
OWASP Top Ten Security Threats

Threats

- **Web defacement**
 - ⇒ loss of reputation (clients, shareholders)
- **Information disclosure** (lost data confidentiality)
 - e.g. business secrets, financial information, client database, medical data, government documents
- **data loss** (or lost data integrity)
- **unauthorized access**
 - ⇒ functionality of the application abused
- **denial of service**
 - ⇒ loss of availability or functionality (and revenue)

OWASP Top Ten (2013 Edition)

(Open Web Application Security Project)

http://owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project

A1: Injection

**A2: Broken
Authentication
and Session
Management**

**A3: Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS)**

**A4: Insecure
Direct Object
References**

**A5: Security
Misconfiguration**

**A6: Sensitive Data
Exposure**

**A7: Missing
Function Level
Access Control**

**A8: Cross Site
Request Forgery
(CSRF)**

**A9: Using Known
Vulnerable
Components**

**A10: Unvalidated
Redirects and
Forwards**

A1: Injection flaws

- Executing code provided (injected) by attacker
 - SQL injection

Server Code

```
txtUserId = getRequestString("UserId");  
txtSQL = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserId = " + txtUserId;
```

UserId:


105 or 1=1

Server Result

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserId = 105 or 1=1
```

- Solutions:
 - **validate** user input
 - **escape** values (use escape functions)
 - use **parameterized queries** (SQL)
 - enforce **least privilege** when accessing a DB, OS etc.

' -> \'



Leave a Comment

http://www.appgoat.com


Please leave a **comment**

Name:

Country:

Comments:

OUR USERS WILL ENTER THEIR NAME HERE





A2: Broken Authentication & session Management

- **Session hijacking** by stealing session id (e.g., using eavesdropping if not https)
- Solutions:
 - generate new session ID on login (do not reuse old ones)
 - use cookies for storing session id
 - set session timeout and provide logout possibility
 - require https (at least for the login / password transfer)

A3: Cross-site scripting (XSS)

- **Cross-site scripting** (XSS) vulnerability
 - an application takes user input and sends it to a Web browser without validation or encoding
 - attacker can execute JavaScript code in the victim's browser
 - to hijack user sessions, deface web sites etc.
- Solution: **validate** user input, **encode** HTML output



Visitors will get the evil script



Static Content

User Supplied
Content

```
<html>
<body>
<h1>New Job Posting</h1>
<h2>Job Description</h2>
<hr/>
Secure Web Developer Needed
<script>/*something evil*/</script>
</body>
</html>
```

New Job Posting!

Job Description

Secure web develop

lol!

Apply Now


Save Job



ATTACKERS CAN USE
JAVASCRIPT TO....

STEAL YOUR SESSION ID:
document.cookie

REWRITE ANY PART
OF THE PAGE



ATTACKERS CAN USE
JAVASCRIPT TO....

OVERLAY THE LOGIN
SCREEN WITH
THEIR OWN,
ALLOWING ATTACKS
TO HARVEST
USERS AND
PASSWORDS

A4: Insecure Direct Object Reference

- Attacker manipulates the URL or form values to get **unauthorized access**
 - to objects (data in a database, objects in memory etc.):
`http://shop.com/cart?id=413246` (your cart)
`http://shop.com/cart?id=123456` (someone else's cart ?)
 - to files:
`http://s.ch/?page=home` -> **home**
`http://s.ch/?page=/etc/passwd` -> **/etc/passwd**
- Solution:
 - avoid exposing IDs, keys, filenames to users if possible
 - **validate** input, accept only correct values
 - **verify authorization** to all accessed objects (files, data etc.)

A4 – Avoiding Insecure Direct Object References

- Eliminate the direct object reference
 - Replace them with a temporary mapping value such as a random mapping

Instead of :

<http://app?id=9182374>

Use:

<http://app?id=7d3J93>



- Validate the direct object reference
 - Verify the user is allowed to access the target object
 - Verify the requested mode of access is allowed to the target object (e.g., read, write, delete)

5 – Security Misconfiguration

Web applications rely on a secure foundation

- Everywhere from the OS up through the App Server
- Hackers can take advantage of poor server configuration to gain unauthorized access to application functionality or data

Solution

- Verify your system's configuration by scanning to find misconfiguration or missing patches
- Secure configuration by “hardening” the servers:
 - Disable unnecessary packages, accounts, processes & services
 - **patch** OS, Web server, and Web applications
 - run Web server as a **regular (non-privileged) user**



6 – Sensitive Data Exposure


Storing and transmitting sensitive data insecurely

- Failure to identify all sensitive data
- Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data gets stored
 - Databases, files, directories, log files, backups, etc.
- Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data is sent
 - On the web, to backend databases, to business partners, internal communications
- Failure to properly protect this data in every location

Typical Impact

- Attackers access or modify confidential or private information
 - e.g, credit cards, health care records, financial data (yours or your customers)
- Attackers extract secrets to use in additional attacks
- Company embarrassment, customer dissatisfaction, and loss of trust
- Expense of cleaning up the incident, such as forensics, sending apology letters, reissuing thousands of credit cards, providing identity theft insurance
- Business gets sued and/or fined


Sensitive Data Exposure – Example



A7: Missing Function Level Access Control

- “Hidden” URLs that don’t require further authorization
 - to actions:
`http://site.com/admin/adduser?name=x&pwd=x`
(even if `http://site.com/admin/` requires authorization)
 - to files:
`http://site.com/internal/salaries.xls`
`http://me.com/No/One/Will/Guess/82534/me.jpg`
- Problem: missing authorization
- Solution
 - add missing authorization 😊
 - don’t rely on security by obscurity – it will not work!

Missing Function Level Access Control Illustrated



- Attacker notices the URL indicates his role
`/user/getAccounts`
- He modifies it to another directory (role)
`/admin/getAccounts`, or
`/manager/getAccounts`
- Attacker views more accounts than just their own


A8: Cross-site request forgery

- **Cross-site request forgery** (CSRF) – a scenario
 - Ali logs in at bank.com, and forgets to log out
 - Ali then visits a evil.com (or just webforums.com), with:

```

```
 - Ali's browser wants to display the image, so sends a request to bank.com, without Ali's consent
 - if Ali is still logged in, then bank.com accepts the request and performs the action, transparently for Ali (!)
- There is **no simple solution**, but the following can help:
 - expire early user sessions, encourage users to log out
 - use secret hidden fields
 - use POST rather than GET, and check referrer value
 - Re-authenticate or CAPTCHA for extra-sensitive pages

CSRF Example



<http://mybank.com/showaccount?id=bill>

<http://mybank.com/transfer?from=bill&amount=10000&for=someguy>

``

9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components

Vulnerable Components Are Common

- Some vulnerable components (e.g., framework libraries) can be identified and exploited with automated tools

Widespread

- Virtually every application has these issues because most development teams don't focus on ensuring their components/libraries are up to date

Typical Impact

- Full range of weaknesses is possible, including injection, broken access control, XSS ...
- The impact could range from minimal to complete host takeover and data compromise

10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

Web application redirects are very common

- Sometimes parameters define the destination URL
- If they aren't validated, attacker can send victim to a site of their choice
- If not validated, attacker may be able to use unvalidated forward to bypass authentication or authorization checks

Typical Impact

- Redirect victim to phishing or malware site
- Attacker's request is forwarded past security checks, allowing unauthorized function or data access

Unvalidated Redirect Illustrated

1 Attacker sends attack to victim via email or webpage




From: Internal Revenue Service
Subject: Your Unclaimed Tax Refund
Our records show you have an unclaimed federal tax refund. Please click here to initiate your claim.

3 Application redirects victim to attacker's site

2

Victim clicks link containing unvalidated parameter



4

Evil site installs malware on victim, or phish's for private information

[http://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006
& ... &dest=www.evilsite.com](http://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006&...&dest=www.evilsite.com)

Client-server – no trust

- **Security on the client side doesn't work** (and cannot)
 - don't rely on the client to perform security checks (validation etc.)
 - e.g. `<input type="text" maxlength="20">` is not enough
 - authentication should be done on the server side, not by the client
- **Don't trust your client**
 - HTTP response header fields like referrer, cookies etc.
 - HTTP query string values (from hidden fields or explicit links)
 - e.g. `<input type="hidden" name="price" value="299">` in an online shop can (and will!) be abused
- **Do all security-related checks on the server**
- Don't expect your clients to send you SQL queries, shell commands etc. to execute – it's not your code anymore
- Put limits on the number of connections, set timeouts

Summary

- **understand** threats and typical attacks
- **validate**, validate, validate (!)
- **do not trust** the client
- **read** and follow recommendations for your platform
- **use** web scanning tools
- **harden** the Web server and programming platform configuration