

# Trade Credit and Sectoral Comovement during Recessions<sup>\*</sup>

Jorge Miranda-Pinto<sup>†</sup>

Gang Zhang<sup>‡</sup>

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## Abstract

Contrary to conventional wisdom, our findings reveal that output growth does not consistently comove across sectors during recessions. Sectoral comovement only increased during the Great Recession, primarily due to the impact of trade credit. In 2008, sectors experiencing reduced trade credit exhibited a 40% higher level of comovement compared to unaffected sectors. Our multisector model demonstrates the asymmetric response of trade credit to financial shocks. Through model calibration, we observe that trade credit, directly and indirectly through financial frictions, contributes 81% to the rise in comovement during the Great Recession. Comparing our model to one with fixed trade credit, we find a 41% lower increase in comovement and a 15-17% smaller decline in GDP. Additionally, our research highlights the role of trade credit as a cushion, mitigating negative sectoral spillovers in the early 1980s recession.

*Keywords:* Trade Credit, Sectoral Comovement, Financial Frictions

*JEL Classifications:* C67, E23, E32, E44, E51, F40, G30

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<sup>†</sup>International Monetary Fund and University of Queensland. Email: jmirandapinto@imf.org

<sup>‡</sup>Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business. Email: gzhang@ckgsb.edu.cn

# 1 Introduction

The output growth of different sectors or firms can comove for at least two reasons. First, aggregate shocks are the main driver of aggregate fluctuations. Second, sectoral shocks propagate and amplify through production and credit linkages (see, for example, [Lucas, 1981](#); [Long and Plosser, 1983](#); [Hornstein and Praschnik, 1997](#); [Horvath, 1998](#); [Shea, 2002](#); [Foerster et al., 2011](#); [Acemoglu et al., 2012](#); [Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016](#); [Baqaee and Farhi, 2019](#); [Lehn and Winberry, 2020](#)). While previous work is crucial to explain the average sectoral comovement, little has been done to understand the dynamics of sectoral comovement during different recessions (e.g., financial vs. economic recessions), which shapes the magnitudes of macroeconomic fluctuations. In this paper, we show that trade credit during financial crises is key to explaining that, compared to economic crises, financial crises (e.g., the Great Recession in the US) display a larger rise in comovement and a sharper decline in GDP.

Using annual sectoral output growth from BEA, we find that sectoral output growth significantly comoves during the Great Recession and the Covid-19 recession but not in the early 1980s, which is comparable in magnitude to the Great Recession. After controlling for the size of recessions, the rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession is still pronounced but not in the Covid-19 recession. We then zoom into the Great Recession with quarterly data and find that sectoral comovement increased more for more interconnected sectors. The average correlation rose from 0.02 to 0.25 between sectors trading intermediates one-way (only one sector providing intermediates to the other) and from 0.1 to 0.52 between two-way (both sectors are intermediate input providers and users of each other).<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, this pattern is not observed in no-trading group nor in other recessions, indicating that a change in the nature of sectoral connections contributed to the rise in comovement during the Great Recession.

We then investigate the contraction in trade credit as the role of changing the sectoral interconnection during the Great Recession. We find that two sectors that experienced a significant contraction in trade credit - as defined by a decline in trade credit provision/reception more than the median among public firms - comoved significantly more. In particular, the two-way trading pairs that displayed such a decline in trade credit had a larger rise in their correlation on average, by 0.18 (40%), than the ones without significant reduction in trade credit. Within one-way trading group, two sectors that experienced the trade-credit decline comoved more by 0.13 (50%) than the two that did not.

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<sup>1</sup>Notably, this relationship between pairwise correlations and input share (or the corresponding cell in the Leontief inverse matrix) is not monotonic, as the point estimate of a linear regression between the two is not statistically significant.

To reconcile our sectoral observations and quantify the role of trade credit in the aggregate economy during recessions, we develop a model that combines the environments in [Greenwood et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Bigio and La'O \(2020\)](#). In particular, we construct a multisector model of production networks displaying firm-to-firm production and credit linkages. Trade credit arises in equilibrium as a way to verify the true quality of intermediates input, which, as in [Smith \(1987\)](#) and [Kim and Shin \(2012\)](#), is assumed to be uncertain *ex-ante* and privately known by the clients *ex-post*. The asymmetric information affects the suppliers, who must exert costly efforts to monitor their clients. Also, the input suppliers have pricing power in the intermediate input markets as they customize their products for their clients. Finally, a collateral constraint is imposed on external funds. Firms need to finance the upfront payments for wages and a portion of input payments through perfectly competitive banks, which, in turn, require firms to pledge a fraction of their outputs as collateral.

The optimal TC contract offered by the supplier includes a price for the intermediate input, a deferred payment, and a penalty payment in case the client is found falsely claiming that the input was faulty. The penalty payment ensures the client always tells the truth, even though the default is inevitable in the bad-realization case. The decision considers the benefit of increased sales and the cost of monitoring the client. A negative financial shock to the supplier reduces trade credit provision. In contrast, the same shock to the client has non-monotonic effects on trade credit, depending on whether the supplier is sufficiently financially constrained relative to the client. If so, such a shock to the client contracts trade credit provision, further tightening the client's financial constraint. Otherwise, the supplier extends more trade credit, alleviating the client's financial constraint. This asymmetry is consistent with the empirical evidence and is crucial to understanding the unique rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession. This mechanism is akin to the one proposed in [Kiyotaki and Moore \(1997a\)](#), in which a 'deep pocket' supplier is key to determining the response of trade credit to the adverse liquidity shocks to clients.

Through the lens of our model, we explore the data-generating process in the presence of endogenous trade credit. In particular, we calibrate the model to the US data and then use sectoral output and bond spreads to back out productivity and financial shocks. We find that during the Great Recession, the average correlations of both shocks rose by 0.19, and the median correlation of financial shocks only increased by 0.04, indicating the deterioration of the financial condition was highly skewed and only a few sectors were originally hit by the financial shocks. We then decompose the model-implied rise in pairwise correlations into four components: productivity shocks, trade credit adjustments,

financial frictions due to collateral constraint and endogenous trade credit, and changes due to generate-equilibrium effects. We find that the contraction in trade credit directly contributes about 20% of the observed rise in the average correlation and accounts for another 60% together with the financial frictions.

Next, we conduct counterfactual exercises by fixing trade credit to the pre-recession level. We find that with our estimated shocks, the average rise in pairwise correlations with fixed trade credit is 42.8% lower than in our benchmark model. It implies that endogenous trade credit propagates highly skewed financial shocks to originally unaffected sectors. Moreover, the trade credit chain amplifies the financial shocks, where the fixed-trade-credit model generates a lower decline in GDP growth, 17.3% (15.2%) in 2008Q4 (2009Q1), than our benchmark economy. Our model can also generate the two additional facts we document for the Great Recession: the rise in sectoral comovement is larger among more interconnected sectors and interconnected sectors that experienced a decline in trade credit. Next, we re-estimate the shocks with the fixed-trade-credit model and find that two times more correlated financial shocks and substantially larger shocks to key sectors (e.g., manufacturing sector) are needed to generate the observed sectoral comovement.

We further investigate why sectoral comovement barely changed in the early 1980s recession and why the rise in comovement in the Covid-19 recession vanished after controlling for the size of the recession. Our calibrated model indicates that, during the 1980s, trade credit served as a cushion that dampened sectoral spillovers and thus comovement. As a result, real GDP did not decline as much as it would have with endogenous trade credit. Also, we also show that the sectoral comovement in the Covid-19 recession resulted from the common shock due to the public health crisis. We simulate a 1.5% decline in productivity for all sectors, where sectoral outputs comove substantially and universally, regardless of whether and how two sectors are interconnected. Thus, after controlling for the aggregate component, the comovement vanishes. It is because productivity shocks in our model generate minor effects on collateral constraints and trade credit provision, implying no significant rise in sectoral spillovers.

Since the Great Recession is the only financial crisis in the US after WWII, we explore the cross-sectional variation across the US public firms to test the main mechanisms of our model. In particular, we use the collapse of Lehman Brothers (LB) as a quasi-natural experiment, along with a firm-to-firm and firm-to-bank network before the collapse. Restricting our sample to pairs where suppliers did not borrow from LB before 2008 but had at least one client doing so and another not, we examine how these common suppliers comoved with their clients exposed differently to the LB shock. We find supportive

evidence for our theoretical and quantitative results. That is LB-related clients comoved more with their common supplier than the LB-unrelated ones, and even more when these clients experienced a decline in trade credit reception after the collapse.

Our paper builds on and contributes to three strands of existing literature. The first studies the role of trade credit in providing liquidity or propagating and amplifying the shocks, (see, for example, [Smith, 1987](#); [Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997a](#); [Love et al., 2007](#); [Giannetti et al., 2011](#); [Jacobson and von Schedvin, 2016](#); [Garcia-Marin et al., 2019](#); [Costello, 2020](#); [Giannetti et al., 2021](#); [Adelino et al., 2023](#)). Empirically, [Jacobson and von Schedvin \(2016\)](#) examines how the trade credit chain propagates the Swedish corporate bankruptcy. [Costello \(2020\)](#) studies the effects of the banking shock on trade credit provision and employment. [Adelino et al. \(2023\)](#) find that firms with bonds eligible for purchase under the European Central Bank's Corporate Sector Purchase Program act as a liquidity providers by extending additional trade credit to their customers. Our paper explores the role of trade credit in determining the pairwise correlation over the US recessions. Moreover, trade credit can act both as a cushion as in [Adelino et al. \(2023\)](#) and a conduit as in [Jacobson and von Schedvin \(2016\)](#) and [Costello \(2020\)](#), depending on the supplier's financial condition relative to the client. In the theoretical front, we incorporate the uncertain quality setting from [Smith \(1987\)](#) into a multisector model and demonstrate the asymmetric role of trade credit as in [Kiyotaki and Moore \(1997a\)](#), in which a "deep pocket" supplier is key to determining the response of trade credit to adverse liquidity shocks to clients. Thus, the driver of sectoral comovement in our model can be quantified over different recessions.

The second strand of related research is to examine how sectors comove over the business cycle and what drives these movements, (see, for example, [Long and Plosser, 1983](#); [Hornstein and Praschnik, 1997](#); [Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1998](#); [Li and Martin, 2019](#); [Huo et al., 2019](#)). Most papers in the existing literature study long-run comovement. An exception is [Li and Martin \(2019\)](#), which also focuses on the Great Recession and documents a large rise in sectoral comovement. The authors propose a dynamic factor model with a common factor, an additional aggregate factor during the Great Recession (GR factor), and sector-specific shocks with loading factors that can be specific to the Great Recession. They find the loadings from 11 out of 16 sectors became smaller than the pre-recession ones. Thus, they attribute the rise in sectoral comovement mainly to a GR-specific common factor. We specify their reduced-form setting by incorporating a micro-founded structural model with state-dependent linkages. This specification is necessary and important for two reasons. First, the GR factor is a common shock during the Great Recession and cannot generate the differential rise in comovement among

two-way, one-way, and no-trading groups. As we show, the rise in comovement of the two-way trading group is the most pronounced. Second, in our model, sectoral spillovers are time-varying and depend on the nature of shocks. We show that modestly correlated and highly skewed financial shocks are sufficient to trigger trade credit as a conduit and amplifier, further generating a significant rise in comovement.

The third strand of related literature is to incorporate financial frictions into multi-sector real business cycle models to study how financial frictions propagate and amplify sector-specific shocks to macroeconomic aggregates (see, for example, [Bigio and La'O, 2020](#); [Altinoglu, 2020](#); [Luo, 2020](#); [Reisher, 2020](#); [Miranda-Pinto and Young, 2022](#); [Shao, 2019](#); [Cun et al., 2020](#)). We make two main contributions to this literature. First, we show that the asymmetric role of trade credit provides a new channel to explain why financial crises are associated with severe recessions, as documented in [Kaminsky and Reinhart \(1999\)](#) and [Reinhart and Rogoff \(2011\)](#). Second, we provide empirical and quantitative results highlighting the asymmetric effects of trade credit over different recessions.

Our model is closely related to the models in [Luo \(2020\)](#) and [Reisher \(2020\)](#), which also display asymmetric effects—mitigation or amplification—of trade credit. Besides the fact that we micro-found trade credit, a key difference with respect to the two papers is what exactly generates the asymmetry in the model. [Luo \(2020\)](#) assumes that trade credit payments can be renegotiated and the interest rate on the bank loans increase with the amount of trade credit forbearance, amplifying the effects of a negatively large financial shock. While her model predicts a rise in trade credit, we observe the median ratio of trade credit relative to sales contracted during the Great Recession. In [Reisher \(2020\)](#), trade credit can amplify the negative financial shock as long as the increase in the interest rate for bank credit translates into an even larger increase in the one on trade credit. The author derives a positive relationship between trade credit provision and the bank credit spread. Nevertheless, in data, the two displayed a negative relationship during the Great Recession. Instead, our model generates an endogenous asymmetric relationship between trade credit provision and the financial condition, which depends on the supplier's and client's relative financial conditions.

All in all, our paper contributes empirically, theoretically, and quantitatively to the literature studying comovement and trade credit by showing that the internal propagation forces during an economic recession can be very different from those triggered during a financial crisis and that trade credit adjustment is a crucial part of this mechanism.

## 2 Empirical Evidence

In this section, we document our main observations regarding the behavior of sectoral comovement during recessions. First, we find that output growth across sectors significantly comoved during the Great Recession, even after controlling for the size of recessions. In other post-war recessions, sectors either did not comove or the comovement was not robust after filtering out the aggregate component. Second, the rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession is more pronounced in pairs of sectors that provide intermediate inputs to each other than in ones only one of which provides inputs to the other, and much more than in ones without input-trading relations. Third, the pairs of sectors comoved more, by more than 40%, when they experienced a larger-than-median contraction in trade credit. Last, we perform some robustness checks and discuss the results.

### 2.1 Observation I: rise in pairwise correlation


We first use the annual growth rate of sectoral outputs from BEA to examine the dynamics of sectoral comovement after WWII (see Appendix A.1 and A.2 for more discussion about sectors' characteristics and measuring sectoral comovement). Panel (a) of Figure 1 displays the evolution of the median value of pairwise correlations over an eight-year rolling window, where the red dashed line is the average in 1950-2005, and the black dashed line is the 95% confidence interval. We find the median fluctuates within the 95% confidence interval for most of the years, except the Great Recession and the Covid-19 recession, while such a rise is not found in other recessions.

Because each recession may vary by size and duration, we control for it by filtering out the aggregate components. In doing so, we regress the logarithm of the sectoral outputs on the logarithm of the US GDP, take the residuals, use their first difference, and calculate the pairwise correlations.<sup>2</sup> Panel (b) of Figure 1 displays the evolution of the median conditional correlations. First, the average before 2008 reduces to 0.07 from 0.31 in the unconditional case. Second, the correlation rose significantly during the Great Recession, where about 35% of the unconditional rise in comovement cannot be accounted for by the aggregate components.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, the conditional average correlation in the Covid-

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<sup>2</sup>Our approach implicitly takes the recession duration into account. Still, since the period of each recession that stays in the fixed time window varies, we adjust the length of our time window to account for the duration explicitly. However, we cannot directly compare across time windows as they show different statistical properties. Thus, we standardize each sequence to the level before the Great Recession. As shown in Figure B.1, we find our results here robust.

<sup>3</sup>Notably, Table B.1 shows that during the Great Recession, the average rise in unconditional correla-



**Note:** Real gross outputs by industry from the BEA are used. Fifty-seven sectors cover all private non-farm business sectors, except for FIRE. The year on the horizontal axis corresponds to the fourth year of each time window. For the conditional correlations, we regress the logarithm of the sectoral outputs on the logarithm of the US GDP, take the residuals, use their first difference, and calculate the pairwise correlations over an eight-year rolling window.

Figure 1  
EVOLUTION OF MEDIAN PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS AFTER WWII

19 recession is statistically indifferent from the pre-recession one. It implies that the inter-sector linkage accounts for a substantial fraction of comovement during the Great Recession, while most sectors in the Covid-19 recession synchronized with the aggregate economy.


We now zoom into the sectoral comovement during the Great Recession, with quarterly data, as some interactions among sectors are averaged out when using annual data. Panel (a) of Figure 2 displays the kernel densities before, during, and after the Great Recession, where following [Kahle and Stulz \(2013\)](#), we choose 2007Q3-2009Q2 to cover the recession and 2005Q3-2007Q2 and 2009Q3-2011Q2 to represent before and after the recession, respectively.<sup>4</sup> Consistent with the evidence using annual growth, we observe a significant rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession. Table 1 reports the average increases from 0.05 before to 0.31 in the recession and back to 0.01 afterward. Interestingly, we find the changes in the correlations varied a lot across pairs, as shown in Panel (b). We find that most pairs experienced a rise in comovement as the center of the density is around 0.31. The correlations of many pairs rose by more than 1, implying that some pairs of sectors that used to comove negatively before moved together during the Great Recession. We perform a two-sample t-test to examine whether the average

tions is 0.34, while the average in conditional ones is 0.12. In contrast, the average rise of unconditional correlations in the Covid-2019 recession is 0.32, while the average in conditional ones is 0.01.

<sup>4</sup>The different coverage periods and lengths of time windows are used. All results here are robust.



correlation is the same across periods and conduct the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to investigate whether pairwise correlations in two periods come from the same distribution. Table 1 shows that both tests reject the null hypotheses at the 1% significance level, implying that the average and distribution of the pairwise correlations during the Great Recession are statistically significantly different from those before and after the recession.



Note: Real gross outputs by industry are seasonally adjusted series at annual rates from the BEA. Fifty-seven sectors cover all private non-farm business sectors, except for FIRE. The kernel density is taken with a bin width of 0.001. 2005Q3-2007Q2, 2007Q3-2009Q2, and 2009Q3-2011Q2 are chosen to represent before, during, and after the Great Recession.

Figure 2  
KERNEL DENSITY OF PAIRWISE CORRELATION DURING THE GREAT RECESSION

Furthermore, we compute the kernel density with the annual growth for other recessions, namely 1960, 1970, 1973, 1990, and 2001 recessions, the 1980 recession together with the 1981-1982 recession, and the Covid-19 recession (see Appendix B.1 for details). Consistent with what Figure 1 implies, the shift in the kernel density in other recessions either is not significant or vanishes after controlling for the GDP. Next, we analyze the role of the intermediate input trading and the trade credit - the firm-to-firm credit relied upon input trading - in accounting for the increase of the sectoral comovement during the Great Recession.

## 2.2 Observation II: role of intermediate-input linkages

To identify the intermediate trading relationship between two sectors, we adjust the input-output (IO) table of 71 industries from the BEA to match the sectors in our sample, take the average between 2003 and 2007 to avoid any short-term variation, and then

Table 1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS: PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS (QUARTERLY GROWTH)

	mean	median	std	skewness	t-test	KS Stat
<b>Overall</b>						
Before the Great Recession	0.05	0.07	0.40	-0.11	0.25(0.00)	0.28(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.31	0.39	0.41	-0.58		
After the Great Recession	0.01	0.01	0.38	-0.07	0.29(0.00)	0.32(0.00)
<b>Two-way trading sectors</b>						
Before the Great Recession	0.10	0.14	0.40	-0.23	0.41(0.00)	0.48(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.52	0.60	0.31	-1.10		
After the Great Recession	0.02	0.01	0.37	-0.03	0.50(0.00)	0.56(0.00)
<b>One-way trading sectors</b>						
Before the Great Recession	0.02	0.02	0.39	0.00	0.23(0.00)	0.27(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.25	0.31	0.41	-0.46		
After the Great Recession	0.02	0.03	0.38	-0.12	0.23(0.00)	0.27(0.00)
<b>No trading sectors</b>						
Before the Great Recession	0.05	0.09	0.41	-0.21	0.09(0.00)	0.11(0.01)
During the Great Recession	0.15	0.17	0.41	-0.23		
After the Great Recession	0.00	-0.02	0.38	0.01	0.15(0.00)	0.18(0.00)
<b>Two-way trading and TC declined group</b>						
Before the Great Recession	0.05	0.08	0.44	-0.03	0.57(0.00)	0.63(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.63	0.69	0.24	-1.43		
After the Great Recession	-0.01	-0.03	0.39	0.15	0.64(0.00)	0.72(0.00)
<b>Two-way trading and TC unchanged group</b>						
Before the Great Recession	0.10	0.14	0.40	-0.29	0.35(0.00)	0.39(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.45	0.51	0.33	-0.81		
After the Great Recession	0.02	0.03	0.36	-0.06	0.42(0.00)	0.49(0.00)
<b>One-way trading and TC declined group</b>						
Before the Great Recession	0.11	0.17	0.40	-0.26	0.27(0.00)	0.35(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.39	0.46	0.34	-0.59		
After the Great Recession	-0.02	0.01	0.37	0.08	0.41(0.00)	0.49(0.00)
<b>One-way trading and TC unchanged group</b>						
Before the Great Recession	-0.02	-0.04	0.39	0.17	0.28(0.00)	0.33(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.26	0.35	0.43	-0.53		
After the Great Recession	0.02	0.02	0.38	-0.17	0.24(0.00)	0.29(0.00)

**Notes:** All kernel densities  $f$  are calculated on unit interval  $[-1, 1]$  with bandwidth 0.001. The critical values of KS statistics at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% significance level are respectively 0.0616, 0.0515 and 0.0430 in this case. The  $p$ -value for the KS statistics is reported in the parentheses. Two sectors are classified as in the two-way trading group if they are both input supplier and client to each other; the one-way trading group if only one sector supplies inputs to the other but not vice versa; and the no-trading group if no intermediate input is traded between two. A pair of sectors is treated in the TC declined group if the change in the supplier's AR-to-sales ratio and the client's AP-to-OC ratio declined more than the corresponding median value across all public firms, respectively -1.6 and -1.3 percentage points.

calculate the IO matrix with each cell equal to the input share.<sup>5</sup> Then, all pairs are catego-

<sup>5</sup>If the input share is lower than 0.1%, we set it to 0. We also try different thresholds, like 0.05% and 0.01%. All results here are robust.


rized into three groups according to the extent of their interconnectedness. In particular, two sectors are classified into the two-way trading group if they are both input supplier and client to each other; the one-way trading group if only one sector supplies inputs to the other but not vice versa; and the no-trading group if no intermediate input is traded between two. Each group has 466, 792, and 338 pairs, respectively.

The way two sectors trade with each other matters for sectoral comovement. The top panel of Figure 3 displays the kernel densities of three groups during the Great Recession.<sup>6</sup> In particular, the average (median) correlation within the two-way trading group is higher, by 0.27 (0.29), than that in the one-way group and much higher, by 0.37 (0.43), than that in the no-trading group, as Table 1 shows. The two-sample t-test (KS test) rejects the null hypothesis that two means (densities) are the same at the 1% significance level. The pairs with two-way interconnection were the main drivers for the rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession. However, as seen in the bottom panels of Figure 3, before and after the Great Recession, the three groups present no statistical difference in their kernel densities.

Our results here indicate that network spillovers, rather than common shocks, are critical to explaining the rise in comovement during the Great Recession. As we demonstrate in Section D.5, the common shock hypothesis would not deliver the fact we present here but increase comovement universally, regardless of whether and how sectors are interconnected. In line with this finding, we apply the same categorization to the Covid-19 recession and examine whether and how sectors within each group comove. As shown in Figure B.3, the increase in comovement was almost universal during the Covid-19 recession, regardless of their degree of interconnectedness. It implies that the rise in sectoral comovement during the Covid-19 recession is likely caused by a large decline in aggregate productivity (a common shock due to the public health crisis). We also examine other recessions (see Appendix B.2 for detail) and do not observe a similar pattern as the one during the Great Recession. Thus, an additional linkage must exist contributing to the second observation, which is also advocated but silent in Li and Martin (2019). Next, we propose a possible candidate originating in the trade credit chain.

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<sup>6</sup>We regress the pairwise correlations during the Great Recession or the change in correlations on the input share (or the Leontief influence factor) along with sectoral fixed effects and other controls. The coefficient is not statistically significant at the 90% significance level.



**Note:** All pairwise correlations are calculated as in Figure 2. The kernel density is taken with a bin width of 0.001. Two sectors are classified as in the two-way trading group if they are both input supplier and client to each other; the one-way trading group if only one sector supplies inputs to the other but not vice versa; and the no-trading group if no intermediate input is traded between two. Each group has 466, 792, and 338 pairs, respectively.

Figure 3  
PAIRWISE CORRELATION BY THE EXTENT OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS

### 2.3 Observation III: role of trade credit during the Great Recession

In addition to trading in intermediate inputs, firms simultaneously defer some input payments to their clients and receive such deferral from their suppliers.<sup>7</sup> The quarterly financial report (QFR), a survey of the US firms' financial positions conducted by the US Census Bureau, shows that the average ratio of account receivables and account payables relative to total assets are 7.9% and 6.3% in 2012-2019 for big firms (assets exceeding \$250 million) and 23.3% and 12.9% for small ones. Among short-term financing sources, the big firms have more account payables, at least by a factor of 9, than short-term bank loans and commercial paper, whereas small firms hold two times more account payables than their short-term bank loans.<sup>8</sup>

Since bilateral TC is unavailable, we first create a variable to measure how TC between two sectors changed in the recession compared to the pre-recession level. In particular,

<sup>7</sup>Claims against clients are recorded as suppliers' account receivables, while liabilities to their own suppliers as their account payables.

<sup>8</sup>From a global perspective, firms in the Worldscope database typically finance about 20% of their working capital with trade credit (TC), and in 60% of countries, firms use TC more than bank credit for short-term financing.

using Compustat, we calculate the ratio of account receivables to average sales between the current and last quarters (the AR-to-sales ratio) to measure the intensity of TC provision, while the ratio of account payables over average operating cost (the AP-to-OC ratio) as the intensity of TC reception.<sup>9</sup> For each firm, we take the median value over two periods, namely 2005Q3–2006Q2 and 2008Q3–2009Q2, and then calculate their first difference. Last, we use the median value across firms in each sector to represent the sectoral change in TC usage. Our sample is reduced to 44 sectors, where only sectors with more than three firms are kept. Our measure stays in line with [Kiyotaki and Moore \(1997a\)](#). They show whether the supplier can provide enough liquidity to its shocked clients, rather than how much the clients rely on the supplier’s TC, matters for the transmission of the liquidity shock.<sup>10</sup>

We then categorize pairs in the two-way (one-way) trading groups into two subgroups based on whether they experienced a decline in TC during the Great Recession. In particular, a pair is considered to have experienced a TC decline (the TC-declined subgroup) if the supplier sector’s AR-to-sales ratio and the client’s AP-to-OC ratio both declined more than the corresponding median across all public firms, which are, respectively, -1.6 and -1.0 percentage points. Otherwise, the pair is categorized in the unchanged subgroup (the TC-unchanged subgroup).<sup>11</sup> In sum, 189 pairs in the two-way trading group experienced TC decline, and 128 did not, whereas the corresponding numbers for one-way trading pairs are 133 and 326.

The top panel of Figure 4 exhibits the kernel densities before, during, and after the Great Recession for the four subgroups described above. Given the interconnectedness, a pair that experienced a decline in TC comoved relatively more than the one that did not. As Table 1 shows, the mean correlation of the two-way trading pairs that experienced a decline in TC is 0.63, higher by 0.18 than that in the unchanged subgroup. Within the one-way trading group, the TC decline group has an average correlation of 0.39, higher by 0.13 than that for pairs that did not experience TC decline. The additional rise accounts for 43.2% (54.1%) of the average rise in pairwise correlations of the two-way (one-way) trading group.<sup>12</sup>


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<sup>9</sup>We select the sample following [Kahle and Stulz \(2013\)](#). Please refer to Appendix A.3 for details. Note that both ratios are not bilateral but measure the total TC provision/reception to/from customers/suppliers.

<sup>10</sup>We use the pre-recession TC usage to classify our pairs into the TC-dependent and independent subgroups. However, we do not observe the TC-dependent subgroup significantly comove more during the Great Recession.

<sup>11</sup>Since each sector can be both supplier and client in the two-way trading group, we classify the pair in the TC decline subgroup if the TC declined condition is satisfied in either direction.

<sup>12</sup>Notably, the average correlation of the one-way trading pairs with available TC data is 0.29, slightly higher than the group average (0.25).



Note: All pairwise correlations are calculated as in Figure 2. A pair of sectors is treated in the TC declined group if the change in the supplier's AR-to-sales ratio and the client's AP-to-OC ratio declined more than the corresponding median value across all public firms, respectively -1.6 and -1.3 percentage points. Each group has 189, 128, 133, and 326 pairs. The equal-weight kernel density is taken with a bin width of 0.001.

Figure 4  
PAIRWISE CORRELATION BY WHETHER TRADE CREDIT DECLINES

Moreover, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 4, the kernel densities of the four subgroups before and after the Great Recession are not significantly different from each other, implying that the TC adjustment during the Great Recession can be an important channel in accounting for the rise in sectoral comovement. As a 'placebo test', we also examine the kernel densities of the TC decline and unchanged subgroups for the no-trading group. Figure B.4 shows no difference between the two subgroups before, during, and after the Great Recession.

## 2.4 Discussion

Due to delivery, adjustment cost, search frictions, and other factors, two sectors may not comove contemporaneously, and instead, one may lead to another. Thus, the rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession may be just a result of synchronization in timing. To address this concern, we follow the method used in [Christiano and Fitzgerald \(1998\)](#), [Hornstein \(2000\)](#), and [Kim and Kim \(2006\)](#), calculate one-period lagged and lead correlations, and then take the maximum value among the three. As displayed

in Panel (a), we find that, during the Great Recession, the kernel density of the maximal correlations still shifts significantly towards the right. This result complements the hypothesis that the rise in sectoral comovement was mainly driven by structural factors linking the sectors rather than the synchronization in timing or some common shocks.

Notably, our sectoral evidence points to the role of supply factors driving the rise in comovement during the Great Recession. However, as argued by [Mian et al. \(2013\)](#), the collapse of house prices generated a negative wealth effect that decreased consumption, especially in states/cities with high mortgage debt. Thus, sectors mainly providing final consumption goods or services should have comoved more strongly during the Great Recession. To test this hypothesis, we divide our sample of sectors into two groups according to the share of output used as the final consumption.<sup>13</sup> Here, one sector is classified into the consumption-provider group if its share is larger than the median value, namely 36.8%. Otherwise, this sector would be grouped as the input provider. Panel (b) of Figure [B.5](#) displays the kernel densities for pairs within and connecting two groups. Surprisingly, during the Great Recession, we observe a significantly higher comovement within the input-provider group, while the correlations among the consumption providers rose the least on average. The densities of the different groups almost overlap before and after the Great Recession. The results are consistent with the main observations we document.

### 3 Model

In this section, we develop a multisector model with endogenous TC adjustment to uncover the mechanism of the rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession. Our model economy combines the environments in [Greenwood et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Bigio and La'O \(2020\)](#). Firms are *ex ante* uncertain about the quality of intermediate inputs, and thus TC arises in equilibrium as a way to learn the true quality of intermediates.

#### 3.1 Firms' Production Plan

Suppose that the economy has  $n$  sectors, each of which has a continuum of firms on the interval  $[0, 1]$ . Each firm hires labor and purchases intermediate inputs to produce. Suppose that each firm purchases inputs from, at most, one firm in each sector.<sup>14</sup> Here, we refer to firms providing inputs as suppliers and purchasing them as clients. Thus, sectors are interconnected via this firm-level network. Suppose that the production of

<sup>13</sup>Please refer Table [E.3](#) for the specific values.

<sup>14</sup>This setup is not essential and only serves to avoid the coordination problem. We further assume that a firm cannot simultaneously be a supplier and client for the same firm.



any firm  $h \in [0, 1]$  in sector  $i$  takes a Cobb-Douglas form as

$$y_i(h) = z_i l_i^{\alpha_i} \left( \prod_{j=1}^n m_{ji}^{\omega_{ji}} \right)^{v_i}, \quad (1)$$

where  $z_i$  is the sectoral TFP,  $l_i$  is the employed labor,  $m_{ji}$  is the intermediate inputs purchased from a firm in sector  $j$ ,  $\omega_{ji}$  governs its share over total expenditures on inputs with  $\sum_{j=1}^n \omega_{ji} = 1$ , and  $\alpha_i$  and  $v_i$  are, respectively, the labor and input share with  $\alpha_i + v_i < 1$ .<sup>15</sup> Note that  $\omega_{ji} = 0$  means that firms in sector  $i$  do not purchase inputs from any firm in sector  $j$ .

Products can be used as either intermediate inputs or consumption goods. Thus, firms in any sector simultaneously act as both a supplier to provide and a client to receive inputs. After receiving orders, suppliers customize their products to be used as inputs. Thus, they enjoy some pricing power and charge  $q_{ij}$ . Alternatively, they can sell their products at a price  $p_i$  in the consumption-good markets, which is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Moreover, following [Smith \(1987\)](#) and [Kim and Shin \(2012\)](#), we assume that the quality of the customization is *ex ante* uncertain.<sup>16</sup> There exists a probability of  $1 - \eta$  that the clients will find the delivered products not qualified for inputs. In this case, these inputs perish, and the clients must purchase  $\gamma > 1$  units from a secondary market and convert them into one unit of input. We assume that the price of sector  $i$ 's products is  $p_i$ , the same as that in the consumption-good market.

Each period is split into two stages. In the first stage, sectoral TFPs are realized, but firms still need to be determined about the quality of their ordered inputs. Nevertheless, they need to order intermediate inputs and employ workers to produce later. Due to the uncertainty, it is ambiguous whether firms can make payments for labor and intermediate inputs. Hence, workers and suppliers demand to be paid in advance. We assume that workers have strong bargaining power over firms and are, therefore, compensated upfront at the full amount.<sup>17</sup> The intermediate input payments are divided into cash before delivery (CBD) and trade credit (TC). The former is due in the first stage, while the latter is deferred until their clients realize their revenue. Suppliers endogenously decide the division, and its details will be specified later. Suppose that no profits can be stored

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<sup>15</sup>As in [Bigio and La'O \(2020\)](#), we can assume that firms use a fixed amount of capital with a capital share of  $1 - \alpha - v$ .

<sup>16</sup>[Giannetti et al. \(2011\)](#) show empirical evidence of the importance of quality uncertainty as a driver of TC intensity.

<sup>17</sup>[Miranda-Pinto and Young \(2022\)](#) show that in input-output models featuring working capital constraints, whether or not labor is paid upfront makes little quantitative difference. The authors show that the constraint on intermediate input purchases is the crucial element that amplifies financial frictions through the input-output network.



over periods. If the required working capital, the summation of the wages and paid CBD, exceeds the received CBD, the supplier needs to borrow the difference from perfectly competitive banks. To secure the loans, banks require firms' products as collateral. Assuming that the liquidation ratio of collateral is  $\theta_i$  for the firm  $i$ , the amount of the loans that can be borrowed should be equal to or smaller than  $\theta_i p_i y_i$  as

$$b_i = \underbrace{w l_i}_{\text{wage}} + \underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^n (1 - tc_{ji}) q_{ji} m_{ji}}_{\text{paid CBD}} - \underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^n (1 - tc_{ij}) q_{ij} m_{ij}}_{\text{received CBD}} \leq \theta_i p_i y_i, \quad (\text{CC})$$

where  $w$  is the wage,  $p_i$  is the price of the consumption goods in sector  $i$ ,  $q_{ji}$  is the price of input from sector  $j$  to  $i$ , and  $tc_{ji}$  is the proportion of input payment deferred as TC. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997b) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we treat the change in  $\theta_i$  as the sector-level financial shocks.

In the second stage, the quality of their ordered inputs is realized, and all goods are produced and delivered. If the client receives good-quality inputs, then she pays back the TC, i.e.,  $tc_{ji} q_{ji} m_{ji}$ . Otherwise, she forgoes the paid CBD, defaults on TC, and then effectively pays  $\gamma p_j$  per unit of input from the secondary market to produce. Thus, the expected unit cost of inputs paid by the client  $i$  to the supplier  $j$  is given as  $(1 - tc_{ji}) q_{ji} + \eta tc_{ji} q_{ji} + (1 - \eta) \gamma p_j$ . The first term is the paid CBD, the second is the deferred payment in the good-quality case, and the third is the unit cost for alternative inputs. As for the supplier, if her products are of good quality, she receives the payment on TC while receiving nothing otherwise. Therefore, when setting the input price, a supplier must ensure that the clients pay at most what they effectively pay from the secondary market. Thus we set the no-arbitrage condition as

$$(1 - tc_{ji}) q_{ji} + \eta tc_{ji} q_{ji} + (1 - \eta) \gamma p_j \leq \gamma p_j. \quad (\text{NAC})$$

Note that the products sold in the consumption and secondary input market are not customized and thus can be delivered for sure.

### 3.2 Optimal Contracts on Trade Credit

Suppose that the realization of product quality is private information for clients. Thus, when good quality is realized, clients have incentives to misreport their status and default on TC. To induce truth-telling, every supplier will offer an optimal contract to each client separately. In the contract to the client  $j$ , the supplier  $i$  specifies the input price  $q_{ij}$ , the

share of TC  $tc_{ij}$ , and the penalty payment  $g_{ij}$  when it finds out the client cheats. Notably, clients that receive bad-quality inputs have no incentives to cheat because they default on TC. Therefore, this contract is designed to satisfy two constraints: the resource constraint (RC) and the incentive-compatible constraint (ICC). The former requires that the penalty payment cannot exceed what the client makes after banks collect their loans as

$$g_{ij} \leq \omega_{ij}v_j(p_jy_j - b_j), \quad (\text{RC})$$

where  $\omega_{ij}$  is input share,  $p_jy_j$  is the products' market value, and  $b_j$  is the bank loan amount. When the supplier detects the client misreports, she can collect a penalty payment proportional to their input supply, namely  $\omega_{ij}v_j$ .

The ICC ensures that the client always reports its true state. As in [Townsend \(1979\)](#), [Bernanke and Gertler \(1986\)](#), [Williamson \(1986\)](#), and [Carlstrom and Fuerst \(1997\)](#), we assume that any supplier exerts costly efforts to verify the state reported by each of its clients. Denote the unit cost of the verifying efforts for offering  $q_{ij}m_{ij}$  dollars of inputs as  $e_{ij}$ , which can be interpreted as the verification intensity. For the same verification intensity, the more inputs the supplier provides, or the higher the price it charges, the more costly it is for a supplier to find out the true status. As in [Greenwood et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Presbitero et al. \(2021\)](#), we assume that suppliers can detect the true quality with only a certain probability  $\Pr(e)$ , which is assumed to be increasing and concave in  $e$ . Thus, in the optimal contract, the incentive-compatible constraint is given as

$$tc_{ij}q_{ij}m_{ij} \leq \Pr(e_{ij})g_{ij}, \quad (\text{ICC})$$

where the left-hand side is TC to be paid, while the right-hand side is the expected payment when cheating. It is straightforward to show that the RC is binding in equilibrium since the marginal benefit of raising the penalty payment is positive, while the marginal cost is zero. Also, because the efforts are costly, suppliers will make just enough efforts to induce clients to report the true status. This implies that the ICC is also binding. Thus, the exerted efforts can be expressed as

$$e_{ij} = \mathbf{e} \left( \frac{tc_{ij}q_{ij}m_{ij}}{\omega_{ij}v_j(p_jy_j - b_j)} \right) \quad (2)$$

where the function  $\mathbf{e}(\cdot)$  is the inverse function of  $\Pr(e)$ .<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>The optimal TC contract in our model is consistent with one observation from microdata: TC provision increases with relationship length ([Garcia-Marin et al., 2019](#)). Longer relationships allow that suppliers to acquire more information on the ability of clients to honor their obligations. This is captured in our model with smaller monitoring costs. Hence, provided one has access to more detailed firm-to-firm network data

### 3.3 Optimal Problem for Firms

In the first stage, all firms in the same sector are *ex ante* the same, making the same decisions. Note that all firms are simultaneously suppliers and clients. The firms will decide the production plan, taking as given the optimal contracts offered by their suppliers. Meanwhile, they act as suppliers and design their own optimal contracts for their clients, given the intermediate input demand function. The former specifies inputs, employees, and loans from banks, while the latter lays out the payment schedule, penalty payment, and verification efforts. In particular, taking as given the wage  $w$ , the consumption good prices  $\{p_j\}$ , the banks loans by other firms  $\{b_j\}$ , the outputs by other firms  $\{y_j\}$ , the optimal contract offered by the supplier  $\{q_{ji}, tc_{ji}, g_{ji}\}$ , a firm in sector  $i$  chooses the inputs  $\{m_{ji}\}$ , the labor  $l_i$ , the optimal contract  $\{q_{ij}, tc_{ij}, g_{ij}\}$ , and the efforts  $\{e_{ij}\}$ , to maximize her profits, subject to the collateral constraint (CC), resource constraint (RC), incentive-compatible constraint (ICC), and no-arbitrage condition (NAC), as,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{l_i, m_{ji}, q_{ij}, tc_{ij}, g_{ij}, e_{ij}} \quad & p_i z_i l_i^{\alpha_i} \left( \prod_{j=1}^n m_{ji}^{\omega_{ji}} \right)^{v_i} - \sum_{j=1}^n (p_i - (1 - (1 - \eta)tc_{ij})q_{ij})m_{ij} \\ & - w l_i - \sum_{j=1}^n ((1 - tc_{ji})q_{ji} + \eta tc_{ji}q_{ji} + (1 - \eta)\gamma p_j)m_{ji} - (1 - \eta) \sum_{j=1}^n e_{ij}q_{ij}m_{ij} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \text{CC, RC, ICC, and NAC} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The expected revenue consists of revenue from offering inputs and sales in the consumption goods and secondary input market, where with a  $1 - \eta$  chance, she cannot collect TC due to default. The costs to produce consist of wages and expected input payments and verification cost.

### 3.4 Households and market clearing condition

Suppose that a representative household exists in the economy. The household's objective is to choose a consumption bundle and labor to maximize her utility subject to her budget constraint as

$$\max_{c_t, l_t} \mathbf{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \log c_t - \psi \frac{l_t^{1+\xi}}{1+\xi} \right) \right] \text{ s.t. } p_t c_t \leq w_t l_t + \pi_t + E_t \quad (4)$$

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on production and credit, our model can match salient features of the microdata.

where  $c$  is the consumption bundle,  $l$  is the hours worked, the parameter  $\psi$  governs the degree of disutility from working,  $\xi$  is the inverse of Fischer elasticity,  $p$  is the price index,  $\pi$  is the total profit generated by all firms, and  $E$  is the total verification cost paid by firms. Moreover, the consumption bundle is defined as a composite of goods and services from all sectors, with a CES form, as in

$$c = \left( \sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_i^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (5)$$

where  $\sigma$  is the elasticity of substitution, and  $\phi_i$  is the share of the household's expenditure on sector  $i$ 's goods and  $\sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i = 1$ . The price index is defined as

$$p = \left( \sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i p_i^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}, \quad (6)$$

Solving the optimal problem, a household's demand for goods in sector  $i$  is given as

$$c_i = \phi_i \left( \frac{p_i}{p} \right)^{-\sigma} c. \quad (7)$$

Labor supply is equal to labor demand across all firms as

$$l = \sum_{i=1}^n l_i. \quad (8)$$

Because firms' customization of their products has a probability  $\eta$  of being qualified for inputs, by law of large number, a fraction  $\eta$  of input orders are turned out to be of good quality. In contrast, the rest  $(1 - \eta)$  find inputs in the secondary market. Therefore, the market-clearing conditions for product market  $i$  can be written as

$$y_i = \sum_{j=1}^n m_{ij} + k_i + c_i, \quad \forall i \quad (9)$$

where  $y_i$  is defined in Equation (1) and  $k_i = \sum_{j=1}^n (1 - \eta) \gamma m_{ij}$ .

## 4 Equilibrium Analysis

Now we define the competitive equilibrium in our model as

**Definition 1** A *Stationary Nash equilibrium* is defined as the commodity prices  $\{p_i\}$ , the wage  $w$ , the sectoral output  $\{y_i\}$ , the consumption goods  $\{c_i\}$ , the goods in the secondary market

the consumption goods  $\{k_i\}$ , the labor allocations  $\{l_i\}$ , the intermediate inputs  $\{m_{ji}\}$ , the optimal contracts  $\{q_{ij}, tc_{ij}, g_{ij}\}$ , and efforts to verify status reported by clients  $\{e_{ij}\}$ , such that

1. Given a vector of prices  $\{p_i\}$ , the wage  $w$  and the contracts offered by suppliers  $\{q_{ji}, tc_{ji}, g_{ji}\}$ , firms in sector  $i$  choose the labor  $l_i$ , the intermediate inputs  $\{m_{ji}\}$ , the optimal contracts for their own clients  $\{q_{ij}, tc_{ij}, g_{ij}\}$ , and the verifying efforts  $\{e_{ij}\}$  to maximize the expected profit as in (3);
2. Given  $\{p_i\}$  and  $w$ , the representative household chooses the consumption goods  $\{c_i\}$  and the labor supply  $l$  to maximize its utility as in (4);
3. The wage  $w$  clears the labor market (8);
4. The commodity prices  $\{p_i\}$  clear commodity markets in (9), and the aggregate price index  $p$  is normalized to 1.

Next, we discuss the solution to the model and examine the role of TC in transmitting shocks. We start with the case in which the firm acts as a client and determines its production plan, as shown in Lemma 1 as:

**Lemma 1 (Production plan)** *Given a vector of the consumption-good prices  $\{p_i\}$ , the wage  $w$ , and the optimal contracts offered by their suppliers  $\{q_{ji}, tc_{ji}, g_{ji}\}$ , the optimal production plan for firms  $i$  satisfies the following conditions:*

$$\alpha_i v_i^L p_i y_i = w l_i, \quad (10)$$

$$\omega_{ji} v_i v_{ji}^M p_i y_i = q_{ji} m_{ji}, \quad \forall j \quad (11)$$

where  $v_i^L$  and  $v_{ji}^M$  are defined as the labor and intermediate input wedges respectively as:

$$v_i^L = \frac{1 + \theta_i \mu_i}{1 + \mu_i}, \text{ and } v_{ji}^M = \frac{1 + \theta_i \mu_i}{1 - tc_{ji} + \eta tc_{ji} + (1 - \eta) \frac{\gamma p_i}{q_{ji}} + \mu_i (1 - tc_{ji})}, \quad (12)$$

and  $\mu_i$  is the Lagrangian multiplier for collateral constraint. Then the output  $y_i$  can be solved as

$$y_i = \left( z_i p_i^{\alpha_i + v_i} \left( v_i \prod_{j=1}^n \left( \frac{\omega_{ji} v_{ji}^M}{q_{ji}} \right)^{\omega_{ji}} \right)^{v_i} \left( \frac{\alpha_i v_i^L}{w} \right)^{\alpha_i} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha_i - v_i}} \quad (13)$$

*Proof:* see Appendix C.2.

Here, the labor and the intermediate input wedges measure to which extent the allocations of the labor and intermediate inputs deviate from the first best. Note that three

types of frictions are at play in our model: the uncertainty about the quality (also, default risk on TC), the pricing power by suppliers, and the collateral constraint. These frictions interact with each other and affect the outputs through both labor and input wedges. The collateral constraint directly affects the labor wedge, while all three jointly determine the input wedge. In particular, a tighter collateral constraint (i.e., a higher  $\mu_i$ ) distorts the labor demand more and affects the input demand, where the latter effects depend on the relative size of received TC to the financial condition. Moreover, when the client finds the delivered goods unqualified for inputs, she bears the additional costs of finding alternatives in the secondary market. When the default risk is higher - i.e.,  $\eta$  is lower - or when the relative price of input to the one in the secondary market is lower - i.e.,  $\frac{q_{ji}}{\gamma p_j}$  is smaller, the additional costs are higher. The higher such costs are, the smaller the input wedge, and the more the client's input demand is distorted. Equation (13) shows that the production in sector  $i$  is a function of their productivity and financial shocks, as well as their suppliers, through the labor and input wedges. Note that setting  $\eta = 1$  and  $\mu_i = 0$  for  $\forall i$  eliminates the frictions in our model, and the allocations are in the first best. As discussed in detail later, TC responds to firms' productivity and financial conditions, which provides an additional channel of propagating shocks through the input and labor wedge, along with the production network.

We now examine how firms, as input suppliers, design optimal contracts with their clients. First, we assume that the probability of detecting a true state is, for  $\forall j$ ,

$$\Pr(e_{ij}) = \sqrt{\frac{e_{ij}}{\bar{e}_i}}, \text{ for } e_{ij} \in [0, \bar{e}_i] \quad (14)$$

where  $\bar{e}_i$  is the maximal effort level for firms  $i$ .<sup>19</sup> Here, we focus on the case in which collateral constraints are binding for all firms. In this case, the loans borrowed by the firm  $j$  are equal to  $\theta_j p_j y_j$ . When the supplier finds out the client  $j$  cheats, the penalty that all suppliers can capture is  $(1 - \theta_j) v_j p_j y_j$ , of which the supplier  $i$  seizes a fraction  $\omega_{ij}$ . Proposition 1 characterizes the details of the optimal contract.

**Proposition 1 (Optimal contract)** *Consider the case in which  $\{\theta_i\}$  are sufficiently small - i.e.,  $\mu_i > 0$  for  $\forall i$ . Given the consumption-good prices  $\{p_i\}$ , the financial condition  $\{\theta_i\}$ , and the tightness of collateral constraints  $\{\mu_i\}$ , the optimal contract, offered by a firm in sector  $i$  to a client in sector  $j$ , specifies the input price  $q_{ij}$ , the share of TC  $tc_{ij}$ , and the penalty payment  $g_{ij}$ ,*

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<sup>19</sup>Note that the square root functional form is selected simply for analytical tractability, and the main results remain, as long as the function is increasing and concave in the effort.

respectively, as:

$$3\gamma\bar{e}_i \left( \frac{(1-\eta)tc_{ij}v_{ij}^M}{1-\theta_j} \right)^2 = (1+(1-\eta)\gamma)(1-tc_{ij}+\eta tc_{ij}) \quad (15)$$

$$+ (\mu_j + (1-\eta)\gamma\mu_i)(1-tc_{ij}),$$

$$\eta \frac{\gamma p_i}{q_{ij}} = \eta + (1-\eta)(1-tc_{ij}), \quad (16)$$

$$g_{ij} = \omega_{ij}v_j p_j y_j, \quad (17)$$

where  $v_{ij}^M$  is defined in Equation (12) and  $y_j$  is given by Equation (13).

*Proof:* see Appendix C.3.

When the firm makes the input price decision, it considers the input demand as in Equation (11). As the relative input price rises, the input wedge increases due to the relatively lower cost of purchasing from the secondary market. The rising wedge partially offsets the decline in the input demand caused by a higher price. As a result, as the input price rises, the input revenue increases but increase less as the price further rises, implying the input revenue that is a concave function in the price.

On the other hand, for the same verification intensity, the cost of verification increases in input sales. Moreover, the incentive to cheat (claim for bad-quality input) increases input sales. Suppliers need to exert more effort to ensure truth-telling. As a result, the verification cost is convex in the input price. Therefore, the input price is determined to balance the concave sales and the convex verification costs.

Regarding the TC decision, the supplier wants to collect the input payment as early as possible. However, the supplier has to defer a proportion of the payment to compensate the client for the potential loss in the bad-quality case. Thus, the TC intensity is chosen until the unit cost of inputs is the same between ordering it from a supplier and purchasing from the secondary market. A partial equilibrium analysis of Equation (16) implies that the TC intensity increases in the relative input price. As the relative input price increases, a higher revenue will be realized in the good-quality case. Thus, suppliers can afford to defer a larger proportion of payment as TC.

Next, we discuss the sufficient condition for the unique existence of TC intensity  $tc_{ij}$ . We also describe how TC responds to changes in the financial conditions of suppliers and clients.

**Proposition 2** Suppose that

$$\bar{e}_i \geq \frac{\eta(1+(1-\eta)\gamma)}{3\gamma(1-\eta)^2}, \quad \forall i. \quad (\#1)$$

Therefore, for any  $\theta_i, \theta_j \in (0, 1)$  and  $\mu_i, \mu_j > 0$ , there exists a unique  $tc_{ij} \in (0, 1)$  that solves Equation (15) given Equation (12) and (16). Moreover, we have

$$\frac{\partial tc_{ij}}{\partial \mu_i} < 0, \text{ and } \frac{\partial tc_{ij}}{\partial \theta_j} \begin{cases} \leq 0 & \text{if } g(tc_{ij}, \mu_i, \mu_j, \theta_j) \leq 0 \\ > 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad (18)$$

where the  $g$  function is defined in Appendix C.4.

*Proof:* see Appendix C.4.

Proposition 2 states that all else equal, the supplier does not need to exert any effort if it issues no TC, whereas it makes the most effort (smaller than the maximal value) when it defers the entire payment. Assumption (#1) ensures that at  $tc_{ij} = 1$ , the marginal cost of verification is at least as much as its marginal revenue and thus guarantees the existence of equilibrium.

Here is the intuition of Proposition 2. A tighter constraint for the supplier limits her production so that it can simply require more upfront payment to alleviate its financial constraint and increase production. For example, all else equal, a negative financial shock to the supplier results in a tighter constraint and, thus, less TC.

The intensity of TC given by a supplier to a client responds to the client's financial condition in a non-monotonic way. The response ultimately depends on the relative financial constraints of the supplier and client. A negative financial shock to the client can lead to more TC being extended to alleviate the client's constraint and increase input sales or less TC being extended if the supplier's financial condition is sufficiently tight. In the latter case, requiring more input payments in advance benefits the supplier's production, in the cost of weakening the client's financial conditions and distorting her production in addition to the negative financial shock. TC is a cushion in the former case, while an amplifier in the latter. This asymmetry is particularly relevant to our observations of the sectoral comovement during recessions in Section 2. During a financial recession, the amplifying role of TC can be triggered as many firms are more likely to be financially constrained. In contrast, in an economic recession, TC works as a cushion to mitigate the spillover of sectoral shocks.

Next, we examine how TC affects sales growth. Lemma 1 implies that the values of the labor and input wedges rely on these binding financial constraints, which further depend on the exogenous financial conditions,  $\theta$ . Given the sectoral productivity shocks  $\{z_{it}\}$ , TC intensities  $\{tc_{ij,t}\}$ , labor wedges  $\{v_{it}^L\}$ , and inputs wedges  $\{v_{ij,t}^M\}$ , we can decompose the real



output growth at time  $t$  as

$$\Delta \log(p_t \circ y_t) = \Delta \tilde{z}_t + \Delta \tilde{c}_t + \Delta \tilde{v}_t + \Delta \widetilde{GE}_t \quad (19)$$

where  $\circ$  is the Hadamard product, and  $\Delta \tilde{z}_t$ ,  $\Delta \tilde{c}_t$ ,  $\Delta \tilde{v}_t$ , and  $\Delta \widetilde{GE}_t$  are respectively defined as the effects of productivity shocks and changes in TC, financial frictions, and generate-equilibrium conditions on the real growth of sectoral outputs as

$$\Delta \tilde{z}_t = \left( \mathbf{I}_n + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \mathbf{M}_{py} \right)^{-1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_\alpha - \mathbf{D}_v)^{-1} \Delta \log z_t, \quad (20)$$

$$\Delta \tilde{c}_t = \left( \mathbf{I}_n + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \mathbf{M}_{py} \right)^{-1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_\alpha - \mathbf{D}_v)^{-1} \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_\omega \Delta \log(1 - (1 - \eta)tc_t), \quad (21)$$

$$\Delta \tilde{v}_t = \left( \mathbf{I}_n + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \mathbf{M}_{py} \right)^{-1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_\alpha - \mathbf{D}_v)^{-1} (\mathbf{D}_\alpha \Delta \log v_t^L + \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_\omega \Delta \log v_t^M), \quad (22)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \widetilde{GE}_t = & \left( \mathbf{I}_n + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \mathbf{M}_{py} \right)^{-1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_\alpha - \mathbf{D}_v)^{-1} \left( -\frac{\xi}{1 + \xi} \Delta \log(\mathbf{1}'_n v^L \circ p_t \circ y_t) \mathbf{D}_\alpha \mathbf{1}_n \right. \\ & \left. + \Delta \log \left( \mathbf{1}'_n \left( \eta \mathbf{I}_n - \frac{1}{\eta \gamma} \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_{xt} \right) p_t \circ y_t \right) \left( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_v \Omega') - \frac{1}{1 - \xi} \mathbf{D}_\alpha \right) \mathbf{1}_n \right), \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

and as shown in Appendix C.5,  $\mathbf{D}_\alpha$ ,  $\mathbf{D}_v$ ,  $\mathbf{M}_\omega$ ,  $\mathbf{M}_{py}$ ,  $\mathbf{M}_{xt}$ , and  $\Omega$  are matrices of structural parameters, and  $p_t$ ,  $y_t$ ,  $z_t$ ,  $v_t^L$ ,  $v_t^M$  and  $tc_t$  are vectors of state or endogenous variables across sectors. Notably, endogenous TC can affect the sectoral output growth in both a direct and indirect way. The TC component ( $\tilde{c}_{it}$ ) captures the direct effects. Moreover, TC is adjusted in response to the exogenous shocks discussed in Proposition 2, which further alters other firms' financial constraints. Thus, TC can indirectly influence output growth through labor and input wedges.

Therefore, the observed sectoral comovement can be attributed to four sources. First, sectoral productivity shocks can generate comovement through input-output linkage. Second, endogenous TC also alters outputs directly, as we demonstrate in Proposition 2. Third, due to the financial frictions and endogenous TC, labor and input wedges arise, which further vary over time as the financial shocks hit. Last, as a common factor, the GE effects lead sectors to comove homogeneously across sectors. As we will show later, the asymmetrical response of TC can account for a substantial proportion of sectoral comovement during the Great Recession, which is mainly attributed to a reduced-form GR-specific common factor by Li and Martin (2019).

## 5 Quantitative model

In this section, we apply our model, along with the outputs and bond spread of the US sectors, to back out the sectoral productivity and financial shocks. We then conduct several exercises to highlight the role of endogenous TC and its interaction with financial shocks in accounting for the large rise in sectoral comovement and the dynamics of the aggregate economy during the Great Recession. Next, we study how the two shocks differ from the ones implied by a fixed-trade-credit model. Last, we study the model implied evolution of comovement for the early 1980s.

### 5.1 Calibration

We follow a three-stage calibration strategy. First, we select the value of some parameters either following existing literature or matching the data moments. Second, we use equilibrium conditions to calibrate the maximal verification efforts to match the sectors' AR-to-sales ratios. Last, we apply our model to back out productivity and financial shocks with the sectoral outputs and bond spread.

Following the common practice in the literature, we set the importance of labor disutility  $\psi$  to be 1, the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods  $\sigma$  to be 2.5, and the inverse of Frisch elasticity  $\xi$  to be 0.36. We set the cost of replacing faulty inputs  $\gamma$  to be 2.89 so that the premium in the secondary market is equivalent to the trading cost between the US and Canada as estimated in [Anderson and Van Wincoop \(2003\)](#).<sup>20</sup> The probability that clients receive qualified inputs,  $\eta$ , is 0.85 to match the one-year survival rate of new startups in the US. As shown in Table 2, we calibrate the total shares of inputs to output ( $\{v_i\}$ ), labor shares ( $\{\alpha_i\}$ ), input-output matrix ( $\{\omega_{ij}\}$ ), and consumption shares ( $\{\phi_i\}$ ) using the 2005 12-sector input-output table from the BEA.<sup>21</sup>

Next, we use our model solution to calibrate the maximal verification effort parameters ( $\{\bar{e}_i\}$ ). Since we do not observe bilateral TC issuance, for our calibration on  $\{\bar{e}_i\}$ , we firstly assume that a given supplier provides the same TC intensity to all clients - i.e.,  $tc_{ij} = \bar{tc}_i$  - for  $\forall j$ . We take the median AR-to-sales ratio between 2005Q3 and 2006Q2 for each firm and the median again across firms in the corresponding industry as  $\bar{tc}_i$ .<sup>22</sup> We then use Equation (15) to solve for  $e_{ij}$ , out of which  $\bar{e}_i$  is selected as the maximal value,

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<sup>20</sup>The value is calculated, based on Table 2 in [Anderson and Van Wincoop \(2003\)](#) with  $\sigma = 2.5$ .

<sup>21</sup>Note that  $\alpha$  in the mining and utility sector is small, because many of the inputs are imported. This would generate a negative  $\theta$  for the corresponding sectors. To avoid this, we use the ratio of the sum of employees' compensation and operating surplus to the total output as  $\alpha$  for these two sectors.

<sup>22</sup>In practice, since firms usually provide either inputs or final goods while sectors in our model do both, thus,  $\bar{tc}_i \kappa_i$  is used, where  $\kappa$  represents the share of products used as intermediate inputs.

Table 2  
CALIBRATION FOR SECTORAL PARAMETERS

Sectors	$\nu$	$\alpha$	$\phi$	$\bar{e}$
Mining	0.44	0.52	0.01	17.66
Utilities	0.56	0.39	0.02	15.70
Construction	0.49	0.30	0.13	9.62
Manufacturing	0.65	0.19	0.16	16.72
Wholesale trade	0.37	0.40	0.09	10.16
Retail trade	0.37	0.44	0.11	9.53
Transportation and warehousing	0.51	0.31	0.05	14.39
Information	0.45	0.22	0.08	11.91
Professional and business services	0.37	0.45	0.09	13.31
Educational services, and health care	0.39	0.50	0.16	9.68
Arts, and recreation services	0.47	0.36	0.07	13.64
Other services	0.38	0.43	0.04	12.32

**Notes:** All parameters are calibrated from the 12-sector input-output table in 2005.  $\{\nu_i\}$  are the intermediate input share over the total output.  $\{\alpha_i\}$  are labor share.  $\{\phi_i\}$  are consumption shares.  $\{\bar{e}_i\}$  are calibrated maximal value of efforts.

across all clients  $j$ . Once  $\{\bar{e}_i\}$  are calibrated, we can deviate away from the Assumption that the supplier issues the same proportion of payments as TC to all clients and let TC be endogenously determined. When the calibrated  $\bar{e}$  is lower than the threshold in Assumption (#1), we replace it with the threshold value. The fourth column of Table 2 displays the results for  $\{\bar{e}_i\}$ . The mining and manufacturing industries have the highest values, which implies that the states of their products are relatively more complex to verify. On the other hand, for the retail, construction, and education services is the lowest, indicating that it is more straightforward to monitor their states.

Following in Bigio and La'O (2020) and Miranda-Pinto and Young (2022), we use the sectoral bond spreads from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) to guide the value for the inverse of the labor wedge, defined in Equation (12).<sup>23</sup> Imposing this condition, along with sectoral real gross output, we can solve the system to obtain the implied sectoral productivity  $\{z_{it}\}$  and financial shock  $\{\theta_{it}\}$ . Table 3 displays the pairwise correlations of calibrated productivity and financial shocks. Before the Great Recession, the mean (median) of pairwise correlations among the productivity shocks is 0.09 (0.17) and -0.01 (0.05) for the financial shocks. During the Great Recession, the correlations of productivity shocks significantly rise, by 0.11, to 0.3, and the ones of the financial shocks increase from -0.01 to 0.18. Interestingly, the average correlation of financial shocks rises more than the me-

<sup>23</sup>We thank Gilchrist and Zakrajšek for kindly sharing their data with us.

dian (rising by 0.04), which implies that the deterioration of financial conditions during the Great Recession was highly skewed. That is, a few sectors' financial conditions, rather than the majority, moved together. Between the two sequences of shocks (e.g., productivity and financial shocks), we find a positive correlation before and a negative one during the Great Recessions.<sup>24</sup>

Last, we verify how well our calibration matches the data we do not target. As shown in Appendix D.2, our model can reasonably account for the decline in aggregate GDP and the sectoral AR-to-sales and AP-to-OC ratios during the Great Recession.<sup>25</sup>

Table 3  
PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS OF CALIBRATED SHOCKS

	endogenous TC		fixed TC	
	mean	median	mean	median
<b>before the Great Recession</b>				
<b>corr</b> ( $\Delta z_{it}, \Delta z_{jt}$ )	0.19	0.27	0.23	0.24
<b>corr</b> ( $\Delta \theta_{it}, \Delta \theta_{jt}$ )	-0.01	0.05	0.04	0.06
<b>corr</b> ( $\Delta z_{it}, \Delta \theta_{jt}$ )	0.07	0.10	-0.02	0.00
<b>during the Great Recession</b>				
<b>corr</b> ( $\Delta z_{it}, \Delta z_{jt}$ )	0.30	0.38	0.32	0.41
<b>corr</b> ( $\Delta \theta_{it}, \Delta \theta_{jt}$ )	0.18	0.09	0.41	0.43
<b>corr</b> ( $\Delta z_{it}, \Delta \theta_{jt}$ )	-0.02	0.03	-0.13	-0.22

**Notes:** The sectoral bond spreads and real sectoral outputs are used to impute productivity and financial shocks, using the solution of the model with or without endogenous trade credit. 2005Q3-2007Q2 and 2007Q3-2009Q2 are respectively the time windows before and during the Great Recession.

## 5.2 Decomposition of sectoral comovement

Now we apply our calibration to decompose pairwise correlations of sectoral output growth before and during the Great Recession. In particular, we use the calibrated productivity shocks, model-implied TC, and labor and input wedge, along with structural parameters, to impute these four components in Equation (19). Therefore, the pairwise correlation of sectoral output growth between sector  $i$  and  $j$  over a certain period can be

<sup>24</sup>Please see Figure D.2 for the kernel densities of pairwise correlation for two shocks.

<sup>25</sup>By construction, our estimated shocks generate the same sectoral output growth as in the data, and thus the observed rise in sectoral comovement.

expressed as

$$\mathbf{corr}(\Delta \log p_{it} y_{it}, \Delta \log p_{jt} y_{jt}) = \sum_{x,v \in \{\tilde{z}, \tilde{f}c, \tilde{v}, \widetilde{GE}\}} \frac{\sigma_i^{\Delta x} \sigma_j^{\Delta v}}{\sigma_i^{\Delta py} \sigma_j^{\Delta py}} \mathbf{corr}(\Delta x_{it}, \Delta v_{jt}) \quad (24)$$

where  $\sigma_i^{\Delta x}$  is the standard deviation of the component  $\Delta x$  for sector  $i$  over the same period.

Table 4 reports the average correlation of corresponding components and their contributions to the average correlation of sectoral output growth.<sup>26</sup> The average correlation of sectoral output growth in our sample increases from 0.04 before to 0.5 during the Great Recession, consistent with but higher than what we find with 57 sectors in Section 2.1. The average correlation of the productivity component, i.e.,  $\mathbf{corr}(\Delta \tilde{z}_{it}, \Delta \tilde{z}_{jt})$ , rise from 0.18 before to 0.3 during the Great Recession, which is mainly driven by the change in the correlation of underline shocks as shown in Table 3. However, the contribution of the comovement generated by productivity shocks,  $\frac{\sigma_i^{\Delta \tilde{z}} \sigma_j^{\Delta \tilde{z}}}{\sigma_i^{\Delta py} \sigma_j^{\Delta py}} \mathbf{corr}(\Delta \tilde{z}_{it}, \Delta \tilde{z}_{jt})$ , only rises from 0.06 to 0.10, which accounts for 8.7% of the rise in the output-growth correlation.

Table 4  
DECOMPOSITION OF PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS

	before Great Recession		during Great Recession		
	average corr	contribution	average corr	contribution	$\Delta$ in contribution
$\Delta \log py$	0.04	0.04	0.50	0.50	
$\Delta \tilde{z}$	0.18	0.06	0.30	0.10	0.04
$\Delta \tilde{f}c$	0.02	-0.01	0.38	0.08	0.09
$\Delta \tilde{v}$	0.29	0.03	0.89	0.31	0.28

**Notes:** The average correlation reports the pairwise correlation of corresponding components, i.e.,  $\mathbf{corr}(\Delta x_{it}, \Delta x_{jt})$  for  $x \in \{\tilde{z}, \tilde{f}c, \tilde{v}\}$ . The contribution reports the contribution of each component to the average correlation of the sectoral output growth, i.e.,  $\frac{\sigma_i^{\Delta x} \sigma_j^{\Delta x}}{\sigma_i^{\Delta py} \sigma_j^{\Delta py}} \mathbf{corr}(\Delta x_{it}, \Delta x_{jt})$  for  $x \in \{\tilde{z}, \tilde{f}c, \tilde{v}\}$ . 2005Q3-2007Q2 and 2007Q3-2009Q2 are respectively the time windows before and during the Great Recession.

Endogenous TC can affect the output-growth correlation in both a direct and indirect way. The direct effects are captured by the comovement of the TC component, i.e.,  $\mathbf{corr}(\Delta \tilde{f}c_{it}, \Delta \tilde{f}c_{jt})$ , which increases by 0.36 during the Great Recession and contributes 19.6% of the rise in the output-growth correlation. Moreover, in response to the financial

<sup>26</sup>Even though the loading of the GE component ( $\widetilde{GE}$ ) varies across sectors, the loading for one sector is fixed over time, and thus the correlation of the GE components between two sectors is equal to one. We also ignore the pairwise correlations between the two components.

shocks during the Great Recession, TC has adjusted so that the financial constraints become even tighter for some sectors. It further generates more comoved labor and input wedges, the average correlation of which increases from 0.29 to 0.89 during the Great Recession and accounts for 60.9% of the rise in the output-growth correlation. This finding highlights the role of TC in determining the sharp rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession.

Moreover, we use the model-implied data to perform a sectoral regression (see Appendix D.3 for details). The results confirm the role of TC in driving the rise in comovement during the Great Recession. Sectoral comovement increases when the clients receive a negative financial shock and even more when their suppliers contract TC. In contrast, we find that productivity shocks play little role.

### 5.3 Counterfactual exercise with fixed trade credit

In this section, we perform several counterfactual exercises to study the role of endogenous TC and its interaction with financial and productivity shocks in explaining the sharp increase in comovement during the Great Recession. Considering a counterfactual economy in which TC is fixed to the pre-recession average, we compare this economy with our benchmark model after imposing productivity and financial shocks together and separately. We report the summary statistics of pairwise correlation, implied by our model, in Table 5.

We first fix the TC intensity to its pre-recession average. Given all parameters, we impose the same productivity and financial shocks calibrated in Section 5.1. In Figure 5, Panel (a) shows that the average pairwise correlations in the fixed-TC model rose by 0.27 during the Great Recession, which is 42.6% lower than the increase with the endogenous one (from 0.04 to 0.5). This result is consistent with our sectoral evidence in Section 2.3, where the difference of rises in pairwise correlations between the TC-declined and unchanged subgroup is more than 40% of the group average. The intuition is straightforward. In the presence of financial shocks during the recession, the sufficiently constrained suppliers do not extend TC to their shocked clients as they normally do but rather a contract TC, making their clients more constrained. Fixed TC limits suppliers' response and, thus, dampens the comovement between the two parties.<sup>27</sup> In addition, the fixed trade-credit model generates a milder decline in aggregate GDP, where the de-

<sup>27</sup>More specifically, we regress the change in the pairwise correlation, with endogenous and fixed TC, on the one-way and two-way indicators, along with other control variables. We find 1) the two-way group comoves more in both models, and the rise in comovement is larger in the endogenous TC model; 2) the rise in the endogenous TC model is due to the contraction in TC provision, while the rise in the fixed TC model is mainly due to the correlations of the underline shocks. Please refer to Appendix ?? for more detail.


Table 5  
MODEL-IMPLIED PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS OF OUTPUT GROWTH RATES

	mean	median	std	skewness	KS statistics
<b>Data / model-implied with both shocks</b>					
Before the Great Recession	0.04	0.03	0.42	-0.11	0.48 (0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.50	0.62	0.34	-0.95	
<b>Model-implied with both shocks and fixed TC</b>					
Before the Great Recession	0.13	0.16	0.41	-0.25	0.33 (0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.40	0.49	0.35	-0.57	
<b>Model-implied with only <math>\theta</math></b>					
Before the Great Recession	0.13	0.16	0.41	-0.25	0.50(0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.65	0.73	0.24	-0.67	
<b>Model-implied with only <math>\theta</math> and fixed TC</b>					
Before the Great Recession	0.19	0.21	0.39	-0.41	0.17(0.29)
During the Great Recession	0.32	0.28	0.37	0.04	
<b>Model-implied with only <math>z</math></b>					
Before the Great Recession	-0.03	-0.02	0.40	-0.02	0.52 (0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.47	0.60	0.39	-0.88	
<b>Model-implied with only <math>z</math> and fixed TC</b>					
Before the Great Recession	0.00	0.00	0.41	-0.09	0.58 (0.00)
During the Great Recession	0.52	0.66	0.38	-1.06	

cline in GDP growth is 17.3% smaller in 2008Q4 and 15.2% smaller in 2009Q1 than our benchmark model. This is because, in the fixed case, the clients' production is not further distorted by a more tightened constraint caused by the contraction in TC.

Next, we study the role of financial and productivity shocks in driving sectoral co-movement during the Great Recession. In doing so, we feed the model one set of shocks at a time while keeping the other fixed at the pre-recession average. Panel (a) of Figure 6 displays the kernel density with only financial shocks for the endogenous TC structure (red) and the one in the fixed-TC case (black). With endogenous TC, the average correlation rises from 0.13 to 0.65 during the Great Recession, which is higher than the one implied by our benchmark model (blue). Notably, such a sharp rise in pairwise correlations of sectoral output growth is generated by modestly correlated and highly skewed financial shocks, where the average increase from -0.01 before to 0.18 during the Great Recession, and the median only rises by 0.04. It indicates trade credit, in this case, is triggered as a conduit that propagates and amplifies the shocks to a few sectors to more





**Note:** The fixed TC case is the one where the TC intensity is fixed to its pre-recession average. The blue lines represent variables in the endogenous TC case, while the red ones describe the variables in the fixed TC case.

**Figure 5**  
**BOTH SHOCKS: ENDOGENOUS VS FIXED TRADE CREDIT**

sectors that are not originally affected. Once we fix the TC intensity, the rise in the sectoral comovement contracts by 75%.


Last, we feed the economy with productivity shocks only. Panel (b) of Figure 6 displays the kernel density in the endogenous TC model (red) and the one in the fixed TC model (black). Thanks to the highly correlated productivity shocks, we observe a rise in sectoral comovement in both models. Since productivity shocks only affect the TC provision through the tightness of the financial constraint, and given that TC responds quantitatively little to productivity shocks, both models behave alike. We even observe more comovement in the fixed-TC model as the negative productivity shocks alleviate the financial constraint in the endogenous TC model.

## 5.4 Recalibrating sectoral shocks in the fixed trade credit model


Now we investigate how the data generate process with a fixed-TC model differs from the one with endogenous TC. Notably, the former model is isomorphic to the one used in [Biggio and La'O \(2020\)](#). In doing so, we re-calibrate financial and productivity shocks while keeping the TC intensities at the pre-recession average and taking all other parameters as given.

Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 report the summary statistics of the productivity and financial shocks. Before the Great Recession, both models with or without endogenous TC imply two sequences of shocks correlate similarly. To generate the same dynamics of





(a) only financial shocks




(b) only productivity shocks


**Note:** The fixed TC case is the one where the TC intensity is fixed to its pre-recession average. The blue lines represent the benchmark case, the red lines show the economy with only financial (productivity) shocks and the endogenous TC case, and the red ones describe the fixed TC case with only financial (productivity) shocks.

Figure 6

#### PAIRWISE CORRELATION: ENDOGENOUS VS FIXED TRADE CREDIT



(a) Financial shocks



(b) Productivity shocks

**Note:** A bubble represents a sector. Each bubble's coordinate value is the shocks' size relative to their pre-recession average. The size of the bubble reflects the sales share in 2005. The horizontal and vertical axes stand for the endogenous and fixed TC models, respectively. In the fixed TC model, the TC intensity is set to its pre-recession average.

Figure 7

#### CALIBRATED FINANCIAL AND PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS: ENDOGENOUS VS FIXED TRADE CREDIT

sectoral output during the Great Recession, the model with fixed TC requires financial shocks that are more than two times more correlated than the endogenous-TC case, while a slightly more correlated productivity shock.

Figure 7 displays the scatter plots of sectoral shocks—the relative size to their pre-recession average, where a bubble represents one sector, its size reflects the sales share in

2005, and the horizontal and vertical axes stand for the endogenous and fixed TC models, respectively. In Panel (a), the financial shocks are quite different between the two models. For example, manufacturing in the endogenous TC model only received a negative financial shock in 2009Q1, and the size of shocks (7.7% decline in 2009Q1) is much smaller than that with fixed TC (15.5% decline in 2008Q4 and 19.9% in 2009Q1). To compare, we plot pre-recession scatter for three quarters before 2008, where we cannot find significant differences between the two series. Moreover, Panel (b) displays the scatter plot for the productivity shocks. All bubbles line up along the 45-degree line, indicating the limited interaction between productivity shocks and endogenous TC.

## 5.5 The other recessions

In this section, we analyze an important question: why did not sectoral comovement rise significantly in the recessions before 2008? Following [Chari et al. \(2007\)](#), we take the case of the early 1980s recession, which displayed a comparable decline in real GDP to the one during the Great Recession.


We answer this question through the lens of our model with sectoral annual growth. Following the same strategy, we back out two shocks to match sectoral outputs and spreads between 1978 and 1989.<sup>28</sup> Using the same set of parameters calibrated in Section 5.1, we then compare the sectoral comovement and GDP decline with those generated by a model with TC fixed to the level in 1978.<sup>29</sup> Panel (a) of Figure 8 plots the evolution of the real GDP growth rate. The model matches the GDP decline in 1982 quite well but slightly underestimates the decline in 1980. The fixed TC model implies a larger decline in GDP growth in both recessions, indicating that TC dampened the magnitude of the recessions in 1980 and 1982.

Panel (b) of Figure 8 plots the kernel density of pairwise correlation of sectoral sales growth. The sectoral comovement (blue) slightly rises, while the model with the fixed TC generates an even larger rise in sectoral comovement. Unlike the Great Recession, TC during the early 1980s was adjusted to mitigate the negative shocks by smoothing negative spillover effects among sectors, reducing the decline in GDP.

In Appendix D.5, we use our calibrated model to confirm the following intuition behind the dynamics of sectoral comovement during Covid-19: if common shocks are the

<sup>28</sup>As shown in Figure D.7 of Appendix D.4, we observe a large variation across pairs in the correlations of two shocks. As in Section 2.1, we use 1978-1985 as the in-recession window, while 1983-1989 as the post-recession one.

<sup>29</sup>Notably, we assume the economy's structure of the early 1980s was similar to the one before the Great Recession. This is a rather strong assumption, but it allows us to focus on the data-generating process rather than the economic structure change over time.



Note: Sectoral productivity and financial shocks are backed out to match sectoral sales and spreads annually for 1978-1989. 1978-1985 is used as the in-recession window, while 1983-1989 as the post-recession one.

Figure 8  
THE EARLY 80s RECESSION: ENDOGENOUS VS EXOGENOUS TRADE CREDIT

driver, sectoral comovement should rise ubiquitously, regardless of the degree of inter-connection among sectors. In doing so, we feed the model with the productivity and financial shocks between 2005Q1 and 2007Q2 and then simulate a 1.5% decline in productivity for all sectors in 2006Q1. We find two-way, one-way, and no-trading groups all comove substantially and universally, consistent with our observation in the Covid-19 recession. We also apply the shocks to the production functions with non-unitary elasticity, and the results remain robust.

## 6 Firm-level evidence on role of trade credit

Since the Great Recession is the only financial crisis in the US after WWII, we explore the cross-sectional variation across the US public firms during the Great Recession and use the collapse of Lehman Brothers (LB) as a quasi-natural experiment. Then, we examine whether and how the asymmetric role of TC during the Great Recession in transmitting or mitigating shocks along the production network.

### 6.1 Data and sample selection

We first construct a firm-to-firm production network using Form 10-K, as in [Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga \(2013\)](#). We identify 641 supplier-client pairs, with

426 suppliers and 176 clients. To establish the relationship between listed firms and LB, we use the syndicated loan data from DealScan. Following [Ivashina and Scharfsteinb \(2010\)](#), we select firms of which LB led or joined a syndicated loan before its collapse. Additionally, in the spirit of the literature on financial networks, such as [Allen and Gale \(2000\)](#), [Elliott et al. \(2014\)](#), [Acemoglu et al. \(2015\)](#), among others, we find lenders that directly share the financial network with LB through the syndicated loan market.<sup>30</sup> Thus, a firm is treated as indirectly connected to LB if that firm did not borrow directly from LB but from lenders connected to LB. Overall, we have 19 out of 426 suppliers directly connected to LB, 237 indirectly connected to LB through their lenders, and 150 without a connection to LB through the syndicated loan market. Also, out of the 176 clients, 40 borrowed directly from LB, 120 were indirectly connected to LB, and 16 had no relationship with LB. Note that we classify these firms only using the information in the syndicated loan market. We do not exclude any other financial connection firms may have had with LB, either directly or indirectly.

We use Compustat database to acquire the financial variables of the listed firms, the summary statistics of which is displayed in Table [E.1](#). We then calculate the pairwise correlations at the firm level and find it significantly increased by 0.17 during the Great Recession. This is consistent with our findings at the sector level. Furthermore, we select financial variables, where the median values of 2005Q3-2006Q2 and 2008Q3-2009Q2 are taken respectively to represent before and during the Great Recession. Before the recession, compared to the average firm in Compustat, the suppliers in our sample are smaller in terms of total assets, extend less TC, and hold more cash, whereas the clients are larger, receive less TC, and have less cash. It is mainly because the suppliers report the clients as their top 10 clients in Form 10-K. As seen in the QFR data, smaller firms rely more on TC, and thus we observe a smaller decline in clients' TC compared to the suppliers'. As in [Kahle and Stulz \(2013\)](#), we find those typical financial variables, such as ratios of investment, cash, and short-term and long-term debt over total assets, of suppliers and clients before and during the recession are all not significantly different. Also, the size of firms, in terms of sales and total assets, is not very different over the two windows. However, profitability and growth perspectives (growth rate of sales and total assets) are significantly lower during the recession. Such a decline is reflected in their market value, resulting in a lower Tobin's Q during the recession.

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<sup>30</sup>Please see Appendix [A.4](#) for details about sample selection.

## 6.2 Transmission of the LB Shock

Did the LB shock contribute to the rise in comovement among firms through the TC channel? We use the variation in the degree of connections to LB to examine the role of TC in explaining the sales comovement between the two firms. In particular, we focus on suppliers that did not directly borrow from LB but had clients with different degrees of exposure to LB (directly, indirectly, and not connected to LB). In total, our sample has 162 pairs that consist of 62 suppliers and 65 clients. Seventeen suppliers had no relationship with LB, and 45 were indirectly connected, while 20, 39, and 6 clients were directly, indirectly, and not connected to LB.

We examine whether and how the pairwise correlation between the two firms responds to the LB shock through the TC channel. In particular, we take the first difference of pairwise correlations between two periods to eliminate the suppliers', clients', and pairs' fixed effects. Moreover, comparing the change in the correlation of the common supplier with different clients makes our approach similar to the difference-in-difference framework, as we mitigate the possibility that some time-varying unobservables, other than the connection to LB, influence the change in comovement over time. Thus, we specify our empirical strategy as

$$\Delta \text{corr}_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \mathbf{1}_j^{LB} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{1}_j^{LB} \times \Delta \frac{AP_j}{OC_j} + \gamma D_i + \beta' \Delta X_j + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad (25)$$

where  $i$  and  $j$  are, respectively, indexes for the supplier and client,  $\Delta \text{corr}_{ij}$  is the change in the pairwise correlation before and during the recession,  $\mathbf{1}_j^{LB}$  is the indicator that the client  $j$  is either directly or indirectly connected to LB,  $D_i$  is the dummy variable for the supplier  $i$ , and  $X$  are characteristics for a firm  $j$ , including the first-difference of financial measurements listed in Table E.1. To highlight the role of TC in propagating and amplifying the LB shocks, we incorporate the interaction term of the LB indicator and the change in the AP-to-OC ratio. Since clients connected to LB experienced a contraction in TC on average, a negative coefficient is expected for the interaction term, which implies the TC channel amplifies the LB shock. Last, we add the dummies for the suppliers to control the time-varying effects for suppliers.

Table 6 reports the point estimates. Column (1) exhibits the results of the benchmark model in Equation (25). We find that, during the Great Recession, the correlation of a supplier with its client connected to LB increased more, by 0.88, than the one with an unconnected one. Such a rise is higher than the sample average (0.17) by a factor of 5.2. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, implying that the TC channel indeed amplified the LB shock after the collapse of LB and

increasing the comovement between the two firms.

Table 6  
POINT ESTIMATES FOR EQUATION (25)

	$\Delta \text{corr}_{ij}$	placebo test	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mathbf{1}_{j,dir}^{LB}$	.875* (.345)	-.172 (1.12)	-.167 (.296)
$\mathbf{1}_{j,indir}^{LB}$	.687^ (.36)	-.501 (1.15)	-.0439 (.3)
$\mathbf{1}_{j,dir}^{LB} \times \Delta \frac{AP_j}{OC_j}$	-.393** (.143)		
$\mathbf{1}_{j,indir}^{LB} \times \Delta \frac{AP_j}{OC_j}$	-.392** (.142)		
$\mathbf{1}_{j,dir}^{LB} \times \frac{AP_j^{pre}}{OC_j^{pre}}$		.00736	(.0177)
$\mathbf{1}_{j,indir}^{LB} \times \frac{AP_j^{pre}}{OC_j^{pre}}$		.00952	(.018)
obs	148	148	150
adjusted $R^2$	.125	.0881	.0522

Notes:  $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$   $^*p < 0.05$ ,  $^{**}p < 0.01$ , and  $^{***}p < 0.001$ .

We also test whether clients that relied more on TC before the Great Recession comoved more during the Great Recession. In doing so, we replace the change in AP-to-OC ratio  $\Delta \frac{AP_j}{OC_j}$  in Equation (25) with the pre-recession ratio  $AP_j^{pre}/OC_j^{pre}$ . The point estimates in Column (3) show that the level of the pre-recession ratios fails to predict the change in pairwise correlations. Lastly, we perform a ‘placebo test’ by comparing the change in correlations between two regular periods, namely 2003Q3-2005Q2 versus 2005Q3-2007Q2. As shown in Column (4), we do not find evidence that the control and the treatment group had pre-existing differences in comovement before the Great Recession.

## 7 Conclusion

We document a defining feature of sectoral comovement over the business cycle in the US. The distribution of sectoral output growth correlations, conditional on aggregate GDP, is

acyclical, except during the Great Recession when it shifted significantly to the right. In other words, sectoral comovement does not significantly change during economic recessions but rises during financial crises. We use sectoral and firm-level data to show that input-output linkages and TC adjustment are key in driving comovement during financial crises.

We then construct a multisector model with endogenous TC adjustment and highlight the importance of TC adjustment in driving sectoral comovement during post-war US recessions. Our model emphasizes the asymmetric role of TC. When financial conditions are loose, suppliers with “deep pockets” have incentives to extend more TC to clients facing tighter financial conditions. However, when financial conditions are adverse to suppliers, too, TC provision collapses. We show that this mechanism is crucial to explain the significant increase in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession in the US. Moreover, through this mechanism, our model suggests that TC amplifies the effect of financial shock on GDP growth. Using our model, we show that during the early 1980 recession, comparable to the Great Recession in magnitude, TC acted as a cushion that mitigated negative spillovers, prevented the shift in comovement, and mitigated the recession.

More generally, our paper emphasizes the relevance of considering the internal propagation forces and the endogenous TC chain when interested in aggregate and sectoral dynamics. Our results have important implications for business cycle stabilization policies. In particular, mild sectoral financial shocks in our model can generate large sectoral cascades compared to a model with exogenous TC. A milder and well-targeted stabilization policy should stabilize the macroeconomy in the presence of negative financial shocks.

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# Online Appendix (not for publication)

## A Data Description

### A.1 Sectors' characteristics

For the annual outputs, we adopt the nominal gross output by industry, provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), adjusted for the sectoral chain-type price indexes. We adopt the real gross output by industry (seasonal-adjusted at annual rates) for the quarterly ones. The quarterly series started in 2005Q1, while the annual ones started in 1947. For both series, after excluding agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (AFFH), finance, insurance, real estate (FIRE), and public sectors, we end up with a sample consisting of 57 sectors and 1596 pairs.

The sectors' list and characteristics are shown in Table E.3. All pairwise correlations of output growth are calculated using Equation (A1). 2005Q3-2007Q2, 2007Q3-2009Q2, and 2009Q3-2011Q2 are respectively used to represent before, during, and after the Great Recession.  $\bar{corr}_{before}$ ,  $\bar{corr}_{in}$ , and  $\bar{corr}_{after}$  are the average for the corresponding sector with all others.

The two or one-way linkages show the number of sectors with which the corresponding sector has a two or one-way trading relationship. Two sectors are classified as in the two-way trading group if they are both input suppliers and clients to each other. The one-way trading group if only one sector supplies inputs to the other but not vice versa.

The consumption share for the corresponding sector is equal to the share of the personal consumption expenditure over the summation of total intermediate input and personal consumption expenditure.

The ratio of account receivables to average sales between the current and past quarters (henceforth, the AR-to-sales ratio) is calculated to measure the intensity of TC provision, while the ratio of account payables over average operating cost (henceforth, the AP-to-OC ratio) as the intensity of TC reception. We take the median value of both ratios for each firm from Compustat, respectively, over 2005Q3–2006Q2 and 2008Q3–2009Q2, further calculate the first difference between two windows, and use the median as the representation for each sector with more than three firms. The median decline in the AR-to-sales ratio and the client's AP-to-OC ratio are -1.6 and -1.3 percentage points.

## A.2 measurement for sectoral comovements

The correlation of real GDP growth between two countries is widely used to study the business cycle comovement across countries (see, for example, [Frankel and Rose, 1998](#); [Clark and van Wincoop, 2001](#)). Here, a similar measure, the pairwise correlation of gross output growth between two sectors, is applied to study intersectoral comovement. Then, we take the growth rates of the sectoral outputs and calculate the correlation of the growth rates between any pair of sectors over a certain time window as

$$\text{corr}(\Delta y_i, \Delta y_j) = \frac{\sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} (\Delta y_{it} - \overline{\Delta y_i})(\Delta y_{jt} - \overline{\Delta y_j})}{(\#\mathcal{T} - 1) \text{std}(\Delta y_i) \text{std}(\Delta y_j)}, \quad (\text{A1})$$

where  $i$  and  $j$  with  $i \neq j$  stand for two sectors,  $\mathcal{T}$  is the time window,  $\Delta y_{it}$  is the growth rate from the previous period at time  $t$ , and  $\overline{\Delta y_i}$  and  $\text{std}(\Delta y_i)$  are, respectively, the sample mean and standard deviation over  $\mathcal{T}$ . Throughout the analysis in the paper, we use eight consecutive periods (either quarters or years) for time window  $\mathcal{T}$  unless otherwise stated. [Li and Martin \(2019\)](#) use the same measurements for the sectoral comovement but over a different time window. Here we use an eight-year time window and also try a six- and ten-year time window. The main results here are robust.

The previous literature, such as [Christiano and Fitzgerald \(1998\)](#), [Hornstein \(2000\)](#), and [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. \(2013\)](#), introduce another approach to measure the comovement. They firstly regress one sector's employment on the other's and then take  $R^2$  to measure the comovement, which assesses how much one sector's employment can be accounted for by the other's. Both approaches are similar, except theirs is only normalized by the standard deviation of the targeted sector, while ours accounts for both sectors' variation.

## A.3 Compustat

Following [Kahle and Stulz \(2013\)](#), we use Compustat Database and create our firm-level sample by filtering out:

- Observations with negative total assets (atq), negative sales (saleq), negative cash and marketable securities, cash and marketable securities greater than total assets;
- Firms not incorporated in the US;
- All financial firms (firms with standard industrial classification(SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999);

- Firms with a market capitalization less than \$50 million and with a book value of assets less than \$10 million
- Firms with a quarterly asset or sales growth greater than 100% at some point during the sample period
- Observations which have cash and marketable securities greater than total assets;

Table A.1 displays the summary statistics of all selected firms.

Table A.1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SELECTED COMPUSTAT FIRMS

	Nobs	Before		During		Difference	
		Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std
<i>AR/Sales</i>	1246	63	80.2	60.8	79.6	-2.3	27.5
<i>AP/Cost</i>	1248	66.9	184.0	59.2	173.9	-7.7	118.6
<i>Investment/TA</i>	1249	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.3	-0.2	0.9
<i>Cash/TA</i>	1249	17.2	18.3	15.9	16.2	-1.3	9.9
<i>Short – term debt/TA</i>	1235	2.3	4.4	2.8	5.1	0.5	4.4
<i>Long – term debt/TA</i>	1243	16.5	17.8	19.2	19.5	2.6	11.8
<i>OIBDP/TA</i>	1241	3.7	2.7	2.9	3.2	-0.7	2.4
<i>Tobin's Q</i>	1249	1.86	0.71	1.44	0.60	-0.43	0.47
<i>Inventory/TA</i>	1241	11.5	12.5	11.4	11.6	-0.1	4.3
<i>g<sub>sales</sub></i>	1249	2.9	4.3	-2.9	7.4	-5.8	8.1
<i>g<sub>assets</sub></i>	1249	2.1	2.7	-1.1	3.7	-3.2	4.2
<i>log(TA)</i>	1249	7.2	1.6	7.3	1.6	0.1	0.3

#### A.4 Syndicated loan from Dealscan

Following Chodorow-Reich (2014), we use Deals can Database and create our firm-bank connection by filtering out

- Firms not incorporated in the US;
- All financial firms (firms with standard industrial classification(SIC) codes between 6000 and and 6999);

- Loans due before October 2008
- The main purpose of loans is not working capital or corporate purpose

## B Additional Sectoral Evidence

### B.1 Pairwise correlations during US post-war recessions

By regressing the logarithm of sectoral output on the logarithm of the US GDP, our approach implicitly takes the recession duration into account. Still, since the period of each recession that stays in the fixed time window varies, we adjust the length of our time window to account for the duration explicitly. However, we cannot directly compare across time windows as they show different statistical properties. Thus, we standardize each sequence to the level before the Great Recession. As shown in Figure B.1, we find our results here robust as in Panel (b) of Figure 1.




Figure B.1  
MEDIAN OF PAIRWISE CORRELATION STANDARDIZED TO PRE-GR

As in Figure 2 in Section 2.1, we compare the kernel density of pairwise correlations for eight US recessions after WWII, namely the 1960, 1970, 1973, 1990, and 2001 recessions, the 1980 recession together with the 1981-1982 recession, the Great Recession, and the Covid-19 recession, where correlations are calculated with annual growth over eight

years, starting three years ahead of each recession. In contrast, we take 1962-1968, 1983-1989, 1992-1999, 2002-2007, and 2011-2018 respectively, to represent the pre-1970, the post-1980 (pre-1990), the post-1990 (pre-2001) recessions, the post-2001 recession (the pre-Great Recession), and the post-Great Recession (the pre-COVID19 recession). The selection of time windows is solely to avoid any overlap with recession year. Unfortunately, we cannot find any time window suitable to compare with the 1973 recession.




Figure B.2  
KERNEL DENSITY OF PAIRWISE CORRELATION IN US RECESSIONS

Panel (a) of Figure B.2 displays the kernel density of unconditional pairwise correlations, while Panel (b) displays the kernel density after filtering out the aggregating component. Table B.1 reports the summary statistics and results for the mean difference of the two-sample t-test and the KS statistics (both with the p-value in parentheses). Consistent with the finding in Figure (1), the density only slightly shifts to the right, if any, the recession before 2008, while the density significantly shifts toward the right only during the Great Recession.

Following Chari et al. (2007), we take a close look at the 1980 recession as a contrast to the Great Recession since the aggregate economy then experienced a slightly lower but comparable decline in GDP than the one in the Great Recession. In 1982, the real GDP dropped by 1.9%, with the deepest drop being 6.5% in 1982Q1, whereas the real GDP contracted by 2.7% in 2008, with the largest contraction by 8.2% in 2008Q4. However, we do not observe a shift in the density of pairwise correlation as prominent as the decline in GDP during the 1980 recession. Moreover, the comovement is disappeared after filtering out the aggregate component, and some of pairs even moved oppositely as the density



Table B.1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS: CONDITIONAL PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS (ANNUAL GROWTH)

	Unconditional				Conditional			
	Mean	Median	T-test	KS Stat	Mean	Median	T-test	KS Stat
<b>The 1960 recession</b>								
During	0.27	0.32			0.05	0.09		
After	0.16	0.19	0.11(0.00)	0.09(0.01)	0.00	0.01	0.04(0.07)	0.09(0.01)
<b>The 1970 recession</b>								
Before	0.16	0.19	0.08(0.00)	0.08(0.01)	0.00	0.01	0.06(0.00)	0.08(0.01)
During	0.24	0.28			0.07	0.08		
<b>The 1973 recession</b>								
During	0.36	0.39			0.09	0.12		
<b>The 1980 recession</b>								
During	0.30	0.35			0.01	0.01		
After	0.14	0.17	0.15(0.00)	0.01(0.75)	0.09	0.09	-0.08(0.99)	0.01(0.75)
<b>The 1990 recession</b>								
Before	0.14	0.17	0.15(0.00)	0.02(0.42)	0.09	0.09	-0.01(0.61)	0.02(0.42)
During	0.29	0.33			0.08	0.08		
After	0.03	0.05	0.26(0.00)	0.04(0.07)	0.06	0.09	0.01(0.17)	0.04(0.07)
<b>The 2001 recession</b>								
Before	0.03	0.05	0.17(0.00)	0.01(0.85)	0.06	0.09	-0.03(0.95)	0.01(0.85)
During	0.24	0.29			0.06	0.07		
After	0.07	0.08	0.13(0.00)	0.07(0.00)	0.02	0.00	0.02(0.09)	0.07(0.00)
<b>The Great Recession</b>								
Before	0.07	0.08	0.33(0.00)	0.14(0.00)	0.02	0.00	0.12(0.00)	0.14(0.00)
During	0.41	0.52			0.14	0.21		
After	0.01	0.00	0.39(0.00)	0.17(0.00)	0.03	0.03	0.11(0.00)	0.17(0.00)
<b>The COVID-19 recession</b>								
Before	0.01	0.00	0.31(0.00)	0.08(0.00)	0.03	0.03	0.00(0.40)	0.08(0.00)
During	0.33	0.46			0.04	0.05		

has a fat left tail. Both the t-test and KS test cannot reject the null hypothesis.

During the COVID-19 recession, we observe a significantly unconditional rise in sectoral comovement, increasing from 0.01 before the recession to 0.33 during the recession. After controlling for GDP, the rise in comovement vanishes.

## B.2 Role of IO linkage in the other recessions

We apply the same classification as in Section 2.2 for pair of sectors to the all other recessions. Figure B.3 reports the kernel densities for three groups and compare them with the ones before and after the recessions. First, the kernel density for three groups does not change in the 1960 and 1970 recession. Second, the two-way and one-way trading groups

modestly shift toward the right during the 1980 and 1990 recession. The two groups contributes the majority of rise in unconditional correlations as in the Great Recession. However, these shifts are not as much as the Great Recession. Third, the three groups exhibit the same pattern as we observe with the quarterly growth. Fourth, during the Covid-19 recession, comovement of three groups increased significantly during Covid-19, and the rise in comovement are in the same scale for all pairs of sectors, regardless of their degree of interconnections.




Figure B.3

KERNEL DENSITY OF UNCONDITIONAL CORRELATION BY INTERCONNECTEDNESS

### B.3 Role of trade credit in the no-trading group

Following the categorization as in Section 2.3, a pair is considered to have experienced a trade credit decline during the Great Recession (henceforth, the TC declined group) if both the change in the supplier's AR-to-sales ratio and the client's AP-to-OC ratio both declined more than the corresponding median value across all public firms, which are, respectively, -1.6 and -1.0 percentage points. Otherwise, the pair is categorized as in the unchanged group (henceforth, the TC unchanged group). Notably, in the no trading group, this pair is classified into the TC declined group if the TC decline condition is

satisfied in either direction. Figure B.4 reports the results. No significant shift is observed in both subgroup, neither during, nor before, nor after the Great Recession.





Figure B.4  
KERNEL DENSITY FOR NO TRADING GROUP BY THE TC SUBGROUP

## B.4 Robustness check

Due to delivery, adjustment cost, search frictions, and other factors, two sectors may not comove contemporaneously, and instead, one may lead to another. Thus, the rise in sectoral comovement during the Great Recession may be just a result of synchronization in timing. In addition to the contemporaneous correlation, we calculate one-period lagged and leaded correlations and then take the maximum value among the three. Panel (a) of Figure B.5 reports the results before, during, and after the Great Recession. We find 1) the maximal correlations still significantly rose during the Great Recession; 2) the maximal correlations are higher than the contemporaneous ones for before, during and after the Great Recession; 3) the rise in the maximal correlations is more concentrated than the contemporaneous ones, where the latter has a fatter right tails.

We further divide our sample of sectors into two groups according to the share of output used as the final consumption. Table E.3 report the specific values. Here, one sector is classified into the consumption-provider group if its share is larger than the median



(a) Maximum and contemporaneous correlations

(b) Consumption exposure subgroups

Figure B.5

KERNEL DENSITY OF UNCONDITIONAL CORRELATION BY INTERCONNECTEDNESS

value, namely 36.8%. Otherwise, this sector would be grouped as the input provider. Panel (b) of Figure B.5 shows the results.

## C Model details: proof for propositions and lemmas

### C.1 Solutions

The first-order conditions on consumption and labor supply yield

$$pc = \frac{w}{\psi l^\xi}. \quad (\text{A1})$$

It is straightforward to show that the RC constraint is binding in equilibrium since the marginal benefit of raising the penalty payment is positive, while the marginal cost is zero. Also, because the efforts are costly, suppliers will make enough efforts to induce clients to report the true status. This implies that the ICC constraint is also binding. Given the form of the probability, we have the  $e_{ij} = \bar{e}_i \left( \frac{tc_{ij}q_{ij}m_{ij}}{(1-\theta_j)\omega_{ij}v_jp_jy_j} \right)^2$ . The Lagrangian for Problem (3) is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} = & p_i z_i \left( \prod_{j=1}^n m_{ji}^{\omega_{ji}} \right)^{v_i} l_i^{\alpha_i} - \sum_{h=1}^n (p_i - (1 - (1 - \eta) t c_{ih}) q_{ih}) m_{ih} \\
& - w l_i - \sum_{j=1}^n \left( 1 - (1 - \eta) t c_{ji} + (1 - \eta) \gamma \frac{p_j}{q_{ji}} \right) q_{ji} m_{ji} \\
& - (1 - \eta) \bar{e}_i \sum_{h=1}^n \left( \frac{t c_{ih} q_{ih} m_{ih}}{(1 - \theta_h) \omega_{ih} v_h p_h y_h} \right)^2 q_{ih} m_{ih} + \mu_i \left( \theta_i p_i z_i \left( \prod_{j=1}^n m_{ji}^{\omega_{ji}} \right)^{v_i} l_i^{\alpha_i} \right. \\
& \left. + \sum_{h=1}^n (1 - t c_{ih}) q_{ih} m_{ih} - w l_i - \sum_{j=1}^n (1 - t c_{ji}) q_{ji} m_{ji} \right) \\
& + \sum_{h=1}^n \lambda_{ih} (\gamma p_i - d_{ih} q_{ih} - \eta (1 - d_{ih}) q_{ih} - (1 - \eta) (\gamma - \theta_i) p_i)
\end{aligned} \tag{A2}$$

## C.2 Proof of Lemma 1

**Proof.** Taking the derivatives of Equation (A2) with respect to  $l_i$  and  $m_{ji}$ , we have the first order conditions as in Equation (10) and (11), and then use Equation (1) to derive the solution for  $y_i$  as in Equation (13). ■

## C.3 Proof of Proposition 1

**Proof.** Since the RC constraint is binding, we have  $g_{ih} = \omega_{ih} v_h p_h y_h$ . Under the assumption that all CC constraints are binding, we obtain the penalty payment as in Equation (17). Taking solution of  $m_{ij}$  from Lemma 1 as given, we have  $\frac{t c_{ih} q_{ih} m_{ih}}{(1 - \theta_h) \omega_{ih} v_h p_h y_h} = \frac{t c_{ij} v_{ij}^M}{1 - \theta_j}$ . Since the firm has pricing power over the input client, we take the first order conditions of  $q_{ij}$  as in Equation (A2). And the firm set the TC intensity to the extent where the no-arbitrage constraint as shown in the NAC constraint is just binding. ■

## C.4 Proof of Proposition 2

**Proof.** Combining Equation (15) with (12) and (16), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& 3\gamma \bar{e}_i \left( \frac{\eta(1 - \eta)(\eta + \theta_j \mu_j) t c_{ij}}{(1 - \theta_j)(1 + \eta \mu_j - (1 - (1 - \mu_j) \eta) t c_{ij})} \right)^2 \\
= & (1 + (1 - \eta) \gamma) (1 - (1 - \eta) t c_{ij}) + (\mu_j + (1 - \eta) \gamma \mu_i) (1 - t c_{ij}).
\end{aligned} \tag{A3}$$

At  $t c_{ij} = 0$ , we have the left-hand side (LHS) of Equation (A3) equal to 0, while the right-hand side (RHS) is positive. Clearly, the LHS is increasing in  $t c_{ij}$ , while the RHS is de-

creasing in  $tc_{ij}$ . Moreover, Assumption (#1) ensures the LHS is larger than the RHS at  $tc_{ij} = 1$ . Therefore, the solution exists for any  $\theta \in (0, 1)$  and  $\mu > 0$ , and the uniqueness is guaranteed due to monotonicity.

Moreover, it is straightforward to show that trade credit intensity  $tc_{ij}$  is decreasing in  $\mu_i$ . Taking the total differentiation on both side, we have  $tc_{ij}$  is decreasing in  $\theta_j$  if  $g$  function is negative, where  $g$  function is given as

$$g(tc_{ij}, \mu_i, \mu_j, \theta_j) = \left( \frac{2\eta(1-tc_{ij})}{1+\eta\mu_j-(1-(1-\mu_j)\eta)tc_{ij}} + \frac{(1-tc_{ij})}{(1+(1-\eta)\gamma)(1-(1-\eta)tc_{ij})(\mu_j+(1-\eta)\gamma\mu_i)(1-tc_{ij})} \right) \frac{\partial \mu_j}{\partial \theta_j} - \frac{2\theta_j}{\eta+\theta_j\mu_j} \frac{\partial \mu_j}{\partial \theta_j} - 2 \left( \frac{1}{1-\theta_j} + \frac{\mu_j}{\eta+\theta_j\mu_j} \right) + \frac{(1-\eta)\gamma(1-tc_{ij})}{(1+(1-\eta)\gamma)(1-(1-\eta)tc_{ij})+(\mu_j+(1-\eta)\gamma\mu_i)(1-tc_{ij})} \frac{\partial \mu_i}{\partial \theta_j} \quad (A4)$$

■

## C.5 Sales Growth Decomposition

We examine how trade credit affects sales growth. First, let  $\mathbf{D}_\alpha$  and  $\mathbf{D}_\nu$  be the diagonal matrix for  $\alpha$  and  $\nu$ , which details are specified in appendix, and let

$$\Omega = \begin{bmatrix} \omega_{11} & \dots & \omega_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \omega_{n1} & \dots & \omega_{nn} \end{bmatrix}, \text{ and } \mathbf{M}_\omega = \begin{bmatrix} \omega_{11} & & \dots & \omega_{n1} \\ & \ddots & & \\ & & \dots & \ddots \\ & & \omega_{1n} & \dots & \omega_{nn} \end{bmatrix}.$$

Then we denote

$$x_t = [x_{1t}, \dots, x_{nt}]', \text{ for } x \in \{p, y, z, \text{sales}, v^L\} \quad (A5)$$

$$x_t = [x_{11,t}, \dots, x_{1n,t}, \dots, x_{n1,t}, \dots, x_{nn,t}]', \text{ for } x \in \{tc, q, v^M\} \quad (A6)$$

Using the goods market clearing condition in Equation (22) and the FOC of the household as in Equation (18), we have

$$\Delta \log p_t = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left( \log \left( \left( \eta \mathbf{I}_n - \frac{1}{\eta\gamma} \mathbf{D}_\nu \mathbf{M}_{xt} \right) p_t \circ y_t \right) - \mathbf{1}_n \log \left( \mathbf{1}_n' \left( \eta \mathbf{I}_n - \frac{1}{\eta\gamma} \mathbf{D}_\nu \mathbf{M}_{xt} \right) p_t \circ y_t \right) \right) \quad (A7)$$

where  $\mathbf{1}_n$  is a 1-by-n unit vector,  $\mathbf{I}_n$  is the n dimension identity matrix,  $\circ$  stands for Hadamard product, and the input-usage weighted matrix  $\mathbf{M}_{xt}$  is defined as

$$\mathbf{M}_{xt} = \begin{bmatrix} (1-(1-\eta)tc_{11,t})\omega_{11}v_{11,t}^M & \dots & (1-(1-\eta)tc_{1n,t})\omega_{1n}v_{1n,t}^M \\ & \ddots & \\ (1-(1-\eta)tc_{n1,t})\omega_{n1}v_{n1,t}^M & \dots & (1-(1-\eta)tc_{nn,t})\omega_{nn}v_{nn,t}^M \end{bmatrix}. \quad (A8)$$

$p \circ y$  is the fixed vector for the following equation

$$\begin{aligned}
& \Delta \log(p_t \circ y_t) + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_v \Omega') \Delta \log \left( \left( \eta \mathbf{I}_n - \frac{1}{\eta \gamma} \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_{xt} \right) p_t \circ y_t \right) \\
&= (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_\alpha - \mathbf{D}_v)^{-1} \left( \Delta \log z_t + \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_\omega \Delta \log (1 - (1 - \eta)tc) + \mathbf{D}_\alpha \Delta \log v_t^L + \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_\omega \Delta \log v_t^M \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \Delta \log \left( \mathbf{1}_n' \left( \eta \mathbf{I}_n - \frac{1}{\eta \gamma} \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_{xt} \right) p_t \circ y_t \right) \left( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_v \Omega') - \frac{1}{1 - \xi} \mathbf{D}_\alpha \right) \mathbf{1}_n - \frac{\xi}{1 + \xi} \Delta \log (\mathbf{1}_n' \mathbf{D}_\alpha v^L \circ p_t \circ y_t) \mathbf{1}_n \right)
\end{aligned}$$

Moreover, using the first-order Taylor expansion, we can derive the left hand side of the equation above as

$$\text{LHS} = (\mathbf{I}_n + \mathbf{M}_{py}) \Delta \log(p_t \circ y_t) \quad (\text{A9})$$

where the matrix  $\mathbf{M}_{py}$  is defined as

$$\mathbf{M}_{py} = \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} (\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{D}_v \Omega') \left( \eta \mathbf{I}_n - \frac{1}{\eta \gamma} \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_{xt} \right) \left( \mathbf{1}_n' \otimes \left( \eta \mathbf{I}_n - \frac{1}{\eta \gamma} \mathbf{D}_v \mathbf{M}_{xt} \right) (p_{t-1} \circ y_{t-1}) \right)^{-1}, \quad (\text{A10})$$

and  $\circ$  is the Hadamard product, and  $\otimes$  is the Kronecker product.

## D More Results from Quantitative Analysis

### D.1 More about calibrated shocks

Panel (a) of Figure D.1 depicts sectoral TFP normalized to 2005Q1, with each grey line standing for one sector and the solid and dashed blue line, respectively, standing for the weighted average (sales share in 2005 as weights) and median across all sectors. Compared to the pre-average between 2005Q3 and 2007Q2, manufacturing, retail and wholesale, and transportation experienced a large drop in productivity in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1. Panel (b) of Figure D.1 shows the normalized financial shocks. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, compared to the pre-recession average, construction, manufacturing, and education & healthcare were hit the most in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1.

Once we impose the fixed trade credit to the economy, our model becomes one akin to Bigio and La'O (2020). In this case, the sectoral sales should highly comove with underline shocks. In Figure D.2, we plot the kernel density of the pairwise correlations for both shocks, where the top panel is for productivity shocks and the bottom for financial shocks, all red lines represent the shocks we used for our exercise, and all dashed and solid lines respectively stand for the kernel density before and during the Great Recession. Here we observe a modest rise in the comovement of productivity shocks during the Great Recession. In contrast, we also calculate the TFP implied by our model as shown in the blue lines of the top panel. Surprisingly, the kernel density during the Great Recession




Figure D.1  
NORMALIZED FINANCIAL AND PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS (2005Q1=1)

does not shift significantly, compared to the one before. It implies that the endogenous trade credit along with the financial shocks can account for most of the rise in sectoral comovement observed in the data. As for financial shocks, we cannot observe a systematic rise in pairwise correlation during the Great Recession. Instead, for a few pairs of sectors, their financial shocks indeed comove during the Great Recession as we observe a fat right tail, while other pairs stay more or less the same as before.

## D.2 Fit of the model

Before performing a series of counterfactual exercises, we begin by verifying the ability of our calibrated model to match key empirical moments. First, we check its ability to match the real GDP per capita growth evolution for 2005-2011. In our model, real GDP is measured by aggregate consumption  $c$ . Figure D.3 displays the quarter-to-quarter annualized growth rate of real GDP between 2005Q2 and 2011Q2. The blue and red lines represent the data and the model-implied growth rate, respectively, and the shaded area represents the Great Recession period defined by the NBER. The model-implied growth rate tracks the data closely.

Second, we examine the model in matching sectoral trade credit issuance and reception. In the data, we take the median of AR-to-sales and AP-to-OC ratios between 2005Q3 and 2006Q2 for each sector. As for the model, we first define the account receivables and payables as  $ar_i = \sum_{j=1}^n tc_{ij}q_{ij}m_{ij}$ , and  $ap_i = \sum_{j=1}^n tc_{ji}q_{ji}m_{ji}$ , where  $tc_{ij}$  is determined, for






Figure D.2  
PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS OF FINANCIAL AND PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS

all  $i$  and  $j$ , by Equation (A3). Then, the AR-to-sales and AP-to-OC ratios implied by the model can be defined, respectively, as

$$\frac{ar_i}{p_i y_i} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n tc_{ij} q_{ij} m_{ij}}{p_i y_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \left( 1 - (1 - \eta) tc_{ij} - \frac{p_i}{q_{ij}} \right) q_{ij} m_{ij}}, \quad (A1)$$

$$\frac{ap_i}{oc_i} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n tc_{ji} q_{ji} m_{ji}}{wl_i + \sum_{j=1}^n q_{ji} m_{ji}}. \quad (A2)$$

where  $sales_i$  is defined in Equation (??), and operational costs are equal to the sum of the wage bill and input payments. Figure D.4 displays the scatter plots of both ratios for model and data, where the horizontal and vertical axis respectively present data and mode-implied ratio, the size of the bubble indicate the sectoral relative size in 2005, and the black dashed line is the 45-degree line. Panel (a) displays the AR-to-sales ratio, while the AP-to-OC ratio is shown in Panel (b). Except for mining and professional services sectors, all bubbles are lined up around the 45-degree line in both cases. It implies that our model does a decent job to match the data. Even though we use the AR-to-sales ratio to




Figure D.3  
GROWTH RATE OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA: MODEL VS DATA

calibrate the maximal efforts, i.e.,  $\{\bar{e}_t\}$ , the model-implied ratios do not necessarily stay in line with data, since the bilateral trade credit intensity now is endogenously determined. Moreover, the model-implied AP-to-OC ratios, which are not targeted, match the data fairly well.

### D.3 Trade credit and model-implied sectoral comovement

We examine whether and how the pairwise correlation between the two firms responds to the financial and productivity shocks through the trade credit channel. In particular, we specify the

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \text{corr}_{ij} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \mathbf{1}_{ij}^{\text{two-way}} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{1}_{ij}^{\text{one-way}} + \alpha_3 \mathbf{1}_{ij}^{\text{two-way}} \times \Delta tc_{ij} + \\ & + \alpha_4 \mathbf{1}_{ij}^{\text{one-way}} \times \Delta tc_{ij} + \beta' X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A3})$$

where  $i$  and  $j$  are, respectively, indexes for the supplier and client,  $\Delta \text{corr}_{ij}$  is the change in the pairwise correlation before and during the recession,  $\mathbf{1}_j^{\text{two-way}}$  ( $\mathbf{1}_j^{\text{one-way}}$ ) is the indicator for the two-way (one-way) connection,  $\Delta tc_{ij}$  is the change in TC intensity, and  $X_{ij}$  are sectoral or pair characteristics, such as input share for the pair, the share of input usage for each sector, the output share, the corresponding cell of the Leontief inverse matrix,




Figure D.4  
COMPARISON OF AR-TO-SALES AND AP-TO-OC RATIOS: MODEL VS DATA

the logarithm of financial and productivity before 2008, and the change in the logarithm of financial and productivity before 2008.

Table D.1 reports the point estimates. Column (1) and (4) display the point estimate without control variables. Thus, the corresponding point estimates are equal to the sample mean. We observe a higher rise in the two-way trading group in both model. However, there still exists variation between two model. To see this, we include control variables in Column (2), the rise in sectoral comovement is also through the contraction in trade credit, whereas the point estimates in the fixed-TC model become insignificant once we include more control variables. We further perform a two-stage least square regression with the change in pairwise correlation as dependent variable and the change in the TC intensity, proxied by pairwise and sectoral characteristics, as the explanatory variables. The negative and statistically significant coefficient indicates that the trade credit chain indeed plays an important role in accounting for the rise in sectoral comovement.

## D.4 Shocks in the Early 1980s Recession

We calibrate the model to match sectoral sales and spreads on an annual basis for the period 1978-1985. We instead use the equilibrium conditions from our model to back out sectoral productivity and financial shocks. The annual data is used instead of the quarterly one, where the period 1978-1985 is used as the in-recession window, while the post-recession one covers 1983-1989. Figure D.6 reports the normalized shocks, and

Table D.1  
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EQUATION (D.1)

	benchmark shocks			benchmark shocks with fixed TC		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\mathbf{1}_{ij}^{one-way}$	.52*	2.1***	.1	.39***	.0077	-.1
	(.27)	(.57)	(.43)	(.13)	(1)	(.39)
$\mathbf{1}_{ij}^{two-way}$	.81***	2.4***	.18	.67***	.26	.16
	(.26)	(.57)	(.45)	(.11)	(.97)	(.44)
$\mathbf{1}_{ij}^{one-way} \times \Delta tc_{ij}$		-1.3***				-.069
		(.29)				(.56)
$\mathbf{1}_{ij}^{two-way} \times \Delta tc_{ij}$		-1.3***				-.056
		(.26)				(.53)
$\Delta \hat{tc}_{ij}$			-1.6***			
			(.6)			
Control Va	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
N	66	66	66	66	66	66
Adjusted $R^2$	.08	.15	.3	.053	.27	.31


Notes:  $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$   $^*p < 0.05$ ,  $^{**}p < 0.01$ , and  $^{***}p < 0.001$ .

Figure D.7 displays the kernel densities for the underline shocks.

## D.5 Role of common shocks

We use our calibrated model to confirm the following intuition behind the dynamics of sectoral comovement during Covid-19: if common shocks are the driver, sectoral comovement should rise ubiquitously, regardless of the degree of interconnection among sectors. In doing so, we feed the model with the productivity and financial shocks between 2005Q1 and 2007Q2 and then simulate a 1.5% decline in productivity for all sectors in 2006Q1. The top left panel of Figure D.8 plots the kernel densities of pairwise correlations for pairs in two-way and one-way trading groups, where we use the same classification as in Section 2.2. Compared to the densities without common shocks in the top-right panel, we observe a significant rise in sectoral comovement for both groups. While the two-way trading group appears to rise more with the common shock, it is also the one comoving more without. These results stay in line with the dynamics of unconditional comovement during Covid-19 in Figure B.3 of Appendix B.2.

The bottom panels compare the kernel density without common shocks to that of com-




(a) Kernel density of pairwise correlation




(b) Growth rate: real GDP per capita

Figure D.5

ONLY PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS: ENDOGENOUS VS FIXED TRADE CREDIT



(a) Productivity Shocks



(b) Financial Shocks

Figure D.6

SHOCKS IN THE EARLY 80s RECESSION

mon shocks. In both groups, the densities significantly shift to the right, highlighting the irrelevance of input-output linkages for comovement with common shocks. Moreover, Figures D.9 show that the same results hold in a model with non-unitary elasticity of substitution in production as in [Atalay \(2017\)](#) and [Carvalho et al. \(2021\)](#), where in Panel (a), we assume an elasticity of substitution between inputs of 0.6, while Panel (b) with an elasticity of 0.2. There is no apparent difference in comovement as a result of the elastic-





Figure D.7

PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS OF SECTORAL SHOCKS: THE EARLY 1980s RECESSION

ity of substitution. An aggregate decline in productivity generates a rise in comovement that is very similar for the one-way and two-way trading groups.


## E Firm-level Evidence

Since the Great Recession is the only financial crisis after the WWII, here we explore the cross-sectional variation across the US public firms to highlight the mechanism in our model. In particular, we use the collapse of Lehman Brothers (LB) as a quasi-natural experiment. First, we show that the median value of the AR-to-sales and AP-to-OC ratios at the listed-firm level experienced a sharp decline during the Great Recession, unlike any other previous recession in the sample. Second, we show that an input supplier comoved more, in terms of sales growth, with a client connected to LB than with an unrelated one. Moreover, the correlation rose even more if the LB-connected client experienced a contraction in trade credit reception.



Note: The model is fed with the productivity and financial shocks between 2005Q2 and 2007Q2, and then a 1.5% decline in productivity for all sectors is imposed in 2006Q2.

Figure D.8  
SECTORAL COMOVEMENT UNDER COMMON SHOCKS



(a) elasticity = 0.6

(b) elasticity = 0.2

Figure D.9  
KERNEL DENSITY: CES PRODUCTION WITH COMMON SHOCKS

## E.1 Trade credit provision and reception during the Great Recession

We use the US public firms' data from Compustat to study how trade credit has evolved and calculate the AR-to-sales and AP-to-OC ratios, defined in Section 2.3. We then adjust these ratios for seasonality using moving-average methods at the firm level. Figure ??

displays the evolution of the median value for both ratios from 1980Q3 to 2016Q3. The two ratios fluctuate modestly over time, even throughout the 1990 and 2001 recessions. During the Great Recession, they went up at the beginning and plummeted by roughly 10 to 20 percentage points starting in 2008Q3. This pattern indicates that, in addition to the reduced demand for inputs, more firms requested more upfront payment for new input orders and wrote off the existing trade credit. This is consistent with the evidence in [Costello \(2020\)](#) for the US during the Great Recession, and the one in [Love et al. \(2007\)](#) for the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian flu in 1997.




Figure E.1  
EVOLUTION OF INTENSITIES OF TRADE CREDIT PROVISION AND RECEPTION

## E.2 Summary statistics for variables

Table [E.1](#) displays the summary statistics of all paired suppliers and clients. Using Equation ([A1](#)) over the same time window as used with the quarterly data in Section [2.1](#), we confirm that the pairwise correlations at the firm level significantly increased, by 0.17, during the Great Recession. This is consistent with our findings at the sector level. Furthermore, we select financial variables, where the median values of 2005Q3-2006Q2 and



2008Q3-2009Q2 are taken respectively to represent before and during the Great Recession. Before the recession, compared to the average firm in Compustat, the suppliers in our sample are smaller in terms of total assets, extend less trade credit, and hold more cash, whereas the clients are larger, receive less trade credit, and have less cash. It is mainly because the suppliers report the clients as their top 10 clients in Form 10-K. As seen in the QFR data, smaller firms rely more on trade credit, and thus we observe a smaller decline in clients' trade credit compared to the suppliers'. As in [Kahle and Stulz \(2013\)](#), we find those typical financial variables, such as ratios of investment, cash, and short-term and long-term debt over total assets, of both suppliers and clients before and during the recession are all not significantly different. Also, the size of firms, in terms of sales and total assets, is not very different over the two windows. However, we find profitability and growth perspectives (growth rate of sales and total assets) to be significantly lower during the recession. Such a decline is reflected in their market value, resulting in a lower Tobin's Q during the recession.

### E.3 The LB shocks on TC provision

We first test how the clients' financial positions responded to the LB shock. In particular, we regress the change in financial measures on whether the clients were directly or indirectly connected to LB before its collapse, along with other control variables, as

$$\Delta y_j = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \mathbf{1}_{j,dir}^{LB} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{1}_{j,indir}^{LB} + \gamma \Delta X_j + \beta y_{j,before} + \epsilon_j, \quad (A1)$$

where  $j$  is an index for a client,  $y$  is the financial variable of interest,  $\Delta$  stands for the first difference,  $\mathbf{1}_{j,dir}^{LB}$  is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the client is directly connected to LB in the syndicated loan market,  $\mathbf{1}_{j,indir}^{LB}$  is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the client is indirectly connected to LB in the syndicated loan market,  $X$  is the control variables listed in Table ??, and  $\Delta X$  is the first difference between the in and pre-recession median of  $X$ . Table E.2 reports the point estimates for Equation (A1), where the robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.

As shown in Column (1), we find that in the regression of the AP-to-OC ratio, the coefficient of the indicator for the direct connection is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the ratio of the LB-connected clients decreased by 6.5 percentage points. It implies that, during the recession, either the LB-connected clients wrote off some of the existing trade credit or their suppliers deferred a smaller proportion of new sales as trade credit. The coefficient of the indirect connection is negative but not statistically significant. It may be because other lenders connected to LB absorbed the LB shocks,

Table E.1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS: PAIRED SUPPLIER AND CLIENT

	Obs	Before		During		Difference	
		Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	t-stats
<b>corr<sub>ij</sub></b>	641	.035	.44	.20	.46	0.17***	(7.14)
<b>Suppliers</b>							
<i>AR/Sales</i>	426	59.92	24.78	59.34	24.74	-0.58	(-0.34)
<i>AP/Cost</i>	426	58.16	53.18	54.28	36.11	-3.88	(-1.25)
<i>Investment/TA</i>	426	1.46	1.82	1.33	1.62	-0.12	(-1.04)
<i>Cash/TA</i>	426	20.00	19.78	18.00	18.32	-1.99	(-1.53)
<i>Short – term debt/TA</i>	425	2.90	4.73	3.30	5.94	0.41	(1.10)
<i>Long – term debt/TA</i>	426	16.39	18.81	18.23	20.65	1.85	(1.36)
<i>OIBDP/TA</i>	423	3.33	3.03	2.23	3.86	-1.10***	(-4.61)
<i>Tobin's Q</i>	423	1.88	0.73	0.14	0.57	-0.52***	(-11.48)
<i>Inventory/TA</i>	426	11.98	10.42	12.50	10.61	0.52	(0.73)
<i>g<sub>sales</sub></i>	426	2.94	3.45	0.24	3.71	-2.71***	(-11.03)
<i>g<sub>assets</sub></i>	426	2.89	3.91	0.18	3.88	-2.71***	(-10.13)
<i>log(TA)</i>	426	6.48	1.69	6.61	1.73	0.13	(1.09)
<i>log(sales)</i>	426	5.07	1.73	5.18	1.73	0.11	(0.92)
<b>CR</b>	452	1.07	0.86				
<b>Clients</b>							
<i>AR/Sales</i>	176	51.67	39.94	52.69	42.66	1.02	(-0.23)
<i>AP/Cost</i>	176	62.74	49.32	62.1	47.62	-0.63	(-0.12)
<i>Investment/TA</i>	176	1.55	1.48	1.49	1.53	-0.06	(-0.35)
<i>Cash/TA</i>	176	11.75	13.7	10.28	11.88	-1.47	(-1.07)
<i>Short – term debt/TA</i>	176	3.95	5.91	4.55	8.16	0.6	(-0.79)
<i>Long – term debt/TA</i>	176	20.32	17.43	23.59	18.48	3.28	(-1.71)
<i>OIBDP/TA</i>	176	3.83	2.08	3.31	2.36	-0.52*	(-2.19)
<i>Tobin's Q</i>	175	0.18	0.64	0.14	0.5	-0.36***	(-5.88)
<i>Inventory/TA</i>	176	13.21	12.99	13.23	12.95	0.02	(-0.01)
<i>g<sub>sales</sub></i>	176	2.61	2.77	0.48	3.59	-2.12***	(-6.21)
<i>g<sub>assets</sub></i>	176	2.69	3.16	0.94	2.84	-1.75***	(-5.48)
<i>log(TA)</i>	176	9.04	1.59	9.2	1.56	0.16	(-0.92)
<i>log(sales)</i>	176	7.72	1.6	7.83	1.58	0.11	(-0.63)
<b>CR</b>	185	0.66	.71				

so they did not systematically transmit the shocks to their own borrowers. In Columns (2)-(4), we examine other short-term financial measures, such as the AR-to-sales, short-

Table E.2  
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EQUATION (A1)

	$\Delta \frac{AP_j}{OC_j}$	$\Delta \frac{AR_j}{sales_j}$	$\Delta \frac{debt_j}{TA_j}$	$\Delta \frac{cash_j}{TA_j}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$1_{j,dir}^{LB}$	-6.52*** (.956)	-.981 (3.15)	3.15 (2.73)	-8.05*** (1.68)
$1_{j,indir}^{LB}$	-6.55 (4.81)	3.2 (2.93)	3.07 (2.21)	-6.55*** (1.26)
obs	58	58	58	58
adjusted $R^2$	.477	.352	.321	.416

Notes: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , and \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

term debt, and cash ratio. The LB shock has no significant effects on the AR-to-sales and short-term debt ratio. However, compared to the average cash-to-assets ratio (10.7%) before the recession, the LB borrowers did experience a sharp decline in cash, while the LB-unrelated firms hoarded more cash by an 8.7 percentage points (the point estimate of constant term) rise in the cash-to-asset ratio. The latter result is consistent with [Kahle and Stulz \(2013\)](#), who find that compared to firms with low leverage, bank-dependent ones did not decrease net debt issuance and instead hoarded cash during the recession.

Table E.3  
LIST OF SECTORS AND CHARACTERISTICS

Sector	# two-way	# one-way	$c\acute{o}rr_{before}$	$c\acute{o}rr_{in}$	$c\acute{o}rr_{after}$	cmp share	$\frac{AR_{before}}{sales_{before}}$	$\frac{AP_{before}}{OC_{before}}$	$\Delta \frac{AR}{sales}$	$\Delta \frac{AP}{OC}$
Oil and gas extraction	5	15	0.034	-0.218	-0.048	0.0%	55.4%	163.7%	-2.8%	-57.9%
Mining, except oil and gas	15	22	0.138	0.245	0.001	0.9%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Support activities for mining	1	27	0.138	0.206	0.085	0.0%	85.4%	39.5%	-3.5%	-3.3%
Utilities	21	35	-0.169	0.425	0.066	44.8%	45.9%	42.1%	-3.1%	-0.1%
Construction	24	31	0.134	0.481	0.002	0.0%	73.8%	33.9%	1.9%	-3.1%
Wood products	21	26	0.122	0.419	-0.017	5.0%	23.0%	18.3%	4.5%	-1.0%
Nonmetallic mineral products	26	21	0.192	0.516	0.092	11.5%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Primary metals	18	22	0.103	0.505	0.046	0.6%	52.6%	31.8%	-3.8%	-0.5%
Fabricated metal products	27	26	0.199	0.519	0.020	7.4%	68.7%	44.5%	-2.5%	0.8%
Machinery	28	25	-0.030	0.380	0.006	10.1%	70.3%	47.9%	-3.8%	-1.2%
Computer and electronic products	25	27	0.127	0.496	0.032	34.2%	66.9%	52.6%	-2.6%	-1.1%
Electrical equipment and appliances	22	25	0.038	0.486	0.066	35.9%	61.8%	45.9%	-2.5%	-1.0%
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers	19	33	-0.023	0.424	0.002	51.6%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Other transportation equipment	2	31	-0.069	0.242	-0.012	33.8%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Furniture and related products	8	30	0.192	0.482	0.023	69.2%	61.2%	46.5%	-4.8%	-3.4%
Miscellaneous manufacturing	20	24	-0.143	0.485	-0.019	72.5%	64.5%	48.8%	-4.4%	-2.4%
Food and beverage and tobacco products	11	31	0.084	-0.076	0.067	70.4%	39.3%	32.5%	-1.2%	-1.5%
Textile mills and textile product mills	15	32	0.109	0.395	-0.039	49.6%	67.8%	31.7%	-0.3%	-1.6%
Apparel and leather and allied products	9	26	0.146	0.086	-0.157	93.4%	68.6%	39.9%	-4.0%	8.7%
Paper products	27	27	0.105	0.431	-0.057	18.7%	63.1%	40.3%	-4.5%	-2.9%
Printing and related support activities	19	27	-0.122	0.452	0.052	6.4%	46.1%	26.1%	1.3%	0.7%
Petroleum and coal products	9	47	-0.064	-0.210	0.003	40.4%	35.4%	29.4%	1.8%	1.8%
Chemical products	27	27	-0.032	0.345	0.108	40.3%	60.9%	46.8%	-0.9%	0.2%
Plastics and rubber products	30	22	0.061	0.464	0.028	18.8%	58.4%	40.0%	-5.2%	0.3%
Wholesale trade	21	25	0.016	0.542	0.074	0.0%	49.3%	38.3%	0.4%	-0.7%
Motor vehicle and parts dealers	0	36	0.004	0.405	0.130	N.A.	37.7%	51.9%	2.0%	0.5%
Food and beverage stores	0	37	0.011	0.496	0.005	N.A.	5.8%	37.4%	0.2%	-0.1%
General merchandise stores	0	31	-0.012	-0.184	-0.132	N.A.	14.5%	33.6%	0.4%	-0.8%
Other retail	0	41	0.153	0.256	0.017	59.7%	11.2%	29.8%	0.3%	0.2%
Air transportation	16	29	-0.085	0.357	-0.058	60.8%	17.9%	18.9%	-1.7%	-2.0%
Rail transportation	2	26	0.198	0.461	0.060	17.6%	47.5%	66.6%	-6.9%	-1.5%
Water transportation	0	20	0.115	-0.047	0.099	71.8%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Truck transportation	9	26	0.208	0.320	0.128	24.8%	46.9%	16.7%	-4.4%	-2.3%
Transit and ground passenger transportation	12	30	0.011	0.240	-0.097	53.8%	41.1%	61.0%	-1.7%	-3.2%
Pipeline transportation	1	23	-0.081	0.288	-0.022	0.0%	44.9%	58.7%	-6.1%	4.0%
Other transportation and support activities	22	29	0.045	0.176	0.101	6.4%	65.4%	29.8%	-0.8%	-2.0%
Warehousing and storage	19	30	0.076	0.349	0.029	0.6%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Publishing industries, except internet	13	28	0.062	0.425	-0.062	70.8%	74.4%	49.1%	-3.0%	-5.1%
Motion picture and sound recording industries	7	28	-0.075	-0.012	-0.024	43.7%	66.9%	38.2%	-1.1%	-1.6%
Broadcasting and telecommunications	30	26	0.048	0.426	-0.060	44.1%	48.6%	38.5%	-2.0%	-2.5%
Data processing and internet publishing	32	19	-0.063	0.424	0.031	11.4%	65.4%	32.5%	-1.2%	-1.7%
Legal services	25	31	-0.036	0.318	-0.016	37.8%	70.4%	21.0%	-0.7%	-1.7%
Computer systems design and related services	27	27	-0.003	0.418	0.024	0.0%	81.8%	32.4%	-4.8%	-4.4%
Professional, scientific, and technical services	37	19	0.077	0.435	0.009	5.3%	71.4%	31.3%	-2.6%	-1.1%
Management of companies and enterprises	28	26	0.065	0.310	-0.057	0.0%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Administrative and support services	36	20	0.084	0.491	-0.062	7.6%	69.2%	15.6%	-1.3%	-0.4%
Waste management and remediation services	29	26	0.040	0.262	0.065	17.7%	48.0%	112.2%	3.7%	-5.8%
Educational services	4	39	-0.025	-0.024	0.074	94.3%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Ambulatory health care services	1	35	-0.043	0.354	0.066	96.6%	60.9%	25.3%	-5.0%	-2.1%
Hospitals	0	33	-0.019	-0.120	0.021	99.6%	59.8%	35.1%	-5.0%	-1.8%
Nursing and residential care facilities	0	35	0.137	0.276	0.003	98.0%	41.5%	9.2%	-0.7%	-0.6%
Social assistance	0	41	0.037	-0.076	0.074	99.1%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Performing arts, spectator sports, and museums	18	22	0.156	0.258	-0.050	48.3%	9.9%	18.6%	0.5%	-1.5%
Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries	13	32	0.099	0.385	-0.054	92.9%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Accommodation	28	19	0.229	0.464	0.032	66.7%	34.6%	36.1%	-2.9%	-1.2%
Food services and drinking places	35	18	0.097	0.402	0.030	78.4%	6.0%	17.7%	0.7%	-1.4%
Other services, except government	38	18	-0.015	0.488	0.034	68.7%	59.1%	34.5%	-1.1%	-2.0%