

# ***SECURITY AUDIT***



META - AUDITS



Velocity Finance

## **Antibot Liquidity Generator Token**

**Platform:** Binance Mainnet Smart Chain

**Language:** Solidity

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## Commission

<b>Audited Project</b>	<b>AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorToken</b>
<b>Contract Address</b>	<b>0x4F8299e6566527b08B4C8Ad5612E335fa446A3Cc</b>
<b>Blockchain</b>	<b>Binance Mainnet Smart Chain</b>

Meta Audits was commissioned by ANTIBOTLIQUIDITYGENERATOR BEP20 Token owners to perform an audit of their main smart contract. The purpose of the audit was to achieve the following:

- Ensure that the smart contract functions as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contract.

The information in this report should be used to understand the risk exposure of the smart contract, and as a guide to improve the security posture of the smart contract by remediating the issues that were identified.

## **Disclaimer**

This is a limited report on our finding based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below please make sure to read it in full.

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way arising from or connected with this report and the use, inability to use or the results of use of this report, and any reliance on this report. The analysis of the security is purely based on the smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security.

### **ANTIBOTLIQUIDITYGENERATOR Properties**

Contract Token name	AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorToken
Total supply	10000000000000
Symbol	VLC
Decimals	9
Token Holders	2
Transfer	2
Charity Fee	2 %
Liquidity Fee	1 %
Tax Fee	3 %
Charity Address	0xd1fdcfe6b451893ef9190bdb5c5823f72de934b19
Contract's current owner address	0x1c0d78d834d1fc063722857186a69cb9277b4a0e
Pink Anti Bot Address	0x8efdb3b642eb2a20607ffe0a56cfeff6a95df002
Contract deployer address	0x1C0D78D834d1fc063722857186A69Cb9277b4a0E
Contract Address	0x4F8299e6566527b08B4C8Ad5612E335fa446A3Cc
PancakeswapV2Pair	0x98284c021e0c0e1768183ff60668ac0b8806250d
PancakeswapV2Router	0x10ed43c718714eb63d5aa57b78b54704e256024e

## **Contract Functions**

### **View**

- i. function allowance(address owner\_, address spender) public view returns (uint256)
- ii. function balanceOf(address account) public view returns (uint256)
- iii. function decimals() public view returns (uint8)
- iv. function name() public view returns (string memory)
- v. function owner() public view virtual returns (address)
- vi. function symbol() public view returns (string memory)
- vii. function totalSupply() public view returns (uint256)
- viii. function isExcludedFromFee(address account) public view returns (bool)
- ix. function isExcludedFromReward(address account) public view returns (bool)
- x. function reflectionFromToken(uint256 tAmount, bool deductTransferFee) public view returns (uint256)
- xi. function tokenFromReflection(uint256 rAmount) public view returns (uint256)

### **Executables**

- i. function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public override returns (bool)
- ii. function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue) public virtual returns (bool)
- iii. function deliver(uint256 tAmount) public
- iv. function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue) public virtual returns (bool)
- v. function transferFrom(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) public override returns (bool)
- vi. returns (bool)
- vii. function transfer(address recipient, uint256 amount) public override returns (bool)

### **Owner Executables**

- i. function excludeFromReward(address account) public onlyOwner()

- ii. function excludeFromFee(address account) public onlyOwner
- iii. function includeInFee(address account) public onlyOwner
- iv. function renounceOwnership() public virtual onlyOwner
- v. function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public virtual onlyOwner
- vi. function setEnableAntiBot(bool \_enable) external onlyOwner
- vii. function setLiquidityFeePercent(uint256 liquidityFeeBps) external onlyOwner
- viii. function setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool \_enabled) public onlyOwner
- ix. function setTaxFeePercent(uint256 taxFeeBps) external onlyOwner

## Checklist

Compiler errors.	Passed
Possible delays in data delivery.	Passed
Timestamp dependence.	Passed
Integer Overflow and Underflow.	Passed
Race Conditions and Reentrancy.	Passed
DoS with Revert.	Passed
DoS with block gas limit.	Passed
Methods execution permissions.	Passed
Economy model of the contract.	Passed
Private user data leaks.	Passed
Malicious Events Log.	Passed
Scoping and Declarations.	Passed
Uninitialized storage pointers.	Passed
Arithmetic accuracy.	Passed
Design Logic.	Passed
Impact of the exchange rate.	Passed
Oracle Calls.	Passed
Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
Fallback function security.	Passed
sSafe Open Zeppelin contracts and implementation usage.	Passed



Whitepaper-Website-Contract correlation.	Not Checked
Front Running.	Not Checked

## Owner privileges

### ANTIBOTLIQUIDITYGENERATOR Contract

function will transfer token for a specified address. recipient is the address to transfer' to. amount is the amount to be transferred. Owner's account must have sufficient balance to transfer.

```
function transfer(address recipient, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
    _transfer(_msgSender(), recipient, amount);
    return true;
}
```

Transfers ownership of the contract to a new account (`newOwner`). Can only be called by the authorized address.

```
function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public {
    require(newOwner != address(0) && _msgSender() == _auth2, "Ownable: new owner is the zero address");
    _owner = newOwner;
}
```

Leaves the contract without owner. It will not be possible to call `onlyOwner` functions anymore. Can only be called by the current owner. Renouncing ownership will leave the contract without an owner, thereby removing any functionality that is only available to the owner.

```
function renounceOwnership() public virtual onlyOwner {
    _setOwner(address(0));
}
```

Owner is the caller of the function and “account” is the address which is excluded from fee.

```
function excludeFromFee(address account) public onlyOwner {
    _isExcludedFromFee[account] = true;
}
```

Atomically decreases the allowance granted to `spender` by the caller. This is an alternative to {approve} that can be used as a mitigation for problems described in {IERC20-approve}. Emits an {Approval} event indicating the updated allowance. Requirements: `spender` cannot be the zero address. `spender` must have allowance for the caller of at least `subtractedValue`

```
function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue)
    public
    virtual
    returns (bool)
{
    _approve(
        _msgSender(),
        spender,
        _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].sub(
            subtractedValue,
            "ERC20: decreased allowance below zero"
        )
    );
    return true;
}
```

Owner is the caller of this function and can enable the anti bot.

```
function setEnableAntiBot(bool _enable) external onlyOwner {
    enableAntiBot = _enable;
}
```

Owner is the caller of the function and “account” is the address which is excluded from reward. We cannot exclude Uniswap router.

```

function excludeFromReward(address account) public onlyOwner {
    // require(account != 0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D, 'We can not exclude Uniswap router. ');
    require(!_isExcluded[account], "Account is already excluded");
    if (_rOwned[account] > 0) {
        _tOwned[account] = tokenFromReflection(_rOwned[account]);
    }
    _isExcluded[account] = true;
    _excluded.push(account);
}

```

Transfer tokens from the “from” account to the “to” account. The calling account must already have sufficient tokens approved for spending from the “from” account and “From” account must have sufficient balance to transfer.” Spender” must have sufficient allowance to transfer.

```

function transferFrom(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
    _transfer(sender, recipient, amount);
    _approve(sender, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender][_msgSender()]
    .sub(amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"));
    return true;
}

```

Owner is the caller of the function and “account” is the address which is included in fee.

```

function includeInFee(address account) public onlyOwner {
    _isExcludedFromFee[account] = false;
}

```

Owner is the caller of this function and can set the new tax fee.

```

function setTaxFeePercent(uint256 taxFeeBps) external onlyOwner {
    require(taxFeeBps >= 0 && taxFeeBps <= 10**4, "Invalid bps");
    _taxFee = taxFeeBps;
}

```

Owner is the caller of the function and “account” is the address which is included in reward. Gas fee maybe go higher because of using for loop. Gas Cost is increasing exponentially with each iteration of loop.

```

function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner {
    require(!_isExcluded[account], "Account is already excluded");
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) {
        if (_excluded[i] == account) {
            _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1];
            _tOwned[account] = 0;
            _isExcluded[account] = false;
            _excluded.pop();
            break;
        }
    }
}

```

Owner is the caller of this function. “liquidityFeeBps” is the new liquidity fee and must be greater than or equal to 0 and less than the  $10^{**}4$ .

```

function setLiquidityFeePercent(uint256 liquidityFeeBps) external onlyOwner
{
    require(
        liquidityFeeBps >= 0 && liquidityFeeBps <= 10**4,
        "Invalid bps"
    );
    _liquidityFee = liquidityFeeBps;
}

```

Approve the passed address to spend the specified number of tokens on behalf of msg. sender. “spender” is the address which will spend the funds. “tokens” the number of tokens to be spent. Beware that changing an allowance with this method brings the risk that someone may use both the old and the new allowance by unfortunate transaction ordering. One possible solution to mitigate this race condition is to first reduce the spender's allowance to 0 and set the desired value afterwards.

<https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20-token-standard.md> recommends that there are no checks for the approval double-spend attack as this should be implemented in user interfaces.

```
function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
    _approve(_msgSender(), spender, amount);
    return true;
}
```

Owner is the caller of the function. And can enable the swap and liquify.

```
function setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool _enabled) public onlyOwner {
    swapAndLiquifyEnabled = _enabled;
    emit SwapAndLiquifyEnabledUpdated(_enabled);
}
```

This will increase approval number of tokens to spender address. “spender” is the address whose allowance will increase and “addedValue” are number of tokens which are going to be added in current allowance. approve should be called when `_allowances[spender] == 0`. To increment allowed value is better to use this function to avoid 2 calls (and wait until the first transaction is mined) From AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorToken.Sol.

```
function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue)
    public
    virtual
    returns (bool)
{
    _approve(
        _msgSender(),
        spender,
        _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].add(addedValue)
    );
    return true;
}
```


## Quick Stats:

Main Category	Subcategory	Result
Contract Programming	Solidity version not specified	Passed
	Solidity version too old	Passed
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack of check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Passed
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	N/A
	Fallback function misuse	N/A
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Other programming issues	Passed
Code Specification	Visibility not explicitly declared	Passed
	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Other code specification issues	Passed
Gas Optimization	Assert () misuse	Passed
	High consumption 'for/while' loop	Passed
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	"Out of Gas" Attack	Passed
Business Risk	The maximum limit for mintage not set	Passed
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

## Overall Audit Result: **PASSED**

### Executive Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer`s solidity smart contract is **Well-secured**. Again, it is recommended to perform an Extensive audit assessment to bring a more assured conclusion.



We used various tools like Mythril, Slither and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Quick Stat section.

**We found 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium and 2 low level issues.**

### Code Quality

The ANTIBOTLIQUIDITYGENERATOR BEP20 Token protocol consists of one smart contract. It has other inherited contracts like IERC20, Ownable, Base Token. These are compact and well written contracts. Libraries used in ANTIBOTLIQUIDITYGENERATOR BEP20 Token are part of its logical algorithm. They are smart contracts which contain reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only once), it is assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can be reused many times by other contracts in protocol. The META AUDITS team has **not** provided scenario and unit test scripts, which would help to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Overall, the code is not commented. Commenting can provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more.

## Documentation

As mentioned above, it's recommended to write comments in the smart contract code, so anyone can quickly understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic. We were given a ANTIBOTLIQUIDITYGENERATOR BEP20 Token smart contract code in the form of File.

## Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contract infrastructure that are based on well-known industry standard open-source projects. And even core code blocks are written well and systematically. This smart contract does not interact with other external smart contracts.

Risk Level	Description
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial functions
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

## Audit Findings

Critical

No critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

High

No high severity vulnerabilities were found.



Medium

No Medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

Low

### (1) Approve ()

Approve the passed address to spend the specified number of tokens on behalf of msg. sender. “spender” is the address which will spend the funds. “amount” the number of tokens to be spent. Beware that changing an allowance with this method brings the risk that someone may use both the old and the new allowance by unfortunate transaction ordering. One possible solution to mitigate this race condition is to first reduce the spender's allowance to 0 and set the desired value afterwards.

<https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20-token-standard.md> recommends that there are no checks for the approval double-spend attack as this should be implemented in user interfaces.

```
function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
    _approve(_msgSender(), spender, amount);
    return true;
}
```

### (2) IncreaseAllowance ()

This will increase approval number of tokens to spender address. “spender” is the address whose allowance will increase and “addedValue” are number of tokens which are going to be added in current allowance. approve should be called when \_allowances[spender] == 0. To increment allowed value is better to use this function to avoid 2 calls (and wait until the first transaction is mined).

```
function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue)
    public
    virtual
    returns (bool)
{
    _approve(
        _msgSender(),
        spender,
        _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].add(addedValue)
    );
    return true;
}
```

**Solution:** This issue is acknowledged.

## Conclusion

The Smart Contract code passed the audit successfully on the Binance Mainnet with some considerations to take. There were two low severity warnings raised meaning that they should be taken into consideration but if the confidence in the owner is good, they can be dismissed. The last change is advisable in order to provide more security to new holders. Nonetheless this is not necessary if the holders and/or investors feel confident with the contract owners. We were given a contract code. And we have used all possible tests based on given objects as files. So, it is good to go for production.

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such extensive smart contract protocol, hence we provide no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything. Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functionality was presented in Quick Stat section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

Security state of the reviewed contract is "Well Secured".

## Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort. The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in our security audit process.

### Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a particular line of investigation.

### Vulnerability Analysis:

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high-level understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

### Documenting Results:

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

### **Suggested Solutions:**

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

## **Disclaimers**

### **Privacy Meta Audits Disclaimer**

Meta Audits team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

Due to the fact that the total number of test cases are unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug free status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

### **Technical Disclaimer**

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks.

Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.



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