

1. Cognitive Security



TL;DR: Cognitive Security

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- There are 3 layers of information security: physical, cyber, and cognitive

Cognitive Security

Information Security, InfoSec, has three layers:

- **Cybersecurity:** machines and the networks between them
- **Physical security:** breaking into the building, because it's easier to steal from the computer than break in electronically
- **Cognitive security:** human beliefs, human emotions, and the networks between them

Cognitive security interacts with cyber and physical security, and includes things like information operations and disinformation. Each of these can share tools, techniques and resources for threat sharing and response, and practical applications.

Disinformation is an attack in the cognitive security domain, but there are others that can be used - social engineering is getting humans who are part of an information security system to help you break that security (e.g. by letting you into their systems).

The cognitive domain can be viewed and defended in similar ways to attacks on machines. Cognitive security is a holistic view of digital harms, from a security practitioners' point of view. It uses information security practices, processes, frameworks, and tools, to plan monitoring and defences. This gives us many things: frameworks, tools, processes, for defining threats, threat sources, indicators, effects, and potential counters. It also guides the design and operation of disinformation Security Operations Centers.

How Disinformation fits into an Infosec Threat Response team

Reading through the CTI League handbook, the league stresses "Our members prioritize efforts on helping hospitals and healthcare facilities protect their infrastructures during the pandemic and creating an efficient channel to supply these services". The disinformation team should do this too.

It lists services as:

1. Neutralize malicious activities in the cyber domain with takedown, triaging, and escalating relevant information for sectors under threats.
2. Prevent attacks by supplying reliable, actionable information (IoCs, vulnerabilities, compromised sensitive information and vulnerabilities alerting).
3. Support the medical sector and other relevant sectors with services such as incident response and technical support.

4. Act as clearinghouse for data, a connection network and a platform for facilitating those connections
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There are disinformation equivalents to these:

1. Neutralize. Disinformation incident response: disinformation triage, takedown, triage and escalation.
2. Clearinghouse. Collate and share incident data, including with organizations focusing on response and counter-campaigns (the “elves” who fight the “trolls”).
3. Prevent. Collate disinformation vulnerabilities and indicators of compromise (IoCs), and supply these to the organizations that we work with.
4. Support. Assess the possibility of direct attacks, and ways to be ready for that. For example, prepare resources that could be used in countering campaigns that target specific facilities, groups and high-profile individuals.

For the neutralization part, the league lists as examples:

- Infrastructures used by a threat actor that is exploiting the pandemic – malicious command and control server / DDoS servers / domains / IPs / etc.
- Exploiting legitimate services (such as open port in a legitimate website or compromised website used by hackers) and relevant to our stakeholders can be used to deploy attacks

The disinformation equivalents here would include:

- Hashtags, groups, networks, botnets, information routes, etc. used by disinformation actor groups to create and run incidents. We can map several of these ahead of time, monitor them for new events forming (e.g. qanon checkins), file abuse complaints to registrars, notify companies hosting botnets and command and control accounts, etc.
 - Medical events (e.g. vaccination rollouts) that we know will trigger disinformation incidents
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For prevention and support, the league lists examples:

- Alerting about vulnerabilities / compromised information and infrastructure to our stakeholders
- Creating a database of malicious indicators of compromise for blocking (via both MISP and GitHub repository)
- Alerting about trends and uneventful events regarding the pandemic in the cyber domain
- Creating a database of hunting queries for alerting systems.
- Create a safe and secure infrastructure for CTI League activities
- Create reports dedicated for the stakeholders and update them about ongoing trends of attack vectors regarding their organizations, such as significant information from underground-based platforms (darknet).

This is more detailed work, but as we track more incidents and become more familiar with the methods and tools used by incident creators, some measure of prevention activities become possible.