

DPS MUN 2025

JODHPUR CHAPTER VIII



**Carpe Diem
Carpe Noctem**

BACKGROUND GUIDE HCC

**KARGIL WAR OF 1999 AND ITS
AFTERMATH IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

DPSMUN 2025

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This introductory guide would be as abstract as possible, and would just give you a basic perspective on what you can expect from the committee and areas wherein your research should be focused at this given point in time. Given the extremely political and volatile nature of the agendas of the committee, your presence of mind and analytical aptitude is something that we at the executive board would be looking to test. The objective of this background guide is to provide you with a ‘background’ of the issue at hand and therefore it might seem to some as not being comprehensive enough. Since our committee is a Joint Parliamentary Committee, the Rules of Procedure and the flow of the committee shall be according to the structure set by the Executive Board to simulate the Rules of Procedure of Lok Sabha to the closest possible level. We are eager to learn from you and hope that you will have a fulfilling experience as well. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us. We will do our best to answer your queries to the best of our abilities. We look forward to an exciting and interesting committee, and we are confident that the pervasive nature of the issue will help us achieve success. As members of the Executive Board, we hope to learn from you and contribute to the committee. All the Best!

Regards, Aabhas Chaturvedi Chairperson

Yash Bohra
Vice-Chairperson

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Carpe Noctem

DATE	KEY EVENTS
3 May	Shepherds report Pakistani infiltration in Kargil region
5 May	Indian patrols sent; five soldiers captured and killed.
9-10 May	Heavy shelling begins. Infiltration confirmed in sectors Dras, Kaksar, Mushkoh. Operation Vijay launched.
16-21 May	56 Mountain Brigade takes Dras-Mushkoh; first siege on Tiger Hill begins.
26 May	Indian Air Force launches Operation Safed Sagar.
Late May	MiG-21 and MiG-27 shot down; Mi-17 attack kills four crew.
1 June	Pakistani shelling on NH-1 begins.
5 June	Documents recovered from casualties expose Pakistan's direct involvement.
9 June	Indian troops recapture key positions in Batalik.
11 June	Intercepted conversation between Gen. Musharraf and Lt Gen. Aziz Khan released.
13 June	Tololing and Point 4590 captured; then-PM Vajpayee visits troops.
20 June	Point 5140 captured.
Late June	Points 4700, Black Rock, Three Pimple, Knoll captured; enemy retreats.
4-7 July	Battle of Point 4875 fought and won by India.
Early July	Tiger Hill captured after assault beginning 3 July; Dras secured soon after.
5 July	Nawaz Sharif announces troop withdrawal after meeting Clinton; Dras cleared.
11-14 July	Remaining peaks cleared; Operation Vijay declared successful on 14 July.
26 July	Formal end of war. Noor regular and irregular Pakistani forces evacuated.

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

The Simla Agreement (1972)

After the completion of the India-Pakistan War of 1971 that created Bangladesh, both countries signed the Simla Agreement. It turned the cease-fire line into the Line of Control (LOC) and established that neither side would alter it unilaterally. Both nations committed to resolving differences through peaceful talks.

Nuclear Tests (1998)

In 1998, India conducted nuclear tests, followed by Pakistan's own tests. With both nations armed with nuclear weapons, the likelihood of conflict escalated markedly and the possibilities of future tensions between the two countries increased.

Lahore Declaration (February 1999)

In February 1999, the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration. This accord reaffirmed the commitment to the Simla Agreement, promoted peaceful coexistence, and aimed to resolve the Kashmir conflict peacefully and bilaterally without permitting third-party intervention. It also sought to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

Infiltration Begins (May 1999)

During the winter of 1998-1999, elements of the Pakistan Armed Forces covertly trained and sent Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces-some allegedly in the guise of Mujahideen-into territory on the Indian side of the LOC. The Pakistani infiltration was codenamed "Operation Badr"; its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh and to compel Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thereby forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Jammu and Kashmir by taking a proactive role.

On 3 May 1999, local shepherd Tashi Namgyal reported Pakistani troops in Kargil (Ladakh) in District Baltistan in the Ladakh region of Jammu & Kashmir. The Indian Army set up patrol units along the area on 5 May. Five Indian patrolling soldiers, including Captain Saurabh Kalia, were

captured alive by Pakistani forces and brutally tortured to death. Heavy shelling began on 9 May to engage Indian troops and facilitate the entry of infiltrators in the region, with infiltrations occurring in the Dras, Mushkoh and Kaksar sectors.

After detecting the infiltration, India launched a military operation codenamed Vijay (“Victory”), ordering its army to push back the intruders-who included regulars of the Pakistan Army-and recapture the occupied areas. At the time of the discovery of these attacks, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of the Indian Army, General V. P. Malik, was on a visit to Poland and was receiving updates regarding the discoveries. On 12 May, the estimate reported by the DGMO to General Malik was “some militants,” but by 15 May the estimate had risen to 250-300. The 8 Mountain Division, under the command of Major General Mohinder Puri, was mobilized to be ready for engagement, and by 21 May the estimate had grown to over 1,000. The Indian Army moved its troops from the Kashmir Valley to the Kargil sector during the middle of May, and the Indian Air Force also engaged the infiltrators by the end of May. Intense fighting continued from both sides.

Operation Safed Sagar (26 May, 1999)

The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar on 26 May 1999 to support the Army’s fight in the high mountains of Kargil. Earlier, on 25 May, the government had allowed limited air power and strictly ordered that no fighter jets cross the Line of Control into enemy territory. This operation was historic-it was the highest-altitude air war ever, with planes operating between 6,000 and 18,000 feet above sea level. Thin air at such heights affected how rockets and bombs behaved, forcing pilots to adjust their aim and tactics. There was no challenge from the Pakistani Air Force, clearing the skies for the IAF to act without interference. Despite harsh weather and a shortage of nearby airstrips, the Mirage 2000 jets-introduced on 30 May-proved exceptionally effective in conducting precision strikes.

Operation Talwar (May, 1999)

During the Kargil War, the Indian Navy launched Operation Talwar as a critical component of India’s multi-pronged response alongside the Army and Air Force. After discussions in the Cabinet Committee on Security around 24-25 May 1999, the Navy deployed both its Western and Eastern Fleets into the North Arabian Sea to form a formidable maritime blockade. This move effectively choked off Pakistan’s sea-based supplies and trade routes, particularly through the Karachi port-

an essential gateway for oil and materials-exerting severe pressure on Pakistan's economy and military logistics. The operation achieved its goal without direct naval combat, but its strategic impact was undeniable: on 14 July 1999, India declared Operation Talwar successful. In early June, the Indian Army released documents confirming the involvement of the Pakistani Army, rebutting claims by the latter that the infiltrations were the work of Kashmiri "freedom fighters."

Capture of Point 5140

On 20 June 1999, during the Kargil War, the 13 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles (13 JAK Rif) under Lieutenant Colonel Yogesh Kumar Joshi successfully captured Point 5140, a crucial and highly fortified position on the Tololing ridge in the Dras sector. The assault was executed by Bravo Company, led by Lieutenant Sanjeev Singh Jamwal, and Delta Company, commanded by Lieutenant Vikram Batra. The operation required detailed reconnaissance the previous day, and the attack began after midnight, supported by artillery fire. In a daring manoeuvre, Delta Company approached from the rear to surprise the enemy. Lieutenant Batra personally engaged in hand-to-hand combat, killed several enemy soldiers-including at least three in close quarters-and secured the position despite being injured. At around 3:35-4:35 a.m., following the successful capture, he transmitted his immortal success signal: "Yeh Dil Maange More!" This victory was pivotal and paved the way for capturing other strategic points like Point 4700, Point 5100, Junction Peak, and the Three Pimple Complex.

Capture of Three Pimples

The capture of Area Three Pimples was a significant operation during the 1999 Kargil War, executed by the 2nd Battalion, Rajputana Rifles (2 Raj Rif), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Ravindranath. This strategic area-comprising Three Pimples, Knoll, and Lone Hill-was crucial for controlling the Dras sector and the vital Srinagar-Leh Highway (NH 1D). By 29 June, Indian forces had successfully captured the area, marking a pivotal moment in the Kargil War. This victory not only disrupted enemy positions but also paved the way for subsequent operations aimed at reclaiming other strategic points in the region.

Battle & Capture of Tiger Hill

The Battle of Tiger Hill was a pivotal confrontation during the 1999 Kargil War, marking a significant victory for the Indian Army. Tiger Hill, standing at approximately 16,500 feet (5,000

metres) above sea level, was strategically crucial as it overlooked the Dras-Kargil-Leh road and the entire Dras sector. Pakistani forces had occupied the peak, posing a severe threat to Indian positions. The battle commenced in the last week of June 1999, with the Indian Army concentrating its firepower on Tiger Hill. The 18 Grenadiers, under the command of Brigadier M. P. S. Bajwa, were tasked with the assault. The operation was supported by the 41 Field Regiment, which provided artillery support, and the Indian Air Force, which conducted air strikes on the position. The initial assault began on 3 July 1999 at 17:15 hours. The 18 Grenadiers, supported by the 8 Sikh Regiment and the 2 Naga Regiment, advanced under intense enemy fire. The operation was characterised by its high-altitude warfare, challenging terrain, and the courage of the soldiers involved. Despite facing stiff resistance, Indian forces made significant progress. By 5 July, several objectives had been achieved, and key Pakistani commanders were neutralised. The entire Tiger Hill feature was captured by 8 July, leading to a decisive Indian victory.

Battle of Point 4875

The Battle of Point 4875 was a pivotal engagement during the 1999 Kargil War, fought in the Mushkoh Valley of Jammu and Kashmir. Point 4875, situated at an elevation of approximately 17,000 feet, was strategically significant as it overlooked vital routes and communications. The battle commenced on 4 July 1999 when the 13 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (13 JAK Rifles), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Y. K. Joshi, launched an assault to reclaim the point. At this juncture, Captain Vikram Batra, who had been recuperating from an illness, volunteered to lead a reinforcement operation. Leading a platoon, he navigated the perilous terrain under cover of darkness. During the night of 6-7 July, Captain Batra's unit engaged in close-quarters combat with the entrenched enemy. In the early hours of 7 July, while rescuing an injured comrade, he was struck by sniper and rocket-propelled grenade fire, leading to his martyrdom. The Indian forces eventually captured Point 4875, which was later renamed Batra Top in honour of Captain Vikram Batra's supreme sacrifice.

FIRST CEASEFIRE (JULY 4 - JULY 12)

A ceasefire was declared between 4 July and 12 July. During this period, Indian forces, including the 17 Jat and 2 Naga regiments, made significant progress in capturing strategic positions adjacent to Point 4875. Special Forces units, such as 6 and 7 Para (SF), initiated operations to capture Point 4700 but were compelled to suspend their efforts on 12 July due to the ceasefire agreement. However, following Pakistan's failure to honour the ceasefire and withdraw its forces as agreed, Indian forces resumed operations. Subsequently, Point 4700 was successfully captured by the Para (SF).

Battle of Zulu Spur (22 July, 1999)

The Battle of Zulu Spur was a significant engagement during the 1999 Kargil War, marking the final major offensive by Indian forces to reclaim territory from Pakistani intruders. The Zulu Spur complex-comprising Tri Junction, Zulu Base, and Zulu Top-was strategically important as it overlooked vital routes and communications. On 22 July 1999, under the leadership of Brigadier M. P. S. Bajwa of the 192 Mountain Brigade, Indian forces commenced the operation. The assault was spearheaded by the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Gorkha Rifles (3/3 GR), and 9 Para (Special Forces). On 25 July, these teams, supported by 3/3 GR, launched a coordinated attack. Despite intense close-quarters combat, they successfully captured Zulu Top. The capture of Zulu Spur effectively neutralised the last significant Pakistani positions in the Kargil sector, leading to the restoration of the Line of Control (LoC) and the conclusion of the conflict.

Final Ceasefire (27 July, 1999)

The final ceasefire of the 1999 Kargil War was officially established on 27 July 1999. On that day, Pakistani forces requested a flag meeting to retrieve the bodies of their fallen soldiers. Major General Mohinder Puri, commanding the Indian 8 Mountain Division, granted this request, allowing Pakistani personnel to collect their dead. Following this, Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), fully adhering to the ceasefire terms.

AFTERMATH OF KARGIL WAR

Increased Defence Readiness & Spending

Following the Kargil conflict, India cut diplomatic ties with Pakistan and ramped up military preparedness. The defence budget rose significantly as the government prioritised acquiring advanced weaponry and strengthening combat readiness.

Intelligence Failures Under Scrutiny

Intelligence agencies, especially the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), came under heavy criticism for failing to predict infiltrations or identify the scale and nature of the intrusion. A military assessment noted that India suffered from a sense of complacency and was not prepared for a conventional conflict, having wrongly assumed that nuclear deterrence would maintain peace. Command-and-control gaps, insufficient troops, and a shortage of heavy artillery like Bofors guns were also highlighted.

Structural Reforms & Intelligence Overhaul

In response, the government undertook reforms to national security structures. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC)-chaired by K. Subrahmanyam-led to major institutional changes, including the establishment of a full-time National Security Advisor; the creation of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Integrated Defence Staff; enhanced aerial surveillance through UAVs and RISAT satellites; and other strategic initiatives to improve coordination and joint operations across the services.

Border Security Enhancement

India also decided to complete the stalled project of fencing the entire Line of Control (LoC), a measure aimed at improving surveillance and preventing future incursions.

Political & Diplomatic Turn

The post-war period coincided with the 13th Lok Sabha elections. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, returned to power with a strong majority-303 out of 545 seats. Diplomatically, relations improved significantly with the United States, which appreciated India's restrained approach to limiting the conflict's scope.

Relationships with Israel also strengthened, as India had received discreet support such as UAVs, laser-guided bombs, and satellite imagery during the war.

A Period of Reflection and Learning

Multiple reform panels and follow-ups-including the Group of Ministers and task forces like the Naresh Chandra Committee-were launched to ensure better preparedness for national security threats. In the aftermath of the Kargil War, India significantly ramped up its defence capabilities and defence spending while also confronting allegations of procurement irregularities like the coffin scam. A glaring intelligence failure and a sense of complacency during the war prompted a wide-ranging overhaul of national security mechanisms-including establishing the National Security Advisor, DIA, NTRO, and improved surveillance systems. Border infrastructure, such as fencing along the LoC, was prioritised, and bureaucratic reforms were launched to enhance coordination among military and intelligence agencies. These developments coincided with the NDAâ€™s return to power and the strengthening of diplomatic ties with the U.S. and Israel-marking a new phase in Indiaâ€™s strategic posture.

Kargil Review Committee Overview

Shortly after the Kargil War, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee established the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) on 29 July 1999, chaired by strategic affairs expert K. Subrahmanyam, to investigate the causes of the conflict and assess intelligence failures. The committee conducted in-depth inquiries, interviewing over a hundred individuals-from military officers and intelligence officials to former prime ministers-and reviewed official records and intelligence inputs. Its report, finalised on 15 December 1999 and tabled in Parliament on 23 February 2000, was unusual in its transparency: while the main report was made public, several annexures were withheld for security reasons. K. Subrahmanyam later noted that these annexures included sensitive information about Indiaâ€™s nuclear weapons development and the roles of past prime ministers.

AFTERMATH IN PAKISTAN

Diplomatic and Military Humiliation

Despite declaring itself a nuclear power, Pakistan faced both diplomatic and military disgrace after Kargil. The country's fragile economy took a further hit amid rising international isolation, and the morale of its troops—especially the Northern Light Infantry—suffered due to heavy casualties. The Pakistani government even refused to accept many of its fallen soldiers' bodies, triggering public outrage in the Northern Areas. While initial casualty figures were downplayed, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif later acknowledged that over 4,000 Pakistani troops were killed.

Political Fallout and Coup

The Kargil debacle created deep mistrust between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the military leadership, particularly General Pervez Musharraf. Tensions escalated when Sharif relieved Admiral Fasih Bokhari of his post amid growing civil-military friction, including the military's unilateral involvement in Kargil policy without full civilian oversight. This rift culminated in a bloodless military coup by General Musharraf on 12 October 1999, just months after the war.

No Official Inquiry

Unlike India, Pakistan never established a public commission to investigate Kargil. In 2006, the PML-N government claimed to have formed an inquiry that recommended a court martial for Musharraf—but alleged he “stole” the report during the coup. Other former officials and intelligence chiefs called for accountability, but none materialised.

Long-term Strategic Impact

The war dented Pakistan's credibility on the global stage. While it did bring international attention to Kashmir, this attention came under unfavourable terms, especially as Kargil violated the Simla Agreement and undermined trust-building efforts. The episode underscored the risks of loose coordination between civilian leadership and military strategy.


Internal Criticism and Blame Game
Within Pakistan, voices emerged sharply critical of the Kargil operation. Retired officials like General Ali Kuli Khan labelled the war “a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy,” describing the plan as flawed in conception, planning, and execution.

DPS MUN 2025

JODHPUR CHAPTER VIII

Participants are free to lobby amongst themselves and decide key issues for debate. It is advisable that the issues outlined for debate are not very broad that renders the debate superficial, but also not very narrow that renders the debate in the agenda incomplete. Please do not refer to unreliable sources such as Wikipedia, unsubstantiated news reports, social media reports, etc. It is advisable to rely on official government data, authoritative sources, and reputed media sources that are supported and substantiated by relevant data.

All the best!



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