


[Don't Fall into the Cognitivist Relational Realism Trap] 🧵 🗆

There is now many very good philosophical argumentations against the substancialist metaphysic of Being (cf. image \(\bar{\bar} \), cited by Vervaeke).




But because they are caught in a linguistic cognitivist and formalist expressions (declarative knowledge coupled with propositional logic), they tend to fall into an opposite "Relational Realism" trap by searching for an "ontological" ultimate ground.

By doing so, they reify implicitly the substance that they criticize (a "relation" between what??), opposing the epistemologic and the ontologic, has if we were not onto-epistemologic beings.

If reality is not subtencial it is no more "relational", unless heuristically. For me it seems more adequate to qualify it as "processual" to keep an open and necessary in-betweeness of our intelligible thinking, as both extreme of the distinctions are, by themselves, erroneous.

For a quick critical de-construction of the "relational" conception, cf. "5.7 Form / Processus: taking care of the pharmakon (gestures and orthopraxis)"



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