

# Payment Application - Don't Secure Sh!t

**cmlh**

Shmoocon 2K10 - Firetalks

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# whoami

Not QSA and/or PA-QSA i.e. End User therefore **Unbiased**.

## PCI-DSS

- Energy Australia (.nsw.gov.au Critical Infrastructure)
- “Should I Black Your PC I/Eyes Again?” Presentation to .nsw.gov.au
- eWay (.au ASP Payment Gateway)
- FOXTEL (.au Subscription Television)

## PA-DSS

- OWASP AU 2009 Presentation with Darren Skidmore (FNIS)

# PA-DSS - History

Payment Application Best Practice (PABP) from VISA

PCI Security Standards Council Publications:

- Accepted PABP v1.4 until 15 October 2008
- v1.1 - 15 April 2008
- v1.2 - 15 October 2008

Rumoured that PA-DSS is more thorough than PABP

- No way to verify as PABP has ceased publication

# PA-DSS - Diff PCI-DSS

PCI SCC list Validated Payment Application (VPA)

- Not QSA like PCI-DSS

PA-DSS Implementation Guide

VISA are the only Card Brand mandating PA-DSS

- Conformance by 1 July 2012

Diff from PCI DSS (.com) or PCI PTS (Hardware /dev)

PA-DSS Implementation Guide (i.e. PCI DSS Conformance)

# Economics of INFOSEC

Identify Political and/or Technical Deficiencies in:

- PA-DSS
  - Including Dependencies on PCI DSS
- PA-QSA

Intend to audit specific Validated Payment Application (VPA) at a later date

# PA-QSA

QSA -> PA-QSA

CI\$\$P (ISC2) and/or CISA/CISM (ISACA)

- ISC2 recently launched the C\$\$LP

Security Researchers with these quals???

<sarcasm>I mistakenly put \$\$ which does represent the not for profit agenda of ISC2</sarcasm>

# Out of Scope

Due to their PCI-DSS (lack of) effort

- Single Implementation (Custom /dev Software)
- Payment Gateway (ASP or SaaS)
- Implementation (DB, OS, etc)

Attack Surface of PCI DSS

# In Scope

Payment Applications which process VISA only

“Payment” Module within COTS is In Scope

- Attack Surface of other “Modules”



# PCI DSS Dependency

*1. Do not retain full magnetic stripe, card validation code or value (CAV2, CID, CVC2, CVV2), or PIN block data*

Attacks are similar to those of PCI DSS

- Masked on Screen yet read /dev
- Commodity Hardware

Commodity i.e. not restricted

# PCI DSS Dependency

## *2. Protect stored cardholder data*

Attacks are similar to those of 3.4 of PCI DSS

- No reference to Cryptographic Modes
  - Hence “Broken” Modes used e.g. ECB

Root Cause “Applied Crypto” as “Reference”

Cryptographic Modes are mentioned in “Applied Cryptography”

# PA-DSS

5. *Develop secure payment applications*

Cites OWASP “Guide” - WTF!!!

- OWASP Top Ten 2007 -> 2010 RCI
- TANDEM, Mainframe and AS/400 based
  - www Server on LPAR

MITRE CWE has > 700 Type of Vuln

# PCI DSS Dependency

- 6. *Protect wireless transmissions*
- WEP - WTF!!!
- Joshua Wright on Not Broadcasting SSID
  - Contacted PCI DSS 1.0
  - Implemented PCI DSS 1.2

Quotes from <http://www.networkworld.com/chat/archive/2008/022608-josh-wright-wireless-security-chat.html>

Q. “Joshua, please let me know your thoughts on disabling broadcasting your router’s SSID.

A. It’s a bad idea. I know the PCI specification requires you to do this, and I’ve told them they need to remove this requirement from the specification.”

# PA-DSS

*7. Test payment applications to address vulnerabilities*

Root Cause is Maturity

- Pen Test is Point in Time

# PCI DSS Dependency

*10. Facilitate secure remote software updates*

Should be implemented but consider other vendors e.g. Evilgrade

- ARP Spoofing,
- DNS Cache Poisoning,
- DHCP Spoofing

# PCI DSS Dependency

- 12. Encrypt sensitive traffic over public networks*
- 13. Encrypt all non-console administrative access*

Recent attacks against SSL not considered.

# Payment Specific

There is no security advice specific to payment transaction types, i.e. Chargeback, etc



# Root Causes

## Elitism

- Financial Security is “Smoke and Mirrors”
- Compounded by Blowing Smoke up their (\_o\_)

# Root Causes

“Hitting the Ceiling” due to:

- CI\$P and CISA/CISM
- Reading “Applied Cryptography”/etc only

# Conclusion

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