

## Vectors over $GF(2)$

Addition of vectors over  $GF(2)$ :

$$\begin{array}{rccccc} & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ + & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{array}$$

For brevity, in doing  $GF(2)$ , we often write 1101 instead of  $[1,1,0,1]$ .

**Example:** Over  $GF(2)$ , what is  $1101 + 0111$ ?

**Answer:** 1010

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : Perfect secrecy

Represent encryption of  $n$  bits by addition of  $n$ -vectors over  $GF(2)$ .

### Example:

Alice and Bob agree on the following 10-vector as a key:

$$\mathbf{k} = [0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]$$

Alice wants to send this message to Bob:

$$\mathbf{p} = [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]$$

She encrypts it by adding  $\mathbf{p}$  to  $\mathbf{k}$ :

$$\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{k} + \mathbf{p} = [0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1] + [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]$$

$$\mathbf{c} = [0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]$$

When Bob receives  $\mathbf{c}$ , he decrypts it by adding  $\mathbf{k}$ :

$$\mathbf{c} + \mathbf{k} = [0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0] + [0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1] = [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]$$

which is the original message.

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : Perfect secrecy

If the key is chosen according to the uniform distribution, encryption by addition of vectors over  $GF(2)$  achieves *perfect secrecy*.

For each plaintext  $\mathbf{p}$ , the function that maps the key to the cyphertext

$$\mathbf{k} \mapsto \mathbf{k} + \mathbf{p}$$

is invertible

Since the key  $\mathbf{k}$  has the uniform distribution,  
the cyphertext  $\mathbf{c}$  also has the uniform distribution.

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : All-or-nothing secret-sharing using $GF(2)$

- ▶ I have a secret: the midterm exam.
- ▶ I've represented it as an  $n$ -vector  $\mathbf{v}$  over  $GF(2)$ .
- ▶ I want to provide it to my TAs Alice and Bob (A and B) so they can administer the midterm while I take vacation.
- ▶ One TA might be bribed by a student into giving out the exam ahead of time, so I don't want to simply provide each TA with the exam.
- ▶ *Idea*: Provide pieces to the TAs:
  - ▶ the two TAs can jointly reconstruct the secret, but
  - ▶ neither of the TAs all alone gains any information whatsoever.
- ▶ *Here's how*:
  - ▶ I choose a random  $n$ -vector  $\mathbf{v}_A$  over  $GF(2)$  randomly according to the uniform distribution.
  - ▶ I then compute

$$\mathbf{v}_B := \mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}_A$$

- ▶ I provide Alice with  $\mathbf{v}_A$  and Bob with  $\mathbf{v}_B$ , and I leave for vacation.

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : All-or-nothing secret-sharing using $GF(2)$

- ▶ What can Alice learn without Bob?
- ▶ All she receives is a random  $n$ -vector.
- ▶ What about Bob?
- ▶ He receives the output of  $f(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{v} - \mathbf{x}$  where the input is random and uniform.
- ▶ Since  $f(\mathbf{x})$  is invertible, the output is also random and uniform.


# Vectors over $GF(2)$ : All-or-nothing secret-sharing using $GF(2)$

Too simple to be useful, right?

RSA just introduced a product based on this idea:

## RSA® DISTRIBUTED CREDENTIAL PROTECTION

Scramble, randomize and split credentials



- ▶ Split each password into two parts.
- ▶ Store the two parts on two separate servers.

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : *Lights Out*


- ▶ *input*: Configuration of lights
- ▶ *output*: Which buttons to press in order to turn off all lights?

**Computational Problem:**

Solve an instance of *Lights Out*


Represent state using  $\text{range}(5) \times \text{range}(5)$ -vector over  $GF(2)$ .

*Example state vector:*






Represent each button as a vector (with ones in positions that the button toggles)

*Example button vector:*



## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : *Lights Out*


Look at  $3 \times 3$  case.





## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : *Lights Out*

Button vectors for  $3 \times 3$ :



**Computational Problem:** Which sequence of button vectors sum to  $\mathbf{s}$ ?

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : *Lights Out*

**Computational Problem:** Which sequence of button vectors sum to  $\mathbf{s}$ ?

Observations:

- ▶ By commutative property of vector addition, order doesn't matter.
- ▶ A button vector occurring twice cancels out.

Replace Computational Problem with: Which set of button vectors sum to  $\mathbf{s}$ ?

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : *Lights Out*

Replace our original Computational Problem with a more general one:

Solve an instance of *Lights Out*

$\Rightarrow$


Which set of button vectors sum to  $\mathbf{s}$ ?

$\Rightarrow$

Find subset of  $GF(2)$  vectors  $\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n$  whose sum equals  $\mathbf{s}$

## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : *Lights Out*

Button vectors for  $2 \times 2$  version:




where the black dots represent ones.

**Quiz:** Find the subset of the button vectors whose sum is



## Vectors over $GF(2)$ : *Lights Out*

Button vectors for  $2 \times 2$  version:



where the black dots represent ones.

**Quiz:** Find the subset of the button vectors whose sum is



**Answer:**

An equation showing the sum of two button vectors equals a target button vector. The first box has dots at (1,1) and (2,1). This is followed by an equals sign, then a box with dots at (1,1), (1,2), and (2,2), followed by a plus sign, then a box with dots at (1,2), (2,1), and (2,2).