




Christophe Rigon / Soto² □ - @ki_cog@mstdn.social @ki_cog

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[Scybernethics: the "Transduction" effect] 🧵 □

One socio-historical emergent (enacted) theme from my scybernethics journey that I have not yet really explicited is what I call the "Transduction". This transduction should not be confused with the techno-poetic Simondonian one.



I use this term in a more classical transformational sense.

In the scybernethics framework (1P perspective of a 1P-3P epistemology), transduction mean "the *apparent* transformation of a form into a process and vis versa".

A "form" being here understood as "everything that one can designate/indicate, to others or to oneself".

I later found that it is what is called in continental phenomenology an "intentional object" (contrary to an implicitly polarized realist analytical phenomenology)

or the mental in-existent object (Inexistenz, cf. scholastic like Aquinas): "The object toward which the mind tends (i.e. its intention) is located inside the mind: hence the reason its presence is said to be "immanent."" (Dupuy).

We can see that in my conception this is clearly more polarized toward a sensori-motor enactive conception (See Alva Noë, Di Paolo or Froese works, "mind as a gesture") than toward a (naive confused with scientific) "realist" one.

Ie "reality" is here part of the scientific problematic question, not the obvious and "blinding proximity" (Bitbol) non-scientific solution.

Hence leading epistemologically and methodologically to the "ambijective gesture" as a complex and iterative phenomenological de-construction (understanding) of the intentional

act.

To note: phenomenological "intenTion" in French is not written as the motivational "intenSion". It's a linguistic "false/cheating friend" (fr. "faux ami).

This is in accordance with Brentano's original definition of phenomenological intentionality as an *act of presentation* (so before being understood as a "re-presentation").

The later "analytic" anglo-saxon version, derived and drifted, is based on a cultural misunderstanding (maybe productive if the debate is not a battle of culture): a translation error by Chisholm, and so then by Quine, which is well documented today.

As Stengers smartly said: "transmission involves a real practice of “misunderstanding”". 😊

One example of such transduction is the intriguing concept of "emergence". Is the emergence a reality or an illusion? Is this distinction pertinent? This dualist perspective, by itself, is not enough to tackle the question.

We need to go to the second-order enactive thinking² (embodied mind, the other standpoint but with the same sense of "enaction"), including phenomenologically the observer-actor.

I won't give you "the answer", as it is a matter of embodied personal understanding which is one step beyond the (technical) linguistic rationalization,

and also I would be horrified to spoil "the trick" or to admit that I don't understand it myself, but just a hint: what could be a "semi-illusion"?!

Strangely for me, when looking for cultural justifications to this enacted observation, I have found that in buddhist epistemology (again), and about this complex notion of "vacuity/emptiness" (which is not "void/nothingness"),

ie Śūnyatā, that it is said that "Form is vacuity and vacuity is form" ... Don't try to catch it totally with intellection: it is a methodological guide toward inner practice/praxis.

"And it should be stressed that it's better to have a direct relation with a qualified spiritual friend for this: ego-monkey is tricky" I said to myself. 😊

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