# Proposed Changes to AMITT

# Introduction

CogSecCollab proposes and receives many suggestions for modifications to the AMITT base model.  This section contains the new things that we're considering.

# Proposed Changes to AMITT

## TTP Changes

Check that we've covered common techniques:

- Add in techniques from https://mediamanipulation.org/definitions
- Add from O'reilly's "4 short links", which had this neat bit on source hacking techniques, accompanied by definitions: Source Hacking — In this report, we identify four specific techniques of source hacking: 1. Viral Sloganeering: repackaging reactionary talking points for social media and press amplification; 2. Leak Forgery: prompting a media spectacle by sharing forged documents; 3. Evidence Collages: compiling information from multiple sources into a single, shareable document, usually as an image; 4. Keyword Squatting: the strategic domination of keywords and sockpuppet accounts to misrepresent groups or individuals These four tactics of source hacking work.
- Add from Rand Waltman's rumours series: https://twitter.com/CogSec/status/1271758646485987329
- Check against the UK Government's RESIST toolkit list of techniques https://3x7ip91ron4ju9ehf2unqrm1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/RESIST-Counter-Disinformation-Toolkit.pdf

Links to check

- [https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation.html](https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation.html)
- [https://medium.com/@Exovera/tracking-media-narratives-275ce78d7303](https://medium.com/@Exovera/tracking-media-narratives-275ce78d7303)
- Mention Kathleen Carley's work: "I would call the group's attention to the work of Dr. Kathleen Carley of Carnegie-Mellon. She has learned to characterize the specific "information maneuvers" of adversaries in terms of specific operational actions and desired intent, and the effects on target networks resulting from these maneuvers. She terms this field "social cybersecurity." "
[https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/english-edition-archives/mar-apr-2019/117-cybersecurity/](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/english-edition-archives/mar-apr-2019/117-cybersecurity/)

We included a column, ethics, in the countermeasures tab, to reflect the different ethical constraints on countermeasures, e.g. offensive moves might be inaccessible to government agencies. We haven't populated it yet, so have removed it for now.

# Incident changes

## Remove attributions in example incidents

This is tidying-up work.  The incident attributions, usually to countries, that we listed back in 2019 were used to ensure that we had variety in the set of examples we picked to seed AMITT.

## Add new incident examples

CogSecCollab and the CTI League team produced AMITT coded data for multiple incidents in 2020.  We should add these, and notes we have on TTPs that were missing from the base model, to the AMITT example incidents list.

# Structure Changes

## AMITT Framework TTPs and Counter TTPs together

The AdTac team reached out to the AMITT team about modelling each incident as a connected series of incident creator TTPs and counter TTPs.  We'd been working on this for a while as part of our thinking on how to model incidents as multi-player games, and this pushed us to manage incident TTPs and counter TTPs together.  We still have work to do on explaining each counter, and combining/ reducing the set of them as necessary.

# Hierarchical AMITT



Hierarchical version of AMITT

For most of 2020, we've had a version of AMITT that fits MITRE's new hierarchical version of ATT&CK. Each TTP in this model can have sub-techniques. The master copy of this model is available at https://vvx7.github.io/amitt-navigator-subtechniques/ (click on "create new layer", then select "AMITT" to view it).

| id | name | tactic | summary | deprecate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0001 | 5Ds | TA01 | Nimmo's "4Ds of propaganda": dismiss, distort, distract, dismay (MisinfosecWG added divide in 2019). Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. But this is often not possible. | FALSE |
| T0001.001 | Dismiss | TA01 | | FALSE |
| T0001.002 | Distort | TA01 | | FALSE |
| T0001.003 | Distract | TA01 | | FALSE |
| T0001.004 | Dismay | TA01 | | FALSE |
| T0001.005 | Divide | TA01 | | FALSE |
| T0002 | Facilitate State Propaganda | TA01 | Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Paid or volunteer groups coordinated to push state propaganda (examples include 2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China's Great Firewall to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message). | FALSE |

| T0003 | Leverage Existing Narratives | TA01 | Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consistent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplification practices. Examples include midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside. | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0004 | Competing Narratives | TA01 | Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. MH17 (example) "Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that "absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community" (deny); "The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate" (dismiss).<br><br>Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on.<br><br>These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach. | FALSE |
| T0005 | Center of Gravity Analysis | TA02 | Recon/research to identify "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength". Includes demographic and network analysis of communities | FALSE |
| T0005.001 | A/B Testing of Messaging | TA02 | | FALSE |
| T0005.002 | Audience Testing of Messaging | TA02 | | FALSE |
| T0005.003 | Demographic Research | TA02 | | FALSE |
| T0006 | Create Master Narratives | TA02 | The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a "whole of society" perpective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion consitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level.<br><br>By way of example, major powers are promoting master narratives such as:<br>* "Huawei is detetmined to build trustworthy networks"<br>* "Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers"<br>* "USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism" | FALSE |

| | | | Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0007 | Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups | TA03 | Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets.<br><br>Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.<br><br>Examples: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook's new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami. | TRUE |
| T0008 | Create fake or imposter news sites | TA03 | Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details. A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton. | TRUE |
| T0009 | Create fake experts | TA03 | Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a "Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME" and the other a "Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author"--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn. | TRUE |
| T0010 | Cultivate ignorant agents | TA04 | Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state's own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents". | FALSE |
| T0010.001 | Individuals | TA04 | Individuals post or engage content online. | FALSE |
| T0010.002 | Community Groups | TA04 | Online groups collectively engage content such as Qanon fixation on Hillary Clinton and George Soros conspiracies. | FALSE |
| T0010.003 | Activity-based Groups | TA04 | Hacker collectives, militias, and other groups, where the group identity is determined by a collective activity/mission. | FALSE |

| T0011 | Hijack legitimate account | TA04 | Hack or take over legitimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. Examples include Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0012 | Use concealment | TA04 | Use anonymous social media profiles. Examples include page or group administrators, masked "whois" website directory data, no bylines connected to news article, no masthead connect to news websites.<br><br>Example is 2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel. | FALSE |
| T0013 | Create fake websites | TA04 | Create media assets to support fake organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations. | TRUE |
| T0014 | Create funding campaigns | TA04 | Generate revenue through online funding campaigns. e.g. Gather data, advance credible persona via Gofundme; Patreon; or via fake website connecting via PayPal or Stripe. (Example 2016) #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targeted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targeting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months). | FALSE |
| T0015 | Create hashtag | TA04 | Many incident-based campaigns will create a hashtag to promote their fabricated event (e.g. #ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana).<br><br>Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects:<br>1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!<br>2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior<br><br>Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites ie: Twitter, LinkedIn) | FALSE |
| T0015.001 | Content Identification | TA04 | Hashtags which identify subject matter such as brands, pop culture. | FALSE |
| T0015.002 | Group Identification | TA04 | Hashtags which identify a group such as Anonymous. | FALSE |
| T0015.003 | Location & Event Identification | TA04 | Hashtags which identify locations such as OccupyWallstreet. | FALSE |
| T0015.003 | Hashtag Campaign | TA04 | Hashtags which identify narratives and campaigns. #WWG1WGA | FALSE |
| T0016 | Clickbait | TA05 | Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. (example 2016) "Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president." (example 2016) "FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother's law firm does Clinton's taxes". This is a key asset | FALSE |
| T0017 | Promote online funding | TA05 | Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign sites; helps provide measurable metrics to assess conversion rates | FALSE |
| T0018 | Paid targeted ads | TA05 | Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations | FALSE |

| T0019 | Generate information pollution | TA06 | Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign. | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0019.001 | Content Flooding | TA06 | Content flooding dilutes adversarial messaging and/or amplifies disinformant messaging. | FALSE |
| T0019.002 | Drive Traffic & Engagement to all Assets | TA06 | Drive traffic to content which is not central to the community. Amplify shitposts and low quality content. | FALSE |
| T0019.003 | Perception of Consensus | TA06 | Falsely create the perception that the community is in support of an otherwise minority view. | FALSE |
| T0019.004 | Perception of Polarization | TA06 | Falsely create the perception that the community is in support of an otherwise controversial view. | FALSE |
| T0019.005 | Amplify Engagement | TA06 | Amplify engagement to give the impression of an active/engaged community. | FALSE |
| T0020 | Trial content | TA06 | Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content engagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates | FALSE |
| T0020.001 | A/B Testing of Messaging | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0020.002 | Audience Testing of Messaging | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0021 | Memes | TA06 | Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns. | FALSE |
| T0021.001 | Image & Image Macro Meme | TA06 | Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina | FALSE |
| T0021.002 | Text Meme | TA06 | Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina | FALSE |
| T0021.003 | Video Meme | TA06 | Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina | FALSE |
| T0021.004 | Audio Meme | TA06 | Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina | FALSE |
| T0021.005 | Physical Meme | TA06 | Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina | FALSE |
| T0021.006 | Performative Meme | TA06 | Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina | FALSE |
| T0021.007 | Selfie | TA06 | Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina | FALSE |

| T0022 | Conspiracy narratives | TA06 | "Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model.<br><br>Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable " | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0023 | Distort facts | TA06 | Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content | FALSE |
| T0023.001 | Misquote or Misattribute | TA06 | https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/ | FALSE |
| T0023.002 | Use Unreliable or Biased Sources | TA06 | https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/ | FALSE |
| T0023.003 | Alter or Invent Facts | TA06 | https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/ | FALSE |
| T0023.004 | Present Unconfirmed Reports/Rumors as Fact | TA06 | https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/ | FALSE |
| T0023.005 | Mistranslate Words | TA06 | https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/ | FALSE |
| T0023.006 | Digitally Alter Media | TA06 | https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/ | FALSE |
| T0023.007 | Recontextualizatio n | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0023.008 | Omission | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0024 | Fake videos and images | TA06 | Create fake videos and/or images by manipulating existing content or generating new content (e.g. deepfakes). Examples include Pelosi video (making her appear drunk) and photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX. | TRUE |
| T0025 | Forgery | TA06 | Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources.<br><br>Example (2019) DFRLab report "Secondary Infektion" highlights incident with key asset being a forged "letter" created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election. | FALSE |
| T0025.001 | Pure Fabrication | TA06 | A document that is a complete work of fiction. | FALSE |
| T0025.002 | Tainted Document | TA06 | An authentic document altered to contain fictitious or inaccurate statements. | FALSE |
| T0026 | Fake research | TA06 | Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx | FALSE |

| T0027 | Adapt existing narratives | TA06 | Adapting existing narratives to current operational goals is the tactical sweet-spot for an effective misinformation campaign. Leveraging existing narratives is not only more effective, it requires substantially less resourcing, as the promotion of new master narratives operates on a much larger scale, both time and scope. Fluid, dynamic & often interchangeable key master narratives can be ("The morally corrupt West") adapted to divisive (LGBT propaganda) or to distort (individuals working as CIA operatives). For Western audiences, different but equally powerful framings are available, such as "USA has a fraught history in race relations, especially in criminal justice areas." | FALSE |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| T0028 | Competing narratives | TA06 | Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. But this is often not possible.<br><br>Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on.<br><br>These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the *firehose of misinformation* approach. | FALSE |
| T0029 | Manipulate online polls | TA07 | Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Examples: flooding FCC with comments; creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of a given issue. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well | TRUE |
| T0030 | Backstop personas | TA03 | Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate credibility/believability | FALSE |
| T0030.001 | Create Assets | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0030.002 | Create Dossiers or Cover | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0030.003 | Create Connections & Relationships | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0030.004 | Create Posting History | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0030.005 | Create Documents | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0030.006 | Create Bylines, Attributions, and References | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0031 | Video Sharing | TA07 | Use video sharing as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0031.001 | YouTube | TA07 | Use YouTube as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0031.002 | Twitch | TA07 | Use Twitch as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |

| T0031.002 | LiveLeak | TA07 | Use YouTube as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0032 | Social Bookmarking | TA07 | Use Reddit as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0032.001 | Reddit | TA07 | Use Reddit as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0033 | Photo Sharing | TA07 | Use Instagram as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0033.001 | Instagram | TA07 | Use Instagram as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0034 | Business/Professional Network | TA07 | Use business/professional networking sites as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0034.001 | LinkedIn | TA07 | Use LinkedIn as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0033.002 | Pinterest | TA07 | Use Pinterest as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0035 | Blog | TA07 | Use blogging services as a dissemination channel. | FALSE |
| T0035.001 | Medium | TA07 | | FALSE |
| T0036 | SMS & Messaging App | TA07 | Use direct messaging apps as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0036.001 | WhatsApp | TA07 | Use WhatsApp as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0036.002 | SMS | TA07 | Use SMS as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0037 | Social Network | TA07 | Use social networks as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0037.001 | Facebook | TA07 | Use Facebook as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0038 | Microblog | TA07 | Use Twitter as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0038.001 | Twitter | TA07 | Use Twitter as a narrative dissemination channel | FALSE |
| T0039 | Bait legitimate influencers | TA08 | Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders. | FALSE |
| T0039.001 | Endorsement | TA08 | Influencer endorsements can be used to signal boost. | FALSE |
| T0039.002 | Misappropriation | TA08 | Bait influencers to respond to false/inaccurate quotes/events. | FALSE |
| T0039.003 | Allegations | TA08 | Bait influencers to respond to allegations. | FALSE |

| T0040 | Demand unsurmountable proof | TA08 | Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof. | TRUE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0041 | Deny involvement | TA08 | Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in T0040 "Demand unsurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment. | TRUE |
| T0042 | Kernel of Truth | TA08 | Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths.<br><br>Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies.<br><br>When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters. | TRUE |
| T0043 | Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps | TA08 | Direct messaging via encrypted app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a diffucult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety. | TRUE |
| T0044 | Seed distortions | TA08 | Incident creators often try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event in order to give a misleading account or impression.<br><br>Examples: (2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO). (2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a "false flag" operation to frame the Syrian government. | FALSE |
| T0045 | Use fake experts | TA08 | Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias | TRUE |
| T0046 | Search Engine Optimization | TA08 | Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" | TRUE |

| T0047 | Muzzle social media as a political force | TA09 | Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports. (Example 20190 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility." Or India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes. | TRUE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0048 | Cow online opinion leaders | TA09 | Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissidents/journalists via trolling, doxing. Examples: Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place; 2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists. | FALSE |
| T0048.001 | Deplatform Influencer | TA09 | | FALSE |
| T0048.002 | Coerce Influencer | TA09 | | FALSE |
| T0049 | Flooding | TA09 | Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.<br><br>Example (2018): bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi's death. | FALSE |
| T0049.001 | Content Flooding | TA09 | Content flooding describes the message volume. | FALSE |
| T0049.002 | Mobbing | TA09 | Mobbing describes the message volume and the messenger volume. See K-Pop stans and TikTok teens during 2020 US Presidential election. | FALSE |
| T0050 | Cheerleading domestic social media ops | TA09 | Deploy state-coordinated social media commenters and astroturfers. Both internal/domestic and external social media influence operations, popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the "Great Firewall") but also technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China. | TRUE |
| T0051 | Fabricate social media comment | TA09 | Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums. (2017 example) the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts) | FALSE |
| T0052 | Tertiary sites amplify news | TA09 | Create content/news/opinion web-sites to cross-post stories. Tertiary sites circulate and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.   Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca. Examples: (2019, Domestic news): Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism. (2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms. | FALSE |

| T0053 | Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate | TA09 | Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized) e.g. BlackLivesMatter or MeToo | TRUE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0054 | Twitter bots amplify | TA09 | Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.(example 2019) #TrudeauMustGo | TRUE |
| T0055 | Use hashtag | TA09 | Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident (e.g. #PhosphorusDisaster) - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag. | FALSE |
| T0055.001 | Hashtag Hijacking | TA09 | Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident (e.g. #PhosphorusDisaster) - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag. | FALSE |
| T0055.002 | Hashtag Campaign | TA09 | Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident (e.g. #PhosphorusDisaster) - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag. | FALSE |
| T0056 | Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution | TA09 | Output information pollution (e.g. articles on an unreported false story/event) through channels controlled by or related to the incident creator. Examples include RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories. | FALSE |
| T0057 | Organise remote rallies and events | TA10 | Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. Example: Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space. (Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election | TRUE |
| T0058 | Legacy web content | TA11 | Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed. | FALSE |
| T0058.001 | Use Archiving Services | TA11 | Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed. | FALSE |
| T0058.002 | Use P2P Networks | TA11 | Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed. | FALSE |
| T0058.003 | I2P | TA11 | Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed. | FALSE |
| T0059 | Play the long game | TA11 | Play the long game can mean a couple of things:<br>1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification.  This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold (e.g. China and its constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China).<br>2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative. | FALSE |

| T0059.001 | Low and Slow Messaging | TA11 | | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0059.002 | Combine Disconnected Narratives | TA11 | | FALSE |
| T0060 | Continue to amplify | TA11 | continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished | FALSE |
| T0061 | Sell merchandising | TA10 | Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded content that's designed to be seen in the real world | FALSE |
| T0062 | Defectors | TA03 | Public defections are used to support an actor's credibility. | FALSE |
| T0062.001 | Moral or Political Defector | TA03 | Someone who sees a problem and defects because of it. | FALSE |
| T0062.002 | Defector Escaping Prosecution | TA03 | Someone who defects to avoid prosecution or persecution. | FALSE |
| T0062.003 | Fake Defector | TA03 | A fake persona used to validate a narrative of adversary defections. | FALSE |
| T0063 | Offline Groups | TA04 | Develop or infiltrate offline groups to advance narratives. | FALSE |
| T0064 | Offline Agents | TA03 | Develop offline persona in infiltrated groups or front groups. | FALSE |
| T0065 | Social Media Persona | TA03 | Account behaviours. | FALSE |
| T0065.001 | In-group Persona | TA03 | https://web.archive.org/web/20180813221652/https://medium.com/@timboucher/adversarial-social-media-tactics-e8e9857fede4 | FALSE |
| T0065.002 | Out-group Persona | TA03 | https://web.archive.org/web/20180813221652/https://medium.com/@timboucher/adversarial-social-media-tactics-e8e9857fede4 | FALSE |
| T0066 | Politics | TA04 | | TRUE |
| T0066.001 | Independent Political Party | TA04 | | TRUE |
| T0066.002 | Political Action Committee | TA04 | | TRUE |
| T0067 | Activist Groups | TA04 | | TRUE |
| T0067.001 | Hacktivist Groups | TA04 | | TRUE |
| T0067.002 | Social Justice Activist Groups | TA04 | | TRUE |
| T0068 | Front Groups | TA04 | Develop front groups. | FALSE |
| T0068.001 | NGO | TA04 | Non profits, philanthropy as seen in Double Deceit. | FALSE |
| T0068.002 | Think Tank & Policy Centre | TA04 | Think tanks and policy centres | FALSE |
| T0068.003 | News Media & Entertainment | TA04 | New organizations and entertainment outlets. | FALSE |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0068.004 | Corporate & Finance | TA04 | Business. | FALSE |
| T0068.005 | Political Groups | TA04 | Political groups. | FALSE |
| T0068.006 | Academic Institutions | TA04 | Academia. | FALSE |
| T0068.007 | Religious Institutions | TA04 | | FALSE |
| T0069 | Build Audience | TA04 | Techniques for building an audience. | FALSE |
| T0069.001 | Re-post Popular Content | TA04 | copypasta | FALSE |
| T0069.002 | Engage Community | TA04 | likes, retweets, comments | FALSE |
| T0069.003 | Mass Follow | TA04 | Mass follow accounts to gain followers. | FALSE |
| T0069.004 | Follow-back Schemes | TA04 | Use follow back schemes to gain followers. | FALSE |
| T0069.005 | Buy Followers | TA04 | Buy followers. | FALSE |
| T0070 | Algorithmic Filter Bubble | TA05 | Identify filter bubbles and promote content within. | FALSE |
| T0071 | Leak Documents | TA06 | Leak documents. | FALSE |
| T0071.001 | High Volume Leak | TA06 | A leak containing a high volume of data such as Macron leaks.  The timing of the leak immediately before the French election made it difficult to parse the documents enabling speculation on the content throughout the remainder of the election. | FALSE |
| T0071.002 | Leak Sensitive Documents | TA06 | A real document containing sensitive information, or any authentic documented leaked to amplify or corroborate existing narratives. | FALSE |
| T0071.003 | Forged Leak | TA06 | A 'leaked' document that is a work of fiction. | FALSE |
| T0071.004 | Tainted Leak | TA06 | A set of leaked documents, most of which are real, and some of which are works of fiction or are altered to contain ficitious or inaccurate statements. | FALSE |
| T0072 | Images | TA06 | Images | FALSE |
| T0073 | Text | TA06 | Text | FALSE |
| T0073.001 | Blog Post | TA06 | Blog Post | FALSE |
| T0073.002 | News Article | TA06 | News Article | FALSE |
| T0074 | Video | TA06 | Video | FALSE |
| T0075 | Audio | TA06 | Audio | FALSE |

| T0076 | Viral Sloganeering | TA06 | https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Source-Hacking_Hi-res.pdf | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0077 | Forum | TA07 | Forum | FALSE |
| T0078 | Video Games | TA07 | Video Games | FALSE |
| T0078.001 | World of Warcraft | TA07 | World of Warcraft | FALSE |
| T0079 | Virtual World | TA07 | Virtual World | FALSE |
| T0079.001 | Second Life | TA07 | Second Life | FALSE |
| T0080 | Leak/Drop Site | TA07 | Leak/Drop Site | FALSE |
| T0080.001 | WikiLeaks | TA07 | WikiLeaks | FALSE |
| T0080.002 | Distributed Denial of Secrets | TA07 | Distributed Denial of Secrets | FALSE |
| T0081 | Paste Site | TA07 | Paste Site | FALSE |
| T0081.001 | Pastebin | TA07 | Pastebin | FALSE |
| T0082 | P2P Sharing | TA07 | P2P Sharing | FALSE |
| T0082.001 | BitTorrent | TA07 | BitTorrent | FALSE |
| T0083 | Darknet | TA07 | Darknet | FALSE |
| T0083.001 | TOR | TA07 | TOR | FALSE |
| T0083.002 | I2P | TA07 | I2P | FALSE |
| T0083.003 | Freenet | TA07 | Freenet | FALSE |
| T0083.004 | IPFS | TA07 | IPFS | FALSE |
| T0084 | Self-published Media | TA07 | Self-published Media | FALSE |
| T0084.001 | Pamphlet | TA07 | Pamphlet | FALSE |
| T0084.002 | Zine | TA07 | Zine | FALSE |
| T0084.003 | Book | TA07 | Book | FALSE |
| T0084.004 | Comic | TA07 | Comic | FALSE |
| T0085 | Academia | TA07 | Academia | FALSE |
| T0085.001 | Conference | TA07 | Conference | FALSE |
| T0085.002 | Journal | TA07 | Journal | FALSE |
| T0085.003 | Class or lecture | TA07 | Class or lecture | FALSE |

| T0086 | Advertisement | TA07 | Advertisement | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0087 | News (Print) | TA07 | News (Print) | FALSE |
| T0088 | Television | TA07 | Television | FALSE |
| T0089 | Radio | TA07 | Radio | FALSE |
| T0090 | Film | TA07 | Film | FALSE |
| T0091 | Data Voids | TA08 | Data Voids | FALSE |
| T0091.001 | Username Squatting | TA08 | Username Squatting | FALSE |
| T0091.002 | Domain Squatting | TA08 | Domain Squatting | FALSE |
| T0091.003 | Keyword Squatting | TA08 | [https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Source-Hacking_Hi-res.pdf](https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Source-Hacking_Hi-res.pdf) | FALSE |
| T0092 | Teaser Campaign | TA08 | Release partial information or intent to act as a way of building interest. | FALSE |
| T0092.001 | Announce Hack & Leak | TA08 | Announce the intent to hack a target after it has already been compromised and exfiled. | FALSE |
| T0092.002 | Announce Rally or Protest | TA08 | Announce an event to build interest/engagement. | FALSE |
| T0093 | Bots Amplify | TA09 | Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.(example 2019) #TrudeauMustGo | FALSE |
| T0093.001 | Social Bots | TA09 | | FALSE |
| T0093.002 | Chat Bots | TA09 | | FALSE |
| T0093.002 | Spam Bots | TA09 | | FALSE |
| T0093.003 | Engagement Pods | TA09 | Engagement pods use bots to engage other group members content.  This | FALSE |
| T0094 | Trolls Amplify | TA09 | Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue | FALSE |

| | | | (issues that can/are be politicized) e.g. BlackLivesMatter or MeToo | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0095 | Censorship | TA09 | Censorship | FALSE |
| T0095.001 | State Censorship | TA09 | Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transparancy reports. (Example 20190 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility." Or India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes. | FALSE |
| T0095.002 | Platform Censorship | TA09 | Platform self regulation. | FALSE |
| T0095.003 | Take-down Requests | TA09 | DMCA and similar take down. | FALSE |
| T0095.004 | Social Pressure | TA09 | Cancel culture, allegations, public shaming. | FALSE |
| T0096 | Influencers Amplify | TA09 | Amplification happens once the influencers take the bait. | FALSE |
| T0097 | Mobbing | TA09 | Mobbing is content exposure distributed across many individuals.  Unlike | TRUE |
| T0098 | Cross-platform Release | TA09 | Coordinated release of content across multiple platforms. | TRUE |
| T0099 | Provocateurs | TA10 | Use of physical agents to accelerate protests. | FALSE |
| T0099.001 | Calls for Violence | TA10 | Actors call for violence against police, minorities, outgroups | FALSE |
| T0100 | Public Speaking | TA10 | Public speaking is used to amplify disinformation, or itself as an act of disinformation. | FALSE |
| T0100.001 | Protest, Rally & Demonstrations | TA10 | Speakers and animators present at rallies. | FALSE |
| T0100.002 | Convention, Conference & Seminars | TA10 | Disinformation in academia and professional conferences. | FALSE |
| T0100.002 | Press Conference | TA10 | Disinformation via press conference. | FALSE |
| T0101 | Iconoclasm | TA10 | Destroy statues, monuments, arts, books, religious/cultural iconography, etcs. Seen frequently in 2020 US Presedential election where counter-protesters burned signage. | FALSE |
| T0102 | Sabotage | TA10 | Sabotage objects or systems to facilitate narratives. | FALSE |

| T0103 | Rallies & Events | TA10 | Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. Example: Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space. (Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0103.001 | Protest | TA10 | | FALSE |
| T0103.002 | Counter-protest | TA10 | | FALSE |
| T0103.003 | Other Real World Events | TA10 | | FALSE |
| T0104 | Support & Fund Actors | TA11 | Finance and support front groups, offline groups, and influencers. | FALSE |
| T0105 | Social Media Groups & Pages | TA04 | Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets.<br><br>Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.<br><br>Examples: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook's new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami. | FALSE |
| T0105.001 | Create Social Media Groups & Pages | TA04 | | FALSE |
| T0105.002 | Buy Social Media Groups & Pages | TA04 | | FALSE |
| T0105.003 | Rent Social Media Groups & Pages | TA04 | | FALSE |
| T0105.004 | Compromise Social Media Groups & Pages | TA04 | | FALSE |

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0106 | Social Media Accounts | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0106.001 | Create Social Media Accounts | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0106.002 | Buy Social Media Accounts | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0106.003 | Rent Social Media Accounts | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0106.004 | Compromise Social Media Accounts | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0113 | Experts | TA03 | Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a "Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME" and the other a "Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author"--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn. | FALSE |
| T0113.001 | True Experts | TA03 | Real experts promote false information. | FALSE |
| T0113.002 | Fake Experts | TA03 | Fake experts promote false information. | FALSE |
| T0114 | News Sites | TA03 | Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their ownership, reporting history and advertising details. A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton. | FALSE |
| T0114.001 | Fake News Sites | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0114.002 | Imposter News Sites | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0114.003 | Pink Slime | TA03 | | FALSE |
| T0115 | Hijack Legitimate Group | TA04 | Hack or take over legitimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. Examples include Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. | FALSE |
| T0115.001 | Change In-group | TA04 | | FALSE |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Messaging | | | |
| T0115.002 | Change Out-group Messaging | TA04 | | FALSE |
| T0116 | Websites | TA04 | Create media assets to support fake organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations. | FALSE |
| T0117 | Behaviour Change | TA12 | | FALSE |
| T0118 | Deep Fake | TA06 | https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DS_Deepfakes_Cheap_Fakes Final-1-1.pdf | FALSE |
| T0118.001 | Virtual Performance | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0118.002 | Voice Synthesis | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0118.003 | Video Synthesis | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0118.004 | Face Swapping | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0118.005 | Lip-syncing | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0118.006 | Audio Synthesis | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0118.007 | Text Generation | TA06 | https://www.aspi.org.au/report/weaponised-deep-fakes | FALSE |
| T0119 | Cheap Fake | TA06 | https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DS_Deepfakes_Cheap_Fakes Final-1-1.pdf | FALSE |
| T0119.001 | Face Swapping | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0119.002 | Speed Alteration | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0119.003 | Lookalikes | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0119.004 | Recontextualizin g | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0119.005 | Selective Editing | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0119.006 | Digital Alteration | TA06 | | FALSE |
| T0120 | Online Polls | TA07 | Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Examples: flooding FCC with comments; creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well | FALSE |
| T0120.001 | Create Online Polls | TA07 | | FALSE |
| T0120.002 | Manipulate | TA07 | | FALSE |

| | Existing Polls | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0121 | Use Fake Experts | TA08 | Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias | TRUE |
| T0122 | Cheerleading | TA09 | Deploy state-coordinated social media commenters and astroturfers. Both internal/domestic and external social media influence operations, popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the "Great Firewall") but also techniques used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China. | FALSE |
| T0122.001 | Domestic Influence Ops | TA09 | | FALSE |
| T0122.002 | Foreign Influence Ops | TA09 | | FALSE |
| T0123 | Advertisement | TA10 | Buy billboard ads, Brexit bus wraps, etc. | FALSE |
| T0124 | Media | TA10 | Books, newspapers, stickers. | FALSE |
| T0125 | Seed Narratives | TA08 | | FALSE |
| T0125.001 | Demand unsurmountable proof | TA08 | Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof. | FALSE |
| T0125.002 | Deny involvement | TA08 | Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in T0040 "Demand unsurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment. | FALSE |

| T0125.003 | Kernel of Truth | TA08 | Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths.<br><br>Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies.<br><br>When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters. | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0126 | Direct Messaging | TA08 | Direct messaging via encrypted app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety. | FALSE |
| T0126 | Direct Messaging | TA05 | | FALSE |
| T0128 | Search Engine Optimization | TA05 | Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" | FALSE |
| T0129 | Email | TA07 | Email. | FALSE |
| T0129 | News Syndicators | TA07 | Tertiary news sites host syndicated news from RT, Sputnik, etc. | FALSE |
| T0131 | Message Reach | TA12 | | FALSE |
| T0132 | Social Media Engagement | TA12 | | FALSE |
| T0133 | Pundits | TA03 | Develop political pundits to promote strategic talking points. | FALSE |
| T0134 | Channels | TA04 | Create channels to support influence operations and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations. | FALSE |
| T0134.001 | Buy Channels | TA04 | | FALSE |
| T0134.002 | Compromise Channels | TA04 | | FALSE |
| T0134.003 | Create Channels | TA04 | | FALSE |

| T0135 | Content Laundering | TA09 | The original meaning of subversive content is diluted by exposing alternative meanings to the target audience.  In China, the "Grass Mud Horse" appeared on Sina Weibo as "Choco Milk Alpaca" as an emoji after censoring the original meme. Xiao Mina - https://88-bar.com/2017/01/has-the-grass-mud-horse-been-defanged/ | FALSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T0136 | Vandalism | TA10 | Agents destroy property to facilitate the narrative of violent protesters as looters and rioters. | FALSE |
| T0137 | Shills | TA10 | A person paid to help an organization without publicly disclosing their financial relationship. | FALSE |
| T0137.001 | Inauthentic Crowds | TA10 | Actors paid to participate in a protest, rally or event. | FALSE |
| T0137.001 | Performance Artists | TA10 | Actors paid to perform acts that support a narrative. During the 2016 US Presidential election, the IRA paid an American actor to depict Hillary Clinton in a prison uniform. See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-factbox/factbox-effort-to-sway-election-included-clinton-in-prison-garb-indictment-idUSKCN1G02CN | FALSE |