

Hi Team

I am a freelance web security auditor and bug bounty hunter. I identify security loopholes and flaws that can lead to the website security compromise or website users security compromise. I have discovered a bug in your website. Please find the details about the reported issue in the PDF file in the attachment. I am hoping to receive a bug bounty reward for reporting this.

## **Bug: No Proxy Protection Impact: Account Compromise/Click jacking**

### **Description:**

CORS Proxy simply takes advantage of Cross-Origin Resource Sharing and this is a feature which was added in HTML 5. With this serves can specify that they want browsers to allow other websites to request resources they host.

CORS Proxy is simply an HTTP Proxy that adds up a header to responses saying "Anyone can request this" or in technical terms it adds Access-Control-Allow-Origin with (\*) value and as it can specify headers so it can also strip away headers. Which is the reason it can strip away the XFrame-Options value whether it be set to "DENY" or "SameOrigin" and like this the CSP Policy and CrossOrigin policy can also be bypassed.

### **Clickjacking Protection on:**

[https://login.opentext.com/otdsws/login?client\\_id=WWW&response\\_mode=form\\_post&response\\_type=id\\_token&scope=openid%20otds%3Aroles&state=OpenIdConnect.AuthenticationProperties%3DPVL3sBaYDNe5RmH0pwXyNne99mmZqimEzBSeEWMu-ATzY4MiEqQCqDL8Os94TW2Lxv\\_c4ECRdYAsXdIH-Lk3\\_J6QtVbutqTeBsjk2121XwufQzkzmiPILI-Xft6lgPrUuH4Bv0N1cKsck8u3M746ow&nonce=637640505964243195.YTcwMmY2OWQtNTBmZC00NDE1LTk2OWUtOGFjYTYzMzMwMjZlZjN2U2ZTltZmU0My00YzA1LTg0NTgtMzg2YWE5NWQ2NGM1&redirect\\_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.opentext.com%2Fotdsagent&x-client-SKU=ID\\_NET461&x-client-ver=5.3.0.0](https://login.opentext.com/otdsws/login?client_id=WWW&response_mode=form_post&response_type=id_token&scope=openid%20otds%3Aroles&state=OpenIdConnect.AuthenticationProperties%3DPVL3sBaYDNe5RmH0pwXyNne99mmZqimEzBSeEWMu-ATzY4MiEqQCqDL8Os94TW2Lxv_c4ECRdYAsXdIH-Lk3_J6QtVbutqTeBsjk2121XwufQzkzmiPILI-Xft6lgPrUuH4Bv0N1cKsck8u3M746ow&nonce=637640505964243195.YTcwMmY2OWQtNTBmZC00NDE1LTk2OWUtOGFjYTYzMzMwMjZlZjN2U2ZTltZmU0My00YzA1LTg0NTgtMzg2YWE5NWQ2NGM1&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.opentext.com%2Fotdsagent&x-client-SKU=ID_NET461&x-client-ver=5.3.0.0)

# Test a page for clickjacking/framing vulnerability

Enter the URL to frame:




## Current Fix deployed for clickjacking (X-Frame-Options: SameOrigin)

The screenshot shows the OpenText Connect login page. The page has a navigation bar with the OpenText logo and links for Products & Solutions, Services, Support, and About. The main heading is "OpenText Connect" with a subtext: "Welcome to OpenText Connect, the entry point for access to My Support, Communities and exclusive thought-leadership content." Below this is a banner for "OpenText named a Leader in the Gartner Content Services Platform Magic Quadrant 2020" with a "Get the report" button. A "Sign in" form is visible with a "Not a member? Register a new account" link and an email input field.

The browser developer tools are open to the Network tab, showing a list of requests. The selected request is "login?client\_id=WWW&response\_mode=form\_post&response\_type=id\_token&scope=openid%20otds%3Aroles&state=OpenIdConnect.Au...". The Headers tab is active, showing the response headers. The "x-frame-options" header is highlighted and its value is "SAMEORIGIN". Other headers include "x-content-type-options: nosniff" and "x-permitted-cross-domain-policies: none".

The Console tab shows a message: "Refused to execute inline script because it violates the Content Security Policy directive: 'script-src 'nonce-37fd142ed6ee35786ad18711a3ba48a8' data: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-blob:'. Note that 'unsafe-inline' is ignored if either a hash is present in the source list."

**Screenshot Proof: (x-frame-options:SameOrigin bypassed)**



### Exploit Code + Proof Of Concept:

You can access the exploit code from here : <https://github.com/niutech/x-frame-bypass>

You would need to place the website link in the iframe provided in the index.html file while simultaneously hosting both the exploit files that are index.html and x-frame-bypass.js.

**Impacts:** The site can also be opened in an iframe after the user has logged it making it hard for the user to avoid phishing. A user can be tricked into entering his credentials in what he may think are the placeholder for the original website details. And thus his credentials would be sent to the attacker as shown in POC. User's account can be compromised using above POC. Attacker can get full access to the account.

**Remediation:**

You must enable proxy protection for your website.

This can be easily verified by visiting this link which would open your website through an unauthorized proxy.

<http://younow-cors-header.herokuapp.com/index.php?q=https://builtworlds.com/login/>

Also you can visit the below links for ffsng.com which has implemented by provided fix to detect the vpn and redirect users to a vpn detected page.

<http://younow-cors-header.herokuapp.com/index.php?q=https://ffsng.com>

Or you can visit the second link which for godaddy.com requested through the same proxy which straight breaks the context of the proxy once detected and replace the link with the help of `document.location.replace.href()` function.

[http://younow-](http://younow-corsheader.herokuapp.com/index.php?q=https://sso.godaddy.com/?realm=idp&app=dashboard.api&path=%2Fvh-login-redirect&marketid=en-PK)

[corsheader.herokuapp.com/index.php?q=https://sso.godaddy.com/?realm=idp&app=dashboard.api&path=%2Fvh-login-redirect&marketid=en-PK](http://younow-corsheader.herokuapp.com/index.php?q=https://sso.godaddy.com/?realm=idp&app=dashboard.api&path=%2Fvh-login-redirect&marketid=en-PK)

**Reference:**

<https://hackerone.com/reports/85624>      <https://hackerone.com/reports/7264>

Looking forward to hearing from you on this. Also hoping to receive a bug bounty reward for reporting this.  
Best Regards

**Possible Fix** ( You would need to have the below code added to your .htaccess file and rewrite the websites access criteria. This fix also allows for white listing any trusted third party proxy).

```
<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
RewriteEngine on
RewriteCond %{HTTP:VIA} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:FORWARDED} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:USERAGENT_VIA} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:X_FORWARDED_FOR} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:PROXY_CONNECTION} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:XPROXY_CONNECTION} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:HTTP_PC_REMOTE_ADDR} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:XROXY_CONNECTION} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:X-FORWARDED-FOR} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:HTTP_CLIENT_IP} !^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP:FORWARDED-FOR} !^$ [OR]      RewriteCond %{HTTP:X-FORWARDED} !^$

RewriteRule ^(.*)$ - [F]
</IfModule>
```