

A governance valuation framework

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1 Voting distribution

Suppose you are in a governance system where voting power is denoted by a token across n token holders. Let the token holder stake be denoted by a vector

$$\mathbf{s} = (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n)$$

where $\sum s_j = 1$. Now, define a *vote* as an n -dimensional vector of binary digits

$$\mathbf{v} = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n)$$

where $v_j \in \{0, 1\}$. Given a real positive number $M \in [0.50, 1)$, and some distribution \mathbf{s} , and some vote \mathbf{v} such that

$$\mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{v} > M$$

we will say that “the vote passes”. Otherwise, “the vote is rejected.” We say that M is the “majority required” for the vote to pass.

2 Decisive votes

For some token holders, for some votes, their stake and vote is the difference between a proposal passing or not passing. Let us formalize this. Define

$\mathbf{v}_0(j) := (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_j, \dots, v_n), v_j = 0$, the vote \mathbf{v}_j where the j -th digit is flipped to 0. Similarly, define $\mathbf{v}_1(j) := (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_j, \dots, v_n), v_j = 1$. Given a stakeholder distribution \mathbf{s} and a vote \mathbf{v} , we say that token holder j 's vote was *decisive* if and only if the following condition holds.

$$\mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{v}_0(j) \leq M \text{ but } \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{v}_1(j) > M \quad (1)$$

Intuitively, a token holder's stake in a particular vote is decisive if and only if it has the power to overturn the outcome of the vote. Note that we can shorten the characterization of a decisive vote as follows. A token holder j is decisive to a vote with respect to token distribution \mathbf{s} if and only if

$$M - s_j < \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{v}_0(j) \leq M.$$

The last inequality follows by definition from (1). The strict inequality follows by adding s_j to both sides.

3 Calculating decisiveness

Let \mathcal{V}_n be set of all possible votes on n token holders, that is, the set of all n -dimensional vectors of binary digits. Given some stake distribution \mathbf{s} , and given some token holder j , let $\mathcal{D}_n(j)$ be the set of decisive votes with respect to j . Then define the decisiveness of j with respect to \mathbf{s} as

$$D(j) := |\mathcal{D}_n(j)|/|\mathcal{V}_n|.$$

Note also that $|D(j)| \leq 1$.