

# Estimating the Effect of Immigration on Public Finances: Evidence from the Influx of Venezuelan Migrants to Colombia

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## Abstract

We investigate the fiscal impact of immigration on the Colombian economy from 2013 to 2018 using an accounting approach and exploiting the large and sudden increase in inflows from Venezuela. In other words, we estimated the difference between the taxes and other contributions migrants make to public finances and the costs of the public benefits and services they receive. Our findings show that immigrants tend to have less access to, and make lower use of, the welfare system, and do not suggest strong evidence of immigrants imposing a higher burden to public finances relative to natives. When we consider only Venezuelan immigrants, consisting of both the Venezuelan-born population and those native-born returnees arriving from Venezuela, our estimates indicate that while they have a less favorable net fiscal position relative to natives, which is driven by the net contributions to regional and local government budgets, their overall fiscal effect is fairly modest in terms of GDP. When we considered the effect that demographic characteristics play on explaining the differences in the net fiscal contributions among groups, our results suggest that the higher fiscal impact of Venezuelan-born immigrants is driven by recent arrivals, as they contribute on average less in terms of income taxes and social security contributions and have a higher reliance for group expenditures. In contrast, immigrants that have been in the country for more than a year have—if any—a better per capita fiscal position than natives. Finally, since migration is not distributed uniformly across space, the fiscal effects at the local level are not homogeneous. We show that the fiscal effects on local budgets are mediated by two forces: cities' fiscal effort (the ability to raise revenues from their own sources) and the share of immigrants in the local population.

**Keywords:** immigration, public finances, public goods, local governments.

**JEL:** H41, H50, H70, J15.

# 1. Introduction

From the seminal work of the National Research Council (1997) and Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999), the impact of immigration on public finances has been a matter of major debate.<sup>1</sup> A large part of the literature has explored the effects for developed countries using a combination of empirical approaches, leaving unattended the context in developing countries. Increasingly, the literature has put emphasis on the net fiscal impact of immigration, estimated as the difference between the taxes and other contributions migrants make to public finances and the costs of transfers and services they receive. However, there does not seem to be a consensus in the empirical literature on the magnitude or direction of the effect of immigration on public finances because, as expected, this is highly dependent on the sociodemographic characteristics of the population, the length of residence in the country of destiny, and the types of policies implemented in the receiving country to attend the immigrants (National Research Council, 1997; Vargas-Silva, 2016).

The impact of immigration on the fiscal balance has been shown to be relatively small to the size of the overall imbalance itself and the economy (OECD, 2013). Thus, immigration seems to be neither a major burden to public finances nor a potential solution to fiscal imbalances. In addition, the effect of immigration on public finances has consistently turned out to be an important issue in the public opinion. Not only many natives see immigration as a burden for the economy, but these concerns—at least partially—are based on the belief that immigration is a drain on the public budget.

In this article, we investigate the fiscal impact of immigration on the Colombian economy from 2013 to 2018 exploiting the large and sudden increase in inflows from Venezuela. According to our estimates using Colombia’s Labor Force Survey and the 2018 Population Census, about 1.2 million Venezuelans and about 400 thousand Colombian returnees had crossed the border between 2013 and 2018. This is the largest flow ever experienced by Colombia (Reina *et al.*, 2018). While over the years Colombia had been a country of emigrants, the Venezuelan crisis has changed that trend. Information from the UN Migration Agency shows that, as of April 2020, approximately 5.1 million Venezuelan migrants were living abroad, of which over 80% were residing in Latin American countries. Now, Colombia has been the preferred destination for Venezuelan immigrants with roughly 35% of total outflows. This trend continues to increase as things get worse in Venezuela. Only between 2017 and 2018 the number of Venezuelans had a 2.6-fold increase. This growing and large immigration inflows to Colombia has effects on the public budget by changing the composition and size of the population, therefore affecting the revenue-contributing capacity of existing groups and the cost of provision of public goods likely from an increase in the demand.

Our assessment of the effect of immigration on public finances is developed in three steps. First, we estimate the welfare dependency of migrants using self-

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<sup>1</sup> A review of more recent contributions can be found in the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2017).

reported information in Colombia’s Labor Force Survey (*Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares—GEIH*). We look at whether individuals claim any type of welfare benefits, such as subsidized health care, conditional cash transfers, unemployment benefits, pension-related benefits, housing-related benefits, or other type of cash assistance. Second, we estimate the net fiscal contributions by level of government for the different immigrant groups (permanent natives, native-born returning from Venezuela, Venezuelan-born immigrants, and other immigrants). In other words, we estimate the difference between the taxes and other contributions migrants make to public finances and the costs of the public benefits and services they receive. In each case we present estimates allocating the cost of all public goods proportionally to the size of each group, as in the *average effect* scenario, and assuming that immigrants only pay their marginal cost to non-congestible public goods, as in the *marginal effect* scenario. Third, we examine the fiscal impact across local governments. Particularly, we estimate the fiscal contribution of Venezuelan immigrants for 23 capital cities with their metropolitan areas between 2013 and 2018.

This paper is related to the literature on the effects of immigration in public finances (*e.g.*, Borjas, 1994; National Research Council, 1997; Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999; Storesletten, 2000; Rowthorne, 2008; OECD, 2013; Preston, 2014). In particular, it relates to the literature using a static accounting framework to compute the burden or surplus that migrants levy on public budgets in receiving countries and comparing it to the fiscal effect of the native-born population (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2017). On the other hand, as we estimate welfare dependency of immigrants, this paper naturally relates to the large literature studying the differences in welfare reliance of immigrants and natives (*e.g.*, Blau, 1984; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Borjas and Trejo, 1991; Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003; Barrett and McCarthy, 2008; Sarvimäki, 2011). Now, we go beyond most of the literature as we are able to disaggregate our results not only by immigration group, but also by cohort of arrival to the country.

Our contribution to the existing literature is four-fold. First, in terms of the context, to our knowledge, we are the first to estimate the net fiscal impact of immigration for a developing country. Second, we present estimates for native-born returnees, which has not been addressed in the literature, and shed light on the effect of an immigration process that is neither solely voluntary nor forced. Third, we present a complete picture of the effects of immigration on public finances by estimating the impact on tax expenditures, which has not been addressed in the literature. Excluding tax expenditures from the analysis gives a one-sided look on the effect of immigration on public finances since in principle tax expenditures substitute for Government spending programs. Fourth, in terms of scope, we calculate the fiscal impact by level of government (National, regional, local). Most of the empirical findings in the literature refer only to the effects on the budget of the General Government—as a whole—or the central government, ignoring the fiscal burden at the regional or local level, which may be higher. From a methodological standpoint our paper follows broadly Dustmann and Frattini (2014).

Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, immigrants tend to have less access to, and make lower use of, the welfare system. However, results suggest a relationship between the length of time in Colombia and the probability—and level—of welfare take-up. Second, there is no strong evidence of immigrants imposing a higher burden to public finances relative to natives. When we consider only Venezuelan immigrants, consisting of both the Venezuelan-born population and their dependent children and those native-born returnees arriving from Venezuela, our estimates suggest that while they have a less favorable net fiscal position relative to permanent natives, which is driven by the net contributions to regional and local government budgets of Venezuelan-born immigrants, their overall fiscal effect is very small in terms of GDP. In addition, when we estimate the net fiscal impact for all groups excluding royalties from the budget, whereas the new estimates show an improvement in the overall net contributions of all immigrant groups to regional and local governments and an increase in the ratio of revenues to expenditures—relative to natives, our main results do not change.

When we considered the effect that demographic characteristics play on explaining the differences in the net fiscal contributions among groups, our results suggest that the higher fiscal impact of Venezuelan-born immigrants is driven by recent arrivals, as they contribute on average less in terms of income taxes and social security contributions and have a higher reliance for group expenditures. In contrast, immigrants that have reside in the country for at least a year have—if any—a better per capita fiscal position than natives. Estimates of the fiscal effect on tax expenditures indicate that Venezuelan-born immigrants have higher per capita tax expenditures in personal income tax and fuel tax than permanent natives, but lower tax expenditures over corporate income tax and value-added tax.

Finally, since migration is not distributed uniformly across space, the fiscal effects at the local level are not homogeneous. Roughly 60 percent of all migrants arriving from Venezuela were residing in the 23 major cities and metropolitan areas as of 2018, with three quarters of these living in just five cities. Our results show that, under the ‘average effect’ assumption, *i.e.*, sharing the cost among a larger population, immigrants tend to have a lower revenues/expenditures ratio relative to natives, particularly in cities that experienced a large increase in inflows. Now, when we attribute only to immigrants the additional cost to public goods provision resulting from their arrival to the country, in 19 out of the 22 cities considered, immigrants had a higher net fiscal position when compared to natives. Although, excluding transfers from the national government does not affect our qualitative results, we show that the fiscal effect on local budgets is mediated by two forces: cities’ fiscal effort (the ability to raise revenues from their own sources) and the share of immigrants in the local population. For cities with low fiscal effort but high inflows, excluding transfers from the national government improves the relative fiscal position of immigrants—using the mid-point between the average and marginal effect scenario. Nevertheless, excluding transfers does not significantly change the relative net fiscal position of immigrants in cities with high fiscal effort.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the different empirical approaches and addresses conceptual issues. Section 3 presents the methodology, data and explains the allocation criteria to allocate revenues and expenditures. The demographic characteristics and the estimates of welfare take-up are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimates of the net contributions of natives and immigrants by level of government, while Section 6 offers a view of the effect on local budgets. Section 7 concludes.

## 2. Alternative Empirical Approaches and Conceptual Issues

Estimating the effect of immigration on public finances is not an easy and straightforward exercise. The complexity of the task is driven by the amount of information required and the methodological choices researchers need to make about how to deal with different costs and benefits. These types of exercises demand detailed information or assumptions on observable or unobservable characteristics of immigrants and current residents, the temporary or permanent nature of migration, and the revenues and expenditures of the different levels of government.

Basically, there are two main approaches to measure the direct fiscal impact of immigration: a *static* or accounting exercise and a *dynamic* application. The static approach compares the tax contributions immigrants make to public finances to the services and benefits they receive within a fiscal year, using data on labor market characteristics, expenditure patterns, public service use, and welfare system access (Borjas, 1994; Gott and Johnson, 2002; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2017). A static analysis may confine attention to a single year or be a repeated cross-section across a set of years. Because the analysis is backward-looking, this approach relies on historical data on tax payments and public expenditures, reducing the need to impose strict assumptions about future trends in population composition, government spending or immigration policies (Kaczmarczyk, 2013). In this sense, results are largely driven by the demographic composition of immigrants in terms of age, skills and access to services. However, static approaches tend to neglect behavioral responses or account for the long-term fiscal consequences of immigration (Preston, 2014).

On the other hand, the dynamic analysis is a forward-looking approach that takes on the current characteristics of migrants and attempts to project the net fiscal impact of current immigrants and their descendants. Also known as the generational accounting approach (National Research Council, 1997; Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999; Lee and Miller, 2000; Storesletten, 2000, 2003; Ekberg, 2011; Cully, 2012), this type of analysis estimates the present discounted value of lifetime fiscal contributions and benefits received by immigrants. This requires projecting future population growth, income levels and employment profiles, public services costs, and government deficits for a span of years, often making heroic assumptions. Now, neither approach accounts for the indirect fiscal effects that arise from the impact that new migration has on the economy, particularly, on factor prices. Indirect effects are commonly studied through general equilibrium models.

A complete view of the fiscal impact that can be attributed to immigration is only realized over the long-term. Being able to get a full picture of the distribution of migrants along the life cycle is a key component. While children are net beneficiaries—*i.e.*, they consume more in public services than what they might contribute to the treasury, later in the life cycle working age individuals typically become net contributors. In addition, high-skilled migrants on average contribute more than low-skilled migrants (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2017), which is one of the main determinants of the overall impact of immigration in the short run (Vargas-Silva, 2016). Depending on the approach selected and the assumptions made, estimates of the effect of immigration on public finances tend to vary. Yet, most empirical analysis find these estimates to be small relative to each country's GDP, being on average close to zero for OECD countries (OECD, 2013).

As we have been discussing, selecting the right methodological approach is crucial as it may result in very different and not straight forward comparable estimates. Equally important are the assumptions made in terms of how the contributions and expenditures that immigrants make or receive are allocated. Particularly, issues such as the unit of analysis or how to deal with immigrants' children, the treatment of public goods or the treatment of interest on the national debt.

According to OECD's *International Migration Outlook* (2013), for static accounting analysis the foreign-born population is the appropriate unit of analysis. Likewise, using the household as the unit of analysis is problematic. While households as a unit tend to consume public services and pay taxes, making it the potential unit of analysis such as in *The New Americans* (National Research Council, 1997), households are not stable over time and often are constituted of both native-born and foreign-born members. Now, in cross-sectional studies the treatment of immigrant's children (also known as second-generation immigrants) is somewhat more difficult. The fiscal effect will be driven by the current demographic composition. Allocating the cost of children proportionally to their parents, especially when having mixed households, is common in the literature. A drawback, however, is that second-generation immigrants can only be identified in survey data while they are still living with their parents. In our case, this will not impose a problem as Venezuelan immigration is quite recent.

Choosing how to allocate public goods is an open debate in the empirical literature. The right choice has to be consistent with the existing theory. As shown by Preston (2014), the fiscal impact of immigration can be decomposed into four effects. The first is the population size effect. It captures the fiscal gain or loss from an increase in population size by the new immigration but depends on the combination of 'pure' and 'congested' public goods as the cost of providing these goods might change. The growth in population size from immigration will not alter the cost of providing 'pure' public goods as they are not rival in consumption and thus the marginal cost is likely to be zero. By allowing fixed costs of providing 'pure' public goods to be spread over a greater number of taxpayers, immigration is beneficial as

it reduces the tax burden imposed on natives. Nonetheless, the spending for some public goods might be correlated with other variables such as GDP growth (which also depend on population growth), challenging the ‘pure’ public good classification. Take as an example expenditure on military defense. National defense is often considered as a non-excludable and non-rival good to the extent that its purpose is to defend a country from foreign attack or protect overseas interests, so it’s likely to be unaffected by population growth. However, in many circumstances the military supports actively domestic law enforcement. So, by being regarded as the ultimate guarantor of the established domestic order, population size cannot be set aside.

A different story happens with ‘congestible’ public goods. As they are to some extent rival in consumption, the fiscal contribution of immigrants will depend on the relationship between the marginal cost and the average cost. If the marginal cost is lower than the average cost, then an increase in population size will be fiscally beneficial in the sense that the public good can be provided at the same level while sharing the costs among the whole population. Consider the spending in law courts. The administration of justice—in its more general sense—can be thought as both non-rival and non-excludable in consumption and, therefore, immigration may be added at zero marginal cost. However, access to the courts is mostly rival in consumption. In addition, spending on judicial services will also depend on how immigration affects crime. Bell and Machin (2012) present a comprehensive survey of the current literature on the effect of immigration on crime, concluding that there is little evidence of immigration increasing crime. Now, using the recent Venezuelan immigration to Colombia, Tribín-Urbe and Knight (2020) show that homicides in Colombia increased in areas close to the border with Venezuela, yet these were driven by crimes against migrants.

As a result, most empirical studies attribute the costs of ‘pure’ public goods only to natives, with some studies assigning them on a per capita basis, and allocate ‘congestible’ public goods proportional to the number of recipients (Rowthorn, 2008). This creates a need for proper and detailed information, or assumptions otherwise, on the access and consumption of such goods.

The second effect arises from changes in the composition of the population. For example, a more diverse population can create additional costs in the provision of public goods. The third effect takes into account differences in the average use of public services and tax payments between immigrants and natives. Lacking the appropriate data, the common assumption in the literature is that immigrants’ use-rate of public services is equal to that for the natives. Lastly, immigration directly induces labor market equilibrium effects. Not only can displacement effects arise from an increase in competition in the labor market as a result of immigrant inflows, but immigration might also have an effect on factor prices, especially wages (Card, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Dustmann *et al.*, 2017). This will affect tax payments and benefits for other economic agents.<sup>2</sup> These effects are commonly overlooked in both static accounting and dynamic exercises as they require additional

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<sup>2</sup> See Preston (2014) for a detailed discussion of the effect of immigration on the remuneration of existing factors.

information which may not be available, or the use of more complex methodological technics.

Now, even though fiscal imbalances are often more openly discussed in forward-looking models, they also play a key role in static analysis. The net contributions of both immigrants and natives depend on the magnitude of the deficit in a particular year as pointed out by Dustmann and Frattini (2014). For an average individual, the net fiscal contribution in a given year will be negative if the country is running a deficit in that year and will be positive if it presents a surplus, even when the behavior of the individual remains the same in both situations. Therefore, empirical analysis should focus on its relative contribution. In other words, we compare the net fiscal position of immigrants relative to that for native-born individuals.

Finally, there is ample debate in the literature on how to treat interest on the national debt. Studies often classify interest on the national debt as a ‘pure’ public good, ascribing it only to natives under the marginal cost scenario. However, interest payments should also be attributed to migrants. Particularly, interests for debt acquired as a result of their arrival to the host country, not the one incurred before their arrival, as immigrants net fiscal position in each fiscal year affect the rate at which countries accumulate debt (Rowthorn, 2014).

### **3. Assessing the Effect of Immigration on Public Finances**

We use a static cross-sectional accounting approach to assess the fiscal contribution of immigrants. Our analysis focuses on individual immigrants rather than immigrant households. In that sense, we define the immigrant population as all foreign-born and their dependents. In the case of mixed households, we apportion the cost of dependents using the relationship with the head of household. Therefore, if the head of household is classified as an immigrant, then his/her direct dependents (children, grandchildren or other relatives) are also classified as such. In line with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2017) we consider dependents to be anyone (1) less than 18 years old, (2) age 18 through 22 and enrolled full-time in secondary education, or (3) age 18 through 22 working less than part time—regardless of their school enrollment status. If a person is married or not part of the household unit, he/she is considered independent regardless of age. This independent-person definition recognizes that the contributions or benefits received by immigrant’s children are driven by the decisions of their parents regardless of the children’s own immigrant status.

We assign all revenues and expenditures for each fiscal year between 2013 and 2018 among Venezuelan-born, other foreign-born, and native-born, our reference population. We further decompose Venezuelan-born into short-, mid- and long-term migrants depending on the time they have resided in Colombia: less than a year, one to five years, more than five years. The native-born group is further broken down into permanent residents (our reference group) and returnees, to account for those native-born individuals previously living in Venezuela who returned to the country since



2012. Throughout the text we will use the terms *permanent natives* and *natives*—in general—interchangeably. Finally, our analysis will focus on the contribution of immigrants relative to permanent natives to mitigate the effect of fiscal imbalances, as discussed in the previous section.

### 3.1. Model

Following Dustmann and Frattini (2014), in every year  $t$ , the General Government fiscal balance ( $GGFB_t$ ) is the difference between revenues ( $REV_t$ ) and expenditures ( $EXP_t$ ),<sup>3</sup> including interest payments on public debt. Total revenues are computed as the sum of all  $N_R$  sources of tax, non-tax, capital, and additional income, with  $rev_{it}$  denoting the income from source  $i$  in year  $t$ . Likewise, we denote expenditure  $j$  in year  $t$  as  $exp_{jt}$ , and  $N_E$  as the number of different expenditure items. Thus, the General Government fiscal balance can be written as

$$GGFB_t = REV_t - EXP_t = \sum_{i=1}^{N_R} rev_{it} - \sum_{j=1}^{N_E} exp_{jt}. \quad (1)$$

We can decompose equation (1) into the net contributions of the different interest groups discussed above at a particular year. Indexing the groups by  $g$ , we can rewrite equation (1) as

$$GGFB_t = \sum_{g=1}^G (\alpha_t^g REV_t - \beta_t^g EXP_t) = \sum_{g=1}^G \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N_R} \alpha_{it}^g rev_{it} - \sum_{j=1}^{N_E} \beta_{it}^g exp_{jt} \right), \quad (2)$$

where  $\alpha_{it}^g$  denotes the share of government revenues  $i$  in year  $t$  that originated in contributions of group  $g$  and  $\beta_{it}^g$  denotes share of expenditures  $j$  allocated to group  $g$ . Note that for every source of revenue  $\sum_{g=1}^G \alpha_{it}^g = 1$  and for every expenditure item  $\sum_{g=1}^G \beta_{it}^g = 1$ . In the next subsection we describe in detail how we compute these shares and how we group government revenues and expenditures. As you can imagine, this computation relies on very detailed administrative information and a rich survey data of the groups of interest for every fiscal year.

Since each group's revenues and expenditures are proportional to group size, we follow Dustmann and Frattini (2014) and compare net contributions across groups using the ratio of revenues to expenditures ( $RE_t^g$ ) for each group in each year as

$$RE_t^g = REV_t^g / EXP_t^g \quad (3)$$

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<sup>3</sup> The General Government is composed of the Central Government, including public establishments, the Social Security sector, and all subnational governments.

and compare net contributions of immigrants relative to natives, indexed by  $n$ , using relative net contributions ( $RNC_t^g$ ), to address the effect of fiscal imbalances:

$$RNC_t^g = RE_t^g / RE_t^n, \quad \text{for } g \neq n. \quad (4)$$

When the ratio of revenues to expenditures is greater (less) than unity, the particular group contributes more (less) in taxes than what it receives from public spending. Similarly, a relative ratio  $RNC_t^g$  greater (less) than unity indicates that the immigrant group's net contribution is greater (less) than the contribution of permanent natives.

### 3.2. Data

The analysis is based on estimates of the contributions of natives and immigrants to government revenues in each fiscal year and the expenditures allocated to each group. Accordingly, we rely on two sources of information. Our first source is Colombia's Labor Force Survey (*Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares—GEIH*), developed by the National Department of Statistics (*Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística—DANE*).<sup>4</sup> The GEIH is a representative monthly survey at the national, urban-rural level and for the thirteen main cities and metropolitan areas. We pooled monthly data to get representative information by capital city with its metropolitan area for each year, consistent with the fiscal year. Each month, approximately 20,500 households are surveyed. The GEIH is a rotating panel, so each household is interviewed during a number of successive cohorts (years) before leaving the sample, and only once in the year. In that sense, during the same year, about 250,000 households are interviewed, or about 1.5% of the Colombian population.

The GEIH allows us to track in each month the number of immigrants residing in Colombia. Since 2013 it allows us to identify the country where the migrant was living twelve months and also five years before being surveyed, and his or her place of birth. However, the survey does not ask the year of entry to the country which prevents us from analyzing immigrants' cohorts by year of arrival. Instead, we focus on moving cohorts (short-, mid- and long-term). Despite these limitations, the GEIH continues to be the best source of data currently available on immigrant population (regular or irregular) residing in the country. This survey has other advantages. The information is collected regardless of immigrants' migratory status and is representative for both regular and irregular migrants. We estimate the stock of immigrants using sample weights. In addition, the GEIH records ample information regarding labor market participation and wages, as well as households and individuals' socioeconomic characteristics. It also collects self-reported information on access to government programs and affiliation to social protection (health care and pension system), which we use to identify beneficiaries.

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<sup>4</sup> Data is available to download at [http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/MICRODATOS/about\\_collection/23/1](http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/MICRODATOS/about_collection/23/1).

We draw on a number of data by the Ministry of Finance, Colombia’s Tax Administration (*Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales—DIAN*), state and local governments’ budget executions, the General Accounting Office, DANE, and several other government entities to construct government receipts and expenditures. We now describe each of these data sources.

We derive our expenditure data from the General Government Expenditure by Sub-function information published annually by DANE. This data reports expenditures for different items classified according to the United Nations Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG). Public data available online on government expenditures are only disaggregated into eleven functions: general public services, defense, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community amenities, health, recreational activities, culture and sports, education, social protection, and debt service.<sup>5</sup> Now, we were able to obtain detailed information by sub-function directly from DANE.

Information on government revenues for all fiscal years between 2013 and 2018, covering the main aspects of government finances for the General Government, is not available in Colombia. Thus, we rely on multiple administrative data to construct government revenues using the same sample of government agencies covered in the expenditures side.<sup>6</sup> As sources of information for the central government, we use the Integrated Financial Information System (*Sistema Integrado de Información Financiera—SIIF*) and annual reports from DIAN. For local governments we use the information available in the Single Territorial Form (*Formulario Único Territorial—FUT*). The information for agencies and public establishments not included partially or totally by the previous data was complemented with the financial statements from the General Accounting Office. Revenues included follow the principle of net revenues. In this sense, tax returns caused during the same fiscal year are discounted. Likewise, transfers between the different levels of government are excluded. Particularly, we rely on information from the fiscal accounts of the Social Security Sector (health and pensions) carried out by the Ministry of Finance. Finally, we use data from the General Royalties System (SGR by its Spanish acronym) to complement the information on investment resources available in the case of local governments.

### 3.3. *Allocation of revenues and expenditures*

We proceed to describe the categories used to group revenues and expenditures and how we allocate these values in our baseline scenario. According to the discussion in Section 2.2, we will make explicit the difference in the allocation criteria when we assume the *average* cost or *marginal* cost of public provision, if relevant in each case.

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<sup>5</sup> Recent information is available online at <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/cuentas-nacionales/cuentas-nacionales-anuales#cuentas-de-sectores-institucionales>.

<sup>6</sup> The sample used by DANE to construct government expenditures follows the recommended classification of the System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA) and the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014 (GFSM).

For a detailed recount of the technical details and data sources used to construct the apportioning coefficients and the items included in each revenue and expenditure category please refer to Appendix A. In subsection 5.2 we conduct a sensitivity analysis by using alternative allocation criteria.

### A. Revenues

Table 1 summarizes the criteria we use in our baseline and alternative scenarios to allocate revenues in each case. We have grouped receipts from the General Government in 14 categories. Details on the grouping and a full list of revenues are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix.

We use income information from the Labor Force Survey (*Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares—GEIH*) to estimate each group’s share of total payments of *income tax, social insurance and payroll taxes*, which account for 13.1% of total government revenues on average over the period 2013-2018. To compute income tax, we use taxable income—which also includes additional sources of income (e.g., capital income)—and apply year-specific tax rates of the ordinary system. In our estimates we allow for tax benefits that reduce the tax base and take into account tax withholdings for those not obliged to file a tax return. Social insurance contributions (SICs) and payroll taxes are calculated by applying year-specific rates to the estimated Contribution Base Income. We use information on the affiliation status to a pension fund and to the contributory health care regime in the case of SICs and use all wage and salary workers to estimate payroll taxes.

To determine the allocation coefficients for *corporate and capital taxes*, which account for 18.6% of total government revenues on average, we first deduct the share of foreign ownership using information from the *Unified Commercial and Social Registry (RUES)* which collects data for all registered business in Colombia and their share of local and foreign capital. We then apportion corporate taxes using each group’s share in the population receiving individual dividend and interest income and allocate the national public ownership share to natives on a *pro rata* basis. Our estimates are based on rolling 2-year GEIH samples. In our sensitivity analysis we use the information from the GEIH on individual dividend and interest income of long-term residents (>5 years), which is composed of income from interest on loans or CDs, savings deposits, profits, gains or dividends on investments. We don’t include this as our baseline scenario because the information reported by households extends beyond business profits or dividends on investment, and thus it is likely to be capturing interests from direct lending to other households.

We apportion *wealth tax* taking into account the contribution of revenues between households and firms. Relative to total government revenues, wealth tax averaged 1.5% over the period 2013-2018. Based on estimates from Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2018), for each fiscal year we can distinguish between personal and corporate wealth tax receipts. We treat firms’ wealth tax payments similarly to corporate and capital tax payments. In the case of personal wealth tax payments, we use a multi-step procedure to proxy for asset ownership based on information from the GEIH. First, we take self-reported values on the minimum price a household

would sell their house if they decided to do so and distribute the resulting value among the head of household and his or her spouse/partner. Next, we estimate price-to-rent ratios for each year using expected rent and expected dwelling values and apply these ratios to reported annualized individual rental income (e.g., houses, apartments, rural property). Finally, we sum all individual property values and allocate revenues based on each group's share among total assets in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile or above.

*VAT and other indirect taxes* are the largest contributor to total revenues, averaging 23.9%. To allocate these receipts we estimate each group's share of total payments for each tax, net of nonresident direct purchases share, following the common multi-step procedure in the literature. First, we apply decile-specific effective tax rates to households' gross income from the GEIH depending on the position in the income distribution. Decile-specific effective tax rates are based on our own estimates using the 2014 Quality of Life Survey (*Encuesta de Calidad de Vida—ECV*) and the 2016-2017 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (*Encuesta Nacional de Presupuestos de los Hogares—ENPH*). A detailed account of how we proceed to estimate the incidence of indirect taxes, tariffs and import duties is presented in the Online Appendix. We apply the tax structure in place in 2014, 2016 and 2017. We use effective tax rates in the following way: (i) for 2013-2014 we use 2014 effective tax rates; (ii) for 2015-2016 we use 2016 effective tax rates; (iii) for 2017-2018 we use 2017 effective tax rates. Then we distribute each household's total payments in indirect taxes to all members of the household using individual contributions to the household gross income. Since we cannot separately identify effective tax rates for natives and immigrants, we implicitly assume that natives and immigrants with similar levels of income have similar consumption patterns. While Colombia and Venezuela share cultural traits, and one would expect this not to be a significant issue, immigrants may have lower consumption or send remittances back to their home countries at levels that may affect consumption. In our sensitivity analysis we follow the literature and assume a 20% reduction in total payment of indirect taxes paid by immigrants relative to the average for the general population.

Finally, we compute apportioning coefficients for each indirect tax by summing total payments for the projected population using sample weights and estimating the contribution of each group in total payments. We use the information from the macroeconomic aggregates reported by Colombia's Statistical Department (DANE) to exclude final consumption spending by non-resident households in the economic territory. Now, since firms contribute to nondeductible VAT, tariffs and import duties revenues, we use data from the supply and use tables of the National Accounts System to estimate the share of payments attributed to firms. We treat firms' nondeductible VAT, tariffs and import duties payments similarly to corporate and capital taxes payments. Wine and spirits VAT are assigned to households.

In the case of *motor vehicle taxes*, we apportion motor vehicle tax proportionately to the share of motor vehicle ownership (car or motorcycle) for each group in the adult (18+) population. Since we can only identify ownership at the household level in the GEIH we assume equal contributions from all adult members.

**Table 1**  
Government Revenues Allocation Criteria

Revenue group	% of total	Baseline	Alternative
Income tax, social Insurance and payroll taxes	13.1	Share of total payments: tax schedule applied to GEIH earnings	
Corporate and capital taxes	18.6	Share of population with individual dividend and interest income, net of nonresident foreign ownership share; national public ownership share is allocated to natives	Share of long-term residents (>5 years) with individual dividend and interest income
Wealth tax	1.5	Share of adult (18+) population (firms' contrib.); share of real estate value for property owners in the 90th percentile or above (households' contrib.)	Same as corporate and capital taxes (firms' contributions)
VAT and other indirect taxes	23.9	Share of total payments, net of nonresident direct purchases share; effective rates by household income decile from the Online Appendix.	Same as baseline, but assuming a 20% reduction in total payment of indirect taxes for immigrants
Motor vehicle tax	0.5	Share of motor vehicle ownership in the adult (18+) population	
Property tax	2.6	Share of adult (18+) population (firms' contrib.); share of real estate value for property owners (households' contrib.)	Same as corporate and capital taxes (firms' contributions)
Industry and commerce tax	2.9	Share of adult (18+) population (firms' contrib.); share of self-employed owning an industrial, commercial, or service business (households' contrib.)	Same as corporate and capital taxes (firms' contributions)
Financial transactions tax	2.7	Share of adult (18+) population with a savings and/or checking account	
Gross operating surplus, rents and royalties	13.1	Share of adult (18+) population ( <i>average contribution</i> ) / All to permanent natives ( <i>marginal contribution</i> )	
Urban phones tax	0.0	Share of adult population (18+) with access to a landline	
Educational services	0.8	Share of population in higher education in public establishments	
National Teachers Pension Fund (FOMAG)	1.4	Share of employees in the education sector classified as government workers	
Immigration Certificates	0.0	Share of foreign-born population	
Other	18.8	Share of adult (18+) population	

*Notes.* The first column reports the revenue groups in which we have classified the list of all government revenues we assembled based on information from the Ministry of Finance, DIAN, FUT, SGR, and the General Accounting Office. The second column shows the average proportion of each group in total government revenues between 2013–2018. The last two columns summarize the criteria we use in our baseline and alternative scenarios to allocate revenues in each case.

*Property tax* contributes roughly 2.6% to total General Government tax receipts over the period 2013-2018. According to estimates from Ávila-Mahecha (2015), firms contributed on average 70% to total property tax revenue between 2010-2013. We use this share to allocate total payments between firms and individuals for all years. We treat firms' contributions similarly to corporate and capital taxes payments and treat households' revenues similarly to personal wealth tax payments, but instead of using only those asset values above the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile we use in this case the whole distribution.

The *industry and commerce tax* is the single largest share of local government revenues—excluding royalties. It is levied on direct or indirect industrial, commercial or service activities in the jurisdiction of a specific municipality, and accounts for 2.9% of total government revenues on average. According to estimates from Ávila-Mahecha (2015), firms contributed on average 90% to total industry and commerce tax revenue between 2010-2013. We use this share to allocate total payments between firms and self-employed for all years. We treat firms' contributions similarly to corporate and capital taxes payments and allocate households' revenues using the share of self-employed owning an industrial, commercial, or service business.

According to estimates from Ávila-Mahecha (2015), firms contributed roughly 85% to total payments of *financial transactions tax* in 2013. We use this share to allocate total payments between firms and households for all years. We allocate households' revenues using the share of each group's expenditures among those with monthly expenses above the tax exemption threshold set by law on financial movements for checking or savings accounts. As we don't have information on the access of households to financial services—or on the legal status of immigrants—and therefore we cannot identify those individuals who have or may have “potential” access to financial services, we apply estimates of the expenditures-to-income ratio by decile (see Online Appendix) to personal income reported in the GEIH. We implicitly assume that natives and immigrants above the threshold have similar access to financial services. While we know immigrants face difficulties to access the financial system as it may take time for them to have all the required documents, we have no way of addressing this.

*Gross operating surplus, rents and royalties* account for 13.1% of total government revenues on average over the period 2013-2018. In our *average effect* scenario, we apportion these receipts proportionately to the share of each group in the adult (18+) population. Now, in the *marginal effect* scenario, we attribute all revenues to the permanent native-born population. As is standard in the literature, we implicitly assume these resources are the result of managerial or investment decisions that took place before immigrants' arrival.

To apportion *urban phones tax* payments, we use the share of adult population (18+) with access to a landline. In the case of *educational services*, we use the share of each group in the total population enrolled in higher education in public institutions. As for the *National Teachers Pension Fund*, responsible, among other activities, for making the payment of social benefits to teachers, we allocate these resources using the share of each group in the total number of workers in the

educational sector (pre-school, primary or secondary education) classified as wage and salary workers working for the government. Revenues from *immigration certificates* are allocated using each group’s share in the foreign-born population. All remaining tax payments, fees, fines and penalties, and other receipts, are apportioned according to the share of each group in the adult (18+) population. The tax receipts involved contribute slightly less than 19% of total revenue annually.

## B. Expenditures

Table 2 summarizes the criteria we use to estimate apportioning coefficients for government expenditures. We have aggregated the list of government expenditures by sub-function (UN COFOG) as adopted by DANE into 15 groups. Details are reported in Table A2 of the appendix.

Following our discussion in subsection 2.2., we stick with the approach used by Dustmann and Frattini (2014) and price ‘pure’ public goods both at their average cost and according to their marginal cost. Doing it this way we can see straightaway the potential effect of population growth from immigration. In our *average effect* scenario, we apportion public goods proportionately to the share of each group in the population. Now, in the *marginal effect* scenario, we attribute all costs to the permanent native-born population. Measuring the difference in the net fiscal contribution between groups on the choice of scenario is a critical issue because ‘pure’ public goods account for 11.3% of total government expenditures on average. We include in this group all expenditures associated with public goods or services that are normally considered as non-rival in consumption—excluding debt servicing.

For those public goods that are to some extent rival in consumption, i.e., that are ‘congestible’, we apportion the cost of providing these goods according to each group’s share in total population (*average effect*). These expenditures account for 21.6% of total government expenditures on average over the period 2013-2018.

Expenditure on *law courts and prisons* is allocated proportionately to the size of each group in the prison population, using information on the nationality of prison inmates from the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute, INPEC. In this case we classify immigrants based on the reported nationality which need not be consistent with the country of birth. *Water supply* is allocated using each group’s share of the total population with access to water supply as reported in the GEIH.

To estimate each group’s share of *health services* expenditure we use the distribution of health costs by age group and the affiliation status to the General Health Care Social Security System (SGSSS) as reported in the GEIH. Now, while access to the SGSSS benefits’ plan is conditional on being affiliated to either the contributory or subsidized regime, by law, emergency services must continue to be provided to those not affiliated. We follow Reina *et al.* (2018) and assign the complete value of the capitation payment unit (UPC) to those affiliated and 45% of the UPC for the subsidized regime as the cost of health services for those not affiliated. We apply the contribution of each age group to total health expenditures according to their affiliation status and distribute the resulting values proportionately to the share of immigrants and natives in each age range. As we lack information on the



use of health services between immigrants and natives, we assume that both groups have similar service use patterns.

Education represents 13.1% of total government expenditures on average over the period 2013-2018. In our *average effect* scenario, we allocate expenditures on *compulsory education* using direct information from the GEIH on the share of each group in the population between 3 and 16 years of age that attends pre-school, primary or secondary education in official establishments. In our expenditures data we cannot discriminate between levels of compulsory education, so we simply assume that the average cost is the same across school levels. Now, spending on compulsory education is carried out by local authorities using transfers from the National Government through the General Participation System (SGP) which are essentially distributed according to payroll costs. Thus, it is likely—at least in the short-term—that the marginal cost of educating an immigrant child is just a fraction of the average cost. So, given the high inflexibility of the teaching staff in the short-term, in the *marginal effect* scenario, we attribute costs for all children between 3 and 16 years of age attending compulsory education in official establishments in the following way: (i) all immigrants and native-born returnees residing in the country for less than a year are assign a marginal cost of zero; (ii) everyone else is assigned the average cost. Expenditures for *job training* are allocated using the share of each group in the total population attending a job training program. In our sensitivity analysis we keep only those in public institutions. Finally, for *higher education* expenditures, we compute the share of each group in the college population in public institutions.

Social protection represented the largest share of government expenditures, averaging 26.7%. Provision of social protection is provided in the form of cash and in-kind benefits and comprises expenditures for *sickness and disability* spending, *pension* benefits, *family and children*, *unemployment* benefits, *social housing* and *vulnerable population*. Using the information of self-declared benefit recipients from the GEIH, we estimate the share of each group receiving each type of benefit when we can identify them, else we use the share of overall cash benefits from government agencies. In the case of sickness and disability, unemployment benefits and vulnerable population, as we have no information on the amount of benefits received, we assume recipients receive the same quantity. Now, social protection expenditures for sickness and disability and unemployment are less than 0.03% of total government spending. Since the amount of family and children benefits depends on the number of children, in our sensitivity analysis we use as an alternative allocation the share of dependent children among family-related benefits recipients. Finally, we apportion expenditures for vulnerable population using the proportion of each group in total population classified as immigrant or native-born returnee arriving during the last twelve months, internally displaced from armed conflict, violence, natural disasters or associated to an ethnic group, or receiving cash benefits from the government with the purpose of reducing their poverty level.

**Table 2**  
Government Expenditures Allocation Criteria

Expenditure group	% of total	Baseline	Alternative
'Pure' public goods	11.3	Share of population ( <i>average cost</i> ) / All to permanent natives ( <i>marginal cost</i> )	
'Congestible' public goods	21.6	Share of population ( <i>average cost</i> )	
Law courts and prisons	3.2	Share of prison population	
Water supply	0.8	Share of population with access to water supply	
Health services	15.1	Share of population in age group, and share of total health cost of age group	
Education: compulsory education	9.6	Share of [3,16] years old pop. attending public institutions ( <i>average cost</i> ) / Excludes pop. with residence < 1 year ( <i>marginal cost</i> )	
Education: job training	1.1	Share of population in job training programs	Share of pop. in job training prog. in public institutions
Education: higher education	2.4	Share of population in higher education in public establishments	
Social protection: sickness and disability	0.0	Share of inactive pop. that left their last job within a year due to illness or accident	
Social protection: pensions	19.6	Share of total pension income (includes <i>Colombia Mayor</i> )	
Social protection: family and children	2.6	Share of total income received of family-related benefits ( <i>Más Familias en Acción</i> )	Share of dependent children among family-related benefits claimants
Social protection: unemployment	0.0	Share of unemployment benefit recipients	
Social protection: housing	1.0	Share of housing-related benefits claimants	
Social protection: vulnerable population	3.4	Share of vulnerable population (immigrants, internally displaced or in poverty)	
Debt service	8.3	Share of each group in the total population by year of arrival	

*Notes.* The first column reports the groups in which we have classified the list of all government expenditures by sub-function (UN COFOG) as adopted by Colombia's Statistical Department (DANE). The second column shows the average proportion of each group in total government expenditures between 2013–2018. The last two columns summarize the criteria we use in our baseline and alternative scenarios to allocate expenditures in each case.

How to allocate *debts service* is a critical issue. As we discussed in Section 2.2, payment of interest on the national debt should also be attributed to migrants. Particularly, interests for debt acquired as a result of their arrival to the country, not the one incurred before their arrival. In this sense, we group interest payments using immigrant's cohort classification: (i) less than a year, (ii) one to five years, (iii) more than five years. Then, we apportion debt service expenditures proportionately to the share of each group in the total resident population by year of arrival. Using information from the Ministry of Finance we were able to disaggregate about 94% of total debt service, the remaining (6% on average) is allocated on a *pro rata* basis. Excluding debt service could lead to large bias in the estimates since it represents on average 8.3% of total government expenditures.

#### 4. Demographic Characteristics and Welfare Dependency of Venezuelan Immigrants

The number of people that have emigrated from Venezuela as a consequence of the current crisis is unprecedented in Latin America. According to the UN Migration Agency, as of April 2020, approximately 5.1 million migrants were living abroad, of which over 80% were residing in Latin American countries.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Colombia has been the preferred destination for Venezuelan immigrants with roughly 35% of total outflows. Historically, Colombia had been a country mainly of emigrants. In the '90s, half a million Colombians migrated to Venezuela due to the good working conditions offered by that country (Echeverry, 2011). However, since 2013 that trend has reversed.

Table 3 contains a complete description of the population and labor force size by native and immigrant status. As shown in the fifth column in panel (a), the total number of Venezuelans in Colombia multiplied by twenty between 2013 and 2018. Only between 2017 and 2018 the number of Venezuelans had a 2.6-fold increase. Breaking these numbers down into short-, mid- and long-term immigrants, in 2013 the first two made up only 38% of the total Venezuelan-born population in Colombia but, by the end of 2018, accounted for 86% of this group. Over that same period, Colombian-born returnees grew also considerably, increasing by a factor of six, so that by 2018 3.1% of the total population residing in Colombia was composed of both returnees and Venezuelan immigrants.

As indicated in panel (c) of Table 3, migration has contributed substantially to the overall employment. Of the 1.5 million new jobs created since 2013, 43% were occupied by persons arriving from Venezuela, which is consistent with the increase in the labor force (Table 3, panel (b)). In particular, total employment for Venezuelan-born immigrants had a 22-fold increase, while the number of employed returnees multiplied by seven.

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<sup>7</sup> The information is available at [https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/02\\_INGLES\\_PR\\_ESENTACION%20ENCUESTA%20DTM%20GENERAL\\_08062020.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=9121](https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/02_INGLES_PR_ESENTACION%20ENCUESTA%20DTM%20GENERAL_08062020.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=9121)

**Table 3**  
Total Population and Labor Force Size by Native and Immigrant Status

Fiscal year	Natives			Venezuelan-born				Other
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Permanent</i>	<i>Returnees</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Short-term</i>	<i>Mid-term</i>	<i>Long-term</i>	
<i>Panel (a): Total population</i>								
2013	45,621,104	45,566,479	54,625	57,537	7,844	13,746	35,946	95,642
2014	46,069,630	45,978,222	91,408	94,803	13,167	16,779	64,857	131,618
2015	46,563,408	46,438,425	124,982	124,678	30,610	29,789	64,279	130,605
2016	46,974,270	46,744,567	229,702	228,549	87,569	54,047	86,932	140,673
2017	47,295,084	47,039,930	255,154	438,281	208,856	128,491	100,934	134,456
2018	47,104,200	46,757,727	346,473	1,147,503	583,965	404,203	159,335	138,844
<i>Panel (b): Labor Force</i>								
2013	22,907,321	22,871,557	35,763	25,934	3,710	6,444	15,780	41,951
2014	23,254,231	23,193,733	60,498	39,939	4,221	7,248	28,470	53,078
2015	23,800,779	23,717,733	83,046	42,802	9,383	9,806	23,613	49,758
2016	24,016,890	23,871,099	145,791	84,218	35,328	21,333	27,556	52,939
2017	24,207,241	24,040,117	167,124	187,140	101,402	56,815	28,923	51,932
2018	24,026,744	23,785,432	241,312	580,558	329,487	216,714	34,357	50,338
<i>Panel (c): Employment</i>								
2013	20,724,150	20,692,793	31,356	22,387	2,770	5,370	14,247	38,680
2014	21,165,687	21,114,240	51,447	35,225	3,848	6,749	24,628	49,078
2015	21,710,297	21,637,737	72,560	38,476	7,648	9,533	21,295	45,915
2016	21,837,528	21,715,326	122,202	71,780	28,639	18,574	24,566	49,037
2017	21,973,376	21,829,050	144,326	159,707	80,937	52,449	26,321	49,177
2018	21,764,468	21,551,961	212,507	495,944	272,134	193,602	30,208	45,778

*Notes.* The Table reports in panel (a) the number of natives and immigrants in every fiscal year. In panel (b), we report the number of individuals in the labor force in each group. In panel (c), we report the total population employed in each group. We distinguish natives between permanent and returnees coming back from Venezuela and classify Venezuelan immigrants by cohort of arrival. Permanent natives include returnees within the last five years from countries other than Venezuela. Other foreign-born residents are classified apart. The labor force is defined as the total number of unemployed people of working age (aged 15 to 64) plus those in employment (aged 15 or over). *Source.* Authors' estimates using data from the 2013-2018 GEIH.

**Table 4**

Descriptive Statistics for the Native and Immigrant Population, 2013-2018

Characteristics	Natives			Venezuelan-born				Other
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Permanent</i>	<i>Returnees</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Short-term</i>	<i>Mid-term</i>	<i>Long-term</i>	
1. Average Family Size	4.2	4.2	4.8	4.9	5.1	4.8	4.8	3.6
2. Percent Male	49.3	49.3	52.7	51.0	51.1	51.2	50.6	55.9
3. Average Age (years)	31.4	31.4	34.1	20.0	20.5	21.7	17.1	27.4
4. Percent Age < 16	28.2	28.3	15.2	43.4	38.1	39.0	58.4	42.9
5. Percent Age 16-24	15.7	15.7	15.2	19.6	23.6	20.5	11.2	9.7
6. Percent Age 65+	8.0	8.0	4.7	0.7	0.4	0.4	1.5	7.9
7. Average years of schooling (age 15+)	8.8	8.8	7.8	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.2	13.0
8. Percent Enrolled (age 3-16)	87.2	87.2	86.5	65.3	47.9	83.0	68.5	88.5
9. Percent College Grads (age 25+)	10.7	10.7	4.0	17.7	16.0	19.1	19.2	52.6
10. Employment Rate	70.5	70.5	70.7	68.5	67.8	70.9	66.1	70.3
11. Unemployment Rate	9.2	9.1	13.5	14.3	18.1	10.1	11.0	7.4
12. Percent Wage and Salary Wkrs.	48.3	48.4	41.2	47.4	48.1	48.6	43.3	45.9
13. Percent Self-Employed	47.0	47.0	54.9	48.8	49.1	47.6	50.4	49.0
14. Avg. <i>real</i> Monthly Labor Income ( <i>K</i> )	979.7	981.1	698.1	1,027.9	664.7	1,245.7	1,638.6	3,927.6
15. Median ( <i>real</i> ) Monthly Labor Income ( <i>K</i> )	760.8	760.8	665.9	747.1	650.3	798.5	812.7	1,622.9
16. Percent Earning below min. wage	47.8	47.7	60.7	58.1	66.5	53.3	43.4	22.9
17. Industrial Distribution:								
a. Agriculture and Mining	17.2	17.2	16.5	6.8	6.2	6.2	10.0	5.1
b. Construction	6.2	6.1	11.8	9.8	10.7	10.1	6.6	3.1
c. Manufacturing	11.9	11.9	13.7	12.4	11.8	12.4	14.1	10.4
d. Transportation, Communication, Utilities	8.8	8.8	7.4	5.9	4.1	6.4	10.3	5.1
e. Trade, Hotels, Restaurants	27.2	27.2	29.9	42.5	48.5	41.3	28.0	30.3
f. Finance, Insurance, Real State	9.1	9.1	6.6	7.4	5.1	8.5	11.6	16.9
g. Services	19.7	19.8	14.1	15.2	13.6	15.1	19.4	29.0

*Notes.* The Table reports, on average for fiscal years 2013-2018, descriptive statistics for natives, Venezuelan-born immigrants and other immigrants by cohort. Family size refers to a single-person household or one with two or more persons who live in the same dwelling and are related to each other by blood, marriage, common-law union or adoption. The employment rate is defined as the ratio of the employed (aged 15 or over) to the working age population (aged 15 to 64). Unemployment is constraint to those of working age. Average and median real labor income (discounted using the 2018 CPI) includes earnings for wage and salary workers and self-employed excluding business owners. Trade industry includes wholesale and retail. *Source.* Authors' estimates using data from the 2013-2018 GEIH.

#### 4.1. *Demographic characteristics*

Table 4 presents demographic information of natives and immigrants in Colombia. The information corresponds to the average over fiscal years 2013-2018. A comparison of the demographic characteristics of native and immigrant populations, specifically those arriving from Venezuela, suggests that the latter have a larger family size, are younger and slightly more likely to be male, but less likely to be enrolled in compulsory education.

Immigrants and their children differ from natives in many ways, but the age structure is particularly something that stands out. Immigrants are on average eleven years younger than natives. While the share of natives under 16 years is roughly 28%, this group represents over two fifths of the Venezuelan-born population. Likewise, the 65-and-older population share is 8 percent for natives but under one per cent for Venezuelans. Figure 1 shows the age structure in 2013 and 2018 of Venezuelan-born and their native-born children by cohort of arrival to Colombia, and the rest of the native-born population. Both the size and speed of the migration flow since 2013 has produced substantial changes in the structure of the population. Panels (a) and (b) reveal a different picture across cohorts but consistent with the arrival of younger persons over time as part of the process of families' reunification after the arrival of first migrants. In 2013 the larger group of long-term immigrant residents presented a more similar pattern than the overall native-born population in the lower side of the distribution, with most of its population being concentrated under 35 years of age. While both mid- and short-term migrants were also at a large very young, the structure was more diversified in the mid-section. The latter is a well-known pattern of more recent immigrants, as they tend to migrate of working age and without most of their family members.

The picture in 2018 is that of an immigrant population heavily concentrated at working ages but at the same time containing a large number of children. The short-term cohort is nearly the mirror image of the mid-term cohort, showing a large arrival in recent years of migrants in their 20s and 30s with children under the age of 10. The long-term cohort, which in 2018 comprises the mid-term cohort and most of the short-term cohort shown in 2013, has comparatively few members of working age and a higher share of children and elderly, particularly children born in Colombia. The presence of a younger migrant population extends the demographic bonus for Colombia. The clear aging of the native-born population, displayed with a fatter right tail in Figure 1, is an indication of changes in the age structure of the resident population with fewer persons of working age that will support those who reach retirement age.


Returning to Table 4, Venezuelan immigrants have higher educational attainment with respect to natives. Both at the aggregate level and looking at each cohort, immigrants have higher average years of schooling and share of college graduates. However, this is not the case with native-born returnees. They have on average one less year of education and a much lower share of college graduates. This may be an indication of either lower attainment before migration to Venezuela, or lower access to education in that country. These differences in education may reflect

the possible differences on labor market assimilation, both on the highly qualified and low qualified population, and thus on net contributions to the government budget.


**Figure 1**

Age Structure of Natives and Immigrant Cohorts

(a) Fiscal year 2013



(b) Fiscal year 2018



*Notes.* Figures (a) and (b) presents the age distribution of natives and Venezuelan immigrants by cohort for fiscal years 2013 and 2018, respectively. For immigrant cohorts we compute equally weighted five-age years moving averages to smooth the effect of low frequency data. We group ages above 90 years. *Source.* Authors' estimates using data from the 2013-2018 GEIH.

Despite having higher levels of education, Venezuelan immigrants present on average a lower employment rate when comparing them to natives and a higher unemployment rate, particularly in the case of short-term cohorts. However, we see these numbers improve as immigrants assimilate in the destination country. Now, while on average Venezuelan immigrants are distributed similar in terms of wage and salary workers and self-employed to the native-born population, long-term migrants are more likely to be self-employed.

Perhaps one of the most notably results is the fact that on average monthly income of Venezuelan-born migrants is higher than that native-born. However, this is driven by high average wages for long-term residents—and part of the mid-term cohort, which display a larger concentration of employment in the mining, finance and services industries. In the case of short-term migrants, we see a significant lower average wage and a large concentration of workers in wholesale and retail and the hospitality industry (hotels and restaurants). In addition, the share of workers earning below the minimum wage reaches 66 per cent, well above other immigrants and natives. This difference is evident throughout the whole distribution of wages. It is not clear that differences in wages and in labor market indicators between migrant cohorts are associated with differences in levels of schooling, which tend to be correlated with labor productivity, but suggest a relationship with the length of their stay in the country.

#### 4.2. *Estimating the welfare dependency of migrants*

Since welfare programs account for a significant share of government expenditures, estimating the welfare dependency of immigrants relative to natives is essential in understanding the fiscal pressure that immigration impose on the central and local governments' budget. In addition, the extent to which welfare provision itself is conducive to self-selection of migrants has been a recurring topic in the literature. A majority of the literature studying the differences in welfare reliance of immigrants and natives finds that immigrant-headed households are less likely to claim welfare relative to natives (Blau, 1984; Barrett and McCarthy, 2008; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). Now, when immigrants are found to use welfare more intensively than natives (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003; Sarvimäki, 2011), the results are mostly driven by differences in the demographic composition of groups. Nonetheless, welfare take-up is found to be higher for recent immigrant cohorts than for cohorts arriving earlier (Borjas and Trejo, 1991). However, the way welfare-use changes with the length of an immigrant stay in the host country is mixed. The results shown in the literature usually take into account only regular (a.k.a. legal) migration as surveys or Census data sometimes are unable to capture irregular migrants. Since irregular immigrants are often not eligible to access welfare services, social insurance dependency would be lower if we are able to account for them.

It is important to mention that since mid-2017 the National Government authorized the admission of non-nationals to the unified vulnerability assessment and identification system for social assistance (SISBEN, for its Spanish acronym). As



a result, the National Planning Department made registration into SISBEN more flexible for Venezuelan immigrants, allowing, in addition to those holding a Colombian foreign resident identity card, those with documents that prove them as regular immigrants, especially those who have an active Special Permit of Permanence (PEP, for its Spanish acronym)—including their dependents.

To estimate the welfare dependency of migrants, we use self-reported information in the GEIH. We look at whether individuals claim any type of welfare benefits, such as subsidized health care, conditional cash transfer from *Más Familias en Acción* or *Jóvenes en Acción*, unemployment benefits, pension-related benefits (*Colombia Mayor* and other subsidies for the elderly), housing-related benefits, or other cash assistance. In the Appendix we estimate welfare dependency using only the head of household (Table B1 in the Appendix). Using this information, we are able to create four variables identifying welfare take-up: (i) any welfare program, (ii) social insurance: health care, (iii) social insurance: pension, and (iv) cash assistance.

Then, we estimate welfare dependency using the following linear probability model:

$$W_{it} = \alpha + \beta M_{it} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\gamma + \Omega_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

where  $\beta$  measures the weighted average difference in the probability of receiving welfare benefits [ $P(W > 0)$ ] between immigrants ( $M$ ) and natives, or the level of receipts in the case of cash assistance given participation [ $W|(W > 0)$ ]. We control for other individual factors  $\mathbf{X}_{it}$  that may influence welfare take-up such as age, sex, family size, monthly wage, nonlabor and nontransfer income, and residential location. Since we pool our monthly data, we include year dummies  $\Omega_t$  to take into account changes in welfare participation over time that do not affect differently immigrants and natives.

As mentioned above, we use a linear probability model (LPM) to estimate marginal effects. The well-known arguments against using LPM suggest that estimates may be bias and inconsistent as it can yield predicted probabilities outside of the [0,1] interval and OLS estimation imposes heteroskedasticity. To deal with this matter we use heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard error estimates. The fact that predicted values are not constrained to the [0,1] interval is not an issue unless one is interested in predicting the value of the dependent variable. In addition, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) show that when none (or few) of the predicted probabilities from our LPM lie outside the interval (0,1) then the LPM estimates are expected to be unbiased. In our example, it turns out that over 99% of predicted probabilities for any welfare and health take-up lie in the interval (0,1). This fraction is lower for pension-related benefits and cash assistance. Nonetheless, our main purpose is to estimate the partial effect of migration on the probability of welfare take-up, then the fact that we have predicted values outside the unit interval is not a concern as probabilities are averaged across the distribution of individual characteristics.

**Table 5**

Welfare Dependency: Immigrant-Native Differences in Welfare-Take Up Probabilities and Transfer Values

	Welfare Take-up Probability				Level of Receipts (COP\$ thousands)
	Any Welfare	Health Care	Pension	Cash Assistance	
Panel (a): Immigrants by group					
All immigrants	− 0.154*** (0.004)	− 0.147*** (0.004)	− 0.079*** (0.006)	− 0.038*** (0.001)	29.39 (67.94)
Venezuelan	− 0.153*** (0.004)	− 0.146*** (0.004)	− 0.067*** (0.007)	− 0.041*** (0.001)	− 32.82 (63.18)
Other	− 0.159*** (0.012)	− 0.151*** (0.012)	− 0.110*** (0.017)	− 0.005*** (0.001)	413.5 (300.1)
Panel (b): Venezuelan immigrants by cohort					
Returnees	0.010* (0.006)	0.016** (0.006)	− 0.067*** (0.009)	− 0.047*** (0.002)	− 108.1*** (38.53)
Short-term	− 0.392*** (0.004)	− 0.383*** (0.004)	− 0.088*** (0.012)	− 0.044*** (0.001)	− 612.9*** (132.0)
Mid-term	− 0.251*** (0.008)	− 0.242*** (0.008)	− 0.079*** (0.014)	− 0.039*** (0.002)	− 124.1 (169.9)
Long-term	− 0.023** (0.011)	− 0.024** (0.011)	− 0.029 (0.023)	− 0.010** (0.005)	205.1 (208.7)
Predicted probability of welfare take-up for permanent natives	0.467	0.454	0.163	0.080	—
Fraction of predicted prob. in the (0,1) interval	0.995	0.994	0.875	0.802	—
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	3,942,593	3,942,593	405,522	3,942,593	257,596

Notes. The unit of analysis is the individual. We consider all persons 10 years of age or older except for pension benefits in which case we consider all female age 54 or older and males age 59 or older. Panel (a) considers all immigrant groups in fiscal years 2013–2018, while panel (b) focuses on Venezuelan immigrants (including returnees) by cohort. Cash assistance includes *Más Familias en Acción*, *Jóvenes en Acción*, unemployment benefits, *Colombia Mayor*, social housing programs, and other cash transfers from National and local governments. The level of receipts is the self-reported value for cash assistance excluding unemployment for which we don't have information. We drop observations with no reported value or values below ten thousand pesos and discount them using the 2018 CPI. Controls include age, a dummy variable for females, family size, monthly wage, annual nonlabor and nontransfer income, and a dummy variable for those living in an urban area. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights reported in the GEIH. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* Denotes significance at 1%, \*\* significance at 5% and \* significance at 10%.

Finally, it is not clear that imposing a nonlinear relationship (as done by Logit and Probit models) is better than imposing a linear relationship. Angrist and Pishke (2009) show that if the conditional expectation function (CEF) is linear, then the linear probability regression function gives the CEF. Now, when the CEF is nonlinear, the regression approximates the CEF. However, since a 'wrong' non-linear model will not estimate the true marginal effects, choosing a non-linear model is a

fairly arbitrary choice. Estimating the LPM gives more robust estimates and a straightforward interpretation over non-linear models.

Table 5 present estimates of the probability of participating in welfare programs and of the level of receipts from each type of program. All else equal, immigrants are significantly less likely to take-up welfare benefits than permanent natives. While 47% of natives were receiving some type of welfare between 2013-2018, Venezuelan migrants were 15.3 percentage points less likely to be participating in welfare programs. When we disaggregate these results by type of benefit, we see that Venezuelan immigrants were 14.6 less likely to be enrolled in subsidized health care, 6.7 percentage points less likely to be receiving pension-related benefits and 4.1 percentage points less likely to be receiving cash benefits. Now, we don't see evidence of significant differences in welfare payments between immigrants and natives, although the coefficient for Venezuelan immigrants is negative.

This trend is similar among Venezuelan-born immigrants but slightly different among native-born returnees. All immigrant cohorts are also less likely to receive any welfare than permanent natives, ranging from 2.3 percentage points for long-term immigrants to 39.2 percentage points in the case of those arriving in the last twelve months. However, while native-born returnees are less likely to receive pension-related benefits and cash assistance than natives, they are 1.6 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in subsidized health care, making them more likely to receive any welfare. Now, both native-born returnees and short-term Venezuelan immigrants receive lower welfare payments. Among cash assistance recipients, short-term (returnees) immigrants receive \$612.9 (\$108.1) thousand pesos less than permanent natives, other things equal. No evidenced of differences in the level of receipts for those receiving cash benefits is seen for cohorts arriving earlier. These results suggest a relationship between the length of time in Colombia and the probability—and level—of welfare take-up.

## 5. Fiscal Impact of Immigration by Level of Government

In this section we report the net fiscal contributions by level of government for the different immigrant groups defined in Section 3. In each case we present estimates using both the average effect and marginal effect scenarios. Allocating the cost of all public goods proportionally to the size of each group, as in the average effect scenario, is likely to overestimate the fiscal effect of immigrants as their marginal cost to non-congestible public goods is close to zero. Therefore, by including in our estimates both scenarios we present an upper and lower bound for the effect of immigrants on public finances.

Revenues and expenditures for the General Government are presented disaggregated by level of government: National and regional and local. We include revenues and expenditures for social security as part of the National government. Revenues that are allocated using the General System of Transfers (*Sistema General de Participaciones*, SGP) are assigned to regional and local governments. The SGP is a revenue-sharing system between the central and subnational governments as part

of the process of fiscal decentralization mandated by the Constitution. However, since these transfers are allocated as a share of National tax and non-tax revenues, we distribute all receipts proportionately and allocate these using the criteria described in Table 1.

### 5.1. *Net fiscal contributions for all groups*

Table 6 summarizes the main findings of the net fiscal impact by scenario and level of government, cumulated over fiscal years 2013–2018. Overall, our estimates indicate that while the native-born population had a negative fiscal contribution of just over 3.6% of GDP, all foreign-born provided an overall net fiscal benefit of at least 0.02% of GDP. These results, however, differ when we disaggregate between groups and levels of government. Results allocating receipts and outlays using the average effect scenario (panel (a), Table 6) show that Venezuelan-born migrants, plus their dependents, had negative contributions both at the National and the regional and local level, while other foreign-born were net contributors at every level of government. To some extent, these sharp differences are driven by an older and more educated foreign-born population (excluding those born in Venezuela), which also has a lower unemployment rate and higher wages, as described in Table 4. In addition, overall net fiscal contributions tend to be negative at the National level but positive at the regional and local level, with the exception of Venezuelan-born immigrants. This is consistent with the fact that the National government runs larger fiscal imbalances.

Now, since these numbers reflect not only the net fiscal position of each group but their relative size, a much clearer comparison can be made if we look at estimates of the ratio of real revenues to real expenditures during the same period. Over the six years considered, total expenditures received by natives and Venezuelan-born migrants exceed their respective contributions to total revenues. This is not the case for other immigrants, which contributed more to revenues than what they received in benefits from the government. The estimates reveal that Venezuelan-born immigrants and their dependent children have a lower fiscal ratio at the National level than permanent natives but slightly higher than returnees, but lower than every other group at the regional and local level. In fact, in contrast to the other groups, Venezuelan-born had a fiscal ratio below one, meaning that they received more in expenditures than what they contributed. Note that at the regional and local level, apart from indirect and excise taxes, the two main sources of revenues are the property tax and the industry and commerce tax. Since Venezuelan-born immigrants are less likely than natives to own property and own a business, their contribution to local budgets is lower.

As we discussed in Section 3.1, these negative contributions are mainly driven by the fiscal imbalances seen between 2013 and 2018. Therefore, the fiscal impact of immigrants is better understood using the relative contribution of immigrants by comparing them to permanent natives. Both Venezuelan-born immigrants and native-born returnees have a worse relative fiscal position when compared to

permanent natives. Overall differences between Venezuelan-born immigrants and permanent natives originate from the considerably lower fiscal ratio at the regional and local level for the former group, as we just discussed. While Venezuelan-born immigrants have a slightly lower relative fiscal position at the National level, the larger gap at the regional and local level drives the total differences.

When we turn our attention to the results from the marginal effect scenario (panel *(b)*, Table 6), we clearly see that the net fiscal contributions of all immigrant groups improve relative to natives. By attributing the additional cost to public goods provision only to immigrants, resulting from their arrival to the country, the implicit savings natives experienced from sharing the fiscal burden of these goods among a larger population (under the ‘average effect’ scenario) are substantially reduced. For example, the results show a reduction of about 27 per cent in the overall cost of Venezuelan-born immigrants and an increase of about 3 per cent in the contributions of other immigrants. However, the increase in expenditures for natives after allocating the cost of ‘pure’ public goods entirely to them is compensated by an increase in revenues from their participation in capital income. In addition, the ratio of revenues to expenditures relative to permanent natives is very close to the unit for Venezuelan-born at the National level, but lower for returnees. This suggests that Venezuelan-born immigrants are not significantly imposing a higher burden to public finances relative to natives at the National level. Nevertheless, while Venezuelan-born immigrants may have a less favorable net fiscal position than the native-born population overall, their overall fiscal effect is very small in terms of GDP.

In Table B2 in the Appendix we estimate the net fiscal impact for all groups excluding royalties from the budget. Since royalties are part of regional and local government budgets, we don’t see changes in results at the National level. While the new estimates show an improvement in the overall net contributions of all immigrant groups to regional and local governments and an increase in the ratio of revenues to expenditures—relative to natives, our main takeaways from the results discussed so far do not change.


However, as shown in Figure 2, which graphs the evolution of the relative net contributions over time for the three immigrant groups for both the average (panel *(a)*) and marginal effect scenario (panel *(b)*), these results vary substantially over time. In general, the results from both scenarios show a similar portrait, although the levels adjust upward in the marginal effect scenario to show the improvement in the relative position. Over the six fiscal years considered, the net fiscal contributions of immigrants excluding those arriving from Venezuela exceeds those of permanent natives. Native-born returnees, on the other hand, present a pattern that moves more closely to permanent natives. Our results show that their relative fiscal position increased between 2013 and 2015, to the point of having higher net contributions than permanent natives but declined subsequently and stabilized just below the unit level.

**Table 6**  
Net Fiscal Impact by Scenario and Level of Government, 2013-2018

	Panel (a): average effect			
	Natives		Venezuelan-born	Other
	Permanent	Returnees		
(1) Overall net fiscal contributions (COP\$ million, 2018 equivalent)				
National	-275,720,784	-1,056,913	-1,737,454	1,239,813
Regional and Local	73,579,475	3,099	-1,146,539	2,498,614
Total	-202,141,310	-1,053,814	-2,883,993	3,738,426
Percent of GDP (%)	-3.61	-0.02	-0.05	0.07
(2) Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures				
National	0.762	0.685	0.702	1.223
Regional and Local	1.129	1.001	0.731	2.620
Total	0.883	0.809	0.715	1.527
(3) Revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives				
National	—	0.899	0.922	1.605
Regional and Local	—	0.887	0.648	2.322
Total	—	0.916	0.809	1.729
	Panel (b): marginal effect			
	Natives		Venezuelan-born	Other
	Permanent	Returnees		
(1) Overall net fiscal contributions (COP\$ million, 2018 equivalent)				
National	-276,349,413	-1,002,083	-1,270,554	1,346,713
Regional and Local	73,344,155	-81,464	-826,982	2,498,939
Total	-203,005,258	-1,083,548	-2,097,537	3,845,652
Percent of GDP (%)	-3.63	-0.02	-0.04	0.07
(2) Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures				
National	0.762	0.649	0.739	1.258
Regional and Local	1.128	0.954	0.753	2.901
Total	0.883	0.765	0.745	1.589
(3) Revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives				
National	—	0.852	0.970	1.652
Regional and Local	—	0.846	0.668	2.572
Total	—	0.867	0.844	1.800

*Notes.* Panel (a) reports estimates when we impute to immigrants the average cost of public goods provision. Panel (b) reports the estimates under the assumption that immigrants pay the marginal cost, assumed to be zero. In each case we report at different levels of government for permanent natives, returnees, Venezuelan-born and other immigrants, cumulated over fiscal years 2013–2018: (1) their overall net fiscal contribution, expressed in 2018 equivalent COP, (2) the ratio of revenues contributed to expenditures received in real terms, and (3) the revenues/expenditures ratio for each immigrant group relative to permanent natives. We include revenues and expenditures for social security as part of the National government. We use gross domestic product implicit price deflator to estimate equivalent COP.

**Figure 2**  
Relative Net Contributions over time



*Notes.* The Figure reports for each fiscal year between 2013 and 2018 the revenues/expenditures ratio for each immigrant cohort, relative to permanent natives. Figure (a) reports the fiscal effect when we impute to immigrants the average cost of public goods provision. Figure (b) reports the fiscal effect under the assumption that immigrants pay the marginal cost, assumed to be zero.

In terms of Venezuelan-born immigrants, while they had higher fiscal contributions relative to permanent natives between 2013 and 2015, their relative fiscal position plummeted thereafter. In fact, their relative ratio went from nearly 1.3 to a just shy of 0.6. Yet, the difference between their net contributions and that of natives seems to stabilize between 2017 and 2018. These two facts suggest that as immigrant inflows have increase exponentially to Colombia in recent years, the net contributions from earlier cohorts have experience a negative effect. Remember that long-term immigrants that were residing in Colombia in 2013 represented less than a quarter of that group’s size by 2018. If one combines this with the fact that there has been an increase in the share of dependents within cohorts (as described in Figure 1(b)), one might expect a deterioration of their fiscal position.

## 5.2. *Sensitivity analysis*

The results presented so far are based on a set of criteria chosen to estimate apportioning coefficients for government revenues and expenditures (Tables 1 and 2). To assess the robustness of our estimates, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by using alternative allocation criteria. Following broadly the approach used by Dustmann and Frattini (2014) and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2017), we consider five variations as shown in rows (*a-e*) in Table 7.

The first variation, scenario (*a*), assigns corporate and capital taxes, including corporate shares of wealth tax, indirect taxes, property tax and industry and commerce tax to long-term residents with individual dividend and interest income. Long-term residents are defined as all native-born and immigrants who have reside in Colombia for at least five years. In our second variation, scenario (*b*), we follow the literature and assume a 20% reduction in total payment of indirect taxes paid by immigrants relative to the average for the general population. As we have discussed, immigrants and natives may have different consumption patterns, particularly, as immigrants tend to send remittances back to their home countries at levels that may affect their consumption level.

In scenarios (*c*) and (*d*) we assign family-related benefits using the share of dependent children for all benefit recipients and assign job training benefits to those studying in public institutions, respectively. In the first case, we account for the fact that the amount of family and children benefits depend on number of dependent children in the household. In the case of job training programs, we don’t include the alternative criteria as our baseline scenario because the Colombian government also finances with public resources the private provision of job training through public-private programs such as *Jóvenes en Acción*, or direct subsidies and loans to students. Finally, in scenario (*e*) we explore the effect from including at the same time all the alternative allocation criteria discussed.



**Table 7**  
Net Fiscal Impact Using Alternative Allocation Criteria, 2013-2018

	Panel (a): average effect			
	Natives		Venezuelan-born	Other
	Permanent	Returnees		
(1) Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures				
(a) Assigning corporate taxation to long-term residents	0.884	0.645	0.674	1.451
(b) Immigrants' consumption is 20% less than natives'	0.883	0.809	0.694	1.500
(c) Accounting for number of children in family benefits	0.883	0.809	0.708	1.523
(d) Assigning job training benefits to those in pub. inst.	0.883	0.810	0.715	1.536
(e) All of the above	0.885	0.648	0.644	1.413
(2) Revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives				
(a) Assigning corporate taxation to long-term residents	—	0.730	0.762	1.641
(b) Immigrants' consumption is 20% less than natives'	—	0.916	0.785	1.698
(c) Accounting for number of children in family benefits	—	0.916	0.802	1.725
(d) Assigning job training benefits to those in pub. inst.	—	0.917	0.810	1.739
(e) All of the above	—	0.732	0.728	1.597
	Panel (b): marginal effect			
	Natives		Venezuelan-born	Other
	Permanent	Returnees		
(1) Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures				
(a) Assigning corporate taxation to long-term residents	0.884	0.570	0.695	1.507
(b) Immigrants' consumption is 20% less than natives'	0.883	0.766	0.719	1.561
(c) Accounting for number of children in family benefits	0.883	0.766	0.737	1.585
(d) Assigning job training benefits to those in pub. inst.	0.883	0.767	0.746	1.600
(e) All of the above	0.884	0.572	0.658	1.465
(2) Revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives				
(a) Assigning corporate taxation to long-term residents	—	0.645	0.786	1.705
(b) Immigrants' consumption is 20% less than natives'	—	0.867	0.814	1.767
(c) Accounting for number of children in family benefits	—	0.867	0.835	1.795
(d) Assigning job training benefits to those in pub. inst.	—	0.868	0.845	1.812
(e) All of the above	—	0.647	0.744	1.657

*Notes.* Panel (a) reports estimates when we impute to immigrants the average cost of public goods provision. Panel (b) reports the estimates under the assumption that immigrants pay the marginal cost, assumed to be zero. In each case we report, for permanent natives, returnees, Venezuelan-born and other immigrants, cumulated over fiscal years 2013–2018: (1) the ratio of revenues contributed to expenditures received in real terms and (2) the revenues/expenditures ratio for each immigrant group relative to natives. Under each heading, we report estimates when we use each alternative allocation criteria (a–f) as defined in Tables 1 and 2.

Although the estimates of natives' contributions remain unaffected, those for immigrants fluctuate across the different scenarios. Our qualitative results remain unchanged for immigrants born in countries other than Venezuela, displaying higher net contributions than those of natives in all scenarios. In the case of native-born returnees, their net fiscal position is lower when we include corporate taxation of

long-term residents but remain unaffected in the rest. Since native-born returnees are by construction residents with less than five years in the country, their contribution to corporate taxation is zero, as described in scenarios (a) and (e), substantially reducing their overall net fiscal position. A similar issue arises with Venezuelan-born immigrants, in which only 14 per cent of the population is classified as long-term resident in 2018, therefore highly affecting their relative contributions. Furthermore, their fiscal position is slightly reduced when we assume a lower consumption by immigrants, but virtually unchanged when we account for the share of dependent children in family-related benefit recipients and those attending job training programs in public institutions.

### 5.3. *Decomposing net contribution differences among groups*

So far, we have not considered the effect that demographic characteristics play on explaining the differences in the net fiscal contributions among groups. Not only are groups so different in size, creating large variation in the aggregate fiscal impacts, but immigrants differ from natives in most of their observable characteristics, especially when it comes to the age structure. Large differences in the age structure of immigration relative to natives, or among immigrant cohorts, is particularly relevant when looking at the short-term impact because, as mentioned by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2017), “a group that is concentrated at working ages when tax contributions are high will be more positive than that of a group that is, at that time, either relatively young or elderly or both, because the latter age ranges typically receive more transfers than they contribute in taxes” (p. 284).


Figure 3 shows the distribution of individual contributions and benefits along the age structure for each group, using the average cost scenario and averaging over fiscal years 2013-2018. We see evidence of systematically different combinations of revenue contribution and benefits received, both in levels and in the shape of the distribution, between and within groups. For example, Venezuelan-born immigrants and other immigrants at working age make consistently higher average per capita contributions to the tax system, relative to natives, but at the same time receive a larger sum of expenditures on average. By contrast, native-born returnees have lower per capita contributions and absorb more benefits.

Overall, revenue contributions display a hump-shaped distribution, consistent with higher income and consumption tax contributions at working ages. In the case of expenditures, the inverted-U shape displayed is consistent with high family and children benefits at lower ages, and higher pension benefits upon retirement. The latter drives the large increase in expenditures for immigrants classified as ‘other’, as a considerable share of this group has resided in the country for a long period of time. This is not the case for Venezuelan-born immigrants and returnees. In summary, while children and family benefits (including compulsory education) drive fiscal flows early in the life cycle, income and consumption taxes drive fiscal flows at working ages, and the cost of pension benefits and health care drives the later years.

This is consistent with findings in the report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2017) for the US.

**Figure 3**

Distribution of Contributions and Benefits by Age and Group, 2013-2018.



*Notes.* The Figure reports the distribution of per capita contributions to revenues and expenditures by age and immigrant group, using both cost scenarios (*average* vs. *marginal*), and averaged over fiscal years 2013–2018. Data are based on our own fiscal estimates following Tables 1 and 2 and GEIH data, smoothed and adjusted by a single multiplicative factor so that the population-weighted aggregate is consistent with totals of our budget estimates of government receipts and expenditures. All public spending is included in benefits. See the Online Appendix for a detail recount of the allocation of revenues and expenditures to each observation in the GEIH.

Given the above patterns, controlling for a group's age structure could potentially change our analysis of the net contribution differences among groups. Following the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2017), in Table 8 we show the results of different regression specifications in which we control for the effect of the calendar year, age, sex, education level, number of dependents and employment status. Coefficients indicate the marginal per capita net fiscal impact, in 2018 million pesos, that are associated with that immigrant group or cohort relative to the natives group. A positive coefficient indicates a lower net fiscal impact—or a saving to the government—as the government runs a budget deficit. On the other hand, a negative coefficient indicates a higher cost to the government, relative to the native group.

**Table 8**

Marginal Per Capita Fiscal Impact by Group and Cohort  
(COP\$ million, 2018 equivalent)

	<i>All sample</i>		<i>Independent person unit</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel (a): Immigrants by group</i>					
All immigrants	− 5.133*** (0.322)	− 4.762*** (0.322)	− 7.076*** (0.534)	− 7.648*** (0.534)	− 7.756*** (0.521)
Returnees	− 6.325*** (0.242)	− 6.528*** (0.242)	− 11.51*** (0.364)	− 11.89*** (0.362)	− 9.452*** (0.352)
Venezuelan-born	− 8.392*** (0.291)	− 7.646*** (0.290)	− 11.05*** (0.549)	− 11.94*** (0.551)	− 11.98*** (0.535)
Other	5.302*** (1.378)	5.476*** (1.376)	13.38*** (2.569)	13.20*** (2.562)	7.366*** (2.530)
<i>Panel (b): Venezuelan-born immigrants by cohort</i>					
Short-term	− 19.87*** (0.225)	− 19.15*** (0.223)	− 25.27*** (0.428)	− 26.30*** (0.426)	− 26.18*** (0.415)
Mid-term	1.633*** (0.723)	2.275*** (0.720)	2.350* (1.243)	1.438 (1.248)	1.569 (1.208)
Long-term	− 0.230 (0.472)	0.695 (0.469)	3.117* (1.215)	2.626* (1.217)	1.836 (1.176)
Controls:					
Age	−	Yes	−	Yes	Yes
Sex	−	Yes	−	Yes	Yes
Education	−	−	−	−	Yes
Number of dependents	−	−	−	−	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	4,681,880	4,681,880	3,243,056	3,243,056	3,243,056

*Notes.* The Table reports OLS regression coefficients of the net fiscal impact (dependent variable) on dummy variables for immigrant's group/cohort after controlling for demographic characteristics. Panel (a) considers all immigrant groups, while panel (b) focuses on Venezuelan-born immigrants by cohort. Coefficients indicate the marginal per capita fiscal impact that is associated with each group/cohort relative to the net contributions of permanent natives. We report results for the average cost scenario over fiscal years 2013–2018. Data are based on our own fiscal estimates following Tables 1 and 2 and GEIH data, adjusted by a single multiplicative factor so that the population-weighted aggregate is consistent with totals of our budget estimates of government receipts and expenditures. All public spending is included in benefits. See the Online Appendix for a detail recount of the allocation of revenues and expenditures to each observation in the GEIH.

Columns 1 and 2 takes as the unit of analysis all individual observations. Columns 3 to 5 exclude dependents from the unit of analysis, defined as any person (i) under the age of 18, (ii) from 18 to 22 years old and enrolled full time in secondary education, or (iii) from 18 to 22 years old in higher education or not, and who is working less than half time; if a person is married, they are considered independent, regardless of their age. However, each dependent's fiscal flows are assigned equally to all independent person(s) to whom they are linked.

Education groups are: (i) less than HS, (ii) HS graduate, (iii) some college, (iv) bachelor's degree, (v) any post bachelors.

Estimates are weighted by sampling weights reported in the GEIH. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* Denotes significance at 1%, \*\* significance at 5% and \* significance at 10%.

The first two specifications use as unit of analysis the individual observation, while the last three specifications exclude dependents from the unit of analysis, defined as any person (i) under the age of 18, (ii) from 18 to 22 years old and enrolled full time in secondary education, or (iii) from 18 to 22 years old in higher education or not, and who is working less than half time; if a person is married, they are considered independent, regardless of their age. Now, each dependent's fiscal flows are assigned equally to all independent person(s) to whom they are linked.

The impact of differences in the demographic distribution can be seen by comparing the coefficients for each group/cohort in the first two columns both in the case of the complete sample and in the independent person sample. Results indicate that the marginal fiscal impact of Venezuelan immigrants (including returnees) after controlling for the age and sex structure does not change significantly. Overall, Venezuelan immigrants pose an additional per capita pressure on public finances—relative to permanent natives—of around COP\$6 to \$8 million using the whole sample, and of COP\$12 million when considering only independent persons as the unit of analysis. However, the higher marginal fiscal impact is driven by the short-term cohort in the case of Venezuelan-born immigrants, particularly, coming from social protection expenditure in the form of vulnerable population benefits. Strikingly, mid- and long-term immigrants if any have a lower marginal fiscal impact than natives. In other words, immigrants that have reside in the country for at least a year have a better per capita fiscal position than natives. In the case of independent persons this result dissipates after controlling for the number of dependents. Results for the marginal cost scenario are similar and are presented in Table B3 in the Appendix.

Now, our results suggest that controlling for the age structure may be more relevant for immigrants with more time in the country of destination, and not so much for short-term cohorts, which usually are composed of a restricted number of members from the household unit and are more similar in age. In addition, short-term cohorts are frequently not fully incorporated in the labor market which creates a higher dependence for group expenditures, assigned on a per capita basis, and less on individual-specific benefits. In addition, short-term cohorts contribute on average less in terms of income taxes and social security contributions.

#### 5.4. *Immigrants' effect on tax expenditures*

An issue that has not been addressed in the literature is the effect of immigration on tax expenditures. A tax expenditure is defined as a loss in revenue for the Government that is attributable to special tax deductions, exemptions and treatments present in the tax legislation. This implies that tax expenditures are in a way a direct transfer from the Government to economic agents by decreasing the tax obligation for taxpayers. Excluding tax expenditures from the analysis gives a one-sided look on the effect of immigration on public finances since in principle tax expenditures substitute for Government spending programs. We see two arguments against the inclusion of tax expenditures in the analysis. First, these resources do not go through the Treasury and thus are not conceived as a fiscal income. Second, these

resources in any case would have reduce the rate at which the public debt accumulates and therefore the payment of interest. However, we believe this is misleading since the allocation of resources would have been different as these tax expenditures weight more on some economic agents. Thus, contributions of natives and immigrants may be distorted.

We focus on tax expenditures in three categories: income tax (including CREE), value-added tax and fuel tax (including surcharge). We use the estimates reported by the Ministry of Finance in its annual Medium-term Budgetary Framework for the fiscal cost of tax expenditures in each category. We do not take into account VAT exclusions as they do not generate an effective loss of revenue. On average, fiscal costs associated with tax expenditures accounted for 1.9% of GDP between 2013 and 2018, of which over 40% represent VAT exemptions and tariffs differentials. To apportion households' tax expenditure on income tax we use each group's share of the total exempt income and tax discounts estimated after applying the tax schedule to GEIH earnings. We allocate tax expenditure on fuel and firms' income tax using the same procedure as describe in motor vehicle tax and corporate and capital taxes, respectively. Finally, we apportion tax expenditures from VAT using each group's share of total benefits, net of nonresident direct purchases share. We estimate total benefits using effective subsidy rates by household income decile from IMF (2011). These estimates do not necessarily explain behavioral responses due to changes in taxation as generally they are computed using the 'foregone income' approach. Thus, estimates of contributions to tax expenditures do not reflect the effective amount of revenues that would be raised from each group if these tax deductions, exemptions and treatments present in the tax code were eliminated, as taxpayers will be likely to adjust in response.

Table 9 reports the fiscal impact on tax expenditures for each group, cumulated over fiscal years 2013–2018. In panel (a) we report estimates of each group's overall contribution to each type of tax expenditure, expressed in 2018 equivalent COP. Over that six-year period the benefits from tax expenditures for all immigrants accounted for more than COP\$1.4 billion or 0.026% of GDP, compared to an overall contribution of COP\$100 billion for natives or 1.79% of GDP (in 2018 equivalency). Of the total loss in revenue attributable to special tax benefits to immigrants (including native-born returnees), 45% were allocated towards other non-Venezuelan foreign-born immigrants, 34% to Venezuelan-born immigrants and over 20% to returnees. Now, in panel (b) we present estimates of the average per capita fiscal impact on tax expenditures during all fiscal years. Venezuelan-born immigrants have higher per capita tax expenditures in personal income tax and fuel tax than permanent natives, but lower tax expenditures over corporate income tax and value-added tax. The rest of the foreign-born population, however, has a higher average per capita fiscal impact across all receipts. In the case of native-born returnees their average per capita impact is the highest in terms of the value-added tax, but the lowest for all other receipts.

Finally, in panel (c) we report estimates of tax expenditures as a share of each group's contribution to each specific tax, as computed for Table 6. Results show that

for natives, tax expenditures on personal income tax represented almost half of each group's total contribution to personal income tax. This share is nearly twice as the one shown for both Venezuelan-born immigrants and other immigrants. The relative weight of tax expenditures on corporate income tax and fuel tax is similar for all groups, while tax expenditures on value-added tax weights more on returnees and somewhat similar among permanent natives and Venezuelan-born immigrants. These results are driven by differences in the income distribution between groups.

**Table 9**  
Fiscal Impact on Tax Expenditures, 2013-2018

	Natives		Venezuelan-born	Other
	Permanent	Returnees		
Panel (a): overall fiscal impact (COP\$ million, 2018 equivalent)				
(1) Income tax (households)	25,852,407	31,937	243,945	607,203
(2) Income tax (corporations)	27,298,454	56,900	68,191	204,030
(3) Value-added tax	44,486,899	196,828	193,930	127,308
(4) Fuel tax	2,157,130	5,705	10,506	17,702
Percent of GDP (%)	1.784	0.005	0.009	0.017
Panel (b): average per capita fiscal impact (COP\$ 2018 equivalent)				
(1) Income tax (households)	92,503	34,554	195,438	767,944
(2) Income tax (corporations)	97,978	54,782	82,048	255,908
(3) Value-added tax	159,645	167,654	91,477	166,171
(4) Fuel tax	7,757	6,268	9,894	23,390
Panel (c): fiscal impact as share of each group's contributions (revenues)				
(1) Income tax (households)	46.9	50.2	27.6	26.4
(2) Income tax (corporations)	10.4	10.5	10.4	10.4
(3) Value-added tax	16.5	26.0	16.9	6.6
(4) Fuel tax	7.0	6.6	6.4	6.8

*Notes.* The table reports the fiscal impact on tax expenditures for permanent natives, returnees, Venezuelan-born and other immigrants, cumulated over fiscal years 2013–2018. Panel (a) reports estimates of each group's overall contribution to each type of tax expenditure, expressed in 2018 equivalent COP. Panel (b) reports the average per capita fiscal impact, expressed in 2018 equivalent Colombian pesos. Panel (c) reports estimates of tax expenditures as share of each group's contribution to each specific tax, as computed for Table 6.

## 6. Local Fiscal Effects of Immigration

In the previous sections we focused on the effect immigrants have on the General Government's budget, however, it is important to examine the fiscal impact across local governments. In this section we will focus on both native-born returnees and Venezuelan-born migrants. Thus, we will refer to them as Venezuelan immigrants.

Since migration is not distributed uniformly across space, the fiscal effects are not homogeneous at the local level. Roughly 60 percent of all migrants arriving from Venezuela were residing in the 23 major cities and metropolitan areas as of 2018 (Table 10), with three quarters of these living in just five cities. In addition, local governments differ in their revenue-raising capacities. Thus, public goods and services provided depend on the level of transfers from the central government and their own fiscal effort. This is particularly relevant as only a fraction of immigrant's direct contributions in the form of tax payments go to local government revenues, with a larger share going to the National government. Whereas education and health expenditures account for large extent of the redistribution from National to local governments, local government's fiscal effort is dedicated towards supporting law enforcement, family-related programs, and infrastructure. This means that, at least in the short-run, local governments will likely incur in net fiscal costs from the arrival of immigrants, with these costs differing across jurisdictions.

### 6.1. *Spatial and demographic distribution of Venezuelan immigrants*

Table 10 present descriptive statistics for 23 capital cities with their metropolitan areas for 2013 and 2018. The first panel shows the distribution of immigrants across cities. While the seven cities with the highest percentages of Venezuelan immigrants in 2018 (Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín, Cúcuta, Cali, Cartagena and Bucaramanga)—which concentrate half of the total migrant population from the neighboring country—were the cities with the highest share of immigrants in 2013, the distribution of immigrants across them has changed. The concentration of immigrants increased in the four largest cities—Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla, and declined in the rest, showing a particularly sharp decline in Cúcuta. It is not surprising that the geographic dispersion of Venezuelan immigrants changed between the two periods. As one might expect, border towns such as Cúcuta concentrated—and still does—a high level of migrants. However, with the unprecedented size and speed of immigration since 2013, immigrants have moved to inner towns in Colombia, especially to the capital cities. This pattern can be explained by both support networks that migrants have raised over time, lowering the costs of moving from the border, as well as by an increase in job opportunities in larger cities (Reina *et al.*, 2018).

The share of adult (18+) immigrants within each city has also changed during the five-year period, as indicated in the second panel. Yet, while the arrival of younger cohorts has reduced the average age overall—as display in the third panel, the share of adults has varied as the age structure of immigrants has changed across cities. Apart from the five cities that experienced an increase in the immigrant adult population—Cúcuta, Ibagué, Medellín, Valledupar and Villavicencio—and Quibdó, which remained stable during the period, the rest saw a decline in the share of population 18 years of age or older. The relative contribution or burden immigrants have on local finances is driven largely by the demographic distribution across cities, as we have been discussing in this paper.



**Table 10**  
Descriptive Statistics of Venezuelan Immigrants by City/MSA

City/MSA	Share of immigrant population (%)		Percent adult (18+)		Average age (years)		Employment rate		Percent wage and salary workers		Percent self-employed	
	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018
Armenia	0.56	0.53	86.2	66.0	33.7	26.2	64.6	67.6	42.0	30.0	61.1	66.9
Barranquilla	7.80	9.57	68.7	67.3	26.6	25.9	53.2	72.3	54.8	40.6	45.2	57.6
Bogotá	12.54	17.93	84.0	70.5	33.3	25.4	83.6	77.6	56.2	63.8	38.6	35.1
Bucaramanga	4.47	2.63	72.4	70.1	29.1	26.6	81.3	75.9	45.3	50.8	49.6	44.7
Cali	2.98	3.97	85.1	67.9	36.0	24.7	64.7	74.4	58.3	63.2	41.7	35.8
Cartagena	4.15	2.77	62.9	61.2	26.6	24.3	57.7	62.5	43.9	25.7	56.1	71.5
Cúcuta	14.26	6.26	57.8	62.3	25.4	24.5	68.6	62.6	25.0	18.1	68.5	77.8
Florencia	—	0.03	—	66.3	—	25.8	—	69.4	—	49.1	—	50.9
Ibagué	0.47	0.30	59.1	70.4	27.4	26.8	61.2	77.7	70.1	58.4	29.9	41.6
Manizales	0.23	0.30	78.0	67.5	29.6	26.4	55.2	67.4	80.6	60.4	19.4	33.8
Medellín	5.95	6.57	67.2	73.9	27.0	26.6	74.2	74.0	63.6	68.1	31.1	31.0
Montería	0.48	0.48	74.5	66.7	29.0	26.0	75.9	71.3	41.2	47.0	58.8	50.8
Neiva	0.10	0.15	56.0	72.6	27.7	24.5	39.4	65.1	28.1	35.6	71.9	62.0
Pasto	—	0.12	—	75.8	—	27.3	—	80.1	—	55.1	—	46.8
Pereira	0.57	0.87	75.1	72.6	28.4	26.7	52.2	72.3	49.4	66.8	50.6	32.5
Popayán	—	0.10	—	86.5	—	31.6	—	64.1	—	26.8	—	73.2
Quibdó	0.05	0.01	69.4	69.4	38.0	28.8	62.0	69.8	53.3	56.4	46.7	37.6
Riohacha	1.17	1.75	66.7	55.5	24.8	21.3	69.6	65.0	32.8	21.9	63.4	74.2
Santa Marta	1.36	2.26	77.5	59.9	27.3	22.7	65.7	69.9	26.2	14.5	70.2	82.6
Sincelejo	0.96	0.63	65.4	64.0	24.8	25.4	56.9	74.1	30.3	33.9	66.4	60.6
Tunja	—	0.15	—	71.9	—	23.9	—	65.7	—	51.7	—	48.3
Valledupar	1.72	1.83	60.0	61.6	24.4	24.2	62.5	65.0	18.1	19.3	77.8	78.7
Villavicencio	0.46	0.47	61.8	72.1	24.0	25.8	80.2	73.4	59.7	56.8	29.8	41.3
Colombia	100	100	66.0	64.6	27.5	24.5	71.9	71.0	45.9	46.4	49.2	51.1

*Notes.* The Table reports descriptive statistics for Venezuelan immigrants (Venezuelan-born and native returnees) in the main metropolitan areas for fiscal years 2013 and 2018. Four cities do not present descriptive statistics in 2013 as they account individually for less than 0.01 percent of immigrants and hence the low frequency data is a problem. The first panel presents the distribution of Venezuelan immigrants across metropolitan areas. In the second, fifth and sixth panels we measure the proportion of adults (18+), wage and salary workers and self-employed. The employment rate is defined as the ratio of the employed (aged 15 or over) to the working age population (aged 15 to 64). Metropolitan areas include the following municipalities: Medellín (Barbosa, Girardota, Copacabana, Bello, Envigado, Itagüí, Sabaneta, La Estrella, Caldas), Cali (Yumbo), Barranquilla (Soledad), Bucaramanga (Floridablanca, Girón, Piedecuesta), Manizales (Villamaría), Pereira (Dosquebradas, La Virginia), Cúcuta (Villa del Rosario, Los Patios, El Zulia). *Source.* Authors' estimates using data from the 2013 and 2018 GEIH.

In terms of labor market assimilation, the fourth panel shows a very different image across cities. Although the employment rate among Venezuelan immigrants is similar to the native-born population country-wide, labor demand for immigrants across cities ranges from 60 to 80 percent. In addition, the employment rate for immigrants declined in seven cities between 2013 and 2018, however, in five of these seven cities the employment of Venezuelan immigrants was still above the country's average and that for the native-born population. Now, these estimates suggest that the labor market has been able to absorb a large share of working age immigrants, even with the exponential trend in total immigration during the same period. Furthermore, simple correlations with the information presented in the last three panels indicate that cities with lower employment rates among Venezuelan immigrants have higher shares of self-employment and lower wage and salary workers. The latter is not only a key factor in determining relative contributions at the national level, as this impacts income tax and social security contributions directly, but also contributions at the local level as higher self-employment shares might influence contributions to industry and commerce tax from business owners if part of the formal sector.

## 6.2. *Net fiscal effects on local budgets*

Before presenting our results at the local level we need to address the issue of sufficient sample size for groups, particularly for 2013 and 2014 in which immigrant inflows were still low as a fraction of the total population. Indeed, for a group of cities, small sample sizes produce estimates of each group's contribution to revenues and expenditures categories over time to vary greatly. Therefore, the results presented are averaged only over those years in which the sample size of immigrants for each city/MSA has at least a confidence level of 90 per cent over the estimate of the total population for the group of reference in each year.<sup>8</sup> To define the reference group (total immigrant population) in each city we use information on the stock of immigrants from the 2018 Population and Housing Census. To estimate the stock of immigrants in all other years (2013-2017) we use information on the destination city reported by migrants at the border point when entering the country, from the immigration authority (*Migración Colombia*), and estimate the change in annual inflows in each city. Of all the cities included only in Florencia we do not have enough sample size in at least one year to be able to compute the fiscal estimates.

Results presented in Table 11 indicate that, on average, between 2013 and 2018 immigrants' net contribution per capita varied considerably across cities. In addition, the net fiscal position of Venezuelan immigrants is contingent on the assumption made on the allocation of public goods. In other words, the differences in net contributions across cities depend on whether fixed costs are distributed proportionately across groups or whether the burden is only shared by permanent natives. Under the 'average effect' assumption, immigrants tend to have a lower revenues/expenditures ratio relative to natives, particularly in cities that experienced

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<sup>8</sup> Our sample size estimates are computed using the modified formular for smaller populations.

a large increase in inflows. However, using a marginal cost allocation, under which we assume immigrants do not increase the cost of public goods provision, leads to estimates of per capita fiscal impacts across cities that tend to be positive, such that in 20 out of the 23 cities considered, immigrants were net contributors to local budgets and had a higher net fiscal position when compared to natives.

If one were to take the midpoint between the average and marginal cost allocation, considering these as the lower and upper bounds, we see that in most of the cities that experienced the largest inflows of immigrants during this period—Barranquilla, Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Cali, Cartagena, Cúcuta and Medellín—Venezuelan immigrants had a negative average per capita fiscal effect. Nonetheless, in the rest—except for Manizales and Pasto, immigrants' contributions averaged between COP\$75,000 and COP\$1,350,00 in per capita terms (rounded to the nearest thousand). Finally, looking at the ratio of revenues to expenditures, relative to the estimate for natives, only six cities fall below. Of those cities, Bogotá and Medellín show a very large gap (0.5 and 0.74) with respect to natives' contributions. The larger increase in expenditures over revenues during the years is driven basically by two forces: an increase in access to compulsory education for immigrants' dependents and the effort of governments, both in cash and in kind, to help in the assimilation of immigrants as part of expenditure in social protection for vulnerable population.

Now, what is the effect of immigrants on local budgets when we exclude transfers from the National government and royalties? We address this question in order to examine local fiscal effort. To do so, we exclude revenues and expenditures from the SGP and the SGR. Other national transfers are not excluded as we are not able to particularly identify them in both sides of the budget (revenues and expenditures). However, transfers from SGP and SGR account on average for 40 per cent of revenues and expenditures of local governments but ranging between 18 per cent for Bogotá and over 60 per cent for Quibdó. Estimates of immigrants' per capita contributions without transfers from the national government presented in Table B4 in the Appendix slightly change across different cities from the ones presented before. Nonetheless, our qualitative results remain unaffected.

To illustrate the differences among both sets of results, Figure 4 plots for each MSA the revenues/expenditures ratio for Venezuelan immigrants, relative to permanent natives. We plot the mid-point between the average and marginal effect. In addition, we group cities based on their fiscal effort, defined with respect to the degree of dependency of each MSA to transfers from the national government (transfers as share of total revenues), and the fraction of Venezuelan immigrants with respect to the population in each city. Three facts stand out: (i) cities with the largest inflows had an overall negative net fiscal impact; (ii) for cities with low fiscal effort but high inflows, excluding transfers from the national government improves the relative fiscal position of immigrants; and (iii) excluding transfers from the national government does not significantly change the relative net fiscal position of immigrants in cities with high fiscal effort.

**Table 11**  
Net Fiscal Impact for Venezuelan Immigrants at the Local Level, 2013-2018

Panel (a): average per capita net fiscal contributions ( <i>COP\$ 2018 equivalent</i> )					
	<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>		<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>
Armenia	567	393,032	Neiva†	719,563	879,718
Barranquilla	-306,409	42,588	Pasto†	-952,273	491,802
Bogotá	-825,242	-583,107	Pereira	-99,056	329,643
Bucaramanga	-408,662	-101,678	Popayán†	593,307	764,947
Cali	-833,907	115,542	Quibdó†	1,150,673	1,548,522
Cartagena	-262,052	77,357	Riohacha	716,497	725,282
Cúcuta	-1,065,594	60,306	Santa Marta	150,695	468,352
Florencia†	—	—	Sincelejo	50,161	265,210
Ibagué†	187,463	565,708	Tunja	-172,031	321,506
Manizales	-435,616	17,344	Valledupar	178,825	523,405
Medellín	-489,664	-346,809	Villavicencio	-39,120	282,309
Montería	440,508	829,963			

Panel (b): ratio of real revenues to real expenditures					
	<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>		<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>
Armenia	0.954	1.282	Neiva†	1.470	1.805
Barranquilla	0.801	0.950	Pasto†	0.706	1.314
Bogotá	0.597	0.617	Pereira	1.016	1.376
Bucaramanga	0.771	0.928	Popayán†	1.398	1.638
Cali	0.625	1.025	Quibdó†	1.490	1.862
Cartagena	0.969	1.188	Riohacha	1.444	1.488
Cúcuta	0.580	1.055	Santa Marta	1.081	1.310
Florencia†	—	—	Sincelejo	0.951	1.050
Ibagué†	1.117	1.468	Tunja	0.955	1.368
Manizales	0.788	1.082	Valledupar	1.061	1.263
Medellín	0.791	0.813	Villavicencio	1.023	1.260
Montería	1.210	1.467			


Panel (c): revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives					
	<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>		<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>
Armenia	0.886	1.196	Neiva†	1.286	1.580
Barranquilla	0.860	1.026	Pasto†	1.018	1.898
Bogotá	0.504	0.522	Pereira	0.898	1.220
Bucaramanga	0.799	0.965	Popayán†	1.234	1.447
Cali	0.775	1.279	Quibdó†	1.479	1.849
Cartagena	0.850	1.047	Riohacha	1.327	1.366
Cúcuta	0.870	1.622	Santa Marta	0.902	1.098
Florencia†	—	—	Sincelejo	0.922	1.020
Ibagué†	0.997	1.312	Tunja	0.827	1.186
Manizales	0.734	1.010	Valledupar	1.007	1.203
Medellín	0.734	0.755	Villavicencio	0.938	1.157
Montería	1.110	1.347			

*Notes.* The Table reports the net fiscal impact for Venezuelan immigrants (native returnees and Venezuelan-born) at the local level averaged over fiscal years 2013–2018. Panel (a) reports the average per capita net fiscal contribution, expressed in 2018 equivalent Colombian pesos. Panel (b) reports the ratio of revenues contributed to expenditures received in real terms over fiscal years 2013-2018. Panel (c) reports the revenues/expenditures ratio for Venezuelan-born immigrants relative to natives. We use gross domestic product implicit price deflator for each regional jurisdiction (Department) to estimate equivalent COP. Estimates are averaged over years with a minimum sample size as describe in the text. † Caution should be taken when examining the local-level estimates because of small immigrant population and subsample size.

Looking in greater detail at the results in Tables 10 and B4 in the Appendix, one can see that, excluding transfers in cities in which Venezuelan immigrants started with a negative fiscal impact tends to improve immigrants average per capita net contribution by reducing the size of the burden, but reduces the relative position of immigrants with respect to permanent natives in most of these cities. Moreover, the relative net fiscal position declines in 13 out of the 22 cases when we exclude transfers.

These results indicate that immigrants' contributions to revenues have a larger drop than the reduction in the total expenditures received when we exclude transfers and royalties. Therefore, as shown in Table 6, immigrants' contributions to revenues tend to be more concentrated in receipts that go to the budget of the National government—such as consumption taxes and VAT, and less to local governments which rely heavily on property and industry and commerce tax. Finally, these results are been driven by the degree of enrollment in compulsory education for immigrants' dependents and the funds allocated for social protection for vulnerable populations by local governments.

**Figure 4**  
Net Fiscal Impact, Aggregate Inflows and Local Fiscal Effort



*Notes.* The Figure reports for each MSA the revenues/expenditures ratio for Venezuelan immigrants, relative to permanent natives for 2013-2018. The relative net contribution depicted corresponds to the mid-point between the average and the marginal effect. Fiscal effort is defined with respect to the degree of dependency of each MSA to transfers from the national government (transfers as share of total revenues).

1. Low fiscal effort: transfers from the national government represent 40% or more of total revenues.
2. High fiscal effort: transfers from the national government represent less than 40% of total revenues.
3. Low inflows: Venezuelan immigrants represent less than 2% of the MSA population (equivalent to two times Colombia's annual population growth rate in 2011).
4. High inflows: Venezuelan immigrants represent 2% or more of the MSA population.

## 7. Conclusion

Using recent Venezuelan immigration to Colombia we revisit the effect of immigration on public finances. First, we show that immigrants tend to have less access to, and make lower use of, the welfare system. We then estimate the difference between the taxes and other contributions migrants make to public finances and the costs of the public benefits and services they receive. Our findings show that foreign-born immigrants provided an overall net fiscal benefit during the period 2013-2018 and do not impose a higher burden to public finances relative to natives. When we divide our results among immigrant groups, Venezuelan immigrants, consisting of both the Venezuelan-born population and those native-born returnees arriving from Venezuela, our estimates suggest that they are not significantly imposing a higher burden to public finances when compared with permanent natives, particularly at the National level. Although Venezuelan immigrants may have a less favorable net fiscal position than permanent natives overall, which is driven by the net contributions to regional and local government budgets of Venezuelan-born immigrants, their overall fiscal effect is very small in terms of GDP (around -0.07%).

When we considered the effect that demographic characteristics play on explaining the differences in the net fiscal contributions among groups, our results suggest that the higher fiscal impact of Venezuelan-born immigrants is driven by the short-term cohort, as they contribute on average less in terms of income taxes and social security contributions and have a higher reliance for group expenditures such as vulnerable population benefits. In contrast, immigrants that have reside in the country for at least a year have a better per capita fiscal position than natives.

At the local level, the large and growing inflows of immigrants to Colombia has effects on local public finances by changing the composition and size of the population and, therefore, affecting the revenue-contributing capacity of existing groups and the cost of provision of public goods likely from an increase in demand. In this sense, since migration is not distributed uniformly across space, the effects at the local level suggest a heterogenous picture. We highlight three results from our analysis of the effect of Venezuelan migration on local budgets: (i) cities with the largest inflows had an overall negative net fiscal impact; (ii) for cities with low fiscal effort but high inflows, excluding transfers from the national government improves the relative fiscal position of immigrants; and (iii) excluding transfers from the national government does not significantly change the relative net fiscal position of immigrants in cities with high fiscal effort.

Now, we like to stress out that our analysis is static and backward-looking in nature, capturing the short-run fiscal effects from a large increase in immigrant inflows. Assessing the complete fiscal impact of immigration requires that these estimates be complemented by studying these effects properly in a dynamic context. Estimates of the fiscal effect depend not only on the demographic structure of immigrant inflows but also on the distinct life cycle characteristic of certain types of publicly provided services, such as health and education, requiring dynamic modeling of future fiscal impacts (Preston, 2014).

Finally, with the large fiscal imbalances experienced in many countries in Latin America, resulting from the commodity price shock in the late 2014 and with the Covid-19 pandemic, combined with the fiscal impact of ageing and spatial regional inequalities, addressing the fiscal impact of immigration is policy relevant. From our analysis, and those in the literature, it is clear that the greater the barriers for immigrants to assimilate in the country of destination (e.g., access to formal employment, education and health care), the greater the future negative fiscal impact.

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# Appendix

## Appendix A. Allocation of Revenues and Expenditures

In this Appendix we explain the technical details and data sources used to construct the apportioning coefficients for allocating tax receipts and government expenditures outlined in Section 3.3.

### A. Revenues

(1) *Income tax, social insurance and payroll taxes.* We use the income information reported in the GEIH to estimate each group's share of total payments. We use labor income for wage and salary workers and for self-employed and apply social insurance and payroll tax rates. To compute income tax we use taxable income, which also includes additional sources of income (*e.g.*, capital income). Our estimates include both the income tax for those individuals above the income threshold in each year and an estimate of tax withholdings for those not obliged to file a tax return.<sup>9</sup>

To estimate income tax, we apply year-specific tax rates of the ordinary system to gross annualized taxable income. We use information from all sources of wage and capital income, non-labor compensation, the sale of fixed assets, and all payments for fees, commissions, services, emoluments and others, reported in the GEIH. We aggregate monthly wages into annual earnings and include information on self-employment income. Until 2017 income tax could be estimated using one of three regimes for workers classified as 'employees': the ordinary system, the National Alternative Minimum Tax (IMAN) and the Alternative Minimum Simple Tax (IMAS), the latter was optional depending on the level of income or wealth. Although the tax each person had to pay was the highest value resulting from simultaneously declaring via the ordinary system and IMAN, we use the ordinary system for simplicity. This does not compromise the results. In our estimates we allow for tax benefits that reduce the tax base. These benefits are classified into three main categories: (i) costs and deductions (*e.g.* health, education, mortgage interests), (ii) non-taxed income (*e.g.* dividends, pension contributions), and (iii) exempt income (*e.g.* 25% of income, worker's compensation). For self-employed we deduct automatically 50% of income. Now, Colombia has a standard "pay as you earn" system for wage and salary workers where estimated taxes are collected throughout the year in the form of withholdings and then the total tax obligation is adjusted against the next tax return. This system also covers most self-employed workers that receive honorariums or are contractors. According to data from Colombia's Tax Administration (*Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales—DIAN*) in 2018 withholdings accounted for almost 75% of total revenues from personal income tax. Since our data does not follow individuals over time, we use income in year  $t$  to compute shares to allocate tax receipts in year  $t$ . In

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<sup>9</sup> It is important to include withholdings for two reasons: 1) even if a person is not obliged to file a tax return, withholdings make him or her a taxpayer; 2) according to Steiner and Cañas (2014), in 2010 76% of those who paid income taxes did so in the form of withholdings even without having filed a tax return, this is about 3.5 million people of the 4.6 million who contributed.

addition, for 2017 and 2018 we treat dividends as part of capital tax schedule as we cannot separately identify this in the GEIH.

For social insurance contributions we use the information provided in the GEIH on everyone affiliated—and contributing—to either a public or private pension fund and those affiliated to the contributory health care regime. We then apply the appropriate year-specific rates to the estimated Contribution Base Income.<sup>10</sup> For payroll taxes we apply year-specific rates for all wage and salary workers. For each fiscal year, we can then compute the total payments of income tax, social security contributions and payroll taxes, and estimate each group's share. We exclude social security contributions from official teachers, as they are included as part of the National Teachers Pension Fund (*Fondo Nacional de Prestaciones Sociales del Magisterio, FOMAG*). In addition, we allocate social security contributions to other special regimes, such as police and the national railway fund, using reported affiliation in the GEIH and excluding workers in the educational sector (pre-school, primary or secondary education) classified as wage and salary workers working for the government. On average, between 2013 and 2014 these special funds accounted for 3.5% of total social security contributions.

(2) *Corporate and capital taxes.* We apportion corporate taxes using each group's share in the adult (18+) population, net of nonresident foreign ownership share. To deduct the share of foreign ownership we use information from the *Unified Commercial and Social Registry (RUES)* which collects data for all registered business in Colombia and their share of local and foreign capital. These shares ranged between 8% and 17% in the fiscal years considered. Individual shares for each company were weighted by their total assets. Next, we distribute the remaining corporate taxes using each group's share in the population receiving individual dividend and interest income and allocate the national public ownership share to natives on a *pro rata* basis.<sup>11</sup> In order to achieve sufficient sample size for our analysis in this case, our estimates are based on rolling 2-year GEIH samples, except for 2013. For example, the proportion of each group receiving dividend and interest income for 2018 come from pooled GEIH samples for 2017-2018. Public ownership ranges between 2% and 13% for the years included in the analysis. As part of our sensitivity analysis, we allocate corporate taxes using the share of individual investment income of long-term residents (>5 years), net of nonresident foreign ownership share. The information in the GEIH on individual dividend and interest income includes income from interest on loans or CDs, savings deposits, profits, gains or dividends on investments. We don't include this as our baseline scenario because the information reported by households extends beyond business profits or dividends on investment, and thus it is likely to be capturing interests from direct lending to other households.

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<sup>10</sup> We impute employers' share of social security contributions to the employee. Health contributions paid by employers are 8.5% for employees who earn 10 times the monthly minimum wage, or more. Pension contributions paid by employers are 12% of the monthly wage.

<sup>11</sup> In Section 6, when we allocate corporate and capital taxes at the local level, we use each group's share in the adult (18+) population and allocate the national public ownership share to natives on a *pro rata* basis. We do this because the frequency of observations for dividend and interest income drops significantly.

(3) *Wealth tax.* The wealth tax is levied on taxable net worth of both individuals and firms.<sup>12</sup> Between 2011 and 2014 Colombia had in place a one-off wealth tax for individuals and firms with a reported net worth exceeding \$1 billion COP and average tax rates ranging from 1% to 6%. The one-off tax was to be made in up to eight equal payments between 2011 and 2014. Now, between 2015 and 2018 individuals with a reported net worth exceeding \$1 billion COP were charged marginal tax rates ranging between 0.125% and 1.5%. In addition, firms with equity exceeding \$1 billion COP experienced tax rates of 1.15% for 2015, 1% for 2016, and 0.4% for 2017, prior to the abandonment of the tax for 2018. Thus, between 2013 and 2017 we allocate revenues to tax payments from both firms and individuals, and for 2018 we allocate revenues solely for tax payments by individuals. To distribute the wealth tax revenues between individuals and firms we use estimates from Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2018). According to their estimates, for 2011-2014 corporations accounted for 94% of total wealth tax revenues. For 2015-2017 we use their estimates of personal wealth tax revenues as share of GDP depicted in Figure A.1. in their paper and distribute any remaining payments in 2018 using the share in 2017. We treat firms' wealth tax payments similarly to corporate and capital tax payments. In the case of personal wealth tax payments, we use a multi-step procedure to proxy for asset ownership based on information from the GEIH. First, we take self-reported values on the minimum price a household would sell their house if they decided to do so and distribute the resulting value among the head of household and his or her spouse/partner. Next, we estimate price-to-rent ratios for each year using expected rent and expected dwelling values and apply these ratios to annualized individual rental income (e.g. houses, apartments, rural property). Finally, we sum all individual property values and allocate revenues based on each group's share among total assets in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile.<sup>13</sup>

(4) *VAT and other indirect taxes.* We estimate each group's share of total payments for each tax, net of nonresident direct purchases share, following the common multi-step procedure in the literature. First, we apply decile-specific effective tax rates to households' gross income from the GEIH depending on the position in the income distribution. We include as part of the household only the expenditure unit. In other words, we exclude domestic workers, their children, and those living as a roomer in a private home or lodging house. The expenditure unit is usually the core of all consumption decisions within a household. All other members of the household that are not part of the expenditure unit are considered as an expenditure unit in its own. Decile-specific effective tax rates are based on our own estimates using the 2014 Quality of Life Survey (*Encuesta de Calidad de Vida—ECV*) and the 2016-2017 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (*Encuesta Nacional de Presupuestos de los Hogares—ENPH*). A detailed account of how we proceed to estimate the incidence of indirect taxes, tariffs and import duties is presented in the

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<sup>12</sup> We include both *patrimonio* and *riqueza* as they have the same purpose and tax the same source, net wealth.

<sup>13</sup> Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2018) note that the wealth tax cutoff excludes more than 99% of adults.

Online Appendix. This allows us to estimate the total spending of the household from eight types of expenditure grouping a little more than 100 categories of items or services that make up the main expenditures: food, early childhood and education, health, clothing expenses and footwear, services and equipment for housing, culture and recreation, transportation and communications, and other household expenses. We apply the tax structure in place in 2014, 2016 and 2017. We use effective tax rates in the following way: (i) for 2013-2014 we use 2014 effective tax rates; (ii) for 2015-2016 we use 2016 effective tax rates; (iii) for 2017-2018 we use 2017 effective tax rates. Then we distribute each household's total payments in indirect taxes to all members of the household using individual contributions to the household gross income. Finally, we compute apportioning coefficients for each indirect tax by summing total payments for the projected population using sample weights and estimating the contribution of each sub-population group (as defined in Section 3) in total payments. We use the information from DANE's macroeconomic aggregates to exclude final consumption spending by non-resident households in the economic territory.

A limitation of expenditure surveys is the lack of an identifier for the country of origin, which does not allow us to separately identify consumption patterns for natives and immigrants. In this sense, the implicit assumption is that natives and immigrants with similar levels of income have similar consumption patterns. While Colombia and Venezuela share cultural traits, and one would expect this not to be a significant issue, immigrants may have lower consumption, particularly recent migrants, or send remittances back to their home countries at levels that may affect consumption. In our sensitivity analysis we follow the literature and assume a 20% reduction in total payment of indirect taxes paid by immigrants relative to the average for the general population.

Now, since firms contribute to nondeductible VAT, tariffs and import duties revenues, we use data from the supply and use tables of the National Accounts System to estimate the share of payments attributed to firms. We treat firms' nondeductible VAT, tariffs and import duties payments similarly to corporate and capital taxes payments. Wine and spirits VAT revenues are assigned to households.

(5) *Motor vehicle tax.* We apportion motor vehicle tax proportionately to the share of motor vehicle ownership (car or motorcycle) for each group in the adult (18+) population. Since we can only identify ownership at the household level in the GEIH we assume equal contributions from all adult members.

(6) *Property tax.* The property tax is levied on all real estate by local authorities. The taxable base of the property tax for each year corresponds to the value reported by the taxpayer through a self-assessment, which must be at least the cadastral value. According to estimates from Ávila-Mahecha (2015), firms contributed on average 70% to total property tax revenue between 2010-2013. We use this share to allocate total payments between firms and individuals for all years. We treat firms' contributions similarly to corporate and capital taxes payments and treat households' revenues similarly to personal wealth tax payments, but instead of using

only those asset values in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile we use in this case the whole distribution.

(7) *Industry and commerce tax.* The industry and commerce tax is caused by direct or indirect industrial, commercial or service activities in the jurisdiction of a specific municipality. According to estimates from Ávila-Mahecha (2015), firms contributed on average 90% to total industry and commerce tax revenue between 2010-2013. We use this share to allocate total payments between firms and self-employed for all years. We treat firms' contributions similarly to corporate and capital taxes payments and allocate households' revenues using the share of self-employed owning an industrial, commercial, or service business.

(8) *Financial transactions tax.* This indirect tax is applied to different types of financial transactions carried out by users. According to estimates from Ávila-Mahecha (2015), firms contributed roughly 85% to total payments of financial transactions tax in 2013. We use this share to allocate total payments between firms and households for all years. Since we don't have access to information about the access of households to financial services, and neither do we have on the legal status of immigrants, we cannot identify those individuals who have or may have "potential" access to a financial service. Nonetheless, using our estimates from the ENPH on the expenditures-to-income ratio by decile (see Online Appendix) we estimate each person's expenditures using the total income reported in the GEIH. We then allocate financial transactions tax using the share of each group's expenditure among those with monthly expenditures above 350 units of tax value (UVT for its Spanish acronym)—which is defined each year by the government. This threshold, set by law, determines the amount on which the tax exemption applies to financial movements for checking or savings accounts. Now, we are implicitly assuming that natives and immigrants above the threshold have similar access to financial services. While we know immigrants face difficulties to access the financial system as it may take time for them to have all the required documents, we have no way of addressing this. Finally, we treat firms' contributions similarly to corporate and capital taxes payments.

(9) *Gross operating surplus, rents and royalties.* In our *average effect* scenario, we apportion government's capital income (gross operating surplus, dividends, interests, royalties and pension funds savings surplus) proportionately to the share of each group in the adult (18+) population. Now, in the *marginal effect* scenario, we attribute all revenues to the native-born population. As is standard in the literature, we implicitly assume these resources are the result of managerial or investment decisions that took place before immigrants' arrival.

(10) *Urban phones tax.* To apportion urban phones tax payments, we use the share of adult population (18+) with access to a landline.

(13) *Educational services.* We group revenues of all official universities, net of government transfers, under educational services. We apportion these receipts using the share of each group in the total population enrolled in higher education in public institutions.

(12) *National Teachers Pension Fund*. The teachers' fund is responsible, among other activities, for making the payment of social benefits (layoffs, pensions, among others) and guaranteeing the provision of medical assistance services to teachers—and their beneficiaries—in the public sector. The fund is composed of employer contributions, teacher contributions and additional contributions from the National Government. We exclude the latter as these transfers are already included in the overall revenues of the Central Government. We allocate these resources using the share of each group in the total number of workers in the educational sector (pre-school, primary or secondary education) classified as wage and salary workers working for the government.

(13) *Immigration certificates*. We allocate receipts from the issuance of foreign resident identification cards using each group's share in the foreign-born population.

(14) *Other*. All remaining tax payments, fees, fines and penalties, and other receipts, are apportioned according to the share of each group in the adult (18+) population. We exclude receipts from credit operations.

## *B. Expenditures*

(1) *'Pure' public goods*. We include in this group all expenditures associated with public goods or services that are normally considered as non-rival in consumption—excluding debt servicing. In our *average effect* scenario, we apportion public goods proportionately to the share of each group in the population. Now, in the *marginal effect* scenario, we attribute all costs to the native-born population.

(2) *'Congestible' public goods*. We include in this group all expenditures that are to some extent rival in consumption. We apportion the cost of providing these goods according to each group's share in total population (*average effect*).

(3) *Law courts and prisons*. We consider the expenditure in law courts and prisons as a 'congestible' public good and apportion them proportional to the number of recipients. We use information on the nationality of prison inmates from the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute, INPEC,<sup>14</sup> and apportion law courts and prison costs proportionately to the size of each group in the prison population. In this case we classify immigrants based on the reported nationality which need not be consistent with the country of birth. We distribute the total Venezuelan-born inmate population among cohorts using the share of each cohort. We do the same between permanent natives and returnees.

(4) *Water supply*. Water supply comprises of expenditures for the administration, construction or operation of water supply systems other than those provided by companies. We estimate each group's share of the total population with access to water supply as reported in the GEIH.

(5) *Health services*. To estimate each group's share of health services expenditure we use the distribution of health costs by age group and the affiliation status to the General Health Care Social Security System (SGSSS) as reported in the

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<sup>14</sup> INPEC is the Colombian central government agency responsible for the administration of the penitentiary institutions in the country.

GEIH. Now, while access to the SGSSS benefits' plan is conditional on being affiliated to either the contributory or subsidized regime,<sup>15</sup> by law, emergency services must continue to be provided to those not affiliated. In line with this, we distribute total health expenditures between affiliates and non-affiliates using the average theoretical value of the capitation payment unit (UPC),<sup>16</sup> which is fixed each year by resolution (similar to an executive order). We follow Reina *et al.* (2018) and assign the complete value of the UPC to those affiliated and 45% of the UPC for the subsidized regime as the cost of health services for those not affiliated. Next, we estimate the distribution of health costs by age group using the number of equivalent affiliates and the UPC value in each age group for each health regime as published by the Ministry of Health.<sup>17</sup> Then, we apply the contribution of each age group to total health expenditures according to their affiliation status and distribute the resulting values proportionately to the share of immigrants and natives in each age range. As we lack information on the use of health services between immigrants and natives, we assume that both groups have similar service use patterns.

(6) *Education.* Expenditures for education include expenditure for compulsory education, job training programs and higher education. We use GEIH information on school or program participation for the different levels by combining information on enrollment and educational attainment, and compute for each group the share among the total participants on each level. In particular, for compulsory education we apportion expenditures using direct information from the GEIH on the share of each group in the population between 3 and 16 years of age that attends pre-school, primary or secondary education in official establishments in the *average effect* scenario. In our expenditures data we cannot discriminate between levels of compulsory education, so we simply assume that the average cost is the same across school levels.<sup>18</sup> Now, spending in compulsory education includes all expenditures associated with the provision of education and those related to the administration, inspection, management or support of schools and other institutions that provide pre-school, primary or secondary education. This does not include the spending on the construction of new schools, transport subsidies or school feeding programs, which we include as part of 'congestible' goods. Spending on compulsory education is carried out by local authorities using transfers from the National Government through the General Participation System (SGP) which are essentially distributed according to

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<sup>15</sup> We treat those that report being affiliated to special regime (military, police, teachers, etc.) as part of the contributory regime.

<sup>16</sup> The UPC is the annual amount recognized by the national government for each individual affiliated to the General Health Care Social Security System (SGSSS) to cover the health benefits plan in the contributory and subsidized regimes.

<sup>17</sup> Equivalent affiliates are an estimate of the number of people who were affiliated 360 days a year. Each year the Ministry of Health publishes a technical study to determine the sufficiency of the Capitation Payment Unit (UPC) of the contributory and subsidized regimes to finance the services contained in each benefit plan. These studies are available for consultation at: <https://www.minsalud.gov.co/salud/POS/Paginas/unidad-de-pago-por-capitacion-upc.aspx>

<sup>18</sup> Using data for 2017 from the Ministry of Education on the average cost per student that must be allocated to finance the provision of education, we don't see large differences in the average costs by level.

payroll costs. Thus, it is likely—at least in the short-term—that the marginal cost of educating an immigrant child is just a fraction of the average cost. So, given the high inflexibility of the teaching staff in the short-term, in the *marginal effect* scenario, we attribute costs for all children between 3 and 16 years of age attending compulsory education in official establishments in the following way: (i) all immigrants and native-born returnees residing in the country for less than a year are assign a marginal cost of zero; (ii) everyone else is assign the average cost.

Expenditures for job training are allocated using the share of each group in the total population that at the time of the survey was attending a job training program. We use the share of each group in the total population attending only job training programs in public institutions as part of our sensitivity analysis. We don't include this as our baseline scenario because the Colombian government also finances with public resources the private provision of job training through public-private programs such as *Jóvenes en Acción*, or direct subsidies and loans to students. Finally, for higher education expenditures, we compute the share of each group in the college population in public institutions.

(7) *Social protection*. Provision of social protection is provided in the form of cash and in-kind benefits and comprises expenditures for sickness and disability spending, pension benefits, family and children, unemployment benefits, social housing and vulnerable population. Using the information of self-declared benefit recipients from the GEIH, we estimate the share of each group receiving the relevant benefit. Specifically, we use the information in section M of the GEIH to identify beneficiaries. Now, from 2013 to 2015 the questionnaire does not disaggregate by type of benefit, so we only have information on overall cash benefits from government agencies. We use this information to allocate all expenditures for family and children and social housing for fiscal years 2013 to 2015. For fiscal years 2016 to 2018 we use the following criteria: for pension benefits we use pension income received from the government including *Colombia Mayor*, for family and children benefits we use the conditional cash transfers program *Más Familias en Acción*, and for social housing we use everyone reporting being a recipient of housing-related subsidies (social housing, interest rate subsidy, eviction subsidy, subsidy for victims of natural disaster or displacement, municipality subsidy, etc.). This information includes the amount of income received by individual members of the household with at least 10 years of age during the last month or the last year for each type of benefit claimed by welfare claimants. Now, since the amount of family and children benefits depends on the number of children, in our sensitivity analysis we use as an alternative allocation the share of dependent children among family-related benefits recipients.

In the case of sickness and disability, unemployment benefits and vulnerable population, because we have no information on the amount of benefits received, we assume recipient receive the same quantity. We use the share of the inactive population that left their last job within a year due to illness or accident to allocate sickness and disability spending. To allocate unemployment benefits we use the share of each group in the total beneficiary population. Finally, we apportion expenditures for vulnerable population using the proportion of each group in total population



classified as either immigrant or native-born returnee arriving during the last twelve months, internally displaced from armed conflict, violence, natural disasters or associated to an ethnic group, or receiving cash benefits from the government with the purpose of reducing their poverty level.

(8) *Debt service*. As we discussed in Section 2, payment of interest on the national debt should also be attributed to migrants. Particularly, interests for debt acquired as a result of their arrival to the country, not the one incurred before their arrival. Therefore, we obtain information from the Ministry of Finance to desegregate the debt service for the National government in each fiscal year by the year the debt was issued. Next, we group interest payments using immigrant's cohort classification: (i) less than a year, (ii) one to five years, (iii) more than five years.<sup>19</sup> Then, we apportion debt service expenditures proportionately to the share of each group in the total resident population by year of arrival. Note that this will allow us to also apportion expenditures differently between permanent natives and the native-born population that returned from Venezuela. Debt service of regional and local governments is allocated on a *pro rata* basis as we don't have detailed information to disaggregate it further.

**Table A1**  
List of Government Revenues

Revenue source	Grouping
Personal income tax	Income tax, social insurance and payroll taxes
Withholding tax	
Capital gains taxes	
Social security contributions	
Payroll taxes	
Corporate income tax	Corporate and capital taxes
Minimum presumptive tax	
Income tax for equality (CREE)	
Wealth tax	Wealth tax
Value-added tax	VAT and other indirect taxes
Consumption tax	
Wine and spirits duties	
Beer and cider duties	
Tobacco duties	
Carbon tax	
Fuel tax	
Fuel surcharge	
Tariffs and customs duties	
Vehicle excise duties	Motor vehicle tax
Property tax	Property tax
Industry and commerce tax	Industry and commerce tax

<sup>19</sup> For example, the total debt service for 2018 is classified in the following way: (i) debt issued in 2017, (ii) debt issued between 2012-2016, (iii) debt issued before 2012.

Financial transactions tax	Financial transactions tax
Gross operating surplus and rents	Gross operating surplus, rents and royalties
Interests and dividends	
Oil and mining royalties	
Urban phones tax	Urban phones tax
Educational services	Educational services
Social security contributions FOMAG	National Teachers Pension Fund
Other receipts FOMAG	
Foreign resident identification card	Immigration certificates
Fees and rights	
Fines and penalties	
Contributions	
Sale of goods and services	Other
Contractual income	
Other taxes	
Other receipts	

*Note.* The Table reports the list of government revenues we assembled based on information from the Ministry of Finance, DIAN, FUT, SGR, and the General Accounting Office, and the classification we use in our analysis to group them.

## Table A2

### List of Government Expenditures by Sub-Function (UN COFOG-DANE)

Expenditure item	Grouping
1.1 - 1.2 Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs, and foreign economic aid	
1.3 General services	
1.4 Basic research	
1.5 R&D general public administration	
1.6 General public administration n.e.c.	
1.8 Transfers of a general character between different levels of government	'Pure' public goods
2.1 Military defense	
2.2 Civil defense	
2.3 Foreign military aid	
2.4 R&D defense	
2.5 Defense administration	
3.1 Police services	
3.2 Fire-protection services	
3.5 R&D public order and safety	
3.6 Public order and safety administration	
4.1 General economic, commercial and labor affairs	
4.2 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting	'Congestible' public goods
4.3 Fuel and energy	
4.4 Mining, manufacturing and construction	
4.5 Transport	
4.6 Communication	

4.7	Other industries	
4.8	R&D economic affairs	
4.9	Economic affairs n.e.c.	
5.1	Waste management	
5.2	Wastewater management	
5.3	Pollution abatement	
5.4	Protection of biodiversity and landscape	
5.5	R&D environmental protection	
5.6	Environmental protection administration	
6.1	Housing development	
6.2	Community development	
6.4	Street lighting	
6.5	R&D housing and community amenities	
6.6	Housing and community amenities administration	
7.5	R&D health	
7.6	Health administration	
8.1	Recreational and sporting services	
8.2	Cultural services	
8.3	Broadcasting and publishing services	
8.4	Religious and other community services	
8.5	R&D recreation, culture and religion	
8.6	Recreation, culture and religion administration	
9.5	Education not definable by level	
9.6	Subsidiary services to education	
9.7	R&D education	
9.8	Education administration	
10.8	R&D social protection	
10.9	Social protection administration	
3.3	Law courts	Law courts and prisons
3.4	Prisons	
6.3	Water supply	Water supply
7.1 - 7.2 - 7.3	Medical, hospital and pharmaceutical services	Health services
7.4	Public health services	
9.1 - 9.2	Pre-primary, primary and secondary education	Education: compulsory education
9.3	Post-secondary non-tertiary education	Education: job training
9.4	Tertiary education	Education: higher education
10.1	Sickness and disability	Social protection: sickness and disability
10.2 - 10.3	Old age	Social protection: pensions
10.4	Family and children	Social protection: family and children
10.5	Unemployment	Social protection: unemployment
10.6	Housing	Social protection: housing
10.7	Socially vulnerable and excluded population	Social protection: vulnerable population
11	Public debt service	Debt service

*Note.* The Table reports the list of government expenditures by sub-function (UN COFOG) as adopted by Colombia's Statistical Department (DANE) and the classification we use in our analysis to group them.

## Appendix B. Additional Tables and Figures

**Table B1**

Welfare dependency: Immigrant-Native differences in welfare-take up probabilities and transfer values using only the head of household

	Welfare Take-up Probability				Level of Receipts (thousands)
	Any Welfare	Health Care	Pension	Cash Assitance	
Panel (a): Immigrants by group					
All immigrants	− 0.104*** (0.007)	− 0.099*** (0.007)	− 0.062*** (0.011)	− 0.030*** (0.002)	8.099 (137.4)
Venezuelan	− 0.102*** (0.007)	− 0.097*** (0.007)	− 0.048*** (0.014)	− 0.034*** (0.003)	− 70.01 (142.2)
Other	− 0.108*** (0.020)	− 0.106*** (0.020)	− 0.087*** (0.023)	− 0.019*** (0.006)	383.6 (421.4)
Panel (b): Venezuelan immigrants by cohort					
Returnees	0.024** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	− 0.049*** (0.017)	− 0.045*** (0.004)	− 213.9*** (60.34)
Short-term	− 0.342*** (0.009)	− 0.333*** (0.008)	− 0.076*** (0.026)	− 0.031*** (0.003)	− 868.2*** (104.4)
Mid-term	− 0.228*** (0.017)	− 0.217*** (0.016)	− 0.045*** (0.016)	− 0.024*** (0.003)	− 1622.8 (1465.7)
Long-term	− 0.011 (0.023)	− 0.019 (0.022)	− 0.018 (0.023)	− 0.002 (0.011)	421.6 (543.3)
Predicted probability of welfare take-up for permanent natives	0.426	0.415	0.171	0.092	−
Fraction of predicted prob. in the (0,1) interval	0.993	0.993	0.900	0.839	−
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	1,383,310	1,383,310	234,370	1,383,310	111,332

Notes. The unit of analysis is the individual. We consider all heads of household 10 years of age or older except for pension benefits in which case we consider all female age 54 or older and males age 59 or older. Panel (a) considers all immigrant groups in fiscal years 2013–2018, while panel (b) focuses on Venezuelan immigrants (including returnees) by cohort. Cash assistance includes *Más Familias en Acción*, *Jóvenes en Acción*, unemployment benefits, *Colombia Mayor*, social housing programs, and other cash transfers from National and local governments. The level of receipts is the self-reported value for cash assistance excluding unemployment for which we don't have information. We drop observations with no reported value or values below ten thousand pesos and discount them using the 2018 CPI. Controls include age, a dummy variable for females, family size, monthly wage, annual nonlabor and nontransfer income, and a dummy variable for those living in an urban area. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights reported in the GEIH. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* Denotes significance at 1%, \*\* significance at 5% and \* significance at 10%.

**Table B2**

Net Fiscal Impact by Scenario and Level of Government without Royalties, 2013-2018

	Panel (a): average effect			
	<i>Natives</i>		<i>Venezuelan-born</i>	<i>Other</i>
	<i>Permanent</i>	<i>Returnees</i>		
<i>(1) Overall net fiscal contributions (COP\$ million, 2018 equivalent)</i>				
National	-275,720,784	-1,056,913	-1,737,454	1,239,813
Regional and Local	52,649,830	-96,984	-1,142,921	2,481,521
Total	-223,070,954	-1,153,897	-2,880,374	3,721,334
Percent of GDP (%)	-3.99	-0.02	-0.05	0.07
<i>(2) Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures</i>				
National	0.762	0.685	0.702	1.223
Regional and Local	1.100	0.951	0.708	2.754
Total	0.868	0.783	0.705	1.534
<i>(3) Revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives</i>				
National	—	0.899	0.922	1.605
Regional and Local	—	0.864	0.644	2.504
Total	—	0.903	0.812	1.768
	Panel (b): marginal effect			
	<i>Natives</i>		<i>Venezuelan-born</i>	<i>Other</i>
	<i>Permanent</i>	<i>Returnees</i>		
<i>(1) Overall net fiscal contributions (COP\$ million, 2018 equivalent)</i>				
National	-276,349,413	-1,002,083	-1,270,554	1,346,713
Regional and Local	51,692,969	89,900	-505,601	2,614,180
Total	-224,656,445	-912,183	-1,776,156	3,960,893
Percent of GDP (%)	-4.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.07
<i>(2) Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures</i>				
National	0.762	0.649	0.739	1.258
Regional and Local	1.098	1.057	0.833	3.180
Total	0.867	0.795	0.775	1.618
<i>(3) Revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives</i>				
National	—	0.852	0.970	1.652
Regional and Local	—	0.962	0.759	2.896
Total	—	0.917	0.894	1.866

*Notes.* Panel (a) reports estimates when we impute to immigrants the average cost of public goods provision. Panel (b) reports the estimates under the assumption that immigrants pay the marginal cost, assumed to be zero. In each case we report at different levels of government for permanent natives, returnees, Venezuelan-born and other immigrants, cumulated over fiscal years 2013–2018: (1) their overall net fiscal contribution, expressed in 2018 equivalent COP, (2) the ratio of revenues contributed to expenditures received in real terms, and (3) the revenues/expenditures ratio for each immigrant group relative to permanent natives. We include revenues and expenditures for social security as part of the National government. We use gross domestic product implicit price deflator to estimate equivalent COP.

**Table B3**

Marginal Per Capita Fiscal Impact by Group and Cohort  
(COP\$ million, 2018 equivalent)

	<i>All sample</i>		<i>Independent person unit</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel (a): Immigrants by group</i>					
All immigrants	− 4.911*** (0.321)	− 4.655*** (0.321)	− 6.839*** (0.532)	− 7.442*** (0.533)	− 7.599*** (0.519)
Returnees	− 6.347*** (0.240)	− 6.507*** (0.240)	− 11.14*** (0.357)	− 11.53*** (0.355)	− 9.230*** (0.347)
Venezuelan-born	− 8.010*** (0.290)	− 7.479*** (0.289)	− 10.77*** (0.546)	− 11.73*** (0.549)	− 11.80*** (0.533)
Other	5.444*** (1.376)	5.544*** (1.374)	13.20*** (2.567)	13.04*** (2.561)	7.331*** (2.529)
<i>Panel (b): Venezuelan-born immigrants by cohort</i>					
Short-term	− 19.27*** (0.222)	− 18.76*** (0.221)	− 24.86*** (0.421)	− 25.97*** (0.419)	− 25.87*** (0.410)
Mid-term	1.786*** (0.722)	2.241*** (0.720)	2.584** (1.240)	1.607 (1.245)	1.673 (1.207)
Long-term	0.047 (0.470)	0.709 (0.468)	3.133*** (1.213)	2.599** (1.215)	1.798 (1.176)
Controls:					
Age	−	Yes	−	Yes	Yes
Sex	−	Yes	−	Yes	Yes
Education	−	−	−	−	Yes
Number of dependents	−	−	−	−	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	4,681,880	4,681,880	3,243,056	3,243,056	3,243,056

*Notes.* The Table reports OLS regression coefficients of the net fiscal impact (dependent variable) on dummy variables for immigrant's group/cohort after controlling for demographic characteristics. Panel (a) considers all immigrant groups, while panel (b) focuses on Venezuelan-born immigrants by cohort. Coefficients indicate the marginal per capita fiscal impact that is associated with each group/cohort relative to the net contributions of permanent natives. We report results for the marginal cost scenario over fiscal years 2013–2018. Data are based on our own fiscal estimates following Tables 1 and 2 and GEIH data, adjusted by a single multiplicative factor so that the population-weighted aggregate is consistent with totals of our budget estimates of government receipts and expenditures. All public spending is included in benefits. See the Online Appendix for a detail recount of the allocation of revenues and expenditures to each observation in the GEIH.

Columns 1 and 2 takes as the unit of analysis all individual observations. Columns 3 to 5 exclude dependents from the unit of analysis, defined as any person (i) under the age of 18, (ii) from 18 to 22 years old and enrolled full time in secondary education, or (iii) from 18 to 22 years old in higher education or not, and who is working less than half time; if a person is married, they are considered independent, regardless of their age. However, each dependent's fiscal flows are assigned equally to all independent person(s) to whom they are linked.

Education groups are: (i) less than HS, (ii) HS graduate, (iii) some college, (iv) bachelor's degree, (v) any post bachelors.

Estimates are weighted by sampling weights reported in the GEIH. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* Denotes significance at 1%, \*\* significance at 5% and \* significance at 10%.

**Table B4**

Net Fiscal Impact for Venezuelan Immigrants at the Local Level Excluding National Transfers, 2013-2018

Panel (a): average per capita net fiscal contributions (COP\$ 2018 equivalent)					
	<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>		<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>
Armenia	98,095	318,244	Neiva†	137,126	276,115
Barranquilla	-383,243	-135,789	Pasto†	-1,793,200	-350,446
Bogotá	-645,458	-420,185	Pereira	4,864	245,149
Bucaramanga	-318,697	-97,384	Popayán†	86,401	151,669
Cali	-767,640	75,733	Quibdó†	402,145	534,691
Cartagena	-70,636	167,547	Riohacha	382,033	365,832
Cúcuta	-922,408	118,558	Santa Marta	49,644	221,702
Florencia†	-	-	Sincelejo	118,269	266,913
Ibagué†	126,326	341,174	Tunja	-322,054	16,441
Manizales	-107,538	85,727	Valledupar	112,122	270,877
Medellín	-532,528	-511,932	Villavicencio	-97,279	143,121
Montería	427,280	537,703			

Panel (b): ratio of real revenues to real expenditures					
	<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>		<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>
Armenia	1.140	1.575	Neiva†	1.128	1.364
Barranquilla	0.705	0.824	Pasto†	0.438	0.770
Bogotá	0.586	0.608	Pereira	1.041	1.381
Bucaramanga	0.698	0.843	Popayán†	1.080	1.170
Cali	0.551	0.938	Quibdó†	1.467	1.816
Cartagena	1.057	1.370	Riohacha	1.964	2.140
Cúcuta	0.445	1.118	Santa Marta	1.034	1.253
Florencia†	-	-	Sincelejo	1.020	1.163
Ibagué†	1.133	1.473	Tunja	0.799	1.108
Manizales	0.889	1.152	Valledupar	1.091	1.331
Medellín	0.759	0.717	Villavicencio	0.911	1.192
Montería	1.490	1.796			

Panel (c): revenues/expenditures ratio, relative to permanent natives					
	<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>		<i>Average Effect</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>
Armenia	1.050	1.455	Neiva†	0.967	1.170
Barranquilla	0.796	0.935	Pasto†	1.042	1.833
Bogotá	0.493	0.513	Pereira	0.894	1.190
Bucaramanga	0.775	0.939	Popayán†	0.860	0.932
Cali	0.742	1.271	Quibdó†	1.429	1.769
Cartagena	0.879	1.144	Riohacha	1.726	1.880
Cúcuta	0.866	2.247	Santa Marta	0.768	0.935
Florencia†	-	-	Sincelejo	0.927	1.059
Ibagué†	0.967	1.258	Tunja	0.654	0.907
Manizales	0.806	1.047	Valledupar	1.003	1.227
Medellín	0.696	0.658	Villavicencio	0.747	0.980
Montería	1.313	1.585			

*Notes.* The Table reports the net fiscal impact for Venezuelan immigrants (native returnees and Venezuelan-born) at the local level averaged over fiscal years 2013–2018. Panel (a) reports the average per capita net fiscal contribution, expressed in 2018 equivalent Colombian pesos. Panel (b) reports the ratio of revenues contributed to expenditures received in real terms. Panel (c) reports the revenues/expenditures ratio for Venezuelan-born immigrants relative to natives. We use gross domestic product implicit price deflator for each regional jurisdiction (Department) to estimate equivalent COP. Estimates are averaged over years with a minimum sample size as describe in the text. † Caution should be taken when examining the local-level estimates because of small immigrant population and subsample size.