

# Blockchain 101

*Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cihangir Tezcan*



## MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

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ODTÜ BLOCKCHAIN  
*18 October 2022*

# You are doing it wrong

## Cryptocurrencies

### Cryptographers are not happy with how you're using the word 'crypto'

The renamed Crypto.com Arena is a win for cryptocurrency fans but strikes a blow against the word's original meaning

Matthew Cantor

✉@CantorMatthew

Thu 18 Nov 2021 16.14 GMT



Construction workers put the finishing touches on the Staples Center sign outside the arena in downtown Los Angeles on 16 September 1999. Photograph: Xero Ryan Covarrubias/AP

The stadium that is home to the Los Angeles Lakers is getting a new name: the Crypto.com Arena. The name reflects the arena's new sponsorship agreement with a Singapore-based cryptocurrency trading platform. That may be good news for cryptocurrency fanatics - but perhaps not so much for another faction within the digital landscape: cryptographers.

Look up the word "crypto" in [Webster's dictionary](#), and you'll see it refers to cryptography, which in turn is defined as "the computerized encoding and decoding of information". Search "crypto" on Google, however, and you'll see a host of top results pointing to cryptocurrencies like bitcoin and ethereum.

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/nov/18/crypto-cryptocurrency-cryptographers>

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  - Almost every e-cash company failed until the invention of Bitcoin

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- Pseudo-anonymity: Account numbers are cryptographically obtained values and do not contain personal information

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Actually we want a hash function to behave like a **random** function

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## 3. Collision Resistance

It should be hard to find two inputs  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  such that  $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$

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Bitcoin script allows the use of **SHA-1**, **RIPEMD-160**, and **SHA-2**

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## Warning

Hardness (intractability) of the discrete logarithm problem depends on the group! (e.g. DLP on an elliptic curve  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ )

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## User key Generation

- 1 **Randomly** choose a secret key  $x$  where  $0 < x < q$
- 2 Calculate the public key  $y = g^x \pmod{p}$

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
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



The signature is valid if  $v = r$

# Elliptic Curve Cryptography




$$y^2 = x^3 + a \cdot x + b$$


# Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Neutral element  $\mathcal{O}$ Inverse element  $-P$ Addition  $P + Q$   
“Chord rule”Doubling  $P + P$   
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


$$y^2 = x^3 - 2x + 1 \text{ over } \mathbb{R}$$



$$y^2 = x^3 - 2x + 1 \text{ over } \mathbb{Z}_{89}$$

# Blockchain



*Bitcoin blockchain structure by Matthäus Wander (CC BY-SA 3.0)*

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- Adding a cryptographic algorithm causes a **soft fork**

# P2SH Example: SHA1 Collision Bounty

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- A disassembly of its script is
  - 1 *OP\_2DUP*
  - 2 *OP\_EQUAL*
  - 3 *OP\_NOT*
  - 4 *OP\_VERIFY*
  - 5 *OP\_SHA1*
  - 6 *OP\_SWAP*
  - 7 *OP\_SHA1*
  - 8 *OP\_EQUAL*

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- After the hard fork, Ethereum subsequently forked twice in the fourth quarter of 2016 to deal with other attacks

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## Electricity Consumption

- Bitcoin mining's yearly electricity consumption is around 200 TWh
- Norway's yearly electricity consumption is around 120 TWh
- Ethereum mining's yearly electricity consumption is around 100 TWh

# Ethereum Merge



<https://blog.ethereum.org/2022/01/24/the-great-eth2-renaming/>

# A Bitcoin Block

Block 714108 ⓘ

USD BTC

This block was mined on December 14, 2021 at 2:49 PM GMT+3 by [AntPool](#). It currently has 1 confirmations on the Bitcoin blockchain.

The miner(s) of this block earned a total reward of 6.25000000 BTC (\$299,190.81). The reward consisted of a base reward of 6.25000000 BTC (\$299,190.81) with an additional 0.07192409 BTC (\$3,443.04) reward paid as fees of the 3561 transactions which were included in the block. The Block rewards, also known as the Coinbase reward, were sent to this address.

A total of 27,890.66393872 BTC (\$1,335,140,864.80) were sent in the block with the average transaction being 7.83225609 BTC (\$374,934.25). Learn more about [how blocks work](#).

Hash	000000000000000000000000000000008247d658dbb5502b4ad00087adc0823ddd34f4dce5b79
Confirmations	1
Timestamp	2021-12-14 14:49
Height	714108
Miner	<a href="#">AntPool</a>
Number of Transactions	3,561
Difficulty	24,195,286,980,613.62
Merkle root	b716d73ff930a5fe5ca70a573734bbe6fc9506d4c1953438543f22224dcbdcbf
Version	0x20400004
Bits	386,638,367
Weight	3,993,549 WU
Size	1,538,685 bytes
Nonce	4,170,003,327
Transaction Volume	27890.66393872 BTC
Block Reward	6.25000000 BTC
Fee Reward	0.07192409 BTC

From www.blockchain.com

# Digital Signatures

## Randomness

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- Some Bitcoin users used the same **k** for signing two different transactions due to a Java bug in the Java SecureRandom class on Android and attackers stole their bitcoins by obtaining secret keys from these transactions

# Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA)

## How to Choose an Elliptic Curve?

- Bitcoin uses the elliptic curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 7$  (secp256k1) over  $F_p$  where  $p = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 2^9 - 2^8 - 2^7 - 2^6 - 2^4 - 1$

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- *Inside Information:* NIST is planning to add `secp256k1` to its standards for interoperability

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- Recall that adding new cryptographic algorithms to a blockchain requires soft forks

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- SNARKS are not post-quantum secure
- STARKS are quantum secure but proof sizes are larger (45-200 KB)

# Lightweight Cryptography

## Blockchains for IoT Devices

- Lightweight cryptography focuses on resource-constrained devices and tries to provide solutions that are tailored for them
  - require less energy
  - require less power
  - have small latency
  - provide better throughput
  - have side-channel resistance

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  - Enocoro (80 and 128-bit keys)

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# CSEC 519

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Cihangir Tezcan

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- 1** Fungible tokens are identical and interchangeable (ERC-20)
- 2** Non-fungible tokens are unique and each token represents someone's ownership of a specific digital asset (ERC-721)

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- In Bitcoin like blockchains, this generally requires 2 transactions

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- ERC-721 standard does NOT record the hash of the file!!!

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
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- 3 NFT files may be lost or changed in the future


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*The same NFT by Moxie Marlinspike on Opensea, Rarible, and Metamask, respectively*


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Storing an NFT at a regular webpage (HTTP) is NOT a good idea

# NFT Example 2



## NFT Example 2

```
name: "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk"
▼ description: "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk\n\nI drew this on National Sovereignty and Children's Day, 23 April 2021. He is the only leader in the world that gifted a holiday to children.\n\n\"Little ladies, little gentlemen! You are all a rose, star and light of prosperity of the future. You are the ones who will drown the country in real light.\"\\n\n\"Children are the future of our nation and a source of joy and merriness. It is our duty to raise children with the awareness that today's children are the future's adults.\""
▼ image: "ipfs://QmSvssb4WFfrstBmy9CHKPY5BZvNMc5bSqaQbuQ4w5aHpv/nft.jpg"
```

ipfs://QmbGNG3wes9tk7ori7Gu6mRcV9fwWvrzyJutqVQ3sCje99/metadata.json

## NFT Example 2



IPFS link:

<ipfs://QmSvssb4WFfrstBmy9CHKPY5BZvNMc5bSqaQbuQ4w5aHpv/nft.jpg>

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IPFS link:

IPFS SHA-256 (CID):

<ipfs://QmSvssb4WFfrstBmy9CHKPY5BZvNMc5bSqaQbuQ4w5aHpv/nft.jpg>  
9772F58B3EA7BD44DB28A93DED464D6A46027B602B8C298F597FE7A9CC5B594B

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IPFS link:

IPFS SHA-256 (CID):  
SHA-256 of the file:

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9772F58B3EA7BD44DB28A93DED464D6A46027B602B8C298F597FE7A9CC5B594B  
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  - Around 9% of OPENSEA royalty fees were modified after the 1st sale

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  - 3 NFT
- Many academic papers that propose blockchain solutions are wrong or redundant

# Why You Do NOT Need a Blockchain

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- 6 Tamper-proof log of all data store writes is wanted

# WEB2 vs WEB3

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
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
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
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*The same NFT by Moxie Marlinspike on OpenSea, Rarible, and Metamask, respectively*




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
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
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- Instead of looking at the blockchain, using a library/API of others result in centralized systems

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- 3 Considering that hundreds of cryptocurrencies died in the last 10 years, assuming that a blockchain will live forever might be a huge assumption

# Metaverse

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- 2 Legal system is not ready for Metaverse
- 3 Services that do not provide convenience will not be preferred
- 4 Some technologies emerge untimely and leave the scene

Thanks

*Thank You for Your Attention*