Accountable and privacy preserving data processing via distributed ledgers

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Theoretical Computer Science

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Outline

- Introduction
- Architecture
- Future work
- Related work




I need patients data for medical research!




Sure, here you are!

GDPR makes that illegal


How can we help Dr. House help the patients?






Architecture


Participants



Participants



Participants




Blockchain advantages


- Immutability
- Accountability
- Auditability
- Non-repudation
- Public bulletin board
- Secure decentralized time-stamping

Algorithms


- Sum
- Average
- Count
- Maximum / Minimum
- Median

Data registration






Step 1: Hash dataset



Step 2: Encrypt dataset




Step 3: Register dataset


Blockchain


emit event: Register(datasetID, owner)


tx(name, uri, category, hash).send()


Data Controller














Step 1: Request for dataset processing




Step 1: Request for dataset processing




Step 2: Get processor's public key





Step 3: Encrypt symmetric key



Step 4: Send symmetric key to processor








listening to Process events

Step 1: Catch process event


Blockchain event(requestID, algorithmID, ck, pk_r) **Data Processor**

listening to Process events


Step 2: Decrypt key




Step 4: Get dataset info




Step 5: Get dataset




Step 6: Decrypt dataset




Step 6: Proof




Step 6: Proof



Step 6: Send proof




Verification




Verification

Step 1: Get proof



listening to Complete events

Step 1: Get proof



listening to Complete events


Step 1: Get proof

Blockchain


tx(requestID).send()

Data Requestor

Step 2: Decrypt results



Step 3: Verify proof



zkSNARKs [PHGR13]

Let **F** an outsource function, a public input **u**, a private input **w** and y = F(u, w)

A zero knowledge verifiable computation scheme consist of a set of three polynomial algorithms:

$$(ek_f, vk_f) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(F, 1^{\lambda})$$

$$(y,\pi) \leftarrow \mathsf{Compute}(ek_f, u)$$

$$\{0,1\} \leftarrow \mathsf{Verify}(vk_f,u,y,\pi)$$

Security assumptions

- Public key infrastructure (PKI)
 - Authenticates and verifies the data processor and the data controller
 - Perform the trusted setup for each algorithm

Assumptions

- Data controller:
 - Integrity
 - Confidentiality

- Data processor:
 - Confidentiality








- Fabricated dataset to manipulate results
- Collusion with data processor



- Fake computation
- Process different dataset
- Use different algorithm
- Fake results
- Expose dataset




DDoS attacks



"I did the correct computation on the requested dataset and algorithm"


Trusted Oracle:

- Hold a list of random datasets with corresponding digests
- The only owner of the datasets and digests
- Cannot lie about the content of the dataset neither of the digest
- No collusion with other participants




Data Processor


Data Requestor





Data Processor


Data Requestor




















Data Requestor



- Ideally the controller could be the trusted oracle
- No security proof
- No indistinguishability assumption





Data Requestor

"I know a dataset d such as H(d) = h and I correctly compute F(d) = y"

- The proof is public in the blockchain
- The results of the computation are encrypted with requestor's public key and in the blockchain
- But...

Data Processor

Data Requestor


- The verification algorithm, verification key and the proof are public
- An adversary can brute-force and guess correctly the output

Adversary

Data Requestor

Parity check

$$F: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$$



Solution

- $\bullet \; \text{Salt:} \; s \xleftarrow{\mathbf{r}} \{0,1\}^l$
- Generated by the processor for each proof
- Public in the zkSNARK setting

Final Construction

Input:

- Public: h, s, ek_f
- Private: dataset

Compute (F'):

- H(d) = h'
- F(d) = y

Output:

• (π, h', y, s)

Evaluation

Implementation


- Ethereum
- Smart contracts
- RESTful API
- DApp
- CLI
- Blockchain, Storage, Crypto libraries
- Controller, Processor, Requestor nodes
- ZKP ecosystem

Evaluation


How much it cost to store data?


Size	Gas	Cost	
32 bytes	20.000	\$0,037	
1KB	724.664	\$1.357	
1MB	697.325.562	\$1,305.393	
10MB	~7.000.000.000	~\$13,104	
100MB	~70.000.000.000	~\$131,040	
1GB	~700.000.000 ~\$13,104,000		

Evaluation: Storage costs



Evaluation: Storage costs





Evaluation: Storage costs

How much it cost to use the system?

Туре	Gas	Cost	
App deployment	3.004.253	\$5.66	
Register	233.487	\$0.44	
Request	89.206	\$0.15	
Process	83.274	\$0.15	
Register entity	25.279	\$0.04	
Proof	100.248	\$0.18	

Evaluation: ZKP

	Setup (s)	Compute (s)	Verify (ms)	Eval key (MB)	Ver key (KB)	Proof (B)
Sum	10	8	27	0,144	100	304
Count	15	9	37	0,036	100	304
Min / Max	29	14	49	17	100	304
Median	1700	780	12	64	100	304
Mean	16	8	10	0,82	100	304

Future Work

- MPC
- Fees
- Reputation System
- Privacy Preserving Algorithms
- New Ideas ?

Related Work

- Enigma
- MedRec
- AD-SNARKs
- Zokrates

Questions?

