Question 1 *61C Review* ()

Comfort with manipulating number representations covered in 61C will help you succeed in the memory safety.

Q1.1 What is the hexadecimal form of decimal number 18?

> **Solution:** 0x12

Q1.2 What is the value of `0x8339e833` + `0x20` in hexadecimal form?

> **Solution:** 0x8339e853

Q1.3 What is the value of `0x550ecdf2` + `decimal_16` in hexadecimal form?

> **Solution:** 0x550ece02

Q1.4 What is the largest unsigned 32-bit integer? What is the result of adding 1 to that number?

> **Solution:** The largest 32-bit unsigned integer is `0xffffffff`, and you will get `0x00000000` if you add 1 to it (unsigned overflow).

Q1.5 What is the largest signed 32-bit integer? What is the result of adding 1 to that number?

> **Solution:** The largest 32-bit signed integer is `0x7fffffff`, and you will get `0x80000000` if you add 1 to it, which will be -2^{31} in decimal (signed overflow).

Q1.6 If you interpret an n-bit two's complement number as an unsigned number, would the negative numbers be smaller or larger than positive numbers?

> **Solution:** Negative numbers would be larger than positive numbers if interpreted as unsigned since their most significant bits are set.

Q1.7 How many bytes are needed to represent char[16]?

> **Solution:** A character array with 16 elements in it needs 16 bytes to represent because each character is 1 byte.

Q1.8 How many bytes are needed to represent int[8]?

> **Solution:** An integer array with 8 elements in it needs 32 bytes to represent because each integer is 4 bytes.

Q1.9 **For the following questions, assume each block is 1 byte, and addresses increase from left-to-right :**

In a little-endian 32-bit system, how would you represent the pointer `0xDEADBEEF`?

> **Solution:**
>
> | 0xEF | 0xBE | 0xAD | 0xDE |
> |---|---|---|---|

Q1.10 In a little-endian 64-bit system, how would you represent the pointer `0xDEADBEEF`?

> **Solution:**
>
> | 0xEF | 0xBE | 0xAD | 0xDE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
> |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Q1.11 In a little-endian 32-bit system, how would you represent the char array "ABCDEFGH"?

> **Solution:**
>
> | E | F | G | H |
> |---|---|---|---|
> | A | B | C | D |

Question 2 *Stack Diagram Practice*

Here are the 11 steps for x86 calling convention for reference:

1. Push arguments onto the stack.

2. Push the old eip (rip) onto the stack.

3. Move eip.

   Execution cha

4. Push the old e   push %ebp)

5. Move ebp dov

6. Move esp down.

7. Execute the function.

8. Move esp up. (mov %ebp, %esp)

9. Restore the old ebp (sfp). (pop %ebp)

10. Restore the old eip (rip). (pop %eip)

11. Remove arguments from the stack.

Consider the following function.

```
1  int swap(int * num1, int * num2, int * arr_local) {
2      int temp = *num1;
3      *num1 = *num2;
4      arr_local[0] = *num1;
5      *num2 = temp;
6      arr_local[1] = *num2;
7      return 0;
8  }
9
10 int main(void) {
11     int x = 61;
12     int y = 1;
13     int arr[2];
14     swap(&x, &y, arr);
15     return 0;
16 }
```

Q2.1 Draw the stack diagram if the code were executed until a breakpoint set on line 4. Assume normal (non-malicious) program execution. You do not need to write the values on the stack, only the names. When drawing the stack diagram, assume that each row in your diagram doesn't have to represent 4 bytes in memory. The bottom of the page represents the lower addresses.

Stack

Solution: Stack diagram:

```
[4] RIP of main
[4] SFP of main
[4] x
[4] y
[8] arr
[4] int* arr_local
[4] int* num2
[4] int* num1
[4] RIP of swap
[4] SFP of swap
[4] temp
```

Q2.2 Now, draw arrows on the stack diagram denoting where the ESP and EBP would point if the code were executed until a breakpoint set on line 4.

Solution: ESP points to `temp`, EBP points to `swap`'s `sfp`.

Q2.3 The return instruction executes steps 8-10 of the calling convention. Draw arrows on the stack diagram denoting where the ESP and EBP would point for each of these steps.

Solution:

- ESP a[...] sfp

- ESP p[...]nd EBP points to `main's sfp`

- ESP p[...] EBP points to `main's sfp`. Note that EIP points the line 15 nov[...]

Question 3 *Security Principles* ()

We discussed the following security principles in lecture (*or in the textbook*):

A. *Know your threat model:* Know your attacker and their resources; the security assumptions originally made may no longer be valid

B. *Consider human factors:* security systems must be usable

C. *Security is economics:* Do a cost-benefit analysis, since adding security usually costs more money

D. *Detect if you can't prevent:* If one cannot prevent an attack, one should be able to at least detect when an attack happens

E. *Defense in depth:* Layer multiple defenses together

F. *Least privilege:* Minimize how much privilege you give each program and system component

G. *Separation of responsibility:* Split up privilege, so no one person or program has complete power

H. *Ensure complete mediation:* Make sure to check *every* access to *every* object

I. *Consider Shannon's Maxim:* Do not rely on security through obscurity

J. *Use fail-safe defaults:* If security mechanisms fail or crash, they should default to secure behavior

K. *Design in security from the start:* Retrofitting security to an existing application after it has been developed is a difficult proposition

Identify the principle(s) relevant to each of the following scenarios:

Note that there may be more than one principle that applies in some of these scenarios.

Q3.1 New cars often come with a valet key. This key is intended to be used by valet drivers who park your car for you. The key opens the door and turns on the ignition, but it does not open the trunk or the glove compartment.

> **Solution:** Principle of least privilege. They do not need to access your trunk or your glove box, so you don't give them access to do so.

Q3.2 Many homeowners leave a house key under the floor mat in front of their door.

> **Solution:** Shannon's Maxim. The security of your home depends on the belief that most criminals don't know where your key is. With a modicum of effort, criminals could find your key and open the lock.

Q3.3 It is not worth it to use a $400,000 bike lock to protect a $100 bike.

> **Solution:** Security is economics. It is more expensive to buy $400 bike lock than to simply buy a new bike to replace it.

Q3.4 Warranties on cell phones do not cover accidental damage, which includes liquid damage. Unfortunately for cell phone companies, many consumers who accidentally damage their phones with liquid will wait for it to dry, then take it in to the store, claiming that "it broke by itself". To combat this threat, many companies have begun to include on the product a small sticker that turns red (and stays red) [...]

> **Solution:** T[...] most relevant factors. "Consider human factors": people will always t[...] account for that when creating a system. More importantly, "Detect if yo[...]dent to try to add ways to detect something when creating the phone si[...]ter damage is impossible to prevent.

Q3.5 Social security numbers were not originally designed as a secret identifier. Nowadays, they are often easily obtainable or guessable.

> **Solution:** Design security from the start. Social security numbers were not designed to be authenticators, so security was not designed from the start. The number is based on a geographic region, a sequential group number, and a sequential serial number. They have since been repurposed as authenticators.

Q3.6 Even if you use a password on your laptop lock screen, there is software that lets a skilled attacker with specialized equipment bypass it.

> **Solution:** Know your threat model: most petty thieves do not have access to this software. (The software referenced is pcileech. The corresponding hardware is on my wishlist. -Keyhan Vakil)

Q3.7 Shamir's secret sharing scheme allows us to split a "secret" between multiple people so that all of them have to collaborate in order to recover the secret.

> **Solution:** Separation of responsibility: require everyone to come together to produce the secret, preventing one person from using the secret alone.

Q3.8 DRM encryption is often effective until someone can reverse-engineer the decryption algorithm.

Solution: Shannon's Maxim. You must assume the attacker knows the system, so DRM encryption is not effective.

Q3.9 Banks often m[...] [se]curity questions over the phone. Answers to these questions are "low entro[...] [they] are easy to guess. Some security-conscious people instead use a random p[...] to the security question. [a] However attackers can sometimes convince the p[...] [by] claiming "I just put in some nonsense for that question".

Solution: Consider human factors. The phone rep is inclined to believe the attacker is not malicious (social engineering).

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[a]Q: "What is your dog's maiden name?": A: '00ba6b1c38f66b3'

Q3.10 Often times at bars, an employee will wait outside the only entrance to the bar, enforcing that people who want to enter the bar form a single-file line. Then, the employee checks each individual's ID to verify if they are 21 before allowing them entry into the bar.

Solution: Ensure complete mediation. There is a single access point through which everyone who wishes to enter the bar must be verified to be 21 before obtaining access.

Q3.11 Tesla vehicles come equipped with "Sentry Mode" which records footage of any break-ins to the vehicle and alerts the vehicle owner of the incident.

Solution: Detect if you can't prevent it. The vehicle owner learns about the intrusion into their vehicle even if they were not able to prevent it.

Q3.12 When a traffic light detects that it may be giving conflicting signals, it enters a state of error and displays a flashing red light in all directions.

Solution: Use fail-safe defaults. The traffic light fails into a safe state because it functions as a stop sign for cars in all directions rather than continuing to operate with conflicting signals.