[ "Metaphysics": Formal Worldview vs Processual Method ]

I don't like the old term "metaphysics" because of its lack of analytical discrimination: do we speak politely about the subjective preconceptions of a view (so critically about its hidden & implicit political agenda),



or about its transcendental (Kant) a priori conditions of possibility?

Moreover, even if physics has historical precedence as a prototype of the objective study of the world-out-there, i.e. of a materialist so-called "realist" formal view,

science is today much broader, even if restricted to the sciences of nature (not so "natural"...), and physics much more fluffy.

I'm much more interested in speaking about today's \*meta-epistemology and onto-epistemology\*.

What's the point of conflicting different preconceptions of reality, moreover when one of its polarity is in phase with our usual common sense (popular/populist doxa), if we don't speak also and first about the way we know it?!


What makes science, in regard to a specific cognitive and phenomenological domain (discipline, ontological domain), is not so much its secondary communicated formal "worldview", but much more fundamentally it's enacted processual and evolutionary \*method\* (wink Descartes).

But the Cartesianist scientific method, a shifting importation of a philosophical view toward an applied view (Bacon), while wonderful to describe the world, totally failed to complexify our \*experience\* of it.

Back to square one, but this time with all the knowledge and technologies capitalized on cognition since his time, as science is also implicitly an inspirational recursive way of self-transformation:

"Thus my intention here is not to teach the method that each person must follow to conduct his reason well, but only to show in what way I have tried to conduct mine".

- Descartes, Discourse on the Method.



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