

CHAPTER XXVII¹*Of Identity and Diversity.*

§ I. ANOTHER occasion, the mind often takes of comparing, is the very Being of things, when considering any thing as existing at any determin'd time and place, we compare it with it self existing at another time, and thereon form the *Ideas* of *Identity* and *Diversity*. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure, (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: And in this consists *Identity*, when the *Ideas* it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there it self alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which 'twas certain, at that instant, was the same with it self and no other: From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of Existence, nor two things one beginning, it being impossible for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning is the same thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same but divers. That which has made the Difficulty about this Relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise Notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§ I. *Wherein Identity consists.*

¹ The whole of this Chapter xxvii add. 2-5, with a consequent re-numbering in 2-5 of the following chapters of Book II.

§ 2. We have the *Ideas* but of three sorts of Substances; 1. God. 2. Finite Intelligences. 3. *Bodies*. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his Identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its Identity as long as it exists.

Thirdly, The same will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which no Addition or Subtraction of Matter being made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of Substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: Or else the Notions and Names of Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinction of Substances, or any thing else one from another. For Example, could two Bodies be in the same place at the same time; then those two parcels of Matter must be one and the same, take them great or little; nay, all Bodies must be one and the same. For by the same reason that two particles of Matter may be in one place, all Bodies may be in one place: Which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of Identity and Diversity, of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction, that two or more should be one, Identity and Diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the Understanding. All other things being but Modes or Relations ultimately terminated in Substances, the Identity and Diversity of each particular Existence of them too will be by the same way determined: Only as to things whose Existence is in succession, such as are the Actions of finite Beings, *v.g. Motion and Thought*, both which consist in a continued train of Succession, concerning their Diversity there can be no question: Because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent Beings can at different times exist in distant places; and therefore no motion or thought considered as at different times can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of Existence.

§ 2. Identity of Substances. § 2(20). Identity of Modes.

(*I. below 36: § 2(20).*) In 2-4, this faces in the margin ‘Which, when it can be supposed, . . . ?’; in 5 it faces *ll. 19-20*; in Coste, it faces ‘All other things . . . ?’ (*I. 25*), which begins a new paragraph in § 2.

§ 3. From what has been said, 'tis easy to discover, what is so much enquired after, the *principium Individuationis*, and that 'tis plain is Existence it self, which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incomunicable to two Beings of the same kind. This though it seems easier to conceive in simple Substances or Modes; yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied; v.g. Let us suppose an Atom, *i.e.* a continued body under one immutable Superficies, existing in a determined time and place: 'tis evident, 10 that, considered in any instant of its Existence, it is, in that instant, the same with it self. For being, at that instant, what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue, as long as its Existence is continued: for so long it will be the same, and no other. In like manner, if two or more Atoms be joined together into the 15 same Mass, every one of those Atoms will be the same, by the foregoing Rule: And whilst they exist united together, the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same Body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled: But if one of these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer 20 the same Mass, or the same Body. In the state of living Creatures, their Identity depends not on a Mass of the same Particles; but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak, growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopp'd, is still the same Oak: And a Colt 25 grown up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same Horse: though, in both these Cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts: So that truly they are not either of them the same Masses of Matter, though they be truly one of them the same Oak, and the other the same Horse. The reason whereof is, 30 that in these two cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body, *Identity* is not applied to the same thing.

§ 4. We must therefore consider wherein an Oak differs from a Mass of Matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other 35 such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an Oak; and

§ 3. Principium Individuationis. § 4. *Identity of Vegetables.*

(3) a Being of any sort] 4-5 | any sort of Being 2-3 | (11) instant,] 2-3 |
 instant 4-5 | (17-18) or the same Body,] add. 4-5 | (19) no longer] 4-5 |
 not 2-3 | (20), or the same Body] add. 4-5 | (26) may] add. 4-5. (Not
 in Coste) | (28) Masses] 2, 4-5 | Mass 3 (likewise Coste)

such an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distribute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, *etc.* of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life. That being then one Plant, which has such an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life, it continues to be the same Plant, as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant, in a like continued Organization, conformable to that sort of Plants. For this Organization being at any one instant in any one Collection of *Matter*, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual Life, which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding Parts united to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity, which makes the same Plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same Plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued Organization, which is fit to convey that Common Life to all the Parts so united.

§ 5. The Case is not so much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an Animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in Machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For Example, what is a Watch? 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a fit Organization, or Construction of Parts, to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this Machine one continued Body, all whose organized Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminish'd, by a constant Addition or Separation of insensible Parts, with one Common Life, we should have something very much like the Body of an Animal, with this difference, That in an Animal the fitness of the Organization, and the Motion wherein Life consists, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines the force, coming sensibly from without, is often away, when the Organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

§ 6. This also shews wherein the Identity of the same *Man* consists; *viz.* in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life,

§ 5. *Identity of Animals.* § 6. *Identity of Man.*

(14) [1st] the] 4-5 | the same 2-3 (15) and . . . Plant,] add. 4-5 (16) they exist] 4er-5 (*likewise Coste*) | they exist, 4 | it exists, one Body, 2-3 (29) in an Animal] add. 4-5 (30), and] 4-5 | and 2-3

by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body. He that shall place the *Identity* of Man in any thing else, but like that of other Animals in one fitly organized Body taken in any one instant, and from thence continued
 5 under one Organization of Life in several successively fleeting Particles of Matter, united to it, will find it hard, to make an *Embryo*, one of Years, mad, and sober, the same Man, by any Supposition, that will not make it possible for *Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Cesar Borgia* to be the same Man. For if the
 10 *Identity* of Soul alone makes the same Man, and there be nothing in the Nature of Matter, why the same individual Spirit may not be united to different Bodies, it will be possible, that those Men, living in distant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the same Man: Which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the
 15 Word *Man*, applied to an *Idea*, out of which Body and Shape is excluded: And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the Notions of those Philosophers, who allow of Transmigration, and are of Opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Miscarriages, be detrued into the Bodies of Beasts, as fit Habitations with Organs
 20 suited to the satisfaction of their Brutal Inclinations. But yet I think no body, could he be sure that the Soul of *Heliogabalus* were in one of his Hogs, would yet say that Hog were a *Man* or *Heliogabalus*.

§ 7. 'Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of *Identity*, or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive,
 25 and judge of it aright, we must consider what *Idea* the Word it is applied to stands for: It being one thing to be the same *Substance*, another the same *Man*, and a third the same *Person*, if *Person, Man*, and *Substance*, are three Names standing for three different *Ideas*; for such as is the *Idea* belonging to that Name, such must be the *Identity*: Which if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often occurs about this Matter, with no small seeming Difficulties; especially concerning *Personal Identity*, which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.

35 § 8. An Animal is a living organized Body; and consequently, the same Animal, as we have observed, is the same continued Life

§ 7. *Identity suited to the Idea.* § 8. *Same Man.*

(19) Habitations with] 4-5 | Habitations with, and 3 | Habitants and 2
 (27), if] 4-5 | . If 2-3

communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past doubt, that the *Idea* in our Minds, of which the Sound *Man* in our Mouths is the Sign, is nothing else but of an Animal of such a ⁵ certain Form: Since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, though it had no more reason all its Life, than a *Cat* or a *Parrot*, would call him still a *Man*; or whoever should hear a *Cat* or a *Parrot* discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a *Cat* or a *Parrot*; ¹⁰ and say, the one was a dull irrational *Man*, and the other a very intelligent rational *Parrot*. A Relation we have in an Author of great note is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational *Parrot*. His Words(^a) are,

"I had a mind to know from *Prince Maurice's* own Mouth, the ¹⁵ account of a common, but much credited Story, that I had heard so often from many others, of an old *Parrot* he had in *Brasil*, during his Government there, that spoke, and asked, and answered common Questions like a reasonable Creature; so that those of his Train there, generally concluded it to be Witchery or Possession; and one ²⁰ of his Chaplains, who lived long afterwards in *Holland*, would never from that time endure a *Parrot*, but said, they all had a Devil in them. I had heard many particulars of this Story, and assevered by People hard to be discredited, which made me ask *Prince Maurice* what there was of it. He said, with his usual plainness, and dryness in ²⁵ talk, there was something true, but a great deal false, of what had been reported. I desired to know of him, what there was of the first; he told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an old *Parrot* when he came to *Brasil*, and though he believed nothing of it, and 'twas a good way off, yet he had so much Curiosity as to ³⁰ send for it, that 'twas a very great and a very old one; and when it came first into the Room where the Prince was, with a great many *Dutch-men* about him, it said presently, *What a company of white Men are here?* They asked it what he thought that Man was, pointing at the Prince? It answered, *Some General or other*; when they brought it ³⁵

(a) *Memoires of what past in Christendom from 1672. to 1679.* p. ⁵⁷_{392.}

(2-6) . And . . . Form:] 5 | : and that our Notion of a *Man*, whatever is talked of other definitions, is but of a particular sort of Animal, I doubt not. 2-4
 (9-10) discourse . . . philosophize] 5 | Discourse, Reason and Philosophize 4 | discourse Reason and Philosophize 2-3 (*likewise Coste*) (12)-335(3) A . . .
Parrots?] add. 4-5. (*Not in Coste*, but in *Coste*₂.) (l. below 35) [Memoires . . . , by Sir William Temple]

close to him, he asked it, *D'où venes vous?* it answered, *De Marinnan.* The Prince, *A qui estes vous?* The Parrot, *A un Portugais.* Prince, *Que fais tu là?* Parrot, *Je garde les poulettes.* The Prince laughed and said, *Vous gardez les poulettes?* The Parrot answered, *Ouy, moy et je scay bien faire;* and made the Chuck four or five times that People use to make to Chickens when they call them.† I set down the Words of this worthy Dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them to me. I asked him in what Language the *Parrot* spoke, and he said, in *Brasilian;* I asked whether he understood *Brasilian;* he said No, but 10 he had taken care to have two Interpreters by him, the one a *Dutch-man,* that spoke *Brasilian,* and the other a *Brasilian,* that spoke *Dutch;* that he asked them separately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the *Parrot* said. I could not but tell this odd Story, because it is so much out of the 15 way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say this Prince, at least, believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and pious Man; I leave it to Naturalists to reason, and to other Men to believe as they please upon it; however, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve or enliven 20 a busie Scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the purpose or no.”

I have taken care that the Reader should have the Story at large in the Authors own Words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a Man 25 as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the Testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a Man whom he mentions as his Friend, but on a Prince in whom he acknowledges very great Honesty and Piety, a Story which if he himself thought incredible, 30 he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince, 'tis plain, who vouches this Story, and our Author who relates it from him, both of them call this Talker a *Parrot;* and I ask any one else who thinks such a Story fit to be told, whether if this *Parrot*, and all of its kind, had always talked as we have a Princes word for it, this one did,

† *Whence come ye?* It answered, *From Marinnan.* The Prince, *To whom do you belong?* The Parrot, *To a Portugeze.* Prince, *What do you there?* Parrot, *I look after the Chickens.* The Prince laughed and said, *You look after the Chickens?* The Parrot answered, *Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it.*

(1) it,] 5 | it; 4
Portugez 4

(22) In 4–5, the marginal sectional summary ‘Same Man.’ is repeated facing the beginning of this paragraph. (2 ll. below 34) Portugeze.] 5 |

whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of *rational Animals*, but yet whether for all that, they would have been allowed to be Men and not *Parrots*? For I presume 'tis not the *Idea* of a thinking or rational Being alone, that makes the *Idea* of a *Man* in most Peoples Sense; but of a Body so and so shaped joined to it; and if that be the *Idea* of a *Man*, the same successive Body not shifted all at once, must as well as the same immaterial Spirit go to the making of the same *Man*.

§ 9. This being premised to find wherein *personal Identity* consists, we must consider what *Person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself, that which he calls *self*: It not being considered in this case, whether the same *self* be continued in the same, or divers Substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal Identity*, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*; it is the same *self* now it was then; and 'tis by the same *self* with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

§ 10. But it is farther enquir'd whether it be the same Identical Substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these Perceptions, with their consciousness, always remain'd present in the Mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to it self. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness, being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our Lives wherein we have the

§ 9. *Personal Identity.* § 10. *Consciousness makes Personal Identity.*

(3) p. 333(12), n. (20, 21) **Coste** adds linguistic footnotes on 'self' and 'consciousness'.
 (22) to] add. 4-5

whole train of all our past Actions before our Eyes in one view: But even the best Memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our Lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present Thoughts, and in sound sleep, having no Thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness, which remarks our waking Thoughts. I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past *selves*, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing; *i.e.* the same substance or no. Which however reasonable, or unreasonable, concerns not *personal Identity* at all. The Question being what makes the same *Person*, and not whether it be the same Identical Substance, which always thinks in the same *Person*, which in this case matters not at all. Different Substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one Person; as well as different Bodies, by the same Life are united into one Animal, whose *Identity* is preserved, in that change of Substances, by the unity of one continued Life. For it being the same consciousness that makes a Man be himself to himself, *personal Identity* depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual Substance, or can be continued in a succession of several Substances. For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the *Idea* of any past Action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present Action; so far it is the same *personal self*. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present Thoughts and Actions, that it is *self* to it *self* now, and so will be the same *self* as far as the same consciousness can extend to Actions past or to come; and would be by distance of Time, or change of Substance, no more two *Persons* than a Man be two Men, by wearing other Cloaths to Day than he did Yesterday, with a long or short sleep between: The same consciousness uniting those distant Actions into the same *Person*, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.

§ II. That this is so, we have some kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all whose Particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touch'd, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our *selves*: *i.e.* of our thinking conscious *self*. Thus

§ II. Personal Identity in change of Substances.

(10) not] 2-3 (*likewise Coste*) | no 4-5
 (32) *Person*,] 4-5 | *Person* 2-3

(29) Cloaths] 4-5 | Cloths 2-3

the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of *himself*: He sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness, we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections; and it is then no longer a part of that which is *himself*, any more than the remotest part of Matter. Thus we see the ⁵ Substance, whereof *personal self* consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal Identity: There being no Question about the same Person, though the Limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

§ 12. But the Question is, whether if the same Substance, which ¹⁰ thinks, be changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining the same, it can be different Persons.

And to this I answer first, this can be no Question at all to those, who place Thought in a purely material, animal, Constitution, void of an immaterial Substance. For, whether their Supposition be true ¹⁵ or no, 'tis plain they conceive personal Identity preserved in something else than Identity of Substance; as animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life, and not of Substance. And therefore those, who place thinking in an immaterial Substance only, before they can come to deal with these Men, must shew why personal Identity ²⁰ cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial Substances, or variety of particular immaterial Substances, as well as animal Identity is preserved in the change of material Substances, or variety of particular Bodies: Unless they will say, 'tis one immaterial Spirit, that makes the same Life in Brutes; as it is one immaterial Spirit ²⁵ 25 that makes the same Person in Men, which the *Cartesians* at least will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.

§ 13. But next, as to the first part of the Question, Whether if the same thinking Substance (supposing immaterial Substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same Person. I answer, that cannot ³⁰ be resolv'd, but by those, who know what kind of Substances they are, that do think; and whether the consciousness of past Actions can be transferr'd from one thinking Substance to another. I grant, were the same Consciousness the same individual Action, it could not: But it being but a present representation of a past Action, why ³⁵ it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn. And

§§ 12-15. *Whether in the change of thinking Substances.*

(15) an immaterial Substance] 4-5 | Spirit 2-3
4-5 | Spirits 2-3

(22) immaterial Substances,]

therefore how far the consciousness of past Actions is annexed to any individual Agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is, that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking Substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the *same consciousness*, not being the same individual Act, why one intellectual Substance may not have represented to it, as done by it self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent, why I say such a representation may not possibly be without reality of Matter of Fact, as well as several representations in Dreams are, which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the Nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the Nature of thinking Substances, be best resolv'd into the Goodness of God, who as far as the Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another, that consciousness, which draws Reward or Punishment with it. How far this may be an Argument against those who would place Thinking in a System of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet to return to the Question before us, it must be allowed, That if the same consciousness (which, as has been shewn, is quite a different thing from the same numerical Figure or Motion in Body) can be transferr'd from one thinking Substance to another, it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one Person. For the same consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv'd.

§ 14. As to the second part of the Question, Whether the same immaterial Substance remaining, there may be two distinct Persons; which Question seems to me to be built on this, Whether the same immaterial Being, being conscious of the Actions of its past Duration, may be wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its past Existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving again: And so as it were beginning a new Account from a new Period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new State. All those who hold pre-existence, are evidently of this Mind, since they allow the Soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent State, either wholly separate from

(3) is,] 2-4 | is; 5 (4) without] 2er-5 | with 2 (18) with] 4-5 | after
 2-3. (Coste 'entraîne après lui') (29), there] 3-5 | there, 2

Body, or informing any other Body; and if they should not, 'tis plain Experience would be against them. So that personal Identity reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent Spirit not having continued so many Ages in a state of Silence, must needs make different Persons. Suppose a Christian *Platonist*⁵ or *Pythagorean*, should upon God's having ended all his Works of Creation the Seventh Day, think his Soul hath existed ever since; and should imagine it has revolved in several Humane Bodies, as I once met with one, who was perswaded his had been the Soul of *Socrates* (how reasonably I will not dispute. This I know, that in the Post he fill'd, which was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very rational Man, and the Press has shewn, that he wanted not Parts or Learning) would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of *Socrates*'s Actions or Thoughts, could be the same Person with *Socrates*? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, that he has in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the constant change of his Body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself: Let him also suppose it to be the same Soul, that was in *Nestor* or *Thersites*, at the Siege of *Troy*, (For Souls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their Nature, indifferent to any parcel of Matter, the Supposition has no apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man: But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either of *Nestor* or *Thersites*, does, or can he, conceive himself the same Person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their Actions? Attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the Actions of any other Man, that ever existed? So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of either of those Men, he is no more one *self* with either of them, than if the Soul or immaterial Spirit, that now informs him, had been created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present Body, though it were never so true, that the same Spirit that informed *Nestor*'s or *Thersites*'s Body, were numerically the same that now informs his. For this would no more make him the same Person with *Nestor*, than if some of the Particles of Matter, that were once a part of *Nestor*, were now a part of this Man, the same immaterial Substance without the same consciousness, no more making the same Person by being united to any Body, than the same Particle of

(38)-340(2) the . . . Person.] **Coste** 'les mêmes particules de matière unies à quelque Corps sans une *conscience* commune, peuvent faire la même personne.'

Matter without consciousness united to any Body, makes the same Person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions of *Nestor*, he then finds himself the same Person with *Nestor*.

§ 15. And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the *Man*, be enough to make the same *Man*. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would say it was the same *Man*? The Body too goes to the making the *Man*, and would, I guess, to every Body determine the *Man* in this case, wherein the Soul, with all its Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another *Man*: But he would be the same Cobler to every one besides himself. I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same *Man*, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what *Ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire, what makes the same *Spirit, Man, or Person*, we must fix the *Ideas of Spirit, Man, or Person*, in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the *same*, and when not.

§ 16. But though the same immaterial Substance, or Soul does not alone, where-ever it be, and in whatsoever State, make the same *Man*; yet 'tis plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to Ages past, unites Existences, and Actions, very remote in time, into the same Person, as well as it does the Existence and Actions of the immediately preceding moment: So that whatever has the consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same Person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness,

§ 16. Consciousness makes the same Person.

(5) , the . . . Resurrection] 4-5 | at the Resurrection the same Person 2-3
 (6) which] add. 4-5 (17-18) he . . . besides 4-5 | it would to every one be
 the same Cobler beside 2-3 (24) [2nd] *Spirit*] 2er-5 | *Spirits* 2 (29) -ever]
v. Register (31) Actions,] 4-5 | Actions 2-3 (l. below 35) makes] 2-3 | make 4-5

that I saw the Ark and *Noah's Flood*, as that I saw an overflowing of the *Thames* last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the *Thames* overflow'd last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the same *self*, place that *self* in what Substance you please, than that I that write this am the same *my self* now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same *self*, it matters not whether this present *self* be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and as justly accountable for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last moment.

§ 17. *Self* is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it *self*, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger is as much a part of it *self*, as what is most so. Upon separation of this little Finger, should this consciousness go along with the little Finger, and leave the rest of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger would be the *Person*, the same *Person*; and *self* then would have nothing to do with the rest of the Body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is separated from another, which makes the same *Person*, and constitutes this inseparable *self*: so it is in reference to Substances remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join it self, makes the same *Person*, and is one *self* with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it *self*, and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

§ 18. In this *personal Identity* is founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery, being that, for
 § 17. *Self depends on Consciousness.* §§ 18–20. *Object of Reward and Punishment.*

(1) [2nd] that] add. 3–5 (12) self-consciousness] **Coste** adds a marginal linguistic note. (13) self-consciousness] **Coste** adds a marginal linguistic note. (14) Substance, /] 2–3, 5 | Substance / 4 (23) self] 2–3 (likewise **Coste**) | self 4–5 (24) Substance, /] 2–3, 5 | Substance / 4 (25) self] 2–3 (likewise **Coste**) | self 4–5 (26) separated] 2–3 (likewise **Coste**) | separate 4–5 (27) Substances] 2–4 | Substance 5 (28) so . . . time. That . . . farther;] 4–5 | So . . . time, that . . . farther, 2–3 (29) Punishment;] 4–5 | Punishment, 2–3 (30) Punishment;] 4–5 | Punishments 4–5 (l. below 34: §§ 18–20.) Punishment.] 2–3 | Punishments 4–5

which every one is concerned for *himself*, not mattering what becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little Finger, when it was cut off, that would be the same *self* which was concerned for the whole Body Yesterday, as making a part of it *self*, whose Actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the same Body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little Finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little Finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of it *self*, or could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19. This may shew us wherein *personal Identity* consists, not in the Identity of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of *consciousness*, wherein, if *Socrates* and the present Mayor of *Quinborough* agree, they are the same Person: If the same *Socrates* waking and sleeping do not partake of the same *consciousness*, *Socrates* waking and sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish *Socrates* waking, for what sleeping *Socrates* thought, and waking *Socrates* was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen.

§ 20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the Word *I* is applied to, which in this case is the Man only. And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, *I* is easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions, Humane Laws not punishing the *Mad Man* for the *Sober Man's* Actions, nor the *Sober Man* for what the *Mad Man* did, thereby making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our

(14) Mayor of *Quinborough*] *Coste 'Roy de Mogol'*
 (30), I] 3-5 | I, 2

(23) I] add. 2er-5

way of speaking in *English*, when we say such an one *is not himself*, or is *besides himself*; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that *self* was changed, the *self* same Person was no longer in that Man.

§ 21. But yet 'tis hard to conceive, that *Socrates* the same individual Man should be two Persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by *Socrates*, or the same individual *Man*.

First, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking Substance: In short, the same numerical Soul, and nothing else.

Secondly, Or the same Animal, without any regard to an immaterial Soul.

Thirdly, Or the same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal.

Now take which of these Suppositions you please, it is impossible to make personal Identity to consist in any thing but consciousness; or reach any farther than that does.

For by the First of them, it must be allowed possible that a Man born of different Women, and in distant times, may be the same Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it possible, for the same Man to be two distinct Persons, as any two that have lived in different Ages without the knowledge of one another's Thoughts.

By the Second and Third, *Socrates* in this Life, and after it, cannot be the same Man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making *Humane Identity* to consist in the same thing wherein we place *Personal Identity*, there will be no difficulty to allow the same Man to be the same Person. But then they who place *Humane Identity* in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the Infant *Socrates* the same Man with *Socrates* after the Resurrection. But whatsoever to some Men makes a *Man*, and consequently the same individual Man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal Identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call *self*) without involving us in great Absurdities.

§ 22. But is not a Man Drunk and Sober the same Person, why else is he punish'd for the Fact he commits when Drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same Person, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same Person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Humane

§§ 21, 22. Difference between Identity of Man and Person.

(2) , as] 4-5 | as 2-3

(9) Substance:] 2-3, 5 | Substance; 4

Laws punish both with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge: Because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in Drunkenness or Sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed
 5 to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the Drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures justly punish him; because the Fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be
 10 reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience accusing or excusing him.

§ 23. Nothing but consciousness can unite remote Existences into the same Person, the Identity of Substance will not do it. For what-
 15 ever Substance there is, however framed, without consciousness, there is no Person: And a Carcase may be a Person, as well as any sort of Substance be so without consciousness.

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by
 20 Night; and on the other side the same consciousness acting by Intervals two distinct Bodies: I ask in the first case, Whether the *Day* and the *Night-man* would not be two as distinct Persons, as *Socrates* and *Plato*; and whether in the second case, there would not be one Person in two distinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the
 25 same in two distinct clothings. Nor is it at all material to say, that this same, and this distinct *consciousness* in the cases above-mentioned, is owing to the same and distinct immaterial Substances, bringing it with them to those Bodies, which whether true or no, alters not the case: Since 'tis evident the *personal Identity* would equally be
 30 determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial Substance or no. For granting that the thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily suppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident, that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to
 35 it again, as appears in the forgetfulness Men often have of their past Actions, and the Mind many times recovers the memory of a

§§ 23-5. Consciousness alone makes self.

(4-8) For . . . him.] add. 2er-5 (6) be] 4-5 | is 2er-3 (7) justly] 2er, 4-5;
 om. 3 (likewise Coste) (11) [2nd] his] 4-5 | his own 2-3 (15) conscious-
 ness,] 4-5 | consciousness 2-3 (31-2) granting that] 4-5 | though 2-3

past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty Years together. Make these intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Persons with the same immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former instance two Persons with the same Body. So that *self* is not determined by Identity or Diversity of Substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by Identity of consciousness.

§ 24. Indeed it may conceive the Substance whereof it is now made up, to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious Being: But consciousness removed, that Substance is no more it ⁵ *self*, or makes no more a part of it, than any other Substance, as is evident in the instance, we have already given, of a Limb cut off, of whose Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any consciousness, it is no more of a Man's self than any other Matter of the Universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial Substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am my ¹⁰ *self* to my *self*: If there be any part of its Existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby I am now my *self*, it is in that part of its Existence no more my *self*, than any other immaterial Being. For whatsoever any Substance ¹⁵ has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial Being any where existing.

§ 25. I agree the more probable Opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial Substance.

But let Men according to their divers Hypotheses resolve of that as they please. This every intelligent Being, sensible of Happiness or Misery, must grant, that there is something that is *himself*, that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this *self* has existed in a continued Duration more than one instant, and therefore 'tis possible may exist, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may be the same *self*, by the same consciousness, continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the same *self* which did such or such an Action some Years since, by

(3) two] 4-5 | the two 2-3

(17) : If . . . which] 4-5 | ; so that 2-3

(18) join] 4-5 | join any part of its Existence 2-3

(22) it] add. 4-5

(28) Hypotheses] 3-5 | Hypothesis 2

(29) every] 2er-5 | very 2

which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of *self*, the same numerical Substance is not considered, as making the same *self*: But the same continued consciousness, in which several Substances may have been united, and again separated from it, s which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same *self*. Thus any part of our Bodies vitally united to that, which is conscious in us, makes a part of our *selves*: But upon separation from the vital union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that, which a 10 moment since was part of our *selves*, is now no more so, than a part of another Man's *self* is a part of me; and 'tis not impossible, but in a little time may become a real part of another Person. And so we have the same numerical Substance become a part of two different Persons; and the same Person preserved under the change of various 15 Substances. Could we suppose any Spirit wholly stripp'd of all its memory or consciousness of past Actions, as we find our Minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all, the union or separation of such a Spiritual Substance would make no variation of personal Identity, any more than that of any Particle 20 of Matter does. Any Substance vitally united to the present thinking Being, is a part of that very *same self* which now is: Any thing united to it by a consciousness of former Actions makes also a part of the *same self*, which is the same both then and now.

§ 26. *Person*, as I take it, is the name for this *self*. Where-ever a 25 Man finds, what he calls *himself*, there I think another may say is the same *Person*. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. This personality extends it *self* beyond present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it 30 becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it *self* past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for Happiness the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that that *self*, that 35 is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present *self* by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain; i.e. Reward or Punishment,

§§ 26, 27. *Person a Forensick Term.*

(19) Particle] 4-5 | Particles 2-3

(28) [2nd] and] 4-5 | or 2-3 (*likewise Coste*)

on the account of any such Action, is all one, as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For supposing a Man punish'd now, for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that Punishment, and being created miserable? And therefore conformable to this, the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one shall receive according to his doings, the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open.* The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same, that committed those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.

§ 27. I am apt enough to think I have in treating of this Subject made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet I think, they are such, as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look on as our selves. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory should depend, we might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Substance, independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things, be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may, at different times be united to different Bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one Man; As well as we suppose a part of a Sheep's Body yesterday should be a part of a Man's Body tomorrow, and in that union make a vital part of *Melibæus* himself as well as it did of his Ram.

§ 28. To conclude, whatever Substance begins to exist, it must, during its Existence, necessarily be the same: Whatever Compositions of Substances begin to exist, during the union of those

§ 28. *The difficulty from ill use of Names.*

(6-7), that] add. 4-5 (25) these] 2er-5 | those 2 (l. below 35) In Coste,
§§ 28, 29 come under the same marginal summary as that for §§ 26, 27.

* cf. 1 Cor. 14: 25 and 2 Cor. 5: 10.

Substances, the concrete must be the same: Whatsoever Mode begins to exist, during its Existence, it is the same: And so if the Composition be of distinct Substances, and different Modes, the same Rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or
 s obscurity, that has been about this Matter, rather rises from the Names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For whatever makes the specifick *Idea*, to which the name is applied, if that *Idea* be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the same, and divers will easily be conceived, and there can arise no
 10 doubt about it.

§ 29. For supposing a rational Spirit be the *Idea* of a *Man*, 'tis easie to know, what is the *same Man*, *viz.* the *same Spirit*, whether separate or in a Body will be the *same Man*. Supposing a rational Spirit vitally united to a Body of a certain conformation of Parts to
 15 make a *Man*, whilst that rational Spirit, with that vital conformation of Parts, though continued in a fleeting successive Body, remains, it will be the *same Man*. But if to any one the *Idea* of a *Man* be, but the vital union of Parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and shape remains, in a concrete no otherwise the same, but by a
 20 continued succession of fleeting Particles, it will be the *same Man*. For whatever be the composition whereof the complex *Idea* is made, whenever Existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same Existence continued, preserves it the same individual under the same denomination.

§ 29. *Continued Existence makes Identity.*

(19-20) remains, . . . Particles,] 4-5 | remains . . . Particles 2-3 (24) 5 adds,
in a footnote, quotations from Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 165,
etc.; prefaced by 'The Doctrine of Identity and Diversity, contained in this Chapter,
the Bishop of Worcester pretends to be inconsistent with the Doctrine of the Christian
Faith, concerning the Resurrection of the Dead. His Way of arguing from it, is this:
He says, 'The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon Mr. Locke's Grounds,
is from the Idea of Identity.' To which our Author answers:' (l. below 24) XXVIII]
2-5 | XXVII 1 (l. above 25) *Relations]* Coste adds 'et sur tout, des Relations
Morales' (26) *Causality]* 1-4 | *Casualty 5*

CHAPTER III

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

25 § I. KNOWLEDGE, as has been said, lying in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement, of any of our *Ideas*, it follows from hence, That,

First, We can have Knowledge no farther than we have Ideas.

§ 1(28). *First, No farther than we have Ideas.*

§ 2. *Secondly*, That we can have no *Knowledge* farther, than we can have Perception of that Agreement, or Disagreement: Which Perception being, 1. Either by *Intuition*, or the immediate comparing any two *Ideas*; or, 2. By *Reason*, examining the Agreement, or Disagreement of two *Ideas*, by the Intervention of some others: Or, 3. 5 By *Sensation*, perceiving the Existence of particular Things. Hence it also follows,

§ 3. *Thirdly*, That we cannot have an *intuitive Knowledge*, that shall extend it self to all our *Ideas*, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations 10 they have one to another by *juxta-position*, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus having the *Ideas* of an obtuse, and an acute angled Triangle, both drawn from equal Bases, and between Parallels, I can by *intuitive Knowledge*, perceive the one not to be the other; but cannot that way know, whether they be equal, or no; 15 because their Agreement, or Disagreement in equality, can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: The difference of Figure makes their parts uncapable of an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of some intervening Quantities to measure them by, which is Demonstration, or rational Knowledge. 20

§ 4. *Fourthly*, It follows also, from what is above observed, that our *rational Knowledge*, cannot reach to the whole extent of our *Ideas*. Because between two different *Ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find such *Mediums*, as we can connect one to another with an 25 *intuitive Knowledge*, in all the parts of the Deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of Knowledge and Demonstration.

§ 5. *Fifthly*, *Sensitive Knowledge* reaching no farther than the Existence of Things actually present to our Senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former. 30

§ 6. From all which it is evident, that *the extent of our Knowledge* comes not only short of the reality of Things, but even of the extent of our own *Ideas*. Though our Knowledge be limited to our *Ideas*, and cannot exceed them either in extent, or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of 35

§ 2. *Secondly*, *No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Disagreement*. § 3. *Thirdly*, *Intuitive Knowledge extends it self not to all the Relations of all our Ideas*. § 4. *Fourthly*, *Nor demonstrative Knowledge*. § 5. *Fifthly*, *Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either*. § 6. *Sixthly*, *Our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas*.

Allbeing, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow Information, is to be received from some few, and not very acute ways of Perception, such as are our Senses; yet it would be well with us, if our Knowledge were but as large as our *Ideas*, and there were not many Doubts and Enquiries concerning the *Ideas* we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this World, resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question, but that Humane Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Constitutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind, employ all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the means of discovering Truth, which they do for the colouring or support of Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest, or Party, they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without Injury to humane Perfection, be confident, that our Knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those *Ideas* we have; nor be able to surmount all the Difficulties, and resolve all the Questions might arise concerning any of them. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle*, and *Equality*; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a Circle equal to a Square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the *Ideas* of *Matter* and *Thinking*, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own *Ideas*, without revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a

(3) to] 1-4; om. 5 (4) Senses] 1-3, 5 | senses 4 (8) not] 4-5 | not yet 1-3

(22) *Thinking*] 5 contains, in a footnote, quotations from Locke's First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 64, etc., and his Third Letter, pp. 396, etc.; prefaced by 'Against that Assertion of Mr. Locke, That possibly we shall never be able to know whether any material Being [edit. | Being] 5] thinks or not, etc. The Bishop of Worcester argues thus: If this be true, then for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter and Thinking, Matter may have a Power of Thinking: And if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a spiritual Substance in us, from the Idea of Thinking: For how can we be assured by our Ideas, that God hath not given such a power of Thinking, to Matter so disposed as our Bodies are? Especially since it is said (B.4 C.3, §6), "That in respect of our Notions, it is not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, super-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should super-add to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking. Whoever asserts this, can never prove a spiritual Substance in us from a Faculty of Thinking; because he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking, that Matter so disposed cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the Matter of our Bodies so as to be capable of it. [paragraph] To which Mr. Locke answers thus:' (23) any . . . Being] 2-5 | Matter 1 (26) not] add. 2-5 some Systems of] add. 2-5

thinking immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that Power, which cannot be in any created Being, but merely by the good pleasure and Bounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being should, if he pleased, give to certain Systems of created sensless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: Though, as I think, I have proved, *Lib. 4. c. 10th.* it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first thinking Being. What certainty of Knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such as v.g. pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial Substance, upon the Motion of the parts of Body: Body as far as we can conceive being able only to strike and affect body; and Motion, according to the utmost reach of our *Ideas*, being able to produce nothing but Motion, so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the *Idea* of a Colour, or Sound, we are fain to quit our Reason, go beyond our *Ideas*, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our Maker. For since we must allow he has annexed Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a Subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Subject we cannot conceive the motion of Matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the Soul's Immortality: I am not here speaking of Probability, but Knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the Modesty of Philosophy, not to pronounce Magisterially, where we want that Evidence that can produce

(1) being] 2-5 | being equally easie 1 (2) not . . . Comprehension] add.
2-5 (3) Matter] 4-5 | our Idea of Matter 1-3 (4) than] 2-5 | as 1
(8-15) I . . . Being.] add. 2-5 (9) Being] 5 | Being or omnipotent Spirit
2-4 (11) sense, perception,] 3, 5 | sense, perception 4 | sense perception 2
(12) is] add. 5 (*likewise Coste*) (15) What] 2-5 | For what 1 certainty] 2-5 |
assurance 1 (16) some perceptions] 2-5 | certain Thoughts 1 (17) some
bodies themselves] 2-5 | Body it self 1 (18) they] 2-5 | it 1 (19-20) Body
... [2nd] and] add. 2-5 (24) our] 4-5 | our own 1-3 (*likewise Coste*)

Knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us, to discern how far our Knowledge does reach; for the state we are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many Things, content our selves with Faith and Probability: and in the present Question, about the immateriality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative Certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great Ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident, that he who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible intelligent Beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of Sensibility in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has designed to Men, according to their doings in this Life. And therefore 'tis not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or t'other, as some over zealous for, or against the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make the World believe. Who, either on the one side, indulging too much to their Thoughts immersed altogether in Matter, can allow no existence to what is not material: Or, who on the other side, finding not *Cogitation* within the natural Powers of Matter, examined over and over again, by the utmost Intention of Mind, have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency it self, cannot give Perception and Thought to a Substance, which has the Modification of Solidity. He that considers how hardly Sensation is, in our Thoughts, reconcilable to extended Matter; or Existence to any thing that hath no Extension at all, will confess, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his Soul is. 'Tis a Point, which seems to me, to be put out of the reach of our Knowledge: And he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypothesis, will scarce find his Reason able to determine him fixedly for, or against the Soul's Materiality. Since on which side soever he views it, either as an unextended Substance, or as a thinking extended Matter; the difficulty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his Thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some Men take with themselves: who, because of the unconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary Hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiased Understanding. This serves, not only to shew the Weakness and the Scantiness of our Knowledge, but the insignificant

(13)–543(27) And . . . Knowledge.] add. 4–5

(17) to 4; om. 5 ('much/ their')

Triumph of such sort of Arguments, which, drawn from our own Views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of the Question; but do not at all thereby help us to Truth, by running into the opposite Opinion, which, on examination, will be found clogg'd with equal difficulties. For what Safety, what Advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming Absurdities, and, to him, unsurmountable Rubs he meets with in one Opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his Comprehension? "Tis past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks, our very Doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content our selves in the Ignorance of what kind of *Being* it is: And 'tis in vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of any thing, because we cannot comprehend its Nature. For I would fain know what Substance exists that has not something in it, which manifestly baffles our Understandings. Other Spirits, who see and know the Nature and inward Constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in Knowledge? To which if we add larger Comprehension, which enables them at one Glance to see the Connexion and Agreement of very many *Ideas*, and readily supplys to them the intermediate Proofs, which we by single and slow Steps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another, we may guess at some part of the Happiness of superior Ranks of Spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating Sight, as well as a larger Field of Knowledge. But to return to the Argument in hand, our *Knowledge*, I say, is not only limited to the Paucity and Imperfections of the *Ideas* we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short of that too: But how far it reaches, let us now enquire.

§ 7. The affirmations or negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts, *viz.* Identity, Co-existence, Relation, and real Existence. I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these:

§ 8. First, *As to Identity and Diversity*, in this way of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our *Ideas*, our intuitive Knowledge is as far

§ 7. How far our Knowledge reaches. § 8. First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity, as far as our Ideas.

(27) v. 542(13), n.
existence 4

(30) , let] 1-3 | let 4-5

(33) Existence] 1-3, 5 |

extended as our Ideas themselves: and there can be no Idea in the Mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive Knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

- § 9. Secondly, As to the second sort, which is the *Agreement*, or *Disagreement* of our Ideas in *Co-existence*, in this our Knowledge is very short, though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge concerning Substances. For our Ideas of the Species of Substances, being, as I have shewed, nothing but certain Collections of simple Ideas united in one Subject, and so co-existing together: v.g. Our Idea of *Flame* is a Body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of *Gold*, a Body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible. These or some such complex Ideas as these in Men's Minds, do these two names of the different Substances, *Flame* and *Gold*, stand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning these, or any other sort of Substances, what do we enquire but what other Qualities, or Powers, these Substances have, or have not? which is nothing else but to know, what other simple Ideas do, or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex Idea.
- § 10. This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of Humane Science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the simple Ideas whereof our complex Ideas of Substances are made up, are, for the most part such, as carry with them, in their own Nature, no visible necessary connexion, or inconsistency with any other simple Ideas, whose *co-existence* with them we would inform our selves about.

- § 11. The Ideas, that our complex ones of Substances are made up of, and about which our Knowledge, concerning Substances, is most employ'd, are those of their *secondary Qualities*; which depending all (as has been shewn) upon the primary Qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or if not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our Comprehension, 'tis impossible we should know, which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another:

§ 9. Secondly, Of Co-existence a very little way. § 10. Because the connexion between most simple Ideas is unknown. § 11. Especially of Secondary Qualities.

(11) upward;] 1-3, 5 | upward, 4

(Coste¹; ces) (13) the] add. 2-5

(19) Idea.] 1 | Idea? 1-5. (Coste 'Et lorsque . . . , nos recherches ne tendent qu'à

savoir quelles . . . , c'est à dire, . . . notre idée complexe.')

2-5 | shewed 1. (Coste adds a marginal reference to Book II, Chap. viii.)

(12) . These] 4er-5 | : for these 1-4.

(17) what other] 1er-5 | whether 1

(30) shewn]

For not knowing the Root they spring from, not knowing what size, figure, and texture of Parts they are, on which depend and from which result those Qualities which make our complex *Idea* of Gold, 'tis impossible we should know what other Qualities result from, or are incompatible with the same Constitution of the insensible parts ⁵ of *Gold*; and so consequently must always *co-exist* with that complex *Idea* we have of it, or else are *inconsistent* with it.

§ 12. Besides this Ignorance of the primary Qualities of the insensible Parts of Bodies, on which depend all their secondary Qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of Ignorance, ¹⁰ which sets us more remote from a certain Knowledge of the *Co-existence*, or *Inco-existence* (if I may so say) of different *Ideas* in the same Subject; and that is, that there is no discoverable connection between any *secondary Quality*, and those *primary Qualities* that it depends on. ¹⁵

§ 13. That the size, figure, and motion of one Body should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception; the separation of the Parts of one Body, upon the intrusion of another; and the change from rest to motion, upon impulse; these, and the like, seem to us to have some *connexion* ²⁰ one with another. And if we knew these primary Qualities of Bodies, we might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to discover any *connexion* betwixt these primary qualities of Bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us ²⁵ by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules, of the Consequence or *Co-existence* of any secondary Qualities, though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible Parts, which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow ³⁰ Colour, a sweet Taste, or a sharp Sound, that we can by no means conceive how any *size, figure, or motion* of any Particles, can possibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour, Taste, or Sound* whatsoever; there is no conceivable *connexion* betwixt the one and the other. ³⁵

§ 14. In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our ³⁵ *Ideas*, (the only true way of certain and universal Knowledge,) what

§§ 12-14. Because all *connexion* between any *secondary* and *primary Qualities* is *undiscoverable*.

(4-5), or . . . with] add. 4-5 (16) figure,] 1-3 | figure 4-5 (17) figure,]
1-3 | figure 4-5 (29) invisible] 2-5 | in- / sible 1

other *Ideas* are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex *Idea* of any Substance: since we neither know the real Constitution of the minute Parts, on which their Qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary *connexion*

5 between them, and any of the *secondary Qualities*: which is necessary to be done, before we can certainly know their *necessary co-existence*. So that let our complex *Idea* of any Species of Substances, be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple *Ideas* contained in it, certainly determine the *necessary co-existence* of any other Quality whatsoever.

10 Our Knowledge in all these Enquiries, reaches very little farther than our Experience. Indeed, some few of the primary Qualities have a necessary dependence, and visible connexion one with another, as Figure necessarily supposes Extension, receiving or communicating Motion by impulse, supposes Solidity. But though

15 these, and perhaps some others of our *Ideas* have: yet there are so few of them, that have a *visible Connexion* one with another, that we can by Intuition or Demonstration, discover the co-existence of very few of the Qualities are to be found united in Substances: and we are left only to the assistance of our Senses, to make known to us,

20 what Qualities they contain. For of all the Qualities that are *co-existent* in any Subject, without this dependence and evident connexion of their *Ideas* one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to *co-exist* any farther, than Experience, by our Senses, informs us. Thus though we see the yellow Colour, and upon trial

25 find the Weight, Malleableness, Fusibility, and Fixedness, that are united in a piece of Gold; yet because no one of these *Ideas* has any evident *dependence*, or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: Because the

30 highest Probability, amounts not to Certainty; without which, there can be no true Knowledge. For this *co-existence* can be no farther known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived but either in particular Subjects, by the observation of our Senses, or in general, by the necessary *connexion* of the *Ideas* themselves.

35 § 15. As to incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence, we may know, that any Subject can have of each sort of primary Qualities,

§ 15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist larger.

(4) nor,] 1-3, 5 | nor 4
1er-5 | some 1

(13) Figure] 1-3, 5 | figure 4
(20) of] add. 4-5
(23) any two] add. 4-5

(15) so]

but one particular at once, *v.g.* each particular Extension, Figure, number of Parts, Motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible *Ideas* peculiar to each Sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any Subject, excludes all other of that sort; *v.g.* no one Subject can have two Smells, or two Colours, at the same time. To this, perhaps, will be said, has not an *Opall*, or the infusion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, two Colours at the same time? To which I answer, that these Bodies, to Eyes differently placed, may at the same time afford different Colours: But I take Liberty also to say, that to Eyes differently placed, 'tis different parts of the object, that reflect the Particles of Light: And therefore 'tis not the same part of the Object, and so not the very same Subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For 'tis as impossible that the very same Particle of any Body, should at the same time differently modify, or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it should have two different Figures and Textures at the same time.

§ 16. But *as to the Powers of Substances* to change the sensible Qualities of other Bodies, which make a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge; I doubt, as to these, whether *our Knowledge reaches* much farther than our Experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these Powers, and be certain that they are in any Subject by the connexion with any of those *Ideas*, which to us make its Essence. Because the Active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover: 'Tis but in very few Cases, we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to any of those *Ideas*, which make our complex one of that sort of Things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of humane Understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary Connexion, and *Co-existence*, of the Powers, which are to be observed united in several

§ 16. Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.

(17) *Powers*] 1-2, 4-5 | *Power 3 (likewise Coste)* (19) *inconsiderable*] 1-4 |
considerable 5 (29) *corpuscularian Hypothesis*] *Coste* 'l'hypothese des
Philosophes Materialistes', adding in a marginal note 'Qui expliquent les effets de la
nature par la seule consideration de la grosseur, de la figure, et du mouvement des
parties de la Matiere.'

sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,) our Knowledge concerning corporeal Substances, will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made see, what Qualities and
 5 Powers of Bodies have a *necessary Connexion or Repugnancy* one with another; which in the present State of Philosophy, I think, we know but to a very small degree: And, I doubt, whether with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther.
 10 Experience is that, which in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wish'd, that it were more improved. We find the advantages some Men's generous pains have this way brought to the stock of natural Knowledge. And if others, especially the Philosophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their observations,
 15 and sincere in their reports, as those who call themselves Philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our insight into their Powers and Operations had been yet much greater.

§ 17. If we are at this loss in respect of the Powers, and Operations of Bodies, I think it is easy to conclude, *we are much more in the dark in reference to Spirits*; whereof we naturally have no Ideas, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the Operations of our own Souls within us, as far as they can come within our Observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit our
 25 Bodies hold amongst those various, and possibly innumerable, kinds of nobler Beings; and how far short they come of the Endowments and Perfections of Cherubims, and Seraphims, and infinite sorts of Spirits above us, is what by a transient hint, in another place, I have offered to my Reader's Consideration.

30 § 18. As to the third sort of our Knowledge, *viz.* the *Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas in any other Relation*: This, as it is the largest Field of our Knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it may extend: Because the Advances that are made in this part of Knowledge, depending on our Sagacity, in finding intermediate Ideas, that may shew the *Relations and Habitudes of Ideas*, whose Co-existence is not considered, 'tis a hard Matter to tell, when we are
 35 § 17. *Of Spirits yet narrower.* § 18. *Thirdly, Of other Relations it is not easy to say how far.*

(10-18) Experience . . . greater.] add. 2-5 (21-22) *Spirits; . . . own,*] 4-5 |
 Spirits, . . . own; 1-3 (28-9) is . . . Consideration] 4-5 | we have in another
 Place made some Reflection upon 1-3 (33) are] 5 | are to be 1-4 (36) a]
 4-5 | an 1-3

at an end of such Discoveries; and when Reason has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of Proofs, or examining the Agreement or Disagreement of remote *Ideas*. They that are ignorant of *Algebra* cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other parts 5 of Knowledge, the sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, 'tis not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the *Ideas* of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Passions, and domineering Interest 10 did not oppose, or menace such Endeavours.

The *Idea* of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the *Idea* of our selves, as understanding, rational Beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered, and 15 pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place *Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demonstration*: wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that 20 will apply himself with the same Indifference and Attention to the one, as he does to the other of these Sciences. The *Relation* of other Modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of Number and Extension: and I cannot see, why they should not also be capable of Demonstration, if due Methods were thought on to examine, or 25 pursue their Agreement or Disagreement. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice*, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in *Euclid*: For the *Idea* of *Property*, being a right to any thing; and the *Idea* to which the Name *Injustice* is given, being the Invasion or Violation of that right; it is evident, that these *Ideas* being thus 30 established, and these Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle has three

§ 18(12). Morality capable of Demonstration.

(2) or] 4-5 | and 1-3 (likewise Coste) (10-11) Interest] 4-5 | Interests 1-3 (likewise Coste) (12), Goodness,] add. 2-5 (14) Beings] 5 | Creatures 1-4 (18-19) self-evident . . . Consequences] 4-5 | Principles 1-3 (19) in Mathematicks,] 4-5 | of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences, 1-3 (26) Property] 2-5 | Propriety 1 (l. below 32) This summary is placed, in 5, at the beginning of the second paragraph of § 18; in 4, near the end of the first paragraph of § 18; and in 2-3 (and Coste), immediately after the first summary for § 18.

Angles equal to two right ones. Again, *No Government allows absolute Liberty*: The *Idea* of Government being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them; and the *Idea* of absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition, as of any in Mathematicks.

§ 19. That which in this respect has given the advantage to the Ideas of Quantity, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration, is,

- 10 First, That they can be set down, and represented by sensible marks, which have a greater and nearer Correspondence with them than any Words or Sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the *Ideas* in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. An Angle, Circle, or
- 15 Square, drawn in Lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be mistaken: It remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered, and examined, and the Demonstration be revised, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without any danger of the least change in the *Ideas*. This cannot be thus done in *moral Ideas*,
- 20 we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we can set them down; we have nothing but Words to express them by: which though, when written, they remain the same, yet the *Ideas* they stand for, may change in the same Man; and 'tis very seldom, that they are not different in different Persons.

25 *Secondly*, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in
Ethicks, is, That *moral Ideas* are commonly more complex than those
of the Figures ordinarily considered in Mathematicks. From whence
these two Inconveniences follow. *First*, That their names are of
more uncertain Signification, the precise Collection of simple *Ideas*
30 they stand for not being so easily agreed on, and so the Sign, that is
used for them in Communication always, and in Thinking often,
does not steadily carry with it the same *Idea*. Upon which the same
Disorder, Confusion, and Error follows, as would if a Man, going to
demonstrate something of an *Heptagon*, should in the Diagram he
35 took to do it, leave out one of the Angles, or by over-sight make the

§ 19. Two Things have made moral Ideas thought incapable of Demonstration. Their Complexity, and want of sensible Representations.

(16) unchangeable] 1T.er, 2-5 | unchangeably 1 (28) Inconveniences] 2-5 |
Inconveniences 1 (32) steadily] 1er-5 | always 1 (34) the] 1-2, 4-5 |
a 3 (35) or] 1T.er, 2-5 | and 1

Figure with one Angle more than the Name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should, when at first he thought of his Demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral Ideas, where the same name being retained, one Angle, *i.e.* one simple Idea is left out or put in, in the complex one, (still called by the same name) more at one time than another. *Secondly,* From the Complexedness of these moral Ideas there follows another Inconvenience, (*viz.*) that the Mind cannot easily retain those precise Combinations, so exactly and perfectly, as is necessary in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correspondencies, Agreements or Disagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where it is to be judg'd of by long Deductions, and the Intervention of several other complex Ideas, to shew the Agreement or Disagreement of two remote ones.

The great help against this, which Mathematicians find in Diagrams and Figures, which remain unalterable in their Draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly, whilst the Mind went over the parts of them, step by step, to examine their several Correspondencies: And though in casting up a long Sum, either in *Addition*, *Multiplication*, or *Division*, every part be only a Progression of the Mind, taking a view of its own Ideas, and considering their Agreement or Disagreement; and the Resolution of the Question be nothing but the Result of the whole, made up of such particulars, whereof the Mind has a clear Perception: yet without setting down the several Parts by marks, whose precise Significations are known, and by marks, that last and remain in view, when the memory had let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many different Ideas in Mind, without confounding, or letting slip some parts of the Reckoning, and thereby making all our Reasonings about it useless. In which Case, the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at all to perceive the Agreement of any two, or more Numbers, their Equalities or Proportions: That the Mind has only by Intuition of its own Ideas of the Numbers themselves. But the numerical Characters are helps to the memory, to record and retain the several Ideas about which the Demonstration is made, whereby a Man may know how far his intuitive Knowledge, in surveying several of the particulars, has proceeded; that so he may without Confusion go on

(1) more] 1T.er, 2-5 | less 1
(9) exactly] 1-3 | exact 4-5

(3) very] 1-2, 4-5 | every 3 (*likewise Coste*)
(33) : That] 2-5 | . That 1

to what is yet unknown; and, at last, have in one view before him the Result of all his Perceptions and Reasonings.

§ 20. One part of *these Disadvantages*, in moral *Ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration, may in a good measure be *remedied* by Definitions, setting down that Collection of simple *Ideas*, which every Term shall stand for; and then using the Terms steadily and constantly for that precise Collection. And what methods *Algebra*, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other difficulties, is not easy to fore-tell. Confident I am, that if Men would in the same method, and with the same indifference, search after moral, as they do mathematical Truths, they would find them to have a stronger Connection one with another, and a more necessary Consequence from our clear and distinct *Ideas*, and to come nearer perfect Demonstration, than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the desire of Esteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men espouse the well endowed Opinions in Fashion, and then seek Arguments, either to make good their Beauty, or varnish over, and cover their Deformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the Understanding, as a Lye. For though many a Man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsome Wife in his Bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has espoused a Falshood, and received into his Breast so ugly a thing as a Lye? Whilst the Parties of Men, cram their Tenets down all Men's Throats, whom they can get into their Power, without permitting them to examine their Truth or Falshood; and will not let Truth have fair play in the World, nor Men the Liberty to search after it; What Improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater Light can be hoped for in the moral Sciences? The Subject part of Mankind, in most Places, might, instead thereof, with *Ægyptian* Bondage, expect *Ægyptian* Darkness, were not the Candle of the Lord set up by himself in Men's minds, which it is impossible for the Breath or Power of Man wholly to extinguish.

§ 21. As to the fourth sort of our Knowledge, *viz. of the real, actual, Existence* of Things, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our

§ 20. *Remedies of those Difficulties.* § 21. *Fourthly, of real Existence we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensible of some few other Things.*

(7) Collection] 1–3, 5 | Collection 4 (25) Men,] 4–5 | Men, I say, 1–3 Tenets]
 4 | Tenents 1–3, 5 (34) Power] 1–3, 5 | power 4 (36) Things] 2–5 |
 Things without us 1

own *Existence*; a demonstrative Knowledge of the *Existence* of a God; of the *Existence* of any thing else, we have no other but a sensitive Knowledge, which extends not beyond the Objects present to our Senses.

§ 22. Our Knowledge being so narrow, as I have shew'd, it will, perhaps, give us some Light into the present State of our minds, if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of *our Ignorance*: which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of Disputes, and Improvement of useful Knowledge; if discovering how far we have clear and distinct *Ideas*, we confine our Thoughts within the Contemplation of those Things, that are within the reach of our Understandings, and lanch not out into that Abyss of Darkness (where we have not Eyes to see, nor Faculties to perceive any thing,) out of a Presumption, that nothing is beyond our Comprehension. But to be satisfied of the Folly of such a Conceit, we need not go far. He that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for Instances of his Ignorance. The meanest, and most obvious Things that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest Sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest, and most enlarged Understandings of thinking Men find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every Particle of Matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the *Causes of our Ignorance*, which, from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:

First, Want of *Ideas*.

Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connexion between the *Ideas* we have.

Thirdly, Want of tracing, and examining our *Ideas*.

§ 23. *First*, There are some Things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of for *want of Ideas*.

First, All the simple *Ideas* we have are confined (as I have shewn) to those we receive from corporeal Objects by *Sensation*, and from the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects of *Reflection*. But how much these few and narrow Inlets are disproportionate

§ 22. *Our Ignorance great*. § 23. *First, one cause of it want of Ideas, either such as we have no Conception of, or such as particularly we have not*.

(5) 22] 1-3, 5 | 21 4 (22). We] 4-5 | ; which we 1-3 to find it so
4-5 | at 1-3 (*likewise Coste*) (31) [1st] have] 1-4, W; om. 5 (32) those]
. . . *Sensation*] 5 | the Observation of our Senses 1-4 [2nd] from] add. 5
(33) as . . . *Reflection*] 5 | , that we are conscious of in our selves 1-4

to the vast whole Extent of all Beings, will not be hard to persuade those, who are not so foolish, as to think their span the measure of all Things. What other simple *Ideas* 'tis possible the Creatures in other parts of the Universe may have, by the Assistance of Senses and Faculties more or perfecter, than we have, or different from ours, 'tis not for us to determine. But to say, or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind Man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours, because he had no manner of *Idea*, of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to himself any Notions about Seeing. The Ignorance, and Darkness that is in us, no more hinders, nor confines the Knowledge, that is in others, than the blindness of a Mole is an Argument against the quick-sightedness of an Eagle. He that will consider the Infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of the Creator of all Things, will find Reason to think, it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a Creature, as he will find Man to be; who in all probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings. What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature, and inmost Constitutions of Things; what *Ideas* they may receive of them, far different from ours, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views of them, besides those we have, to make Discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the *Ideas*, we can attain to by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to Things themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self, which is the Foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of *Ideas* of this kind being a Part, as well as Cause of our Ignorance, cannot be described. Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and sensible World, are in this perfectly alike; That that part, which we see of either of them, holds no proportion with what we see not; And whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing, in comparison of the rest.

35 § 24. Secondly, Another great Cause of Ignorance, is the *want of Ideas we are capable of*. As the want of *Ideas*, which our faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of Things,

§ 24. *Because of their Remoteness, or,*

(12) nor] 1-5 | or 1er (21) from] 1-4, W | of 5 (37) [2nd] us] 1-2, 4-5; om. 3

which 'tis reasonable to think other Beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; so the want of *Ideas*, I now speak of, keeps us in ignorance of Things, we conceive capable of being known to us. *Bulk, Figure, and Motion*, we have *Ideas* of. But though we are not without *Ideas* of these primary qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular *Bulk, Figure, and Motion*, of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe, we are ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects, which we daily see, are produced. These are hid from us in some Things, by being *too remote*; and in others, by being *too minute*. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to think, that what lies within our Ken, is but a small part of the immense Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter, which make up the whole stupendious frame of Corporeal Beings; how far they are extended; what is their Motion, and how continued, or communicated; and what Influence they have one upon another, are Contemplations, that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our Contemplation, and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter, that visibly move about it, what several sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth, may there probably be in the other Planets, to the Knowledge of which, even of their outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural Means, either by Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain *Ideas* into our Minds? They are out of the reach of those Inlets of all our Knowledge: and what sorts of Furniture and Inhabitants those Mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear, and distinct *Ideas* of them.

§ 25. If a great, nay far the greatest part of the several ranks of *Bodies* in the Universe, scape our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their *Minuteness*. These insensible Corpuscles, being the active parts of Matter, and

§ 25. *Because of their Minuteness.*

(1) Beings . . . we,] 2-5 | perfecter Beings than we 1 (9) , which] add.
 4-5 (17) their] 1-2, 4-5 | there 3 (24) there] add. 4-5 (29) Minds?] 1er, 4-5 | Minds. 1-3 (33) 25.] 1-4 | 23. 5 far] 1er-5 | for 1

the great Instruments of Nature, on which depend not only all their secondary Qualities, but also most of their natural Operations, our want of precise distinct *Ideas* of their primary Qualities, keeps us in an incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them.

- 5 I doubt not but if we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute Constituent parts of any two Bodies, we should know without Trial several of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or a Triangle. Did we know the Mechanical affections of the Particles of *Rhubarb*,

10 *Hemlock*, *Opium*, and a *Man*, as a Watchmaker does those of a Watch, whereby it performs its Operations, and of a File which by rubbing on them will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels, we should be able to tell before Hand, that *Rhubarb* will purge, *Hemlock* kill, and *Opium* make a *Man* sleep; as well as a Watch-maker can,

15 that a little piece of Paper laid on the Balance, will keep the Watch from going, till it be removed; or that some small part of it, being rubb'd by a File, the Machin would quite lose its Motion, and the Watch go no more. The dissolving of Silver in *aqua fortis*, and Gold in *aqua Regia*, and not *vice versa*, would be then, perhaps, no more

20 difficult to know, than it is to a Smith to understand, why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough, to discover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us *Ideas* of their mechanical Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and

25 ways of Operation; nor can we be assured about them any farther, than some few Trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths concerning natural Bodies: and our Reason carries us herein very little beyond

30 particular matter of Fact.

§ 26. And therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever humane Industry may advance useful and *experimental* Philosophy in *physical Things, scientifical* will still be out of our reach: because we want perfect and adequate *Ideas* of those very Bodies, which are

§ 26. Hence no Science of Bodies.

(2) Operations] **1-2**, **4-5** | Operation **3** (5) Texture] **2-5** | Connexion **1** (8-18). Did . . . more.] **2-5** | And [**1er**] ; and **1** we should be able to tell before Hand, . . . , and the Watch go no more, did [**1er**] . Did **1** we know . . . of any of the Wheels. [**1er**] Wheels; **1** **1** (11) its **2-5** | all its **1** (13) will] **4-5** | would **1-3** (14) can] **2-5** | does **1**

nearest to us, and most under our Command. Those which we have ranked into Classes under names, and we think our selves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect, and incompleat Ideas of. Distinct Ideas of the several sorts of Bodies, that fall under the Examination of our Senses, perhaps, we may have: but adequate Ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common Use and Discourse: yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of *scientifical Knowledge*; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable Truths concerning them. *Certainty* and *Demonstration*, are Things we must not, in these Matters, pretend to. By the Colour, Figure, Taste, and Smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as clear, and distinct Ideas of Sage and Hemlock, as we have of a Circle and a Triangle: But having no Ideas of the particular primary Qualities of the minute parts of either of these Plants, nor of other Bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; Nor when we see those Effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus having no Ideas of the particular mechanical Affections of the minute parts of Bodies, that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their Constitutions, Powers, and Operations: and of Bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant not knowing so much as their very outward Shapes or the sensible and grosser parts of their Constitutions.

§ 27. This, at first sight, will shew us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of material Beings; to which, if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to our selves any distinct Ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual World; a greater certainly, and more beautiful World, than the material. For bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial

§ 27. *Much less of Spirits.*

(3) incompleat] 1-2, 4-5 | compleat 3 (9-10) , unquestionable] add. 2-5
 (16) which] add. 4-5 (22) yet more] add. 2-5 (22-4) not . . . Constitutions] 4-5 | not knowing so much as their very outward Shapes and Beings 2-3
 | of their very outward Shapes and Beings 1 (33) certainly] 1-2, 4-5 | certainty 3

- Ideas of Spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence, the best we can, collect, of the Father of all Spirits, the eternal independent Author of them and us and all Things, we have no certain information, so much as of the Existence of other Spirits, s but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery: And all those intelligences, whereof 'tis likely there are more Orders than of corporeal Substances, are Things, whereof our natural Faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are Minds, and thinking Beings in other Men as well as himself, every 10 Man has a reason, from their Words and Actions, to be satisfied: And the Knowledge of his own Mind cannot suffer a Man, that considers, to be ignorant, that there is a GOD. But that there are degrees of Spiritual Beings between us and the great GOD, who is there, that by his own search and ability can come to know? 15 Much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures, Conditions, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an absolute ignorance.
- 20 § 28. *Secondly*, What a small part of the substantial Beings, that are in the Universe, the want of Ideas leave open to our Knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another cause of Ignorance, of no less moment, is a want of *a discoverable Connection* between those Ideas which we have. For wherever we want that, we are utterly un- 25 capable of universal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former case, left only to Observation and Experiment: which how narrow and confined it is, how far from general Knowledge, we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this cause of our Ignorance and so leave it. 'Tis evident that the bulk, figure, and 30 motion of several Bodies about us, produce in us several Sensations, as of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure and Pain, etc. These mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with those

§ 28. *Secondly, want of a discoverable connexion between Ideas we have.*

(1) [1st] of . . . we] 2-5 | , which Spirit, [all om. 1er] we, by reflection, 1 (1-2) from . . . collect, [collect 2-3]] add. 2-5 (4) the . . . Spirits] 2-5 | their Existence 1 (11-12) And . . . GOD.] add. 2-5 (12-14) [2nd] that . . . know?] 2-5 | between us and the Great GOD, we can have no certain knowledge of the Existence of any Spirits, but by revelation; 1 (23) a] 4-5 | the 1-3. (*Coste* 'nous ne saurions trouver') (24) which] add. 4-5 (31) Smells] 5 | or Smells 1-4 These] 2er-5 | those 1-2 (Those 2) (32) those] 2er-5 | these 1-2

Ideas, they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of Body, and any perception of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions. As the *Ideas* of sensible secondary Qualities, which we have in our Minds, can, by us, be no way deduced from bodily Causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary Qualities which (Experience shews us) produce them in us; so on the other side, the Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable. How any thought should produce a motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our *Ideas*, as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is so, if Experience did not convince us, the Consideration of the Things themselves would never be able, in the least, to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have a constant and regular connexion, in the ordinary course of Things: yet that connexion being not discoverable in the *Ideas* themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependance one on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing else, but the arbitrary Determination of that All-wise Agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak Understandings to conceive.

§ 29. In some of our *Ideas* there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, so visibly included in the Nature of the *Ideas* themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them, by any Power whatsoever. And in these only, we are capable of certain and universal Knowledge. Thus the *Idea* of a right-lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its Angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this connexion of these two *Ideas*, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of Matter; the production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds, etc. by impulse

§ 29. Instances.

(3) which] add. 1er-5

(8) , which] *ad*

(5-6) effects . . . the] 4-5 | the effects or 1-3

(8), which] add. 4-5 (II) Operation 2-5 | Operations 1 (15) Con-

[⁽⁸⁾ consideration] 2-5 | Considerations 1 (23) wholly 2-5 | utterly 1 Under-standings] 4-5 | Understanding 1-3 (*likewise Coste*) (32) [2nd] to add. 2-5

and motion; nay, the original Rules and Communication of Motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any *Ideas* we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the Wise Architect. I need not, I think, here
 5 mention the Resurrection of the dead, the future state of this Globe of Earth, and such other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent. The Things that, as far as our Observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude, do act by a
 10 Law set them; but yet by a Law, that we know not: whereby, though Causes work steadily, and Effects constantly flow from them, yet their *Connexions* and *Dependancies* being not discoverable in our *Ideas*, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them.
 From all which 'tis easy to perceive, what a darkness we are
 15 involved in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our Knowledge when we modestly think with our selves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the Universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of
 20 a philosophical *Knowledge* of the Bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: Concerning their secondary Qualities, Powers, and Operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our Senses, of which we have so far *sensitive Knowledge*: but the causes, manner, and certainty of their
 25 production, for the two foregoing Reasons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of fact, and by Analogy to guess what Effects the like Bodies are, upon other tryals, like to produce. But as to a perfect *Science* of natural Bodies, (not to mention
 30 spiritual Beings,) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.

§ 30. *Thirdly*, Where we have adequate *Ideas*, and where there is a certain and discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of *tracing* those *Ideas* which we have, or may have;
 35 and for want of finding out those intermediate *Ideas*, which may shew us, what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have

§ 30. *Thirdly, want of tracing our Ideas.*

(5) the dead] 4-5 | our Bodies 1-3 (10) by] add. 2-5 (13) Knowledge]
 1-3, 5 | Knowledge, /4 (34) which] add. 4-5 (35) for want of] add. 4-5

one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any imperfection of their Faculties, or uncertainty in the Things themselves; but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those *Ideas*. That which has most contributed to hinder the due *tracing* of our *Ideas*, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of *Words*. It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* themselves, whilst their Thoughts flutter about, or stick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds, the *Ideas* themselves, that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindred Mens progress in other parts of Knowledge. For whilst they stick in Words of undetermined and uncertain signification, they are unable to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable, Consistent from Inconsistent, in their own Opinions. This having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of the men of Letters, the increase brought into the Stock of real Knowledge, has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been fill'd with; whilst Students, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in the discoveries of the material, done, as they have in those of the intellectual World, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes multiplied and disputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared Heresy to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of Words, and the ill or careless use, that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.

(16) . For . . . stick] 4-5 | ; who sticking 1-3

1-3 (19-20) . This . . . Letters,] 4-5 | : Whereby 1-3

5 | Schools 4 (23) Students] 4-5 | Men 1-3

(28) ways] 4-5 | terms and ways 1-3 (*likewise Coste*)

Tydes, 5 (32) be still] 1-2, 4-5 | still be 3

(17) they are] 4-5 | were

1-3 (22) Schools,] 1-3,

(26) [2nd] the] 5 | their 1-4

(30) Tydes] 1-4 |

§ 31. Hitherto we have examined the *extent* of our Knowledge, in respect of the several sorts of Beings that are. There is another *extent of it, in respect of universality*, which will also deserve to be considered: and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Nature of our *Ideas*. If the *Ideas* are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general *Ideas*, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that Essence, *i.e.* that abstract *Idea* is to be found: and what is once known of such *Ideas*, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own Minds, and 'tis only the examining of our own *Ideas*, that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to Essences of Things, (that is, to abstract *Ideas*) are eternal, and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those Essences: as the Existence of Things is to be known only from Experience. But having more to say of this in the Chapters, where I shall speak of general and real Knowledge, this may here suffice, as to the Universality of our Knowledge in general.

§ 31. *Extent in respect of Universality.*

(15) say] add. **1T.er, 2-5**

(29) their] **1-2, 4-5 | the 3 (likewise Coste)**

CHAPTER X

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD.

§ 1. THOUGH GOD has given us no innate *Ideas* of himself; though he has stamped no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read his Being: yet having furnished us with those Faculties, our Minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have Sense, Perception, and Reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry our selves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our Being, and the great concernment of our Happiness. But though this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers; and though its Evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical Certainty: yet it requires Thought and Attention; and the Mind must apply it self to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive Knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain, and ignorant of this, as of other Propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear Demonstration. To shew therefore, that we are capable of *knowing*, i.e. *being certain that there is a GOD*, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than our selves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence.

§ 2. I think it is beyond Question, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being*; he knows certainly, that he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical, as to deny his own Existence, (for

§ 1. *We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a GOD.* § 2. *Man knows that he himself is.*

(1) Reasoning,] edit. | Reasoning 1-5 (5) on 2-5 | in 1 (16) it
3-5 | its 1-2 (17) part . . . intuitive] 2-5 | unquestionable parts of our 1
(20) we . . . certain] 2-5 | we are capable of knowing, certainly knowing 1
(21) may] add. 2-5 this certainty] 2-5 | it 1 (22) go] 2-5 | look 1
(29) pretends] 4-5 | pretend 1-3

really to doubt of it, is manifestly impossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved Happiness of being nothing, until Hunger, or some other Pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, I may take for a Truth, which every ones certain Knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, *viz.* that he is something that actually exists.

§ 3. In the next place, Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare *nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles*. If a Man knows not that Non-entity, or the Absence of all Being cannot be equal to two right Angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in *Euclid*. If therefore we know there is some real Being, and that Non-entity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident demonstration, that from Eternity there has been something; Since what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning, must be produced by something else.

§ 4. Next, it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all being must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so *this eternal Being must be also the most powerful*.

§ 5. Again, a Man finds in himself *Perception*, and *Knowledge*. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some Being, but some knowing intelligent Being in the World.

There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledge began to be; or else, there has been also *a knowing Being from Eternity*. If it be said, there was a time when no Being had any Knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all Understanding. I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any Knowledge. It being as impossible, that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is impossible, that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the *Idea* of senseless Matter,

§ 3. *He knows also, that Nothing cannot produce a Being, therefore something eternal.*
 § 4. *That eternal Being must be most powerful.* § 5. *And most knowing.*

that it should put into it self Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as it is repugnant to the *Idea* of a Triangle, that it should put into it self greater Angles than two right ones.

§ 6. Thus from the Consideration of our selves, and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That *there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being*; which whether any one will please to call *God*, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this *Idea* duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other Attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If nevertheless any one should be found so senslessly arrogant, as to suppose Man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the Universe acted only by that blind hap-hazard: I shall leave with him that very Rational and Emphatical rebuke of *Tully l. 2. de leg.* to be considered at his leisure. “What can be more silly arrogant and misbecoming, than for a Man to think that he has a Mind and Understanding in him, but yet in all the Universe beside, there is no such thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his Reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any Reason at all?” *Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet? Aut ea que vix summā ingenii ratione comprehendantur, nullā ratione moveri putet?*

From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD, than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a GOD, than that there is any thing else without us. When I say we *know*, I mean there is such a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to several other Enquiries.

§ 7. *How far the Idea of a most perfect Being*, which a Man may frame in his Mind, does, or does not prove the *Existence of a GOD*, I will not here examine. For in the different Make of Men’s Tempers, and Application of their Thoughts, some Arguments prevail more

§ 6. *And therefore GOD.* § 7. *Our Idea of a most perfect Being not the sole proof of a GOD.*

(10) which] add. 4-5
... all?] add. 4-5
Ideas 1

(11-16) If ... leisure.] add. 2-5
(21-4) *Quid ... putet?*] add. 2-5

(16-21) “What
(32) Idea] 2-5 |

on one, and some on another, for the Confirmation of the same Truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this Truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a Point, as this, upon that sole Foundation:

5 And take some Men's having that *Idea* of GOD in their Minds, (for 'tis evident, some Men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over-fondness of that Darling Invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to

10 those proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own Existence, and the sensible parts of the Universe, offer so clearly, and cogently to our Thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering Man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a Truth, as can any where be delivered, That *the invisible Things of GOD are*

15 *clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the Things that are made, even his Eternal Power, and God-head.** Though our own Being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident, and incontestable proof of a Deity; And I believe no Body can avoid the Cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other

20 Demonstration of so many parts: Yet this being so fundamental a Truth, and of that Consequence, that all Religion and genuine Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven by my Reader, if I go over some parts of this Argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

25 § 8. There is no Truth more evident, than that *something* must be *from Eternity*. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a Contradiction, as a Time, wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all Absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect Negation and

30 Absence of all Beings, should ever produce any real Existence.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures, to conclude, that something has existed from Eternity; Let us next see what kind of thing that must be.

35 § 9. There are but two sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives.

§ 8. *Something from Eternity.* § 9. *Two sorts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.*

(7) different] 1-2, 4-5 | indifferent 3. (**Coste** 'une idée telle quelle')

* Rom. 1: 20.

First, Such as are purely material, without Sense, Perception, or Thought, as the clippings of our Beards, and paring of our Nails.

Secondly, Sensible, thinking, perceiving Beings, such as we find our selves to be, which if you please, we will hereafter call *cogitative* 5 and *incogitative* Beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are, perhaps, better Terms, than material and immaterial.

§ 10. If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of Being it must be. And to that, it is very obvious to Reason, that it must necessarily be a *cogitative* Being. For it is as impossible to 10 conceive, that ever bare *incogitative* Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing should of it self produce Matter. Let us suppose any parcel of Matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in it self, able to produce nothing. For Example; let us suppose the Matter of the next Pebble, we meet 15 with, eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together, if there were no other Being in the World, Must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to it self, being purely Matter, or produce any thing? Matter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in it self 20 so much as Motion: the Motion it has, must also be from Eternity, or else be produced, and added to Matter by some other Being more powerful than Matter; Matter, as is evident, having not Power to produce Motion in it self. But let us suppose Motion eternal too; yet Matter, *incogitative Matter* and Motion, whatever changes it 25 might produce of Figure and Bulk, *could never produce Thought*: Knowledge will still be as far beyond the Power of Motion and Matter to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of *nothing*, or *non-entity* to produce. And I appeal to every one's own Thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive Matter produced by *nothing*, as Thought 30 to be produced by pure Matter, when before there was no such thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being existing. Divide Matter into as minute parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the Figure and Motion of it, as much as you please, a Globe, Cube, Cone, 35 Prism, Cylinder, *etc.* whose Diameters are but 1000000th part of a

§ 10. *Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.*

(13) *parcel* 2-5 | part 1. (*Coste* 'une partie')
4-5 | *nothing* 1-3 (*likewise Coste*)

(28-9) *nothing*, or *non-entity*]

- Gry (a) will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of proportionable Bulk, than those of an inch or foot Diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce Sense, Thought, and Knowledge, by putting together in a certain Figure and Motion, gross Particles of
- s Matter, as by those that are the very minutest, that do any where exist. They knock, impell, and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal; *Matter* can never begin to be: If we suppose bare Matter, without Motion, eternal; *Motion* can never begin to be:
- 10 If we suppose only Matter and Motion first, or eternal; *Thought* can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that Matter either with or without Motion could have originally in and from it self Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Sense, Perception, and Knowledge must be a property
- 15 eternally inseparable from Matter and every Particle of it. Not to add, that though our general or specifick conception of Matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all Matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one material Being or one single Body that we know or can conceive.
- 20 And therefore if Matter were the eternal first cogitative Being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative Being, but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative Beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty which is to be found
- 25 in Nature. Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal *Being* must necessarily be cogitative; And whatsoever is first of all *Things*, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the Perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in it self, or at least
- 30 in a higher degree; It necessarily follows, that the first eternal *Being* cannot be Matter.

(a) A Gry is $\frac{1}{10}$ of a line, a line $\frac{1}{10}$ of an inch, an inch $\frac{1}{10}$ of a philosophical foot, a philosophical foot $\frac{1}{10}$ of a pendulum, whose Diadroms, in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to one Second of time, or $\frac{1}{60}$ of a minute. I have affectedly made use of this measure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal division with names to them; because, I think, it would be of general convenience, that this should be the common measure in the Commonwealth of Letters.

(8, 9, 10) eternal;] 4-5 | eternal, 1-3 (11-25) For . . . Nature.] add. 2-5
 (14) then] 2er-5 | the 2 (23) [1st] of] 2er, 4-5 | with 2-3 (24) be] 2-4;
 om. 5 (25-6) Since . . . And] 2-5 | Whatsoever therefore is eternal, must be a cogitative Being, a Spirit: 1 (30-1) It . . . Matter.] add. 2-5 (l. below 31:
 (a)) Coste adds, at the end of the note on 'Gry', 'Cette Note est de Mr. Locke. Le mot Gry est de sa façon. Il l'a inventé pour exprimer $\frac{1}{10}$ de Ligne, mesure qui jusqu'ici n'a point eu de nom, et qu'on peut aussi bien désigner par ce mot que par quelque autre que ce soit.'

§ 11. If therefore it be evident, that *something* necessarily must exist from Eternity, 'tis also as evident, that *that Something must necessarily be a cogitative Being*: For it is as impossible, that incogitative Matter should produce a cogitative Being, as that nothing, or the negation of all Being, should produce a positive Being or s Matter.

§ 12. Though this discovery of the *necessary Existence of an eternal Mind*, does sufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of GOD; since it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings that have a beginning, must depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge, or extent of Power, than what he gives them; And therefore if he made those, he made also the less-excellent pieces of this Universe, all inanimate Beings, whereby his *Omniscience, Power, and Providence*, will be established, and all his other Attributes necessarily follow: Yet to clear up this a little farther, we will see what Doubts can be raised against it.

§ 13. First, Perhaps it will be said, that though it be as clear as demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that Being must also be knowing: yet it does not follow, but that thinking Being may also be material. Let it be so; it equally still follows, that there is a GOD. For if there be an Eternal, Omniscent, Omnipotent Being, it is certain, that there is a GOD, whether you imagine that Being to be material, or no. But, herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of that Supposition: There being no way to avoid the demonstration, that there is an eternal knowing Being, Men, devoted to Matter, would willingly have it granted, that this knowing Being is material; and then letting slide out of their Minds, or the Discourse, the demonstration whereby an eternal knowing Being was proved necessarily to exist, would argue all to be Matter, and so deny a GOD, that is, an eternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from establishing, that they destroy their own Hypothesis. For if there can be, in their Opinion, eternal Matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they manifestly separate Matter and Thinking, and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of an eternal Spirit, but not of Matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now if

§§ 11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom. § 13. Whether material or no.

(8) does] 4-5 | do 1-3 Knowledge] 1-3, 5 | Knowledg 4 GOD] 2-5 |
a GOD 1 (19) it] 2-5 | is 1 (33) any] 2-5 | an 1

Thinking and Matter may be separated, *the eternal Existence of Matter, will not follow from the eternal Existence of a cogitative Being,* and they suppose it to no purpose.

§ 14. But now let us see how they can satisfie themselves, or others, that this *eternal thinking Being is material.*

First, I would ask them, whether they imagine, that all Matter, *every particle of Matter, thinks?* This, I suppose, they will scarce say; since then there would be as many eternal thinking Beings, as there are Particles of Matter, and so an infinity of Gods. And yet if they will not allow Matter as Matter, that is, every Particle of Matter to be as well cogitative, as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out to their own Reasons, a cogitative Being out of incogitative Particles, as an extended Being, out of unextended Parts, if I may so speak.

§ 15. Secondly, If all Matter does not think, I next ask, whether it be *only one Atom that does so?* This has as many Absurdities as the other; for then this Atom of Matter must be alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful Thought, or Will, made all the rest of Matter. And so we have the creation of Matter by a powerful Thought, which is that the Materialists stick at. For if they suppose one single thinking Atom, to have produced all the rest of Matter, they cannot ascribe that Pre-eminency to it upon any other account, than that of its Thinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some other way, which is above our conception, it must be still Creation; and these Men must give up their great Maxim, *Ex nihilo nil fit.** If it be said, that all the rest of Matter is equally eternal, as that thinking Atom, it will be to say any thing at pleasure, though never so absurd: For to suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in Knowledge and Power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance of Reason to frame any Hypothesis. Every particle of Matter, as Matter, is capable of all the same Figures and Motions of any other; and I challenge any one in his Thoughts, to add any Thing else to one above another.

§ 14. *Not material, First, because every particle of Matter is not cogitative.* § 15. *Secondly, One particle alone of Matter cannot be cogitative.*

(1) and] 1-4; om. 5 (5) this] 1, 3 | this, 2, 4-5
2-5 (15) does] 4-5 | do 1-3

(12) a] add. 1T.er,

* Cf. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, I, 150 ff.

§ 16. *Thirdly*, If then neither one peculiar Atom alone, can be this eternal thinking Being; nor all Matter, as Matter; *i.e.* every particle of Matter can be it, it only remains, that it is *some certain System of Matter* duly put together, that is this *thinking eternal Being*. This is that, which, I imagine, is that Notion, which Men are aptest to have of GOD, who would have him a material Being, as most readily suggested to them, by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves, and other Men, which they take to be material thinking Beings. But this Imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: For to suppose the eternal thinking Being, to be nothing else but a composition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being, only to the *juxta-position* of parts; than which, nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of Position, which 'tis impossible should give thought and knowledge to them.

§ 17. But farther, this *corporeal System* either has all its parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its Thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no priviledges above one Atom.

If it be the motion of its parts, on which its Thinking depends, all the Thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental, and limited; since all the Particles that by Motion cause Thought, being each of them in it self without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions, much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole; since that Thought is not the cause of Motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the consequence of it, whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking Being will be no better nor wiser, than pure blind Matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided motions of blind Matter, is the same thing; not to mention the narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge, that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis, (however full of them it be,) than that before-mentioned; since let this thinking System be all, or a

§ 16. *Thirdly, a System of incogitative Matter, cannot be cogitative.* § 17. *Whether in motion, or at rest.*

part of the Matter of the Universe, it is impossible that any one Particle, should either know its own, or the motion of any other Particle, or the Whole know the motion of every Particular; and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion.

§ 18. Others would have *Matter* to be *eternal*, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, tho' it take not away the Being of a GOD, yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his Workmanship, the Creation, let us consider it a little. *Matter* must be allowed eternal: Why? Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do you not also think your self eternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because about twenty or forty Years since, you began to be. But if I ask you what that *You* is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The Matter whereof you are made, began not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: But it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame, as makes up your Body; but yet that frame of Particles, is not *You*, it makes not that thinking Thing *You* are; (for I have now to do with one, who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too;) therefore when did that thinking Thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking Thing from Eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one, who is so void of Understanding, as to own it.

If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing, to be made out of nothing, (as all Things that are not eternal must be,) why also can you not allow it possible, for a material Being to be made out of nothing, by an equal Power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when well considered, Creation of a Spirit will be found to require no less Power, than the Creation of Matter. Nay possibly, if we would emancipate our selves from vulgar Notions, and raise our Thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how Matter might at first be made, and begin to exist by the power of that

§§ 18, 19. *Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.*

(11) ; whyl 2-5 | , why 1 (14) then] add. 2-5 (30)-629(9) a Spirit ... that] 2-5 | one, as well as t'other, requires an equal Power: And we have no more reason to boggle at the effect of that Power in one, than in the other; because the manner of it in both, is equally beyond our comprehension. For 1 (33) , to] 4-5 | to 2-3

eternal first being: But to give beginning and being to a Spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent Power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the Notions, on which the Philosophy now in the World is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them; or to enquire, so far as 5 Grammar it self would authorize, if the common settled Opinion opposes it: Especially in this place, where the received Doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves this past doubt, that the Creation or Beginning of any one SUBSTANCE out of nothing, being once admitted, the Creation of all other, but 10 the CREATOR himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed.

§ 19. But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the *making any thing out of nothing*, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer, No: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite Being, because we cannot comprehend its Operations. We 15 do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their Production. We cannot conceive how any thing but impulse of Body can move Body; and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant Experience, we have of it in our selves, in all our 20 voluntary Motions, which are produced in us only by the free Action or Thought of our own Minds; and are not, nor can be the effects of the impulse or determination of the Motion of blind Matter, in or upon our Bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example: My right Hand writes, whilst 25 my left Hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind; my Thought only changing, the right Hand rests, and the left Hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: Explain this, and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand 30 Creation. For the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal Spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter the determination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less, than to give motion it self: Since the new determination given to the animal Spirits 35 must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put in their way by thought, which was not in their way before, and

(9) p. 628(30), n. or 2-5 |, or 1 SUBSTANCE] 2-5 | thing 1 (10) all other] 2-5 | every thing else 1 (17) the manner of] add. 2-5 (18) any ... [1st] Body] 4-5 | Thought (or any thing but motion in Body) 1-3 (22) Action or Thought] 4-5 | Thoughts 1-3 can] 2-5 | cannot 1 (31)-630(2) For ... before.] add. 2-5

so must owe its motion to thought; either of which leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, 'tis an overvaluing our selves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our Capacities; and to conclude, all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension. This is to make our Comprehension infinite, or GOD finite, when what he can do, is limittted to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the Operations of your own finite Mind, that thinking Thing within you, do not deem it strange, that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and governs all Things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.