying higher levels of left-right voting.

Among new democracies, while a low level of left-right voting is found in a few CEE countries, the trend is more pronounced in the Balkans and (especially) East Asia. This observation raises obvious questions on why ideological labels serve as more efficacious guides to voting in some transitional societies than others, when all these countries share the commonality of having nascent party systems. One plausible explanation is party system polarization, since voters in more polarized polities are more able to distinguish parties' ideological differences, and may deem the stakes of choosing one party over another to be higher. Another, related, cause lies in the extent to which left and right are structured: the more these labels are anchored in attitudes and issue preferences, the more voters are likely to consider spatial proximity when marking their ballots. For the seventeen new democracies listed in table 5.1, the level of left-right voting and the explanatory contribution of the full model presented in the previous chapter (see table 4.10) are highly correlated at 0.793. This is in accord with intuitive logic, since one can hardly expect voters to consider left-right distance when choosing parties if ideological designations do not carry much meaning in the first place. Lithuania stands out as an outlier, with a high explained variance by the full model yet a low level of left-right voting. Excluding this single case brings the correlation to 0.886.

How can we account of weak left-right voting in East Asian new democracies? One possible explanation lies in a lingering aversion to the leftist label, as a psychological legacy of former authoritarian regimes. Even if some voters – a smaller proportion than in other transitional regions, as chapter 2 shows – are willing to profess leftist inclinations, parties would likely hesitate to do so, whether based on principle or electoral considerations. An alternative elucidation raises the more fundamental issue regarding an inability of left-right semantics to encapsulate some important political cleavages in these countries, in contrast to most new democracies in Eastern Europe. The validity of the latter suggestion would lead to queries into what sets of historical and cultural, as well as political, circumstances are more conducive to the absorptive capacity of the left-right schema.

Public-Government Congruence

To test the quality of representation in left-right terms, I searched for patterns of congruence between the positions of electorates and their governments. None is found in either part of Europe, suggesting that the ideological composition of governments

often does not match collective public opinion. The latter measure would mean little if publics are polarized, but we have already shown in chapter 2 that relatively normal ideological distribution characterizes citizens in almost every country. Another possible concern is that public positions may have shifted since the previous election which installed the existing government. Unfortunately, since WVS surveys and national elections are not temporally synchronized, it is not possible to address this critique without observing trends over at least two points in time. What is more readily discernible is the clustering of governments' ideological orientations: center and left in Western Europe, right in ex-communist countries. While the ideological leaning of governments changes over time, one may detect a diffusion effect. If so, this raises the question of whether political circumstances in one country may affect electorates' left-right dispositions in its neighbors.

One reason for aggregate-level mismatches between the left-right positions of voters and their preferred parties remains unexplored: that an individual respondent votes for the party she *believes* to be closest to her own position, but this perception does not correspond to the party's *actual* stance as assessed by scholars. In other words, left-right voting at the micro level belies the absence thereof at the macro level. This paradox is particularly applicable to extreme parties whose supporters see both themselves and their favored party as relatively centrist and vote accordingly. For example, the mean left-right self-placements of supporters of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH), at the centrist positions of 5.75 and 5.83 on a ten-point scale, respectively, deviate greatly from expert scores of 9.53 and 9.29.[80] We cannot test how many among those who voted for these extreme right nationalist parties projected their own moderate positions to their party of choice (see Brody and Page 1972; Conover and Feldman 1982; Martinez 1988 for discussion on projection effect motivated by party identification), but it is reasonable to surmise that in a number of countries this phenomenon may have some impact on levels of left-right voting presented above.

As noted more than once throughout this study, results presented here only offer a snapshot of how publics understand and utilize the left-right schema. Only

[80] Voters do not always hold more moderate views than their preferred parties, even if the latter are far from centrist. Examples in ex-communist countries of supporters of right-wing parties identifying themselves as even further to the right than their party include the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic, Homeland Union in Lithuania, and Solidarity Election Action (AWS) in Poland. It is noteworthy that there are almost no equivalent examples on the left.

comparing different points in time can reveal whether the patterns of ideologically motivated voting behavior discussed in this chapter would hold true in the coming years, but it is nevertheless worth conjecturing possible developments. The finding that younger cohorts are less inclined to choose parties based on left-right proximity, particularly in several former communist countries, suggests that overall levels of left-right voting may decline as a consequence of generational replacement. The uneven impact of education means that longer schooling is unlikely to halt, let alone reverse, this tendency. Competition among programmatically close parties is also likely to make it more challenging to utilize spatial distance as a determinant of voting behavior. Furthermore, if party system polarization is the main cause of left-right voting (Dalton 2008, 2011; Lachat 2008), then the trend toward centripetal party movement observed in many countries also predicts a declining importance of left-right proximity as a factor influencing vote choice.

Conclusion

My dissertation has explored the applicability of the left-right schema in new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Balkans, and East Asia by examining the extent to which publics meet three conditions that render spatial orientations pertinent for political behavior: recognizing the left-right spectrum, attaching meaning to these labels, and utilizing them in determining vote choice. Using public opinion data from the World Values Survey (WVS), the analysis compares and contrasts patterns in nineteen new democracies with fifteen established democracies in Western Europe. While using regional categorization to facilitate discussion of findings, results for each country are presented separately, in order to reveal and highlight differences within regions that are often obscured in studies aimed at identifying and explaining global trends. The following pages summarize findings on the three aforementioned key questions and discuss their implications, make general comments on the applicability of the left-right schema in new democracies, and note a number of limitations and topics for potential future research.

Left-right orientations in established Western democracies are commonly associated with cleavages shaped by particular historical developments, especially class and religious conflicts that dominated political debate at the time of mass enfranchisement and party formation. Consequently, both political elites and the general public in these nations came to use labels of left and right to connote policy stances particularly on economic issues (as well as organizations identified with capital and labor). This naturally raises questions regarding the applicability of the same spatial labels to other regions of the world with divergent historical trajectories and social conditions. This question provides the puzzle that motivates my dissertation.

Left-Right Cognition

To make the case that the left-right schema is applicable in the context of new democracies, I first tried to establish that publics in these countries are familiar with spatial labels. Focusing on the topic of cognition in chapter 2, I found that the proportion of respondents who could not or did not wish to place themselves along the left-right scale was twice as high in CEE and Balkan countries as in Western Europe, while ‘don’t know’ responses were remarkably infrequent in East Asia. It must be

noted that these generalizations conceal large intra-regional variations. Leaving aside one conspicuous outlier, modestly high correlations between aggregate cognition rates found in the WVS and another dataset confirm the accuracy of these results. I sought to identify contextual factors accounting for the variation in left-right cognition among new democracies, such as the duration and severity of authoritarian rule, the degree of party system institutionalization following transition, and the length of independent statehood, but each explanation is accompanied by several exceptions.

Among factors that influence left-right cognition, education plays the most substantive role in each newly democratized region, suggesting that awareness of the ideological schema is lower among less educated segments in these countries than in established democracies. In old and new democracies alike, men are significantly more likely to place themselves along the left-right spectrum than women. Urban residents display higher levels of cognition than their rural counterparts in many new democracies, but this distinction is absent in Western Europe, implying that awareness of left and right is already pervasive. Cognition is positively related to age in established democracies, due to both the period of socialization and accumulated experience, but where this variable is significant in transitional countries, it points in the opposite direction, as younger cohorts prove quicker to adapt to conditions of open political contestation following democratization. Finally, political interest and party preference both exert strong effects on left-right cognition as expected in both old and new democracies.

It also warrants noting that the proportion of extremist self-placements on the left-right scale is higher in new democracies. A closer look reveals that such radical leanings usually result not from bipolarization, but instead a one-sided concentration of extreme views. The leftist label seems to carry a negative connotation in former communist countries due to its association with past authoritarian regimes, but the rightist label in East Asia does not appear similarly tarnished. Average left-right placements in the Western European, CEE, and Balkan regions fall close to the midpoint of the scale, but are located markedly to the right in East Asia. Finally, a comparison of cognition rates in two (for a few countries, three) WVS waves provides no evidence of increasing left-right awareness, though the brevity of the intervening period means that one must exercise caution before rejecting the possibility of ideological learning over time.

These results show that while overall publics in new democracies are more

hesitant to locate themselves along the left-right spectrum compared to established Western democracies, the left-right schema still constitutes a relevant point of reference. High cognition rates alone provides no information about whether or how individuals utilize left and right labels, but at least suggests the *potential* that these spatial semantics can guide behavior in a meaningful way. One cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents simply gave random answers when in fact they did not associate these terms with views on any issue or political actor, but findings in succeeding chapters largely allay this concern. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to corroborate studies presented in chapter 1 on the utility of left and right as a tool of political communication beyond countries where they have long been in use.

Furthermore, since many respondents in new democracies must have been familiar with left and right prior to the transition – the absence of trends toward greater cognition in the period following democratization suggests that living under a democratic system does not augment cognition rates, at least in the short run – we can reasonably infer that even publics in authoritarian states would recognize these terms, albeit at a lower rate than many new democracies. The lack of noticeable increases in ideological cognition over time may also suggest a continuance of disengagement from or suspicion of politics developed under authoritarian rule. One can even speculate that the turbulent political events during and immediately after transition might have unsettled long-held ideological anchors so that some respondents became *less* able or willing to identify themselves in left-right terms in the context of new political paradigms.

While the question of left-right cognition is of theoretical interest, an issue more pertinent to political developments in new democracies involves the distribution of ideological self-placements. Looking at average left-right positions, ex-communist new democracies appear similar to Western Europe; the only markedly divergent cases are found in East Asia, where three countries contain a preponderance of right-leaning respondents. In such an environment, leftist parties may not take root at all, or remain relatively minor actors that can at best influence policy at the margins without prospects of gaining power. The contrast between these East Asian cases on one hand, and the "normal" pattern in CEE and Balkan countries on the other hand, suggest a difference in the depth of ideological penetration of the former authoritarian regime: whereas communist rule did not appear to inculcate leftist ideology in a majority of the population (although we found evidence that cohorts who spent longer

time under communism leaned significantly toward the left in some countries), several anti-communist dictatorships seemed to have entrenched rightist doctrine among their subjects, or at least discredited its alternative. What mechanisms allowed the latter regimes to leave such a lasting ideological legacy warrants further examination.

Finally, the high percentages of respondents who identified with the extreme right or left in transitional societies – extremist placements exceed 10 percent in only two out of fifteen Western European countries, but twelve out of nineteen new democracies in our study – hint at greater hurdles for political actors seeking common ground. Moreover, there is no indication that the proportion of extremist views are declining with lengthening democratic experience. Polarized opinion offers parties and politicians greater incentive to assert or reaffirm views on either side of the spectrum rather than to engage in negotiations across the ideological divide. It is not surprising that, in contrast to some among the EU 15 countries, none of the new democracies has (yet) evolved a consensual style of government. Considering the increasing constraints imposed by global developments such as economic liberalization, one may question the degree to which *policy* options proposed by the right and the left actually differ in many new (as well as old) democracies. Nevertheless, high extremist placements permit and encourage *rhetorical* confrontation likely to hamper compromises.

Meaning of Left and Right

Since placing oneself on the left-right scale does not necessarily signify that one attributes specific meaning to these spatial labels, chapters 3 and 4 proceeded to examine how publics understand left and right. I began with a base model predicting respondents' left-right positioning using only socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, income, town size), against which various theoretically derived clusters of issues and attitudes are compared to test for increases in explanatory value. Not surprisingly, socio-demographic factors account for relatively little variation in respondents' left-right self-placements in both established and new democracies. The three models examined in chapter 3, based on economic (confidence in labor unions and large businesses, income inequality, public ownership of industries, government responsibility), social/religious (confidence in churches, frequency of attending service, importance of God, tolerance of abortion and homosexuality), and

post-materialist (respect authority, extra taxes for environmental protection, direct political action, gender roles) issues, all proved more robust in Western Europe than in any newly democratized region, suggesting that left and right are more firmly anchored by attitudes and issue preferences in established democracies.

On economic issues, questions over public ownership of industries and government responsibility significantly structure respondents' left-right positions in CEE and Balkan new democracies, respectively, while income inequality also has an impact in a number of countries in both regions. In contrast to Western Europe, attitudes toward labor unions exert little influence. Results in East Asia showing that the same preferences are linked to rightist self-placements in some countries and leftist ones in others imply the absence of a clear relationship between economic issues and left-right orientations. On social/religious issues, organizational attachment to religion matters more than personal belief in structuring left-right orientations in the CEE region, while both factors are significant in a number of Balkan countries. Interestingly, in the Balkans greater tolerance of lifestyle choices such as abortion and homosexuality is sometimes correlated with rightist stances. Religion does not appear to influence ideological positioning in East Asia. Finally, post-materialist issues play a much more substantive role in Western Europe than nearly all new democracies.

I also explored several possible contextual factors accounting for the variation in the explanatory value of each model across the entire sample. Economic issues exert greater impact on left-right orientations in richer countries (both old and new democracies), but there is no evidence that economic issues become more salient as the poverty gap increases. National wealth is also highly correlated with the influence of post-materialist attitudes on left-right positioning, along with the proportion of respondents identified as post-materialist in each country. Testing the explanatory value of each model against issue salience given by parties in their election manifestos yields scarce evidence that elite discourse plays a significant role in affecting how publics understand left and right through selective emphasis on economic or religious/moral questions. However, a modest relationship is found for post-materialist issues.

While these findings seem to indicate that left-right orientations are less structured in new democracies than in established ones, one must take circumstances unique to transitional societies into consideration. Chapter 4 thus examines the impact of attitudes toward democracy and regime evaluations. Specifically, I tested the effect

of opinions on democratic principles (views on the democratic system and three authoritarian regime types: rule by strongman, technocracy, and the military) and performance (on the economy, law and order, decisiveness, and preference for democracy despite its shortcomings), as well as assessments of the former (authoritarian) and present regimes, on respondents' left-right self-placement. The last section of the chapter presents a full model incorporating all clusters of issues to test for the relative importance of each variable.

Many studies on new democracies highlight a "regime divide" pitting supporters against opponents of authoritarian rule, or alternatively winners against losers of democratic transition. In contrast to established democracies, where the form of government rarely comes under debate, it is conceivable that certain segments in newly democratized societies would favor alternative regime types. Empirical tests show that attitudes toward the democratic system – but not views on its authoritarian alternatives – indeed distinguished left from right in several new democracies in all three regions. The same pattern largely holds true for the impact of democratic performance variables: what influence they exerted on left-right orientations is mostly attributable to views on whether respondents retained their faith in democracy as the best system despite its deficiencies. However, neither of these models offers substantial explanatory value. In contrast, evaluation of past and present regimes (especially the former) proved the most robust predictor of left-right self-placements in almost all CEE and Balkan countries, confirming previous findings that, a decade after the fall of communism, a cleavage rooted in comparative regime appraisals continued to anchor ideological understanding. The same cannot be said of East Asian cases.

In a full model encompassing all variables found to be significant in previous tests, evaluation of the past regime once again turned out to be the strongest predictor of left-right orientations in the CEE region, and confidence in church also proved relevant in most cases. Despite extensive economic reforms following democratic transition, the impact of economic issues was only sporadic. Similar patterns for past regime assessment and trust in the church are observed in Balkan countries, while a nationalist cleavage that one may expect in a region recently devastated by ethnic tensions did not emerge in the analysis. No single dimension stood out as providing a clear ideological anchor in East Asia. Preference for a democratic system despite its shortcomings attained significance in a majority of cases, but coefficients point in

opposite directions.

On the question of whether the left-right schema is relevant in new democracies in the sense that these terms are systematically structured by attitudes and issue preferences, the answer appears to be cautiously affirmative, since results show that they are (nearly) as meaningful in many new democracies as in Western Europe. This confirms the proposition underlying our study that the left-right schema is applicable in countries with different historical experiences and socio-economic conditions from established Western democracies where the concept originated. At the same time, one must keep considerable variations within each region in mind. Ironically, it is in East Asia, with rates of left-right cognition higher than other transitional regions, where left and right labels are least anchored in policy or attitudinal terms. If we assume that responses were not made randomly, this paradox provokes the question of what factors – presumably overlooked in our models – account for East Asian citizens' left-right self-placements. One possibility is foreign policy, in a region where tensions that marked the Cold War have not entirely abated. Another question concerns the national sovereignty, which some citizens may perceive as under threat by either hostile powers externally or separatists internally. Testing these conjectures would require region-specific survey questionnaires, since these issues are not pertinent in many other parts of the world and therefore unlikely to be included in global surveys.

Leaving aside the East Asian cases, the most notable result in new democracies is the persistence of a regime divide as a dominant influence shaping citizens' left-right orientations. Since it makes little sense to ask most Western European respondents to evaluate the previous authoritarian regime in their countries (with the exceptions of three southern European states which democratized in the 1970s), we are unable to make direct comparisons with established democracies. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume the presence and significance of the regime divide as unique to societies that underwent recent transition. This leads to the more politically germane question of how long one expects attitudes rooted in an increasingly distant past – evaluation of the present implicitly takes the past as a point of reference – to continue exerting an impact on ideological understanding in the years ahead.

One approach may treat the regime divide as a "frozen" cleavage, because this conflict was at its most salient at the time of initial party system formation in many new democracies. Thus parties would reflect this cleavage by embedding it in their fundamental stances, which in turn influence the views of their supporters. However,

one major distinction from the "frozen" class conflict that Lipset and Rokkan elucidated for Western Europe lies in the nature of the cleavage: one can try to resolve disagreements over the distribution of concrete resources by making partial concessions to demands from each side, but it is much more difficult to negotiate over the legitimacy of abstract beliefs. Furthermore, conflict at this abstract level hinges less on the government's policy outputs than on the justification for its very existence. Continuation of clashes between left and right over issues derived from the regime divide may harden lines of party division and render efforts to seek consensus on other policy areas less politically palatable. Parties or individual politicians would have greater incentive to mobilize the electorate through symbolic issues, including appeals to nationalism in countries where either the past or present regime is seen as beholden to foreign control or influence, instead of those closer to voters' daily concerns. Lastly, this may incubate anti-democratic sentiments by perpetuating depictions of a better yesterday.

Alternatively, it is also conceivable that the structuring of left and right by comparative regime assessments reflects a temporary rather than an enduring phenomenon, and that other issues will eclipse the regime divide as memories of authoritarian rule and democratization fade with time. If this proposition is valid, disagreements over the mode of transition, new institutional and legal frameworks, and handling of policies and personnel associated with the former regime would gradually recede from the frontline of political debate, partly because once disputed arrangements have been settled, and also due to the emergence of other concerns which are similar to the staple of political contestation in established democracies, ranging from pensions to the treatment of minorities. This does not ensure better policy outputs, but at least offers greater possibility of compromise solutions. To test this hypothesis, one can trace longitudinal trends since the 1990s, or replicate the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 using more recent data.

Left-Right Voting

In addition to recognizing and attaching meaning to labels of left and right, if one wishes to validate their political importance it is also necessary to demonstrate that these spatial labels help to guide voting behavior. After discussing methods for ascertaining party locations along the left-right scale, chapter 5 addresses this topic by comparing respondents' ideological self-placements and party positions derived from

the judgment of country experts. I identified levels of left-right voting for each country, with the caveat that not all parties included in the expert survey can be matched with parties for which respondents in the WVS expressed voting intention (respondent averages from another dataset are used in East Asian cases where expert surveys are not available). Keeping in mind the usual qualification concerning large intra-regional variation, it is still clear that left-right orientations exert a greater influence on vote choice in Western Europe than in all transitional regions. Nevertheless, results of multivariate analysis show that left-right self-placement remains substantially robust in a large majority of new democracies after controlling for respondents' socio-demographic characteristics.

A closer look at levels of left-right voting by age, education, and political interest yields further insights. Contrary to expectations, left-right voting in new democracies is much more prevalent among older cohorts despite their socialization under authoritarian rule. The same phenomenon holds true in Western Europe, albeit with a narrower generational gap. Another unanticipated finding is that while more highly educated strata in established democracies display a greater propensity to choose parties according to left-right propinquity, this variable has a much smaller impact in the CEE region, and makes almost no difference in many Balkan cases. Similarly, while politically interested respondents in both old and new democracies are more inclined to vote on the basis of ideological proximity, the gap is wider in Western Europe.

Another indicator pertinent to the left-right schema concerns the extent of congruence between the ideological positions of citizens and their governments, with the expectation that one should observe some degree of match between the two measures. However, data from WVS does not support this proposition. Also, average public positions are similar in established and ex-communist new democracies, but rightist governments are more common in the latter, accompanied by a dearth of centrist executives. One may infer greater polarization in the CEE and Balkan regions, with cabinets comprised of parties entirely from one side of the ideological spectrum rather than bridging the left-right divide. Due to lack of comparable data for East Asia, I utilized data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) for three countries in this region, and found low correlations between respondents' left-right self-placements and party ratings, meaning that publics did not identify most parties as clearly on the right or left. Leftist options were notably scarce.

Returning to the familiar question on the utility of the left-right schema in new democracies, this time serving the role of cues guiding vote choice, the answer is a qualified yes, at least as far as ex-communist countries are concerned. On this most direct link between individuals' left-right positioning and political behavior, I found that ideological labels in former communist countries do not exert as large an impact as in established Western democracies, but nevertheless serve an important function (the often reiterated caveat concerning intra-regional variations also applies here). It is only with respect to East Asian cases where results raise doubts about the functioning of spatial labels as useful heuristics.

In addition to the difference in levels of left-right voting between established and new democracies, it is also worth noting disparities in how age and education mediates the impact of left-right orientations on party choice, which may have long term ramifications. While left-right voting is higher among older and more highly educated segments of the population in both the EU 15 and transitional countries, generational and educational gaps are much wider in the latter regions. The particularly large difference between young and old in new democracies implies that, even allowing for ideological learning among younger cohorts, we can expect a decline in left-right voting in the years ahead. This is unlikely to be compensated by an increasing proportion of highly educated citizens among the current generation of youths, given the modest gap in many countries between respondents with more than a secondary degree and those who do not. The effectiveness of left-right labels in helping voters to determine how to mark their ballots may also wane among Western European electorates, but at a much more gradual pace.

The discussion above is based only on the demand side of left-right voting, and simply assumes no changes on the supply side. However, most political parties are constantly exploring means of gaining or retaining power, and some may recalibrate their stances on salient issues, and by implication their positions along the left-right scale, for this purpose. The likelihood of such rhetorical or policy modification is higher for parties which lack mass memberships that can influence internal decision-making. Many more parties in new democracies fit this description than in established democracies. If a party decides to occupy a niche position toward either end of the spectrum, and augments its support as a result, this would probably have an effect of increasing the level of left-right voting by stretching the ideological span and presenting clearer choices to voters, but also intensifying polarization. In contrast, if a

party succeeds in expanding support through a centripetal strategy, and assuming that at least one competitor already occupies the space near the center, this would lead to a decrease in left-right voting because now the party has a less clear cut ideological profile, though such a development may augur well for consensus politics. Thus, whether and in which direction parties shift hold one of the keys to determining trends in left-right voting.

How Useful is the Left-Right Schema in New Democracies?

This study has been conducted under the assumption that, despite the presence of multiple axes of competitions in many countries, a uni-dimensional left-right schema is flexible enough to adequately encapsulate the most salient issues, and can therefore be useful for analyzing political behavior cross-nationally. Do empirical findings in new democracies reported and discussed in the preceding chapters corroborate this fundamental premise? The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, we have demonstrated that left-right orientations in new democracies are indeed meaningfully anchored in citizens' attitudes and preferences in several issue areas, and found moderate levels of ideologically motivated voting behavior in many cases. On the other hand, overall the left-right dimension is less recognized, less structured, and exerts less influence on vote choice in each of the newly democratized regions than in Western Europe. Moreover, there is little indication that these spatial labels will come to play a greater role in summarizing and guiding how citizens understand and act upon their political preferences as they accumulate more experience of democratic competition.

A vital distinction emphasized throughout all empirical chapters is that of wide variations *within* each of the three regions I analyzed, but if we allow for generalizations, it is clear that there are notable differences *among* regions. Publics in East Asia are much more cognizant of the left-right schema than citizens in former communist countries (in fact more so than even many Western Europeans), but when it comes to how left and right are understood and utilized, the pattern is reversed. Between the two ex-communist regions, the social/religious model performs better in CEE countries, and the democratic procedures model in the Balkans; for every model we consistently found the lowest explanatory value in East Asia (leaving aside post-materialist issues which do not account for left-right orientations in any of the three regions). Left-right voting is equally common in the CEE and Balkan regions,

while in East Asia what conclusions we can draw based on limited data suggest a lower level thereof.

These regional contrasts pose potential challenges to the thesis of a universally applicable left-right dimension. Can one construe the limited impact of left-right orientations on bundling issues and directing vote choice in some regions as evidence of the non-programmatic nature of competition, that is, political practice has failed to meet an ideational standard? Or does this phenomenon instead highlight constraints of the concept itself, because it is insufficiently elastic to incorporate certain types of issues which dominate political debate in these countries? One can cite examples supporting both views, and upon closer inspection these two suggestions may not be incompatible. For example, voter mobilization along ethnic lines fits both explanations. It is notable that several cross-national surveys covering newly democratized regions do not even include a question on left-right self-placement, no doubt reflecting the investigators' skepticism about the relevance of these spatial labels to their prospective respondents.

However, the inference from the above explanation, namely that publics and political elites in some regions of the world engage in issues that are entirely different from those debated in established democracies, seems counterintuitive. While the extent to which given issues are salient obviously differs from one political context to another, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which ordinary citizens would either wholly disregard concerns for economic well-being and social order, or reach complete consensus on these matters and thus leave no room for contestation. An alternative explanation for the limited utility of the left-right dimension in regions such as East Asia could focus on the schema's differential absorptive capacity, i.e. that issue positions commonly linked with either left or right in established democracies lack similar ideological associations in some new (and non-)democracies. For example, Portugal, Poland, and the Philippines may all have labor unions which oppose extending privatization, but only in the latter case do we find views on neither unions nor public ownership linked to leftist orientations. In other words, spatial labels may be more proficient at connecting different clusters of issues in some countries than in others. What factors facilitate, or impede, the elasticity of the left-right dimension presents an analytical puzzle inviting further investigation.

Limitations of the Study

Having presented a summary of my findings and discussed their implications, it is necessary to mention some important limitations of the present study. First, while cross-sectional data is valuable for the purpose of comparing a large number of countries, results only represent a static snapshot. In view of often volatile changes in both public opinion and party constellations in new democracies, one may question to what extent findings reported in the preceding chapters would remain valid into the future. For example, how long will publics in ex-communist new democracies continue to construe left and right largely through a prism relating to the previous authoritarian regime, especially as new generations without any experience of communism form an increasing proportion of the electorate? And how would new political cleavages, such as opinions on European integration during debates leading up to (and in some cases also following) European Union accession, affect understanding of left and right? Longitudinal observations and studies are required to provide a dynamic perspective on *changes* in the contents of left and right and their partisan ramifications.

Second, methods employed in this study rely on fundamental assumptions of a uni-dimensional and linear left-right spectrum. Chapter 1 discussed and justified the former attribute at some length, but the latter has not been commented on. While on most issues the stance of an extreme right-winger is diametrically opposed to that of an extreme left-winger, there are possible exceptions, not least with respect to attitudes toward democracy and, under certain circumstances, nationalism. In other words, on a number of issues a cleavage may not pit left against right, but instead the extreme left and right on one hand versus mainstream left and right on the other hand. Third, a growing number of studies based on cross-national survey data have utilize multilevel hierarchical models to simultaneously account for both macro- and micro-level variation, but my dissertation has not taken advantage of this recent methodological advance. The main reason lies in the presentation of my results on a country-by-country basis. The unavailability of some questionnaire items in several cases constitutes another constraint when interpreting the results and comparing them across countries.

In addition to calling for longitudinal and more methodologically sophisticated undertakings, sizeable differences within as well as among regions reported and emphasized throughout this study suggest potential topics for future research: What factors account for variations in the level of left-right cognition, the extent that

understanding of left and right are anchored in attitudes and issue preferences, and the degree of ideological voting? I believe that answering these questions requires detailed knowledge of countries under consideration often found in qualitative studies, ranging from historical background to party mobilization strategies. What sacrifices in the breadth of geographical scope such work may entail should be more than compensated for by its resulting wealth of analytical insights.

Appendix: Survey Questions

Survey item	Question wording	Question coding
left-right placement	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	1= left; 10= right
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC		
age		actual age
gender		1= male; 2= female
education		1= lowest; 8= highest
income		1= lowest; 10= highest
town size		1= smallest; 8= largest
ECONOMIC		
confidence in unions	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them.	1= a great deal; 4= none at all
confidence in business	SAME AS ABOVE	1= a great deal; 4= none at all
income equality	Agree more with "incomes should be made more equal" or "we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort"	1= larger differences; 10= more equal
private ownership	Agree more with "private ownership of business and industry should be increased" or "government ownership of business and industry should be increased"	1= private ownership; 10= public ownership
government responsibility	Agree more with "the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" or "people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves"	1= personal responsibility; 10= government responsibility
SOCIAL/RELIGIOUS		
confidence in church	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them.	1= a great deal; 4= none at all
attend service	How often do you attend religious services these days?	1= more than once a week; 8= never
God important	How important is God in your life?	1= not at all; 10= very

homosexuality	Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.	1= never justifiable; 10= always justifiable
abortion		

POST-MATERIALISM

respect authority	Whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind: greater respect for authority	1= good thing; 2= don't mind; 3= bad thing
pay extra for environment	I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution	1= strongly agree; 4= strongly disagree
direct political action	I am going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strike, occupying buildings or factories	1= have done; 2= might do; 3= would never do [additive score]
jobs for men	When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	1= agree; 3= disagree
men better leaders	On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	1= strongly agree; 4= strongly disagree

DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

	I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country:	
strong leader	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	1= very good; 4= very bad
experts	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country	1= very good; 4= very bad
army rule	Having the army rule	1= very good; 4= very bad
democratic system	Having a democratic political system	1= very bad; 4= very good [recoded]

DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES

	I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system.	

	Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?	
bad economics	In democracy, the economic system runs badly	1= agree strongly; 4= disagree strongly
indecisive	Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling	1= agree strongly; 4= disagree strongly
bad order	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order	1= agree strongly; 4= disagree strongly
democracy still preferred	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government	1= disagree strongly; 4= agree strongly [recoded]
COMPARATIVE REGIME EVALUATION		
rate current system	People have different views about the system for governing the country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going.	1= very bad; 10= very good
rate past system*	SAME AS ABOVE	1= very bad; 10= very good
NATIONALISM		
fight for country	We all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?	0= no; 1= depends; 2= yes
proud of country	How proud are you to be [nationality]?	1= very proud; 4= not at all proud

* In former communist countries, question item refers specifically to "communist regime"

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