Report: Homework 2 - DNS Lookup

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1. Case 1
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i. random0.irl
ii. random3.irl
iii. random5.irl
iv. random6.irl
```

- 2. Case 2
- 3. **Case 3**
- 4. Case 4
- 5. Extra Credit

Case 1

random0.irl

```
Lookup : random0.irl
Query : random0.irl, type 1, TXID 0x0000
Server : 128.194.135.82
**********
Attempt 0 with 29 bytes... response in 178ms with 82 bytes
 TXID 0x0000, flags 0x8400, questions 1, answers 2, authority 0, additional 0
 succeeded with Rcode = 0
  ----- [questions] ------
      random0.irl type 1 class 1
 ----- [answers] ------
 ++ invalid record: jump into fixed DNS header
```

This error is caused what there is a jump offset that is less than the size of the FixedDNSHeader, which attempts to overwrite crucial data. This can be caught with a simple bounds check before jumping.

random3.irl

```
Lookup : random3.irl
Query : random3.irl, type 1, TXID 0x0003
Server : 128.194.135.82
Attempt 0 with 29 bytes...
 ++ invalid reply: packet smaller than fixed DNS header
```

This error occurs when the DNS server attempts to return a packet that is smaller than the mandatory fixed header size. This can be caught immediately after the receive functionality.

random5.irl

```
Lookup : random5.irl
Query : random5.irl, type 1, TXID 0x0007
Server : 128.194.135.82
Attempt 0 with 29 bytes... response in 17ms with 71 bytes
```

This error occurs when the jump offset is outside of the packet boundary. This can be checked with a simple bounds check before jumping.

random6.irl

This error occurs when there is a number of jumps that cause a high number of them to occur. We can prevent this by checking that the number of jumps doesn't get higher than the maximum amount of jumps that could be stored in a packet.

Case 2 (random1.irl)

This errors is caused by the amount of actual records is greater than the total number of stated records. This can be checked by counting the number of responses recieved, and comparing it against the stated number of responses in the fixed DNS header.

Case 3 (random7.irl)

```
Lookup : random7.irl
Query : random7.irl, type 1, TXID 0x0009
Server : 128.194.135.82
********************************
Attempt 0 with 29 bytes... response in 13ms with 42 bytes
TXID 0x0009, flags 0x8400, questions 1, answers 2, authority 0, additional 0
```

```
succeeded with Rcode = 0
------ [questions] ------
random7.irl type 1 class 1
------ [answers] ------
++ invalid record: truncated jump offset
```

This error can happen if the packet ends right in between the jump offset bytes, so the program can know that it should jump, it just doesn't have the lower 8 bits of the offset address. We can check this by doing a bounds check on the next byte before we use it for the lower half of the offset address.

Case 4 (random4.irl)

```
Lookup : random4.irl
Query : random4.irl, type 1, TXID 0x000A
Server : 128.194.135.82
Attempt 0 with 29 bytes... response in 33ms with 324 bytes
 TXID 0x000A, flags 0x8400, questions 1, answers 1, authority 0, additional 11
  succeeded with Rcode = 0
  ----- [questions] ------
      random4.irl type 1 class 1
  ----- [answers] ------
      random.irl A 1.1.1.1 TTL = 30
  ----- [additional] -----
      Episode.IV A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       A.NEW.HOPE A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       It.is.a.period.of.civil.war A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       Rebel.spaceships A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
        striking.from.a.hidden.base A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       have.won.their.first.victory A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
        against.the.evil.Galactic.Empire A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
  ++ invalid record: truncated RR answer header
```

This error occurs when the Answer header has been corrupted in some way, either it was cut off by the packet ending, or other data has malformed it. We can check it be doing a bounds check on the current position *plus* the size of the Answer Header. By doing this, we can ensure that all of the data in the answer header is left unmodified.

This errors is caused by the amount of actual records is greater than the total number of stated records. This can be checked by counting the number of responses recieved, and comparing it against the stated number of responses in the fixed DNS header.

```
Lookup : random4.irl
Query : random4.irl, type 1, TXID 0x0004
Server : 128.194.135.82
```

This error happens when the name in the packet is imcomplete, most likely because of abrupt packing ending. We can prevent this by doing bounds checks on the iterater as we go through the name, doing a bounds check each time.

Extra Credit

I queried this hostname repeatedly so that I could get a good capture of as many DNS requests as possible in Wireshark, which helped me to see the patterns that were there.

```
Lookup : random8.irl
Query : random8.irl, type 1, TXID 0x0001
Server : 128.194.135.82
Attempt 0 with 29 bytes... response in 4ms with 468 bytes
 TXID 0x0001, flags 0x8400, questions 1, answers 1, authority 0, additional 11
 succeeded with Rcode = 0
  ----- [questions] ------
      random8.irl type 1 class 1
  ----- [answers] -----
      random.irl A 1.1.1.1 TTL = 30
  ----- [additional] ------
      Episode.IV A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       A.NEW.HOPE A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       It.is.a.period.of.civil.war A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       Rebel.spaceships A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       striking.from.a.hidden.base A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       have.won.their.first.victory A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       against.the.evil.Galactic.Empire A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       During.the.battle A 2.2.2.2 TTL = 30
       Rebel.spies.managed A 108.111.108.108 TTL = 1819045740
  ++ invalid record: RR value length stretches the answer beyond packet
```

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Le	Lengtl Info
7 2.203019	128.194.135.82	10.247.139.50	DNS	510 Standard query response 0x0001 A random8.irl A 1.1.1.1 A \002\002.\001A.NEW.HOPE/0
8 2.212116	10.247.139.50	128.194.135.82	DNS	71 Standard query 0x0002 A random8.irl
9 2.216935	128.194.135.82	10.247.139.50	DNS	510 Standard query response 0x0002 A random8.irl A 1.1.1.1 A \002\002.\001A.NEW.HOPE/0
10 2.224969	10.247.139.50	128.194.135.82	DNS	71 Standard query 0x0003 A random8.irl
11 2.228847	128.194.135.82	10.247.139.50	DNS	510 Standard query response 0x0003 A random8.irl A 1.1.1.1 A \002\002.\001A.NEW.HOPE/0
12 2.236475	10.247.139.50	128.194.135.82	DNS	71 Standard query 0x0004 A random8.irl
13 2.240967	128.194.135.82	10.247.139.50	DNS	510 Standard query response 0x0004 A random8.irl A 1.1.1.1 A \002\002.\001A.NEW.HOPE/0
14 2.246333	10.247.139.50	128.194.135.82	DNS	71 Standard query 0x0005 A random8.irl
15 2.249768	128.194.135.82	10.247.139.50	DNS	510 Standard query response 0x0005 A random8.irl A 1.1.1.1 A[Malformed Packet]
16 2.252800	10.247.139.50	128.194.135.82	DNS	71 Standard query 0x0006 A random8.irl
17 2.256696	128.194.135.82	10.247.139.50	DNS	510 Standard query response 0x0006 A random8.irl A 1.1.1.1 A \002\002.\001A.NEW.HOPE/0
18 2.262452	10.247.139.50	128.194.135.82	DNS	71 Standard guerv 0x0007 A random8.irl
0070	03 00 00 0	00 1e 00 04	ao a	02 02 02 01 41 03 4e 45 ························
0070	00 00 00	00 IE 00 04	02 0	02 02 02 01 41 03 46 43
0080	57 04 48 4	4f 50 45 00	00 0	01 00 03 00 00 00 1e 00 W·HOPE········
0090	04 02 02 6	02 02 02 49	74 0	02 69 73 01 61 06 70 65 ·····It ·is·a·pe
00a0	72 69 6f 6	64 02 6f 66	05 6	63 69 76 69 6c 03 77 61 riod·of· civil·wa
00b0	72 00 00 0	01 00 03 00	00 0	00 1e 00 04 02 02 02 02 r
00c0	05 52 65 6	62 65 6c 0a	73 7	70 61 63 65 73 68 69 70 ·Rebel·s paceship

s..... 00d0 73 00 00 01 00 03 00 00 00 1e 00 04 02 02 02 02 00e0 08 73 74 72 69 6b 69 6e 67 04 66 72 6f 6d 01 61 ·strikin g·from·a 00f0 06 68 69 64 64 65 6e 04 62 61 73 65 00 00 01 00 ·hidden· base···· 03 00 00 0100 00 1e 00 04 02 02 02 02 04 68 61 76 · · · · · · · · have 6e 05 74 68 65 69 72 05 66 69 72 73 ·won·the ir·first 0110 03 77 6f 63 74 6f 72 79 00 00 01 00 03 00 0120 07 76 69 00 00 ·victory ····· ····· against· 0130 1e 00 04 02 02 02 02 07 61 67 61 69 6e 73 74 03 74 68 65 04 65 76 69 6c 08 47 61 6c 61 63 74 69 0140 the∙evil •Galacti 0150 63 06 45 6d 70 69 72 65 00 00 01 00 03 00 00 00 c.Empire 0160 1e 00 04 02 02 02 02 06 44 75 72 69 6e 67 03 74 ····· During·t 0170 68 65 06 62 61 74 74 6c 65 00 00 01 00 03 00 00 he·battl e····· 52 0180 02 02 02 02 65 ······· ·Rebel·s 07 0190 70 69 65 73 6d 61 6e 61 67 65 64 00 00 01 6c pies∙man aged···l 6f 6c 6c ollollol lollollo 01a0 6f 6c 6c 6f 6c 6c 6f 6c 6c 6f 6c 6c 6f 01b0 6c 6c 6f 6c llolloll ollollol 01c0 6c 6f 6c 6c lollollo llolloll 6f 6c 6c 6f 6c 6c 6f 6c 01d0 6c 6f 6c 6c 6f 6c 6c ollollol lollollo 01e0 6c 6c 6f 6c llolloll ollollol 00 04 02 02 02 02 01f0 6c 6f 6c 03 00 00 00 1e lol.....

This endpoint on the server takes the default response (11 records in the additional name entries that are from the intro sequence to Star Wars: A New Hope), and randomly chooses a places among the records. It then enters 2 null bytes before "padding" the rest of the packet with "lol" until the length of the packet is 510 bytes in length. This would be pretty easy with a random number generator and knowing the current legnth of the packet.