浅谈Android重打包技术

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大纲

- * Android应用APK文件结构
- * 重打包步骤
 - * Apk unpackaging
 - Decompiling
 - * Resource and code manipulation
 - * Repackaging and signing
- * Case study 基于重打包技术的geinimi木马 样本简单分析
- * 总结

Android应用开发步骤

• Coding

- Java in SDK
- C/CPP in NDK

Compiling

Compiling to Dalvik (DEX-Files)

packaging

Packaging as signed APK

APK文件结构

APK 实际上是个ZIP文件

assets

META-INF

Manifest.mf

Cert.rsa

Cert.sf

res


AndroidManifest.xml

classes.dex


resources.arsc



文件转换图



重打包过程



unpackaging

- * 使用apktool解包
- * Apktool d <file.apk> [<dstdir>]

```
D:\Android-Tools\apktool>apktool.bat d HelloActivity.apk
I: Baksmaling...
I: Loading resource table...
I: Loaded.
I: Loading resource table from file: C:\Users\hou\apktool\framework\1.apk
I: Loaded.
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values*/* XMLs...
I: Done.
I: Copying assets and libs...
D:\Android-Tools\apktool>_
```

Resource and code manipulation

简单	修改配置文件,包括sd卡中和一些xml配置文件
中等	修改apk中的资源文件
较难	修改smail文件内容
难	需要绕开破解一些本地的加密,混淆机制

修改smali代码

```
new-instance v5, Ljava/lang/String;
const/4 v6, 0x0
invoke-direct {v5, v3, v6, v4}, Ljava/lang/String;-
><init>([BII)V
v3 = 0x1fa3
v3 = v5.equals(v3);
const-string v3, "hello"->"你好"
invoke-virtual {v5, v3}, Ljava/lang/String;-
>equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
move-result v3
```

修改AndroidManifest.xml

```
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"</pre>
  package="com.netease.is.helloandroid"
  android:versionCode="1"
  android:versionName="1.0" >
  <uses-sdk
    android:minSdkVersion="8"
    android:targetSdkVersion="15" />
  <application
    android:icon="@drawable/ic_launcher"
    android:label="@string/app_name"
    android:theme="@style/AppTheme" >
    <activity
      android:name=".MainActivity" -> another activity
      android:label="@string/title_activity_main" >
      <intent-filter>
         <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
         <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
      </intent-filter>
    </activity>
  </application>
</manifest>
```

Repackaging

- * 使用apktool打包
- * Apktool b <srcdir>

```
D:\Android-Tools\apktool>apktool.bat b HelloActivity
I: Checking whether sources has changed...
I: Smaling...
I: Checking whether resources has changed...
I: Building resources...
I: Building apk file...
```

signing with certification

* 使用keytool和jarsigner来签名

```
D:\Android-Tools\apktool>jarsign -verbose -keystore android.keystore HelloActivi
ty.apk android
半:
```

* 或者使用autosign等其他工具签名

重打包技术应用

- * 学习别人的代码设计和逻辑
- * 汉化
- * 破解
- *制作病毒,木马,广告软件
- * 0 0 0

Case study -Geinimi 木马



geinimi

百度一下

當 您要找的是不是: 给你米

给你米病毒 百度百科

百度名片:给你米(Geinimi)给你米(Geinimi)后门程序,基于Android平台,通过各种伎俩植入 到多款流行手机游戏软件中,生成新的软件安装包后在手机论坛、手机...

百度名片...- 概念释义...- 病毒危害 - 传播方式...- 应对方法

baike.baidu.com/view/62359...htm 2012-9-1 - 百度快照

"给你米"?给你手机病毒 经济新闻-解放日报

2010年12月7日 - 本报讯 (记者 吴卫群)近日,网秦全球手机安全中心发布手机安全预警:一组名 为"给你米"(Geinimi)的手机后门程序,正在大里手机软件下载站、论坛中肆意... newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2010... 2010-12-7 - 百度快照

"给你米"感染手机或超90万部-MSN中国科技频道

wenku.baidu.com/search?word=geinimi&lm=0&od=0 该网友中的正是"给你米"后门程序变种

分析样本

- * File: MonkeyJump2.apk
- * Md5: e0106a0f1e687834ad3c91e599ace1be
- * Sha1:179e1c69ceaf2a98fdca1817a3f3f1fa28236b13

AndroidManifest.xml中入口修改

```
<!-- Default activity --> <activity
android:theme="@android:01030009"
android:label="@7F050000"
android:name="com.dseffects.MonkeyJump2.jump2.c.rufCuAtj">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"></action>
<category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"></category>
</intent-filter>
</activity>
<!-- Broadcast receiver -->
<receiver android:name="com.dseffects.MonkeyJump2.jump2.f">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED"></action>
<category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"></category>
</intent-filter>
<intent-filter android:priority="65535">
<action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SMS RECEIVED">
</action>
</intent-filter>
</receiver>
```

AndroidManifest.xml 中权限修改

android.permission.INTERNET
android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
android.permission.VIBRATE

android.permission.INTERNET android.permission.ACCESS COARSE LOCATION android.permission.READ PHONE STATE android.permission.VIBRATE com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL SHORTCUT android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION android.permission.CALL PHONE android.permission.MOUNT UNMOUNT FILESYSTEMS android.permission.READ CONTACTS android.permission.READ SMS android.permission.SEND SMS android.permission.SET WALLPAPER android.permission.WRITE CONTACTS android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE com.android.browser.permission.READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS com.android.browser.permission.WRITE HISTORY BOOKMARKS android.permission.ACCESS GPS android.permission.ACCESS LOCATION android.permission.RESTART PACKAGES android.permission.RECEIVE SMS android.permission.WRITE SMS

代码分析

- * 客户端代码
- * client.smali

- * 服务端代码
- * server.smali

通信数据分析

```
07:51:47.551306 52:54:00:12:34:56 > 52:54:00:12:35:02, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length
349: 10.0.2.15.47895 > 117.135.134.184.8080: P 241:536(295) ack 1 win 5840
        0x0020: 5018 16d0 ca6a 0000 7061 7261 6d73 3d33 P..??j..params=3
        0x0030: 6666 3864 3235 6334 3337 3030 3935 3339 ff8d25c437009539
        0x0040: 3866 6533 3735 6137 6465 3137 3937 6137 8fe375a7de1797a7
        0x0050: 3564 6137 6661 3336 6235 6365 6534 3166 5da7fa36b5cee41f
        0x0060: 3261 6266 6464 3964 3065 3034 6333 6239 2abfdd9d0e04c3b9
        0x0070: 6161 6639 3362 6630 3665 6430 3439 3065 aaf93bf06ed0490e
        0x0080: 3637 3062 3461 6234 6263 6536 6563 3961 670b4ab4bce6ec9a
        0x0090: 3133 3166 3864 3336 3864 3661 3039 3933 131f8d368d6a0993
        0x00a0: 3235 6461 3237 3432 3637 3733 3838 6535 25da2742677388e5
        0x00b0: 3639 6130 3866 3161 6532 3530 3764 3066 69a08f1ae2507d0f
        0x00c0: 3261 6266 6464 3964 3065 3034 6333 6266 2abfdd9d0e04c3bf
        0x00d0: 3737 6637 3333 3964 3562 3536 3835 3562 77f7339d5b56855b
        0x00e0: 3538 6136 6533 6333 3063 3466 3037 6233 58a6e3c30c4f07b3
        0x00f0: 6637 6330 3334 3765 3261 3439 3861 6238 f7c0347e2a498ab8
        0x0100: 3631 3964 3533 3231 3036 3330 6637 6563 619d53210630f7ec
        0x0110: 3733 3035 3661 6562 6331 6165 3536 6533 73056aebclae56e3
        0x0120: 6665 6631 3863 6266 3335 6431 3163 3134 fef18cbf35d11c14
        0x0130: 6333 3732 3835 3933 3631 6336 3238 6462 c372859361c628db
        0x0140: 6563 6630 6630 6364 3562 3231 3632 62 ecf0f0cd5b2162b
```

PTID=33120001&IME1=00000000000000000&sdkver=10.7&SALESID=0006&IMS1=310260 000000000&longitude=0.0&latitude=0.0&DID=2001&autosdkver=10.7&CPID=3312

控制命令列表

- * dsms
- * smsrecord
- * call
- * showurl
- * install:// and install Download an APK; trigger installation
- updateHost Updates the server list with a new list supplied by the server.
- changeFrequency Changes the frequency preference for checking into the server.
- skipTime Controls the delay between command execution.
- applist Delivers a list of installed applications to the server.
- * contactlist Dumps contact information including display name, last access time, and phone number about all device contacts to the server.

总结

- * 开发 如果防止自己开发的被重打包
 - * 核心代码放到本地库中.so
 - * 在线签名校验
 - * 代码混淆,ProGuard
- * 用户 如何避免成为受害者?
 - * 安装前仔细检查权限
 - * 从可信的第三方菜市场下载安装应用
- * 安全人员 如何检测,如何帮助开发和用户?

静态分析

- *静态分析
 - * 差异分析
 - * 特征匹配
 - * 权限检测
 - * 函数检测
 - * 类别检测

静态分析工具

- Apktool
- * Smali/baksmali
- * Dex2jar
- * jd-gui
- * sqlitebrowser

动态分析

- * 监控文件读写
- * 网络连接
- * 短信发送
- * 自定义行为匹配

动态分析工具

- ***** □ Dalvik Debug Monitor Android SDK
- **⋆** □ DroidBox Application sandbox
- **⋆** □ TaintDroid Application sandbox
- ★ □ Android Reverse Engineering (A.R.E.) Virtual Machine
- **∗** □ Network traffic
 - * WireShark
 - * □Tcpdump
 - ∗ □Shark for Root

谢谢!

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 - * http://aq.163.com
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