

Legion

Smart Contract Security Assessment

Version 2.0

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1. Introduction

1.1 About Zenith

Zenith is an offering by Code4rena that provides consultative audits from the very best security researchers in the space. We focus on crafting a tailored security team specifically for the needs of your codebase.

Learn more about us at <https://code4rena.com/zenith>.

1.2 Disclaimer

This report reflects an analysis conducted within a defined scope and time frame, based on provided materials and documentation. It does not encompass all possible vulnerabilities and should not be considered exhaustive.

The review and accompanying report are presented on an "as-is" and "as-available" basis, without any express or implied warranties.

Furthermore, this report neither endorses any specific project or team nor assures the complete security of the project.

1.3 Risk Classification

SEVERITY LEVEL	IMPACT: HIGH	IMPACT: MEDIUM	IMPACT: LOW
Likelihood: High	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: Medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: Low	Medium	Low	Low

2. Executive Summary

2.1 About Legion

We're changing the way the world communicates online The goal of Legion is to create a network where anyone can freely chat and socialize without compromising their privacy, using the hashgraph consensus.

2.2 Scope

Repository	Legion-Team/evm-contracts
Commit Hash	c020bd1b84faab99d1b8738b48d1e253e4557671
Mitigation Hash	2d7514e3a2f5f5b0823b9d68662f136cf1b45b37

2.3 Audit Timeline

DATE	EVENT
Sep 10, 2024	Audit start
Sep 17, 2024	Audit end
Nov 28, 2024	Report published

2.4 Issues Found

SEVERITY	COUNT
Critical Risk	0
High Risk	4
Medium Risk	2
Low Risk	1
Informational	2
Total Issues	9

3. Findings Summary

ID	DESCRIPTION	STATUS
H-1	withdrawRaisedCapital() the project can malicious withdrawals	Resolved

H-2	when cachedTokenAllocationBps decreases , investors can maliciously use the old cachedTokenAllocationBps before refund	Resolved
H-3	withdrawCapital() can be called multiple times by the project to withdraw ExcessCapital	Resolved
H-4	Incorrect formula used for totalCapitalRaised calculation in publishSaleResults function	Resolved
M-1	withdrawCapitalIfSaleIsCanceled() Investors who have already settled can still refund	Resolved
M-2	Legion signature can be reused	Resolved
L-1	Impossible to update Legion addresses when the sale is initialized	Resolved
I-1	ECIES#isValid() Validity check is not complete	Resolved
I-2	Misplaced values in saleConfiguration() function	Resolved

4. Findings

4.1 High Risk

A total of 4 high risk findings were identified.

[H-1] `withdrawRaisedCapital()` the project can malicious withdrawals

Severity: High

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionPreLiquidSale.sol#L391](#)

Description:

The project can uses `withdrawRaisedCapital()` to take away `RaisedCapital`.

```
function withdrawRaisedCapital(address[] calldata investors) external
onlyProject returns (uint256 amount) {
    /// Verify that the sale is not canceled
    _verifySaleNotCanceled();

    /// Loop through the investors positions
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < investors.length; ++i) {
        /// Verify that the refund period is over for the specified
position
        _verifyRefundPeriodIsOver(investors[i]);

        /// Verify that the investor has actually invested capital
        _verifyCanWithdrawInvestorPosition(investors[i]);

        /// Load the investor position
        InvestorPosition storage position =
investorPositions[investors[i]];

        /// Mark the amount of capital withdrawn
@> position.withdrawnCapital += position.investedCapital;

        /// Increment the total amount to be withdrawn
        amount += position.investedCapital;
    }

    /// Account for the capital withdrawn
```

```

        totalCapitalWithdrawn += amount;

        /// Calculate Legion Fee
        uint256 legionFee = (legionFeeOnCapitalRaisedBps * amount) /
10000;

        /// Emit successfully CapitalWithdrawn
        emit CapitalWithdrawn(amount);

        /// Transfer the amount to the Project's address
        IERC20(bidToken).safeTransfer(msg.sender, (amount - legionFee));

        /// Transfer the Legion fee to the Legion fee receiver address
        if (legionFee != 0)
        IERC20(bidToken).safeTransfer(legionFeeReceiver, legionFee);
    }

```

The problem is that the above method uses `position.withdrawnCapital += position.investedCapital`, instead of adding the difference between the two variables.

And since the terms are modifiable, i.e. `cachedSAFTInvestAmount` can be changed, this gives the project the opportunity to withdraw in advance and malicious transfer `ExcessCapital`

Example:

1. alice's `cachedSAFTInvestAmount` = 10
2. alice call `invest(10)`
3. the project change alice's `cachedSAFTInvestAmount` = 20
4. alice call `withdrawRaisedCapital()` ***front-run `publishTgeDetails()`
 - `withdrawnCapital` = 10
5. alice `invest(10)` → `investedCapital += 10` ***front-run `publishTgeDetails()`
 - `investedCapital` = 20
6. leginon execute `publishTgeDetails()`
7. After that, the project executes `withdrawRaisedCapital(alice)` any times.
 - `withdrawnCapital += investedCapital` = 10 + 20 = 30

Recommendation: use the difference between the two variables

```

function withdrawRaisedCapital(address[] calldata investors) external
onlyProject returns (uint256 amount) {
    /// Verify that the sale is not canceled
    _verifySaleNotCanceled();

    /// Loop through the investors positions

```

```

        for (uint256 i = 0; i < investors.length; ++i) {
            /// Verify that the refund period is over for the specified
position
            _verifyRefundPeriodIsOver(investors[i]);

            /// Verify that the investor has actually invested capital
            _verifyCanWithdrawInvestorPosition(investors[i]);

            /// Load the investor position
            InvestorPosition storage position =
investorPositions[investors[i]];

            /// Mark the amount of capital withdrawn
-           position.withdrawnCapital += position.investedCapital;
+           uint256 currentAmount = position.investedCapital -
position.withdrawnCapital;
+           position.withdrawnCapital += currentAmount;
            /// Increment the total amount to be withdrawn
-           amount += position.investedCapital;
+           amount += currentAmount;
        }

```

Legion: The issue has been fixed with the following [commit](#)

Zenith: Verified

[H-2] when cachedTokenAllocationBps decreases , investors can maliciously use the old cachedTokenAllocationBps before refund

Severity: High

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionPreLiquidSale.sol#L416](#)
- [LegionPreLiquidSale.sol#L512](#)

Description:

the project can modify the terms by `updatingVestingTerms()` and `updateSAFTMerkleRoot()`.

For example, it is possible to reduce an investor's investment percentage, and after updating the terms, that investor can get back the `ExcessCapital` by `withdrawExcessCapital()`.

But currently there is no restriction on the order of `claimAskTokenAllocation()` and `withdrawExcessCapital()`.

This way, a malicious investor can execute `claimAskTokenAllocation()` first and use the larger `cachedTokenAllocationBps` to maliciously obtain more `askTokens`.

After that, execute `withdrawExcessCapital()` to retrieve the `ExcessCapital`.

Example:

1. project call `updateSAFTMerkleRoot()`
 - `cachedTokenAllocationBps[alice]= 5%`
 - `cachedSAFTInvestAmount = 500e6`
2. alice call `invest(500e6)`
3. project call `updateSAFTMerkleRoot()`
 - `cachedTokenAllocationBps[alice]= 1%` ----> `cachedTokenAllocationBps` decreases
 - `cachedSAFTInvestAmount = 100e6`
4. alice call `claimAskTokenAllocation()`
 - get `cachedTokenAllocationBps[alice]= 5%` ask token
5. alice call `withdrawExcessCapital()`
 - get back 400e6 bidToken

Recommendation:

`claimAskTokenAllocation()` add in `proof[]` and validate `saftMerkleRoot` again.

```
- function claimAskTokenAllocation() external {  
+ function claimAskTokenAllocation(bytes32[] calldata proof) external {  
    /// Verify that the sale has not been canceled  
    _verifySaleNotCanceled();  
  
    /// Verify that the investor can claim the token allocation  
    _verifyCanClaimTokenAllocation(msg.sender);  
  
+    _verifyCanInvestCapital(msg.sender, proof);
```

Legion: The issue has been fixed with the following [commit](#)

Zenith: Verified - The issue has been resolved by add `proof` param

[H-3] withdrawCapital() can be called multiple times by the project to withdraw ExcessCapital

Severity: High

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionBaseSale.sol#L210](#)

Description: The project can take the raised capital `totalCapitalRaised` by `withdrawCapital()`

```
function withdrawCapital() external virtual onlyProject {
    /// Verify that the refund period is over
    _verifyRefundPeriodIsOver();

    /// Verify that the sale is not canceled
    _verifySaleNotCanceled();

    /// Verify that sale results have been published
    _verifySaleResultsArePublished();

    /// Check if projects are withdrawing capital on the sale source
chain
    if (askToken != address(0)) {
        /// Allow projects to withdraw capital only in case they've
supplied tokens
        _verifyTokensSupplied();
    }

    /// Cache value in memory
    uint256 _totalCapitalRaised = totalCapitalRaised;

    /// Calculate Legion Fee
    uint256 _legionFee = (legionFeeOnCapitalRaisedBps *
_totalCapitalRaised) / 10000;

    /// Emit successfully CapitalWithdrawn
    emit CapitalWithdrawn(_totalCapitalRaised, msg.sender);

    /// Transfer the raised capital to the project owner
    IERC20(bidToken).safeTransfer(msg.sender, (_totalCapitalRaised -
_legionFee));
}
```

```

        /// Transfer the Legion fee to the Legion fee receiver address
        if (_legionFee != 0)
            IERC20(bidToken).safeTransfer(legionFeeReceiver, _legionFee);
    }

```

The problem with this method is that it does not change the flag that prevents the project from executing multiple times.

The capital deposited in the contract is usually larger than `totalCapitalRaised`, and contains a portion of `ExcessCapital` that has not yet been withdrawn by the investor.

This part of the capital can be maliciously withdrawn by the project by executing `withdrawCapital()` multiple times.

Recommendation:

Add flag `tokensWithdrawn`.

```

abstract contract LegionBaseSale is ILegionBaseSale, Initializable {
    ...
    /// @dev Whether tokens have been supplied by the project or not.
    bool internal tokensSupplied;
+   bool internal tokensWithdrawn;

    function withdrawCapital() external virtual onlyProject {
        /// Verify that the refund period is over
        _verifyRefundPeriodIsOver();

        /// Verify that the sale is not canceled
        _verifySaleNotCanceled();

        /// Verify that sale results have been published
        _verifySaleResultsArePublished();

+       if (tokensWithdrawn) revert TokensAlreadyWithdrawn;
+       tokensWithdrawn = true;
    }
}

```

Legion: The issue has been fixed with the following [commit](#)

Zenith: Verified. The issue has been resolved by add `capitalWithdrawn` flag

[H-4] Incorrect formula used for totalCapitalRaised calculation in publishSaleResults function

Severity: High

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionFixedPriceSale.sol#L157](#)

Description: After the sale is completed, the `publishSaleResults` function is called to configure the following parameters:

- `totalTokensAllocated` - the total amount of ask tokens available for users
- `totalCapitalRaised` - the amount of bid tokens that can be withdrawn by the project owners

```
function publishSaleResults(bytes32 merkleRoot, uint256
tokensAllocated) external onlyLegion {
    /// Verify that the sale is not canceled
    _verifySaleNotCanceled();

    /// Verify that the refund period is over
    _verifyRefundPeriodIsOver();

    /// Verify that sale results are not already published
    _verifyCanPublishSaleResults();

    /// Set the merkle root for claiming tokens
    claimTokensMerkleRoot = merkleRoot;

    /// Set the total tokens to be allocated by the Project team
    totalTokensAllocated = tokensAllocated;

    /// Set the total capital raised to be withdrawn by the project
    >> totalCapitalRaised = (tokensAllocated * tokenPrice) / (10 **
    (ERC20(bidToken).decimals()));

    /// Emit successfully SaleResultsPublished
    emit SaleResultsPublished(merkleRoot, tokensAllocated);
}
```

However, the formula for `totalCapitalRaised` can produce incorrect results when the ask and bid tokens have different decimal places. Consider the following scenario:

- There is a fixed price sale of VIP tokens (18 decimals) for USDC (6 decimals) at a price of \$3000 per VIP token.
- If 10 VIP tokens (10e18) are allocated, the total capital should be \$30,000 (30,000e6).
- However, using the current formula in the contract, we get $10 * 1e18 * 3000 * 1e6 / 1e6 = 30,000e18$ USDC, which is incorrect.

Due to the inflated `totalCapitalRaised`, the project owner would be unable to withdraw the correct amount of bid tokens collected by the sale contract.

Recommendation: The divisor should be `10 ** (ERC20(askToken).decimals())` for correct calculation.

Legion: The issue has been fixed with [commit](#)

Zenith: Verified - Divisor has been changed to `10 ** (askTokenDecimals)`, where `askTokenDecimals` passed as an argument by the Legion caller.

4.2 Medium Risk

A total of 2 medium risk findings were identified.

[M-1] `withdrawCapitalIfSaleIsCanceled()` Investors who have already settled can still refund

Severity: Medium

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionPreLiquidSale.sol#L486](#)

Description:

If the project owner decides to cancel `PreLiquid`, it can be done through the method `cancelSale()`. When canceling, need to return the withdrawn capital: `totalCapitalWithdrawn`. The investor can then retrieve the investment via `withdrawCapitalIfSaleIsCanceled()`.

The problem is that currently `withdrawCapitalIfSaleIsCanceled()` doesn't restrict the refund of already settled investments. This can result in the investor receiving both `askToken` + `refund bidToken`.

Example:

1. alice invest 100 `bidToken`
2. `publishTgeDetails()` && `supplyAskTokens()`
3. the project call `withdrawRaisedCapital()` , `totalCapitalWithdrawn` = 1000
4. alice `claimAskTokenAllocation()` , get 100 `askToken`
5. the project Decide to cancel , call `cancelSale()` , return `totalCapitalWithdrawn` = 1000
6. alice call `withdrawCapitalIfSaleIsCanceled()` get 100 `bidToken`

so alice get 100 `refund bidToken` + 100 `askToken`

Recommendation:

It is recommended that what has been settled cannot be refunded, and the excess `bidToken` is returned to the project offline via `emergencyWithdraw()`.

```
function withdrawCapitalIfSaleIsCanceled() external {
    /// Verify that the sale has been actually canceled
    _verifySaleIsCanceled();

    /// Cache the amount to refund in memory
```

```
uint256 amountToClaim =  
investorPositions[msg.sender].investedCapital;  
+     if (investorPositions[msg.sender].hasSettled) revert  
AlreadySettled(msg.sender);
```

Legion: The issue has been fixed with the following [commit](#)

Zenith: Verified. It has been supplied and cannot be cancelled

[M-2] Legion signature can be reused

Severity: Medium

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionBaseSale.sol#L652-L655](#)
- [LegionFixedPriceSale.sol#L106-L107](#)
- [LegionSealedBidAuction.sol#L98-L99](#)

Description: The sale contract verifies if a user is eligible to pledge capital by checking if the signature is signed by the trusted Legion signer:

```
function pledgeCapital(uint256 amount, bytes memory signature)
external {
    /// Verify that the investor is allowed to pledge capital
    >> _verifyLegionSignature(signature);
```

In the `_verifyLegionSignature` function, only the caller's address is used in the hash:

```
function _verifyLegionSignature(bytes memory _signature) internal
view virtual {
    >> bytes32 _data =
    keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)).toEthSignedMessageHash();
    if (_data.recover(_signature) != legionSigner) revert
    InvalidSignature();
}
```

This makes it possible to reuse the signature across all ongoing and future Legion sales. Moreover, the same signature can be used to gain investment access in different chains where Legion is deployed.

Recommendation: Consider including additional parameters in the hash so the signature is valid only for the specific sale:

```
function _verifyLegionSignature(bytes memory _signature) internal
view virtual {
    - bytes32 _data =
    keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)).toEthSignedMessageHash();
    + bytes32 _data = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender,
    address(this), block.chainid)).toEthSignedMessageHash();
```

```
        if (_data.recover(_signature) != legionSigner) revert  
        InvalidSignature();  
    }
```

Legion: The issue has been fixed with [commit](#)

Zenith: Verified

4.3 Low Risk

A total of 1 low risk findings were identified.

[L-1] Impossible to update Legion addresses when the sale is initialized

Severity: Low

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionFixedPriceSale.sol#L95-L99](#)
- [LegionSealedBidAuction.sol#L87-L91](#)
- [LegionPreLiquidSale.sol#L161-L164](#)

Description: It's impossible to change addresses from the `addressRegistry` that were set during the sale initialization:

```
function initialize(FixedPriceSaleConfig calldata
fixedPriceSaleConfig) external initializer {
    ---SNIP---

    /// Calculate and set prefundStartTime, prefundEndTime,
    startTime, endTime and refundEndTime
    prefundStartTime = block.timestamp;
    prefundEndTime = prefundStartTime +
fixedPriceSaleConfig.prefundPeriodSeconds;
    startTime = prefundEndTime +
fixedPriceSaleConfig.prefundAllocationPeriodSeconds;
    endTime = startTime + fixedPriceSaleConfig.salePeriodSeconds;
    refundEndTime = endTime +
fixedPriceSaleConfig.refundPeriodSeconds;

    /// Check if lockupPeriodSeconds is less than refundPeriodSeconds
    /// lockupEndTime should be at least refundEndTime
    if (fixedPriceSaleConfig.lockupPeriodSeconds <=
fixedPriceSaleConfig.refundPeriodSeconds) {
        /// If yes, set lockupEndTime to be refundEndTime
        lockupEndTime = refundEndTime;
    } else {
        /// If no, calculate the lockupEndTime
        lockupEndTime = endTime +
fixedPriceSaleConfig.lockupPeriodSeconds;
    }
}
```

```

        // Set the vestingStartTime to begin when lockupEndTime is
reached
        vestingStartTime = lockupEndTime;

        /// Verify if the sale configuration is valid
        _verifyValidConfig(fixedPriceSaleConfig);

>>        /// Cache Legion addresses from `LegionAddressRegistry`
        legionBouncer =
ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_BOUNCER_I
D);
        legionSigner =
ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_SIGNER_ID
);
        legionFeeReceiver =
ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_FEE_RECEI
VER_ID);
        vestingFactory =
ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_VESTING_F
ACTORY_ID);
    }

```

Although the owner can assign a new address for a given ID in `LegionAddressRegistry.sol`, the sale will still use the old address:

```

function setLegionAddress(bytes32 id, address updatedAddress)
external onlyOwner {
    /// Cache the previous address before update
    address previousAddress = _legionAddresses[id];

    /// Update the address in the state
    _legionAddresses[id] = updatedAddress;

    /// Successfully emit LegionAddressSet
    emit LegionAddressSet(id, previousAddress, updatedAddress);
}

```

For instance, if `LEGION_SIGNER_ID` is compromised after the sale deployment, updating it with `setLegionAddress(LEGION_SIGNER_ID, newSigner)` won't affect the sale, which will continue using the compromised address.

Recommendation: It is recommended to implement an additional function that allows to sync sale addresses in the sale contract with addresses from the `AddressRegistry.sol`:

```

function syncAddresses() external onlyLegion {
    legionBouncer =
    ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_BOUNCER_ID);
    legionSigner =
    ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_SIGNER_ID);
    legionFeeReceiver =
    ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_FEE_RECEIVER_ID);
    vestingFactory =
    ILegionAddressRegistry(addressRegistry).getLegionAddress(LEGION_VESTING_FACTORY_ID);
}

```

Legion: The issue has been fixed with [PR-2](#)

**** Zenith:**** Verified

4.4 Informational

A total of 2 informational findings were identified.

[I-1] ECIES#isValid() Validity check is not complete

Severity: Informational

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [ECIES.sol#L138](#)

Description: `isValid()` and `decrypt()` current implementation:

```
function isValid(Point memory p) public pure returns (bool) {
    return isOnBn128(p) && !(p.x == 1 && p.y == 2) && !(p.x == 0 &&
p.y == 0);
}

// ECIES.sol

function decrypt(
    uint256 ciphertext_,
    Point memory ciphertextPubKey_,
    uint256 privateKey_,
    uint256 salt_
) public view returns (uint256 message_) {
    // Calculate the shared secret
    // Validates the ciphertext public key is on the curve and the
private key is valid
    uint256 sharedSecret = recoverSharedSecret(ciphertextPubKey_,
privateKey_);

    ...
}

function recoverSharedSecret(
    Point memory ciphertextPubKey_,
    uint256 privateKey_
) public view returns (uint256) {
    ...

    Point memory p = _ecMul(ciphertextPubKey_, privateKey_);

    return p.x;
}
```

```

    }

    function _ecMul(Point memory p, uint256 scalar) private view returns
(Point memory p2) {
        (bool success, bytes memory output) =
            address(0x07).staticcall{gas: 6000}(abi.encode(p.x, p.y,
scalar));

        if (!success || output.length == 0) revert("ecMul failed.");

        p2 = abi.decode(output, (Point));
    }

```

`isValid()` Validity check is not complete, May cause `decrypt()` to failure

Among other things, `recoverSharedSecret()` will execute a scalar multiplication between the invalid public key and the global private key via the `ecMul` precompile. This is where the denial of service will take place.

[more detailed description](#)

The `pubKey` is provided by `legion` so There are currently no security risks. However, since this is a tool function, it is recommended add check to avoid subsequent use elsewhere.

Recommendation:

```

    function isValid(Point memory p) public pure returns (bool) {
-       return isOnBn128(p) && !(p.x == 1 && p.y == 2) && !(p.x == 0 &&
p.y == 0);
+       return isOnBn128(p) && !(p.x == 1 && p.y == 2) && !(p.x == 0 &&
p.y == 0)&& (p.x < FIELD_MODULUS) && (p.y < FIELD_MODULUS)
    }

```

Legion: The issue has been fixed with the following [commit](#)

Zenith: Verified

[I-2] Misplaced values in saleConfiguration() function

Severity: Informational

Status: Resolved

Context:

- [LegionFixedPriceSale.sol#L178-L179](#)
- [ILegionFixedPriceSale.sol#L42-L73](#)

Description: The `saleConfiguration()` function returns a `FixedPriceSaleConfig` structure with various sale configuration parameters:

```
function saleConfiguration() external view returns
(FixedPriceSaleConfig memory saleConfig) {
    /// Get the fixed price sale config
    saleConfig = FixedPriceSaleConfig(
        prefundPeriodSeconds,
        prefundAllocationPeriodSeconds,
        salePeriodSeconds,
        refundPeriodSeconds,
        lockupPeriodSeconds,
        vestingDurationSeconds,
        vestingCliffDurationSeconds,
        legionFeeOnCapitalRaisedBps,
        legionFeeOnTokensSoldBps,
    >> tokenPrice,
    >> minimumPledgeAmount,
        bidToken,
        askToken,
        projectAdmin,
        addressRegistry
    );
}
```

Upon review of the `ILegionFixedPriceSale.sol` interface, it appears that the `tokenPrice` and `minimumPledgeAmount` parameters are misplaced and should be swapped to match their correct positioning.

Recommendation: Correct the parameter order by swapping `tokenPrice` and `minimumPledgeAmount`.

Legion: The issue has been fixed with the following [commit](#)

Zenith: The issue has been resolved as per recommendation.