


# Secure Group Communication in Wireless Mesh Networks

Jing Dong, Kurt Ackermann, Cristina Nita-Rotaru  
Department of Computer Science and CERIAS  
Purdue University



# Group Communication in Wireless Mesh Networks



Multimedia Conferencing

Video/audio broadcasting

Online gaming

Distance learning

# Confidential Group Communication

- Ensure data confidentiality against outsiders
- Application
  - Paid video broadcasting
  - Sensitive multimedia conferencing





# Related Work

- On wired networks
  - LKH [Wong '00] and its variants [Li '01, Zhang '03, Zhang '04]
  - Protocols for overlay networks [Yiu '04, Abad '05, Zhu '05]
- Wireless networks
  - GKMPAN [Zhu '04]
  - CRTDH [Balachandran '05]
  - Secret key management [Chan '03, Du '06]

None of them address the unique  
features of WMNs

# Our Approach: SeGrOM

- Decentralize membership management
  - To avoid communication and computation bottleneck
- Localize communication
  - To save limited bandwidth
  - To reduce communication latency
- Exploit wireless broadcast
  - To improve performance and save bandwidth
- Use symmetric cryptography
  - To reduce computation overhead





# System and Security Model


- Tree-based multicast protocol
- Public key infrastructure
  - Group membership authentication
- supports dynamic group membership
- Security Goal
  - Confidentiality against outsider attacks
    - Wireless routers,
    - Non-member clients, or
    - Other devices
  - Forward and backward secrecy
    - Protect future data from members who have left
    - Protect past data from newly joined members

# SeGrOM Architecture

## Two-level architecture


### Global Data Delivery

Inter-router communication




### Local Data Delivery

Intra-router communication







# SeGrOM Head Member and Group Overlay

- Head member
  - One per access router
  - Elected among local member clients
  - Participate in global data delivery
  - Coordinate local data delivery
- Secure group overlay
  - Secret key between neighboring head members








# SeGrOM Data Flow

- Source forwards data to the local head member
- Local head member forwards data to
  - other local member clients
  - downstream head members
- Downstream head members forwards data to
  - their local member clients
  - downstream head members





# Secure Local Data Delivery

- Relies on a common local data key
- Data delivery
  - Encrypt data using the local data key
  - Send it to the access router
  - Access router broadcast to other client nodes
- To preserve forward and backward secrecy
  - Join or leave of local group member refreshes the local data key



# Global Data Delivery on Secure Group Overlay

- SeGrOM-Group
  - Use a common group key
  - The group key is refreshed to provide forward/backward secrecy
- SeGrOM-Link
  - Use the symmetric keys on the secure group overlay directly
  - Encrypt and deliver data for each of the downstream head members separately
- SeGrOM-Hop
  - Maintain a hop key on each hop
  - Exploit broadcast for group data delivery
  - Optimized communication and computation cost compared to SeGrOM-Link



# Global Data Delivery on Secure Group Overlay

- SeGrOM-Group
- SeGrOM-Link
- SeGrOM-Hop



# SeGrOM-Group

- All head members share a common group key
- Data is encrypted using the common group key for delivery across the backbone routers
- Pro:
  - Simplicity
  - Broadcast advantage and computation efficiency
- Cons:
  - Group key needs to be refreshed for every head member change – global communication



# SeGrOM-Link

- Use symmetric keys on the secure group overlay for data delivery
- Pros:
  - Avoids global communication
- Cons:
  - Expensive in computation
  - Does not exploit broadcast advantage



# SeGrOM-Hop

- Maintain a hop key at each hop
- Data is encrypted using the hop key hop by hop
- Pros:
  - Localized communication
  - Exploit broadcast for group data delivery
  - Optimized communication and computation cost compared to SeGrOM-Link
- Cons:
  - The need to maintain hop keys – but it involves only local communication





# Handling Group Dynamics

- Join/leave of non-head members
  - Only involves communication with the local head member
  - Refreshes local data key
- Join/leave of head members
  - Involves communication with neighboring head members
  - Updates the group overlay

Localized communication →  
Application responsiveness

# Member Revocation: SeGrOM-Revoke

- CRL is inefficient in WMNs
- Exploit client movement locality
- Each client selects a set of **home routers**
  - Maintains the revocation status
- Revocation
  - CA sends a revocation notice to the members on the home routers
- Check revocation status
  - Sends a query to any member on any of the home routers – **Localized communication**
  - If no member exists, send query to the CA





# Experimental Evaluation

- ns2 with MAODV
- 802.11 radio, bandwidth 2Mbps, range 250m, 1500m x1500m area
- Network structure
  - 100 wireless routers
  - 100 member clients
  - Member clients join with the nearest router
- One client as source
- Poisson group dynamics
  - join rate = leave rate for stabilized group size


# Protocols Compared

- W-LKH
  - Centralized protocol
- SeGrOM Protocols
  - SeGrOM-Group
  - SeGrOM-Link
  - SeGrOM-Hop




# Application Performance

Delivery ratio vs. data rates




Delivery ratio vs. group dynamics




Adding confidentiality does not degrade performance

# Computation Overhead

## Symmetric encryptions




## Asymmetric encryptions




Decentralized protocol avoids computation bottleneck

# Join and Leave Bandwidth Overhead and Latency

Join bandwidth overhead and latency



Decentralized membership management reduces bandwidth overhead




# Peak Bandwidth Comparisons

SeGrOM-Group

SeGrOM-Link

SeGrOM-Hop

W-LKH



Decentralized schemes reduces bandwidth variability





# Conclusion

- We proposed a framework for achieving data confidentiality for group communications in WMNs
- We proposed several variants that tradeoff complexity and performance
- We show that
  - Adding confidentiality does not degrade performance
  - Decentralized protocols are more efficient

● ● ● | Thank You!

Questions?



Contact: [dongj@cs.purdue.edu](mailto:dongj@cs.purdue.edu)