COMP5212: Machine Learning

Lecture 22

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Adversarial defense

Adversarial training

- Adversarial training [MMS18]:
  - $$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\max_{\|x'-x\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} loss(\theta, x') \right]$$
- TRADES
  - $$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\underbrace{loss(\theta, x)}_{\text{clean acc}} + \underbrace{\lambda \max_{\|x'-x\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} loss(\theta, x')}_{\text{robust reg}} \right]$$

Robustness verification

Why

- Many heuristic defense was broken under stronger attacks
- A verified model cannot be attacked by any attacks (including unforeseen ones)

Robustness verification

Basic formulation

- Consider a binary classification case:

x_0

Input is a **point**



Neural Network

$f(x_0) = 1.2$

Output is a score

$f(x_0) > 0$

Positive Example

$f(x_0) \leq 0$

Negative Example

Robustness verification

Basic formulation

- Suppose $f(x_0) > 0$, can we verify this property:

$$f(x) > 0, \forall x \in \mathcal{C}$$



Robustness verification

Basic formulation

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

Robustness verification

Basic formulation

Assuming $f(x_0) > 0$, we solve the optimization problem to find the worst case:

$$f^* = \min_{x \in \mathcal{C}} f(x)$$

$\mathcal{C}$ is usually a perturbation set "around" x_0, e.g., $\mathcal{C} := \{x | \|x - x_0\|_p \leq \epsilon\}$





Is it a hard problem?

Robustness verification

Basic formulation

Multi-class case:

Data perturbed arbitrarily within a set



output bounds

(guaranteed score ranges)
2.3 ≤ cat ≤ 4.5
-0.8 ≤ dog ≤ **1.2**
-4.2 ≤ panda ≤ **-0.1**

we guarantee that “cat” stays top-1
under input perturbations



x_0

Robustness verification

How to solve?

This is the fundamental problem we want to solve (Wong & Kolter 2018, Salman et al. 2019):

$$f^* = \min z^{(L)}$$

Last layer output f(x), at layer L

pre-activation

$$\text{s.t.} \quad z^{(i)} = W^{(i)}\,\hat{z}^{(i-1)} + b^{(i)} \qquad i \in \{1, \cdots, L\}$$

Linear constraints

$$\hat{z}^{(i)} = \sigma\left(z^{(i)}\right) \quad i \in \{1, \cdots, L-1\}$$

Non-linear, non-convex constraints

post-activation

$$\hat{z}^{(0)} = x, \quad x \in \mathcal{C}$$

Input perturbations



Training-time Integrity

Training-time integrity

Data poisoning

- An attack where an adversary corrupts some portion of the training set or adds new inputs
- Targeted/untargeted
  - Untargeted: decrease the overall performance (i.e., accuracy, convergence) of an ML model,
  - Targeted: induce misclassification to a specific test sample or a subset of the test sample

Training-time integrity

Label flip attack

- In FedML



- In GCN



(a) Attack process. (b) Test accuracy.

Training-time integrity

Backdoor attacks

- Perform maliciously on trigger instances
- Maintain similar performance on normal data.



Training-time integrity

Backdoor attacks

- $$\min \sum_{j=1}^{|\mathscr{D}_p|} \ell(f_i(\tilde{x}_j), y_t) + \lambda \sum_{k=1}^{|N|} \ell(F(x_j), f_i(x_j))$$
- Where $A(x_i, y_t) = \tilde{x}_i$



Training-time integrity

Taxonomy of backdoor attacks



Fig. 2. Taxonomy of poisoning-based backdoor attacks with different categorization criteria. In this figure, the red boxes represent categorization criteria, while the blue boxes indicates attack subtypes.

Training-time integrity

Taxonomy of backdoor attacks



Training-time integrity

Backdoor attacks in text

- Trigger could be a word, a short phrase, or a syntax



Training-time integrity

Counter Backdoor attack

- Backdoor detection
  - Build a detector to tell whether a given neural network contains a backdoor
- Backdoor analysis
  - Target label prediction
    - Identify the target label
  - Trigger Synthesis
    - Reverse-engineer the trigger

Backdoor analysis

Neural Cleanse



- $\min_{m,\Delta} \ \ell(y_t, f(A(x, m, \Delta))) + \lambda \cdot |m|$
- for $x \in X$
- $A(x, m, \Delta) = x' \quad x'_{i,j,c} = (1 - m_{i,j}) \cdot x_{i,j,c} + m_{i,j} \cdot \Delta_{i,j,c}$

Review

Final Project

- Presentation :5 mins per group (background, methodology, initial result) + 1min Q&A
  - Held by TAs on Nov 28th and Nov 30th
  - Group in alphabet order according canvas
- 4 pages long report (addition contents in appendix)

Final exam

- 90 mins
- Close-book

Review

Matrix derivate

- Chain rule: f is a function of Y, let Y=AXB, to get $\frac{\partial f}{\partial X}$
  - $df = tr(\frac{\partial f}{\partial Y}^T dY) = tr(\frac{\partial f}{\partial Y}^T AdXB) = tr(B\frac{\partial f}{\partial Y}^T AdX) = tr((A^T\frac{\partial f}{\partial Y}B^T)^T dX)$
    - Since $dY = d(A)XB + AdXB + AXdB = AdXB$ as $dA = 0, dB = 0$
  - So we get $\frac{\partial f}{\partial X} = A^T\frac{\partial f}{\partial Y}B^T$

Review

Matrix derivate

- Ex 1: $f = a^T Xb$, solve $\frac{\partial f}{\partial X}$, where a is $m \times 1$ vector, X is $m \times n$ matrix, b is $n \times 1$ vector
- Ex 2: $f = a^T exp(Xb)$, solve $\frac{\partial f}{\partial X}$, where a is $m \times 1$ vector, X is $m \times n$ matrix, b is $n \times 1$ vector
- Ex 3: $f = \|Xw - y\|^2$, solve $\frac{\partial f}{\partial w}$, where y is $m \times 1$ vector, X is $m \times n$ matrix, w is $n \times 1$ vector
-

Review

Convexity

- A function $f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ is a convex function
- $\Leftrightarrow$ the function f is below any line segment between two points on f:
  - $\forall x_1, x_2, \forall t \in [0,1],$
  - $f(tx_1 + (1-t)x_2) \leq tf(x_1) + (1-t)f(x_2)$

Review
Convexity

- Another equivalent definition for differentiable function:
  - f is convex if and only if $f(x) \geq f(x_0) + \nabla f(x_0)^T (x - x_0), \forall x, x_0$



convex function



nonconvex function

Review

Convexity



- Convex function:
  - (For differentiable function) $\nabla f(w^*) = 0 \Leftrightarrow w^*$ is a global minimum
  - If f is twice differentiable $\Rightarrow$
    - F is convex if and only if $\nabla^2 f(w)$ is **positive semi-definite**
    - Example: linear regression, logistic regression, …

Review

Lipchitz continuous/smooth

- A differential function f is said to be L-Lipschitz continuous:
  - $\|f(x_1) - f(x_2)\|_2 \leq L\|x_1 - x_2\|_2$
- A differential function f is said to be L-smooth: its gradient are Lipschitz continuous:
  - $\|\nabla f(x_1) - \nabla f(x_2)\|_2 \leq L\|x_1 - x_2\|_2$
  - And we could get
    - $\nabla^2 f(x) \leq LI$
    - $f(y) \leq f(x) + \nabla f(x)^T(y - x) + \frac{1}{2}L\|y - x\|^2$

Review

Linear regression

- $min_w f(w) = \|Xw - y\|^2$
  - E_{train}: continuous, differentiable, convex
  - Necessary condition of optimal w:
  - $$\nabla f(w^*) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f}{\partial w_0}(w^*) \\ \vdots \\ \frac{\partial f}{\partial w_d}(w^*) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$



Review

Linear regression

$$f(w) = \|Xw - y\|^2 = w^T X^T X w - 2w^T X^T y + y^T y$$

$$\nabla f(w) = 2(X^T X w - X^T y)$$

- $$\nabla f(w^*) = 0 \Rightarrow \underbrace{X^T X w^* = X^T y}_{\text{normal equation}}$$
- $\Rightarrow w^* = (X^T X)^{-1} X^T y$

Review
Linear SVM

- Given training examples $(x_1, y_1), \ldots, (x_n, y_n)$
  - Consider binary classification: $y_i \in \{+1, -1\}$
- Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM):

$$\min_{w} \quad \frac{1}{2} w^T w + C \sum_{i=1}^{n} \xi_i$$

- s.t. $y_i(w^T x_i) \geq 1 - \xi_i, i = 1, \ldots, n$

  $\xi_i \geq 0$



Review

Optimization

- Gradient descent
- Stochastic gradient descent
- Adagrad
- Momentum
- Adam

Review

Nonlinear mapping

- Can now freely do quadratic classification, quadratic regression
- Can easily extend to any degree of polynomial mappings
  - E.g.,
    $\phi(x) = (x_1, x_2, x_3, x_1x_2, x_1x_3, x_2x_3, x_1x_2^2, x_1x_3^2, x_1x_2^2, x_2^2x_3, x_2^2x_3, x_1^3, x_2^3, x_3^3)$
- Kernel trick

Review

Generalization bound

- $$P[\neg \exists h \in \mathscr{H} \,|\, E_{tr}(h) - E(h)| > \epsilon] = P[\forall h \in \mathscr{H} \,|\, E_{tr}(h) - E(h)| \leq \epsilon]$$
$$\geq 1 - 2|\mathscr{H}|e^{-2\epsilon^2 N}$$
- Given N and some δ, we have
  - $|E_{tr}(h) - E(h)| \leq \sqrt{\frac{1}{2N}\log\frac{2|\mathscr{H}|}{\delta}}$
  - i.e $|E_{tr}(h) - E(h)| \leq \gamma$ for all $h \in \mathscr{H}$

Review

VC Dimension

- Given a set $S = \{x^{(i)}, \ldots, x^{(d)}\}$ (no relation to the training set) of points $x^{(i)} \in \mathcal{X}$, we say that $\mathcal{H}$ shatters S if $\mathcal{H}$ can realize any labeling on S. I.e, if for any set of labels $\{y^{(i)}, \ldots, y^{(d)}\}$, there exist some $h \in \mathcal{H}$ so that $h(x^{(i)}) = y^{(i)}$ for all $i = 1,\ldots, d$
- If no data set of size k can be shattered by $\mathcal{H}$, then k is a break point for $\mathcal{H}$
  - $m_{\mathcal{H}}(k) < 2^k$
- VC dimension for linear model

Review

Regularization

- Calling the regularizer $\Omega = \Omega(h)$, we minimize
  - $E_{\text{reg}}(h) = E_{\text{tr}}(h) + \frac{\lambda}{N}\Omega(h)$
- In general, $\Omega(h)$ can be any measurement for the “size” of h

Review

Decision Tree

- The averaged entropy of a split $S \rightarrow S_1, S_2$
  - $\frac{|S_1|}{|S|}H(S_1) + \frac{|S_2|}{|S|}H(S_2)$
- Information gain: measure how good is the split
  - $H(S) - ((|S_1|/|S|)H(S_1) + (|S_2|/|S|)H(S_2))$



Averaged entropy: 1.51

Information gain: 1.58 – 1.51 = 0.07

Review

Model ensemble

- Bagging
  - Random Forest (Bootstrap ensemble for decision trees):
    - Create T trees
    - Learn each tree using a subsampled dataset S_i and subsampled feature set D_i
    - Prediction: Average the results from all the T trees
- Boosting
  - Direct loss minimization: at each stage m, find the best function to minimize loss
    - Solve $f_m = \arg\min_{f_m} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ell(y_i, F_{m-1}(x_i) + f_m(x_i))$
    - Update $F_m \leftarrow F_{m-1} + f_m$