KUBERNETES COMMUNITY DAYS BEIJING 2025

Exploring the Next Generation of Secure Containers: gVisor and Kata Fusion

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Content

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Part 01

Secure Containers Overview

Why secure containers?

Secure Containers Overview

Secure containers are more than security

- **Security isolation** prevents sensitive instruction escapes
  - Executing untrusted code
  - Multi-tenancy
- **Performance isolation** prevents scheduling, networking, I/O interference
  - Online-offline hybrid deployment
- **Fault isolation** prevents shared kernel crashes/faults



Secure Containers Overview

At the mean time...

- Runtime overheads cause increased latency, reduced throughput or density
- Resource footprints from additional components, e.g. guest kernel/Sentry





*Data from gVisor Documentation
https://gvisor.dev/docs/architecture_guide/performance/

Part 02

Inside Existing Solutions

Brief Introduction to gVisor and Kata Containers



Inside Existing Solutions

Secure Containers Landscape

Inside Existing Solutions: Kata Containers

- The speed of containers, the security of VMs
- Kata provides a **virtual machine**: a typical model with a clear layered structure
  - VMM provides virtual devices
  - Guest kernel provides dedicated runtime environment
- Most of the work is focused on reducing overheads
  - MicroVMs: Firecracker (for FaaS), Cloud-hypervisor (for general tasks), etc.
  - Disabled unnecessary kernel configs



Inside Existing Solutions: gVisor

- gVisor is an independent kernel running in user-space, exposing a *Linux-like* interface.
- gVisor provides a **virtual kernel** with merged VMM and guest kernel layers. The model eliminates unnecessary virtualization assumptions.
- Supported platforms: KVM, systrap and ptrace
- Sentry ≈ kernel: When the application makes a system call, the platform redirects the call to the Sentry, which will do the necessary work to service it.



Inside Existing Solutions



gVisor

kata containers

So… what is the next?

Part 03

User-Mode Linux

The Next Generation of Secure Containers

User-Mode Linux

UML was first released in 1991 and has been merged into the Linux mainline.

- Build with *make ARCH=um*



User-Mode Linux

UML is more like gVisor from perspective of architecture



User-Mode Linux

Compared with gVisor

- Running applications without modification or adaptation
- Time-tested kernel (also known as implementation costs)
- Costs of Golang: runtime, garbage collection, etc.
- Free to use any customized kernels

Compared with Kata Containers

- With **NanoPVM**, running in environments that do not support nested virtualization
- Simpler virtualization model
- vGPU support (nvproxy)

User-Mode Linux

UML as a Hypervisor



Part 04

NanoPVM

Enables User Mode Kernel to Run in Any Environments

What is NanoPVM ?

- Same architectural level as KVM ,

  Currently exists as an out-of-tree Linux kernel module

- **4 Core points:**
  - **New virtualization model paradigm**
  - Memory isolation utilizes **Direct Memory Management**
  - **Executable Context Management**, No instruction emulation
  - Minimalist Interface



New virtualization model paradigm

Popek and Goldberg virtualization requirements:

- Equivalence / Fidelity
- Resource control / Safety
- Efficiency / Performance

- Provide 2 Virtualization ability: **Context Execution, Address Space Management**
- Implementation with 3 Control Interfaces : **Map, Unmap, Switch**

OS Interface Complete

OS Function	Implement method	Interface
Create Process	Allocate address space and setup initial process status	map + switch
Process Exit	Release all memory mappings and resource	unmap
Memory Manage	Map/Unmap mapping on demand	map + unmap
Syscall Handle	Trap and handle after VM-Exit	switch
Exception Handle	Trap and handle after VM-Exit	switch
Device IO	Map device memory or port to host	map + switch

Secondary Mode

- Direct Memory Management via Map and Unmap.
- Intercept Syscall and Exception to User Mode Kernel.



Interface and Usage example

```
/* Create compute instance: */
instance_fd = open("/dev/nanopvm");
as_fd = ioctl(instance_fd, NANOPVM_AS_CREATE);
ioctl(asfd, NANOPVM_MAP, *mem_range);

/* Virtualization loop: */
do {
     ioctl(asfd, NANOPVM_SWITCH, *context_regs);
     ...
     handle_vm_exit();
} while(1);

/* Process exit: */
ioctl(asfd, NANOPVM_UNMAP, *mem_range);
```

Syscall/Exception Intercept

- Intercept without Ptrace, but **hook the trampoline entry**.
- Provide “Executable” context, and 4 capabilities:
  - enter vm
  - force kick out (bounce)
  - exception exit
  - syscall exit
- With the help of **Switcher**



Secondary Mode Switch

- Called with context_switch by UML on purpose
- Call with Guest_Context_Regs {

        // fields similar to ptrace_regs

        ……

}



Memory Management

- Called from mmap, brk, handle_user_fault and so on.
- Call with Guest_Memory_Range {

```
void *gva;
void *hva;
uint len;
uint prot;
.....
```

}

- **No conception of GPT** at all.
- All Guest address mapped with User permission.
- Memory region Management with rbTree.



Performance

Compared with UML+NanoPVM, gVisor+NanoPVM, gVisor+KVM, gVisor-systrap







Future

- The basement of Next Security Container.
- Alternative base tech for other kind of Sandbox, e.g. WebAssembly Runtime.
- (Maybe) Remove the GPT from UML.

Thanks and QA