

# Advanced Manual **Smart Contract Audit**

September 27, 2022

Audit requested by



**Laeeb Football**

0x31d91887fab81690525c25b76022796d4091e8a

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# Audit Summary

## Audit Scope

Project Name	Laeeb Football
Website	<a href="https://www.laeeb.football/">https://www.laeeb.football/</a>
Blockchain	Binance Smart Chain
Smart Contract Language	Solidity
Contract Address	0x31d91887fab81690525c25b76022796d4091e8a
Audit Method	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Date of Audit	27 September 2022

This audit report has been prepared by Coinsult's experts at the request of the client. In this audit, the results of the static analysis and the manual code review will be presented. The purpose of the audit is to see if the functions work as intended, and to identify potential security issues within the smart contract.

The information in this report should be used to understand the risks associated with the smart contract. This report can be used as a guide for the development team on how the contract could possibly be improved by remediating the issues that were identified.

## Tokenomics

Rank	Address	Quantity (Token)	Percentage
1	0x5f9ba9608bfa7878c9cb3bfe95d12bfb1b1a22af	1,000,000,000	100.0000%

## Source Code

Coinsult was commissioned by Laeab Football to perform an audit based on the following code:

<https://bscscan.com/address/0x31d91887fab81690525c25b76022796d4091e8a#code>

# Disclaimer

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Coinsult is not responsible if a project turns out to be a scam, rug-pull or honeypot. We only provide a detailed analysis for your own research.

Coinsult is not responsible for any financial losses. Nothing in this contract audit is financial advice, please do your own research.

The information provided in this audit is for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment advice. Coinsult does not endorse, recommend, support or suggest to invest in any project.

Coinsult can not be held responsible for when a project turns out to be a rug-pull, honeypot or scam.

# Global Overview

## Manual Code Review

In this audit report we will highlight the following issues:

Vulnerability Level	Total	Pending	Acknowledged	Resolved
● Informational	0	0	0	0
● Low-Risk	1	0	1	0
● Medium-Risk	0	0	0	0
● High-Risk	0	0	0	0

## Privilege Overview

Coinsult checked the following privileges:

Contract Privilege	Description
Owner can mint?	● Owner cannot mint new tokens
Owner can blacklist?	● Owner cannot blacklist addresses
Owner can set fees > 25%?	● Owner cannot set the sell fee to 25% or higher
Owner can exclude from fees?	● Owner can exclude from fees
Owner can pause trading?	● Owner cannot pause the contract
Owner can set Max TX amount?	● Owner can set max transaction amount

More owner privileges are listed later in the report.

● **Low-Risk:** Could be fixed, will not bring problems.

## Contract contains Reentrancy vulnerabilities

Additional information: This combination increases risk of malicious intent. While it may be justified by some complex mechanics (e.g. rebase, reflections, buyback).

More information: Slither

```
function _transfer(
    address sender,
    address recipient,
    uint256 amount
) internal virtual override {
    if (!isAntiWhaleEnded()) {
        if (!presaleAddress[sender]) {
            require(amount <= antiWhaleAmount, "anti Whale is On");
        }
    }

    if (inSwap) {
        super._transfer(sender, recipient, amount);
        return;
    }

    if (sender != uniswapV2Pair && recipient != uniswapV2Pair) {
        if (shouldSwapBack()) {
            swapBack();
        }
    }
}
```

## Recommendation

Apply the check-effects-interactions pattern.

## Exploit scenario

```
function withdrawBalance(){
    // send userBalance[msg.sender] Ether to msg.sender
    // if msg.sender is a contract, it will call its fallback function
    if( ! (msg.sender.call.value(userBalance[msg.sender])() ) ){
        throw;
    }
    userBalance[msg.sender] = 0;
}
```

Bob uses the re-entrancy bug to call withdrawBalance two times, and withdraw more than its initial deposit to the contract.

# Contract Privileges

## Maximum Fee Limit Check

Coinsult tests if the owner of the smart contract can set the transfer, buy or sell fee to 25% or more. It is bad practice to set the fees to 25% or more, because owners can prevent healthy trading or even stop trading when the fees are set too high.

Type of fee	Description
Transfer fee	● Owner cannot set the transfer fee to 25% or higher
Buy fee	● Owner cannot set the buy fee to 25% or higher
Sell fee	● Owner cannot set the sell fee to 25% or higher

Type of fee	Description
Max transfer fee	0%
Max buy fee	3%
Max sell fee	9%



## Contract Pausability Check

Coinsult tests if the owner of the smart contract has the ability to pause the contract. If this is the case, users can no longer interact with the smart contract; users can no longer trade the token.

Privilege Check	Description
Can owner pause the contract?	● Owner cannot pause the contract

## Max Transaction Amount Check

Coinsult tests if the owner of the smart contract can set the maximum amount of a transaction. If the transaction exceeds this limit, the transaction will revert. Owners could prevent normal transactions to take place if they abuse this function.

Privilege Check	Description
Can owner set max tx amount?	● Owner can set max transaction amount

## Exclude From Fees Check

Coinsult tests if the owner of the smart contract can exclude addresses from paying tax fees. If the owner of the smart contract can exclude from fees, they could set high tax fees and exclude themselves from fees and benefit from 0% trading fees. However, some smart contracts require this function to exclude routers, dex, cex or other contracts / wallets from fees.


Privilege Check	Description
Can owner exclude from fees?	● Owner can exclude from fees

## Ability To Mint Check

Coinsult tests if the owner of the smart contract can mint new tokens. If the contract contains a mint function, we refer to the token's total supply as non-fixed, allowing the token owner to "mint" more tokens whenever they want.

A mint function in the smart contract allows minting tokens at a later stage. A method to disable minting can also be added to stop the minting process irreversibly.


Minting tokens is done by sending a transaction that creates new tokens inside of the token smart contract. With the help of the smart contract function, an unlimited number of tokens can be created without spending additional energy or money.

Privilege Check	Description
Can owner mint?	 Owner cannot mint new tokens

## Ability To Blacklist Check

Coinsult tests if the owner of the smart contract can blacklist accounts from interacting with the smart contract. Blacklisting methods allow the contract owner to enter wallet addresses which are not allowed to interact with the smart contract.

This method can be abused by token owners to prevent certain / all holders from trading the token. However, blacklists might be good for tokens that want to rule out certain addresses from interacting with a smart contract.

Privilege Check	Description
Can owner blacklist?	 Owner cannot blacklist addresses

## Other Owner Privileges Check

Coinsult lists all important contract methods which the owner can interact with.

⚠️ Owner can set antiWhaleAmount

⚠️ Owner can set “presale address” Which will exclude this specific address from “AntiWhale” requirement and fees

# Notes

## Notes by Laeab Football

No notes provided by the team.

## Notes by Coinsult

✓ Owner can set max transaction amount only once by enabling antiWhale function. After this the owner cannot change max transaction amount and there will be no transaction limit

# Contract Snapshot

This is how the constructor of the contract looked at the time of auditing the smart contract.

```
contract LaeefFootball is TokenERC20 {  
    using SafeMath for uint256;  
  
    uint256 public constant DECIMALS = 18;  
  
    IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapV2Router;  
  
    uint256 public constant maxSupply = 10**9 * 10**18;  
  
    address public uniswapV2Pair;
```



# Website Review

Coinsult checks the website completely manually and looks for visual, technical and textual errors. We also look at the security, speed and accessibility of the website. In short, a complete check to see if the website meets the current standard of the web development industry.



Type of check	Description
Mobile friendly?	● The website is mobile friendly
Contains jQuery errors?	● The website does not contain jQuery errors
Is SSL secured?	● The website is SSL secured
Contains spelling errors?	● The website does not contain spelling errors

# Certificate of Proof

● Not KYC verified by Coinsult

## Laeeb Football

Audited by Coinsult.net



Date: 27 September 2022

✓ Advanced Manual Smart Contract Audit

End of report  
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