and developing nations) through the transfer of production, and the widespread contamination of soil, air, and water supplies due to industrial waste disposal and wildlife clearing. Whatever arguments can be marshaled for the ultimate wisdom of globalization policies, there is no ducking the fact that they have done and are doing serious harm.

McKinney's implicit denial of power imbalance and social conflict in his analysis of NAFTA-related institutions is consistent with, and perhaps stems from, his reliance on game theory concepts, which presuppose relative power equilibrium among nation-states and relative independence of political leaders from the interests of dominant socio-economic classes. In apparently embracing a modernist representation of nation-states as self-contained political and economic units, McKinney also ignores the global interconnectedness of capitalist development historically. This analytic approach leads McKinney to interpret U.S. multilateralism and NAFTA as an alternative to a U.S. geopolitical strategy of "hegemony." At least as strong a case could be made, I would argue, that U.S. multilateralism and NAFTA are a *manifestation* of that strategy.

Capitalism in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, as can be said for Central and South America and beyond, has developed interdependently over the course of several centuries. Today, the United States embodies the first truly global hegemonic power in history, and Mexico is viewed by many as a "semi-peripheral" zone of foreign transnational corporate domination. I believe that McKinney's portrayal of NAFTA-related institutions as a set of structures that brings together disparate economies and societies in a fundamentally unprecedented fashion fails to take into account the impact of this colonial past and neocolonial present. His emphasis on the difficulties in integrating countries with vast disparities in "culture, legal traditions, labor histories, and levels of economic development," as well as "size," "income levels," and "regulatory regimes," in my view misses the point that national economies have developed in relation to each other and that "disparities in development" reflect the historic predominance of powerful transnational economic interests.

McKinney attributes the shortcomings of NAFTA-related institutions, particularly those created in response to labor and environmental concerns, to their "early stage of development." Over time, he affirms, they will become more "robust" and effective. But many working people, social movement activists, and academics believe that NAFTA's *raison d'Ítre*—neoliberal trade and investment liberalization—directly conflicts with the goals of decent wages, decent working conditions, and ecologically sustainable development. McKinney's argument would be stronger if he acknowledged and responded to these perceptions.

For those looking for a summary of recent activities, functions, and procedural norms of NAFTA-related institutions, *Created by NAFTA* will prove a valuable resource. The reprinted labor and environmental side agreements, in addition to other appendices, are a useful reference. However, this work falls short of a critical engagement of the "significance" of NAFTA and neoliberal "free trade" policies. Such a discussion would have arrived in opportune fashion, given the profound social inequality and economic crises that beset our times.

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History

Culture of Misfortune: An Interpretive History of Textile Unionism in the United States. By Clete Daniel. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press (an imprint of Cornell University Press), 2001. x, 327 pp. ISBN 0-8014-3853-5, $39.95 (cloth).

Clete Daniel's fine history of the failures of textile unionism in the United States during the middle decades of the twentieth century runs counter to the dominant tendencies in the writing of contemporary labor history. During the past two decades an enormous burst of historical scholarship has focused on textile workers, especially in the American South, and their struggles to secure a more stable and prosperous life. Among these studies—several of which are brilliant in their conception and execution—most have examined the culture and everyday lives of textile workers; some have described in detail the quotidian aspects of life and labor in small communities; some have analyzed the triumphs and failures of local unions; and many have either dissected the general failure of unions in southern mills or the deindustrialization of northern textiles. Daniel, however, is the first scholar in more

than two generations to study the textile workers by examining the institutional history of their union, the Textile Workers Union of America, which tried and failed to organize the majority of textile workers in the mid-twentieth century.

In his introduction, Daniel makes clear his purpose and his departure from contemporary scholarly fashion. American workers, he observes, fail "to conform to any particular theory or notion of class relations in a capitalist culture" (p. 1). Disdaining theory and discourse analysis, Daniel instead produces a narrative that describes in plain prose why what Sidney Hillman, the creator of the Textile Workers' Organizing Committee (the TWOC) and its child, the TWUA, thought would prove to be one of industrial unionism's greatest triumphs turned into its gravest disappointment—and how the TWUA, in its failure, would foreshadow the nation's fall from industrial preeminence and also serve as the first major union "to confront the specter of postindustrialism."

This tale, as told by Daniel, begins with the failure of the United Textile Workers of America (UTWA), a union that originated in New England largely among the predominantly male, highly skilled textile workers of north European origins. Unable to organize successfully beyond its loyal base, it failed totally in the South, especially during the great general textile strike of 1934. In the wake of that failure and the rise of the CIO, first the TWOC and then the TWUA emerged as an alternative for textile workers who chose the union path regardless of nativity, gender, or skill. The TWOC, however, was little more than Hillman's Amalgamated Clothing Workers with a different name, a legacy that handicapped it from birth. Northern and immigrant in culture and attitude, the TWOC's leaders and organizers failed to penetrate deeply or broadly among southern workers; nor were they able to use the power of New Deal labor law to surmount southern employers' opposition to unions. Worse yet, as described by Daniel, differences and conflicts among the TWOC's leaders—Hillman, Sol Barkin, and Francis Gorman, the putative chief—paralyzed many organizing initiatives, nowhere more so than in the South. So intense did their interpersonal conflict grow that Gorman walked out of the TWOC, reorganized the UTW, and reaffiliated with the AFL. In response, Hillman and his loyalists took what remained of the TWOC and the members unwilling to follow Gorman, and created the TWUA.

Then came World War II, which, for the TWUA as for many other new unions, proved a godsend. Labor scarcity, combined with the policies of the War Labor Board, enabled the TWUA to unionize in the South as well as the North. Yet success in the South paled before expansion in the North, and at war's end, the TWUA, then one of the CIO's largest affiliates with 400,000 members, was a more northern institution than ever. Daniel sees that development as largely explaining the union's future trajectory. Its leaders, men like William Pollock and Emil Rieve, viewed southern textile workers through northern lenses; they conceived of southern unionization primarily as a means to protect the higher wage rates and better conditions of northern workers, an aim that southern textile workers sensed and rejected. Hence, Operation Dixie, the CIO's post–World War II Southern organizing campaign, failed to convince the region's textile workers that a union would improve what they already considered to be high wages or that a union would deliver more benefits than costs when challenged by obdurate anti-union employers. The one union leader with some awareness of the needs and experiences of southern workers, George Baldanzi, regularly feuded with Rieve, who, together with his northern allies in the TWUA hierarchy, forced Baldanzi out of the union and, like Gorman before him, back into the ineffective UTW-AFL.

Even before Rieve forced Baldanzi out, the TWUA suffered a loss from which it never recovered, its defeat in the southern textile strike of 1951. That defeat, combined with Baldanzi's move into the UTW, doomed the TWUA. In Daniel's words, "By permitting their desire to discredit Baldanzi [to] influence the TWUA's collective bargaining strategy in the southern cotton-rayon industry . . . Rieve and his northern-based allies inflicted an injury from which the union would never fully recover" (p. 205). Thereafter, as primarily a New England–based union,

the TWUA declined in part as a consequence of the deindustrialization of northern textiles.

By stressing institutional history and leadership practices rather than race, gender, or discourse and making excellent use of union archives and records, Daniels confirms David Brody's observation that unions in the United States, left to their own devices, lack the means to defeat powerful anti-union adversaries. In his conclusion, he also seconds Brody's more recent assertion that workers' elemental desire for justice in the workplace will persistently

motivate them to turn to unions as the best means to achieve voice and democracy at work. Daniels writes, "The desire of textile workers to have an equal role in deciding issues of workplace fairness and justice was likely to be as strong and persistent in the new century as it had been in the old" (p. 281). Would that were so, and that a "culture of misfortune" would never prove itself sufficiently powerful to extinguish the faith of those who believed in the cause of unionism.

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Unionization and Union Leadership: The Road Haulage Industry. By Paul Smith. London: Continuum, 2001. 230 pages. ISBN 0-8264-5214-0, $99.95 (hardback).

The British road haulage industry is rarely studied by students of industrial relations. It is not hard to understand why. Compared to miners and dockworkers, engineering and auto workers, and even railway workers, the men who drive trucks in Britain have always looked a rather unattractive group for those in search of romanticism and a lost class-conscious proletariat. But this comparative lack of interest in truckers in the study of British labor history—for all their importance to the economy—has been profoundly mistaken. The lasting value of Paul Smith's short but lucid and well-argued analysis, based firmly on interviews and a range of archival sources, is that it has gone some considerable way to make up for that serious past neglect.

Smith's study—developed from an earlier doctoral thesis—is much more than a straightforward narrative of the evolution of road haulage trade unionism in the twentieth century. It claims higher theoretical ambitions. Indeed, it purports to challenge many of the alleged assumptions lying behind the work of Warwick University's Industrial Relations Research Unit, mainly during the 1970s and early 1980s. Smith argues that the "creation and mobilization of trade union power—unionization—has been unexplored." The emphasis on job control and workplace organization in so much research of that time resulted, he argues, in the exclusion of "any analysis of the changing nature and meaning of trade unionism." Whether this charge constitutes anything so grand as a theory is questionable, but Smith does have a point. Far too much of the academic research in the so-called golden age of British industrial relations was concerned with shop stewards and workers in the engineering and auto industries, and trade unions as such were not the central focus of attention.

In this study Smith relates the development of road haulage industrial relations to the rise and fall of trade union organization, in particular that of the Transport and General Workers union, the 1921 brainchild of Ernest Bevin. In doing so he digs deep into the complexities of road haulage with empirical studies of the union's trucker branches in London, Liverpool, and Birmingham. What unfolds reads like a description of a lost world of workplace democracy and mobilization of collective power on a district-wide basis, a world that lasted for only a surprisingly brief time in the 1960s and 1970s.

This so-called new unionism reached its apogee in the January 1979 road haulage dispute, which turned out to be an important part of the much wider national trade union offensive, during the "winter of discontent," against the Labour government's attempt to restrain wages for what it perceived to be the national interest. The lorry drivers won a famous victory on that occasion—mainly as a result of their aggressive use of picketing to disrupt the movement of food supplies—and humiliated both the government and the road haulage employers. However, this proved to be only a short-lived triumph.

Smith displays considerable sympathy for the truckers in their struggle, but he admits that "the very determination and breadth of the 1979 road haulage strike was a major factor precipitating the mobilization of the coercive power of the state during the 1980s to counter the power of militant trade unionism." Not long after the election of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives a few months following the strike, the so-called balance of industrial power shifted in road haulage back to employers. Abetting anti-union initiatives by the government were the onset of recession and a rapid contraction of unionization, which weakened the TGWU's "capacity to mobilize collective action across the sector." We have witnessed few signs of recovery in road haulage unionism in recent years. Smith argues that "an accommodation to overwhelming force has narrowed hopes and aspirations," which the arrival of the social partnership concept and new union recognition laws under Labour since May 1997