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Simulating Synchronous Processors*

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In this paper we show how a distributed system with synchronous processors and asynchronous message delays can be simulated by a system with both asynchronous processors and asynchronous message delays in the presence of various types of processor faults. Consequently, the result of Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson (1985, *J. Assoc. Comput. Mach.* **32**, 374–382) that no consensus protocol for asynchronous processors and communication can tolerate one failstop fault, implies a result of Dolev, Dwork, and Stockmeyer (1987, *J. Assoc. Comput. Mach.* **34**) that no consensus protocol for synchronous processors and asynchronous communication can tolerate one failstop fault.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we show how a distributed system with synchronous processors and asynchronous message delays can be simulated by a system in which both processors and messages are asynchronous, in the presence of various types of processor failures. One application of this result is that now a result of Dolev *et al.* (1987), that no fault-tolerant consensus protocol is possible in a distributed system with asynchronous communication even if processors are synchronous, follows easily from the result of Fischer *et al.* (1985), that no fault-tolerant consensus protocol is possible when communication and processors are asynchronous.

The equivalence of a system with synchronous processors and asynchronous communication to one in which both processors and communication are asynchronous has been a folk theorem in distributed computing circles for some time. One of the contributions of this paper is to present a careful statement and proof of this result, using a variant of Lamport clocks (Lamport, 1978). We have made precise a notion of simulation particularly suited to showing impossibility results. The novel feature of

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this paper is applying the simulation result to obtain an easy proof of the impossibility of fault-tolerant consensus for synchronous processors and asynchronous communication.

The sense in which we show that the two systems are equivalent is that no processor can tell if it is in one system or the other. Of course, an outside observer can tell the difference. For instance, if all the processors are to perform some action at their tenth step, the effect could be quite different with synchronous processors (where the actions would happen at the same real time) than with asynchronous processors (where the actions do not necessarily happen at the same real time). Thus, the notion of simulation that we define preserves local views, but not global views.

We observe that the only situation visible to a processor in the system with asynchronous processors that cannot happen in the system with synchronous processors is for the processor to receive a message at its ith step that was sent at the sender's jth step, where $j \geqslant i$. To avoid this anomalous situation, our simulation tags all messages with the sender's current step number; then processors save messages that arrive too early, and wait to process them until they are no longer early. (Compare Lamport clocks, which cause the local clock, or step counter, to skip ahead when a message with too large a timestamp arrives.)

Neiger and Toueg (1986) have independently developed the same simulation technique. However, they do not consider faults, and they apply the simulation to different problems, namely, determining when one can substitute these modified Lamport clocks for real time clocks while maintaining correctness, and determining when a variant of common knowledge, achieved with the help of this simulation, can be substituted for the standard notion of common knowledge. Their paper formally characterizes types of behavior that can be preserved by this simulation.

Our formal model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we show how to do the simulation for Byzantine processor faults. Simplifications for weaker fault models are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 demonstrates that the result of Dolev *et al.* (1987) follows from that of Fischer *et al.* (1985).

2. Model

We model a general distributed system in which processors communicate by sending messages. Conceptually, there is a global clock that measures time in integer ticks. At each tick, some processors take steps, in which they can atomically receive messages, change state and send messages. A message buffer holds messages between the sending and receiving times. A protocol determines for each processor the state changes and messages

sent, given the old state and messages received. A run of the protocol specifies at each tick which processors take steps and which messages are received. Various kinds of faulty processor behaviors are introduced next. After formally defining what a system is in this general model, we define the type of simulation we are concerned with.

2.1. *Basic Model*

Messages are assumed to be unique and are tagged with both the sender's and recipient's names by the message system. The *message buffer* holds messages that have been sent but not yet received. It is modeled as a set of messages. A *processor* is a deterministic state machine with a set of states, and a transition function that uses the current state and messages received to compute the new state and messages to be sent (at most one message to each processor). Certain states are designated *initial* states. A *protocol* is a set of n processors. In our terminology, a processor is more than just bare hardware—it includes the local algorithm for changing state and sending messages. A protocol is the collection of all the local algorithms.

A *step* of processor p is designated either α, indicating that p does some computation, or λ, indicating that p does nothing. An α step is an *active* step. A *processor history* for processor p, H_p, consists of an infinite sequence $d_1 s_1 d_2 s_2 \ldots$ of states d_i of p alternating with steps s_i of p such that d_1 is an initial state, and if $s_i = \lambda$, then $d_i = d_{i+1}$. The ith state of H_p is denoted state(H_p, i), and the ith step step(H_p, i). Given processor history H_p and integer i, define active(H_p, i) to be the number of active steps in H_p up to and including the ith step. A *message buffer history* H_B is an infinite sequence $M_1 M_2 \ldots$, where each M_i is a set of messages and $M_1 = \varnothing$, such that if message m is in M_i and not in M_{i+1}, then m is not in M_j for any $j > i$. The ith element of H_B is denoted by msgs(H_B, i).

A *run* R of protocol P consists of n processor histories H_p, one for each processor p in P, and a message buffer history H_B such that the following are true. Suppose message m has sender p and recipient q, and i is the smallest integer such that m is in $msgs(H_B, i)$: (1) Then step$(H_p, i-1)$ is active. We say m is *sent* by p at step $i-1$. (2) Furthermore, if j is the greatest integer such that m is in msgs(H_B, j), then step(H_q, j) is active. We say m is *received* by q at step j.

Given a processor history H_p, define states(H_p) to be the (finite or infinite) sequence of states $d_1 d_2 \ldots$, where $d_1 = \text{state}(H_p, 1)$ and d_{i+1} is the state following the ith active step in H_p. (The do-nothing steps have been eliminated and the state transitions isolated.) For a run $R = \langle H_B, \{H_p\}_{p \in P} \rangle$, define states$(R)$ to be $\{\text{states}(H_p)\}_{p \in P}$.

Various types of processor faults are now considered, classified by their observable effects. Suppose processor p has processor history

$H_p = d_1 s_1 d_2 s_2 \ldots$ in run R. Fix i and let M be the set of messages received by p at step s_i, and let M' be the set of messages sent by p at step s_i. Processor p *operates correctly* at step s_i, if d_{i+1} is the result of p's transition function applied to d_i and M, and if M' is exactly the set of messages returned by p's transition function applied to d_i and M. Processor p *exhibits an omission failure upon sending* at s_i if d_{i+1} is the result of p's transition function applied to d_i and a subset S of M, and M' is a strict subset of the set of messages returned by p's transition function applied to d_i and S. Processor p *exhibits an omission failure upon receiving* at s_i if p does not operate correctly at s_i, but p's transition function applied to d_i and a (strict) subset of M produces d_{i+1} and a set of messages of which M' is a subset. A message not used by the transition function or not placed in the message buffer is *omitted.* (Note that these definitions allow a processor to exhibit an omission failure upon both sending and receiving at the same step.) Processor p *exhibits a Byzantine failure* at s_i if d_{i+1} and M' cannot be described as the result of p's operating correctly or p's exhibiting an omission failure upon sending or receiving.

Processor p is *nonfaulty* in run R if it takes an infinite number of active steps and operates correctly at each one; otherwise p is *faulty.* Faulty processor p is *failstop-faulty* in run R if it takes only a finite number of active steps and operates correctly at each one. Faulty processor p is *omission-faulty* in run R if p is not failstop-faulty and at each active step p either operates correctly or exhibits an omission failure upon sending or receiving. Faulty processor p is *Byzantine-faulty* in run R if p is not failstop-faulty or omission-faulty, and at each active step p operates correctly, exhibits an omission failure, or exhibits a Byzantine failure.

The next definition concerns communication faults. A message m sent in an infinite run is *lost* if the recipient takes infinitely many active steps but never receives m.

2.2. *Systems*

We are interested in restricting the allowable runs (of any protocol) in different ways. Fix a protocol P. Let runs(P) be the set of all runs of P. Define the universe of all runs, U, to be $\bigcup_{\text{all } P} \text{runs}(P)$. A *system* is a subset of U. The system U can be characterized as having unreliable, asynchronous communication, since it includes runs in which messages are lost and runs in which messages remain in the buffer for arbitrarily long periods of time. Similarly, U has asynchronous processors, since there is no restriction on the number of λ steps between consecutive active steps in a processor history. There is also no restriction on the number or types of processor faults exhibited, when all the runs of U are considered.

The following systems are used as building blocks in this paper:

- *System SP.* The set of all runs such that if a processor takes a λ step, then all subsequent steps of that processor are λ steps. This system has synchronous processors. The processors can know the global clock value, because it is the same as the number of active steps they have taken.
- *System RC.* The set of all runs such that no messages are lost. This system has asynchronous, but reliable, communication.

We can restrict the number and type of faults to be considered by defining:

- *System FS(t).* The set of all runs such that at most t processors are failstop-faulty, and the rest are nonfaulty.
- *System OM(t).* The set of all runs such that at most t processors are omission-faulty or failstop-faulty, and the rest are nonfaulty.
- *System BZ(t).* The set of all runs such that at most t processors are Byzantine-faulty, omission-faulty, or failstop-faulty, and the rest are nonfaulty.

2.3. *Simulations*

A *simulation function* $f_{p'}$ for processors p' and p is a function from states of p' to states of p. Extend $f_{p'}$ to map sequences of states of p' to sequences of states of p by defining $f_{p'}(d_1 d_2 \ldots) = f_{p'}(d_1) f_{p'}(d_2) \ldots$.

Run $R' = \langle H_{B'}, \{H_{p'}\}_{p' \in P'} \rangle$ of protocol P' *simulates* run $R = \langle H_B, \{H_p\}_{p \in P} \rangle$ of protocol P via set $F = \{f_{p'}: p' \in P'\}$ of simulation functions, if there exists a one-to-one correspondence c between processors of P' and processors of P with the following properties. Fix p' in P', and let $p = c(p')$: (1) The simulation function $f_{p'}$ for p' and p satisfies $f_{p'}(\text{states}(H_{p'})) = \text{states}(H_p)$. (2) If p' is nonfaulty in R', then p is nonfaulty in R. We say processor p' *simulates* processor p for runs R and R' via $f_{p'}$. (The simulation function $f_{p'}$ does not necessarily cause p' to simulate p for other pairs of runs.)

Protocol P' in system A' *simulates* protocol P in system A if there exists a set F of simulation functions such that (1) for every run R' of P' in system A', there exists a run R of P in system A such that R' simulates R via F, and (2) for every run R of P in system A, there is a run R' of P' in system A' such that R' simulates R via F. We call P' a *simulation protocol* for P relative to A' and A.

System A' *simulates* system A if, for any protocol P, there exists a protocol P' such that protocol P' in system A' simulates protocol P in system A.

This definition of simulation is very strong, since the correspondence between runs of the simulation protocol and runs of the original protocol must be onto. However, for showing lower bounds or impossibility results,

this strength is good, and in fact is necessary for the application in Section 5. A more appropriate definition for upper bounds would not require the correspondence to be onto, but would need some condition on the responses of the simulation protocol to various inputs of the original protocol, in order to rule out trivial solutions. As discussed in the introduction, this definition of simulation concentrates on the sequences of individual processors' state transitions and is not concerned with global behavior that is only detectable by an observer outside the system.

3. Simulating Synchronous Processors with Byzantine Faults

Our goal is to show that if the communication system is asynchronous, then synchronous processors "don't help"—i.e., a system with asynchronous processors and asynchronous communication can simulate (the state transitions of) a system with synchronous processors and asynchronous communication, even if there is any number of Byzantine-faulty processors. The main idea of the simulation is for each asynchronous processor to keep track of how many active steps it has taken and append this number on each message (of the synchronous protocol) sent. The only situation visible to the processors in the asynchronous case that cannot occur in the synchronous case is for a processor at its ith active step to receive a message that was sent at the sender's jth active step, where $j \geqslant i$. To avoid this anomaly, such "early" messages are simply saved up until the recipient has passed its jth active step, and then they are used in the simulation.

Although the model of computation presented in this paper gives processors the ability to receive and send messages in the same atomic step, and to send messages to all the processors at one step, this power is not necessary for the simulation to work. If the model is weakened so that processors can send at most one message at a step, or can only send or receive at a step, but not both, (as studied by Dolev *et al.* (1987)), the same simulation will show that asynchronous processors can simulate synchronous processors when communication is asynchronous.

Subsection 3.1 describes the simulation protocol for a given synchronous protocol in more detail. In Subsection 3.2, we show how to map a run of the simulation protocol to a run of the simulated protocol. The proof of the main result is presented in Subsection 3.3.

3.1. *Simulation Protocol*

Fix t between 1 and n. Let system $\mathrm{S1}(t)$ be the intersection of systems $\mathrm{BZ}(t)$ and RC and SP. This is the system with at most t Byzantine-faulty processors, reliable asynchronous communication, and synchronous

processors. Let system A1(t) be the intersection of systems BZ(t) and RC. This is the system with at most t Byzantine-faulty processors, reliable asynchronous communication, and asynchronous processors.

Fix a protocol P. We define a simulation protocol P' for P relative to A1(t) and S1(t) as follows. Each processor p' in P' is assigned a processor p in P to simulate; it knows the states and transition function for p as well as the processor correspondence c. Each state d of p' has a component *d.sim*. It also has components *d.early*, which is a set of messages (to be described below), and *d.counter*, which tells the sequence number of the next active step p' will take. Every message m that p' sends in the step following state d has the value of *d.counter* appended to it, in a tag called *m.tag*. Each processor also keeps the necessary information to decide if message m from p' is the first message from p' with the tag value *m.tag*. (More than one such message is only sent if p' is Byzantine-faulty.)

We first describe the states of p'. An initial state d of p' has *d.sim* equal to an initial state of p, $d.early = \varnothing$ and $d.counter = 1$. There is one initial state of p' for each initial state of p. Noninitial states are obtained by starting from an initial state and applying p''s transition function (some number of times).

We now describe p''s transition function. Suppose that p' is in state d and receives the set of messages M. Let E be the set of all messages m in $M \cup d.early$ such that m is the first message received from the sender with the tag value *m.tag*. Let M' be the set of all messages m in E such that $m.tag < d.counter$. Then p' calculates the result of the transition function for p applied to *d.sim* and M' (after removing the *tag* components of the messages and applying c to the sender's name). Call the results the state d'' and the message set M''. Let d' be the new state of p'; $d'.sim$ is set equal to d'', $d'.early$ is set equal to $E - M'$, and $d'.counter$ is set equal to $d.counter + 1$. The messages sent are those in M'', each tagged with *d.counter*.

3.2. *Constructing Corresponding Runs*

Pick a run $R' = \langle H_{B'}, \{H_{p'}\}_{p' \in P'} \rangle$ of P' in system A1(t). We describe a particular run R of protocol P corresponding to R'. (In the next subsection we show that R is in S1(t).)

We define the message buffer history H_B. Suppose processor p', at its ath active step, sends message m' with tag b to processor q'. (As will be discussed in Section 4, if p' is not Byzantine-faulty, then $a = b$.) Let m be the message obtained from m' by deleting the tag and changing the sender to p and the recipient to q. If b is anything other than a positive integer (for instance, missing) or if m' is not the first message received by q' from p' with tag b, then nothing corresponding to m' is present in H_B. Otherwise, let $i = \min(a + 1, b + 1)$. (The goal is for m to be sent in R either at the same active step when p' actually sends m', or when p' claims, via the tag,

to have sent it, whichever is earlier.) Suppose q' receives m' at its lth active step. Let $j = \max(b+1, l)$. If m' is never received in $H_{q'}$, or if q' takes fewer than j active steps, then m is in $\text{msgs}(H_B, k)$ precisely for all $k \geqslant i$. Otherwise m is in $\text{msgs}(H_B, k)$ precisely for $i \leqslant k \leqslant j$. No other messages are present. Clearly H_B is a message history.

We define inductively the processor history $H_p = d_1 s_1 d_2 s_2 \ldots$ for processor p in P, which is simulated by processor p' in P'. Let $H_{p'} = d'_1 s'_1 d'_2 s'_2 \ldots$. For the basis, $d_1 = d'_1.sim$. Suppose the processor history up to d_i has been defined. If there are fewer than i active steps in $H_{p'}$, then $s_i = \lambda$ and $d_{i+1} = d_i$. Otherwise, $s_i = \alpha$, and $d_{i+1} = d'_j.sim$, where d'_j is the state following the ith active step in $H_{p'}$. Clearly, the sequence H_p is a processor history for p in P.

LEMMA 1. $R = \langle H_B, \{H_p\}_{p \in P} \rangle$, as defined above, is a run of protocol P.

Proof. We already know that the H_p's are processor histories for P. We must show that the message buffer behaves properly. Suppose message m has sender p and recipient q, and i is the smallest integer such that m is in $\text{msgs}(H_B, i)$. (1) By construction of R, there exists a such that m' (m with *tag* b) is sent at p''s ath active step, and $i - 1 = \min(a, b)$. Thus p' takes at least $i-1$ active steps, so $\text{step}(H_p, i-1)$ is active. (2) Suppose m is received in R. Let j be the greatest integer such that m is in $\text{msgs}(H_B, j)$. By construction of R, there exists l such that m is received at q''s lth active step, $j = \max(b+1, l)$, and q' takes at least j active steps. Thus, $\text{step}(H_q, j)$ is active. ∎

3.3. *Results*

This subsection contains the proof that the simulation protocol actually works. For the remainder of this section, fix a run R' of P' in $\text{A1}(t)$, and construct run R from R' as above. Recall that processor p' in P' simulates processor p in P for runs R' and R.

LEMMA 2. *Processor p' takes an infinite number of active steps in R' if and only if p takes an infinite number of active steps in R.*

Proof. By construction of R. ∎

Nonfaulty, sending omission-faulty and failstop-faulty behaviors are preserved by the simulation. However, if a processor p' exhibits an omission failure upon receiving in R' and the message omitted is early, then p in R may exhibit a weaker form of faulty behavior (or perhaps be nonfaulty). Similarly, if a processor p' exhibits a Byzantine failure in R' and the Byzantine nature of the error only affects the tag on a message, then p in R

may exhibit a weaker form of faulty behavior (or perhaps be nonfaulty). Lemmas 3 and 4 demonstrate these facts.

LEMMA 3. *If p' is not Byzantine-faulty and p' operates correctly at* step($H_{p'}$, i), *then p operates correctly at* step(H_p, j), *where* $j = \text{active}(H_{p'}, i)$.

Proof. Suppose at step($H_{p'}$, i), p' applies p's transition function to the set of messages M', and that p receives the set of messages M at step(H_p, j). The following argument shows that $M' = M$. We say that a message m' of R' and a message m of R *correspond* if the text is the same and the senders and recipients are corresponding processors (with respect to the simulation). Message m is in M' if and only if there is some corresponding message m' such that m' is the first message received from the sender in $H_{p'}$ with tag value $m'.tag$, $m'.tag$ is a positive integer, and $m'.tag < j$. These three conditions are true if and only if m is in M.

By construction of R, state(H_p, j) = state($H_{p'}$, i).*sim*. Since p' operates correctly at step($H_{p'}$, i), and it applies p's transition function to state(H_p, j) and M, and since state(H_p, $j+1$) = state($H_{p'}$, $i+1$).*sim*, p changes state correctly at step(H_p, j).

Suppose p' sends the set of messages N' at step($H_{p'}$, i) and p sends the set of messages N at step(H_p, j). Since p' operates correctly, we can deduce that state($H_{p'}$, i).*counter* = j, all the tags of messages in N' are equal to j, there is at most one message sent to each processor, and no other messages from p' have tag j (because p' is not Byzantine-faulty). Thus, if m' is in N', then a corresponding m is in N, and if m is in N, then a corresponding m' is in N'. Thus, p sends the correct messages at step(H_p, j). ∎

LEMMA 4. (a) *If processor p' is nonfaulty in R', then processor p is nonfaulty in R.*

(b) *If processor p' is failstop-faulty in R', then processor p is failstop-faulty in R.*

(c) *If processor p' is omission-faulty in R', then processor p is omission-faulty, failstop-faulty or nonfaulty in R.*

Proof. Parts (a) and (b) follow from Lemmas 2 and 3.

(c) The hypothesis that p' is omission-faulty in R' is equivalent to assuming that at each active step (of which there are either a finite or infinite number), p' either operates correctly or exhibits an omission failure, and there is some active step at which p' exhibits an omission failure.

By Lemma 3, if p' operates correctly at step($H_{p'}$, i), then p operates correctly at step(H_p, j), where $j = \text{active}(H_{p'}, i)$.

Suppose p' exhibits an omission failure upon sending at step($H_{p'}$, i).

Then by construction of R, p exhibits an omission failure upon sending at step(H_p, j), where $j = \text{active}(H_{p'}, i)$.

Suppose p' exhibits an omission failure upon receiving at step($H_{p'}$, i), and one of the messages omitted is m. Let $a = \text{active}(H_{p'}, i)$ and $m.tag = b$. If $b < a$, then by construction of R, p exhibits an omission failure upon receiving at step(H_p, a) (p' should have used m in the simulation when m was received). If $b \geq a$, then by construction of R, p could exhibit an omission failure upon receiving at step(H_p, $b+1$) (p' should have saved m and used it in the simulation when its counter reached $b+1$). However, it might be the case that the presence or absence of message m is immaterial to p's state change and set of messages sent, in which case p operates correctly at step(H_p, $b+1$).

Thus, at each active step in R, p either operates correctly, or exhibits an omission failure. The result follows. ∎

LEMMA 5. *R is in system* S1(t).

Proof. R is in system SP since, by construction of R, once a processor takes a λ step, all subsequent steps are λ steps.

Since R' is in system BZ(t), at least $n-t$ processors are nonfaulty in R'. By Lemma 4, at least $n-t$ processors are nonfaulty in R. Thus, R is in system BZ(t).

Next we show that R is in system RC. Suppose message m is sent in R by processor p to processor q, and q takes infinitely many active steps. In R', p' sends message m' (m with *tag* b for some positive integer b) to q'. Since R' is in system RC, and since by Lemma 2 q' takes infinitely many active steps, m' eventually arrives in R', say at q''s lth active step. Then m is received at step(H_q, j), where $j = \max(b+1, l)$. ∎

THEOREM 6. *System* A1(t) *simulates system* S1(t), *for any value of* t, $1 \leq t \leq n$.

Proof. Fix any protocol P. Let P' be the protocol defined above. We must show that protocol P' in system A1(t) simulates protocol P in system S1(t). Let the correspondence c between processors in P' and processors in P be that implicit in the construction of P'. Define a set $F = \{f_{p'} : p' \in P'\}$ of simulation functions as follows. Fix p' in P' and let $p = c(p')$. Define simulation function $f_{p'}$ from states of p' to states of p to be $f_{p'}(d') = d'.sim$.

The first direction is showing that for every run R' of P' in system A1(t), there exists a run R of P in system S1(t) such that R' simulates R via F. Given a run R' of P' in system A1(t), let R be the run constructed as above. By Lemma 1, R is a run of P. By Lemma 5, R is in system S1(t). Now we must show that R' simulates R via F. By construction of R, $f_{p'}(states(H_{p'})) = states(H_p)$. Furthermore, if p' is nonfaulty in R', then p is nonfaulty in R, by Lemma 4.

The second direction is showing that given a run R of P in S1(t), there is a run R' of P' in system A1(t) such that R' simulates R via F. The idea of the construction is to let processors in R' take the same steps at exactly the same ticks as do the processors they are simulating in R and to let the message delays be exactly the same. The key is to observe that a run in which processors are synchronous is also in the system with asynchronous processors (i.e., S1(t) is a subset of A1(t)). The following merely formalizes the idea and adds the appropriate tags to the messages.

Let $R = \langle H_B, \{H_p\}_{p \in P} \rangle$. Define a message buffer history $H_{B'}$ as follows. Suppose message m from processor p to processor q is in msgs(H_B, i) for some i, and let b be the smallest integer such that m is in msgs(H_B, b). Then message m', equal to m with *tag* $b-1$, from processor p' to processor q', is in msgs($H_{B'}$, i). No other messages are in msgs($H_{B'}$, i).

Define processor history $H_{p'} = d'_1 s'_1 d'_2 s'_2 \ldots$ as follows. Let d'_1 be the initial state of p' with *sim* component equal to state(H_p, 1). Suppose $H_{p'}$ has been defined up to d'_i. Then $s_i = \text{step}(H_p, i)$. If $s_i = \lambda$, then $d'_{i+1} = d'_i$; otherwise let $d'_{i+1}.sim = \text{state}(H_p, i+1)$, $d'_{i+1}.counter = d'_i.counter + 1$, and $d'_{i+1}.early = \varnothing$. This defines the states of $H_{p'}$.

It is straightforward to show that $R' = \langle H_{B'}, \{H_{p'}\}_{p' \in P'} \rangle$ is a run of P' in system A1(t), and that R' simulates R via F. ∎

4. Simulating Synchronous Processors with Weaker Faults

If the strongest type of processor fault allowed is omission, then the simulation and proofs can be slightly simplified. Fix t between 1 and n. Let system S2(t) be the intersection of systems OM(t) and RC and SP. Let system A2(t) be the intersection of systems OM(t) and RC. The same simulation as in Section 3 can be used, except it is no longer necessary to check if a message is the first one with that tag value. Since no Byzantine faults are considered, the message tag is always the correct active step count, so in constructing a run of the simulated protocol, variables a and b are always equal. Furthermore, Lemma 4 implies that each simulated processor has the same behavior (or better) as its simulating processor.

THEOREM 7. *System* A2(t) *simulates system* S2(t), *for any value of* t, $1 \leqslant t \leqslant n$.

The same simplifications apply if the only type of faults is failstop. Fix t between 1 and n. Let system S3(t) be the intersection of systems FS(t) and RC and SP. Let system A3 be the intersection of systems FS(t) and RC.

THEOREM 8. *System* A3(t) *simulates system* S3(t), *for any value of* t, $1 \leqslant t \leqslant n$.

5. Application

An important result in the theoretical study of distributed systems is that no consensus protocol operating in a system with asynchronous processors and asynchronous communication can be guaranteed to terminate, if it must tolerate even one failstop processor fault (Fischer *et al.*, 1985). This result was subsequently extended (Dolev *et al.*, 1987) to show that no consensus protocol operating in a system with asynchronous communication, but with processors in lockstep synchrony, can be guaranteed to terminate, if it must tolerate even one failstop processor fault. The proof of Dolev *et al.* (1987) followed the spirit of the proof of Fischer *et al.* (1985), but required additional machinery and a more involved argument.

The result of Dolev *et al.* (1987) can be seen to be a corollary of the result of Fischer *et al.* (1985), using Theorem 8 of this paper.

Given a system S, a *consensus protocol* P for S is a protocol that satisfies the following: (1) Each processor's set of non-initial states has two disjoint subsets, the 0-*final* states and the 1-*final* states. Once a processor enters a v-final state, it is always in a v-final state. (2) There exists a run of P in S in which a processor enters a 0-final state, and there exists a run of P in S in which a processor enters a 1-final state. (3) For every run of P in system S, if some processor enters a v-final state, then no processor enters a w-final state for $w \neq v$. (4) For every run of P in system S, some processor enters a v-final state, for some v.

The model of Fischer *et al.* (1985) corresponds in our model to the system A3(1) obtained from the intersection of systems FS(1) and RC, i.e., the system with asynchronous processors, at most one of which is failstop-faulty, and reliable but asynchronous communication.

THEOREM 9 (Fischer *et al.* 1985, Theorem I). *There is no consensus protocol for system* A3(1).

The model of Dolev *et al.* (1987) corresponds in our model to the system S3(1) obtained from the intersection of systems FS(1) and SP and RC, i.e., the system with lockstep-synchronous processors, at most one of which is failstop-faulty, and reliable but asynchronous communication.

THEOREM 10 (Dolev *et al.* 1987, Theorem I0). *There is no consensus protocol for system* S3(1).

We now show that Theorem 10 follows from Theorem 9 using the results of this paper.

THEOREM 11. *If there is no consensus protocol for system* A3(1), *then there is no consensus protocol for system* S3(1).

Proof. Suppose in contradiction that there is a consensus protocol P for system S3(1). By Theorem 8, system A3(1) simulates system S3(1). Thus, there exists a simulation protocol P' such that P' in system A3(1) simulates P in system S3(1). The protocol P' can be used to construct a consensus protocol for system A3(1) simply by letting v-final states of P' be those states d such that $d.sim$ is a v-final state of P. Since P is a consensus protocol for system S3(1), there is a run R_0 of P in system S3(1) in which some processor enters a 0-final state and another run R_1 of P in system S3(1) in which some processor enters a 1-final state. Since P' in A3(1) simulates P in S3(1), there is a run R_0' of P' in system A3(1) that simulates R_0, i.e., in which some processor enters a 0-final state, and another run R_1' of P' in system A3(1) that simulates R_1, i.e., in which some processor enters a 1-final state. Since P is a consensus protocol for S3(1), and since P is simulated by P', there is no run of P' in system A3(1) with processors in conflicting final states, and some processor eventually enters a final state in every run in system A3(1). Thus there is a consensus protocol for system A3(1), contradicting the hypothesis. ∎

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