



September 7th 2022 — Quantstamp Verified

Lukso LSPs

This audit report was prepared by Quantstamp, the leader in blockchain security.

Executive Summary

Type	Industry Standards for Universal Profile and Asset Contracts										
Auditors	Poming Lee, Senior Research Engineer Bohan Zhang, Auditing Engineer Rabib Islam, Research Engineer										
Timeline	2022-07-11 through 2022-09-08										
EVM	Gray Glacier										
Languages	Solidity										
Methods	Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review										
Specification	<a href="#">Public Facing Documents</a> <a href="#">LSP standards</a>										
Documentation Quality	<div><div></div>High</div>										
Test Quality	<div><div></div>Undetermined</div>										
Source Code	<table><tr><th>Repository</th><th>Commit</th></tr><tr><td><a href="#">ERC725Alliance/ERC725</a></td><td>3541ee4</td></tr><tr><td><a href="#">lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts</a></td><td>602b79b</td></tr><tr><td><a href="#">ERC725Alliance/ERC725</a></td><td>5c47854</td></tr><tr><td><a href="#">lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts</a></td><td>3f14866</td></tr></table>	Repository	Commit	<a href="#">ERC725Alliance/ERC725</a>	3541ee4	<a href="#">lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts</a>	602b79b	<a href="#">ERC725Alliance/ERC725</a>	5c47854	<a href="#">lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts</a>	3f14866
Repository	Commit										
<a href="#">ERC725Alliance/ERC725</a>	3541ee4										
<a href="#">lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts</a>	602b79b										
<a href="#">ERC725Alliance/ERC725</a>	5c47854										
<a href="#">lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts</a>	3f14866										

Total Issues	14 (8 Resolved)
High Risk Issues	0 (0 Resolved)
Medium Risk Issues	0 (0 Resolved)
Low Risk Issues	6 (5 Resolved)
Informational Risk Issues	8 (3 Resolved)
Undetermined Risk Issues	0 (0 Resolved)



High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for client's reputation or serious financial implications for client and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low-impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Undetermined	The impact of the issue is uncertain.
Unresolved	Acknowledged the existence of the risk, and decided to accept it without engaging in special efforts to control it.
Acknowledged	The issue remains in the code but is a result of an intentional business or design decision. As such, it is supposed to be addressed outside the programmatic means, such as: 1) comments, documentation, README, FAQ; 2) business processes; 3) analyses showing that the issue shall have no negative consequences in practice (e.g., gas analysis, deployment settings).
Fixed	Adjusted program implementation, requirements or constraints to eliminate the risk.
Mitigated	Implemented actions to minimize the impact or likelihood of the risk.

## Summary of Findings

Quantstamp has done the audit for Lukso's LSPs, on a best-effort basis, with 3 auditors working independently (based on a commit-reveal scheme and later on syncing on their findings). During the course of this audit, we have found a few issues with low and informational severity levels. Overall, the code and the documentation appear to be of high quality; however, the coverage score of the test suite cannot be determined at this moment due to the testing framework used. The dev team has been very professional and helpful throughout the course of the audit. Although we have discovered some issues that may be fixed before the project goes live, we believe that the project may remain risky in the sense that as an industry standard, the project is novel, contains intricate logic, and is expected to be extensively applied to a wide variety of user scenarios with/without being modified by different developers from other projects. Unexpected new ways of using the standards may arise and edge cases are extremely difficult to predict. We highly recommend extensively testing the code (at least improving all coverage to >90%) and thinking of more edge cases before going live. Also, continuous on-chain observation and revision of the standards based on how people/projects are using them are recommended.

**2022-09-08 Update:** During this re-audit, the admin team has brought all the status of findings into fixed, acknowledged, or mitigated. The coverage scores have been obtained. At this moment the branch coverage for [ERC725Alliance/ERC725](#) is 88.1% and 82.23% for [lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts](#).

ID	Description	Severity	Status
QSP-1	Overwriting without User Acknowledgement Due to Hash Collision/Mistake	✖ Low	Acknowledged
QSP-2	Operator Could Clear Operator List	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-3	Missing Input Validation	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-4	Missing <code>_disableInitializers</code> for some Contracts	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-5	<code>LSP6KeyManagerCore::_countTrailingZeroBytes()</code> Can Not Recognize the Condition Where <code>key == 0</code>	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-6	Incorrect Key Prefix Could Be Used	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-7	Critical Functions Are Not Protected From Reentrancy	○ Informational	Acknowledged
QSP-8	On Potential Hash Collisions	○ Informational	Acknowledged
QSP-9	Allowance Double-Spend Exploit	○ Informational	Acknowledged
QSP-10	Repeatedly Adding the Same Operator for One TokenID	○ Informational	Fixed
QSP-11	Unlocked Pragma	○ Informational	Acknowledged
QSP-12	Possible to Renounce Ownership	○ Informational	Mitigated
QSP-13	<code>LSP1UniversalReceiver</code> Can Lead to Unexpected Reentrancy Behavior	○ Informational	Acknowledged
QSP-14	Remove Non-Existing Operator	○ Informational	Fixed

# Quantstamp Audit Breakdown

Quantstamp's objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

**DISCLAIMER:**

If the final commit hash provided by the client contains features that are not in scope of the audit or a re-audit, those features are excluded from consideration in this report.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow / underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting

**Methodology**

The Quantstamp auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following
  - i. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, and actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

**Toolset**

The notes below outline the setup and steps performed in the process of this audit.

**Setup**

Tool Setup:

- [Slither](#) v0.8.2

Steps taken to run the tools:

1. Install the Slither tool: `pip3 install slither-analyzer`
2. Run Slither from the project directory: `slither .`

## Findings

### QSP-1 Overwriting without User Acknowledgement Due to Hash Collision/Mistake

Severity: Low Risk

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: ERC725-3541ee4/implementations/contracts/ERC725YCore.sol

Description: Users may call `setData()` with an existing key by mistake or because of a hash collision. As the core part of this project. It is suggested to distinguish two modes, one of which sets new data, while the other modifies existing data.

Recommendation: Consider adding relative checks when calling `ERC725YCore : _setData()`. For instance, by adding a `boolean` to API representing if users allow an overwritten.

Update: The dev team stated:

ERC725Y is a general module that allows mapping data keys to data values. These data keys are not checked by default if they are mapped to some data value or not. To check if a data key is mapped to some value or not before writing is seen as an optional feature for some users implementing the ERC725Y standard. This design decision is also supported by the additional gas cost that would be required to read the contract storage to check for overriding or not. If a check should be added to avoid overwriting existing entries, it should be added on the LSP6KeyManager standard instead of on LSP0. An issue was opened on the LIPs repo to discuss splitting SETDATA Permission into



EDITDATA and ADDDATA Permissions.  
See [issue #110](https://github.com/lukso-network/LIPs/issues/110) in lukso-network/LIPs repository.

## QSP-2 Operator Could Clear Operator List

Severity: Low Risk

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol

Description: For the function `revokeOperator()`, the dev team only allows the token owner to revoke the operator. However, if any operator calls `transfer(from = owner, to = owner)`, then the operator list is cleared, and the owner will still have the NFT. The effect would be equivalent to that the operator successfully revokes all operators.

Recommendation: Re-consider whether this behavior is allowed from the standards' perspective. Otherwise, add relevant checks to stop this unexpected edge case from occurring.

Update: The dev team stated:

A custom error in LSP8 was introduced to revert when the from and to addresses are the same, to avoid this unexpected side effect of clearing the list of operators for a specific tokenId. See [PR #266](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/266) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts repository.

## QSP-3 Missing Input Validation

Severity: Low Risk

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/Custom/ClaimOwnership.sol

Description: To avoid human error, it is important to validate inputs even if they only come from trusted addresses. The following functions do not have a proper validation of input parameters:

- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/Custom/ClaimOwnership.sol::transferOwnership()` does not check if `newOwner` is `0x0`.
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata.sol::constructor()` does not check if `newOwner_` is `0x0`.
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol::_burn()` does not check if the NFT token it wants to burn exists or not.

Recommendation: Consider adding relevant checks.

Update: The dev team stated:

Regarding the missing input validations, below are the details of actions taken on each points.

- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/Custom/ClaimOwnership.sol::transferOwnership()` does not check if `newOwner` is `0x0`.  
  
Not implemented in the `ClaimOwnership` contract as in some cases, transferring ownership to the address(0) can be relevant. Examples:
  - to reset the `pendingOwner` to `address(0)` if the owner made a mistake in the address provided as a parameter.
  - if the owner changes his mind and does not want to transfer ownership anymore.
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata.sol::constructor()` does not check if `newOwner_` is `0x0`.  
  
Fixed and implemented directly in:
  - `LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata.sol` and `LSP4DigitalAssetMetadataInitAbstract.sol`: [PR #268](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/268) on lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts repository.
  - `ERC725`, `ERC725InitAbstract`, `ERC725X`, `ERC725XInitAbstract`, `ERC725Y` and `ERC725YInitAbstract`: [PR #159](https://github.com/ERC725Alliance/ERC725/pull/159) in ERC725Alliance/ERC725 repository.  
A new 3.1.3 version of the `@erc725/smart-contracts` package will be released and the dependency will be upgraded in the `@lukso/lsp-smart-contracts` repository to ensure that this requirement check is fixed on all the LSP smart contracts implementations that inherit from any ERC725 contracts.
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol::_burn()` does not check if the NFT token it wants to burn exists or not.  
  
Not applicable: the internal `_burn(...)` function checks if the `tokenId` passed as a parameter exists through the function `tokenOwnerOf(...)`. See [LSP8DigitalAssetCore.sol, line 307](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/blob/4576e9dd6bf7597ac06d8036a19e817cc35611c7/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol#L307) and [LSP8DigitalAssetCore.sol, lines 69-71](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/blob/4576e9dd6bf7597ac06d8036a19e817cc35611c7/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol#L69-L71).  
More tests were added in commit 4576e9d ([PR #268](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/268)) to ensure that the `_burn(...)` function reverts when the `tokenId` given as a parameter does not exist.

## QSP-4 Missing \_disableInitializers for some Contracts

Severity: Low Risk

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadataInit.sol,lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CappedSupplyInit.sol,lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInit.sol,lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CompatibleERC721Init.sol,lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/LSP8CompatibleERC721MintableInit.sol,lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CappedSupplyInit.sol

Description: An uninitialized contract can be taken over by an attacker. This applies to both a proxy and its implementation contract, which may impact the proxy. To prevent the implementation contract from being used, you should invoke the `_disableInitializers` function in the constructor to automatically lock it when it is deployed. The following contracts' `constructor` is not protected by `_disableInitializers`:

- `LSP4DigitalAssetMetadataInit`
- `LSP7CappedSupplyInit`
- `LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInit`
- `LSP8CompatibleERC721Init`
- `LSP8CompatibleERC721MintableInit`
- `LSP8CappedSupplyInit`

Recommendation: Consider adding `_disableInitializers` to the `constructor` of the listed contracts to enhance security.

Update: The dev team stated:

The following changes were applied to resolve this issue:

- A constructor with a call to `_disableInitializers(...)` was added in the following contracts
    - `LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInit`
    - `LSP8CompatibleERC721MintableInit`
  - The following contracts from the `extensions/` folder of LSP7 and LSP8 were removed.
    - `LSP4DigitalAssetMetadataInit`
    - `LSP7CappedSupplyInit`
    - `LSP8CappedSupplyInit`
    - `LSP7CompatibleERC20Init`
    - `LSP8CompatibleERC721Init`
- These contracts are token extension and should be used via inheritance, not deployed directly. The inheritance of other contracts was changed to use the `InitAbstract` contracts in replacement. See [PR #265](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/265) in `lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts` repository:

### QSP-5 LSP6KeyManagerCore::\_countTrailingZeroBytes() Can Not Recognize the Condition Where `key == 0`

### Severity: Low Risk

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: [lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol](#)

**Description:** On `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol`:L616, the minimum `index` is `0`, so the max value of the function output result would be `31` instead of `32`.

**Recommendation:** Consider changing the while loop condition into `while (index >= 0 && key[index] == 0x00) index--;` to fix this edge case.

**Update:** The dev team stated:

This issue was found by the internal smart contract team during the audit. There was an underflow in the function `_countTrailingZeroBytes(...)` if one of the allowed ERC725Y Keys in the list was `bytes32(0)`.

See [PR #226](https://github.com/luks-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/226) in `luks-network/lsp-smart-contracts` where the issue was initially resolved.

An extra bug was also found in the same function. The index in the while loop was checked incorrectly. The function was refactored with more tests were added to ensure the correct behaviour (for instance, when an allowed ERC725Y contains only 1 bytes, and 31 trailing zero bytes).

See [PR #264](https://github.com/luks-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/264) in `luks-network/lsp-smart-contracts`.

See [PR #226](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/226) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts where the issue was initially resolved.

An extra bug was also found in the same function. The index in the while loop was checked incorrectly. The function was refactored with more tests were added to ensure the correct behaviour (for instance, when an allowed ERC725Y contains only 1 bytes, and 31 trailing zero bytes).

See [PR #264](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/264) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts.

## QSP-6 Incorrect Key Prefix Could Be Used

### Severity: Low Risk

**Status:** Fixed

File(s) affected: `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP2ERC725YJSONSchema/LSP2Utils.sol`

**Description:** According to the documentation, data keys of type "Mapping" and "MappingWithGrouping" are formatted such that there are two empty bytes between the first ten bytes and the last twenty bytes. However, the versions of the functions `generateMappingKey` and `generateMappingWithGroupingKey` that use byte inputs take `bytes12` for the first part of the key without ensuring that there are two empty bytes as per the specification.

**Recommendation:** Consider making the functions take `bytes10` for the first argument, and while generating the data key, make sure to concatenate two empty bytes in the middle of the key.

**Update:** The dev team stated:

All the literal constants for LSP2 key types Mapping and MappingWithGrouping were edited to remove the last two zero bytes. Both functions were refactored as per the suggested changes to append two zero bytes at the end.

See [PR #269](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/269/files) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts.

See [PR #269](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/269/files) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts.

## QSP-7 Critical Functions Are Not Protected From Reentrancy

Severity: Informational

**Status:** Acknowledged

**File(s) affected:** ERC725-3541ee4/implementations/contracts/ERC725XCore.sol, lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0ERC725AccountCore.sol, lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol, lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol, lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol, lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP9Vault/LSP9VaultCore.sol

**Description:** There are several critical functions in the system that are not protected from re-entrancy and this pattern could be used as a tool to conduct a complex attack that involves [re-entrancy attack](#).

1. ERC725XCore::execute()
2. LSP0ERC725AccountCore::universalReceiver()
3. LSP6KeyManagerCore::executeRelayCall()
4. LSP6KeyManagerCore::execute()
5. LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol::\_transfer()
6. LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol::\_mint()
7. LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol::\_burn()
8. LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore::\_transfer()
9. LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore::\_mint()
10. LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore::\_burn()
11. LSP9VaultCore::universalReceiver()

**Recommendation:** It is highly recommended to inherit (ReentrancyGuard.sol)[<https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol>] and add `nonReentrant` modifier to all the critical functions that are not expected to be re-entered.

**Update:** The dev team stated:

1. ERC725Core::execute(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard, as its a core module, to be used in a variety of contracts. Reentrancy is a feature here.



2. LSP0ERC725AccountCore::universalReceiver(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard, as its a feature to notify the UP of multiple actions that happen during a transaction. For example sending of batch transactions via a LSP7/8 transferBatch() call.

3. LSP6KeyManagerCore::executeRelayCall()

LSP6KeyManagerCore::execute(): Will ADD an reentrancy guard in the current implementation, to keep the risk smaller. With the goal to remove it in the future, when risks and use cases are better understood, as reentrancy is a feature for potential use cases here, and the KM safeguards entrance based on permission.

4. LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol::\_transfer(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard as its a feature for protocols and its protected as the msg.sender needs to have a balance.

5. LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol::\_mint(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard on the internal function, its a feature for protocols and its protected as the msg.sender is the owner in the public mint(...) function of the preset contracts.

6. LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol::\_burn(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard on the internal function, its a feature for protocols and its protected as the msg.sender is the owner.

7. LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore::\_transfer(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard as its a feature for protocols and its protected as the msg.sender needs to have a balance.

8. LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore::\_mint(): Will NOT receive a reentrancy guard on the internal function, its a feature for protocols and its protected as the msg.sender is the owner in the public mint(...) function of the preset contracts.

9. LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore::\_burn(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard on the internal function, its a feature for protocols and its protected as the msg.sender is the owner.

10. LSP9VaultCore::universalReceiver(): Will NOT receive an reentrancy guard, as its a feature to notify the Vault of multiple actions that happen during a transaction. For example sending of batch transactions via a LSP7/8 transferBatch() call.

See [issue #286](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/issues/286) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts repository.

Notably, point (3) has not been added to the code base at this moment when we do the fix review.

## QSP-8 On Potential Hash Collisions

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: [lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP2ERC725YJSONSchema/LSP2Utils.sol](#)

Description: In the function `generateMappingWithGroupingKey(firstWord, secondWord, addr)`, when `firstword` and `addr` are the same, there is a `0.0000000233%` possibility that two random variables `secondWord` will result in the same key.

Recommendation: Consider adding this information to the public-facing documentation to make sure that users and devs working on related projects are aware of this risk and would be taking action to avoid it. Another approach to prevent this collision from happening is to explicitly reject the condition where `firstWord == addr`.

Update: The dev team stated:

A warning of potential hash collision for LSP2 key type MappingWithGrouping was documented in docs.lukso.tech (Standards > Generic Standards > LSP2 > MappingWithGrouping.

See [PR #369](https://github.com/lukso-network/docs/pull/369) in lukso-network/docs.

## QSP-9 Allowance Double-Spend Exploit

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: [lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol](#)

Description: As it presently is constructed, the contract is vulnerable to the [allowance double-spend exploit](#), as with other ERC20/LSP7 tokens.

Exploit Scenario:

- Alice allows Bob to transfer `N` amount of Alice's tokens (`N>0`) by calling the `authorizeOperator()` method on `Token` smart contract (passing Bob's address and `N` as method arguments)
- After some time, Alice decides to change from `N` to `M` (`M>0`) the number of Alice's tokens Bob is allowed to transfer, so she calls the `authorizeOperator()` method again, this time passing Bob's address and `M` as method arguments
- Bob notices Alice's second transaction before it was mined and quickly sends another transaction that calls the `transfer()` method to transfer `N` Alice's tokens somewhere
- If Bob's transaction will be executed before Alice's transaction, then Bob will successfully transfer `N` Alice's tokens and will gain the ability to transfer another `M` tokens
- Before Alice notices any irregularities, Bob calls the `transfer()` method again, this time to transfer `M` Alice's tokens.

Recommendation: The exploit (as described above) can be mitigated through the use of functions that increase/decrease the allowance relative to its current value, such as `increaseAllowance()` and `decreaseAllowance()`.

Pending community agreement on an ERC standard that would protect against this exploit, we recommend that developers of applications dependent on a traditional `approve()` / `transferFrom()` should keep in mind that they have to set allowance to `0` first and verify if it was used before setting the new value. Teams who decide to wait for such a standard should make these recommendations to app developers who work with their token contracts.

Update: The dev team stated:

As a secure flow exists due to setting the allowance to 0 and the setting it to the wanted number, we don't see a strong need for extra functions in the standard. We will discuss in the future within the community if it makes sense to add two new functions to the standard.

See the following links for references:

- [Issue #112](https://github.com/lukso-network/LIPs/issues/112) in lukso-network/LIPs repository.
- [PR #277](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/277) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts
- [PR #373](https://github.com/lukso-network/docs/pull/373) in lukso-network/docs
- [PR #111](https://github.com/lukso-network/LIPs/pull/111) in lukso-network/LIP repository

## QSP-10 Repeatedly Adding the Same Operator for One TokenID

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: [lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol](#)

Description: Users can call the function `authorizeOperator()`, multiple times with the same arguments. That will also cause the same event to be emitted multiple times.

Recommendation: Consider checking the returned `boolean` of `EnumerableSet::add()` in `authorizeOperator()`.

Update: The dev team stated:

The function authorizeOperator(...) in LSP8 was refactored to revert when an operator for a specific tokenId is already approved.

See [PR #270](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/270) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts

## QSP-11 Unlocked Pragma

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: `ERC725-3541ee4/*, lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/*`

Description: Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format `pragma solidity (^)0.8.*`. The caret (^) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version and above, hence the term "unlocked".

Recommendation: For consistency and to prevent unexpected behavior in the future, it is recommended to remove the caret to lock the file onto a specific Solidity version.

Update: The dev team stated:

The SWC-103 (Smart Contract Weakness Classification nb 103) mentions:  
  
"Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package. Otherwise, the developer would need to manually update the pragma in order to compile locally."  
  
This is the case of the lsp-smart-contracts. These contracts are intended to be used as a library and consumed by other developers. Therefore, a floating pragma was kept on all the contracts.  
  
See [PR #275](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/275) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts repository.

## QSP-12 Possible to Renounce Ownership

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Mitigated

File(s) affected: `ERC725-3541ee4/implementations/contracts/custom/OwnableUnset.sol`

Description: Contract `OwnableUnset` contains the function `renounceOwnership`, which, if called, would render the contract largely unusable. In particular, it would leave an `LSP0ERC725Account` without `KeyManager`, resulting in much of the contracts' functionality being unusable. This could lead to loss of funds and in some cases break composability where the contract in concern is part of a greater system of contracts.

Recommendation: Override the `renounceOwnership` function in contracts that should not be left without an owner.

Update: The dev team stated:

RenounceOwnership is a valid use case when UP owners die, or NFTs should be finally locked.  
  
- In ERC725 contracts RenounceOwnership is left in its basic form, as those are module contracts for a variety of other smart contracts.  
  
- For LSP0 and LSP9 we changed it now to two step process, where the the user calls renounceOwnership(), which starts a time in blocks, where for the first 100 blocks, he can not complete the renouncement, and after 100 blocks he has the ability to call renounceOwnership() again to complete the renouncement. If after 200 blocks after the initial call to renounceOwnership() the process was not completed, the user will have to start all over again.  
We also added a RenounceOwnershipInitiated Event to notify the user of a started process.  
  
This will allow for a delay time for the owner to act, if a malicious controller initiated the process. And allows for an expiry, the process is not completed within 100 blocks (~20min)  
  
- The LSP6 implementation will not allow renounceOwnership(...) at all for now.  
  
See the following references for more details:  
- [Issue #115](https://github.com/lukso-network/LIPs/issues/115) in lukso-network/LIPs.  
- [PR #282](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/282) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts.

## QSP-13 LSP1UniversalReceiver Can Lead to Unexpected Reentrancy Behavior

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Acknowledged

Description: In scenarios where permissions are set in certain specific ways, users may trigger transactions that cause their balances to change much more drastically than expected. Consider the following scenario:

1. Alice authorizes Bob as an operator for `5000` tokens.
2. Bob uses a universal receiver with logic that calls `transfer` using the sender's funds to send the remainder of the sender's balance to himself.
3. Alice transfers `200` tokens to Bob.
4. Bob receives `5000` tokens, more than Alice expected.

Although Alice did authorize Bob to transfer her tokens as she saw fit, she did not expect that merely transferring `200` tokens would wipe out her entire balance.

Recommendation: Properly notify users of the potential for unexpected behavior due to `universalReceiver` when functions like `authorizeOperator` are called.

Update: The dev team stated:

We introduced a warning in the LSP7 and LSP8 pages on docs.lukso.tech.  
  
Regarding the example documented in the audit report, we do not consider this as a security issue in this context. Since Bob was granted an operator allowance in the first place by Alice, he could also transfer all the tokens to himself in a separate transaction.  
  
It should be up to the LSP7 token contract implementation to decide if this behaviour should be allowed or not by adding a reentrancy guard on the `transfer(...)` function. It is something to not restrict on the standard level or the implementation.  
  
Since the `LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate` is the only gateway for users to react depending on the action they get notified about (token transfers, etc.), there could be use cases where the `universalReceiver(...)` function should be reentered to perform specific actions.  
  
A notice was added in docs.lukso.tech about external calls being done via hooks when LSP7 and LSP8 assets are transferred.  
  
See [PR #376](https://github.com/lukso-network/docs/pull/376) in lukso-network/docs repository for more details.

## QSP-14 Remove Non-Existing Operator

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol`

Description: When the user calls `_revokeOperator()` with a non-existing operator, the function will terminate successfully and with an incorrectly emitted event.



**Recommendation:** Consider checking the returned `boolean` of `EnumerableSet::add()` in `_revokeOperator()`.

**Update:** The dev team stated:

The function `revokeOperator(...)` in LSP8 now revert when the caller tries to revoke an operator that does not exist, or is not authorised as an operator for a specific `tokenId`.  
  
See [PR #271](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/pull/271) in lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts repository.

## Automated Analyses

### Slither

Slither reported 587 results, all of which were either identified as false positives or included in the findings of this report.

## Code Documentation

- [claimownership](#): a typo "In EIP713", should be "In EIP173" instead.
- On L140, L157, and L177 of `ERC725-3541ee4/implementations/contracts/ERC725XCore.sol`, "Unknow Error" should be "Unknown Error"
- On L107, L148 of `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol`, "Unknow Error" should be "Unknown Error"
- On L145 of `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP5ReceivedAssets/LSP5Utils.sol`, "elemnt" should be "element"
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/ILSP6KeyManager.sol::L36: _calldata -> payload`
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP2ERC725YJSONSchema/LSP2Utils.sol`: Not every function has `NatSpec`.
- In [LSP6](#): "they check on restrictions for addresses, standards, or functions are skipped." is improper grammar.
- In [LSP6](#): similarly, "This allows for cheaper transactions where, these restrictions aren't set anyway."
- In [LSP6](#): `sequentiel` -> `sequential`
- In [LSP6](#): `sequentieliaily` -> `sequentially`
- [singleton](#), the "key" inside the example JSON:

```
{
  "name": "SupportedStandards:LSP3UniversalProfile",
  "key": "0xeafec4d89fa9619884b6b89135626455000000000000000000abe425d6",
  "keyType": "Mapping",
  "valueType": "bytes4",
  "valueContent": "0xabe425d6"
}
```

is different from the key listed in the [image](#). Please check which one is correct.

=====2022-09-08 Update: all fixed=====

## Adherence to Best Practices

- [fixed] TODO on `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/Factories/UniversalFactory.sol::L135`.
- [fixed] TODO on `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0ERC725AccountCore.sol::L60`.
- [fixed] TODO on `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP.sol::L63`
- [fixed] TODO on `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol::L453`
- [fixed] TODO on `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol::L644`
- [fixed] TODO on `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol::L229`
- [ack] Functions `_mint` in `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol` could be re-entered. It is highly recommended to inherit (`ReentrancyGuard.sol`)[https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol] and add `nonReentrant` modifier to them.
- [fixed] `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol::_verifyCanSetPermissions()`: consider blocking the `else` case by reverting the transaction to prevent edge cases from bypassing the permission checks.
- [fixed] `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol::L395`: consider reverting the transaction if the `allowedERC725YKeysEncoded` data is found corrupted.
- [fixed] `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol::L549`: consider reverting the transaction if the `allowedAddresses` data is found corrupted.
- [fixed] `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol::L574`: consider reverting the transaction if the `allowedStandards` data is found corrupted.
- [fixed] `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol::L600`: consider reverting the transaction if the `allowedFunctions` data is found corrupted.
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP.sol::universalReceiverDelegate()`: unused function parameters: `uint256 value` and `bytes memory data`.
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault.sol::universalReceiverDelegate()`: unused function parameters: `uint256 value` and `bytes memory data`.
- `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/Legacy/UniversalReceiverAddressStore.sol::universalReceiverDelegate()`: unused function parameters: `uint256 value` and `bytes memory data`.
- [fixed] The import of `Initializable` contract has two distinct sources, they are: `"@erc725/smart-contracts/contracts/custom/Initializable.sol"` and



- "@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol". Consider removing one of the sources and leaving only one version of **Initializable** contract to avoid the unexpected condition.
17. [fixed] In `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0ERC725AccountCore.sol`, the function `transferOwnership()` seems to be redundant since it was implemented in `ClaimOwnership.sol` with same name and functionality.
18. [fixed] In `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol`, function name `isOperatorFor` implies the return type should be a boolean . However, the return value is type `uint`. Consider renaming it similar as `authorizedAmount()` to avoid confusion.
19. [fixed] In `lsp-smart-contracts-602b79b/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol`, function `_requirePermissions()` does not return anything. Consider removing `returns (bool)`.
20. [fixed] ERC725 uses `uncheckedIncrement` for iterating through for loops. However, the LSPs repo does not use this. Consider using the same function for the LSPs to save gas.

=====2022-09-08 Update=====

For **BP-4**, the dev team stated:

DELEGATECALL is dangerous by nature and its effects can hardly be anticipated or mitigated. There might be multiple ways to use DELEGATECALL for the same outcome or to override specific parts of the contract storage.

DELEGATECALL will remain disallowed via the KeyManager. Developers who want to use a UP without a Key Manager should be cautious when using DELEGATECALL and ensure the address being called is trusted and will not have dangerous side effects on the contract storage.

For **BP-7**, the dev team stated:

No reentrancy guard was applied in the internal `_mint(...)` function. It should be up to the contract implementing LSP7 to add the reentrancy guard depending on the feature they want to allow or not (see also QSP-1 for additional information).

For **BP-9** to **BP-12`** the code is unchanged. The dev team stated:

In the current implementation of LSP6KeyManager, for the following data keys:

- AddressPermissions:AllowedAddresses:<address>
- AddressPermissions:AllowedFunctions:<address>
- AddressPermissions:AllowedStandards:<address>
- AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:<address>

A check is currently applied in two scenarios inside the code of LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol

Scenario 1: When the Key Manager reads the UP to retrieve the list of allowed addresses/functions/standards/ERC725YKeys to perform the permissions checks.

When reading the value stored under these data keys, if the underlying bytes stored are corrupted (not a correctly abi-encoded array), then we consider it like if nothing is set under these data keys. This is equivalent to allowing any address, function, etc... according to LSP6. This is the reason why the code returns directly in the related functions.

The reason for this is because if the data under one of these data keys is corrupted, `[abi.decode(...)](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/blob/d608479df753087b33897586f2fe92b90252c869/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol#L580)` will fail and revert. This would lead a controller address with some incorrectly/corrupted data stored under its allowed key to be stuck. The controller address would not be able to do anything (`setData(...)` or `execute(...)`) anymore, as every time it would try to call the Key Manager, it would revert on `abi-decode(...)`. This would make its permission `SETDATA` or `CALL` unusable.

Scenario 2: when writing data on the UP via the Key Manager, giving some specific allowed addresses/functions/standards/ERC725YKeys for a controller address (= an address with some permissions) as an input.

A check is made on the values given as input when the payload is `setData(...)` to verify that no corrupted data will be stored for these data keys. This ensure that the potential issue mentioned in scenario 1 (a controller being stuck) does not occur in the first place.

Therefore the values given as input for setting the AllowedAddresses, AllowedFunctions, AllowedStandards or AllowedERC725YKeys are checked to ensure they are correctly abi-encoded arrays. If they are not, we `[revert execution](https://github.com/lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts/blob/d608479df753087b33897586f2fe92b90252c869/contracts/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol#L317-L319)`.

To conclude, we have these checks in both places (scenario 1 and scenario 2) because these data keys can be set before a Key Manager becomes the owner of an LSP0/Universal Profile. This way, we can catch the potential bug (of a controller address being stuck) by anticipation (scenario 1), and prevent the bug from happening afterwards (scenario 2).

For **BP-16**, the dev team stated:

The Initializable contract from `@erc725/smart-contracts` has been removed. Once a new 3.1.3 version of the `@erc725/smart-contracts` package is released, the dependency will be updated in `@lukso/lsp-smart-contracts` to fix the error.

For **BP-17**, the dev team stated:

This function cannot be removed from `LSP0ERC725AccountCore.sol` because of the inheritance.

This function is also defined in `OwnableUnset` and needs to be overridden in `LSP0`. Otherwise, the Solidity compiler does not know which function to refer to (the one from `OwnableUnset` or from `ClaimOwnership`) and report the following error:

'Derived contract must override function "transferOwnership". Two or more base classes define function with same name and parameter types'.

## Test Results

### Test Suite Results

All tests have passed.

```
=====ERC725Alliance/ERC725:

Calculate ERC725 InterfaceIDs
  ✓ ERC725X
  ✓ ERC725Y

ERC725
when using ERC725 with constructor
  when deploying the contract
    ✓ should revert when giving address(0) as owner (54ms)
when using ERC725 with proxy
  when deploying the base implementation contract
    ✓ prevent any address from calling the initialize(...) function on the implementation (131ms)
  when deploying the contract as proxy
    ✓ should revert when initializing with address(0) as owner

ERC725X
when using ERC725X contract with constructor
  when deploying the contract
    ✓ should revert when giving address(0) as owner
  once the contract was deployed
    when the contract was initialized
      ✓ should have registered the ERC165 interface
      ✓ should have registered the ERC725X interface
      ✓ should have set the correct owner
when testing deployed contract
  When testing ownership
    When owner is transferring ownership
      ✓ should pass and emit OwnershipTransferred event
    When non-owner is transferring ownership
      ✓ should revert
    When owner is renouncing ownership
      ✓ should pass and emit OwnershipTransferred event (79ms)
    When non-owner is renouncing ownership
      ✓ should revert
  When testing execution
    When testing execution ownership
      When owner is executing
        ✓ should pass and emit Executed event (45ms)
```

[illegible]





```

when interacting with the ERC725Y storage
  should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
when testing deployed contract
  when setting data on ERC725Y storage
    should deploy an initializable CREATE2 proxy contract and get the owner successfully

```

```

-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Solc version: 0.8.10 | Optimizer enabled: true | Runs: 1000 | Block limit: 3000000 gas |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Methods |
| Contract | Method | Min | Max | Avg | # calls | usd (avg) |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| UniversalFactory | deployCreate2(bytes,bytes32,bytes) | 70217 | 2097638 | 909058 | 5 | - |
| UniversalFactory | deployCreate2Proxy(address,bytes32,bytes) | 64473 | 119156 | 78256 | 5 | - |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Deployments | | | | | % of limit | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateP | - | - | 1511074 | 5 % | - |
| UniversalFactory | - | - | 680591 | 2.3 % | - |
| UniversalProfile | - | - | 2069065 | 6.9 % | - |
| UniversalProfileInit | - | - | 2202316 | 7.3 % | - |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|

```

```

27 passing (36s)

```

```

Failed to generate 1 stack trace. Run Hardhat with --verbose to learn more.
  should have registered the LSP7 interface
  should revert when trying to edit Token Name
  should revert when trying to edit Token Symbol
when minting tokens
  when tokenId has already been minted
    should have registered the ERC725Y interface
    should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
when testing deployed contract
  when setting data on ERC725Y storage
    should set the 3 x keys for a basic UP setup => `LSP3Profile`, `LSP12IssuedAssets[]` and `LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate`
    should revert when trying to edit Token Name
    should revert
  when tokenId has not been minted
    when `to` is the zero address
      should revert
    when `to` is not the zero address
      should revert when trying to edit Token Symbol
when minting tokens
  when `to` is the zero address
gas cost LYX transfer - with 1 x allowed address: 74791
  when caller has only 1 x allowed address allowed
    should mint the token
  when tokens have been minted
    totalSupply
    should revert
    when `to` is not the zero address
gas cost LYX transfer - with 1 x allowed address + 1 x allowed standard: 85399
  when caller has only 1 x allowed address + 1 x allowed standard allowed
    display gas cost
    should have registered the LSP1Delegate interface
when testing deployed contract
  should have registered the LSP9 interface
  should return total token supply
  balanceOf
  when the given address owns tokens
gas cost LYX transfer - everything allowed: 56030
  when caller has any allowed address and standard allowed

```

```

NFTStorageMerkle
  Testing Merkle Tree
    Should return 8 for leaves count
    Keccak256 hash should match for the first NFT address
    Should verify the proof in the smart contract
  should mint the token amount
  when tokens have been minted
    totalSupply

```

```

-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Solc version: 0.8.10 | Optimizer enabled: true | Runs: 1000 | Block limit: 3000000 gas |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Methods |
| Contract | Method | Min | Max | Avg | # calls | usd (avg) |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| AddressRegistry | removeAddress(address) | - | - | 29976 | 1 | - |
| AddressRegistryRequiresERC725 | addAddress(address) | - | - | 92208 | 1 | - |
| LSP6KeyManager | execute(bytes) | 44069 | 85399 | 68073 | 7 | - |
| UniversalProfile | execute(uint256,address,uint256,bytes) | 35326 | 99822 | 67574 | 2 | - |
| UniversalProfile | setData(bytes32[],bytes[]) | - | - | 448606 | 1 | - |
| UniversalProfile | transferOwnership(address) | - | - | 46163 | 1 | - |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Deployments | | | | | % of limit | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| AddressRegistry | - | - | 394991 | 1.3 % | - |
| AddressRegistryRequiresERC725 | - | - | 514084 | 1.7 % | - |
| ERC725 | - | - | 1444163 | 4.8 % | - |
| LSP6KeyManager | - | - | 2446105 | 8.2 % | - |
| UniversalProfile | - | - | 2091006 | 7 % | - |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|

```

```

36 passing (38s)

```

```

  should add +10 more LSP12IssuedAssets[]
  should add return the owned token count
  when the given address does not own tokens
    should support ERC165 interface
    should return total token supply
balanceOf
  when the given address owns tokens
    should return zero
tokenOwnerOf
  when tokenId has not been minted
    should return the owned token count
  when the given address does not own tokens
    should support ERC1271 interface
    should have registered the LSP1 interface
    should revert
  when tokenId has been minted
    should return zero
decimals
  should support LSP6 interface
  should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
  should return owner address
tokenIdsOf
  when the given address owns some tokens
    should return 18 as default value
authorizeOperator
  when operator is not the zero address
    should be linked to the right ERC725 account contract
when testing deployed contract
  CHANGEOWNER
    when upgrading to a new KeyManager via transferOwnership(...)
      when caller does not have have CHANGEOWNER permission
        should return the list of owned tokenIds
      when the given address does not owns some tokens
when testing ERC165 standard
  should support ERC165 interface
  should support LSP1Delegate interface

```



```
when testing LSP7-DigitalAsset
  should succeed
  when operator is already authorized
    should return an empty list
authorizeOperator
  when tokenId does not exist
    should support ClaimOwnership interface
  should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
when minting tokens
  when minting 10 tokenA to universalProfile1
    should revert
  when caller is not owner of tokenId
    should succeed
  when operator is the zero address
    should revert
  when caller is owner of tokenId
    when operator is not the zero address
      should revert
revokeOperator
  when operator is not the zero address
    should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
    should succeed
    when operator is already authorized
      should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
when testing deployed contract
  should revert
  when caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
    should succeed
  when operator is the zero address
    should revert
    when operator is the zero address
      should revert
authorizedAmountFor
  when operator is the token owner
    should revert
revokeOperator
  when tokenId does not exist
    should return the balance of the token owner
  when operator has not been authorized
    should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
    should revert
  when caller is not owner of tokenId
    should return zero
  when one account have been authorized
when testing setting data
  should revert
  when caller is owner of tokenId
    when operator is not the zero address
      should return the authorized amount
  when many accounts have been authorized
owner should be able to setData
  should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenA address in UP1
  when minting 10 tokenB to universalProfile1
    should have set newKeyManager as pendingOwner
    should return the authorized amount for each operator
transfers
  transfer
    when tokenOwner sends tx
      when using force=true
        when 'to' is an EOA
          when 'to' is not the zero address
non-owner shouldn't be able to setData
  should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
    should succeed
    when operator is the zero address
      should revert
    when address provided to revoke is not an existing operator
      should revert
isOperatorFor
  when tokenId has not been minted
  UniversalReceiverDelegate should be able to setData
when using vault with UniversalProfile
  when transferring ownership of the vault to the universalProfile
    should allow transferring
    when 'to' is the zero address
  should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
    should revert
  when tokenId has been minted
    when operator has not been authorized
      should return false
    when one account have been authorized for the tokenId
      owner should remain the current KeyManager
      should revert
      when 'to' is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
          should return true
    when many accounts have been authorized for the tokenId
  should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in UP1
  when minting 10 of the same tokenB to universalProfile1
    should return true for all operators
getOperatorsOf
  when tokenId has not been minted
    should revert
  when tokenId has been minted
    when operator has not been authorized
      should keep the same lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in UP1
  when minting 10 tokenC to universalProfile1
    should return empty list
    when one account have been authorized for the tokenId
      should allow transferring
      when receiving contract does not support LSP1
        should override the pendingOwner when transferOwnership(...) is called twice
        it should still be possible to call onlyOwner functions via the old KeyManager
        should return list
    when many accounts have been authorized for the tokenId
  should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
when sending native tokens to the contract
  should register lsp10 keys of the vault on the profile
when restrictitng address to only talk to the vault
  should return list
transfers
  transfer
    when tokenOwner sends tx
      when using force=true
        when 'to' is an EOA
  should emit the right ValueReceived event
    should allow transferring
    when force=false
      when 'to' is an EOA
  should allow to send a random payload as well, and emit the ValueReceived event
when sending a random payload, without any value
  should revert
  when 'to' is a contract
    when receiving contract supports LSP1
      setData(...)
    should execute the fallback function, but not emit the ValueReceived event
when renouncing ownership of the universal profile
  should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 3, index 2, tokenC address in UP1
when burning tokens
  when burning 10 tokenC (last token) from universalProfile1
    should allow friend to talk to the vault
    should allow transferring the tokenId
    when 'to' is the zero address
      should fail when friend is interfacting with other contracts
when renouncing ownership of the vault
  should allow transferring
  when receiving contract does not support LSP1
should fail to confirm if delay didn't expire
  execute(...) - LYX transfer
  when caller has only CHANGEOWNER permission
    should revert
    when 'to' is a contract
      when receiving contract supports LSP1
        should revert
    when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
      should revert
  when operator sends tx
    when using force=true
      when 'to' is an EOA
```

```
        when 'to' is not the zero address
    should renounce ownership in a 2-step process after delay expires
when calling the `universalReceiver(...)` function
    from an EOA
        should fail to confirm if delay didn't expire
        should have set newKeyManager as pendingOwner
        should emit a UniversalReceiver(...) event with correct topics
    from a Contract
        via a contract call - `contract.universalReceiver(...)`
        should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, no map, no tokenC address in UP1
    when burning 10 tokenA (first token) from universalProfile1
        should allow transferring
        when 'to' is the zero address
            should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
        via a low-level call - `address(contract).call(...)`
            should revert
            when 'to' is a contract
                when receiving contract supports LSP1
                    should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
when calling the `universalReceiver(...)` function while sending native tokens
    from an EOA
        should renounce ownership in a 2-step process after delay expires
when owner call transferOwnership(...)
    owner should remain the current KeyManager
    should have set the pendingOwner
    should emit a UniversalReceiver(...) event with correct topics
    from a Contract
        via a contract call - `contract.universalReceiver(...)`
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when 'from == to' address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
            owner should remain the current owner
            should allow transferring
            when receiving contract does not support LSP1
                should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
        via a low-level call - `address(contract).call(...)`
            should override the pendingOwner when transferOwnership(...) is called twice
    it should still be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
        should revert
        when force=false
            when 'to' is an EOA
                should override the pendingOwner when transferOwnership(...) is called twice
    when calling claimOwnership(...) from a KeyManager that is not the pendingOwner
        should pop and swap TokenA with TokenB, lsp5keys (tokenB should become first token) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenB address in UP1
        should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, no map, no tokenA address in UP1
        when burning 10 (half of the amount) tokenB from universalProfile1
            should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
when owner call transferOwnership(...)
    setData(...)
        should allow transferring
        when force=false
            when 'to' is an EOA
                should keep the same lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenB address in UP1
        when burning 10 (remaining) tokenB from universalProfile1
            execute(...) - LYX transfer
when non-owner call transferOwnership(...)
    should not allow transferring the tokenId
    when 'to' is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
            should revert
when calling claimOwnership(...)
    should have set the pendingOwner
    should revert when caller is not the pending owner
    when caller is the pending owner
        should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
                should revert
when calling claimOwnership(...) via the pending new KeyManager
    owner should remain the current owner
    should change the contract owner to the pendingOwner
    should override the pendingOwner when transferOwnership(...) is called twice
    it should still be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
        should have cleared the pendingOwner after transferring ownership
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should allow transferring
            when receiving contract does not support LSP1
                should have emitted a OwnershipTransferred event
    after pendingOwner has claimed ownership
        previous owner should not be allowed anymore to call onlyOwner functions
        should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 0, no map, no tokenB address in UP1
when transferring tokens
    setData(...)
        should revert
        when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
            should not allow transferring the tokenId
            when 'from == to' address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
                should have change the account's owner to the pendingOwner (= pending KeyManager)
                should revert when calling `setData(...)`
                should revert
            when operator does not have enough authorized amount
                execute(...) - LYX transfer
when non-owner call transferOwnership(...)
    should revert
    when operator sends tx
        when using force=true
            when 'to' is an EOA
                should revert when calling `execute(...)`
    should revert
when calling claimOwnership(...)
    should revert
    when the caller is not an operator
        should revert when caller is not the pending owner
    when caller is the pending owner
        should have cleared the pendingOwner after transferring ownership
    after KeyManager has been upgraded via claimOwnership(...)
        old KeyManager should not be allowed to call onlyOwner functions anymore
        should revert when calling `renounceOwnership(...)`
        new owner should be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
        should revert
transferBatch
    when tokenOwner sends tx
        when using force=true
            when 'to' is an EOA
                when 'to' is the zero address
                    should change the contract owner to the pendingOwner
            setData(...)
                should allow transferring the tokenId
                when 'to' is the zero address
                    should revert
                when 'to' is not the zero address
                    execute(...) - LYX transfer
when using LSP9Vault contract with proxy
    when deploying the base implementation contract
        should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
                should have cleared the pendingOwner after transferring ownership
    prevent any address from calling the initialize(...) function on the implementation
when deploying the contract as proxy
    when initializing the contract
        when the contract was initialized
            should revert when calling `setData(...)`
            should have emitted a OwnershipTransferred event
    after pendingOwner has claimed ownership
        previous owner should not be allowed anymore to call onlyOwner functions
        should allow transferring
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
                should have registered the ERC165 interface
                should revert when calling `setData(...)`
                should revert when calling `execute(...)`
    new Key Manager should be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should revert when calling `execute(...)`
            should allow transferring
            when receiving contract does not support LSP1
```



```
    should fund the universalProfile with 10 tokens (each) to test token transfers (TokenA, TokenB, TokenC)
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 3, index [1,2,3], [tokenA, tokenB, tokenC] addresses in UP1
When transferring 10 (all) token A from UP1 to UP2
    should revert when calling 'renounceOwnership(...)'
new owner should be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
should have registered the ERC725X interface
    should allow transferring the tokenId
        when 'from == to' address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
    setData(...)
    setData(...)
        should allow transferring
        when force=false
            when 'to' is an EOA
                should revert
        when force=false
            when 'to' is an EOA
                should not allow transferring the tokenId
            when 'to' is a contract
                when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should have registered the ERC725Y interface
        should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
    execute(...) - LYX transfer
when using UniversalProfile contract with proxy
when deploying the base implementation contract
    prevent any address from calling the initialize(...) function on the implementation
when deploying the proxy contract
    when initializing the proxy contract with or without value
        execute(...) - LYX transfer
CHANGE / ADD permissions
    setting permissions keys (CHANGE vs ADD Permissions)
        when setting one permission key
            when caller is an address with ALL PERMISSIONS
    should have deployed with the correct funding amount (undefined)
when the contract was initialized
    should support ERC165 interface
    should have registered the LSP9 interface
    should support ERC1271 interface
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
        should allow transferring
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
        should be allowed to ADD a permission
    should support ERC725X interface
        should not allow transferring the tokenId
        when 'from == to' address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
        should revert
        when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
    should support ERC725Y interface
    should have registered the LSP1 interface
        should be allowed to CHANGE a permission
    should support LSP0 (ERC725Account) interface
        should revert
        when the caller is not an operator
            should revert
        when function parameters list length does not match
    should pop and swap TokenA with TokenC, lsp5keys (tokenC should become first token) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenC address in UP1
    should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, no map, no tokenA address in UP1
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenA address in UP2
When transferring 5 (half of amount) token B from UP1 to UP2
    should support LSP1 interface
        should revert
        when the from address is incorrect
    should support ClaimOwnership interface
        should revert
    when operator sends tx
        when using force=true
            when 'to' is an EOA
                when 'to' is the zero address
                    should be allowed to increment the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
    should support ClaimOwnership interface
        should revert
        when the given tokenId has not been minted
    should have set key 'SupportedStandards:LSP3UniversalProfile'
when calling 'initialize(...)' more than once
    should revert
        when 'to' is not the zero address
    should revert
transferBatch
    when tokenOwner sends tx
        when using force=true
            when 'to' is an EOA
                should be allowed to decrement the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
    should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
when calling initialize more than once
    should revert
when deploying the proxy contract
    when initializing the proxy contract with or without value
        should allow transferring
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
                should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP1
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in UP2
    When transferring 4 (few) token B from UP1 to UP2
        should be allowed to edit key at index -> AddressPermissions[4]
        if the data key starts with AddressPermissions: but is a non-standard LSP6 permission data key
    should have deployed with the correct funding amount (0)
when the contract was initialized
    should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP1
    should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP2
    When transferring 1 (remaining) token B from UP1 to UP2
        should support ERC165 interface
    should revert
when testing deployed contract
    should allow transferring the tokenId
        when 'to' is the zero address
    should support ERC1271 interface
        should revert
        when caller is an address with permission ADDPERMISSIONS
            should allow transferring
            when receiving contract does not support LSP1
    should support ERC725X interface
        should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should support ERC725Y interface
when testing setting data
    should be allowed to add a permission
    should support LSP0 (ERC725Account) interface
        should allow transferring
        when force=false
            when 'to' is an EOA
    should support LSP1 interface
        should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should update lsp5keys (no pop and swap as TokenB has the last index): arrayLength 1, no map, no tokenB address in UP1
    should support ClaimOwnership interface
        should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP2
    When transferring 10 (all) token C from UP1 to UP2
        should not be allowed to CHANGE a permission
        should have set key 'SupportedStandards:LSP3UniversalProfile'
when calling 'initialize(...)' more than once
    owner should be able to setData
    should revert
when deploying the proxy contract
    when initializing the proxy contract with or without value
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
        should be allowed to increment the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
        should allow transferring
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
    should have deployed with the correct funding amount (5)
when the contract was initialized
    should support ERC165 interface
        should revert
        when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
    non-owner shouldn't be able to setData
        should not be allowed to decrement the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
```

```
    should support ERC1271 interface
    should revert
    when function parameters list length does not match
    should support ERC725X interface
    should support ERC725Y interface
    should allow transferring the tokenId
    when force=false
    when `to` is an EOA
    should not be allowed to edit key at index -> AddressPermissions[4]
    if the data key starts with AddressPermissions: but is a non-standard LSP6 permission data key
    should revert
    when operator does not have enough authorized amount
    should support LSP0 (ERC725Account) interface
    should support LSP1 interface
    should revert
    when the caller is not an operator
    UniversalReceiverDelegate should be able to setData
    should update lsp5keys (no pop and swap as TokenC has the last index): arrayLength 0, no map, no tokenB address in UP1
when using vault with UniversalProfile
when transferring ownership of the vault to the universalProfile
    should register lsp5keys : arrayLength 3, index = 2, tokenC address in UP2
    When transferring 1 (few) token B from UP2 to UP1
    should not allow transferring the tokenId
    when `to` is a contract
    when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should revert when trying to set a non-standard LSP6 permission data key
    when caller is an address with permission CHANGEPERMISSION
    should support ClaimOwnership interface
    should revert
when using LSP7 contract with proxy
when deploying the base implementation contract
    prevent any address from calling the initialize(...) function on the implementation
when deploying the contract as proxy
    should have set key 'SupportedStandards:LSP3UniversalProfile'
when calling 'initialize(...)' more than once
    should revert when initializing with address(0) as owner
when initializing the contract
    when the contract was initialized
    should revert
when testing deployed contract
    when using 'isValidSignature()' from ERC1271
    should not be allowed to ADD a permission
    should have registered the ERC165 interface
    should not be allowed to set (= ADD) a permission for an address that has 32 x 0 bytes (0x0000...0000) as permission value
    should allow transferring the tokenId
    when receiving contract does not support LSP1
    should verify signature from owner
    should register lsp5keys (UP1 able to re-register keys) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenB address in UP1
when removing all keys
    should have registered the ERC725Y interface
    should be allowed to CHANGE a permission
    should not allow transferring the tokenId
    when the from address is incorrect
    should register lsp10 keys of the vault on the profile
when restricting address to only talk to the vault
    should fail when verifying signature from non-owner
    should revert
    when the given tokenId has not been minted
    should not be allowed to increment the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
    should have registered the LSP7 interface
    should revert
    when function parameters list length does not match
    should be allowed to decrement the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
    should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
when calling initialize more than once
    should return failValue when the owner doesn't support ERC1271
when interacting with the ERC725Y storage
    should revert
    when operator sends tx
    when using force=true
    when `to` is an EOA
    should allow friend to talk to the vault
    should revert
when testing deployed contract
    when setting data on ERC725Y storage
    should be allowed to edit key at index -> AddressPermissions[4]
    if the data key starts with AddressPermissions: but is a non-standard LSP6 permission data key
    should revert when trying to edit Token Name
    should revert when trying to set a non-standard LSP6 permission data key
    when caller is an address with permission SETDATA
    should fail when friend is interfacting with other contracts
when renouncing ownership of the vault
    should set the 3 x keys for a basic UP setup => 'LSP3Profile', 'LSP12IssuedAssets[]' and 'LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate'
    should revert when trying to edit Token Symbol
when minting tokens
    when `to` is the zero address
    should allow transferring the tokenId
    when `to` is the zero address
    should not be allowed to ADD a permission
    should revert
    when `to` is not the zero address
    should revert
    when `to` is a contract
    when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should not be allowed to set (= ADD) a permission for an address that has 32 x 0 bytes (0x0000...0000) as permission value
    should mint the token amount
when tokens have been minted
    totalSupply
    should not be allowed to CHANGE a permission
    should return total token supply
    balanceOf
    when the given address owns tokens
    should add +10 more LSP12IssuedAssets[]
    should not be allowed to increment the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
    should return the owned token count
    when the given address does not own tokens
    should allow transferring the tokenId
    when receiving contract does not support LSP1
    should fail to confirm if delay didn't expire
    should not be allowed to decrement the 'AddressPermissions[]' key (length)
    should remove all lsp5 keys on both UP
when testing LSP8-IdentifiableDigitalAsset
    should return zero
decimals
when minting tokens
    when minting tokenId 1 of tokenA to universalProfile1
    should return 18 as default value
authorizeOperator
    when operator is not the zero address
    should not be allowed to edit key at index -> AddressPermissions[4]
    if the data key starts with AddressPermissions: but is a non-standard LSP6 permission data key
    should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
    should revert when trying to set a non-standard LSP6 permission data key
setting Allowed Addresses
    when caller has permission ADDPERMISSIONS
    should succeed
    when operator is already authorized
    should allow transferring the tokenId
    when force=false
    when `to` is an EOA
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenA address in UP1
    when minting tokenId 1 of tokenB to universalProfile1
    should fail when trying to edit existing allowed addresses for an address
    should not allow transferring the tokenId
    when `to` is a contract
    when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should renounce ownership in a 2-step process after delay expires
when owner call transferOwnership(...)
    should succeed
    when operator is the zero address
    should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary address had an invalid abi-encoded array of address[] initially
    should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
    should revert
revokeOperator
    when operator is not the zero address
    should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary had 32 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed addresses
    should have set the pendingOwner
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in UP1
    when minting tokenId 2 of tokenB (another) to universalProfile1
    should keep the same lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in UP1
```



```

        when minting tokenId 1 of tokenC to universalProfile1
            should succeed
    when operator is the zero address
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary had 40 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed addresses
        should revert
    authorizedAmountFor
    when operator is the token owner
        should not allow transferring the tokenId
        when the from address is incorrect
            owner should remain the current owner
        should pass when beneficiary had no values set under AddressPermissions:AllowedAddresses:... + setting a valid abi-encoded array of address
[] (= with 12 x leading '00')
        when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of address[] for a new beneficiary
            should return the balance of the token owner
        when operator has not been authorized
            should revert
            when the given tokenId has not been minted
                should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 3, index 2, tokenC address in UP1
    when burning tokens
        when burning tokenId 1 (all balance) of tokenC (last token) from universalProfile1
            should revert with error when value = random bytes
            should return zero
        when one account have been authorized
            should revert
            when function parameters list length does not match
                should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
                should revert with error when value = invalid abi-encoded array of address[] (not enough leading zero bytes for an address -> 10 x '00')
        when caller has permission CHANGEPERMISSIONS
            should return the authorized amount
        when many accounts have been authorized
            should revert
            when the caller is not an operator
                should override the pendingOwner when transferOwnership(...) is called twice
    it should still be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
        should fail when beneficiary had no values set under AddressPermissions:AllowedAddresses:...
        should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, no map, no tokenC address in UP1
        when burning tokenId 1 (all balance) of tokenA (first token) from universalProfile1
            should revert
    _burn
        when tokenId has not been minted
            should return the authorized amount for each operator
    transfers
    transfer
        when tokenOwner sends tx
            when using force=true
                when 'to' is an EOA
                    when 'to' is not the zero address
                        should revert
        when tokenId has been minted
            after burning a tokenId
                should have decreased the total supply
                should pass when trying to edit existing allowed addresses for an address
        should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
            should have emitted a Transfer event with address(0) as 'to' param
            when calling 'tokenOwnerOf(...)' for the burnt tokenId
                setData(...)
                    should allow transferring
                    when 'to' is the zero address
                        should revert stating tokenId does not exist
                    when calling 'tokenIdsOf(...)' with the initial owner address of the burnt token
                        should pass when address had an invalid abi-encoded array of address[] initially
                        should return a list of tokenIds that does not contain the burnt tokenId
                    when trying to get the operators for the burnt tokenId
                        should pop and swap TokenA with TokenB, lsp5keys (tokenB should become first token) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenB address in UP1
                    should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, no map, no tokenA address in UP1
        when burning 1 tokenId (not all balance) of tokenB from universalProfile1
            should revert
            when 'to' is a contract
                when receiving contract supports LSP1
                    should pass when address had 32 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed addresses
            execute(...) - LYX transfer
    when non-owner call transferOwnership(...)
        should revert stating tokenId does not exist
    when using LSP8 contract with proxy
    when deploying the contract as proxy
        should revert when initializing with address(0) as owner
    when initializing the contract
        when the contract was initialized
            should keep the same lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenB address in UP1
        when burning all tokenB from universalProfile1
            should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
            should have registered the ERC165 interface
            should have registered the ERC725Y interface
        should revert
    when calling claimOwnership(...)
        should allow transferring
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should pass when address had 40 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed addresses
        when changing the list of allowed address of existing address to an invalid value
            should have registered the LSP8 interface
            should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
    when calling initialize more than once
        should revert with error when value = random bytes
        should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 0, no map, no tokenB address in UP1
    when transferring tokens
        should revert
    when testing deployed contract
    when setting data on ERC725Y storage
        should revert when caller is not the pending owner
        when caller is the pending owner
            should allow transferring
            when force=false
                when 'to' is an EOA
                    should revert with error when value = invalid abi-encoded array of address[] (not enough leading zero bytes for an address -> 10 x '00')
    setting Allowed Functions
        when caller has permission ADDPERMISSIONS
            should revert when trying to edit Token Name
        should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
        should revert when trying to edit Token Symbol
    when minting tokens
        when tokenId has already been minted
            should fail when trying to edit existing allowed functions for an address
            should revert
            when 'to' is a contract
                when receiving contract supports LSP1
                    should change the contract owner to the pendingOwner
            should revert
        when tokenId has not been minted
            when 'to' is the zero address
                should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary address had an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] initially
            should revert
            when 'to' is not the zero address
                should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary had 32 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed functions
                should allow transferring
                when receiving contract does not support LSP1
                    should mint the token
    when tokens have been minted
    totalSupply
        should have cleared the pendingOwner after transferring ownership
        should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary had 40 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed functions
        should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
        should return total token supply
    balanceOf
        when the given address owns tokens
            should revert
            when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
                should pass when beneficiary had no values set under AddressPermissions:AllowedFunctions:... + setting a valid abi-encoded array of bytes4[
] (= 28 leading zeros)
            when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] selector for a new beneficiary
                should return the owned token count
            when the given address does not own tokens
                should have emitted a OwnershipTransferred event
        after pendingOwner has claimed ownership
            previous owner should not be allowed anymore to call onlyOwner functions
            should revert
            when operator sends tx
                when using force=true
                    when 'to' is an EOA

```

```

    when 'to' is not the zero address
    should return zero
tokenOwnerOf
    when tokenId has not been minted
    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] (= random bytes)
    should fund the universalProfile with tokens to test token transfers (TokenA, TokenB, TokenC)
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 3, index [1,2,3], [tokenA, tokenB, tokenC] addresses in UP1
    When transferring tokenId 1 (all) of token A from UP1 to UP2
    should revert
    when tokenId has been minted
    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] (not enough leading zero bytes for a bytes4 value -> 26 x '00')
    when caller has CHANGEPERMISSIONS
    should add +1 LSP12IssuedAssets
when sending native tokens to the contract
    should revert when calling `setData(...)`
    should allow transferring
        when 'to' is the zero address
        should return owner address
tokenIdsOf
    when the given address owns some tokens
    should fail when beneficiary had no values set under AddressPermissions:AllowedFunctions:...
    should return the list of owned tokenIds
    when the given address does not owns some tokens
    should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should emit the right ValueReceived event
    should pass when trying to edit existing allowed bytes4 selectors for an address
    should revert when calling `execute(...)`
    should return an empty list
authorizeOperator
    when tokenId does not exist
    should pass when address had an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] initially
    should revert
    when caller is not owner of tokenId
    should allow transferring
    should allow to send a random payload as well, and emit the ValueReceived event
when sending a random payload, without any value
    when receiving contract does not support LSP1
    should pop and swap TokenA with TokenC, lsp5keys (tokenC should become first token) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenC address in UP1
    should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, no map, no tokenA address in UP1
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenA address in UP2
    When transferring tokenId 1 (not all balance) of token B from UP1 to UP2
    should revert when calling `renounceOwnership(...)`
    new owner should be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
    should revert
    when caller is owner of tokenId
    when operator is not the zero address
    should pass when address had 32 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed functions
    should execute the fallback function, but not emit the ValueReceived event
when renouncing ownership of the universal profile
    should pass when address had 40 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed functions
    when changing the list of allowed bytes4 function selectors to an invalid value
    should allow transferring
        when force=false
        when 'to' is an EOA
        should succeed
        when operator is already authorized
    setData(...)
        should revert with error when value = random bytes
        should revert
    when operator is the zero address
    should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
    should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP1
    should revert with error when value = invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] (not enough leading zero bytes for a bytes4 value -> 26 x '00')
)

setting Allowed Standards
    when caller has ADDEPERMISSIONS
    should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in UP2
    When transferring tokenId 2 (not all balance) of token B from UP1 to UP2
    should revert

revokeOperator
    when tokenId does not exist
    should fail to confirm if delay didn't expire
    should fail when trying to edit existing allowed standards for an address
    should revert
    when caller is not owner of tokenId
    execute(...) - LYX transfer
)

-----|-----|-----|-----
| Solc version: 0.8.10 | Optimizer enabled: true | Runs: 1000 | Block limit: 3000000 gas
|-----|-----|-----|-----
| Methods | | | | | | | |
| Contract | Method | Min | Max | Avg | # calls | | |
| ERC725 | execute(uint256,address,uint256,bytes) | - | - | 40230 | 3 | - |
| ERC725 | renounceOwnership() | 31844 | 49715 | 43758 | 6 | - |
| ERC725 | setData(bytes32,bytes) | 51375 | 51603 | 51438 | 4 | - |
| ERC725 | transferOwnership(address) | 31713 | 48813 | 46801 | 17 | - |
| LSP0ERC725Account | claimOwnership() | - | - | 35569 | 9 | - |
| LSP0ERC725AccountInit | initialize(address) | - | - | 75256 | 35 | - |
| LSP6KeyManager | execute(bytes) | 44069 | 204003 | 57913 | 50 | - |
| LSP9Vault | claimOwnership() | - | - | 32865 | 9 | - |
| LSP9Vault | execute(uint256,address,uint256,bytes) | - | - | 37550 | 3 | - |
| LSP9Vault | renounceOwnership() | 27176 | 47071 | 40439 | 6 | - |
| LSP9Vault | setData(bytes32,bytes) | 48641 | 48857 | 48701 | 4 | - |
| LSP9Vault | transferOwnership(address) | 29029 | 46141 | 44129 | 17 | - |
| UniversalProfile | setData(bytes32[],bytes[]) | 244284 | 244320 | 244318 | 44 | - |
| UniversalProfile | transferOwnership(address) | 46139 | 46163 | 46162 | 44 | - |
| Deployments | | | | | % of limit | |
| LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP | | - | - | 1511074 | 5 % | - |
| LSP6KeyManager | | 2446093 | 2446105 | 2446104 | 8.2 % | - |
| LSP9Vault | | - | - | 2000952 | 6.7 % | - |
| LSP9VaultInit | | - | - | 2097304 | 7 % | - |
| UniversalProfile | | - | - | 2091006 | 7 % | - |
-----|-----|-----|-----

62 passing (2m)

    should allow transferring
    when receiving contract does not support LSP1
    should revert
    when caller is owner of tokenId
    when operator is not the zero address
    should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary address had an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] initially
    should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP1
    should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP2
    When transferring tokenId 3 (remaining balance) of token B from UP1 to UP2
    should renounce ownership in a 2-step process after delay expires
when calling the `universalReceiver(...)` function
    from an EOA
    should revert
    when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
    should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary had 32 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed functions
    should succeed
    when operator is the zero address
    should fail with NotAuthorised -> when beneficiary had 40 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed functions
    should revert

```



```
        when address provided to revoke is not an existing operator
            should revert
        when operator does not have enough authorized amount
            should emit a UniversalReceiver(...) event with correct topics
from a Contract
    via a contract call - `contract.universalReceiver(...)`
        should revert
isOperatorFor
    when tokenId has not been minted
        should update lsp5keys (no pop and swap as TokenB has the last index): arrayLength 1, no map, no tokenB address in UP1
        should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in UP2
    When transferring tokenId 1 (all balance) of token C from UP1 to UP2
        should pass when beneficiary had no values set under AddressPermissions:AllowedStandards:... + setting a valid abi-encoded array of bytes4[
] (= 28 leading zeros)
        when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] interface IDs for a new beneficiary
            should revert
        when the caller is not an operator
            should revert
    when tokenId has been minted
        when operator has not been authorized
            should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
        via a low-level call - `address(contract).call(...)`
            should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] (= random bytes)
            should return false
        when one account have been authorized for the tokenId
            should revert
transferBatch
    when tokenOwner sends tx
        when using force=true
            when `to` is an EOA
                when `to` is the zero address
                    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] (not enough leading zero bytes for a bytes4 value -> 26 x `00`)
            when caller has CHANGEPERMISSION
                should return true
            when many accounts have been authorized for the tokenId
                should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
when calling the `universalReceiver(...)` function while sending native tokens
    from an EOA
        should fail when beneficiary had no values set under AddressPermissions:AllowedStandards:...
        should revert
        when `to` is not the zero address
            should return true for all operators
getOperatorsOf
    when tokenId has not been minted
        should update lsp5keys (no pop and swap as TokenC has the last index): arrayLength 0, no map, no tokenB address in UP1
        should register lsp5keys : arrayLength 3, index = 2, tokenC address in UP2
    When transferring 1 tokenId (not all balance) of token B from UP2 to UP1
        should pass when trying to edit existing allowed standards for an address
        should emit a UniversalReceiver(...) event with correct topics
from a Contract
    via a contract call - `contract.universalReceiver(...)`
        should revert
    when tokenId has been minted
        when operator has not been authorized
            should pass when address had an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] interface IDs initially
            should allow transferring
            when `to` is a contract
                when receiving contract supports LSP1
                    should return empty list
            when one account have been authorized for the tokenId
                should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
        via a low-level call - `address(contract).call(...)`
            should pass when address had 32 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed standards
            should return list
            when many accounts have been authorized for the tokenId
                should register lsp5keys (UP1 able to re-register keys) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenB address in UP1
when testing LSP9-Vault
    should pass when address had 40 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed standards
    when changing the list of allowed bytes4 interface IDs to an invalid value
when transferring ownership of vaults from EOA to UP
    When transferring Ownership of VaultA to UP1
        should allow transferring
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should emit an UniversalReceiver(...) event
when owner call transferOwnership(...)
    should revert with error when value = random bytes
    should return list
transfers
transfer
    when tokenOwner sends tx
        when using force=true
            when `to` is an EOA
                should revert with error when value = invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] (not enough leading zero bytes for a bytes4 value -> 26 x `00`
')
setting Allowed ERC725YKeys
    when caller has ADDPERMISSIONS
        when beneficiary had some ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
            should have set the pendingOwner
            should register lsp10key: arrayLength 1, index 0, VaultA address in UP1
    When transferring Ownership of VaultB to UP1
        should fail when adding an extra allowed ERC725Y data key
        should allow transferring
        when force=false
            when `to` is an EOA
                should allow transferring the tokenId
            when `to` is the zero address
                should fail when removing an allowed ERC725Y data key
    owner should remain the current owner
        should revert
        when `to` is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
                should fail when trying to clear the array completely
            should register lsp10key: arrayLength 1, index 0, VaultA address in UP1
    When transferring Ownership of VaultC to UP1
        should revert
        when `to` is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
                should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
            when beneficiary had no ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
                should override the pendingOwner when transferOwnership(...) is called twice
it should still be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
    should pass when setting a valid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
    should register lsp10key: arrayLength 1, index 0, VaultA address in UP1
when transferring ownership of vaults from UP to UP
    When transferring Ownership of VaultA from UP1 to UP2
        should allow transferring
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[] (random bytes)
    when caller has CHANGEPERMISSIONS
        when beneficiary had some ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
            should allow transferring the tokenId
            when receiving contract does not support LSP1
                setData(...)
                    should pass when adding an extra allowed ERC725Y data key
                    should revert
                when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
                    should allow transferring the tokenId
                    when `from == to` address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
                        should pass when removing an allowed ERC725Y data key
                execute(...) - LYX transfer
when non-owner call transferOwnership(...)
    should revert
    when function parameters list length does not match
        should revert
    when force=false
        when `to` is an EOA
            should pass when trying to clear the array completely
    should revert
when calling claimOwnership(...)
    should revert
    when operator sends tx
        when using force=true
            when `to` is an EOA
                when `to` is the zero address
                    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
            when beneficiary had no ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
                should pop and swap VaultA with VaultC, lsp10keys (VaultC should become first vault) : arrayLength 2, index = 0, VaultC address in UP1
            should register lsp10key: arrayLength 1, index 0, VaultA address in UP2
    When transferring Ownership of VaultB from UP1 to UP2
        should not allow transferring the tokenId
```

```

        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
        should revert when caller is not the pending owner
    when caller is the pending owner
        should fail and not authorize to add a list of allowed ERC725Y data keys (not authorised)
        should revert
        when 'to' is not the zero address
            should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
    setting mixed keys (SETDATA, CHANGE & ADD Permissions)
    when setting multiple keys
        when caller is an address with ALL PERMISSIONS
        should change the contract owner to the pendingOwner
            should allow transferring the tokenId
            when receiving contract does not support LSP1
                should allow transferring
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
            (should pass): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions
        should update lsp10keys (no pop and swap as VaultB has the last index): arrayLength 1, no map, no VaultB address in UP1
        should register lsp10key: arrayLength 2, index 1, VaultB address in UP2
    When transferring Ownership of VaultC from UP1 to UP2
        should not allow transferring the tokenId
        when 'from == to' address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
    should have cleared the pendingOwner after transferring ownership
        (should pass): 2 x keys + change 2 x existing permissions
        should revert
    when operator sends tx
        when using force=true
            when 'to' is an EOA
                should allow transferring
                when receiving contract does not support LSP1
                    (should pass): 2 x keys + (add 1 x new permission) + (change 1 x existing permission)
            when caller is an address with permission SETDATA + ADDPERMISSIONS
                should have emitted a OwnershipTransferred event
    after pendingOwner has claimed ownership
        previous owner should not be allowed anymore to call onlyOwner functions
        should remove all lsp10keys : arrayLength 0, no map, no VaultC address in UP1
        should register lsp10key: arrayLength 3, index 2, VaultC address in UP2
    When transferring Ownership of VaultB from UP2 to UP1
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when 'to' is the zero address
            should allow transferring
        when force=false
            when 'to' is an EOA
                (should pass): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions + increment AddressPermissions[].length by +2
    should revert when calling `setData(...)`
        should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
            (should fail): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions + decrement AddressPermissions[].length by -1
            should revert
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
            (should fail): 2 x keys + change 2 x existing permissions
    should revert when calling `execute(...)`
        (should fail): 2 x keys + (add 1 x new permission) + (change 1 x existing permission)
    when caller is an address with permission SETDATA + CHANGEPERMISSIONS
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should allow transferring
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should register lsp10key (UP1 able to re-write) : arrayLength 1, index 0, VaultB address in UP1
    when transferring ownership of vaults from UP to EOA
        When transferring Ownership of VaultA from UP2 to EOA
            should revert when calling `renounceOwnership(...)`
        new owner should be allowed to call onlyOwner functions
            (should pass): 2 x keys + remove 2 x addresses with permissions + decrement AddressPermissions[].length by -2
            should revert
            when the given amount is more than balance of tokenOwner
                setData(...)
                should pop and swap VaultA with VaultC, lsp10keys (VaultC should become first vault) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, VaultC address in UP2
    when deploying vault to a UP directly
        (should pass): 2 x keys + change 2 x existing permissions
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when 'from == to' address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
        should register the data key relevant to the vault deployed in the UP storage
```

LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault

```

    when testing deployed contract
        should revert
        when function parameters list length does not match
            (should fail): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions
    when testing ERC165 standard
        should support ERC165 interface
        should support LSP1Delegate interface
    when testing LSP7-DigitalAsset
        when minting tokens
            when minting 10 tokenA to lsp9Vault1
                {should fail): 2 x keys + increment AddressPermissions[].length by +1
                should revert
            when force=false
                when 'to' is an EOA
                    execute(...) - LYX transfer
```

----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----																	
		Solc version: 0.8.10					Optimizer enabled: true										
							Runs: 1000										
							Block limit: 30000000 gas										
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----																	
Methods																	
Contract																	
		Method				Min		Max									
								Avg									
								# calls									
								usd (avg)									
		ERC725				execute(uint256,address,uint256,bytes)		-									
								-									
								40185									
								3									
								-									
		ERC725				renounceOwnership()		31844									
								49715									
								43758									
								6									
								-									
		ERC725				setData(bytes32,bytes)		-									
								-									
								51378									
								2									
								-									
		ERC725				setData(bytes32[],bytes[])		245245									
								584940									
								459221									
								10									
								-									
		ERC725				transferOwnership(address)		31713									
								48813									
								46801									
								17									
								-									
		LSP0ERC725Account				claimOwnership()		-									
								-									
								31238									
								9									
								-									
		LSP0ERC725Account				universalReceiver(bytes32,bytes)		31070									
								31526									
								31298									
								4									
								-									
		LSP0ERC725AccountInit				initialize(address)		-									
								-									
								74535									
								149									
								-									
		UniversalProfile				claimOwnership()		-									
								-									
								28545									
								9									
								-									
		UniversalProfile				execute(uint256,address,uint256,bytes)		-									
								-									
								37505									
								3									
								-									
		UniversalProfile				renounceOwnership()		27194									
								47093									
								40460									
								6									
								-									
		UniversalProfile				setData(bytes32,bytes)		-									
								-									
								48665									
								2									
								-									
		UniversalProfile				setData(bytes32[],bytes[])		242444									
								581777									
								456178									
								10									
								-									
		UniversalProfile				transferOwnership(address)		29063									
								46163									
								44151									
								17									
								-									
		UniversalProfile				universalReceiver(bytes32,bytes)		28405									
								28855									
								28630									
								4									
								-									
		Deployments						%									
								of limit									
		UniversalProfile				-		-									
						-		-									
						-		2091006									
								7 %									
								-									
		UniversalProfileInit				-		-									
						-		-									
						-		2202316									
								7.3 %									
								-									
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----																	



```
        when 'to' is a contract
            when receiving contract supports LSP1
            should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in Vault1
        when minting 10 of the same tokenB to lsp9Vault1
            should pass
            For address that has permission SETDATA
            should keep the same lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in Vault1
        when minting 10 tokenC to lsp9Vault1
            should revert
            when the caller is not an operator
            should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 3, index 2, tokenC address in Vault1
    when burning tokens
        when burning 10 tokenC (last token) from lsp9Vault1
            should pass
            For address that doesn't have permission SETDATA
            should not allow
        when setting multiple keys
            For UP owner
            should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, no map, no tokenC address in Vault1
        when burning 10 tokenA (first token) from lsp9Vault1
            should revert

LSP7CappedSupply
when using LSP7CappedSupply with constructor
    when deploying the contract
        when the contract was initialized
            should have registered the ERC165 interface
            should allow transferring the tokenId
            when receiving contract does not support LSP1
            should have registered the ERC725Y interface
            should have registered the LSP7 interface
            (should pass): adding 5 singleton keys
            should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
    when testing deployed contract
        tokenSupplyCap
            should allow reading tokenSupplyCap
        when minting tokens
            should allow minting amount up to tokenSupplyCap
        when cap has been reached
            should error when minting more than tokenSupplyCapTokens
            should pop and swap TokenA with TokenB, lsp5keys (tokenB should become first token) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenB address in Vault1
            should not allow transferring the tokenId
            when 'from == to' address (= sending to tokenId's owner itself)
            should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, no map, no tokenA address in Vault1
        when burning 10 (half of the amount) tokenB from lsp9Vault1
            should keep the same lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenB address in Vault1
        when burning 10 (remaining) tokenB from lsp9Vault1
            should revert
            when the caller is not an operator
            should allow minting after burning
    when using LSP7CappedSupply with proxy
    when deploying the contract as proxy
        when initializing the contract
            when the contract was initialized
            should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 0, no map, no tokenB address in Vault1
        when transferring tokens
            (should pass): adding 10 LSP12IssuedAssets
            should have registered the ERC165 interface
            should have registered the ERC725Y interface
            should revert
            when the from address is incorrect
            should have registered the LSP7 interface
            should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
        when calling initialize more than once
            should revert
            when the given tokenId has not been minted
            should revert
    when testing deployed contract
        tokenSupplyCap
            (should pass): setup a basic Universal Profile ('LSP3Profile', 'LSP12IssuedAssets[]' and 'LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate')
            For address that has permission SETDATA
            should allow reading tokenSupplyCap
        when minting tokens
            should revert
        transferBatch
            when tokenOwner sends tx
            when using force=true
            when 'to' is an EOA
            should fund the universalProfile with 10 tokens (each) to test token transfers (TokenA, TokenB, TokenC)
            should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 3, index [1,2,3], [tokenA, tokenB, tokenC] addresses in Vault1
        When transferring 10 (all) token A from UP1 to UP2
            should allow minting amount up to tokenSupplyCap
        when cap has been reached
            (should pass): adding 5 singleton keys
            should error when minting more than tokenSupplyCapTokens
            should allow minting after burning

LSP7CompatibleERC20
when using LSP7 contract with constructor
    when deploying the contract
        when initializing the contract
            when the contract was initialized
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should have registered its ERC165 interface
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
        when testing deployed contract
            approve
            when operator is the zero address
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should revert
            when the operator had no authorized amount
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should pop and swap TokenA with TokenC, lsp5keys (tokenC should become first token) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenC address in Vault1
            should update lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, no map, no tokenA address in Vault1
            should succeed by setting the given amount
            when the operator had an authorized amount
            when the operator authorized amount is changed to another non-zero value
            should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenA address in Vault2
        When transferring 5 (half of amount) token B from UP1 to UP2
            (should pass): adding 10 LSP12IssuedAssets
            should allow transferring the tokenId
            when 'to' is the zero address
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should succeed by replacing the existing amount with the given amount
            when the operator authorized amount is changed to zero
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in Vault1
            should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in Vault2
        When transferring 4 (few) token B from UP1 to UP2
            should succeed by replacing the existing amount with the given amount
        allowance
            when operator has been approved
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in Vault1
            should return approval amount
            when operator has not been approved
            should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in Vault2
        When transferring 1 (remaining) token B from UP1 to UP2
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should return zero
        mint
            when a token is minted
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should have expected events
        burn
            when a token is burned
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            (should pass): setup a basic Universal Profile ('LSP3Profile', 'LSP12IssuedAssets[]' and 'LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate')
            For address that doesn't have permission SETDATA
            should have expected events
        transfers
            transfer
            when sender has enough balance
            when 'to' is an EOA
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
            should revert
            when 'to' is a contract
```

```
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when `to` is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
        (should fail): adding 5 singleton keys
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should update lsp5keys (no pop and swap as TokenB has the last index): arrayLength 1, no map, no tokenB address in Vault1
        should keep the same lsp5keys : arrayLength 2, index = 1, tokenB address in Vault2
    When transferring 10 (all) token C from UP1 to UP2
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        (should fail): adding 10 LSP12IssuedAssets
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when sender does not have enough balance
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should revert
    transferFrom
        when sender has enough balance
        when `to` is an EOA
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        (should fail): setup a basic Universal Profile (`LSP3Profile`, `LSP12IssuedAssets[]` and `LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate`)
    when caller is a contract
    > contract calls
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when `to` is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should update lsp5keys (no pop and swap as TokenC has the last index): arrayLength 0, no map, no tokenB address in Vault1
        should register lsp5keys : arrayLength 3, index = 2, tokenC address in Vault2
    When transferring 1 (few) token B from UP2 to UP1
        should allow to set a key hardcoded inside a function of the calling contract
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        Should allow to set a key computed inside a function of the calling contract
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when sender does not have enough balance
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should revert
    when using LSP7 contract with proxy
    when deploying the base implementation contract
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        prevent any address from calling the initialize(...) function on the implementation
    when deploying the contract as proxy
    when initializing the contract
    when the contract was initialized
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should register lsp5keys (UP1 able to re-register keys) : arrayLength 1, index = 0, tokenB address in Vault1
    when removing all keys
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        Should allow to set a key computed from parameters given to a function of the calling contract
    > Low-level calls
        should have registered its ERC165 interface
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
        when calling initialize more than once
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        Should allow to `setHardcodedKeyRawCall` on UP
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should revert
    when testing deployed contract
    approve
        when operator is the zero address
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when force=false
        when `to` is an EOA
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        Should allow to `setComputedKeyRawCall` on UP
        should revert
        when the operator had no authorized amount
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should succeed by setting the given amount
        when the operator had an authorized amount
        when the operator authorized amount is changed to another non-zero value
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        Should allow to `setComputedKeyFromParamsRawCall` on UP
        when caller is another UniversalProfile (with a KeyManager attached as owner)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should succeed by replacing the existing amount with the given amount
        when the operator authorized amount is changed to zero
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should not allow transferring the tokenId
        when `to` is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        Alice should have ALL PERMISSIONS in her UP
        should succeed by replacing the existing amount with the given amount
    allowance
        when operator has been approved
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should return approval amount
        when operator has not been approved
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should remove all lsp5 keys on both UP
    when testing LSP8-IdentifiableDigitalAsset
        Bob should have ALL PERMISSIONS in his UP
        should return zero
    mint
        when a token is minted
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        when minting tokens
        when minting tokenId 1 of tokenA to lsp9Vault1
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
        should have expected events
    burn
        when a token is burned
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        Alice's UP should have permission SETDATA on Bob's UP
        should have expected events
    transfers
    transfer
        when sender has enough balance
        when `to` is an EOA
        should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 1, index 0, tokenA address in Vault1
        when minting tokenId 1 of tokenB to lsp9Vault1
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
        should not allow transferring the tokenId
        when the from address is incorrect
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when `to` is a contract
        when receiving contract supports LSP1
        should register lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in Vault1
        when minting tokenId 2 of tokenB (another) to lsp9Vault1
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,uint256,bool,bytes))
gas used: 97527
        Alice's UP should be able to `setData(...)` on Bob's UP
    when caller has SUPER_SETDATA + some allowed ERC725YKeys
    when trying to set a disallowed key
        should keep the same lsp5keys: arrayLength 2, index 1, tokenB address in Vault1
    when minting tokenId 1 of tokenC to lsp9Vault1
        should be allowed to set a disallowed key: 0xce4b625ea0e12f6fc6897ae6135917a8a1ab2f3d3e8bb1b799d3629495d4a52
        should revert
        when the given tokenId has not been minted
        should allow transferring the tokenId
        when receiving contract does not support LSP1
```



```
-----|-----|-----|
| Solc version: 0.8.10 | Optimizer enabled: true | Runs: 1000 | Block limit: 30000000 gas |
|-----|-----|-----|
| Methods |
|-----|-----|-----|
```

Contract		и Method	и Min	и Max	и Avg	и # calls	и usd (avg)
LSP6KeyManager		и execute(bytes)	и 44069	и 368837	и 172532	и 50	и -
LSP7CompatibleERC20Mintable		и mint(address,uint256,bool,bytes)	и 165287	и 207217	и 183402	и 6	и -
LSP8CompatibleERC721Mintable		и mint(address,bytes32,bool,bytes)	и 130272	и 274565	и 204211	и 10	и -
LSP9Vault		и claimOwnership()	и -	и -	и 137332	и 1	и -
LSP9Vault		и transferOwnership(address)	и -	и -	и 46141	и 3	и -
UniversalProfile		и execute(uint256,address,uint256,bytes)	и 59874	и 313300	и 164228	и 34	и -
UniversalProfile		и setData(bytes32[],bytes[])	и -	и -	и 244320	и 6	и -
UniversalProfile		и transferOwnership(address)	и -	и -	и 46163	и 6	и -
Deployments			и		и % of limit	и	
LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP			и -	и -	и 1511074	и 5	и -
LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault			и -	и -	и 1379449	и 4.6	и -
LSP6KeyManager			и -	и -	и 2446105	и 8.2	и -
LSP9Vault			и 2000940	и 2117646	и 2014237	и 6.7	и -



[illegible]



[illegible]



[illegible]



[illegible]



	TargetContract nb 5	
	eg: any LSP7 Token owned by the UP	
	should allow reading tokenURI	
	ownerOf	
	when tokenId has not been minted	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should revert	
	when tokenId has been minted	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	LSP7DigitalAsset nb 1	
	should return owner address	
	approve	
	when tokenId has not been minted	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should revert	
	when the tokenId has been minted	
	when caller is not owner of tokenId	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	LSP7DigitalAsset nb 2	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should revert	
	when caller is owner of tokenId	
	when operator is not the zero address	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	LSP7DigitalAsset nb 3	
	should succeed	
	when operator is the zero address	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	LSP7DigitalAsset nb 4	
	should revert	
	setApprovalForAll	
	when calling setApprovalForAll with true	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	LSP7DigitalAsset nb 5	
	should not be allowed to interact with any contract if sending LYX along the call	
	Target Payable Contract nb 1	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should revert when trying to pass caller address as operator	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	Target Payable Contract nb 2	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	Target Payable Contract nb 3	
	Target Payable Contract nb 4	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should have emitted an ApprovalForAll event	
	when calling isApprovedForAll	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	Target Payable Contract nb 5	
	when caller has SUPER_TRANSERVALUE + SUPER_CALL	
	should be allowed to send LYX to any address	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should send LYX to EOA -> 0x32520d84dE24357070bd6e7708fF506d9187F23f	
	should send LYX to EOA -> 0xbCbC4348b5fAf31cB85438C8F1c9a0dF43c9178	
	should return true for operator	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should send LYX to EOA -> 0x76b04187a1452401E3F1031Ce16f7fA445e5479	
	should send LYX to EOA -> 0xF8d262804Fe39863D0b3cd08fAbAAd5A862f3aC	
	should return false for non-operator	
	when operator transfer tokenId	
	for tokenId 0xf9cf48dad4314d77852b91dfd2ac169c398ce27d20bfacf4add50af358e743ef:	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should send LYX to EOA -> 0xb0D3c06CB9d55A8560EFdb24B846b2D57C1c42EE	
	should be allowed to interact with any contract	
	eg: any TargetContract	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	TargetContract nb 1	
	TargetContract nb 2	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	should have transferred successfully with `transferFrom(...)` (changed token owner)	
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of	Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256),	Transfer(address,address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
	TargetContract nb 3	
Duplicate		



```

Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    can verify signature from address with ALL PERMISSIONS on KeyManager
    can verify signature from signer on KeyManager
    should fail when verifying signature from address with no SIGN permission
    should fail when verifying signature from address with no permissions set
ALLOWEDADDRESSES
    when caller has no ALLOWED ADDRESSES set
        it should be allowed to interact with any address
            sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x2a22ac2b4b83d39b4b0bf4a914e9524268435bec
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should have transferred successfully with 'transferFrom(...)' (changed token owner)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x6ff70b24c8ffbd929e7963f7298f6e67507f00b
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x13fda878395661cf49dc08204450e66dc611e601
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xf85def6be667d371135893b71405dc567fcea2fb
    should have emitted a Transfer event
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xff6610a3489d15028e670cadd3bbdd321b722fe0
    when caller has 2 x ALLOWED ADDRESSES set
        should be allowed to send LYX to an allowed address (= EOA)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should be allowed to interact with an allowed address (= contract)
    should have cleared operators array
        for tokenId 0xf4f30a065b7a210c0b81cc9be61666043cbd7a6c576bfcdb8022a532a14610b5:
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should revert when sending LYX to a non-allowed address (= EOA)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should revert when interacting with an non-allowed address (= contract)
    when caller has an invalid abi-encoded array set for ALLOWED ADDRESSES
        it should be allowed to interact with any address
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xeb02a8bcded64718bdaa825398f21f82816b9085
    should have transferred successfully with 'transferFrom(...)' (changed token owner)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x812395f73bffa8c8ab3c8a81f8607f32fcd1b332
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x0c37d00dfb72ca1de494b68768c505d428434b9c
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should have emitted a Transfer event
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xf757cf192424e1731a9b30198478cdfb3553f86d
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x0647910240dba2c838cbefad24e88aa0e3f235a
ALLOWEDFUNCTIONS
    when interacting via 'execute(...)'
        when caller has nothing listed under AllowedFunctions
            when calling a contract
                should pass when calling any function (eg: 'setName(...)')
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should pass when calling any function (eg: 'setNumber(...)')
    when caller has 1 x bytes4 function selector listed under AllowedFunctions
        should have cleared operators array
            for tokenId 0x24248d4bb005cd61e85488ec603a8f8ac3f1a5bca1f6ca1ca5e29bf2f39285d:
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should revert when passing a random bytes payload with a random function selector
    when calling a contract
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should pass when the bytes4 selector of the function called is listed in its AllowedFunctions
    should revert when the bytes4 selector of the function called is NOT listed in its AllowedFunctions
    when interacting via 'executeRelayCall(...)'
        when signer has 1 x bytes4 function selector listed under AllowedFunctions
            when calling a contract
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should have transferred successfully with 'transferFrom(...)' (changed token owner)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))

Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    'setName(...)' - should pass when the bytes4 selector of the function called is listed in its AllowedFunctions
    'setNumber(...)' - should revert when the bytes4 selector of the function called is NOT listed in its AllowedFunctions
ALLOWEDSTANDARDS
    when caller has no value set for ALLOWEDSTANDARDS (= all interfaces whitelisted)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should allow to interact with contract that does not implement any interface
    should allow to interact with a contract that implement (+ register) any interface
    should have emitted a Transfer event
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    ERC1271
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    LSP0 (ERC725Account)
    when caller has only ERC1271 interface ID set for ALLOWED STANDARDS
        when interacting with a contract that implements + register ERC1271 interface
            should have cleared operators array
                for tokenId 0xb0c09f17a4b027ad28c7a4b6e59e9a18d1534a54bab492838fc09def0d9e4d2:
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
    should pass
    when trying to interact an ERC725Account (LSP0)
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))

```



Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should allow to transfer LYX  
    when interacting with contract that does not implement ERC1271  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should have transferred successfully with `transferFrom(...)` (changed token owner)  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should fail  
    when caller has only LSP7 interface ID set for ALLOWED STANDARDS  
    when interacting with a contract that implements + register ERC1271 interface  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should fail  
    when interacting with an ERC725Account (LSP0)  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should fail when trying to transfer LYX  
ALLOWEDERC725YKeys  
    keyType: Singleton  
    should have emitted a Transfer event  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    verify allowed ERC725Y keys set  
    `controllerCanSetOneKey` should have 1 x key in its list of allowed keys  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    `controllerCanSetManyKeys` should have 3 x keys in its list of allowed keys  
    `controllerCanSetOneKey` should have the right keys set in its list of allowed keys  
    `controllerCanSetManyKeys` should have the right keys set in its list of allowed keys  
when address can set only one key  
    when setting one key  
        should pass when setting the right key  
        should fail when setting the wrong key  
    when setting multiple keys  
        should fail when the list contains none of the allowed keys  
        should fail, even if the list contains the allowed key  
when address can set multiple keys  
    should pass when the input is all the allowed keys  
    should fail when the input contains none of the allowed keys  
    when setting one key  
        should pass when trying to set the 1st allowed key  
        should pass when trying to set the 2nd allowed key  
        should pass when trying to set the 3rd allowed key  
        should fail when setting a not-allowed Singleton key  
    when setting 2 x keys  
        should pass when  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    the input is the first two (subset) allowed keys  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    the input is the last two (subset) allowed keys  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    the input is the first + last (subset) allowed keys  
    when setting 3 x keys  
        should fail when  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    1st key in input = 1st allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    2nd key in input = 1st allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    3rd key in input = 1st allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    1st key in input = 2nd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    2nd key in input = 2nd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    3rd key in input = 2nd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    1st key in input = 3rd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    2nd key in input = 3rd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
    should have cleared operators array  
    when calling setApprovalForAll with false (removing operator full approval)  
        3rd key in input = 3rd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    1st key in input = not allowed key. Other 2 keys = allowed  
    2nd key in input = not allowed key. Other 2 keys = allowed  
    3rd key in input = not allowed key. Other 2 keys = allowed  
    when setting multiple keys  
        when input is bigger than the number of allowed keys  
        should fail when  
            input = all the allowed keys + 1 x not-allowed key  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    input = all the allowed keys + 5 x not-allowed key  
    should pass when  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should return false when calling isApprovedForAll for operator  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    input contains all the allowed keys as DUPLICATE  
    when address can set any key  
        when setting one key  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should pass when setting any random key  
    when setting multiple keys  
        should pass when setting any multiple keys  
keyType: Mapping  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    when address can set Mapping keys starting with a `SupportedStandards:...`  
        when setting one key  
            should pass when setting SupportedStandards:LSPX  
            should pass when overriding SupportedStandards:LSPX  
            should pass when setting SupportedStandards:LSPY  
            should pass when setting SupportedStandards:LSPZ  
            should fail when setting any other not-allowed Mapping key  
        when setting multiple keys  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    (2 x keys) should pass when all the keys in the list start with bytes16(keccak256("SupportedStandards"))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should revert when operator try to transfer tokenId 0xf9cf48dad4314d77852b91dfd2ac169c398ce27d20bfacf4add50af358e743ef with transferFrom(...)  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    (2 x keys) (override) should pass when all the keys in the list start with bytes16(keccak256("SupportedStandards"))  
    (3 x keys) should pass when all the keys in the list start with bytes16(keccak256("SupportedStandards"))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    (3 x keys) (override) should pass when all the keys in the list start with bytes16(keccak256("SupportedStandards"))  
    should fail when the list contains none of the allowed Mapping keys  
    should fail, even if the list contains some keys starting with `SupportedStandards`  
    when address can set any key  
        when setting one key  
            should pass when setting any random Mapping key  
        when setting multiple keys  
            should pass when setting any random set of Mapping keys  
keyType: Array  
    when address can set Array element in `MyArray[]`  
        when setting one key  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should pass when setting array key length MyArray[]  
    should return false when calling isApprovedForAll for operator  
    should pass when setting 1st array element MyArray[0]  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
Duplicate definition of Transfer (Transfer(address,address,uint256), Transfer(address,address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes))  
    should pass when setting 2nd array element MyArray[1]



[illegible]



[illegible]

```

    should not get token
when minted tokens
    Bytes20Mapping: should return 16 for 'LSP5ReceivedAssetsMap:...' -> 0x812c4334633eb8160000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
    'getPermissionsFor(...)' -> reading permissions
        should access by index
        Should return ALL_PERMISSIONS for owner
        should not access by index after removed
        Should return SETDATA
        should access by index after removed

```

```

LSP8Mintable {
  when using LSP8Mintable with constructor
    when deploying the contract
      when the contract was initialized
        should have registered the ERC165 interface
        should have registered the ERC725Y interface
        should have registered the LSP8 interface
        Should return SETDATA + CALL
      'getPermissionsFor(...)' -> reading empty permissions
      should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
    when testing deployed contract
      when owner minting tokens
        total supply should have increased
        tokenReceiver balance should have increased
      when non-owner minting tokens
        should revert
      when owner try to re-enter function through the UniversalReceiverDelegate
        should cast permissions to 32 bytes when reading permissions stored as more than 32 empty bytes
        should cast permissions to 32 bytes when reading permissions stored as less than 32 empty bytes
        should pass
    when using LSP8Mintable with proxy
      when deploying the contract as proxy
        when initializing the contract
          when the contract was initialized
            should have registered the ERC165 interface
            should cast permissions to 32 bytes when reading permissions stored as one empty byte
          'includesPermissions(...)'
            should have registered the ERC725Y interface
            should have registered the LSP8 interface
            should have set expected entries with ERC725Y.setData
        when calling initialize more than once
          Should return true when checking if has permission SETDATA
        AddressPermissions[]
          should revert
      when testing deployed contract
        when owner minting tokens
          total supply should have increased
          tokenReceiver balance should have increased
        when non-owner minting tokens
          should revert
        when owner try to re-enter function through the UniversalReceiverDelegate
          Value should be 5 for key 'AddressPermissions[1]'
          Checking address (=value) stored at AddressPermissions[1]'
          Checking address (=value) stored at AddressPermissions[2]'
          should pass

```

	Solc version: 0.8.10	Optimizer enabled: true	Runs: 1000	Block limit:	
t: 30000000 gas					
Methods					
Contract	Method	Min	Max	Avg	# calls
usd (avg)					
ERC725	transferOwnership(address)	-	-	31503	
LSP6KeyManager	execute(bytes)	44069	299419	148741	
LSP7CompatibleERC20InitAbstract	approve(address,uint256)	80532	100746	93466	6
LSP7CompatibleERC20InitAbstract	transferFrom(address,address,uint256)	113184	148476	126628	6
LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInit	initialize(string,string,address)	146729	169272	151143	10
LSP8CompatibleERC721InitAbstract	safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)	122831	125552	124192	
LSP8CompatibleERC721InitAbstract	safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)	120913	123584	122249	
LSP8CompatibleERC721InitAbstract	setApprovalForAll(address,bool)	24309	48918	41254	8
LSP8CompatibleERC721Mintable	mint(address,bytes32,bool,bytes)	105374	146452	133495	19
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset	authorizeOperator(address,bytes32)	76080	95855	86337	27
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset	revokeOperator(address,bytes32)	33707	35828	34768	
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset	transfer(address,address,bytes32,bool,bytes)	122433	133815	128511	7
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset	transferBatch(address[],address[],bytes32[],bool,bytes[])	208096	225245	216671	11
LSP8Mintable	mint(address,bytes32,bool,bytes)	-	-	143778	
LSP8Mintable	transferOwnership(address)	-	-	28823	
UniversalProfile	setData(bytes32[],bytes[])	-	-	244296	
UniversalProfile	transferOwnership(address)	-	-	46163	
Deployments					% of limit
LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP		-	-	1511074	5
LSP6KeyManager		-	-	2446105	8.2



[illegible]

should pass when address had 40 x 0 bytes set initially as allowed standards  
when changing the list of allowed bytes4 interface IDs to an invalid value  
should revert with error when value = random bytes  
should revert with error when value = invalid abi-encoded array of bytes4[] (not enough leading zero bytes for a bytes4 value -> 26 x '00')

')

```
setting Allowed ERC725YKeys
when caller has ADDPERMISSIONS
  when beneficiary had some ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
    should fail when adding an extra allowed ERC725Y data key
    should fail when removing an allowed ERC725Y data key
    should fail when trying to clear the array completely
    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
  when beneficiary had no ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
    should pass when setting a valid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[] (random bytes)
when caller has CHANGEPERMISSIONS
  when beneficiary had some ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
    should pass when adding an extra allowed ERC725Y data key
    should pass when removing an allowed ERC725Y data key
    should pass when trying to clear the array completely
    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
  when beneficiary had no ERC725Y data keys set under AddressPermissions:AllowedERC725YKeys:...
    should fail and not authorize to add a list of allowed ERC725Y data keys (not authorised)
    should fail when setting an invalid abi-encoded array of bytes32[]
setting mixed keys (SETDATA, CHANGE & ADD Permissions)
when setting multiple keys
  when caller is an address with ALL PERMISSIONS
    (should pass): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions
    (should pass): 2 x keys + change 2 x existing permissions
    (should pass): 2 x keys + (add 1 x new permission) + (change 1 x existing permission)
  when caller is an address with permission SETDATA + ADDPERMISSIONS
    (should pass): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions + increment AddressPermissions[].length by +2
    (should fail): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions + decrement AddressPermissions[].length by -1
    (should fail): 2 x keys + change 2 x existing permissions
    (should fail): 2 x keys + (add 1 x new permission) + (change 1 x existing permission)
  when caller is an address with permission SETDATA + CHANGEPERMISSIONS
    (should pass): 2 x keys + remove 2 x addresses with permissions + decrement AddressPermissions[].length by -2
    (should pass): 2 x keys + change 2 x existing permissions
    (should fail): 2 x keys + add 2 x new permissions
    (should fail): 2 x keys + increment AddressPermissions[].length by +1
    (should fail): 2 x keys + (add 1 x new permission) + (change 1 x existing permission)
SETDATA
when caller is an EOA
  when setting one key
    For UP owner
      should pass
    For address that has permission SETDATA
      should pass
    For address that doesn't have permission SETDATA
      should not allow
  when setting multiple keys
    For UP owner
      (should pass): adding 5 singleton keys
      (should pass): adding 10 LSP12IssuedAssets
      (should pass): setup a basic Universal Profile ('LSP3Profile', 'LSP12IssuedAssets[]' and 'LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate')
    For address that has permission SETDATA
      (should pass): adding 5 singleton keys
      (should pass): adding 10 LSP12IssuedAssets
      (should pass): setup a basic Universal Profile ('LSP3Profile', 'LSP12IssuedAssets[]' and 'LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate')
    For address that doesn't have permission SETDATA
      (should fail): adding 5 singleton keys
      (should fail): adding 10 LSP12IssuedAssets
      (should fail): setup a basic Universal Profile ('LSP3Profile', 'LSP12IssuedAssets[]' and 'LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate')
when caller is a contract
  > contract calls
    should allow to set a key hardcoded inside a function of the calling contract
    Should allow to set a key computed inside a function of the calling contract
    Should allow to set a key computed from parameters given to a function of the calling contract
  > Low-level calls
    Should allow to 'setHardcodedKeyRawCall' on UP
    Should allow to 'setComputedKeyRawCall' on UP
    Should allow to 'setComputedKeyFromParamsRawCall' on UP
when caller is another UniversalProfile (with a KeyManager attached as owner)
  Alice should have ALL PERMISSIONS in her UP
  Bob should have ALL PERMISSIONS in his UP
  Alice's UP should have permission SETDATA on Bob's UP
```

gas used: 109258

```
  Alice's UP should be able to 'setData(...)' on Bob's UP
when caller has SUPER_SETDATA + some allowed ERC725YKeys
  when trying to set a disallowed key
    should be allowed to set a disallowed key: 0xce4b625ea0e12f6f6c6897ae6135917a8a1ab2f3d3e8bb1b799d3629495d4a52
    should be allowed to set a disallowed key: 0x30520d24ed35d205e2401d763abf84056b914487855139e6b5a38a3eb53a5f72
    should be allowed to set a disallowed key: 0xd725eaaad24b642ab5ec92f479215e2c326d0fb18fc80ac1413070b4e913ea897
    should be allowed to set a disallowed key: 0xded639d04e7d7a12082e6ceae9b28efca1539ebc0cd3f630e0d039281df45fc3
    should be allowed to set a disallowed key: 0x9f0ee8fd4a734ff11929291ce258b12e5c2fc09653010ebac39dbf114ee5de73
  when trying to set an allowed key
    should be allowed to set the 1st allowed key
    should be allowed to set the 2nd allowed key
    should be allowed to set the 3rd allowed key
```

```
CALL
when interacting via 'execute(...)'
  when caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
    should pass and change state at the target contract
  when caller has permission CALL
    should pass and change state at the target contract
  when caller does not have permission CALL
    should revert
  when calling a function that returns some value
    should return the value to the Key Manager <- UP <- targetContract.getName()
    Should return the value to the Key Manager <- UP <- targetContract.getNumber()
  when calling a function that reverts
    should revert
when interacting via 'executeRelayCall(...)'
  when signer has ALL PERMISSIONS
    should execute successfully
  when signer has permission CALL
    should execute successfully
  when signer does not have permission CALL
    should fail
```

```
STATICCALL
when caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
  should pass and return data
when caller has permission STATICCALL
  should pass and return data
  should revert when trying to change state at the target contract
  should revert when caller try to make a CALL
when caller does not have permission STATICCALL
  should revert
when caller has permission STATICCALL + 2 x allowed addresses
  should revert when trying to interact with a non-allowed address
  when interacting with 1st allowed contract
    should allow to call view function -> getName()
    should allow to call view function -> getNumber()
    should revert when calling state changing function -> setName(string)
    should revert when calling state changing function -> setNumber(uint256)
  when interacting with 2nd allowed contract
    should allow to interact with 2nd allowed contract - getName()
    should allow to interact with 2nd allowed contract - getNumber()
    should revert when calling state changing function -> setName(string)
    should revert when calling state changing function -> setNumber(uint256)
when caller has permission SUPER_STATICCALL + 2 allowed addresses
  it should bypass allowed addresses check + allow to interact with any contract
  e.g: Target Contract nb 1
  e.g: Target Contract nb 2
  e.g: Target Contract nb 3
  e.g: Target Contract nb 4
  e.g: Target Contract nb 5
```

```
DELEGATECALL
when trying to make a DELEGATECALL via UP, DELEGATECALL is disallowed
  should revert even if caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
  should revert even if caller has permission DELEGATECALL
  should revert with operation disallowed, even if caller does not have permission DELEGATECALL
when caller has permission SUPER_DELEGATECALL + 2 x allowed addresses
  when calling a disallowed contract
    it should revert since DELEGATECALL is disallowed
    delegate call to contract nb 0
    delegate call to contract nb 1
    delegate call to contract nb 2
    delegate call to contract nb 3
    delegate call to contract nb 4
```



```
when calling an allowed contract
  should revert with DELEGATECALL disallowed when trying to interact with the 1st allowed contract
  should revert with DELEGATECALL disallowed when trying to interact with the 2nd allowed contract
DEPLOY
when caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
  should be allowed to deploy a contract TargetContract via CREATE
  should be allowed to deploy a contract TargetContract via CREATE2
when caller is an address with permission DEPLOY
  should be allowed to deploy a contract TargetContract via CREATE
  should be allowed to deploy a contract TargetContract via CREATE2
when caller is an address that does not have the permission DEPLOY
  when calling via execute(...)
    should revert when trying to deploy a contract via CREATE
    should revert when trying to deploy a contract via CREATE2
  when calling via executeRelayCall(...)
    should revert when trying to deploy a contract via CREATE
    should revert when trying to deploy a contract via CREATE2
TRANSFERVALUE
when caller = EOA
  when recipient = EOA
    when transferring value without bytes `_data`
      should pass when caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
      should pass when caller has permission TRANSFERVALUE only
      should pass when caller has permission TRANSFERVALUE + CALL
      should fail when caller does not have permission TRANSFERVALUE
    when transferring value with bytes `_data`
      should pass when caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
      should pass when caller has permission TRANSFERVALUE + CALL
      should fail when caller has permission TRANSFERVALUE only
      should fail when caller does not have permission TRANSFERVALUE
when caller = contract
  > Contract calls
    Should send 1 LYX to an address hardcoded in Executor (`sendOneLyxHardcoded`)
    Should send 1 LYX to an address provided to Executor (`sendOneLyxToRecipient`)
  > Low-level calls
    Should send 1 LYX to an address hardcoded in Executor (`sendOneLyxHardcodedRawCall`)
    Should send 1 LYX to an address provided to Executor (`sendOneLyxToRecipientRawCall`)
when caller is another UP (with a KeyManager as owner)
  Alice should have ALL PERMISSIONS in her UP
  Bob should have ALL PERMISSIONS in his UP
  Alice's UP should have permission TRANSFERVALUE on Bob's UP
  Alice should be able to send 5 LYX from Bob's UP to her UP
when caller has SUPER_TRANSFERVALUE + CALL
  should not be allowed to interact with a disallowed LSP7 contract
  should be allowed to interact with an allowed LSP7 contract
  should be allowed to interact with an allowed contract
  should be allowed to interact with an allowed contract + send some LYX while calling the function
  should be allowed to send LYX to any EOA
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x9b31Fc7eE8bEC568A2150ba600C985C931dfEcd8
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0xC801cdABe8cF903a72cB698d1005105B0E8717BC
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x70eb002Ba3e3804fB1A9E08c4b73f2b24552CCB7
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x80f0105E987b49274009b807eff65ebcCEB209d4
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x37665E718Aaa782177AA29358130a584F5D3B74F
  should be allowed to send LYX to any other UP contract
    should send LYX to UP 0
    should send LYX to UP 1
    should send LYX to UP 2
    should send LYX to UP 3
    should send LYX to UP 4
when caller has TRANSFERVALUE + SUPER_CALL
  should not be allowed to do a plain LYX transfer to a non-allowed address
  should be allowed to do a plain LYX transfer to an allowed address
  should be allowed to interact with any contract
  eg: any TargetContract
    TargetContract nb 1
    TargetContract nb 2
    TargetContract nb 3
    TargetContract nb 4
    TargetContract nb 5
  eg: any LSP7 Token owned by the UP
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 1
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 2
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 3
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 4
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 5
  should not be allowed to interact with any contract if sending LYX along the call
    Target Payable Contract nb 1
    Target Payable Contract nb 2
    Target Payable Contract nb 3
    Target Payable Contract nb 4
    Target Payable Contract nb 5
when caller has SUPER_TRANSFERVALUE + SUPER_CALL
  should be allowed to send LYX to any address
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x8e224dF07DA3a688EA54033c9666b153743740Da
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x69961fB61cF5eC3B52a82320A55d73cAd051D34f
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0xd16a7848d13348962177805F4D34D371862c6c01
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x0e440C17E534EDe8396484Cd2B0aBE5E3D3e8D99
    should send LYX to EOA -> 0x853B1499DfBD1fb605a9b2aC69d828F1541258ce
  should be allowed to interact with any contract
  eg: any TargetContract
    TargetContract nb 1
    TargetContract nb 2
    TargetContract nb 3
    TargetContract nb 4
    TargetContract nb 5
  eg: any LSP7 Token owned by the UP
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 1
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 2
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 3
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 4
    LSP7DigitalAsset nb 5
SIGN (ERC1271)
  can verify signature from address with ALL PERMISSIONS on KeyManager
  can verify signature from signer on KeyManager
  should fail when verifying signature from address with no SIGN permission
  should fail when verifying signature from address with no permissions set
ALLOWEDADDRESSES
  when caller has no ALLOWED ADDRESSES set
    it should be allowed to interact with any address
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xd34c7cee59094ae35fe8cc0706fea9b5b8037897
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x29b5133aa8113bd2eda26a074f7402cd89139713
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xdb683d8eb4d5a6d55577a45035c8897de5dc39b0
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xbe4e735ea046c104b7ee567c653318625f63dbb4
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x06f35237e6a032e966462a97edfceb18cfe64e3
  when caller has 2 x ALLOWED ADDRESSES set
    should be allowed to send LYX to an allowed address (= EOA)
    should be allowed to interact with an allowed address (= contract)
    should revert when sending LYX to a non-allowed address (= EOA)
    should revert when interacting with a non-allowed address (= contract)
  when caller has an invalid abi-encoded array set for ALLOWED ADDRESSES
    it should be allowed to interact with any address
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xb9411ff3f5de96cdf50ddd8cdcb7363eb2fb5fe5
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x9c57fd474f17546ef3624b1ce8b7747ec8d61c90
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x77b1134ef235ce20a63c5f070d879d94190e86fb
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0xe1e2ee23e3e5d30b5a4577bb5f7c179dc1bbb97
      sending 1 LYX to EOA 0x090e67f69a480a6fa56c56fd738e59af213ab431
ALLOWEDFUNCTIONS
  when interacting via `execute(...)`
    when caller has nothing listed under AllowedFunctions
      when calling a contract
        should pass when calling any function (eg: `setName(...)`)
        should pass when calling any function (eg: `setNumber(...)`)
      when caller has 1 x bytes4 function selector listed under AllowedFunctions
        should revert when passing a random bytes payload with a random function selector
      when calling a contract
        should pass when the bytes4 selector of the function called is listed in its AllowedFunctions
        should revert when the bytes4 selector of the function called is NOT listed in its AllowedFunctions
  when interacting via `executeRelayCall(...)`
    when signer has 1 x bytes4 function selector listed under AllowedFunctions
      when calling a contract
        `setName(...)` - should pass when the bytes4 selector of the function called is listed in its AllowedFunctions
        `setNumber(...)` - should revert when the bytes4 selector of the function called is NOT listed in its AllowedFunctions
ALLOWEDSTANDARDS
  when caller has no value set for ALLOWEDSTANDARDS (= all interfaces whitelisted)
    should allow to interact with contract that does not implement any interface
    should allow to interact with a contract that implement (+ register) any interface
  ERC1271
    LSP0 (ERC725Account)
  when caller has only ERC1271 interface ID set for ALLOWED STANDARDS
    when interacting with a contract that implements + register ERC1271 interface
```

```
ALLOWEDERC725YKeys
  keyType: Singleton
  verify allowed ERC725Y keys set
    'controllerCanSetOneKey' should have 1 x key in its list of allowed keys
    'controllerCanSetManyKeys' should have 3 x keys in its list of allowed keys
    'controllerCanSetOneKey' should have the right keys set in its list of allowed keys
    'controllerCanSetManyKeys' should have the right keys set in its list of allowed keys
```

```

when setting 3 x keys
    should fail when
        1st key in input = 1st allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        2nd key in input = 1st allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        3rd key in input = 1st allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        1st key in input = 2nd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        2nd key in input = 2nd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        3rd key in input = 2nd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        1st key in input = 3rd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        2nd key in input = 3rd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        3rd key in input = 3rd allowed key. Other 2 keys = not allowed
        1st key in input = not allowed key. Other 2 keys = allowed
        2nd key in input = not allowed key. Other 2 keys = allowed
        3rd key in input = not allowed key. Other 2 keys = allowed

```

```
keyType: Mapping
  when address can set Mapping keys starting with a 'Supported'
  when setting one key
    should pass when setting SupportedStandards:LSPX
    should pass when overriding SupportedStandards:LSPX
    should pass when setting SupportedStandards:LSPY
    should pass when setting SupportedStandards:LSPZ
    should fail when setting any other not-allowed Mapping
```

```

keyType: Array
  when address can set Array element in 'MyArray[]'
    when setting one key
      should pass when setting array key length MyArray[]
      should pass when setting 1st array element MyArray[0]
      should pass when setting 2nd array element MyArray[1]
      should pass when setting 3rd array element MyArray[3]
      should fail when setting elements of a not-allowed Array (eg: LSP5ReceivedAssets)
    when setting multiple keys

```

[illegible]

```
Multi Channel nonces
  testing sequential nonces (channel = 0)
    First call > nonce should increment from undefined to NaN
    Second call > nonce should increment from undefined to NaN
    Third call > nonce should increment from undefined to NaN
    Fourth call > nonce should increment from undefined to NaN
  out of order execution (channel = n)
```

```
miscellaneous
payload
- should fail when sending an empty payload to `keyManager.execute('0x')`
- should revert because calling an nonexistent function in ERC725
wrong operation type
- Should revert because of wrong operation type when caller has ALL PERMISSIONS
- Should revert because of wrong operation type when caller has not ALL PERMISSIONS
Security
```

---



Solc version: 0.8.10		Optimizer enabled: true		Runs: 1000		Block limit: 3000000 gas	
Methods							
Contract	Method	Min	Max	Avg	# calls	usd (avg)	
ERC725	setData(bytes32[],bytes[])	78979	497621	266389	313	-	
ERC725	transferOwnership(address)	48789	48813	48812	313	-	
LSP0ERC725AccountInit	initialize(address)	48845	74535	61701	636	-	
LSP6KeyManager	execute(bytes)	41746	384843	68542	1121	-	
LSP6KeyManager	executeRelayCall(bytes,uint256,bytes)	83411	116201	95759	30	-	
LSP7Mintable	mint(address,uint256,bool,bytes)	86270	89137	87708	48	-	
UniversalProfile	setData(bytes32[],bytes[])	76263	661191	264979	374	-	
UniversalProfile	transferOwnership(address)	46139	46163	46162	374	-	
Deployments						% of limit	
LSP6KeyManager		2446081	2446105	2446104	8.2	-	
LSP6KeyManagerInit		-	-	2593136	8.6	-	
LSP7Mintable		1641836	1641920	1641838	5.5	-	
UniversalProfile		-	-	2091006	7	-	
UniversalProfileInit		-	-	2202316	7.3	-	

788 passing (9m)  
2 pending

## Code Coverage

For code coverage the current test code managed to achieve 88.1% coverage for [ERC725Alliance/ERC725](#) and 82.23% coverage for [lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts](#). We recommend increasing the branch coverage to 90% before the project go live, in order to avoid hidden functional bugs that might not be easy to spot during the development phase.

=====ERC725Alliance/ERC725:

File	% StmtS	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
contracts/	93.85	96.67	85.71	93.65	
ERC725.sol	0	100	0	0	24,41
ERC725Init.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725InitAbstract.sol	0	100	0	0	21,38
ERC725X.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725XCore.sol	100	96.43	100	100	
ERC725XInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725XInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725Y.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725YCore.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725YInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725YInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/custom/	100	75	100	100	
OwnableUnset.sol	100	75	100	100	
contracts/helpers/	64.52	50	67.57	68.57	
Contract.sol	0	100	0	0	8
Counter.sol	100	100	100	100	
CustomRevertTest.sol	100	100	100	100	
DelegateTest.sol	0	100	0	0	14,18
ERC165InterfaceIDs.sol	100	50	100	100	
ERC725XPayableTester.sol	100	100	0	100	
ERC725YReader.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC725YWriter.sol	100	100	100	100	
NoReceive.sol	100	100	0	100	
NonPayableFallbackContract.sol	100	100	0	100	

File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
PayableFallbackContract.sol	100	100	100	100	10,18,19,21,22
Reader.sol	0	100	0	0	
ReceiveTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
Return.sol	40	100	50	50	33,57,65
WithConstructorPayable.sol	100	100	100	100	
WithConstructorWithArgs.sol	100	100	100	100	
WithConstructorWithoutArgs.sol	100	100	100	100	
WithoutConstructor.sol	100	100	0	100	
selfdestruct.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/interfaces/	100	100	100	100	
IERC725X.sol	100	100	100	100	
IERC725Y.sol	100	100	100	100	
All files	85.98	88.1	77.78	86.49	

=====lukso-network/lsp-smart-contracts:

File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
contracts/	100	100	100	100	
UniversalProfile.sol	100	100	100	100	
UniversalProfileInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
UniversalProfileInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/Custom/	50	57.14	45.45	50	39,43
ClaimOwnership.sol	83.33	100	66.67	84.62	
ERC165Checker.sol	27.78	25	20	23.53	
IClaimOwnership.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/Factories/	70.97	68.75	66.67	69.7	... 59,67,79,80
Create2Factory.sol	0	0	0	0	
UniversalFactory.sol	100	91.67	100	100	
contracts/Helpers/	100	50	97.62	100	
ERC165CheckerCustomTest.sol	100	100	100	100	
ERC165Interfaces.sol	100	50	100	100	
Executor.sol	100	100	100	100	
FallbackContract.sol	100	100	100	100	
ImplementationTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP2UtilsLibraryTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
NFTStorage.sol	100	100	100	100	
PayableContract.sol	100	100	66.67	100	
SignatureValidatorContract.sol	100	100	100	100	
TargetContract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/Helpers/KeyManager/	81.82	100	84.62	81.82	
ERC725YDelegateCall.sol	0	100	50	0	
KeyManagerInternalsTester.sol	88.89	100	90	88.89	41
TargetPayableContract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/Helpers/Security/	100	100	100	100	
Reentrancy.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/Helpers/Tokens/	97.78	100	95.83	97.78	
IERC223.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP4CompatibilityTester.sol	100	100	100	100	



File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
LSP7CappedSupplyInitTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7CappedSupplyTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7CompatibleERC20InitTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7CompatibleERC20Tester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7InitTester.sol	50	100	50	50	23
LSP7Tester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CappedSupplyInitTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CappedSupplyTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CompatibleERC721Tester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CompatibleERC721TesterInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8EnumerableInitTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8EnumerableTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8InitTester.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8Tester.sol	100	100	100	100	
TokenReceiverWithLSP1.sol	100	100	66.67	100	
TokenReceiverWithoutLSP1.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/Helpers/UniversalReceivers/	94.12	66.67	85.71	94.12	
UniversalReceiverDelegateTokenReentrant.sol	100	75	100	100	
UniversalReceiverDelegateVaultSetter.sol	100	100	100	100	
UniversalReceiverTester.sol	75	50	66.67	75	13
contracts/LSP0ERC725Account/	84.21	75	80	83.33	
LSP0Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP0ERC725Account.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP0ERC725AccountCore.sol	93.33	75	100	92.86	124
LSP0ERC725AccountInit.sol	0	100	0	0	17,25
LSP0ERC725AccountInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP10ReceivedVaults/	100	100	100	100	
LSP10Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/	100	100	100	100	
ILSP1UniversalReceiver.sol	100	100	100	100	
ILSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP1Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP1Utils.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP/	100	50	100	100	
LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP.sol	100	50	100	100	
contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP/Handling/	85	78.57	100	100	
TokenAndVaultHandling.sol	85	78.57	100	100	
contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault/	100	50	100	100	
LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault.sol	100	50	100	100	
contracts/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault/Handling/	88.24	80	100	100	
TokenHandling.sol	88.24	80	100	100	
contracts/LSP2ERC725YJSONSchema/	63.33	81.25	50	61.11	
LSP2Errors.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP2Utils.sol	63.33	81.25	50	61.11	... 196,197,199
contracts/LSP3UniversalProfile/	100	100	100	100	

File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
LSP3Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/	100	100	100	100	
ILSP4Compatibility.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP4Compatibility.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP4Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP4DigitalAssetMetadataInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP4Errors.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP5ReceivedAssets/	100	83.33	100	98.21	
LSP5Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP5Utils.sol	100	83.33	100	98.21	92
contracts/LSP6KeyManager/	96.59	90.91	100	99.42	
ILSP6KeyManager.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP6Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP6Errors.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP6KeyManager.sol	100	50	100	100	
LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol	96.32	92.19	100	99.36	666
LSP6KeyManagerInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP6KeyManagerInitAbstract.sol	100	50	100	100	
LSP6Utils.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/	94.44	85	100	91.57	
ILSP7DigitalAsset.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7DigitalAsset.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol	93.85	85	100	90.79	... 253,254,256
LSP7DigitalAssetInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7DigitalAssetInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7Errors.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/	94.29	66.67	92.31	89.47	
ILSP7CappedSupply.sol	100	100	100	100	
ILSP7CompatibleERC20.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7CappedSupply.sol	100	50	100	75	20
LSP7CappedSupplyCore.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7CappedSupplyInitAbstract.sol	100	50	100	75	19
LSP7CompatibleERC20.sol	80	100	83.33	80	65
LSP7CompatibleERC20Core.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7CompatibleERC20InitAbstract.sol	83.33	100	83.33	83.33	65
contracts/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/	50	100	50	50	
ILSP7Mintable.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7CompatibleERC20Mintable.sol	0	100	0	0	20
LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInit.sol	0	100	0	0	14,28
LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInitAbstract.sol	0	100	0	0	16,25
LSP7Mintable.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP7MintableInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
<b>LSP7MintableInitAbstract.sol</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/	95.56	95.65	92.86	96.23	



File	% Stmt <span>s</span>	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
ILSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8Errors.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol	97.65	95.65	100	98.02	104,130
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetInit.sol	0	100	0	0	19,33
LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/	100	77.78	100	97.33	
ILSP8CappedSupply.sol	100	100	100	100	
ILSP8CompatibleERC721.sol	100	100	100	100	
ILSP8Enumerable.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CappedSupply.sol	100	50	100	75	20
LSP8CappedSupplyCore.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CappedSupplyInitAbstract.sol	100	50	100	75	21
LSP8CompatibleConstants.sol					
LSP8CompatibleConstants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CompatibleERC721.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CompatibleERC721Core.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CompatibleERC721InitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8Enumerable.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8EnumerableCore.sol	100	66.67	100	100	
LSP8EnumerableInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/	50	100	50	50	
ILSP8Mintable.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8CompatibleERC721Mintable.sol	0	100	0	0	20
LSP8CompatibleERC721MintableInit.sol	0	100	0	0	14,28
LSP8CompatibleERC721MintableInitAbstract.sol	0	100	0	0	16,25
LSP8Mintable.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8MintableInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP8MintableInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/LSP9Vault/	100	75	100	100	
LSP9Constants.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP9Vault.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP9VaultCore.sol	100	75	100	100	
LSP9VaultInit.sol	100	100	100	100	
LSP9VaultInitAbstract.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/Legacy/	0	0	0	0	
UniversalReceiverAddressStore.sol	0	0	0	0	... 53,55,60,61
contracts/Legacy/Registries/	100	75	100	100	
AddressRegistry.sol	100	100	100	100	
AddressRegistryRequiresERC725.sol	100	66.67	100	100	
contracts/Utils/	100	100	100	100	
UtilsLib.sol	100	100	100	100	
All files	90.57	82.23	88.28	90.79	

# Appendix

## File Signatures

The following are the SHA-256 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different SHA-256 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different SHA-256 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review.

### Contracts

55d53041c3688418f96406ef4541bc9549bf8be15a67e8f67f6c79ce8d70f496	./contracts/lsps/UniversalProfile.sol
34acb82e1344a8eb8ba372decce84a72d609da72122d2ee639e05fe8adbecef3	./contracts/lsps/UniversalProfileInit.sol
176fee542581697ef8647b5c6bd0d7243a570f2a13e0c2bebcd8351033714459	./contracts/lsps/UniversalProfileInitAbstract.sol
5b9fccdc2f06c2e7f38137ddd063e90a94d24227e0c667f3e90b89507f816d14	./contracts/lsps/Utils/UtilsLib.sol
c92d24adf8dd80e3a08187a890fb1d416b92ec909eda71b5c575ae8ea152791f	./contracts/lsps/LSP9Vault/LSP9Constants.sol
826cb3cd08bda32a5b27627e84f9f6d5a74a58390f61478a5677da20d884a5df	./contracts/lsps/LSP9Vault/LSP9Vault.sol
b003e93de34ec7ab1dd58bc134a4d90222d63cfc1ae435f34ec38936e2fc07c5	./contracts/lsps/LSP9Vault/LSP9VaultCore.sol
3f2f41d0bd67fe94d5b16fe3fbf0ed8da735c40c5ac61d853fa4a3c449f18f7a	./contracts/lsps/LSP9Vault/LSP9VaultInit.sol
542cf93829c374a1bab98ea14fa3b8f182a92a18841b7d34f26633fa069957a9	./contracts/lsps/LSP9Vault/LSP9VaultInitAbstract.sol
d45d0961e2d21342d3e173684d35795111d1f401ec9fc47aec4439605606e679 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/ILSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset.sol	
48c8861c56027721efd5452c9994bf9805d0a24dcf33ea87817ec60ec5e87b50	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8Constants.sol
61b55a9434d232c08d73167ba6c4bf8f78562deee33b1ad6f5de657535ecc7c8	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8Errors.sol
adc5af3b291c1dcca385869ca316cbc810bc4f1686171288f198c259f1e9a1f8 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset.sol	
086116de814fcea7206e19d59ba8a7cf939f976b86d7324770a4f27a22d692d6 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetCore.sol	
02546c7be5e2b5ab723ca3dcdd65a75f0a01d2b9cca867bfafe534409f93cf0c ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetInit.sol	
23fb0ac0645352401018fe154a010a3a93f8cd6299d1b310727b329e718712e0 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAssetInitAbstract.sol	
c846cde9cfb5a5a158b6d4ab92bccf91050d49be5c03b6f96d9da1915fe0386a	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/ILSP8Mintable.sol
386b8b0ca4d1aec7d41b8516d7c6f3d433b0e9c2af2ed484fb9c1f087325da97 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/LSP8CompatibleERC721Mintable.sol	
1d34738a5c9e4f1db876c803bc48d075796e3d935034e19513c8fd13b0bcf648 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/LSP8CompatibleERC721MintableInit.sol	
4dbecce3d569276167c531cac131e08204f52bcdcd22498571e060a1d43d41058 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/LSP8CompatibleERC721MintableInitAbstract.sol	
bf8853c23a0577ff737d9d88cf3227d23cd97166e64aa89b648f9afaf0fd0856	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/LSP8Mintable.sol
8d1bdef15ce86b2aaaae350f7484a3e8cff632dd8d6c463fb575cf782aa4ab0fc	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/LSP8MintableInit.sol
54ea26e8f7098b20812e6445e61400fa9fdfb0eede14e53ab5e5501d1c1d59bf ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/presets/LSP8MintableInitAbstract.sol	
5729208487154911212919aec0b03d9b07e385575026725763ad252c813b74b2 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/ILSP8CappedSupply.sol	
97571c7430612df9a2d07145eaf627420f28161e3bd0a5479b37d56c3c6d0544 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/ILSP8CompatibleERC721.sol	
1e869bf90bdc5d84e74c2d45fb405c46c2bba48cf4c3b3d5d329a7b8d47f4462	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/ILSP8Enumerable.sol
5a4bc7805b1cae9139a42233820f40d3a1a0ee64b9e55eeacd07d5e021156046	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CappedSupply.sol
b61bffdf32f4c45af95c6f8d81647dbf0eae37623a7ee3b1a5417e0d1ab409f82 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CappedSupplyCore.sol	
f87e136cb060a2a6b35c1e4f7ddd7a5853cb6807865067f104806716b12a6a61 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CappedSupplyInitAbstract.sol	
649b496636e2d36cf113c259765cb48111e2fb401e145079938f4058fc8c9c9c ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CompatibleConstants.sol	
5b50295791d71d114cffaf719d514ad614f2e84264154aa9f68319267982ff0b ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CompatibleERC721.sol	
2bd9467b2c0c78d85f0aea0094fc3c4080dcffd066d416ee819d95122e0c4207 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CompatibleERC721Core.sol	
ed26a60d981293721c3dc7feab45b747b54ee6e9a02f680f76e8301f97d00239 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CompatibleERC721InitAbstract.sol	
bac342a9b570f5dfeef35ec30d920e8221cc3456b3a7c6957cd34997553f20b8	./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8Enumerable.sol
6176723391a567ce05d4a1a60af3e5ce1d8a3b7c4c14976d1fba93dc50904382 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8EnumerableCore.sol	
2fadfbef3bb1287a77fe8a8b205e63ce29bdd4559e6213c9d230fbfd56a7c55 ./contracts/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8EnumerableInitAbstract.sol	
4dea698aee81ca2f1df30f2f91a4ff6ffd646fad895837ae012cbe657e74bb47	./contracts/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/ILSP7DigitalAsset.sol
b2397b4456c8b4964d1dac632544dc4f4b5b3ee71506fb5a1b57a03cb15e696c	./contracts/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7Constants.sol
7b970e867d11037b64081be9916e3ec7aea04cac473312c042199df9ee91f7ac	./contracts/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAsset.sol
5b04742938621d445a50698a1b5ab23dd5533bba98dfcb75c6467901cf2dbc25	./contracts/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAssetCore.sol
95894bd41ae7bd50b356f0c55f2445e85de17c2bfda02fd614bfcc4240fe56df	./contracts/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAssetInit.sol



0295af381757e1a4d4d5235bf6af06736a2d81867ecb43a371335215b575af9b ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAssetInitAbstract.sol

9b7c36e9c193761cf962e55aae18b99e7ed6c2b1ef70a581603ed581cf81778d ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7Errors.sol

ea0618aa6448b5b6e3def903fcc1da7a5973f9db1bbb463f5808dbc7c6305c76 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/ILSP7Mintable.sol

944afa753160e7971df156590ffa2b5307e15f24e6688814c9e0d313ed711487 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/LSP7CompatibleERC20Mintable.sol

09631b14f11bea9c498a7ba9031932bd5a17999ecc3887642c07481ee0450fdc ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInit.sol

eff45b13d7adafd71264ef1c0ff11cc68422d82b909b5879fe0393db312b040c  
./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/LSP7CompatibleERC20MintableInitAbstract.sol

86a505365be7f79b289005e24a0121b44e25db87ebe9f09a4f74874b18af7ad4 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/LSP7Mintable.sol

bbc88a063584b3dac2ca4c6085f9c15c9af1e55b14dcfb3364213bd97c280948 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/LSP7MintableInit.sol

2d6f6ebb18a3a42e1ea940993892b07f708d23288c5c65a01ef1a347add38f79 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/presets/LSP7MintableInitAbstract.sol

0f398b817f1aa2f92419694e66aad333b4b5af06937bc6715c62530e5636d1e0 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/ILSP7CappedSupply.sol

fbd2a3f4ee8201f704c98c249d00de3a724ff27a66613f525804a437b141d55e ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/ILSP7CompatibleERC20.sol

32338e07234c7db76db5812aaa0218b7c94e99f2b66a503774662da46b792c56 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CappedSupply.sol

7cd4347e99b8fc77de9626d427f36572db1ed5e77cef5ead0e894568c4d7e849 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CappedSupplyCore.sol

d5c6d2fc4f2665befc634476a899425730ecd86856d78e79cba801c60d32aa9 ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CappedSupplyInitAbstract.sol

b58ed962893522bffd8df5d621557ad2ac989e4b11d7fa0902578ea4e3d82ed ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CompatibleERC20.sol

207aff1685af76dbe4099568b2fa061c69216971020d83423dccc2a3f33084ac ./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CompatibleERC20Core.sol

5f1bf9371f209b3bb489554224d19322ccf0c5d45aa5c9356676e2b7ab4139f5  
./contracts/lsp/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CompatibleERC20InitAbstract.sol

72ea4854b2aa3c6ce8269cd4f5668dc4430e62d39b8ac330de9e813c593cc922 ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/ILSP6KeyManager.sol

0dcf6e214d96f2dc82bc0fa4b3f6d8b3b7a9d131ffe78d63134c28810a37a050 ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6Constants.sol

425eb1ef9e8d9c281c68f35a76dcacf079643a32b5db75def31d09c15ef062cc0 ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6Errors.sol

fc94ba2b868b00edc2907c24696c88737b4ddad120ca60ddd49d3cd705f45171 ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManager.sol

672a75e94e30a451500af4afcac92c3596ce5a7713c5e64d2b9801a5ab7eab26 ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerCore.sol

2f1945e81d8a4c46ca1d2d33243cd564fdcfc05032725e82dde81846c9f52c25 ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerInit.sol

da8bbc4052756858c80d6162770a17a0c03f40f3a73688954643ad32e85b4c1c ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManagerInitAbstract.sol

c3f22f60359ea2c24d1a0bcf49d7f2efac01cc74476dfb07206428df680a2f14 ./contracts/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6Utils.sol

f85c3244b36ae76e38a9cb62108368414bb11fade710a6a938accb47562d800d ./contracts/lsp/LSP5ReceivedAssets/LSP5Constants.sol

c72f5bfc00936a5dabc9686c7c792c7a5b1fbe555681c0d4a2e65e6c1c460ac ./contracts/lsp/LSP5ReceivedAssets/LSP5Utils.sol

47645357e64d0dbfed6dcd999ffd2b66beb9bc0f043a591ba64fac9db905a35d ./contracts/lsp/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/ILSP4Compatibility.sol

964508657a9a87969ac8d8cdf6a5b62750306fc751cfc8c8ef16cb66bc964455 ./contracts/lsp/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4Compatibility.sol

df1493a7746eaa2c7d28fa69a42fe628adc99d79aa977a2ca502eef73e6ce04c ./contracts/lsp/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4Constants.sol

45734da9ed85f60659fdc967b6ffff74a347bee8806b046dd7a61ef170f634e6e ./contracts/lsp/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata.sol

07e0547b22a99f75b1690d946ccfb75ae9c4265d98d7cc5d9b9d2a4caed848b3  
./contracts/lsp/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadataInitAbstract.sol

0f6500778cb5bb9918bc260463fe6d492026d4bd47d96b72f88b9a0a950081bf ./contracts/lsp/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4Errors.sol

08f9bc0a4a67e117d0773f07bec8dd930c0364a0ab723abec2e0c6cfa7b51cc6 ./contracts/lsp/LSP3UniversalProfile/LSP3Constants.sol

a684c6e799f8f5aaccdd63136a246d197bd95c52be436fa84b42c2f1ad1e47940 ./contracts/lsp/LSP2ERC725YJSSONSchema/LSP2Errors.sol

4d40f91b2aa6d601960eab07fad2b462cf113ae38b4f060a8e45824af3efd21e ./contracts/lsp/LSP2ERC725YJSSONSchema/LSP2Utils.sol

832db54ceb8a63e152ffb65cbd169b7f5b63d2fd99e4ce8460aad96f52290b0 ./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/ILSP1UniversalReceiver.sol

f0c658b4b614ccf255e10cde2be231fe28ccafd3f93c17abb8b1f78351293fb8 ./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/ILSP1UniversalReceiverDelegate.sol

18b480a767d26e9d5f865f3b281e7d8568392fae90e2b52fb82bf9517240c6c4 ./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1Constants.sol

344523566a854db34b571e98b1afb989c613f3644da5affd620619f6f4399c2d ./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1Utils.sol

c3ea3d2db58ae63d04340a10c4a0e05f6ff51e124a76c8e3cb5212c697f2541a  
./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault.sol

944b568e584a5630c7235d91c2014cc808cfc51fd8bde36517eb29390fb00cdd  
./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault/Handling/TokenHandling.sol

a1b7e3e158251eeb472f6745fa0788c49c3f9b985f28925c963c89522b227841  
./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP.sol

4ff5562c2ec9e2cab14f5c1e7f4fc2d564e2e55ce9a1efa4d19c4e0177a10982  
./contracts/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP/Handling/TokenAndVaultHandling.sol

dfd8db1f9275efef3c3ab70a79db7f20253655ea4e95f6aac96a3a5fefb63661 ./contracts/lsp/LSP10ReceivedVaults/LSP10Constants.sol

43428032cf4e531a1996544c3492770750c3318a33a910380e7f15b051df0913 ./contracts/lsp/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0Constants.sol

4737600fb721826498a196dd2ac2cd64e2c049647c1b6d94776785dfbe6ebe2c ./contracts/lsp/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0ERC725Account.sol

e0dd1d6574737a989486ff76f9753faf453fe73237fd703dba252b8378388614 ./contracts/lsp/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0ERC725AccountCore.sol

1355ddf00c2a2274a01b7c88f49516fff2373646dcc0f6982f67cf961df92b1de ./contracts/lsp/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0ERC725AccountInit.sol

330718003e2f78216e50ea7b7c43df23e669c8e3b8c35d2c75293b3d29726def ./contracts/lsp/LSP0ERC725Account/LSP0ERC725AccountInitAbstract.sol

36515c652ade841e428e773eb458c5844640af88896cb9b4d4be50962ba651d9 ./contracts/lsp/Legacy/UniversalReceiverAddressStore.sol

989c7f94ac472c55cd0e9ff7260e7fa99559d8dc9168f3fb659c621a4b9599b0 ./contracts/lsp/Legacy/Registries/AddressRegistry.sol

84ba2368b288e4e66615a95c8b519108bf3a00da68f873bc8d5ada14c9b10316 ./contracts/lsp/Legacy/Registries/AddressRegistryRequiresERC725.sol



6742a7797bc37f7340d4a44f8e34bcb5573a5908f0976de07b65b05cb03264fa ./contracts/lsps/Factories/Create2Factory.sol

d7314aa55b5d5797f64bef6ace230d62d210d29e8131ec5f481af12f5d97420b ./contracts/lsps/Factories/UniversalFactory.sol

9e9b0da97a355b50d5bbc4c2f24c317bfd7204a1793ca207db1d80a8b75cada8 ./contracts/lsps/Custom/ClaimOwnership.sol

db043af168308bfaf9eccfc373c3609a98c3bb2157c74f237e7e37bf46a26746 ./contracts/lsps/Custom/ERC165Checker.sol

afbdb4915fe30fd8db64e353f060ebe13e9e47cdf055569df44a459a0e8d5f2a ./contracts/lsps/Custom/IClaimOwnership.sol

fc3bb4bbfffc88acb648fe6dbd1dc4c21f38af7725bd3482e535f58106480a3dec ./contracts/erc725/constants.sol

e6f1513b7bee45696c16c297eb02c5d6c0e7862fe9308977aee4130622e5f670 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725.sol

07019830df3ad4f9d8ae56089b048b15febbc913d6e8c1be3a0dadf83242800f ./contracts/erc725/ERC725Init.sol

23e2bed0574a91e9b170d5ab456045d6fac7d1322a0703a9e049e8921b5d4497 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725InitAbstract.sol

fdf11fda029d99e835db919bb854dd0840143390d022c231f6156c8f76300321 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725X.sol

e465083820795761e93ce212c7a9184ce826ea412c8038ebe35868ae232ef993 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725XCore.sol

95f3f58ef9e33f2ce45050768cc7eff00f27cb8a84ff65fc73a568ffea3e1129 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725XInit.sol

9d87f0b754fe420629beb1b12823e76696733e46d3391757e9e5ad242c805a87 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725XInitAbstract.sol

68c77a66b03b9bbef3b18036908a25be8a6cbab12289d60066afe3b10eec5825 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725Y.sol

ea4180a6a773af7b7b5f30f7feaabc78bdc23a3d893b0a97124417025892883c ./contracts/erc725/ERC725YCore.sol

715abca6d32d2f52f43ad95071981944402d1fcff3ea6d576043daac0b154479 ./contracts/erc725/ERC725YInit.sol

e85b04661aaf88ca9fd28b2e7c3d2bafdaa893628066133d26b2462b7817670e ./contracts/erc725/ERC725YInitAbstract.sol

c427249e83b8cb5e5a83cb61dd3ac7c571dc44177fd5d002ef45944156abc957 ./contracts/erc725/interfaces/IERC725X.sol

c133130c38d17a455938c68b2a25404e1a69150c2b8d99677f7890680f31c53e ./contracts/erc725/interfaces/IERC725Y.sol

eaea6a07652b111a2002bed996565e43f25af595b008b5de2588e9ebc287f207 ./contracts/erc725/custom/OwnableUnset.sol

Tests

e59d223f899594d5e3f924570161f594cd171543317f9e517e12ea7753dd2db3 ./tests/lsps/ClaimOwnership.behaviour.ts

46c3d3ecacae270e07e77b5fffd4d1f79b4f61d04ff07944bcc1ba8ddddd24f7da ./tests/lsps/UniversalProfile.behaviour.ts

414e9009c74130844023b750b3c2e890908b473ea64d10f17fb11bae5d25a825 ./tests/lsps/UniversalProfile.test.ts

2541384b08fc48327ebf9423373312a4c13df1cf866fd9c8ec07324f753cff5c ./tests/lsps/utils/context.ts

80175446f7a7cd26ef47c45d1e5be0f88adcc3ea25b8b1ab2a0a69fd46dbcc6f ./tests/lsps/utils/deploy.ts

371ca6078fb59e9e89d109a29f7c9d3a27a9db1728aed99298d5c9f8ce73b53a ./tests/lsps/utils/errors.ts

4391b35a8fd4dceb2ec2055d002f9e2f02aa951878021971b7e0ec6acccb13b1 ./tests/lsps/utils/fixtures.ts

3372a900edc08834288627c445cd83634ddbe0ffcf3a4ca78bfd99768ca64160 ./tests/lsps/utils/helpers.ts

baf7d1f167a13794f29ca35acb3e30158e3da6a1aae05a2abee6eb7dcec7a313 ./tests/lsps/utils/tokens.ts

dccbff92d26c28e15386fbd783f6a782a889c3b6a9e56a8994074ce694be5627 ./tests/lsps/LSP9Vault/LSP9Vault.behaviour.ts

d21f843a0b11fa6de466979c7f71bc24046092fe65a2f692ca1c55cdc126d1b7 ./tests/lsps/LSP9Vault/LSP9Vault.test.ts

afe590575ec035608fef9e8d76e07c4efc5c84d4e038a9c0c961944d9b4447bf  
./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset.behaviour.ts

287d8ee89ffeb8155189131a6018a6fa67a1c9d356e5e7cf0a646e96652d38d4  
./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset.test.ts

4ad83deb05c6c15f0d92d9597f3590a44e5eded672989a037bdbcd2426ca4537  
./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CappedSupply.behaviour.ts

25b0d3352314c9d50ca6208d63126039c6ea74078c7a32a5e7a99a88e873b798 ./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CappedSupply.test.ts

2d0930182296bf59c024b6bcc6dc8e9af375c64bcb814e325057364f2c396ad0  
./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CompatibleERC721.behaviour.ts

19b0c407e9ab4810c3dfac83dc73eb4cb472f6d9b3395b067d8f21e67c29ed45  
./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8CompatibleERC721.test.ts

e8d718eb5f797f17f9c330f3e92e9cc035324f9b433f925fafdd509b70fb790e  
./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8Enumerable.behaviour.ts

6542731705328ec6fa525ba42d09892d9b98185d8787988550953d4af945af06 ./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8Enumerable.test.ts

77f109aa7f64c1b41b7ec52dca46113e991777871772568f94f6dc62dfea66ba  
./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8Mintable.behaviour.ts

a4f6332da68c8be339bdc4d0cc4708867f889ec1b2a715ed0f660419277799aa ./tests/lsps/LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset/extensions/LSP8Mintable.test.ts

875b56b44d68ee578d77b19c3b1acb1cafc24c09be246e9caf123cf6217c2e2c ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAsset.behaviour.ts

a56579a00e19552cd3b0d6cd57a45050bb752716a1915343e57cdda54c880a28 ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/LSP7DigitalAsset.test.ts

e3eade8d3b20fef5ea420897578f8a672d16ce9254acc85a6c11e6b0d9b0b130 ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CappedSupply.behaviour.ts

41cca74924091be0a17f5afdb18945859b6a1e740c7cc07b61365b9111ad95dc ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CappedSupply.test.ts

d620c836e69c63150e4b439f15d5fdc9fc8866062a07cf66afb06758b8ebd2e1 ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CompatibleERC20.behaviour.ts

e363004a8a1fe8551200f3875a9683cf4e75fa4a07b919da249b4b1cdf61f64 ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7CompatibleERC20.test.ts

6540d40469b51cc0b42a78a38d2d3a956f31fdb45619d96fa2b359f8d4cffb6a ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7Mintable.behaviour.ts

4b0a9403df5c579805e9b39a284e6aa9dd3636ede14d72c7313dc9bca1b58ce3 ./tests/lsps/LSP7DigitalAsset/extensions/LSP7Mintable.test.ts

419ce2d1046d2059af30fc93945ee26654403204fab3e8f0a08cf6bcd addedd8d93 ./tests/lsps/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManager.behaviour.ts

ac286c9508d4e2921b7875f95d0731feb170d560a27654ee7a9b51364ac9679 ./tests/lsps/LSP6KeyManager/LSP6KeyManager.test.ts



81b9a195b1b7019f0bfd81fe26a490f1bd6bf56e171c5dde30b6bd7ecb5bb307 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/AllowedAddresses.test.ts

d654af1c5b4e3161ba87466cc3fd73342942597cea5940b8d57b5035d2122c0d ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/AllowedERC725YKeys.test.ts

b778648bfe8f30f36b561dabb682a174737b41e74f4fa857cb34c9ae7cddb448 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/AllowedFunctions.test.ts

b96ef6a4ad7e1ffaa7260cef865fce26dfc23973530b14685f0667dc7aa818ec ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/AllowedStandards.test.ts

947847e4bde5f7c06b226685257a7d5b1c52a4fbcf5c4a054093943f64882e30 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/index.ts

0702c5d640ee19a4f76b86de1d3ffb10806c5fbd4934d6c6b55427130b6358e0 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/MultiChannelNonce.test.ts

a289bb0562c032cf7692b66c6a63ee2442e885e3675f5be3a420bf6b960ed5b4 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/OtherScenarios.test.ts

97e16446b8a2daec513d54136c79ce001d67649b90ec513077fd86c34f2bde29 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionCall.test.ts

c7e58cabe37d529ac5f186c59677f9d43b6cf6194f89a26df9f7858c201d18a9 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionChangeAddPermissions.test.ts

ef7a5c77e2bc13246fa21daa7f26b52a2322f4541eab8df25f6040ddaa99c09c ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionChangeOwner.test.ts

11f125c4025e6bfb973c08af3454952a5783b1a96cdc4136e101afb70ee4f5f0 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionDelegateCall.test.ts

2b730b6d332add17809085e459b3d87e77c7102ab928a9767f190f469f2bc04b ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionDeploy.test.ts

9e38d5376c213544c414abd0f7e5cf6128b857ad06bad2733d8dee18b82351a5 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionSetData.test.ts

4355ee57e566eeb1b189affae48d16f77a296fb5a41a13a049afbc289906d072 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionSign.test.ts

e54dbe48767e133b9002174c5f301024487e4ce6e19d0da57e4f5fa26338fbe6 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionStaticCall.test.ts

3028bbfea3df0bc520e9a975f94c59b6d744a64a5b87ec4e7eaeedf5ba3cc55c ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/PermissionTransferValue.test.ts

673466dcf409138fa4312adba933b1caf05556d0f12d86ff23fd6b10cdac5e92 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/tests/Security.test.ts

6cb2b105258ec8328bff39bf41764a79491337f94d561b3078340a15830b35cc ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/internals/AllowedAddresses.internal.ts

4ccf2efd9f0c3b13c1255447edbef926d2e4473274ccda70a0049310a6f22044 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/internals/AllowedERC725YKeys.internal.ts

d8fc02e2c11cbf3c8001facb655bdf8e25c04934860ef2e8f13918a4cd108b1e ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/internals/AllowedFunctions.internal.ts

8434e2fcccc1af860e2a8588eace5bab67f1e2335e23d28da4df6c86dc58ab537 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/internals/index.ts

964b80755d94e81e10cb37df0cf4f28588d829ec580ce9a241bf15f5f7f73356 ./tests/lsp/LSP6KeyManager/internals/ReadPermissions.internal.ts

16293162529c7447f1436a7883a998aa70d611dc0698f87c1a3c52a50fb61e02 ./tests/lsp/LSP4DigitalAssetMetadata/LSP4Compatibility.test.ts

f212611c79c89a0e6a92310be41506bd005e1463685e9a051bfb90bff30fecad ./tests/lsp/LSP2ERC725YJSONSchema/LSP2UtilsLibrary.test.ts

75b29b64aa7ec2d9f7325d76c1b8eced0b909615b12288e12b996bb6c6ef445d ./tests/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiver.behaviour.ts

d7fe39dbfbeeef39e18bbd881abde57e5b4a3d3b67f9fbd859434cb4e1fe4c5c  
./tests/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP.behaviour.ts

83acb5b1ee677d694281cad215ab4ed97e826901b72f39e9e6e946245458a62c ./tests/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP.test.ts

96fe30e39185c333aa822836506babe93dcbba120d24e823eb1eec7184996fc  
./tests/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault.behaviour.ts

f01cb62c5fd4be89f369eb6f6f199b2d7fece154c5eb64f5689da85d4ebe450b ./tests/lsp/LSP1UniversalReceiver/LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateVault.test.ts

b41d5b18b61bc2de0241ff3a2b206de71fad6a747d211c0ef0fcf6b44a1eb1ec ./tests/lsp/Helpers/AddressRegistry.test.ts

ed01166a889d02eca2c8b9b3427dd2b81a99c0449ffc57a0caa5e7baf17082b5 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/ERC165CheckerCustom.test.ts

39f3c56cc08dc8892d423d17c6c3c07adf1cedda6e77dc9163cf47f81a772079 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/ERC165CheckerCustomTest.sol

073e3707404aafcc65011f7e4d05f607061411dad9e5adf1166e9f20a747471d ./tests/lsp/Helpers/ERC165Interfaces.sol

37b16f7eeb35b2e0ab201229b95f759ea6681bb75360aac1ce2315c3ddbba5c3 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/ERC165Interfaces.test.ts

70235360bc2e25d7ba63a9efba8542bd6a9827bb9fde115bb27308da496a3a76 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Executor.sol

b72a48ed86ea00680d7c1378d909f2efcc8023aeb5ec86eadbd4e2c5a7659c52 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/FallbackContract.sol

1b24bfd844adeca499aa5024d640cb65ef9ffb9af298e102995438e027bcc052 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/ImplementationTester.sol

54b6ea417108dcd6518dc0b9965ca0c24b81158066df67ed29570cd8bf3002f4 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/KeyManagerExecutionCosts.test.ts

61799f50f8ab35213c00a461d2ddb44bd94c103b85ad9004c68ea06fe036602d ./tests/lsp/Helpers/LSP2UtilsLibraryTester.sol

b6f89ba973dbc11361a20c634bb4a7ea0b4edb211952c824ce8f897b857f5996 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/NFTStorage.sol

e2541495334c72325d1ecbe34aa2a3a88388475477219d292093acc13a888aba ./tests/lsp/Helpers/NFTStorage.test.ts

f0edc004c5c9244f53ab62991926100998e8a05335f51ef263749e9dbda1f78 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/PayableContract.sol

cf8a77e9b37a2eea409c8746b629eb4cff727f328bb817e44657e2f632c58e56 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/SignatureValidatorContract.sol

5b2f6d9faf02b36e0a02e54762ad3fc6068835b17ec015c92eeae11dc3ce0e0e ./tests/lsp/Helpers/TargetContract.sol

aea7bff36d1744606ffc773d5aa6b5887241aeec310141f0f5805e3d37ca1588  
./tests/lsp/Helpers/UniversalReceivers/UniversalReceiverDelegateTokenReentrant.sol

966278931cc283b335cfbe86f7d1f93cd11ebf265c5e190379c2dd6f82249f34  
./tests/lsp/Helpers/UniversalReceivers/UniversalReceiverDelegateVaultSetter.sol

f5962830d2f0fb4a967537e6996f613d9f1e9f8ac53a40548193b6db1a6433f7 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/UniversalReceivers/UniversalReceiverTester.sol

1ed20dff4325c7079f7c8846c7b9074216dc8d91ef2a5ad8cf3751542cbf072f ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/IERC223.sol

94229c3743d208e01eedf787399874d574b4f6c36a6f3c0125452617b0adf272 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP4CompatibilityTester.sol

fc948a38fb5eac0d35de82f15a31f186a2d95eb868b38f708ad20b695e6b6a74 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP7CappedSupplyInitTester.sol

01b385b6e80ec869febe1d7ea89ca7299e19540fde35974ca83b7d11e044f2ac ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP7CappedSupplyTester.sol

b09e31f2cd6674116cfa9a3fe72876eb204e923f9a6914a0142b545e57e3b870 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP7CompatibleERC20InitTester.sol

df493c4ca9a03771de4491ad09e410d47da87eadd4d8472dd37ac5da72eaf61a ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP7CompatibleERC20Tester.sol

c528e535e880ccfde0316c5a133610091e1a45997f86b2ba8effebed89ebf296 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP7InitTester.sol

b6b84135ef17a5a90e792d93c3fc4d29e5bfe4dbf708db58df9b7177af4c5325 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP7Tester.sol



960472b2eb22ac2252884567527177cb698857a1baf497686a9f0a6310aac133 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8CappedSupplyInitTester.sol

d838eca130c62cecb97da28d84fdc05ae549a3fa6f0c81d83ffb0cc772a163ec ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8CappedSupplyTester.sol

76f28959866b2d763b57e12fe6f40e2b67983ebc2adc6e98be725968964fdbc1 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8CompatibleERC721Tester.sol

9e55ada2a136b9070229cf6f37bacea864f8f1ef84011c929edcdf701ed513a4 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8CompatibleERC721TesterInit.sol

cfe24553e931e42be69bedf610151b215d659f6966338b5e04363565600532d9 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8EnumerableInitTester.sol

b3f171f3b3e048f1be9de8c644132352c2b55c9d1eecf446cf3700922da9aa90 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8EnumerableTester.sol

b02c46a56454e518a1ff6f0b89b8b76b0eb8484289b87547f95715afec9b76ac ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8InitTester.sol

70dfc7409299da4d9c3f1236393dcb04491f1984d5269eccb26ec258582d919f ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/LSP8Tester.sol

5fbbc3757128d5d4660e25a1a379c89d76ea0b5103dfd132eff6dae04fda506a ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/TokenReceiverWithLSP1.sol

738385d014e2f6672105fe9ed39cc4a127d34e5bcb02bef4798f74e37636789d ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Tokens/TokenReceiverWithoutLSP1.sol

b517c272bc23e2959939c21fce09cc123f1df8a6286630df9ef38d76963d6730 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/Security/Reentrancy.sol

0877c56750c9ddefec6eca213a25ed99a37ecf30fafddc9a772794b69ae57a38 ./tests/lsp/Helpers/KeyManager/ERC725YDelegateCall.sol

73489409f7a3d3931458ad42d8146207d8fb5c3b5fdda2d8da1be425ce840abe ./tests/lsp/Helpers/KeyManager/KeyManagerInternalsTester.sol

e8c2ce687db96e61b3ef02d4830fa853926d888cf529f0353bfba7be5a9d65ba ./tests/lsp/Helpers/KeyManager/TargetPayableContract.sol

81418a91e27217348dfb4316843fc18d473c654b3f0800679ee963c027290ab2 ./tests/lsp/Factories/UniversalFactory.test.ts

de3942566099210f68f7c060a5950013f2dfb74908ec7a06b325a815f6798929 ./tests/erc725/ERC165InterfaceId.test.ts

b733d52b7cbcdf871ca4559b8602bb90a8a8aaec26e04579d0058b588ee1567 ./tests/erc725/ERC725.test.ts

6a55e7774a304919562e05b8b2cb982646a776b6fb21fb6b9a24ba9213c169b8 ./tests/erc725/ERC725X.behaviour.ts

cc98891bd88adfbad82e6e410b61d239c016842cc10c4e67b573fe20e802c1f ./tests/erc725/ERC725X.test.ts

a1d1107df62defc7b147493c7fa32cc6299013d6906955b84341d0451e625207 ./tests/erc725/ERC725Y.behaviour.ts

0e3df5a60068a4e75a73d69283ae8dbb580066fc1d43acb080cfc9a7aec322a1 ./tests/erc725/ERC725Y.test.ts

249132c1d431b7355d4232220e852f2118e0fc784eeddb135aeb57b9f74c3d46 ./tests/erc725/fixtures.ts

88eed2f8ce41ac097d5a3b107d91b7604d3470d6a6e80df8cba760468e7646eb ./tests/erc725/helpers/Contract.sol

e71bb1e3eddefc6a42ce304dbfbaca4afdd13c73df52049150c5dfe5ad2ac1ad ./tests/erc725/helpers/Counter.sol

c6977cee193ecef9c9202041f9cdcb33190910b569f7548ec3a0f8b595358a98b ./tests/erc725/helpers/CustomRevertTest.sol

51c4231a6269fda7b3a83af733f36685203632e07373a5666dfe7ed5fd2af8b2 ./tests/erc725/helpers/DelegateTest.sol

13d837339f4993da5ae06976263f4fdefb1754f96b8961036ab31e8adeaf7404 ./tests/erc725/helpers/ERC165InterfaceIDs.sol

aa9fd62ca8a2db999021c2410d33ae3f9ea18d8cc8e69cb3bf20b48499fef93b ./tests/erc725/helpers/ERC725XPayableTester.sol

4ca7af64441a7a4510bd05282234e6054a6360d4911272dce3124dd27db5bf05 ./tests/erc725/helpers/ERC725YReader.sol

e9b5ec73ef907919ac93c56efc34f68c291f145dd4cd3d89816b1708fe16ac86 ./tests/erc725/helpers/ERC725YWriter.sol

8f77534878b7659da6a2f912d8e539cec3a2c12588ff45e60c38c560c4ebc1c4 ./tests/erc725/helpers/NonPayableFallbackContract.sol

c61220abde4459f6a8673788dd24f178e718d75dc28366597df0743dc7689295 ./tests/erc725/helpers/NoReceive.sol

1ac1ab2bd686257ac1e890ac56b37072fd2768b08e229710cc33e40be8e2120e ./tests/erc725/helpers/PayableFallbackContract.sol

e95f9ec8343731813ab01275e517b9015be65b77d62e9e3822a0909af419a777 ./tests/erc725/helpers/Reader.sol

aa3a6e799c10c985743b4b1640722ecc6fc70612363f2e68c016c53653dec056 ./tests/erc725/helpers/ReceiveTester.sol

f6bc0b3eae59a953a6a10905d5dd393750ce5b7b7711fb33515b5355795b122f ./tests/erc725/helpers/Return.sol

2277b6b4599b3326cbb27c1a2fe50bd72981e7601e478f9b9824a3c7b04fad5 ./tests/erc725/helpers/selfdestruct.sol

460f7bcb7f1b744d6b9fb1860516aba16136bed316d0f0da243d1192a0ac89e5 ./tests/erc725/helpers/WithConstructorPayable.sol

ad7221a598c7015c17de24bcb6368b201810bcb241c10c35ceee4e895fdbb768 ./tests/erc725/helpers/WithConstructorWithArgs.sol

83d90e317bc037e92a4c63a9a03fa5cb8e6adc951ccccf25b996d40ffca2969cf ./tests/erc725/helpers/WithConstructorWithoutArgs.sol

d1e4a8da541fece1f742dbfbb4eb9f0f7d1a2faad69346d22844baafa9651aa4 ./tests/erc725/helpers/WithoutConstructor.sol

## Changelog

- 2022-08-10 - Initial report
- 2022-09-08 - Final report



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Quantstamp is a Y Combinator-backed company that helps to secure blockchain platforms at scale using computer-aided reasoning tools, with a mission to help boost the adoption of this exponentially growing technology.

With over 1000 Google scholar citations and numerous published papers, Quantstamp's team has decades of combined experience in formal verification, static analysis, and software verification. Quantstamp has also developed a protocol to help smart contract developers and projects worldwide to perform cost-effective smart contract security scans.

To date, Quantstamp has protected \$5B in digital asset risk from hackers and assisted dozens of blockchain projects globally through its white glove security assessment services. As an evangelist of the blockchain ecosystem, Quantstamp assists core infrastructure projects and leading community initiatives such as the Ethereum Community Fund to expedite the adoption of blockchain technology.

Quantstamp's collaborations with leading academic institutions such as the National University of Singapore and MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) reflect our commitment to research, development, and enabling world-class blockchain security.

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