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### 25 Introduction to Networking

To discuss network security, first we need to know how the network is designed. This section provides a (simplified) overview of the various Internet layers and how they interact. A video version of this section is available: see [Lecture 11, Summer 2020](#).

#### Assignment Project Exam Help 25.1 Local Area Networks Email: [tutorcs@163.com](mailto:tutorcs@163.com)

The primary goal of the Internet is to move data from one location to another. A good analogy for the Internet is the postal system, which we'll refer to throughout this section.

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The first building block we need is something that moves data across space, such as bits on a wire, radio waves, carrier pigeons, etc. Using our first building block, we can connect a group of local machines in a **local area network (LAN)**.

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


Figure 1: Computers connected in a local area network (LAN).

Note that in a LAN, all machines are connected to all other machines. This allows any machine on the LAN to send and receive messages from any other machine on the same LAN. You can think of a LAN as an apartment complex, a local group of nearby apartments that are all connected. However, it would be infeasible to connect every machine in the world to every other machine in the world, so we introduce a **router** to connect multiple LANs.




Figure 2: Two LANs connected through a router.

A router is a machine that is connected to two or more LANs. If a machine wants to send a message to a machine on a different LAN, it sends the message to the router, which forwards the message to the second LAN. You can think of a router as a post office: to send a message somewhere outside of your local apartment complex, you'd take it to the post office, and they would forward your message to the other apartment complex.

With enough routers and LANs, we can connect the entire world in a **wide area network**, which forms the basis of the Internet.

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## 25.2 Internet layering

You may have noticed that this design uses layers of abstraction to build the Internet. The lowest layer (layer 1, also called the physical layer) moves bits across space. Then, layer 2 (the link layer) uses layer 1 as a building block to connect local machines in a LAN. Finally, layer 3 (the internetwork layer) connects many layer 2 LANs. Each layer relies on services from a lower layer and provides services to a higher layer. Higher layers contain richer information, while lower layers provide the support necessary to send the richer information at the higher layers.

This design provides a clean abstraction barrier for implementation. For example, a network can choose to use wired or wireless communication at Layer 1, and the Layer 1 implementation does not affect any protocols at the other layers.

In total, there are 7 layers of the Internet, as defined by the [OSI 7-layer model](#). However, this model is a little outdated, so some layers are obsolete, and additional layers for security have been added since then. We will see these higher layers later.

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The OSI 7-layer model.

## 25.3 Protocols and Headers

Each layer has its own set of **protocols**, a set of agreements on how to communicate. Each protocol specifies how communication is structured (e.g. message format), how machines should behave while communicating (e.g. what actions are needed to send and receive messages), and how errors should be handled (e.g. a message timing out).

To support protocols, messages are sent with a **header**, which is placed at the beginning of the message and contains some metadata such as the sender and recipient's identities, the length of the message, identification numbers, etc. You can think of headers as the envelope of a letter: it contains the information needed to deliver the letter, and appears before the actual letter.

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


Figure 4: Multiple headers on a single packet.

Because multiple protocols across different layers are needed to send a message, we need multiple headers on each packet. Each message begins as regular human-readable text (the highest layer). As the message is being prepared to get sent, it is passed down the protocol stack to lower layers (similar to how C programs are passed to lower layers to translate C code to RISC-V to machine-readable bits). Each layer adds its own header to the top of the message provided from the layer directly above. When the message reaches the lowest layer,

it now has multiple headers, starting with the header for the lowest layer first.

Once the message reaches its destination, the recipient must unpack the message and decode it back into human-readable text. Starting at the lowest layer, the message moves up the protocol stack to higher layers. Each layer removes its header and provides the remaining content to the layer above it. When the message reaches the highest layer, all headers have been processed and the recipient sees the regular human-readable text from before.

## 25.4 Addressing

Depending on the layer, a single machine can be referred to by several different addresses.

Layer 2 (link layer) uses 48-bit (6-byte) **MAC addresses** to uniquely identify each machine on the LAN. This is not to be confused with MACs (message authentication codes) from the crypto section. Usually it is clear from context which type of MAC we are referring to, although sometimes cryptographic MACs are called MICs (message integrity codes) when discussing networking. MAC addresses are usually written as 6 pairs of hex numbers, such as `ca:fe:f0:0d:be:ef`. There is also a special MAC address, the broadcast address of `ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff`, that says “send this message to everyone on the local network.” You can think of MAC addresses as apartment numbers: they are used to uniquely identify people within one apartment complex, but are useless for uniquely identifying one person in the world. (Imagine sending a letter addressed to “Apartment 5.” This might work if you’re delivering letters within your own apartment complex, but how many Apartment 5s exist in the entire world?)

Layer 3 (IP layer) uses 32 bit (4 byte) **IP addresses** to uniquely identify each machine globally. IP addresses are usually written as 4 integers between 0 and 255, such as `128.32.131.10`. Because the Internet has grown so quickly, the most recent version of the layer 3 protocol, IPv6, uses 128-bit IP addresses, which are written as 8 2-byte hex values separated by colons, such as `cafef00d:100d:1401:2414:1248:1281:8712`. However, for this class, you only need to know about IPv4, which uses 32-bit IP addresses.

Higher layers are designed to allow each machine to have multiple processes communicating across the network. For example, your computer only has one IP address, but it may have multiple browser tabs and applications open that all want to communicate over the network. To distinguish each process, higher layers assign each process on a machine a unique 16-bit **port number**. You can think of port numbers as room numbers: they are used to uniquely identify one person in a building.

The source and destination addresses are contained in the header of a message. For example, the Layer 2 header contains MAC addresses, the Layer 3 header contains IP addresses, and higher layer headers will contain port numbers.

## 25.5 Packets vs. Connections

Notice that in the postal system example, the post office has no idea if you and your pen pal are having a conversation through letters. The Internet is the same: at the physical, link,

and internetwork layers, there is no concept of a connection. A router at the link layer only needs to consider each individual packet and send it to its destination (or, in the case of a long-distance message, forward it to another router somewhere closer to the destination). At the lower layers, we call individual messages **packets**. Packets are usually limited to a fixed length.

In order to actually maintain a connection, we rely on higher layers, which maintain a connection by breaking up large messages into individual packets and sending them through the lower layer protocols. These connections can also implement cryptographic protocols like in the TLS section.

Note that so far, the connection is not guaranteed any correctness or security. Packets can be corrupted in transit or even fail to send entirely. The IP (Internet Protocol) at layer 3 only guarantees *best-effort delivery*, and does not handle any errors. Instead, we rely on higher layers for correctness and security.

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## 25.6 Network Adversaries

Network adversaries can be sorted into 3 general categories. They are from weakest to strongest:

**Off-path Adversaries:** cannot read or modify any packets sent over the connection.

**On-path Adversaries** can read, but not modify packets.

**In-path Adversaries:** can read, modify, and block packets. Also known as a **man-in-the-middle**.

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Note that all adversaries can send packets of their own, including faking or **spoofing** the packet headers to appear like the message is coming from somebody else. This is often as simple as setting the “source” field on the packet header to somebody else’s address.

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## 26 Wired Local Networks: ARP

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### 26.1 Cheat sheet

- Layer: Link (2)
- Purpose: Translates IP addresses to MAC addresses
- Vulnerability: An adversary can see requests and send spoofed malicious responses
- Defense: Switches



### 26.2 Networking background: Ethernet

Recall that on a LAN (local-area network), all machines are connected to all other machines. Ethernet is one particular LAN implementation that uses wires to connect all machines.

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Ethernet started as a broadcast-only network. Each node on the network could see messages sent by all other nodes, either by being on a common wire or a network **hub**, a simple repeater that took every packet it received and rebroadcast it to all the outputs. A receiver is simply supposed to ignore all packets not sent to either the receiver's MAC or the broadcast address. But this is only enforced in software, and most Ethernet devices can enter **promiscuous mode**, where it will receive all packets. This is also called **sniffing packets**.

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For versions of Ethernet that are inherently broadcast, such as a hub, an adversary in the local network can see all network traffic and can also introduce any traffic they desire by simply sending packets with a spoofed MAC address. Sanity check: what type of adversary does this make someone on the same LAN network a victim?<sup>1</sup>

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### 26.3 Protocol: ARP

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ARP, the **Address Resolution Protocol**, translates Layer 3 IP addresses into Layer 2 MAC addresses.

Say Alice wants to send a message to Bob, and Alice knows that Bob's IP address is 1.1.1.1. The ARP protocol would follow three steps:

1. Alice would broadcast to everyone else on the LAN: “What is the MAC address of 1.1.1.1?”
2. Bob responds by sending a message only to Alice: “My IP is 1.1.1.1 and my MAC address is ca:fe:f0:0d:be:ef.” Everyone else does nothing.
3. Alice caches the IP address to MAC address mapping for Bob.

If Bob is outside of the LAN, then the router would respond in step 2 with its MAC address.

Any received ARP replies are always cached, even if no broadcast request (step 1) was ever made.

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<sup>1</sup>A: On-path

## 26.4 Attack: ARP Spoofing

Because there is no way to verify that the reply in step 2 is actually from Bob, it is easy to attack this protocol. If Mallory is able to create a spoofed reply and send it to Alice before Bob can send his legitimate reply, then she can convince Alice that a different MAC address (such as Mallory's) corresponds to Bob's IP address. Now, when Alice wants to send a local message to Bob, she will use her previous cached IP address to MAC address mapping, which might map Bob's IP address to Mallory's MAC address. This will cause messages intended for Bob to instead go to Mallory.<sup>2</sup> Sanity check: what type of adversary is Mallory after she executes an ARP spoofing attack?

ARP spoofing is our first race condition, where the attacker's response must arrive faster than the legitimate response to fool the victim. This is a common pattern for on-path attackers, who cannot block the legitimate response and thus must race to send their response first.

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## 26.5 Defenses: Switches

A simple defense against ARP spoofing is to use a tool like arpwatch, which tracks the IP address to MAC address pairings across the LAN and makes sure nothing suspicious happens.

Modern wired Ethernet networks defend against ARP spoofing by using switches rather than hubs. Switches have a MAC cache, which keeps track of the IP address to MAC address pairings. If the packet's IP address has a known MAC in the cache, the switch just sends it to the MAC. Otherwise, it broadcasts the packet to everyone. Smarter switches can filter requests so that not every request is broadcast to everyone.

Higher-quality switches include VLANs (Virtual Local Area Networks), which implement isolation by breaking the network into separate virtual networks.

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<sup>2</sup>A: Man-in-the-middle. She can receive messages from Alice, modify them, then send them to Bob.

# 27 Wireless Local Networks: WPA2

## 27.1 Cheat sheet

- Layer: Link (2)
- Purpose: Communicate in a wireless local network
- Vulnerability: An attacker can learn the encryption keys from the handshake and decrypt messages (forcing the password if they don't know it already)
- Defense: WPA



## 27.2 Networking background: WiFi

Another implementation of the link layer is WiFi, which wirelessly connects machines in a LAN. Because it wireless connections over cellular networks, WiFi has some differences from wired Ethernet, but these are out of scope for this class. For the purposes of this class, WiFi behaves mostly like Ethernet, with the same packet format and similar protocols like ARP for address translation.

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To join a WiFi network, your computer establishes a connection to the network's **AP (Access Point)**. Generally the AP is continuously broadcasting beacon packets saying "I am here" and announcing the name of the network (also called the **SSID (Service Set Identifier)**). When you choose to connect to a WiFi network (or if your computer is configured to automatically join a WiFi network), it will broadcast a request to join the network.

If the network is configured without a password, your computer immediately joins the network, and all data is transmitted without encryption. This means that anybody else on the same network can see your traffic and inject packets, like in ARP spoofing.

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## 27.3 Protocol

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**WPA2-PSK (WiFi Protected Access: Pre-Shared Key)** is a protocol that enables secure communications over a WiFi network by encrypting messages with cryptography.

In WPA2-PSK, a network has one password for all users (this is the WiFi password you ask your friends for). The access point derives a **PSK (Pre-Shared Key)** by applying a password-based key derivation function (PBKDF2-SHA1) on the SSID and the password. Recall from the cryptography unit that password-based key derivation functions are designed to be slower by a large constant factor to make brute-force attacks more difficult. Sanity check: Why might we choose to include the SSID as input to the key derivation function?<sup>3</sup>

When a computer (client) wants to connect to a network protected with WPA2-PSK, the user must first type in the WiFi password. Then, the client uses the same key derivation

<sup>3</sup>By including the SSID, two different networks with the same password will still have different PSKs.

function to generate the PSK. Sanity check: Why can't we be done here and use the PSK to encrypt all further communications?

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To give each user a unique encryption key, after both the client and the access point independently derive the PSK, they participate in a handshake to generate shared encryption keys.




Figure 5: The WPA2 handshake.

1. The client and the access point exchange random nonces, the ANonce and the SNonce. The nonces ensure that different keys will be generated during each handshake. The nonces are sent without any encryption.
2. The client and access point independently derive the **PTK (Pairwise Transport Keys)** as a function of the two nonces, the PSK, and the MAC addresses of both the access point and the client.
3. The client and the access point exchange MICs (recall that these are MACs from the crypto unit) to check that no one tampered with the nonces, and that both sides

<sup>4</sup>Because everyone on the network would use the same PSK, so others on the same network can still decrypt your traffic.

correctly derived the PTK.

4. The access point encrypts the GTK (Group Temporal Key) and sends it to the client.

5. The client sends an acknowledgement message (ACK) to indicate that it successfully received the GTK.

Once the handshake is complete, the communication between the client and the access point is encrypted with the derived PTK.

The GTK is used for broadcast messages sent to the entire network (i.e. sent to the broadcast MAC address, ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff). Since the GTK is the same for everyone on the network, so everyone can encrypt/send and decrypt/receive broadcast messages.

In practice, the handshake is optimized into a 4-way handshake, requiring only 4 messages to be exchanged between the client and the access point.




Figure 6: The optimized, 4-way WPA2 handshake.

1. The access point sends the ANonce, as before.

2. Once the client receives the ANonce, it has all the information needed to derive the PTK, so it derives the PTK first. Then it sends the SNonce and the MIC to the access point.
3. Once the access point receives the SNonce, it can derive the PTK as well. Then it sends the encrypted MIC to the client.
4. The client sends a message to indicate that it successfully received the GTK, as before.

## 27.4 Attacks

In the WPA2 handshake, except the GTK is sent unencrypted. Recall that the PTK is derived with the two nonces, the PSK, and the MAC addresses of both the access point and the client. This means that an on-path attacker who eavesdrops on the entire handshake can learn the nonces and the MAC addresses. If the attacker is part of the WiFi network (i.e. they know the WiFi password and generated the PSK), then they know everything necessary to derive the PTK. This attacker can decrypt all messages and eavesdrop on communications, and encrypt and inject messages.

Even if the attacker isn't on the WiFi network (doesn't know the WiFi password and cannot generate the PSK), they can try to brute-force the WiFi password. For each guessed password, the attacker derives the PSK from that password, uses the PSK (and the other unencrypted information from the handshake) to derive the PTK, and checks if that PTK is consistent with the MICs. If the WiFi password is low-entropy, an attacker with enough compute power can brute-force the password and learn the PTK.

## 27.5 Defenses: WPA2-Enterprise

The main problem leading to the attacks in the previous section is that every user on the network uses the same secrecy (the WiFi password) to derive private keys. To solve this, each user needs a different, unique source of secrecy. This modified protocol is called **WPA2-Enterprise**. AirBears2 is an example of WPA2-Enterprise that you might be familiar with.

Instead of using one WiFi password for all users, WPA2-Enterprise gives authorized a unique username and password. In WPA2-Enterprise, before the handshake occurs, the client connects to a secure authentication server and proves its identity to that server by providing a username and password. (The connection to the authentication server is secured with TLS, which is covered in a later section.) If the username and password are correct, the authentication server presents both the client and the access point with a random **PMK (Pairwise Master Key)** to use instead of the PSK. The handshake proceeds as in the previous section, but it uses the PMK (unique for each user) in place of the PSK (same for all users) to derive the PTK.

WPA2-Enterprise defends against the attacks from the previous section, because the PMK is created randomly by a third-party authentication server and sent over encrypted channels to both the AP and the client. However, note that WPA2-Enterprise is still vulnerable against another authenticated user who executes an ARP or DHCP attack to become a man-in-the-middle.

## 28 DHCP

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### 28.1 Cheat sheet

- Layer: 2-3 (see )
- Purpose: Get first connecting to a network
- Vulnerability:  can see requests and send spoofed malicious responses
- Defense: Accept and rely on higher layers

### 28.2 Protocol: DHCP

DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) is responsible for setting up configurations when a computer first joins a local network. These settings enable communication over LANs and the Internet, so it is sometimes considered a layer 2-3 protocol. The Internet layers are defined primarily for communication, so setup protocols like DHCP don't fit cleanly into the abstraction barriers in the layering model.

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In order to connect to a network, you need a few things:

- An IP address, so other people can contact you
- The IP address of the DNS server, so you can translate a site name like [www.google.com](http://www.google.com) into an IP address (DNS is covered in more detail later)
- The IP address of the router (also called the **gateway**), so you can contact others on the Internet

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The DHCP handshake follows four steps, between you (the client) and the server (who can give you the needed IP addresses)

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1. **Client Discover:** The client broadcasts a request for a configuration.
2. **Server Offer:** Any server able to offer IP addresses responds with some configuration settings. (In practice, usually only one server replies here.)
3. **Client Request:** The client broadcasts which configuration it has chosen.
4. **Server Acknowledge:** The chosen server confirms that its configuration has been chosen.

The configuration information provided in step 2 (server offer) is sometimes called a **DHCP lease**. The offer may include a lease time. After the time expires, the client must ask to renew the lease to keep using that configuration, or else the DHCP server will free up those settings for other devices that request leases later.

Notice that both client messages are broadcast. Step 3 (client request) must be broadcast so that if multiple servers made offers in step 2, all the servers know which one has been

chosen. Sanity check: why must client discover be broadcast?

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### 28.3 Networking background: NAT

Because there are not enough IPv4 addresses on the modern Internet, and not all networks support them (they have a limited address space) yet, DHCP supports **NAT** (Network Address Translation). NAT allows multiple computers on a local network to share an IP address. When a server (DHCP server) assigns that IP address, it also configures a configuration through DHCP, the router (DHCP relay agent) translates the request from the client to the Internet using a different IP address. This address usually comes from a reserved block of private IP addresses that are invalid on the Internet, but can be used as placeholders in the local network.



When a computer sends a packet to the Internet, the packet passes through the router first. The router stores a record mapping the internal (source) IP address to the remote (destination) IP address, for processing optional replies. Then the router replaces the placeholder IP address with a valid IP address, and sends the packet to the remote sever on the Internet. Sanity check: does this replacement happen for the source or destination IP address?<sup>6</sup> When the router sees an incoming packet, it checks the stored mappings, converts the destination IP address back to the correct placeholder address, and forwards the message to the original computer on the local network. With NAT, the router could potentially use a single valid IP address to send packets on behalf of every computer on the local network.

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## 28.4 Attack

The attack on DHCP is almost identical to ARP spoofing. At the server offer step, an attacker can send a forged configuration, which the client will accept if it arrives before the legitimate configuration reply. The attacker could offer its own IP address as the gateway address, which makes the attacker a man-in-the-middle. Packets intended for the network would be sent to the attacker, who can modify them before forwarding them to the real gateway. The attacker can also become a man-in-the-middle by manipulating the DNS server address, which lets the attacker supply malicious translations between human-readable host names (www.google.com) and IP addresses (6.6.6.6).

## 28.5 Defenses

In reality, many networks just accept DHCP spoofing as a fact of life and rely on the higher layers to defend against attackers (the general idea: if the message sent is properly encrypted, the man-in-the-middle can't do anything anyway).

Defending against low-layer attacks like DHCP spoofing is hard, because there is no trusted party to rely on when we're first connecting to the network.

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<sup>5</sup>A: Before DHCP, the client has no idea where the servers are.

<sup>6</sup>Source, since it's an outgoing packet.

## 29 IP Routing, BGP

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### 29.1 Cheat sheet

- Layer: 3 (inter-
- Purpose: Send by connecting lots of local networks
- Vulnerability: works can read messages in intermediate transit and forward them
- Defense: Access and rely on higher layers



### 29.2 Networking background: Subnets

Recall that IP addresses uniquely identify a single machine on the global network. (With NAT, the address could correspond to multiple machines, but this can be abstracted away when discussing IP.) When sending packets to a remote IP on a different local network, the packet must make many hops across many local networks before finally reaching its destination.

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IP routes by “subnets”, groups of addresses with a common prefix. A subnet is usually written as a prefix followed by the number of bits in the prefix. For example, 128.32/16 is an IPv4 subnet with all addresses beginning with the 16-bit prefix 128.32. There are  $2^{16}$  addresses on this prefix, because there are  $32 - 16 = 16$  bits not in the prefix. Sanity check: how many addresses are in the 128.32.131/24 subnet?<sup>7</sup> Routing generally proceeds on a subnet rather than individual IP basis.

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There are some special reserved IP addresses and network blocks that do not represent machines and subnets. 127.0.0.1/24 and ::1 are “localhost”, used to create ‘network’ connections to your own system. Also, 255.255.255.255 is the IPv4 broadcast address, sending to all computers within the local network.

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When a client gets its configuration from DHCP, it is told its own IP address, the address of the gateway, and the size of the subnet it is on. To send a packet to another computer on the same local network, the client first verifies that the computer is on the same local network by checking that its IP address is in the same subnet (same IP prefix). Then, the client uses ARP to translate the IP address to a MAC address and directly sends the packet to that MAC address.

To send a packet to another computer on a different local network, the client sends the packet to the gateway, whose responsibility is to forward the packet towards the destination.

Past the gateway, the packet passes onto the general Internet, which is composed of many **ASs (Autonomous Systems)**, identified by unique **ASNs (Autonomous System Numbers)**. Each AS consists of one or more local networks managed by an organization, such as an Internet service provider (ISP), university, or business. Within each AS, packets can be

<sup>7</sup>2<sup>8</sup>. The prefix is 24 bits, so there are  $32 - 24 = 8$  bits not in the prefix.

routed by any mechanism the AS desires, usually involving a complicated set of preferences designed to minimize the AS's own cost.

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When an AS receives a packet, it first checks if that packet's final destination is located within the AS. If the final destination is within the AS, it routes the packet directly to the final destination. Otherwise, it forwards the packet to another AS that is closer to the final destination.

### 29.3 Protocol:

Routing between ASes is determined by BGP (the Border Gateway Protocol). BGP operates by having each AS advertise which networks it is responsible for to its neighboring ASs. Then each neighbor advertises that they can process packets to that network and provides information about the AS path that the packets would follow. The process continues until the entire Internet is connected into a graph with many paths between ASes. If an AS has a choice between two advertisements, it will generally select the shortest path. Actual BGP path selection is a fair bit more complicated than described here, but is out of scope for this class (take CS 168 to learn more).

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### 29.4 Attack: Malicious ASes

The biggest problem with BGP is that it operates on trust, assuming that all ASes are effectively honest. Thus an AS can lie and say that it is responsible for a network it isn't, resulting in all traffic being redirected to the lying AS. There are further enhancements that allow a lying AS to act as a full man-in-the-middle, routing all traffic for a destination through the rogue AS.

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Recall that IP operates on "best effort". Packets are delivered whole, but can be delivered in any order and may be corrupted or not sent at all. IPv4 and lower layers usually include checksums or CRC checks designed to detect corrupted packets. Sanity check: Why do the checksums not prevent a malicious AS from modifying packets?<sup>8</sup>

### 29.5 Defenses

In practice, there's not much anyone can do to defend against a malicious AS, since each AS operates relatively independently. Instead, we rely on protocols such as TCP at higher layers to guarantee that messages are sent. TCP will resend packets that are lost or corrupted because of malicious ASes. Also, cryptographic protocols at higher layers such as TLS can defend against malicious attackers, by guaranteeing confidentiality (attacker can't read the packets) and integrity (attacker can't modify the packets without detection) on packets. Both TCP and TLS are covered in later sections.

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<sup>8</sup>Checksums are not cryptographic. The malicious AS could modify the packet and create a new checksum for the modified packet.

## 30 Transport Layer: TCP, UDP

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### 30.1 Cheat sheet

- Layer: 4 (transport)
- Purpose: Establishes communication between individual processes on machines (TCP and UDP). Guarantees delivery of data successfully and in the correct order (TCP only).
- Vulnerability: Off-path attackers can inject data or RST packets. Off-path attackers must spoof sequence number to inject packets.
- Defense: Rely on cryptography at a higher layer (TLS). Use randomly generated sequence numbers to stop off-path attackers.

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### 30.2 Networking background: Ports

Recall that IP, the layer 3 (inter-network) protocol, is a best-effort protocol, meaning that packets can be corrupted, reordered, or dropped entirely. Also, IP addresses uniquely identify machines, but do not support multiple processes on one machine using the network (e.g. multiple browser tabs, multiple applications).

The transport layer solves the problem of multiple processes by introducing **port numbers**. Each process on a machine that wants to communicate over the network uses a unique 16-bit port number. Recall that port numbers are unique per machine, but cannot be used for global addressing—two machines can have processes with the same port number. However, an IP address and a port number together uniquely identify one process on one machine.

On client machines, such as your laptop, port numbers can be arbitrarily assigned. As long as each application uses a different port number, incoming packets can be sorted by port number and directed to the correct application. However, server machines offering services over the network need to use constant, well-known port numbers so client machines can send requests to those port numbers. For example, web servers always receive HTTP requests at port 80, and HTTPS (secure) requests at port 443. Ports below 1024 are “reserved” ports: only a program running as root can receive packets at those ports, but anyone can send packets to those ports.

The transport layer has 2 main protocols to choose from: TCP guarantees reliable, in-order packet delivery, while UDP does not. Both protocols use port numbers to support communication between processes. The choice of protocol depends on the context of the application.

### 30.3 Protocol: UDP

**UDP (user datagram protocol)** is a best-effort transport layer protocol. With UDP, applications send and receive discrete packets, and packets are not guaranteed to arrive, just

like in IP. It is possible for datagrams to be larger than the underlying network's packet size, but this can sometimes introduce problems.

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The UDP header contains 16-bit source and destination port numbers to support communication between processes. The header also contains a checksum (non-cryptographic) to detect corrupted packets.



Source port	16 bits
Destination port	

Checksum

Figure 7: The UDP packet header.

## 30.4 Protocol: TCP

**TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)** is a reliable in-order, connection-based stream protocol. In TCP, a client first establishes a connection to the server by performing a handshake. Once established, the connection is reliable and in order: TCP handles resending dropped packets until they are received on the other side and rearranging any packets received out of order. TCP also handles breaking up long messages into individual packets, which lets programmers think in terms of high-level, arbitrary-length byte-stream connections and abstract away low-level, fixed-size packets.

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Like UDP, the TCP header contains 16-bit source and destination port numbers to support communication between processes, and a checksum to detect corrupted packets. Additionally, a 32-bit **sequence number** and a 32-bit **acknowledgment (ACK) number** are used for keeping track of missing or out-of-order packets. Flags such as SYN, ACK, and FIN can be set in the header to indicate that the packet has some special meaning in the TCP protocol.

Source port	16 bits	Destination port	16 bits
Sequence Number			
Acknowledgment Number			
Flags		Checksum	

Figure 8: The TCP packet header.

A unique TCP connection is identified by a 5-tuple of (Client IP Address, Client Port, Server IP Address, Server Port, Protocol), where protocol is always TCP. In other words, a TCP connection is a sequence of back-and-forth communications between one port on one IP address, and another port on another IP address.

TCP communication works between any two machines, but it is most commonly used between a **client** requesting a service (such as your computer) and a **server** providing the service. To provide a service, the server waits for connection requests (sometimes called listening for requests), usually on a well-known port. To request the service, the client makes a connection request to that server's IP address and well-known port.

A TCP connection consists of two bytestreams of data: one from the client to the server, and one from the server to the client. The data in each stream is indexed using sequence numbers. Since there are two streams, there are two sets of sequence numbers in each TCP connection, one for each bytestream.




Figure 9: TCP communication.

In every TCP packet, the sequence number field in the header is set to the index of the first byte sent in that packet. In packets from the client to the server, the sequence number is an index in the client-to-server bytestream, and in packets from the server to the client, the sequence number is an index in the server-to-client bytestream. If packets are reordered, the end hosts can use the sequence numbers to reconstruct the message in the correct order.

To ensure packets are successfully delivered, when one side receives a TCP packet, it must reply with an acknowledgment saying that it received the packet. If the packet was dropped in transit, the recipient will never send an acknowledgment, and after a timeout period, the sender will re-send that packet.

If the packet is delivered, but the acknowledgment is dropped in transit, the sender will notice that it never received an acknowledgment and will re-send the packet. The recipient will see a duplicate packet (since the original packet was delivered), discard the duplicate, and re-send the acknowledgment.

Sending acknowledgment packets is wasteful in a two-way communication, so TCP combines acknowledgment packets with data packets. Each TCP packet can contain both data and an acknowledgment that a previous packet was received.

To support acknowledgments, the acknowledgment (ACK) number in the header is set to the index of the last byte received, plus 1. (This is equivalent to the index of the next byte the sender expects to receive.) In other words, in packets from the client to the server, the ACK number is the next unsent byte in the server-to-client stream, and in packets from the server to the client, the ACK number is the next unsent byte in the client-to-server stream.

Note that in each packet, the sequence number is an index in the sender's bytestream, and the ACK number is an index in the recipient's bytestream.




Figure 10: The TCP handshake.

Note that the sequence numbers do not start at 0 (for a security reason discussed below). Instead, to initiate a connection, the client and server participate in a three-way **TCP handshake** to exchange random initial sequence numbers.

1. The client sends a **SYN packet** (a packet with no data and the SYN flag set) to the server. The client sets the sequence number field to a random 32-bit **initial sequence number (ISN)**.
2. If the server decides to accept the request, it sends back a **SYN-ACK packet** (a packet with no data and both the SYN flag and ACK flag set). The server sets the sequence number field to its own random 32-bit initial sequence number (note that this is different from the client's ISN). The acknowledgement number is set to the client's initial sequence number + 1.  
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3. The client responds with an **ACK packet** (a packet with no data and the ACK flag set). The sequence number is set to the client's initial sequence number + 1, and the acknowledgement number is set to the server's initial sequence number + 1.

To end a connection, one side sends a FIN (a packet with the FIN flag set), and the other side replies with a FIN-ACK. This indicates that the side that sent the FIN will not send any more data, but can continue accepting data. This leaves the TCP connection in a “half closed” state, where one side stops sending but will receive and acknowledge further information. When the other side is done, it sends its own FIN as well, and it is acknowledged with a FIN-ACK reply.

Connections can also be unilaterally aborted. If one side sends a RST packet with a proper sequence number, this tells the other side that “I won’t send any more data on this connection and I won’t accept any more data on this connection.” Unlike FIN packets, RST packets are not acknowledged. A RST usually indicates something went wrong, such as a program crashing or abruptly terminating a connection.

## 30.5 Tradeoffs between TCP and UDP

TCP is slower than UDP, because it requires a 3-way handshake at the start of each connection, and it will wait indefinitely for dropped packets to resent. However, TCP provides better correctness guarantees than UDP.

UDP is generally used for applications that don't care about correctness concern. For example, DNS requires extremely short response times, so it uses UDP. Video games and voice applications often use UDP, because if one packet is lost, it is better to just miss a request than to stall everything waiting for it.

## 30.6 Attack: TCP Packet Injection

The main attack in TCP is **packet injection**. The attacker spoofs a malicious packet, filling in the header so that the packet looks like it came from someone in the TCP connection.

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A related attack is **RST injection**. Instead of sending a packet with malicious data, the attacker sends a packet with the RST flag, causing the connection to abruptly terminate. This attack is useful for censorship; for example, Comcast used RST injection to abruptly terminate BitTorrent uploads.

Recall that there are three types of network attackers. Each one has different capabilities in attacking the TCP protocol.

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**Off-path Adversary:** The off-path adversary cannot read or modify any messages over the connection. Therefore, to attack a TCP communication, an off-path adversary must know or guess the values of the client IP, client port, server IP, and server port. Usually, the server IP address and port are well-known. Whether we know the client IP or port depends on our threat model. The off-path attacker must also guess the sequence number to inject a packet into the communication, because if the sequence number is too far off from what the recipient is expecting, it will reject the spoofed packet. Sanity check: What is the approximate probability of correctly guessing a random sequence number?<sup>9</sup>

**On-path Adversary:** The on-path adversary can read, but not modify messages. Since they can read the sequence numbers, IP addresses, and ports being used in the connection, an on-path adversary can inject messages into a TCP connection without guessing any values. As a concrete example, assume Alice has just sent a packet to Bob with sequence number X, and Bob responds with a packet of his own with sequence number Y and ACK X + 1. An on-path adversary Mallory wants to inject data into this TCP connection. While she cannot stop Alice from responding (because Mallory is not a man-in-the-middle), Mallory can race Alice's next packet with her own, using sequence number X + 1, ACK Y + 1, and Alice's IP and port. Since TCP on its own does not provide integrity, Bob will not be able to distinguish which message actually came from Alice, and which one came from Mallory.

**In-path Adversary:** The in-path (man-in-the-middle) adversary has all the powers of the on-path adversary and can additionally modify and block messages sent by either party. As

<sup>9</sup>The sequence number is 32 bits, so guessing a random sequence number succeeds with probability  $1/2^{32}$ .

a result, the same attack as the on-path adversary outlined above applies, and in addition, the in-path adversary doesn't have to leave the party they are attacking. A man-in-the-middle can just block the message from ever arriving to the other party and send their own.

### 30.7 Defenses:



initial sequence numbers

The main problem here is that TCP itself provides no confidentiality or integrity guarantees. To prevent injection attacks, we rely on TLS, which is a higher-layer protocol that secures TCP communication.

One important defense against sequence number attacks is using random, unpredictable initial sequence numbers. This makes it much harder for an attacker to guess the correct sequence number with very low probability.

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## 31 TLS

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TLS (Transport Layer Security) is a protocol that provides an end-to-end encrypted communication channel. (You may sometimes see SSL, which is the old, deprecated version of TLS.) **End-to-end** guarantees that even if any one part of the communication chain is compromised (e.g., if the packet passes through a malicious AS), no one except the sender is able to read or modify the data being sent.

The original OSI 7-layer model did not include TLS. Instead, it was considered a layer 6.5 protocol. It is used to provide security guarantees between layer 4 TCP (layers 5 and 6 are obsolete), and it is used to provide security guarantees to layer 7 applications. Examples of applications that use TLS are HTTP, which is renamed HTTPS if TLS is used; SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol), which uses the STARTTLS command to enable TLS on emails; and VPN (Virtual Private Network) connections, which encrypt the user's traffic.

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TLS relies on TCP to guarantee that messages are delivered reliably in the proper order. From the application viewpoint, TLS is effectively just like a TCP connection with additional security guarantees.

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### 31.1 TLS Handshake




Figure 11: Part 1 of TLS handshake.

Because it's built on top of TCP, the TLS handshake starts with a TCP handshake. This lets us abstract away the notion of best-effort, fixed-size packets and think in terms of reliable messages for the rest of the TLS protocol.

The first message, `ClientHello`, presents a random number  $R_B$  and a list of encryption protocols it supports. The client can optionally also send the name of the server it actually wants to contact.

The second message, `ServerHello`, replies with its own random number  $R_S$ , the selected encryption protocol,  certificate, which contains a copy of the server's public key signed by a **certificate authority** (CA).

If the client trusts the  certificate (e.g. that CA is included in the Chrome browser's pinned list), then the client can use the signature to verify the server's public key . If the client doesn't directly trust the CA, it may need to verify a chain of certificates until it reaches the trusted root of the certificate chain. Either way, the client now has a trusted copy of the server's public key.

What is the public key being sent here? Every server implementing TLS must maintain a public/private key pair in order to support the PS exchange step you'll see next. We will assume that only the server knows the private key - if an attacker steals the private key, they would be able to impersonate the server, and the security guarantees no longer hold.

Sanity check: After the first two messages, can the client be certain that it is talking to the genuine server and not an impostor?<sup>10</sup>

The next step in TLS is to generate a random **Premaster Secret (PS)** known to only the client and the server. The PS should be generated so that no eavesdropper can determine the PS based on the data sent over the connection, and no one except the client and the legitimate server have enough information to derive the PS.

The first way to derive a shared PS is to encrypt it with RSA, shown in the second arrow here:

---

<sup>10</sup>A: No. An attacker can obtain the genuine server's certificate by starting its own TLS connection with the genuine server, and then present a copy of that certificate in step 2.

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


Figure 12: Part 2 of TLS handshake (RSA version).

Here, the client generates the random PS, encrypts it with the server's public key, and sends it to the server, which decrypts using its private key.

Sanity check: How can the client be sure it's using the correct public key?<sup>11</sup>

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We can verify that this method satisfies all the properties of a PS. Because it is encrypted when sent across the channel, no eavesdropper can decrypt and figure out its value. Also, only the legitimate server will be able to decrypt the PS (using its secret key), so only the client and the legitimate server will know the value of the PS.

The second way to generate a PS is to use Diffie-Hellman key exchange, shown in the second (red) and third (blue) arrows here:

---

<sup>11</sup>A: It was signed by a certificate authority in the previous step.




Figure 13: Part 2 of TLS handshake (Diffie-Hellman version).

The exchange looks just like classic Diffie-Hellman, except the server signs its half of the exchange with its secret key. The shared PS is the result of the key exchange,  $g^{ab} \text{ mod } p$ .

Again, we can verify that this satisfies the properties of a PS. Diffie-Hellman's security properties guarantee that eavesdroppers cannot figure out PS, and no one but the client and the server know PS. We can be sure that the server is legitimate because the server's half of the key exchange is signed with its secret key.

An alternate implementation here is to use Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE). The specifics are out of scope, but it provides the same guarantees as regular DHE using elliptic curve math.

Generating the PS with DHE and ECDHE has a substantial advantage over RSA key exchange, because it provides **forward secrecy**. Suppose an attacker records lots of RSA-based TLS communications, and some time in the future manages to steal the server's private key. Now the attacker can decrypt PS values sent in old connections, which violates the security of those old TLS connections.

On the other hand, if the attacker steals the private key of a server using DHE or ECDHE-based TLS, they have no way of discovering the PS values of old connections, because the secrets required to generate the PS ( $a, b$ ) cannot be discovered using the data sent over the connection ( $g^a, g^b \text{ mod } p$ ). Starting from TLS 1.3, RSA key exchanges are no longer allowed for this reason.

Now that both client and server have a shared PS, they will each use the PS and the random values  $R_B$  and  $R_S$  to derive a set of four shared symmetric keys: an encryption key  $C_B$  and

an integrity key  $I_B$  for the client, and an encryption key  $C_S$  and an integrity key  $I_S$  for the server.

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Up until now, every message has been sent in plaintext over TLS. Sanity check: how might this be vulnerable?<sup>12</sup>

In order to ensure integrity, both the client and server generate MACs over all messages sent so far, and verify MACs over all messages sent so far. Notice that the client uses its own integrity key  $I_B$  to MAC the message, and the server uses its own integrity key  $I_S$ . Hence, both client and server know the value of  $I_B$  and  $I_S$  so that they can verify each other's MACs.



At the end of a proper TLS handshake, we have several security guarantees. (Sanity check: where in the handshake did these guarantees come from?)

1. The client is talking to the legitimate server.
2. No one has tampered with the handshake.
3. The client and server share a set of symmetric keys, unique to this connection, that no one else knows.

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Once the handshake is complete, messages are encrypted and MAC'd with the encryption and integrity keys of the sender before being sent. Because these messages have full confidentiality and integrity, TLS has achieved end-to-end security between the client and the server.

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### 31.2 Replay attacks

Recall that a **replay attack** involves an attacker recording old messages and sending them to the server. Even though the attacker doesn't know what these messages decrypt to, if the protocol doesn't properly defend against replay attacks, the server might accept these messages as valid and allow the attacker to spoof a connection.

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The public values  $R_B$  and  $R_S$  at the start of the handshake defend against replay attacks. To see why, let's assume that  $R_B = R_S = 0$  every time and try to execute a replay attack on RSA-based TLS. Since the attacker is sending the same encrypted PS, and  $R_B$  and  $R_S$  are not changing, the server will re-generate the same symmetric keys. Now the attacker can replay messages from the old TLS connection, which will be accepted by the server because they have the correct MACs. Using new, randomly generated values  $R_B$  and  $R_S$  every time ensures that each connection results in a different set of symmetric keys, so replay attacks trying to establish a new connection with the same keys will fail.

What about a replay attack within the same connection? In practice, messages sent over TLS usually include some counter or timestamp so that an attacker cannot record a TLS message and send it again within the same connection.

<sup>12</sup>A: TCP is insecure against on-path and MITM attackers, who can spoof messages.

### 31.3 TLS in practice

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The biggest advantage and problem of TLS is the certificate authorities. “Trust does not scale”, that is, you personally can’t make trust decisions about everyone, but trust can be delegated, which is how TLS operates. We have delegated to a large number of companies, the **Certificate Authorities**, responsibility of proving that a particular public key can speak for a particular site. This allows the system to work at all. But at the same time, unless additional measures are taken, this means that all CAs need to be trusted to speak for every site. A browser, for example, has a “pinned” CA list, so only some CAs are allowed to issue certificates.

Similarly, newer CAs implement **certificate transparency**, a mechanism where anyone can see all the certificates the CA has issued, implemented as a hash chain. Such CAs may issue a certificate incorrectly, but the impersonated victim can at least know this has happened. Certificates also expire and can be revoked, where a list of no-longer accepted certificates is published and regularly downloaded by a web browser or an online-service provides a mechanism to check if a particular certificate is revoked.

These days TLS is effectively free. The computational overhead is minor to the point of trivial: an ECDSA signature and ECDHE key exchange for the server, and such signatures and key exchanges are computationally minor: a single modern processor core can do tens of thousands of signatures or key exchanges per second. And once the key exchange is completed the bulk encryption is nearly free as most processors include routines specifically designed to accelerate AES.

This leaves the biggest cost of TLS in managing the private keys. Previously CAs charged a substantial amount to issue a certificate, but LetsEncrypt costs nothing because they have fully automated the process. You run a small program on your web server that generates keys, sends the public key to LetsEncrypt, and LetsEncrypt instructs that you put a particular file in a particular location on your server, acting to prove that you control the server. So LetsEncrypt has reduced the cost in two ways. It makes the TLS certificate monetarily free and, as important, makes it very easy to generate and use.

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## 32 DNS

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The Internet is commonly indexed in two different ways. Humans refer to websites using human-readable names such as `google.com` and `eecs.berkeley.edu`, while computers refer to websites using IP addresses such as `172.217.4.174` and `23.195.69.108`. **DNS**, or the **Domain Name System**, is a protocol that translates between the two.

### 32.1 Name servers

It would be great if there were a single server that stored a mapping from every domain to every IP address that ever existed. Unfortunately, there is no server big enough to store the IP address of every domain on the Internet and fast enough to handle the volume of DNS requests generated by the entire world. Instead, DNS uses a collection of many **name servers**, which are servers dedicated to replying to DNS requests.

Each name server is responsible for a specific zone of domains, so that no single server needs to store every domain on the Internet. For example, a name server responsible for the `.com` zone only needs to answer queries for domains that end in `.com`. This name server doesn't need to store any DNS information related to `wikipedia.org`. Likewise, a name server responsible for the `berkeley.edu` zone doesn't need to store any DNS information related to `stanford.edu`.

Even though it has a special purpose (responding to DNS requests), a name server is just like any other server you can contact on the Internet—each one has a human-readable domain name (e.g. `a.edu-servers.net`) and a computer-readable IP address (e.g. `192.5.6.30`). Be careful not to confuse the domain name with the zone. For example, this name server has `.net` in its domain, but it responds to DNS requests for `.edu` domains.

### 32.2 Name server hierarchy


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You might notice two problems with this design. First, the `.com` zone may be smaller than the entire Internet, but it is still impractical for one name server to store all domains ending in `.com`. Second, if there are many name servers, how does your computer know which one to contact?

DNS solves both of these problems by introducing a new idea: when you query a name server, instead of always returning the IP address of the domain you queried, the name server can also direct you to another name server for the answer. This allows name servers with large zones such as `.edu` to redirect your query to other name servers with smaller zones such as `berkeley.edu`. Now, the name server for the `.edu` zone doesn't need to store any information about `eecs.berkeley.edu`, `math.berkeley.edu`, etc. Instead, the `.edu` name server stores information about the `berkeley.edu` name server and redirects requests for `eecs.berkeley.edu`, `math.berkeley.edu`, etc. to a `berkeley.edu` name server.

DNS arranges all the name servers in a tree hierarchy based on their zones:

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The **root server** at the top level of the tree has all domains in its zone (this zone is usually written as `.`). Name servers at lower levels of the tree have smaller, more specific zones. Each name server is only responsible for storing information about their children, except for the name servers at the bottom of the tree, which are responsible for storing the actual mappings from domain names to IP addresses.

DNS queries always start at the root. The root will direct your query to one of its children name servers. Then you make a query to the child name server, and that name server redirects you to one of its children. The process repeats until you make a query to a name server at the bottom of the tree, which will return the IP address corresponding to your domain.

To redirect you to a child name server, the parent name server must provide the child's zone, human-readable domain name, and IP address, so that you can contact that child name server for more information.

As an example, a DNS query for `eeecs.berkeley.edu` might have the following steps. (A comic version of this query is available at <https://howdns.works/>.)




Figure 15: Steps of a DNS query.

1. You to the root name server: Please tell me the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu.
2. Root server to you: I don't know, but I can redirect you to another name server with more information. This name server is responsible for the .edu zone. It has human-readable domain name a.edu-servers.net and IP address 192.5.6.30.

3. You to the .edu name server: Please tell me the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu.

4. The .edu name server to you: I don't know, but I can redirect you to another name server with more information. This name server is responsible for the berkeley.edu zone. It has human-readable domain name adns1.berkeley.edu and IP address 128.32.136.3



5. You to the berkeley.edu name server: Please tell me the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu.
6. The berkeley.edu name server to you: OK, the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu is 23.185.0.1.

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A note on who is actually sending the DNS queries in this example: Your computer can manually perform DNS lookups, but in practice, your local computer usually delegates the task of DNS lookups to a **DNS Recursive Resolver**, provided by your Internet service provider (ISP), which sends the queries, processes the responses, and maintains an internal cache of records. When performing a lookup, the **DNS Stub Resolver** on your computer sends a query to the recursive resolver, lets it do all the work, and receives the response. When thinking about DNS requests, you can usually focus on the messages being sent between the recursive resolver and the name server.

Congratulations, you now understand how DNS translates domains to IP addresses! The rest of this section describes the specific implementation details of DNS.

### 32.3 DNS Message Format

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Since every website lookup must start with a DNS query, DNS is designed to be very lightweight and fast - it uses UDP (best-effort packets, no TCP handshakes) and has a fairly simple message format.

16 bits	16 bits
Identification	Flags
# Questions	# Answer RRs
# Authority RRs	# Additional RRs
Questions (variable # of RRs)	
Answers (variable # of RRs)	
Authority (variable # of RRs)	
Additional info (variable # of RRs)	

Figure 16: The DNS packet header.

The first field is a 16 bit **identification field** that is randomly selected per query and used to match requests to responses. When a DNS query is sent, the ID field is filled with random

bits. Since UDP is stateless, the DNS response must send back the same bits in the ID field so that the original query sender knows which DNS query the response corresponds to.

Sanity check: Which type(s) of adversary can read this ID field? Which type(s) of adversary cannot read the ID field and must guess it when attacking DNS?<sup>13</sup>

The next 16 bits are used to indicate if the message is a query or a response, as well as to indicate if the query was successful (e.g. the NOERROR flag is set in the message). The AIN flag is set in the reply if the query asked about a non-existent name.

The next field specifies the number of questions asked (in practice, this is always 1). The three fields after that are used in response messages and specify the number of **resource records** (RRs) contained in the message. We'll describe each of these categories of RRs in depth later.

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The rest of the message contains the actual content of the DNS query/response. This content is always structured as a set of RRs, where each RR is a key-value pair with an associated type.

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For completeness, a DNS record key is formally defined as a 3-tuple <Name, Class, Type>, where Name is the actual key data, Class is always IN for Internet (except for special queries used to get information about DNS itself), and Type specifies the record type. A DNS record value contains <TTL, Value>, where TTL is the time-to-live (how long, in seconds, the record can be cached), and Value is the actual value data.

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There are two main types of records in DNS. A **A type records** map domains to IP addresses. The key is a domain, and the value is an IP address. **NS type records** map zones to domains. The key is a zone, and the value is a domain.

Important takeaways from this section: Each DNS packet has a 16-bit random ID field, some metadata, and a set of resource records. Each record falls into one of four categories (question, answer, authority, additional), and each record contains a type, a key, and a value. There are A type records and NS type records.

## 32.4 DNS Lookup

Now, let's walk through a real DNS query for the IP address of `eecs.berkeley.edu`. You can try this at home with the `dig` utility—remember to set the `+norecurse` flag so you can unravel the recursion yourself.

Every DNS query begins with the root server. For redundancy, there are actually 13 root servers located around the world. We can look up the **IP addresses** of the root servers, which are public and well-known. In a real recursive resolver, these addresses are usually hardcoded.

The first root server has domain `a.root-servers.net` and IP address `198.41.0.4`. We can use `dig` to send a DNS request to this address, asking for the IP address of `eecs.berkeley.edu`.

<sup>13</sup>A: MITM and on-path can read the ID field. Off-path must guess the ID field.

\$ dig +norecurse eecs.berkeley.edu @ 192.41.0.1

```
; ; Got answer:  
;; ->>HEADER< status: NOERROR, id: 26114  
;; flags: qr; rcode: 0, AUTHORITY: 13, ADDITIONAL: 27  
;;  
;; QUESTION SECTION:  
;eecs.berkeley.edu. IN A  
;;  
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:  
.edu. 172800 IN NS a.edu-servers.net.  
.edu. 172800 IN NS b.edu-servers.net.  
.edu. 172800 IN NS c.edu-servers.net.  
...  
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:  
a.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.5.6.30  
b.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.33.14.30  
c.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.26.92.30  
...
```

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In the first section of the answer, we can see the header information, including the ID field (26114), the return flags (NOERROR), and the number of records returned in each section.

The **question section** contains 1 record (you can verify by seeing QUERY: 1 in the header). It has key eecs.berkeley.edu, type A, and a blank value. This represents the domain we queried for (the value is blank because we don't know the corresponding IP address).

The **answer section** is blank (ANSWER: 0 in the header), because the root server didn't provide a direct answer to our query.

The **authority section** contains 13 records. The first one has key .edu, type NS, and value a.edu-servers.net. This is the root server giving us the zone and the domain name of the next name server we should contact. Each record in this section corresponds to a potential name server we could ask next.

The **additional section** contains 27 records. The first one has key a.edu-servers.net, type A, and value 192.5.6.30. This is the root server giving us the IP address of the next name server by mapping a domain from the authority section to an IP address.

Together, the authority section and additional section combined give us the zone, domain name, and IP address of the next name server. This information is spread across two sections to maintain the key-value structure of the DNS message.

For completeness: 172800 is the TTL (time-to-live) for each record, set at 172,800 seconds = 48 hours here. The IN is the Internet class and can basically be ignored. Sometimes you

will see records of type AAAA which correspond to IPv6 addresses (the usual A-type records correspond to IPv4 addresses).

Sanity check: What name server do we query next? How do we know where that name server is located? What do we query that name server for?<sup>14</sup>

```
$ dig +norecurse eecs.berkeley.edu @192.5.6.30  
;; Got answer  
;; ->>HEADER<<  
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 5  
;; QUESTION SECTION:  
;eecs.berkeley.edu. IN A  
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:  
berkeley.edu. 172800 IN NS adns1.berkeley.edu.  
berkeley.edu. 172800 IN NS adns2.berkeley.edu.  
berkeley.edu. 172800 IN NS adns3.berkeley.edu.  
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:  
adns1.berkeley.edu. 172800 IN A 128.32.136.3  
adns2.berkeley.edu. 172800 IN A 128.32.136.14  
adns3.berkeley.edu. 172800 IN A 192.107.102.142  
...  
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```

The next query also has an empty answer section, with NS records in the authority section and A records in the additional section which give us the domains and IP addresses of name servers responsible for the berkeley.edu zone.

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```
$ dig +norecurse eecs.berkeley.edu @128.32.136.3  
;; Got answer:  
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 52788  
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1  
;; QUESTION SECTION:  
;eecs.berkeley.edu. IN A  
;; ANSWER SECTION:  
eecs.berkeley.edu. 86400 IN A 23.185.0.1
```

Finally, the last query gives us the IP address corresponding to eecs.berkeley.edu in the

<sup>14</sup>Query a.edu-servers.net, whose location we know because of the records in the additional section. Query for the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu just like before.

form of a single A type record in the answer section.

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In practice, because the recursive resolver caches as many answers as possible, most queries can skip the first few steps and used cached records instead of asking root servers and high-level name servers like .edu every time. Caching helps speed up DNS, because fewer packets need to be sent across the network to translate a domain name to an IP address. Caching also helps reduce requests to the highest-level name servers.

### 32.5 DNS Security

DNS is insecure against a compromised name server. For example, if a berkeley.edu name server was taken over by an attacker, it could send answer records that point to malicious IP addresses.

However, a more dangerous exploit is using the additional section to poison the cache with even more malicious IP addresses. For example, this malicious DNS response would cause the resolver to associate google.com with an attacker-owned IP address 6.6.6.6.

```
$ dig +norecurse eecs.berkeley.edu @192.5.6.30
```

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```
...
```

```
; ; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
```

adns1.berkeley.edu	1172800	IN	A	128.32.136.3
www.google.com	999999	IN	A	6.6.6.6

```
...
```

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To prevent any malicious name server from doing too much damage, resolvers implement **bailiwick checking**. With bailiwick checking, a name server is only allowed to provide records in its zone. This means that the berkeley.edu name server can only provide records for domains under berkeley.edu (not stanford.edu), the .edu name server can only provide records for domains under .edu (not google.com), and the root name servers can provide records for anything.

### 32.6 DNS Security: On-path attackers and off-path attackers

Against an on-path attacker, DNS is completely insecure - everything is sent over plaintext, so an attacker can read the request, construct a malicious response message with malicious records and the correct ID field, and race to send the malicious reply before the legitimate response. If the time-to-live (TTL) of the malicious records is set to a very high number, then the victim will cache those malicious records for a very long time.

For both on-path and off-path attackers, if the legitimate response arrives before the fake response, it is cached. Caching limits the attacker to only a few tries per week, because future requests for that domain can reference the cache, so no DNS queries are sent. Since off-path attackers must guess the ID field with a  $1/2^{16}$  probability of success, and they only get a few tries per week, DNS was believed to be secure against off-path attackers, until Dan

Kaminsky discovered a flaw in the DNS protocol in 2008. This attack was so severe that Kaminsky was awarded with a [Wikimedia article](#).

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### 32.7 DNS Security: Kaminsky attack

The Kaminsky attack allows on-path attackers to race until their fake response arrives first for nonexistent domains. Remember that the legitimate response for a nonexistent domain is an NXDOMAIN status with no other records, which means that nothing else can be added to the response. This allows the attacker to repeatedly race until they win, without having to wait for the legitimate response to expire.

An attacker can now add additional records in the fake response for the nonexistent `fake161.berkeley.edu`:

```
$ dig fake161.berkeley.edu  
;; Got answer:  
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 29439  
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1  
;; QUESTION SECTION:  
;fake161.berkeley.edu. IN A  
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:  
berkeley.edu. 999999 IN A 6.6.6.6
```

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If the fake response arrives first, the resolver will cache the malicious additional record. Notice that this doesn't violate bailiwick checking, since the name server responsible for answering `fake161.berkeley.edu` can provide a record for `berkeley.edu`.

Now that the attacker can query as many times as they want, all that's left is to force a victim to make thousands of DNS queries for nonexistent domains. This can be achieved by tricking the victim into visiting a website that tries to load lots of nonexistent domains:

```
  
  
  
...
```

This HTML snippet will cause the victim's browser to try and fetch images from `http://fake001.berkeley.edu/image.jpg`, `http://fake002.berkeley.edu/image.jpg`, etc. To fetch these images, the browser will first make a DNS request for the domains `fake001.berkeley.edu`, `fake002.berkeley.edu`, etc. For each request, if the legitimate response arrives before the malicious response, or if the off-path attacker incorrectly guesses the ID field, nothing is cached, so the attacker can immediately try again when the victim makes the next DNS request to the next non-existent domain.

The Kaminsky attack allows on-path attackers to race until their fake response arrives first

and off-path attackers to race until they successfully guess the ID field. There is no way to completely eliminate the Kaminsky attack in regular DNS, although modern DNS protocols add **UDP source port randomization** to make it much harder.

Recall that UDP is a transport-layer protocol like TCP, so a UDP packet requires a source port and destination port. The destination port must be well-known and constant (in practice, it is always 53). When a resolver sends UDP packets to the correct port on the name server. However, DNS does not tell the resolver what source port the resolver uses to send queries, so source port randomization is used. The name server must send the response back to the correct source port of the resolver, so it must include the source port in the response message. The destination port of the response is the destination port field of the response. Now, an attacker must guess the random source port and the 16-bit source port in order to successfully forge a response packet. This decreases an off-path attacker's probability of success to  $1/2^{32}$ , which is much harder, but certainly not impossible.




Figure 17: Source port randomization.

Sanity check: How much extra security does source port randomization provide against on-path attackers?<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>A: None, on-path attackers can see the source port value.

## 33 DNSSEC

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DNSSEC is an extension to regular DNS that provides integrity and authentication on all DNS messages sent. Sanity check: Why do we not care about the confidentiality of DNSSEC?<sup>16</sup>



### 33.1 Signing records

We want every DNS server to sign every record it sends with its private key. This ensures integrity and authenticity, and we want everyone to be able to verify the integrity and authenticity of records. Digital signatures are a good fit in this situation, because only someone with the private key can create signatures, and everyone can use the public key to verify signatures.

To ensure integrity and authenticity, let's have every name server generate a public/private key pair and sign every record it sends with its private key. When the name server receives a DNS request, it sends the records, along with a signature on the records and the public key, to the resolver. The resolver uses the public key to verify the signature on the records.

Because of the signatures, a network attacker MITM (inter-path or eavesdropper) cannot tamper with the data or inject malicious data without being detected (integrity). Also, the resolver can cache the signatures and the public key, and check at any time that the records actually came from the name server (authenticity).

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You might see a flaw in this design: what if a name server is malicious? Then the malicious name server could return valid signatures on malicious records. How do we modify our design to prevent this?

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### 33.2 Delegating trust

The main issue in our design so far is we lack a *trust anchor*. We want DNSSEC to defend against malicious name servers, so we cannot implicitly trust the name servers. However, if we don't trust anybody, then DNSSEC will never work (we'll never trust any records we get), so we must first choose a trust anchor, an entity that we implicitly trust. In DNSSEC, the root servers are the trust anchor: every computer automatically assumes that the root server is honest and uncompromised. In real life, this is a safe assumption, because the organizations overseeing the Internet hold painstakingly formal ceremonies to ensure that the root server is uncompromised. (If you're interested, you can [read more about the root signing ceremony here](#).)

Given a trust anchor, we can now *delegate trust* from the trust anchor to somebody else. If the root endorses Alice, then you can be sure that Alice is trusted as well, since you implicitly trust the root. Also, if Alice endorses Bob, then you can be sure that Bob is trusted, since you trust Alice. This trust delegation starting from the root is how DNSSEC delegates trust from the root to all legitimate name servers, while protecting against malicious name servers.

<sup>16</sup>A: DNS responses don't contain sensitive data. Anyone could query the name servers for the same information.

Consider two parties, root and Alice, who each have a public key and a private key. You trust root, because it is the trust anchor. The root can delegate trust to Alice by *signing Alice's public key*. The root's signature on Alice's public key effectively says that Alice's public key is trustworthy, and the root trusts any message signed by Alice using her corresponding private key.

Now, when Alice signs a message, you can use Alice's public key to verify that the message was properly signed. You know that Alice's public key is trusted, because the root has signed it, and the root is the root.

If Alice was malicious, she could not delegate trust to her by signing her public key, because we are not honest and uncompromised.

We can apply this delegation idea to the entire DNS tree. Each name server will sign the public key of all its trusted children name servers. For example, root signs .edu's public key. We trust root, and root signed .edu's public key, so now we trust .edu. Next, .edu signs berkeley.edu's public key. We trust .edu, and .edu signed berkeley.edu's public key, so now we trust berkeley.edu.

### 33.3 DNSSEC Intuition

With these ideas in mind, let's revisit the DNS query for eecs.berkeley.edu from earlier and convert it to a secure DNSSEC query. The DNSSEC additions are italicized.

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


Figure 18: Steps of a DNS query.

1. You to the root name server: Please tell me the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu.
2. Root server to you: I don't know, but I can redirect you to another name server with more information. This name server is responsible for the .edu zone. It has human-readable domain name `a.edu-servers.net` and IP address `192.5.6.30`. *Here is a signature on the next name server's public key. If you trust me, then now you trust them too. Finally, here is my public key.*
3. You to the .edu name server: Please tell me the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu.
4. The .edu name server to you: I don't know, but I can redirect you to another name server with more information. This name server is responsible for the berkeley.edu

zone. It has human-readable domain name `adns1.berkeley.edu` and IP address `128.32.136.3`. *Here is a signature on the next name server's public key. If you trust me, then now you trust them too. Finally, here is my public key.*

5. You to the `berkeley.edu` name server: Please tell me the IP address of `eeecs.berkeley.edu`.
6. The `berkeley.edu` name server to you: OK, the IP address of `eeecs.berkeley.edu` is `23.185.0.1`.  *A QR code linking to the Tutor CS website, featuring a graduation cap icon and the text "Tutor CS".*

Note that we implicitly trust messages from the root, because the root is our trust anchor. In practice, most DNS servers have the root's public key hardcoded, and any messages verified with this key are implicitly trusted.

Congratulations, you now have all the intuition for how DNSSEC works! The rest of this section shows how we implement this design in DNS.

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### 33.4 New DNSSEC record types

To store cryptographic information in DNS messages, we need to introduce a few new record types.

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The **DNSKEY type record** encodes a public key.

The **RRSIG type record** is a signature on a set of multiple other records in the message, all of the same type. For example, if the authority section returns 13 NS type records, you can sign all 13 records at once with one RRSIG type record. However, to sign the 26 A type records in the additional section, you would need another RRSIG type record. In addition to the actual cryptographic signature, the RRSIG type record contains the type of the records being signed, the signature creation and expiration date, and the identity of the signer (information about which public key/DNSKEY record should be used to verify this signature).

The **DS (Delegated Signer)** type record is a hash of the signer's name and a child's public key. The DS record, combined with a RRSIG record that signs the DS record, effectively allows each name server to sign the public key of its trusted children.

All DNSSEC cryptographic records additionally include some (uninteresting) metadata, such as which algorithm was used for signing/verifying/hashing.

You might have noticed that the number of additional records is always 1 more than the actual number of additional records that appear in the response. For example, consider the final query in our regular DNS query walkthrough:

```
$ dig +norecurse eecs.berkeley.edu @128.32.136.3

;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 52788
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;eecs.berkeley.edu.           IN      A
```

;; ANSWER SECTION:  
eecs.berkeley.edu. 86400 IN A 23.185.0.1

The response report shows one record but shows no additional records at all. This extra record corresponds to the pseudosection (seen just above the question section). This pseudosection contains DNSSEC-specific flags (e.g. the D0 flag requests DNSSEC information). To be backwards-compatible with regular DNS, the section is encoded as a separate record when sent in the request and the reply.

### 33.5 Key Signing Keys

There is one final complication in DNSSEC—what if a name server wants to change its key pair? A key change is necessary if, for example, an attacker steals the private key of a trusted name server, because now the attacker can impersonate a trusted name server.

In our current DNSSEC design, a name server that wants to change keys must notify its parent name server so that the parent can change the DS record (which endorses the child's public key). As it turns out, this process is difficult to perform securely and can easily go wrong.

To minimize the use of this difficult key change protocol, each DNSSEC name server generates two public/private key pairs. The **key signing key** (KSK) is only used to sign the zone signing key, and the **zone signing key** (ZSK) is used to sign everything else.

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Figure 19: Validating a set of AAAA type records with an RRSIG on them and the public ZSK used to generate the signature. Source: [How DNSSEC Works \(Cloudflare\)](#)

In our previous design with one key pair, the name server sends (1) a set of records, (2) a signature on those records, and (3) the public key (endorsed by the parent). The DNS resolver uses the public key to verify the signature, and accepts the set of records.

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Figure 20: Validating a ZSK with an RRSIG on it and the public KSK used to generate the signature. Then validating the set of AAAA type records with an RRSIG on them and the public ZSK used to generate the signature. Source: [How DNSSEC Works \(Cloudflare\)](#)

In our new design with two key pairs, the name server sends (1) the public ZSK, (2) a signature on the public ZSK, and (3) the public KSK (endorsed by the parent). The DNS resolver uses the public KSK to verify the signature, and accepts the public ZSK. Note that this is the exact same structure that was used to sign records before, but in this case, the record is the public ZSK, signed using the KSK.

Another way to think about this step is to recall that a parent endorses a child by signing its public key. You can think of the KSK as the “parent” and the ZSK as the “child,” both within one name server. The parent (KSK) endorses the child (ZSK) by signing the public ZSK.

The result of this first step is that we now have a trusted public ZSK. The second step is the same as before: the name server sends a set of records, a signature on those records (using the private ZSK), and the public ZSK (endorsed by the KSK in the previous step).



Figure 21: The DNSSEC chain of trust.

Here is a diagram of the entire two-key DNSSEC. Each color (blue, green, orange) represents a name server. The lighter shade represents records signed with the KSK. The darker shade represents records signed with the ZSK.

Verification would proceed as follows.

- Light blue: Because of our trust anchor, we trust the KSK of the root (1). The root's KSK signs its ZSK, so now we trust the root's ZSK (2-3).
- Dark blue: We trust the root's ZSK. The root's ZSK signs .edu's KSK (4-5), so now we trust .edu's KSK.
- Light green: We trust the .edu's KSK (6). .edu's KSK signs .edu's ZSK, so now we trust .edu's ZSK (7-8).
- Dark green: We trust .edu's ZSK. .edu's ZSK signs berkeley.edu's KSK (9-10), so now we trust berkeley.edu's KSK.

- Light orange: We trust the berkeley.edu's KSK (11). berkeley.edu's KSK signs berkeley.edu's ZSK, so now we trust berkeley.edu's ZSK (12-13).
- Dark orange: We trust berkeley.edu's ZSK. berkeley.edu's ZSK signs the final answer record (14-15), so now we trust the final answer.

## 33.6 DNSSEC

Now we're ready to query in action. As before, you can try this at home with the [dig utility](#). Use the `+norecuse` flag so you can unravel the recursion yourself, and remember to use the `+dnssec` flag to enable DNSSEC.

First, we query the root server for its public keys. Recall that the root's IP address, 198.41.0.4, is publicly-known and hardcoded.

```
$ dig +norecuse +dnssec DNSKEY . @198.41.0.4
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 7149
;; flags: qr aa, QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 3, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; edns: 1472
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;.

IN DNSKEY
;; ANSWER SECTION:
. 172800 IN DNSKEY 256 {ZSK of root}
. 172800 IN DNSKEY 257 {KSK of root}
. 172800 IN RRSIG DNSKEY {signature on DNSKEY records}
...
```

In this response, the root has returned its public ZSK, public KSK, and a `RRSIG` type record over the two `DNSKEY` type records. We can use the public KSK to verify the signature on the public ZSK.

Because we implicitly trust the root's KSK (trust anchor), and the root's KSK signs its ZSK, we now trust the root's ZSK.

Next, we query the root server for the IP address of `ee.cs.berkeley.edu`.

```
$ dig +norecuse +dnssec ee.cs.berkeley.edu @198.41.0.4
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 5232
;; flags: qr; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 15, ADDITIONAL: 27
```

```

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0 flags: do udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;eecs.berkeley.edu.           IN  A

;; AUTHORITY
edu.          IN  NS   a.edu-servers.net.
edu.          IN  NS   b.edu-servers.net.
edu.          IN  NS   c.edu-servers.net.
...
edu.          IN  DS   {hash of .edu's KSK}
edu.          86400 IN  RRSIG DS {signature on DS record}

```



```

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION.
a.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN  A   192.5.6.30
b.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN  A   192.33.14.30
c.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN  A   192.26.92.30
...

```

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DNSSEC doesn't remove any records compared to regular DNS—the question, answer (blank here), authority, and additional sections all contain the same records from regular DNS. However, DNSSEC adds a DS record and a RRSIG signature record on the DS record. Together, these two records sign the KSK of the .edu name server with the root's ZSK. Since we trust the root's ZSK (from the previous step), now we trust the .edu name server's KSK.

Next, we query the .edu name server for its public keys.

```

$ dig +norecurse +dnssec DNSKEY edu. @192.5.6.30
;; Got answer.
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 9776
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 3, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;edu.           IN  DNSKEY

;; ANSWER SECTION:
edu.    86400   IN  DNSKEY 256 {ZSK of .edu}
edu.    86400   IN  DNSKEY 257 {KSK of .edu}
edu.    86400   IN  RRSIG  DNSKEY {signature on DNSKEY records}
...

```

In this response, the .edu name server has returned its public ZSK, public KSK, and a

RRSIG type record over the two DNSKEY type records. We can use the public KSK to verify the signature on the public ZSK.

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Because we trust the .edu name server's KSK (from the previous step), and the .edu KSK signs its ZSK, we now trust the .edu name server's ZSK.

Next, we query the IP address of eecs.berkeley.edu.

```
$ dig +noredirect @berkeley.edu A eecs.berkeley.edu  
berkeley.edu. @192.5.6.30  
;; Got answer:  
;; ->>HEADER<- status: NOERROR, id: 60799  
;; flags: qr; QUERY, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 5, ADDITIONAL: 5  
  
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:  
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096  
;; QUESTION SECTION:  
;eecs.berkeley.edu. IN A  
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:  
berkeley.edu. 172800 IN NS adns1.berkeley.edu.  
berkeley.edu. 172800 IN NS adns2.berkeley.edu.  
berkeley.edu. 172800 IN DS adns3.berkeley.edu  
berkeley.edu. 86400 IN DS {hash of berkeley.edu's KSK}  
berkeley.edu. 86400 IN RRSIG DS {signature on DS record}  
  
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:  
adns1.berkeley.edu. 172800 IN A 128.32.136.3  
adns2.berkeley.edu. 172800 IN A 128.32.136.14  
adns3.berkeley.edu. 172800 IN A 192.167.102.142  
...  
  
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```

In this response, the .edu name server returns NS and A type records that tell us what name server to query next, just like in regular DNS.

In addition, the response has a DS type record and an RRSIG signature on the DS record. Sanity check: which key is used to sign the DS record?<sup>17</sup> Together, these two records sign the KSK of the berkeley.edu name server. Because we trust the .edu name server's ZSK (from the previous step), and the .edu ZSK signs the berkeley.edu KSK, we now trust the berkeley.edu name server's KSK.

Next, we query the berkeley.edu name server for its public keys.

```
$ dig +noredirect +dnssec DNSKEY berkeley.edu @128.32.136.3  
;; Got answer:
```

<sup>17</sup>A: The ZSK of the .edu name server.

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 4169  
 ;; flags: qr aa, QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 5, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1  
 ;  
 ; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:  
 ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do, udp: 1220  
 ; QUESTION SECTION:  
 ;berkeley.edu.  
 ;  
 ; ANSWER SECTION:  
 berkeley.edu. 172800 IN RRSIG DNSKEY {signature on DNSKEY records}  
 ...  


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In this response, the `berkeley.edu` name server has returned its public ZSK, public KSK, and a RRSIG type record over the two DNSKEY type records. We can use the public KSK to verify the signature on the public ZSK.

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Because we trust the `berkeley.edu` name server's KSK (from the previous step), and the `berkeley.edu` KSK signs its ZSK, we now trust the `berkeley.edu` name server's ZSK.

Finally, we query the `berkeley.edu` name server for the IP address of `eeecs.berkeley.edu`.

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```
$ dig +norecurse +dnssec eecs.berkeley.edu @128.32.136.3

;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 21205
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1220
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;eeecs.berkeley.edu.           IN  A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
eeecs.berkeley.edu. 86400   IN  A       23.185.0.1
eeecs.berkeley.edu. 86400   IN  RRSIG  A {signature on A record}
```

This response has the final answer A type record and a signature on the final answer. Because we trust the `berkeley.edu` name server's ZSK (from the previous part), we also trust the final answer.

### 33.7 Nonexistent domains

Remember that DNS is designed to be fast and lightweight. However, public-key cryptography is slow, because it requires math. As a result, name servers that support DNSSEC

sign records *offline*—records are signed ahead of time, and the signatures saved in the server along with the records. When the server receives a DNS query, it can immediately return the saved signature without computing it.

Offline signing works fine for existing domains, but what if we receive a request for a nonexistent domain? The problem is that there are many nonexistent domains, so we cannot sign them all offline. However, we can sign ranges of nonexistent domains *online* either, because this is too slow. Also, or rather, this makes name servers vulnerable to an attack. Sanity check: what's the answer?

DNSSEC has a clever solution to this problem—instead of signing individual nonexistent domains, name servers sign entire ranges of nonexistent domains. Suppose we have a website with three subdomains:

b.example.com  
l.example.com  
q.example.com

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If we sort every possible subdomain alphabetically, there are three ranges of nonexistent domains: everything between b and l, l and q, and q and b (wrapping around from z to a).

Now, if someone queries for c.example.com, instead of signing a message proving the nonexistence of that specific domain, the name server returns a **NSEC record** saying, “No domains exist between b.example.com and l.example.com.” Signed, name server.”

NSEC records have a slight vulnerability - notice that every time we query for a nonexistent domain, we can discover two valid domains that we might have otherwise not known. By traversing the alphabet, an attacker can now learn the names of every subdomain of the website:

1. Query c.example.com. Receive NSEC saying nothing exists between b and l. Attacker now knows b and l exist.  
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2. Query m.example.com. Receive NSEC saying nothing exists between l and q. Attacker now knows q exists.
3. Query r.example.com. Receive NSEC saying nothing exists between q and b. Attacker has already seen b, so they know they have walked the entire alphabet successfully.

Some argue that this is not really a vulnerability, because hiding a domain name like admin.example.com is relying on security through obscurity. Nevertheless, an attempt to fix this was implemented as **NSEC3**, which simply uses the hashes of every domain name instead of the actual domain name.

372fbe338b9f3bb6f857352bc4c6a49721d6066f (l.example.com)  
6898bc7daf3054daae05e8763153ee1506e809d5 (q.example.com)  
f96a6ec2fb6efbe43002f4cbf124f90879424d79 (b.example.com)

<sup>18</sup>A: Denial of service (DoS). Flood the name server with requests for nonexistent domains, and it will be forced to sign all of them.

The order of the domain names has changed, but the process is the same: if someone queries for `c.example.com`, which hashes to `34ca64e4b0e1724fd185c25c935d15529ab0a2`, the NSEC3 record will say, “No domains exist that hash to values between `6898b...` and `f96a6....` Signed, name server.”

Of course, an attacker could PUE and precompute hashes to learn domain names anyway... and [NSEC3](#)... Unfortunately, it's still out of scope for this class.



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## 34 Denial-of-Service (DoS) 程序代写代做 CS编程辅导

### 34.1 Introduction

Since the bandwidth a server can maintain is limited. capacity in order to of its processors to r Any attack that is d



nite, the number of connections a web server can handle to a server needs some minimum amount of network bandwidth. When a server has used up its bandwidth (the ability of any additional attempted connections are dropped. machine or a piece of software to be unavailable and is known as a denial of service (DoS) attack.

A majority of DoS attacks refer to deliberate attempts to exceed the maximum available bandwidth of a server usually through exploiting program flaws or resource exhaustion. The underlying concept is that since different parts of the system might have different resource limits, the attack only needs to exhaust the part of the system with the least resources (i.e. the bottleneck). Since attackers in a DoS attack are not concerned with receiving responses from the server, they often spoof the source IP address in an attempt to obscure the identity of the attacker and make mitigations of the attack more difficult. Because some servers may stop DoS attacks by dropping packets from certain blacklisted IP addresses, attackers can generate a unique source IP address for every packet sent, thus preventing the target from successfully identifying and blocking the attacker. This use of IP spoofing therefore makes it more difficult to target the source of a DoS attack.

### 34.2 Application Level DoS

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Application level DoS attacks tend to target the resources that an application uses and exploits features of the application itself. Some attacks rely on asymmetry wherein a small amount of input from the attack results in a large amount of consumed resources. Such attacks could include exhausting the filesystem space by having continuous calls to write, exhausting the RAM by having continuous calls to malloc, exhausting the processing threads by having continuous calls to fork, or exhausting the disk I/O operations. Defense against such attacks usually take on a three-pronged approach:

1. Identification: You must be able to distinguish requests from different users and require some method to identify or authenticate them (though this process might be expensive and itself vulnerable to DoS attacks)
2. Isolation: You must ensure that one user's actions do not affect another user's experience
3. Quotas: You must ensure that users can only access a certain proportion of resources. Possible implementations of this are that you could limit each user to 4 GB of RAM and 2 CPU cores or you could ensure that only trusted users can execute expensive requests. Another possible "defense" could include proof-of-work (like a CAPTCHA) wherein you force users to spend some resources in order to issue a request. The idea here is that the DoS attack becomes more expensive for the attacker as they have to

now spend extra resources in order to succeed.

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### 34.3 SYN Flood Attacks

Recall (from Chapter 3) that to initiate a TCP session, the client first sends a SYN packet to the server. After the server replies with a SYN/ACK packet. This handshake is concluded by the client sending a concluding ACK packet to the server, but if the server does not receive the ACK packet, it waits for a certain time-out period before discarding the session state.

In a SYN flooding attack, the attacker sends a large number of SYN packets to the server, ignores the SYN/ACK replies, and never sends the ACK response. In fact, an attacker will usually use a spoofed IP source address in the SYN packets, so any SYN/ACK replies are sent to random IP addresses. Therefore, if the attacker sends a large number of SYN packets with no corresponding ACK packets, the server's memory will fill up with sequence numbers that it is forced to remember in order to match up TCP sessions with the expected ACK packets. Since these ACK packets never actually arrive, this wasted memory will ultimately block out other, legitimate TCP session requests.

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Essentially, if the attacker sends a large volume of SYN packets to the server, the server is forced to send SYN/ACK packets back to the "client" and has to remember the sequence numbers of each of the packets for when the connections are established. However, if the attacker does not complete the handshake by sending the ACK packet, the server has wasted a lot of memory by being forced to remember all the sequence numbers for connections that will never actually happen, thus using up all of the server's bandwidth and preventing legitimate connections from taking place.

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There are a couple of possible defenses for SYN flooding. The first is a process known as overprovisioning wherein we ensure that the server has a lot of memory. However, this can be pretty expensive and usually can still be circumvented depending on your threat model. Perhaps a more stable defense is to filter packets to ensure that only legitimate connections will create state, through the use of SYN cookies. In an ideal scenario, the server generates state for the client but does not save it when it sends the SYN/ACK flag; instead, it sends the state to the client encoded with a secret. It is then up to the client to store the state on behalf of the server and return the state in the corresponding ACK packet. Only when the handshake is complete will the server allocate state for the connection after checking the cookie against the secret. The issue, however, is that TCP does not have the mechanism to store state. Thus, instead, the server generates state for the client when it generates the SYN/ACK flag and does not save it; instead, it encodes the state within the sequence number with a secret. The client remembers the sequence number and returns it in the corresponding ACK number. Only when the handshake is complete will the server allocate state for the connection after checking the cookie against the secret.

Essentially, what is happening here is that the server does not create state until the handshake is completed, so the attacker cannot spoof source addresses.

## 34.4 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

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Today, most standard DoS attacks are impractical to execute from a single machine. Modern server technology allows websites to handle an enormous amount of bandwidth, much greater than the bandwidth available from a single machine. Despite this however, DoS conditions can still be created by multiple attacking machines in what is known as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Here, malicious user(s) leverage the power of many machines (the number of attacking machines could be in the thousands) to direct traffic against a single website in a coordinated manner. Using botnets, a series of large networks of machines that have been compromised, attackers carry out controllable remotely.



Theoretically, there is no way to completely eliminate the possibility of a DDoS attack since the bandwidth that a server is able to provide its users is always going to be limited. However, measures can still be taken to mitigate the risks of DDoS attacks. For example, several servers incorporate DDoS protection mechanisms that analyze incoming traffic and drop packets from sources that are consuming too much bandwidth. Unfortunately, IP spoofing makes this defense extremely difficult by obscuring the identity of the attacker bots and providing inconsistent information on where network traffic is coming from.

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# 35 Firewalls 程序代写代做 CS 编程辅导

## 35.1 Introduction to Controlling Network Access

Suppose you are given a machine to harden against external attacks. How would you go about it?

A possible starting point is to look at the functionality and the network services that this machine is providing to the outside world. If any of the network services have bugs or security flaws, an attacker could exploit that part of the service and might be able to penetrate your machine. In software, bugs are inevitable, and bugs in security-critical applications often lead to security holes. Therefore, the more network services that your machine runs, the greater the risk of attacks.

The general principle here is that bugs present in code that you do not run cannot hurt you. Therefore, the less functionality you try to provide, the less of an opportunity exists for security vulnerabilities in that functionality. This suggests one simple way to reduce the risk of external attack: *Turn off every unnecessary network service*. By disabling every network-accessible application that isn't absolutely needed, you are essentially building a stripped-down box that runs the least amount of code necessary. After all, any code that you don't run, can't hurt you. And for any network service that you do run, double-check that it has been implemented and configured securely, and take every precaution possible to ensure that it is safe.

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While this is an intuitive and fairly effective approach when you only have one or two machines to secure, the problem becomes slightly more complicated when we scale things up. Suppose you are now in charge of security for all of Caltopia, and your job is to protect the computer systems, the network and its infrastructure from external attacks. If Caltopia has thousands of computers, it will be extremely difficult to harden every single machine individually as each computer could have different operating systems and different hardware platforms. Furthermore, different users could have very different requirements, where a service that could be disabled for one user might be essential to another user's job. At this scale, it is often hard just to get an accurate list of all machines inside the company, and if you miss even one machine, it could then become a vulnerable point that could be broken into and serve as a launching point for attackers to attack the rest of the Caltopia network. So, managing each computer individually is probably infeasible at this scale.

However, it is still true that one risk factor is the number of network services that are accessible to outsiders. This suggests a possible defense; if we could block, *in the network*, outsiders from being able to interact with many of the network services from running on internal machines, we could potentially reduce the risk. This is exactly the concept behind *firewalls*, which are devices designed to block access to network services that are running on internal machines. Essentially, firewalls reduce risk by blocking network outsiders from having unwanted access to all the network services by acting as a choke point between the internet (outsiders) and your internal network. Now, all we need to know to implement a firewall is: 1. What is our *security policy*? Namely, which network services should be made visible to the outside world and which should be blocked? How do we discern insiders from



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outsiders? 2. How will we *enforce the security policy*? How do we build a firewall that does what we want it to do, and what are the implementation issues?

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### 35.2 Security Policy

If you wanted to visit



of the internal network, you could think about having the company's machines, the external world, which is the rest of the internet.

How do we decide which connections are likely to be affected by the firewall and which don't? A very simple threat model would be to decide that we trust all company employees, but we don't trust anyone else. We could then define the internal network to contain machines owned by trusted employees and the external world to include everyone (and everything) else. The link to our Internet Service Provider (ISP) could be the link between the two networks.

Perhaps the simplest security policy that we could easily implement would be an outbound-only policy. Before we delve into how it works, let's define and distinguish between inbound and outbound connections. An *inbound connection* is one that is initiated by external users and attempts to connect to services that are running on internal machines. On the other hand, an *outbound connection* is one which is initiated by an internal user, and attempts to initiate contact with external services. An outbound-only connection would permit all outbound connections, but inbound connections would be denied outright. The reasoning behind such a connection is that internal users are trusted, so if they wish to open a connection, we will let them. The effect of the resulting connection is that none of our network services are visible to the outside world, but they can still be accessed by internal users. The issue is that such a security policy is likely to be restrictive for any large organization since it means that the company cannot run any public web server, a mail server, an FTP server, etc. Therefore, we need a little more flexibility in defining our security policy.

More generally, our security policy is going to be some form of *access control policy*, wherein we have two subjects: a generic internal user and an anonymous external user. We then define an *object* to be the set of network services that are run on all inside machines; if there are 100 machines, and each machine runs 7 network services, then we have 700 objects. An access control policy should specify, for each subject and each object, whether that subject has permission to access that object.

A firewall is used to enforce a specific kind of access control policy, one where insider users are permitted to connect to any network service desired, whereas external users are restricted; there are some services that are intended to be externally visible (and thus, external users are permitted to connect to those services), but there are also other services that are not intended to be accessible from the outside world (and these services are blocked by the access policy).

As a security administrator, your first job would be to identify a security policy, namely which services should external users have access to and which services should external users not have access to. Generally, there are two main philosophies that we might use to determine which services we allow external users to connect to:

- *Default-allow or blacklist*: By default, every network service is permitted unless it has been specifically listed as denied. Under this approach, one might start by allowing external users to access all internal services, and then mark a couple of services that are known to be unsafe and therefore should be blocked. For example, if you learn today that the  that targets Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) servers, you would be inclined to revise your security policy by denying outsiders access to those servers.

- *Default-deny or whitelist*: By default, every network service is denied to external users, unless it has been explicitly listed as allowed. Here, we might start off with a list of a few known services that are known to be visible to the outside world (which have been judged to be reasonably safe). External users will be denied access to any service that is not on this list of allowed services. For example, if Caltopia users complain that their department's File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server is inaccessible to the outside world (since it is not on the allowed list), we can check to see if they are running a safe and properly configured implementation of the FTP service, and then add the FTP service to the "allowed" list.

The default-allow policy is more convenient since, from a functionality point of view, everything stays working. However, from a security point of view, the default-allow policy is dangerous since it *fails-open*, meaning that if any mistake is made (if there is some service that is vulnerable but you forgot to add it to the "allow" list), the result is likely to be some form of an expensive security failure.

On the other hand, the default-deny policy *fails-closed*, meaning that if any mistake is made (if some service that is safe has been mistakenly omitted from the "allow" list), then the result is the loss of functionality or availability, but not a security breach. When operating at large scales, such errors of omission are likely to be common. Since errors of omission are a lot more dangerous in a default-allow policy than in a default-deny policy, and because the cost of a security failure is often a lot more than the cost of a loss of functionality, default-deny is usually a much safer bet.

Another advantage of the default-deny policy is that when a system fails open (like in default-allow), you might never notice the failure, and since attackers who penetrate the system are unlikely to tell you that they have done so, security breaches may go undetected for long periods of time. This gets you into an arms race, wherein you have to keep up with all of the attacks that adversaries discover, and even stay ahead of them. This arms race is usually a losing proposition since there are a lot more of the attackers than there are defenders and the attacker only has to win once to make you extremely vulnerable. In contrast, when a system fails closed (like in default-deny), someone will probably notice the flaw and will likely complain that some service is not working; since the omission is immediately evidence and easily correctable, failures in default-allow systems are much more costly than failures in default-deny systems.

As such, a majority of well-implemented firewalls implement a default-deny system, wherein the security policy specifies a list of "allowed" services that external users are permitted to connect to, and all other services are forbidden. To determine whether a service should

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be removed from the allowed list, some kind of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis is applied; if some service is too risky compared to its benefits, it is removed from the allowed list.

To identify network services, recall that TCP and UDP connections can be uniquely identified by the machine's IP number. Therefore, we can identify each network service with a triple  $(i, r, p)$ , where  $i$  is the IP address of a machine,  $r$  is the protocol identifier (i.e. TCP or UDP), and  $p$  is the port number. For instance, the company might have its official web server running on machine 1.2.3.4, and then  $(1.2.3.4, \text{TCP}, 80)$  would be added to the allowed services. In a deny policy, the list of network services that should be externally visible is defined as a set of these triplets.



### 35.3 Enforcement: Stateful Packet Filters

The main idea behind enforcing security policies is to do so at a choke point in the network. The existence of a central choke point gives us a single place to monitor, where we can easily enforce a security policy on thousands of machines with minimal effort. This idea of a choke point is similar to that of physical security; at an airport, for example, all passengers are funneled through a security checkpoint, where access can be controlled. It is easier to perform such checks at one, or a few, checkpoints rather than hundreds or even thousands of entrances.

A stateful packet filter is a router that checks each packet against the provided access control policy. If the policy allows the packet, it is forwarded on towards its destination; if the policy denies the packet, then the packet is dropped and is not forwarded. The access control policy is usually specified as a list of rules; as the firewall processes each packet, it examines the rules one-by-one, and the first matching rule determines how the packet will be handled.

Typically, rules specify which connections are allowed. The rule can list the protocol (tcp or udp), the initiator's IP address (the machine that initiated the connection), the initiator's port number, the recipient's IP address (the machine that the connection is directed to), and the recipient's port number. A rule can use wildcards, denoted by the symbol \*, for any of these. Each rule also specifies what action to take for matching connections; typical values might be ALLOW or DROP.

For example, take the following ruleset: allow tcp \* : \* → 1.2.3.4 : 25 drop \* → \* : \* → \*

This ruleset allows anyone to open a TCP connection to port 25 on machine 1.2.3.4, but blocks all other connections.

A stateful packet filter maintains state, meaning that it keeps track of all open connections that have been established. When a packet is processed, the filter allows the firewall to check whether the packet is part of a connection that is already open. If it is, then the packet can be forwarded. Without state, it is harder to know how to handle the packet; for example, if we see a packet that is going from X to Y, we don't know if the packet was on a connection that was initiated by X or by Y, the answer to which might determine whether or not the packet is allowed to be forwarded. By keeping state, stateful packet filters allow policies that inspect the data, like for example, a policy that blocks any attempt to log into an FTP

server with the username “root”. However, stateful packet filters must be written extremely carefully to ensure that it only keeps a small amount of information per connection to ensure that the firewall does not run out of memory.

### 35.4 Enforcement: Firewalls

*Stateless packet filters* inspect traffic on the network level and generally only look at TCP, UDP, and IP headers. In contrast to stateful packet filters, stateless packet filters do not keep any state, meaning each packet is handled as it arrives, with no memory or history retained by the firewall.

*Application-layer firewalls* inspect traffic according to the content of the data fields. These types of firewalls have certain security advantages since they can enforce more restrictive security policies and can transform data on the fly.

Rather than simply inspecting traffic, we can also build firewalls that participate in application layer exchanges. For example, we can introduce a web proxy in a network and configure all local systems to use it for their web access. The local web browsers would then connect to the proxy rather than directly to remote web servers, and the proxy would in turn make the actual remote request. A major benefit of this design is that we can include monitoring in the proxy that has available for its decision-making all of the application-layer information associated with a given request and reply, so we can make fine-grained allow/deny decisions based on a wealth of information. This sort of design isn’t specific to web proxies but can be done for many different types of applications. The general term is an application proxy or gateway proxy. One difficulty with using this approach, however, is implementation complexity. The application proxy needs to understand all of the details of the application protocol that it mediates. Another potential issue concerns performance. If we bottleneck all of the site’s outbound traffic through just a few proxy systems, they may be overwhelmed by the load.

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### 35.5 Firewall Principles

In general, the mechanism that enforces an access control policy often takes the form of a reference monitor. The purpose of a reference monitor is to examine every request to access any controlled resource (an “object”) and determine whether that request should be allowed.

There are three security properties that any reference monitor should have:

- Unbypassable (also known as Always invoked): The reference monitor should be invoked on every operation that is controlled by the access control policy. There must be no way to bypass the reference monitor (i.e., the complete mediation property): all security-relevant operations must be mediated by the reference monitor.
- Tamper-resistant: The reference monitor should be protected from tampering by other agents. For instance, other parties should not be able to modify its code or state. The integrity of the reference monitor must be maintained.

- Verifiable: It should be possible to verify the correctness of the reference monitor, including that it actually does enforce the desired access control policy correctly. This usually requires that the reference monitor be extremely simple, as generally it is beyond the state of the art to verify the correctness of subsystems with any significant degree of complexity.

We can recognize a reference monitor by three properties:

- Always invoked: the packet filter is placed on a chokepoint link, with the property that all connections between the internal and external networks must traverse this link. The filter has an opportunity to inspect all such packets. Moreover, packets are not forwarded across this link unless the packet filter inspects them and forwards them (there needs to be no other mechanism by which packets might flow across this link). Of course, in some cases we discover that it doesn't work out like we hoped. For instance, maybe a user hooks up an unsecured wireless access point to their internal machine. Then anyone who drives by with a wireless-enabled laptop effectively gains access to the internal network, bypassing the packet filter. This illustrates that, to use a firewall safely, we'd better be sure that our firewalls cover all of the links between the internal network and the external world. We term this set of links as the security perimeter.
- Tamper-resistant: We haven't really discussed how to make packet filters resistant to attack. However, they obviously should be hardened as much as possible, because they are a single point of failure. Fortunately, their desired functionality is relatively simple, so we should have a reasonable chance at protecting them from outside attack. For instance, they might not need to run a standard operating system, any user-level programs, or network services, eliminating many avenues of outside attack. More generally, we can use firewall protection for the firewall itself, and not allow any management access to the firewall device except from specific trusted machines. Of course, we must also ensure the physical security of the packet filter device.
- Verifiable: In current practice, unfortunately the correctness of a firewall's operation is generally not verified in any systematic fashion. The software is usually too complex for this to be feasible. And we do suffer as a result of our failure to verify packet filters: over time, there have been bugs that allowed attackers to defeat the intended security policy by sending unexpected packets that the packet filter doesn't handle quite the way it should. In addition, experience has shown that firewall policies rapidly become complex. Thus, even if a firewall's internal workings are entirely correct, the rules it enforces may not in fact accurately reflect the access controls that the operator believes they provide.

Finally, firewalls also embody *orthogonal security* meaning that it can be deployed to protect pre-existing legacy systems much more easily than other security mechanisms that have to be integrated with the rest of the system. A reference monitor that filters the set of requests, dropping unallowed requests but allowing allowed requests to pass through unchanged, is essentially transparent to the rest of the system: other components do not need to be aware



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of the presence of the reference monitor.

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### 35.6 Firewall Advantages

- Central control: Firewalls provide a single point of control. When security policies change, only the firewall needs to be updated; we do not have to touch individual machines. For instance, if a new threat to an Internet service is discovered, it is often possible to verify that all internal machines are protected by modifying the firewall's security policy slightly, and then applying this protection. This makes it easier to administer, control, and update a security policy for an entire organization.
- Easy to deploy: Because firewalls are essentially transparent to internal hosts, there is an easy migration path, and they are easy to deploy (incrementally, or all at once). Because one firewall can protect thousands of machines, they provide a huge amount of leverage.

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### 35.7 Firewall Disadvantages

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- Loss of functionality: The very essence of the firewalls concept involves turning off functionality, and often users miss the disabled functionality. Some applications don't work with firewalls. For instance, peer-to-peer networks have big problems: if both users are behind firewalls, then when one user tries to connect to another user, the second user's firewall will see this as an inbound connection and will usually block it. The observation underlying firewalls is that connectivity begets risk, and firewalls are all about managing risk by reducing connectivity from the outside world to internal machines. It should be no surprise that reducing network connectivity can reduce the usefulness of the network.
- The malicious insider problem: Firewalls make the assumption that insiders are trusted. This gives internal users the power to violate your security policy. Firewalls are usually used to establish a security perimeter between the inside and outside world. However, if a malicious party breaches that security perimeter in any way, or otherwise gains control of an inside machine, then the malicious party becomes trusted and can wreak havoc, because inside machines have unlimited power to attack other inside machines. For this reason, Bill Cheswick called firewalled networks a "crunchy outer coating, with a soft, chewy center." There is nothing that the firewall can do once a bad guy gets inside the security perimeter. We see this in practice. For example, laptops have become a serious problem. People take their laptop on a trip with them, connect to the Internet from their hotel room (without any firewall), get infected with malware, then bring their laptop home and connect it to their company's internal network, and the malware proceeds to infect other internal machines.

- Adversarial applications: The previous two properties can combine in a particularly problematic way. Suppose that an application developer realizes the protocol is going to be blocked by their users' firewalls. What do you think they are going to do? Often, what happens is that the application tunnels its traffic over HTTP (web, port 80) or SMTP (email, port 25). Originally firewalls allow port 80 traffic, because the web is the "killer app". But now the firewall cannot distinguish between this application's traffic and legitimate web traffic.

The fact that insiders execute will be trusted as a consequence that all applications that insiders execute will be trusted such applications act in a way that subverts the security policy, the firewall can be limited (even though the application developers probably do not think of themselves as malicious). The end result is that, over time, more and more traffic goes over ports nominally associated with other application protocols (particularly port 80, intended for web access), with firewalls gaining less and less visibility into the traffic that traverses them. As a result firewalls are becoming increasingly less effective.

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## 36 Intrusion Detection 程序代写代做 CS 编程辅导

In this class, we've talked about many ways to prevent attacks, but not all defenses are perfect, and attacks will often slip through our defenses. How do we detect these attacks when they happen?

Imagine that you're connected to the Internet with your local network of computers (for example, all the web servers and employee computers in your company's office building). The local network is connected to the Internet with a router. All requests from the local network to the wider Internet will pass through the router. How can we detect attacks on this network?



### 36.1 Types of detectors

There are three broad types of detectors. The main difference in implementation is where on the network these detectors are installed. Each type of detector has its advantages and drawbacks.

### 36.2 Types of detectors: Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)

A NIDS (network intrusion detection system) is installed between the router and the internal network. This means that all requests to and from the outside Internet must pass through the NIDS. The NIDS can read and potentially modify all packets sent to the outside Internet and received from the outside Internet.

The biggest advantage of a NIDS is that a single NIDS is enough to cover the entire network. There's no need to install anything on the end hosts (e.g. employee computers or web servers) because all their requests will pass through the NIDS anyway. Installing a single NIDS for the whole network is a cheap solution with low management overhead.

However, there are some drawbacks to using a NIDS. Recall that even though the Internet fundamentally works by sending packets, rich information communicated with higher-layer protocols are made up of multiple packets. For example, a single message sent through TCP may consist of many small packets that are combined to form a longer message. Also, packets may be dropped or sent out of order—it's the end hosts' responsibility to rearrange the pieces correctly with TCP.

A plain NIDS that just observes individual packets would not be too useful, because it will probably see a lot of packets with partial data out of order. The NIDS may also be seeing packets from lots of different TCP connections, since every connection from inside the network goes through the NIDS. A more useful NIDS would separate packets by their connection and correctly reorder the packets within each connection together by TCP sequence number. Once the NIDS has successfully reconstructed the connection, it can read the rich information and analyze it for attacks.

To make matters worse, the TCP connection reconstructed at the NIDS may not match the TCP connection that the end host sees. Recall that each TCP packet has a time-to-live (TTL) field, which specifies how long the packet can be in transit before it expires. (This

is often measured in the number of hops, i.e. the number of machines that the packet has been sent through.) Then there could be a scenario where the NIDS sees a TCP packet because the TTL has not yet expired, but by the time it's sent to the end host, the TTL has expired, and the end host discards the message. There could also be a scenario where the NIDS sees a packet, ed or dropped before it reaches the recipient. Thus the NIDS must also see packets that potentially don't reach the end host.

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Another major issue with NIDS is the need to deal with encrypted traffic. Most modern web traffic is encrypted with HTTPS (TLS), which is end-to-end secure. In other words, the NIDS has no way to determine the contents of the messages being sent. To allow NIDS to analyze encrypted traffic, the network may need to be configured so that the end hosts give the NIDS their private keys to allow the NIDS to decrypt TLS connections. This might not always be a desirable solution, since it compromises the security of private keys and the security guarantees of NIDS, and it may allow network analysts to see sensitive information that only the end hosts should see.

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Another major issue with NIDS is the need to deal with encrypted traffic. Most modern web traffic is encrypted with HTTPS (TLS), which is end-to-end secure. In other words, the NIDS has no way to determine the contents of the messages being sent. To allow NIDS to analyze encrypted traffic, the network may need to be configured so that the end hosts give the NIDS their private keys to allow the NIDS to decrypt TLS connections. This might not always be a desirable solution, since it compromises the security of private keys and the security guarantees of NIDS, and it may allow network analysts to see sensitive information that only the end hosts should see.

36.3 Types of detectors: Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) <https://tutorcs.com>

A HIDS (host-based intrusion detection system) is installed directly on the end hosts. For example, antivirus software might be considered a HIDS, because it is installed on the same computer that is generating and receiving network requests.

HIDS have much fewer inconsistency issues than NIDS. Since the HIDS is located on the same machine that is receiving and interpreting the requests, it can directly check what data is received and how the data is being parsed. HTTPS connections are also no longer an issue, because the HIDS can view the decrypted traffic at the end host.

However, these advantages don't come for free. Unlike NIDS, where a single implementation can defend against the entire network, a HIDS must be installed for every machine on the network. This can be very costly, especially if different machines need differently-configured HIDS.

HIDS also don't defend against all evasion attacks. For example, a web server might expect a filename input from the user and serve the matching file to the user. If the user inputs `evanbot.txt`, the server might check the `/public/files` directory and return the



WeChat: estutorcs attack, is called an *evasion attack*. The NIDS only does the the NIDS have to reason about the traffic to detect the attack.

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/public/files/evanbot.txt file to the user. An attacker could supply a malicious input like ../../etc/passwd. In Unix, .. says to go up one directory, so the input would allow the attacker to access the passwords file, even though it's located in a different directory on the server. This type of attack is called a *path traversal attack*. To fully defend against path traversal attacks, it [QR code] the HIDS to understand the contents of the end request. The HIDS will reason about how the underlying filesystem interprets the contents of the end request, which can lead to further parsing inconsistencies and evasion attacks.

## 36.4 Types of Logging

A third approach to intrusion detection is logging. Most modern web servers generate logs with information such as what web requests have been made, what files have been accessed, and what applications have been run. We can analyze these logs for evidence of malicious behavior or attacks.

Logging is similar to HIDS because both systems directly use information from the end host, avoiding many potential parsing inconsistencies and problems with encrypted traffic. However, like NIDS, logging may need to consider evasion attacks such as the path traversal attack, which requires smarter filesystem parsing and can lead to inconsistencies.

The biggest drawback to logging is that it cannot be done in real-time. By the time the log has been generated, the event that's being logged has already happened. This also means that if an attack has happened, a log-based system will only detect the attack after it has happened. This can be dangerous if the attack is immediately damaging. However, logs are still useful for detecting attacks after they've happened (better late than never).

In terms of cost, logging is usually cheap, because web servers already have built-in logging mechanisms. The only overhead is occasionally running an external script on those logs to search for evidence of attacks.

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## 36.5 False Positives and False Negatives

There are two ways a detector can go wrong. A *false negative* occurs when an attack happens but the detector incorrectly reports that there is no attack. A *false positive* occurs when there is no attack, but the detector incorrectly reports that there is an attack. As an example, consider a fire alarm system. A false negative occurs if there is a fire but the fire alarm does not go off. A false positive occurs if there is no fire, but the fire alarm goes off.

It's easy to build a detector with a 0% false negative rate. Just report that there is an attack every single time. Then there will never be a case where your detector incorrectly reports that there is no attack. Similarly, a detector that never reports an attack will have a 0% false positive rate. Clearly, both of these are pretty useless detectors. In the real world, different detectors will have different false negative rates and false positive rates, and part of designing a good detector is balancing the two error rates. In general, as one error rate decreases, the other error rate will increase. Intuitively, to get fewer false positives, you must alert less often, which means you will also incorrectly fail to alert more often (higher

false negative rate). Similarly, to get fewer false negatives, you must alert more often, which means you will also incorrectly alert more often (higher false positive rate).

Suppose you have two detectors. Detector A has a false positive rate of 0.1% and a false negative rate of 2%. Meanwhile, Detector B has a false positive rate of 2% and a false negative rate of 0.1%. Which detector is better? It depends on the cost of each type of error. Consider a fire alarm system—if the fire alarm gives you a false negative, then your building has burned down. If the fire alarm gives you a false positive, then you've wasted an hour with unnecessary evacuation. In this scenario, the false positive is probably less costly than the false negative, so you would probably prefer Detector B. In another scenario, a false positive might be more costly than a false negative, so you might prefer Detector A instead.

The quality of your detector also depends on the rate of attacks. Consider Detector A again. If we receive 1,000 requests a day and 5 of them are attacks, then the expected number of false positives is  $0.1\% \times 995 \approx 1$  request per day. (995 requests are not attacks, and out of the non-attacks, 0.1% of them will incorrectly be reported as an attack.) However, now suppose we receive 10,000,000 (10 million) requests a day and 5 of them are attacks. Now the expected number of false positives is  $0.1\% \times 9,999,995 \approx 10,000$  requests per day. Note that nothing has changed about the detector. The only thing that changed was the number of requests received per day (and thus the rate of attacks). However, in the second scenario, our detector is much less useful, because we have to handle 10,000 false positives every day. This example shows that accurate detection is very challenging when the rate of attacks is extremely low, because even a very good detector will flag so many false positives that it becomes impractical to manually review every single false positive. For more information on this phenomenon, read about the [late rate fallacy](#).



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## 36.6 Detection strategies

So far, we've talked about how detectors are installed and how to measure their effectiveness, but we haven't talked about how the detector actually analyzes network traffic to detect an attack. There are four main strategies for detecting an attack, each with their benefits and drawbacks.

## 36.7 Detection strategies: Signature-based detection

**The idea:** Look for activity that matches the structure of a known attack.

Signature-based detection can be thought of as *blacklisting*—we maintain a list of patterns that are not allowed, and we detect if we see something in the list of disallowed patterns.

**Example:** We know that inputting some garbage bytes, followed by a memory address, followed by shellcode is the structure of a buffer overflow attack, so the detector can search for strings that match this pattern and classify them as attacks.

Pros:

- Detecting known signatures is easy.

- It's very good at detecting known attacks. Over time, the security community has built up huge shared libraries of attacks with known signatures.

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Cons:

- It won't catch new attacks that have never been seen before.
- It might not catch variants of known attacks if the variant is different enough that the signature no longer matches. If the signature detector is too simple, it's easy to modify the attack slightly to bypass the detector.

## 36.8 Detection strategies: Anomaly-based detection

**The idea:** Develop a model of what normal activity looks like. Flag any activity that deviates from normal activity.

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Anomaly-based detection can be thought of *whitelisting*—we maintain a list of normal patterns that are allowed, and we detect if we see something that is *not* in the list of allowed patterns.

**Example:** A C program expects user input. Most user input consists of letters, numbers, and symbols—things you would expect to use the type of a keyboard. We determine that normal activity is any input that can be typed on a keyboard, and flag any input that cannot be typed on a keyboard. If an attacker tries to input a buffer overflow attack with memory addresses and shellcode (raw bytes that often can't be typed on a keyboard), we detect that this doesn't match normal behavior and flag it as an attack.

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Pros:

- It can catch new attacks that have never been seen before.

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Cons:

- Defining normal behavior is difficult. What if you train a model for normal behavior on training data that includes attacks?
- A poor model might classify lots of attacks as normal, or classify lots of normal requests as attacks.

In general, anomaly-based behavior is mostly studied in academic papers but not widely deployed as a detection strategy.

## 36.9 Detection strategies: Specification-based detection

**The idea:** Manually specify what normal activity looks like. Flag any activity that deviates from normal activity.

Specification-based detection is also a form of whitelisting. The main difference between specification-based detection and anomaly-based detection is that specification-based detection manually defines normal activity (instead of trying to learn a model for normal activity).

**Example:** A C programmer writes a program that asks for the user's age as input. The programmer knows that ages are numerical and specifies that normal behavior is inputting a number. If an attacker tries to input a buffer overflow attack with memory addresses and shellcode (raw bytes that are not numbers), we detect that this doesn't match normal behavior and flag it

Pros:

- It can catch new attacks that have never been seen before.
- If the specification is well-defined, the false positive rate can be made very low.

Cons:



- It's very time-consuming to manually write specifications for every application.

## 36.10 Detection strategies: Behavioral detection

**The idea:** Look for evidence of compromise.

Unlike the other three models, behavioral detection doesn't search for attack patterns in the input. Instead, behavior detection looks for malicious behavior that an attacker might try to perform. In other words, we are looking for the result of the exploit, not the contents of the exploit itself.

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**Example:** A C programmer writes a program that never calls the `exec` function. If an attacker tries to input a buffer overflow attack with shellcode that calls the `exec` function to spawn a shell, we detect that the code has called `exec` and flag this behavior as an attack. Note that we did not analyze the attacker input. Instead, we analyzed the program behavior and noticed that it called the `exec` function, which is evidence that the program has been compromised.

Pros:

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- It can catch new attacks that have never been seen before.
- If the behavior rarely or never occurs in benign (non-attack) circumstances, the false positive rate can be made very low.
- It can be cheap to implement.

Cons:

- The attack is only detected after it's started, so there's no way to prevent the attack before it happens.
- An attacker can try to avoid detection by using different behavior to execute their attack.

## 37 37. Abusing Intrusion Detection 程序代写代做CS编程辅导

On a high level, network intrusion detection can be thought of as wiretapping on a bulk scale. The NSA utilizes various “off-the-shelf” concepts including using various Network Intrusion Detection Systems, malicious code, and hadoop.

The NSA language is derived from the security language present in this class.

- A *selector* is a piece of information that identifies what you are looking for, like an email address, phone number, etc.
- A *fingerprint* is used in an intrusion detection match
- An *implant* is a malcode or another piece of sabotage

The FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Amendments Act section 702 states that if you are not a “US person”, meaning you are not a US citizen or permanent resident, and you are located outside of the United States, then the NSA can obtain all your information through a US provider. If you are either a US person or are located within the United States, however, you are afforded a lot of protection due to the United States Constitution.

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The NSA is part of Five Eyes (FVEY), an intelligence alliance comprising of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries are parties to the multilateral UKUSA agreement, a treaty for joint cooperation in signals intelligence. The primary rule within FVEY is “when in country X, behave according to country X’s laws”.

The NSA’s objective is, for a valid target (that is a non-US person outside of the US), to be able to collect all relevant communications. This, however, requires the capability to collect information on everyone since a valid target could be anyone, meaning that the NSA requires global capabilities. As such, the solution that the NSA employs is to collect all intelligence that they feasibly can on everybody and store it for as long as possible, assuming that at some point in the future they might need to search that information and hopefully find something useful. One issue of utilizing the aforementioned method, however, is that there is now too much information, and sifting through that information to find the relevant details is much more difficult.

Say, for example, that you are an analyst and you are watching an IRC chat between two “anonymous” people, and your task is to identify the two people involved in the conversation; the only information that you do have is that they both visited some article at some specified time. The first thing you might do is to use Signal Intelligence Flow (also known as the Digital Network Intelligence Flow) to develop an online pattern of life for these anonymous users, before using a computer network exploitation to invoke an “exploit by name” attack to take over their computers.

A majority of signals intelligence starts off with wiretaps, and the NSA’s preferred system of doing so is called Xkeyscore Deepdive (a large majority, if not all, of which are overseas). These wiretaps are nothing more than scalable network intrusion detection systems (NIDS)! After the NIDS extracts the network information and parses the data packet to extract the

metadata, it stores it within a dataframe. However, unlike conventional NIDS, if you want to evade the NSA monitoring, all you have to do is encrypt the data using some form of cryptography.

In practice, Xkeyscore is primarily centered around an easy-to-use web interface with a lot of pre-canned search functionality for application users along with a large number of pre-made “fingerprints” to identify communications, etc.

Good transport ciphers provide significant problems when the NSA attempts to collect data; however, they have some tricks to get around this (though a large majority of these don't work). For example, some retaps collect encrypted traffic and pass it off to a black-box elsewhere that then decodes it. The NSA might come back at some point in the future having obtained the cryptographic key and might be able to then convert the ciphertext back into plaintext.

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## 38 Malware

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### 38.1 Overview

Malware, or malicious software, runs on victim computers through self-replication. It can send to other people, in addition to, say delete a copy of itself and



own as malcode), is any type of attacker code that primary ways that malware is able to propagate is code snippet that outputs a copy of itself (usually to oppose a piece of malware runs on your computer; in turning on your webcam, the malware also outputs computers, thereby infecting other devices.

Viruses and worms are two categories of self-propagating malware wherein the malicious code sends copies of itself to other users. A virus is a piece of malware or malcode that requires some user action to propagate, meaning that the user has to take some action in order for the virus to spread. Usually, once the computer gets infected, a piece of code is stored somewhere on the infected computer. Then, when the user runs the code, the virus gets spread to other users.

On the other hand, a worm is a piece of malware or malcode that does not require user action to propagate. Usually, rather than the infection happening on code that is stored on the computer that gets run later, it instead infects a computer by altering some already-running code. As such, no user interaction is required for the worm to spread to other users.

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One possible application of malware is to construct a botnet. A botnet is a set of compromised machines, or bots, that are under centralized control, allowing the owner of the botnet to own a huge amount of resources that could be used for other attacks (like DoS). An attacker could use a virus or a worm to infect a large number of machines, causing every infected machine to now be under the control of the attacker.

### 38.2 Viruses <https://tutorcs.com>

Recall that viruses are forms of malware that require user action to propagate, meaning that it usually infects a computer by altering some stored code and when the user runs the code, the malicious code spreads to other users. For example, an attacker could infect the start-up code of an application, meaning that when the user tries to open the application, the malcode will run and look for opportunities to infect more systems (i.e. forward itself to other users, copy itself onto a USB drive, etc.).

One common approach to detecting viruses is through signature-based detection. Since viruses are self-propagating, they often use copies of the same code. Since signature-based detection uses patterns of known attacks, a signature can be created on the virus (since the virus has been infecting several computers in the same manner using the same code snippet). So, the signature-based detection system will capture a virus on one system (usually through a sacrificial computer which opens a bunch of malicious files on purpose) and look for bytes corresponding to the malcode on other systems. Antivirus software performs these checks for you by usually including a checklist of common viruses. Most antivirus will incorporate some form of signature-based detection and will use the signatures of these viruses to ensure

that your computer is not infected. Stronger antivirus softwares will likely have a greater number of virus signatures than weaker ones, ensuring that your computer is protected from a wider range of attacks.

Viruses have existed for several decades, and there is a constant race that exists between attackers writing viruses and companies detecting viruses. As this arms race continues, propagation and evasion strategies of malware have evolved. Attackers tend to look for ways to be detected by the antivirus software. As such, they could change the virus so that each copy looks different, thus making signature-based detection harder. Rather than changing the virus's appearance manually, certain evaders attempt to automate this process through polymorphic code. In this arms race, since the attacker can see what detection strategies the antivirus software is using, but the antivirus cannot see what attacks the attacker is planning, the attackers often have a slight advantage. In other words, the attackers can see the defense strategies employed by the antivirus companies and therefore write evasion strategies to get around them (namely, the attacker knows the system). Therefore, since the detectors have to usually publish their code first, they are at a bit of a disadvantage.

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In an attempt to continuously change the virus's appearance to avoid signature-based detection, attackers employ polymorphic code where in each time the virus propagates, it inserts an encrypted copy of the malcode. This code also includes the key and the decryptor, so when the code runs, it uses the key and decryptor to obtain the original, plaintext malcode. Since encryption schemes produce different looking outputs on repeated encryptions (with IND-CPA secure schemes), the attacker is able to change the appearance of the virus to help avoid signature-based detections. However, note that encryption is being used for obfuscation and not for confidentiality. Namely, the attacker is not trying to hide the contents of the virus (rather, the malcode is going to get run eventually and the decoder and the key are sent in plaintext), but simply avoid detection by making every copy of the virus look different. As such, this also means that weaker encryption algorithms, like ECB, can be used (since our goal is not confidentiality) and the decryption keys can be sent in plaintext.

One possible defense against polymorphic code is to simply add a signature for detecting the decryptor code. For example, a possible signature could be a key being used to decrypt a certain piece of code. However, this raises a lot of false positives since there are a lot of pieces of code that are not malware, which use a key to decrypt other pieces of code. Furthermore, another issue arises if the decryptor code is scattered across different parts of memory as matching several small instructions is a lot harder than matching one big block of code. Another possible defense is to run the potentially dangerous code in a sandbox, or an isolated environment, where if something goes terribly wrong, nothing outside of the sandbox is affected. For example, if a piece of code performs a decryption mechanism, the machine could execute the code in a sandbox (like a virtual machine), thus allowing us to analyze the code structure without actually executing the code in a dangerous environment.

In addition to polymorphic code, metamorphic code is another way to try to avoid signature-



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based detection. Here, each time the virus propagates, it generates a semantically different version of the code. In other words, the code performs the same high-level function, but with minor differences in execution, like changing variable names or changing the order of certain operations or using a for loop instead of a while loop. Usually included in metamorphic code is a code re-writer which changes the code randomly each time. Note that the re-writer can also change the re-written code to the virus code before propagating the virus to ensure that the entire process is different.

Because the code is now different each time, there is now no easy pattern to find the malcode, meaning that signature-based detection is extremely difficult. However, it does let us use behavioral-detection instead, which focuses on the behavior of the code instead of the syntax (since the syntax is continuously changing). As such, we now look at the effect of the instructions rather than the appearance of the instructions. However, viruses can subvert behavioral detection; for example, the virus could delay analysis by waiting a long time before executing the malicious code or it could detect that the code is being analyzed (run in a debugger or a sandbox) and could choose different, “normal” behavior.

Theoretically however, it is pretty much impossible to write a perfect algorithm to separate malicious code from safe code (though if you manage to write something that accomplishes this task, you would have solved the halting problem!). Rather, antivirus softwares usually try to simply look for new and unfamiliar code. The software company keeps a central repository of previously-seen code and if some code has never been seen before, it treats that piece of code as malicious. Flagging unfamiliar code is a powerful defense as it employs a signature-based detection system to detect malicious behavior as well as a strategy for people avoiding the first detector. In other words, if the attacker does not modify the code for each propagation, it will have a detectable signature and if the attacker modifies the code each time, it always appears as new, and therefore suspicious.

## 38.4 Worms <https://tutorcs.com>

Worms are pieces of code that, unlike viruses, do not require user action to propagate; instead, they usually infect a computer by altering some already-running code. Since worms want to run immediately, they usually randomly choose machines by randomly generating 32-bit IP addresses and try connecting to them in an attempt to propagate. Essentially, worms want to directly inject malcode into a lot of different computers very quickly. To find the different computers to inject, the worm will either try to connect to random machines or will use a pre-generated “hit-list”.

Worms can potentially spread extremely quickly since they parallelize the process of propagation and replication. As more computers are infected, more computers are available to spread the worm further. While viruses have the same property, they usually spread more slowly since user action is needed to activate the virus. As such, worm propagation can be modeled as an infectious epidemic and computer scientists often use the same models that biologists use to model their spread of infectious diseases. Similar to epidemics, the spread of the worm depends on the size of the population, the proportion of the population that is vulnerable to the infection, the number of infected hosts, and the contact rate, or how

often the infected host communicates with other hosts. The number of infected hosts grows logically, meaning that the initial growth is exponential, since as more hosts are infected, there are more opportunities to infect, but later growth slows down as it becomes harder to find new non-infected hosts to infect.



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## 39 Anonymity and Tor

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### 39.1 Overview

Imagine you wanted to send a message to someone via a messaging app to share a public message but did not want your name attached to it. How would you go about using the chat to achieve that?

One possible solution is to only choose one member of the group on the participant list, send them a message with your message and have them post the message on the forum. This way, the message gets posted to the forum but without your name attached to it.

This is the basis of *anonymity*, essentially a methodology that enables you to conceal your identity. In the context of the Internet, we may want *anonymous communications* wherein the identity of the source and/or destination are concealed. Note that anonymity is not the same as confidentiality, which is about keeping the message private, whereas anonymity is concerned with keeping one's identity private. As we will soon come to understand, anonymity on the internet is difficult without help; baked into the Internet protocol is placing the IP address into the packet header, meaning that any message that is sent to a server reveals your IP address (which reveals quite a bit about your identity and is often one of the primary means of internet tracking). Malicious users, however, have it easier when it comes to anonymity due to the existence of *bots*, which come about when someone hacks a set of machines and then controls those machines for various purposes (each machine is essentially a bot in the hands of the person who hacked it). The key takeaway here is that for the good guys to gain anonymity, we generally require some help, and what this comes down to is to simply ask someone else to send the message for you (as we saw in the previous example).

A majority of anonymity techniques require the use of a *proxy*, an intermediary (usually a somewhat trusted 3rd party) who relays our traffic for us. Say for example you wanted to visit a website, [www.example.com](http://www.example.com), but you don't want to reveal to that server that you are visiting them. To hide your identity, you can route your traffic through a proxy server, which visits [www.example.com](http://www.example.com) on your behalf, gets the page, and returns the page to you. An issue that you might be thinking about right now is that you have to place your trust into this proxy server as they are now able to have access to your identity, so you are *not quite* completely anonymous, and you would be completely correct. We will see a couple of ways to circumvent this further down the road.

### 39.2 Anonymity in Cryptography

Let's try to understand in a little more detail how anonymity works when dealing with cryptography. Say that Alice wants to send a message  $M$  to Bob, but wants to conceal her identity when doing so. This means that not only should Bob not know that  $M$  is from Alice, but an eavesdropper, Eve, should also not be able to determine that Alice is communicating with Bob. Using an intermediate proxy server, Alice can encrypt  $(M, Bob)$  using the proxy server's public key ( $K_{PS}$ ), and sends this along to the intermediary. Note that



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the information packet needs to include the message and the person who the intermediary has to forward the information along to, in this case, Bob. Since Alice wants to send this information privately, she utilizes public key encryption. The proxy then decrypts the packet from Alice, retrieves the message,  $M$ , and the intended recipient, Bob, and then forwards the message to the intended recipient, Bob. Essentially, all the proxy server is doing is accepting encrypted messages, extracting the message and the destination, and then forwarding the message to the intended recipient.

Notice that this method, as mentioned earlier, requires Alice to have complete trust in the proxy server in the chain. To not reveal her identity. To prevent having to place full trust in a third party, we introduce the concept of onion routing.



### 39.3 Onion Routing

The key idea behind onion routing is the use of multiple proxy servers chained together in the hopes that at least one can be trusted. Again, Alice wants to send the message  $M$  to Bob, but this time she doesn't quite trust her proxy server, so instead decides to use onion routing to chain together 3 different intermediaries (let's call them Fuzzy, Dan, and Charlie).

- Charlie is going to be the final proxy in the chain, so it needs to know the final recipient and the final message. So the packet Charlie receives will be  $(M, Bob)$  encrypted with Charlie's  $PK$ ,  $K_{Charlie}$  since Alice wants the message to be private. Charlie then decrypts the packet with his private key to obtain  $(M, Bob)$ , then sends the message  $M$  to Bob.

- Since Alice doesn't trust Charlie to not reveal her identity, however, she wants to route the message through another proxy server, Dan. Again, the proxy requires the message and the recipient to forward the message to. In this case, the message is  $(M, Bob)_{KCharlie}$ , and the recipient is Charlie. So the packet that Dan receives is  $((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}$ . Dan decrypts the packet using his private key to obtain  $((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}$ , then sends  $M' = (M, Bob)_{KCharlie}$  to Charlie.
- Since Alice doesn't trust Dan either to not reveal her identity, she again wants to route the message through a different proxy server, Fuzzy. Again, the proxy requires the message and the recipient that it forwards the message to. In this case the message is  $((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}$  and the recipient is Dan. So the packet that Charlie Fuzzy receives is  $(((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}, Dan)_{KFuzzy}$ . Fuzzy decrypts the packet using his private key to obtain  $(((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}, Dan)$ , then sends  $M'' = ((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}$  to Dan.

The overall routing scheme sends the packet from  $Alice \rightarrow Fuzzy \rightarrow Dan \rightarrow Charlie \rightarrow Bob$ , where Fuzzy, Dan, and Charlie are the three intermediaries, or proxies:

- Alice sends Fuzzy  $(((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}, Dan)_{KFuzzy}$
- Fuzzy decrypts this using his private key and sends  $((M, Bob)_{KCharlie}, Charlie)_{KDan}$  to Dan
- Dan decrypts this using his private key and sends  $(M, Bob)_{KCharlie}$  to Charlie

- Charlie decrypts this using his private key and sends  $M$  to Bob
- For additional security, the message  $M$  could also have been encrypted using  $PK_{Bob}$ .

Note that this approach can be generalized to  $n$  intermediaries, and no one proxy knows both the sender and receiver. In fact, even if  $n - 1$  of the intermediaries were malicious and were colluding, if the client is honest, there is a low probability that they can connect Alice and Bob. There are not a lot of people using the system however, if Fuzzy and Charlie control many of the proxy servers, there will be a way to link the messages. In reality, though, each proxy server would be handling and receiving several thousands of messages, so it would be extremely difficult to link the two messages together.



Tor uses this type of onion routing for anonymous web browsing and censorship circumvention. While this example only depicted onion routing in one-direction, it can easily be scaled up, and Tor provides bidirectional communication.

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### 39.4 Onion Routing Issues and Attacks

One of the downsides in onion routing is performance, as the message has to bounce off of several proxy servers before it reaches its destination, it takes a lot longer to get there. Each time the message goes through a proxy, there is an extra delay that is added to the latency. However, it should be noted that performance decreases linearly with the number of proxies added, and if you estimate that roughly half of the available proxy servers are honest then you only need to chain together a small number of proxies before you can be fairly sure that you have gained some level of anonymity (you can think of security going up exponentially, but performance going down linearly with the number of proxy servers added).

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Another possible attack is one that was mentioned in the previous section, when the first and last proxy servers are under malicious control. The attacker can use timing information to link Alice and Bob, but, as mentioned earlier, this depends on the amount of traffic that is flowing through the proxy servers at that time. A possible defense is to pad messages (this is what Tor does but they note that it's not enough for defense), introduce significant delays, or if Bob is ready to accept encrypted messages, then the original message  $M$  can be encrypted.