

AN
E S S A Y
CONCERNING
Humane Understanding.

In Four BOOKS.

¹-Written by JOHN LOCKE, Gent.¹

²-*The Fourth³ Edition, with large Additions.*²

⁴-ECCLES. XI. 5.

*As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things.*⁴

Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effuentem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere! Cic. de Natur. Deor. l. i.

LONDON:

⁵-Printed for Awnsham and John Churchill,⁶ at the Black-Swan⁷ in Pater-Noster-Row; and Samuel Manship, at the Ship in Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange,⁸,⁵ MDCC.⁹

TITLE-PAGE

¹⁻¹ Written . . . Gent.] add. 2-5 ²⁻² *The . . . Additions.*] add. 2, 4-5 | *The Third Edition.* 3 ³ *Fourth*] 4 | *Fifth* 5 | *Third* 3 | *Second* 2 ⁴⁻⁴ ECCLES. . . .
things.] add. 4-5 ⁵⁻⁵ Printed . . . *Royal-Exchange,*] 2-5 | Printed by Eliz. Holt,
for Thomas Bassett, at the George in Fleetstreet, near St. Dunstan's Church. 1. (Con-
cerning other issues of 1 and 2, v. pp. xvii and xxv above.) ⁶ Churchill] 2-4 | Churchill 5
⁷ *Black-Swan*] 4 | *Black Swan* 2-3, 5 ⁸ *Royal-Exchange*] 4 | *Royal Exchange* 2-3, 5
9 MDCC.] 4 | MDCCVI. 5 | 1695. 3 | MDCXCIV. 2 | MDCXC. 1

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
THOMAS
EARL OF
Pembroke and Montgomery,

5

*Baron Herbert of Cardiff, Lord Ross of Kendal,
Par, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, and Shur-
land; Lord President of his Majesties most Honour-
able Privy-Council, and Lord Lieutenant of the
County of Wilts, and of South Wales.*

10

My LORD,

THIS Treatise, which is grown up under your Lordship's Eye, and has ventured into the World by your Order, does now, by a natural kind of Right, come to your Lordship for that Protection, which you several years since promised it. 'Tis not that I think any Name, how great soever, set at the beginning of a Book, will be able to cover the Faults are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own Worth, or the Reader's Fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for Truth, than a fair unprejudiced Hearing, no body is more likely to procure me that, than your Lordship, who are allowed to have got so intimate an Acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your Lordship is known to have so far advanced your Speculations in the most abstract and general Knowledge of Things, beyond the ordinary reach, or common Methods, that your Allowance, and Approbation of the Design of this Treatise, will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading; and will prevail to have those Parts a little weighed, which might otherwise, perhaps, be thought to deserve no Consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road.

(6-9) *Lord... and] 4-5 | Lord Ross of Kendal, Par, Marmion, Sr. Quintin and Shurland;
Lord Privy-Seal, 2-3 | &c. 1* (10) *and of South Wales.] 4-5 | and of South-Wales;*
*and one of Their Majesties most Honourable Privy-Council. 2-3 | and One of Their Majesties
most Honourable Privy Council. 1* (17) *in it] 1er-5 | it 1*

The Imputation of Novelty, is a terrible charge amongst those, who judge of Men's Heads, as they do of their Perukes, by the Fashion; and can allow none to be right, but the received Doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by Vote any where at its first appearance: New Opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other Reason, but because they are not already common. But Truth, like Gold, is not the less so, for being newly brought out of the Mine. 'Tis Trial and Examination must give it price, and not any antick Fashion: And though it be not yet current by the publick stamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as Nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your Lordship can give great and convincing Instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the Publick with some of those large and comprehensive Discoveries, you have made, of Truths, hitherto unknown, unless to some few, to whom your Lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a sufficient Reason, were there no other, why I should Dedicate this *Essay* to your Lordship; and its having some little Correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast System of the Sciences, your Lordship has made, so new, exact, and instructive a Draught of, I think it Glory enough, if your Lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into some Thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your Lordship think fit, that, by your encouragement, this should appear in the World, I hope it may be a Reason, some time or other, to lead your Lordship farther; and you will allow me to say, That you here give the World an earnest of something, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my Lord, shews what a Present I here make to your Lordship; just such as the poor Man does to his Rich and Great Neighbour, by whom the Basket of Flowers, or Fruit, is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthless Things receive a Value, when they are made the Offerings of Respect, Esteem, and Gratitude: These you have given me so mighty and peculiar Reasons to have, in the highest degree, for your Lordship, that if they can add a price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own Greatness, I can with Confidence brag, I here make your Lordship the richest Present, you ever received. This I am sure, I am under the greatest Obligation to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long Train of Favors, I have received from your

Lordship; Favors, though great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the Forwardness, Concern, and Kindness, and other obliging Circumstances, that never failed to accompany them. To all this you are pleased to add that, which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest: You vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your Esteem, and allow me a place in your good Thoughts, I had almost said Friendship. This, my Lord, your Words and Actions so constantly shew on all occasions, even to others when I am absent, that it is not Vanity in me to mention, what every body knows: But it would be want of good Manners not to acknowledge what so many are Witnesses of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordship for. I wish they could as easily assist my Gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing Engagements it has to your Lordship. This I am sure, I. should write of the *Understanding* without having any, if I were not extremely sensible of them, and did not lay hold on this Opportunity to testifie to the World, how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am,

*Dorset Court 24th
of May 1689.*

*My Lord,
Your Lordship's
Most Humble, and
Most Obedient Servant,*

JOHN LOCKE.

(10) good] add. 4-5 (16) extremely] 2-5 | certainly 1. In some, but not all, copies of the Holt issue of 1, 'certainly' was altered in ink by the printers to 'extreamly' (or this word differently spelt). (19) Dorset Court 24th of May 1689.] add. 4-5 (not in Coste). (Cf. p. xv above.)

THE
EPISTLE
TO THE
R E A D E R

Reader,

I Here put into thy Hands, what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy Hours: If it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much Pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy Money, as I do my Pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this, for a 5 Commendation of my Work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at Larks and Sparrows, has no less Sport, though a much less considerable Quarry, than he that flies at nobler Game: And he is little acquainted with the Subject of this Treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not 10 know, that as it is the most elevated Faculty of the Soul, so it is employed with a greater, and more constant Delight than any of the other. Its searches after Truth, are a sort of Hawking and Hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the Pleasure. Every step the Mind takes in its Progress towards Knowledge, makes some Discovery, which is not only new, but the 15 best too, for the time at least.

For the Understanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects, only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has scaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begg'd 20 Opinions, sets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the Hunter's Satisfaction; every moment of his Pursuit, will reward his Pains with some Delight; and he will have Reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great Acquisition.

25 This, Reader, is the Entertainment of those, who let loose their own Thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy

(14) *some*] add. 2-5. In some, but not all, copies of the Holt issue of 1, 'some' was inserted in ink by the printers.

them, since they afford thee an Opportunity of the like Diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own Thoughts in reading.' Tis to them, if they are thy own, that I referr my self. But if they are taken upon Trust from others, 'tis no great Matter what they are, they not following Truth, but some meaner Consideration: and 'tis not worth while to be concerned, what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgest for thy self, I know thou wilt judge candidly; and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy Censure. For though it be certain, that there is nothing in this Treatise of the Truth whereof I am not fully persuaded; yet I consider my self as liable to Mistakes, as I can think thee; and know, that this Book must stand or fall with thee, not by any Opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those, that had already mastered this Subject, and made a through Acquaintance with their own Understandings; but for my own Information, and the Satisfaction of a few Friends, who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subj'ct very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled our selves, without coming any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the Company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first Enquiry. Some hasty and undigested Thoughts, on a Subject I had never before consider'd, which I set down against our next Meeting, gave the first entrance into this Discourse, which having been thus begun by Chance, was continued by Intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resum'd again, as my Humour or Occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an Attendance on my Health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order, thou now seest it.

This discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary Faults, viz. that too little, and too much may be said in it. If thou findest any thing wanting, I shall be glad, that what I have writ, gives thee any Desire, that I should have gone farther: If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the Subject; for when I first put Pen to Paper, I thought all I should have to say on this Matter, would have been contained in one sheet of (9) the . . . persuaded] 2-5 | whose Truth I am not persuaded 1

The Epistle to the Reader

Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Prospect I had: New Discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is; and that some Parts of it might be contracted: the way it has been writ in, by 5 catches, and many long intervals of Interruption, being apt to cause some Repetitions. But to confess the Truth, I am now too lazie, or too busie to make it shorter.

I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own Reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a Fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who 10 are always the nicest, Readers. But they who know Sloth is apt to content it self with any Excuse, will pardon me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore alledge in my Defence, that the same Notion, having different Respects, may be convenient or necessary, to prove or illustrate several Parts of the same Discourse; and that 15 so it has happened in many Parts of this: But waving that, I shall frankly avow, that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same Argument, and expressed it different ways, with a quite different Design. I pretend not to publish this Essay for the Information of Men of large Thoughts and quick Apprehensions; to such Masters of Knowledge I profess my self a Scholar, and 20 therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what being spun out of my own course Thoughts, is fitted to Men of my own size, to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken some Pains, to make plain and familiar to their Thoughts some Truths, which established Prejudice, or the Abstractness of the Ideas themselves, might render 25 difficult. Some Objects had need be turned on every side; and when the Notion is new, as I confess some of these are to me; or out of the ordinary Road, as I suspect they will appear to others, 'tis not one simple view of it, that will gain it admittance into every Understanding, or fix it there with a clear and lasting Impression. There are few, I believe, who have not observed in them- 30 selves or others, That what in one way of proposing was very obscure, another way of expressing it, has made very clear and intelligible: Though afterward the Mind found little difference in the Phrases, and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every Man's Imagination. We have our Understandings no less 35 different than our Palates; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of Cookery: The Meat may be the same, and the Nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that Seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong 40 Constitutions. The Truth is, those who advised me to publish it, advised me,

for this Reason, to publish it as it is: and since I have been brought to let it go abroad, I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the Pains to read it. I have so little Affection to be in Print, that if I were not flattered, this Essay might be of some use to others, as I think, it has been to me, I should have confined it to the view of some Friends, who gave the first Occasion 5 to it. My appearing therefore in Print, being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make, what I have to say, as easie and intelligible to all sorts of Readers as I can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than that any one, not accustomed to abstract Speculations, or prepossessed with 10 different Notions, should mistake, or not comprehend my meaning.

It will possibly be censured as a great piece of *Vanity*, or *Insolence* in me, to pretend to instruct this our knowing Age, it amounting to little less, when I own, that I publish this Essay with hopes it may be useful to others. But if it may be permitted to speak freely of those, who with a feigned Modesty 15 condemn as useless, what they themselves Write, methinks it savours much more of *Vanity* or *Insolence*, to publish a Book for any other end; and he fails very much of that Respect he owes the Publick, who prints, and consequently expects Men should read that, wherein he intends not they should meet with any thing of Use to themselves or others: and should nothing else be found 20 allowable in this Treatise, yet my Design will not cease to be so; and the Goodness of my intention ought to be some Excuse for the Worthlessness of my Present. 'Tis that chiefly which secures me from the Fear of Censure, which I expect not to escape more than better *Writers*. Men's Principles, Notions, and Relishes are so different, that it is hard to find a Book which pleases or dis- 25 pleases all Men. I acknowledge the Age we live in, is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most easie to be satisfied. If I have not the good luck to please, yet no Body ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my Readers, except half a dozen, this Treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the Trouble to be of that number. But yet if any 30 one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it securely: For I shall find some better way of spending my time, than in such kind of Conversation. I shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at Truth and Use- 35 fulness, though in one of the meanest ways. The Commonwealth of Learning, is not at this time without Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in ad- vancing the Sciences, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity; But every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and

(3) *Affection* 4-5 | *Affection* 1-3 (14) *this Essay* 2-5 | *it* 1 (27-8) *satisfied...*
 ought] 2-5 | *satisfied*; which if I have not the good luck to doe, no Body yet ought 1 (31) to
 1-4; om. 5

The Epistle to the Reader

in an Age that produces such Masters, as the Great — Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some other of that Strain; 'tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and industrious Men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that Degree, that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledge of Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred Company, and polite Conversation. Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language, have so long passed for Mysteries of Science; And hard or misapply'd Words, with little or no meaning, have, by Prescription, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and height of Speculation, that it will not be easie to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and hindrance of true Knowledge. To break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity and Ignorance, will be, I suppose, some Service to Humane Understanding: Though so few are apt to think, they deceive, or are deceived in the Use of Words; or that the Language of the Sect they are of, has any Faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardon'd, if I have in the Thrid Book dwelt long on this Subject; and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the Mischief, nor the prevalency of the Fashion, shall be any Excuse for those, who will not take Care about the meaning of their own Words, and will not suffer the Significancy of their Expressions to be enquired into.

I have been told that a short Epitome of this Treatise, which was printed 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because innate Ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate Ideas were not supposed, there would be little left, either of the Notion or Proof of Spirits. If any one take the like Offence at the Entrance of this Treatise, I shall desire him to read it through: and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away false Foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of Truth; which is never injur'd or endanger'd so much, as when mixed with, or built on, Falshood. In the Second Edition, I added as followeth:

(4) Ground] 4—5 | the Ground 1—3 (likewise Coste) (17) the] 5 | this 1—4 (28)
 1688] 4—5 | about two Years since 1—3 (35) In . . . followeth:] add. 5. Instead of this and
 the remainder of the Epistle, 1 concludes here with this paragraph: 'One thing more I must adver-
 tise my Reader of, and that is, That the Summary of each Section is printed in Italick Characters,
 whereby the Reader may find the Contents almost as well as if it had been printed in the Margin
 by the side, if a little allowance be made for the Grammatical Construction, which in the Text

The Bookseller will not forgive me, if I say nothing of this Second Edition, which he has promised, by the correctness of it, shall make amends for the many Faults committed in the former. He desires too, that it should be known, that it has one whole new Chapter concerning Identity, and many additions, and amendments in other places. These I must inform my Reader 5 are not all new matter, but most of them either farther confirmation of what I had said, or Explications to prevent others being mistaken in the sence of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it; I must only except the alterations I have made in Book 2. Chap. 21.

*What I had there Writ concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought 10
deserv'd as accurate a review, as I was capable of: Those Subjects having
in all Ages exercised the learned part of the World, with Questions and
Difficulties, that have not a little perplex'd Morality and Divinity, those
parts of Knowledge, that Men are most concern'd to be clear in. Upon a
closer inspection into the working of Men's Minds, and a stricter examina- 15
tion of those motives and views, they are turn'd by, I have found reason
somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives
the last determination to the Will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot
forbear to acknowledge to the World, with as much freedom and readiness, as
I at first published, what then seem'd to me to be right, thinking my self more 20
concern'd to quit and renounce any Opinion of my own, than oppose that of
another, when Truth appears against it. For 'tis Truth alone I seek, and that
will always be welcome to me, when or from whencesoever it comes.*

*But what forwardness soever I have to resign any Opinion I have, or to
recede from any thing I have Writ, upon the first evidence of any error in it; 25
yet this I must own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light
from those Exceptions, I have met with in print against any part of my Book,
nor have, from any thing has been urg'd against it, found reason to alter my
Sense, in any of the Points have been question'd. Whether the Subject, I have
in hand, requires often more thought and attention, than Cursory Readers, at 30
least such as are prepossessed, are willing to allow? Or whether any obscurity
in my expressions casts a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to
others apprehension in my way of treating them? So it is, that my meaning,
I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly
understood. There are so many Instances of this, that I think it Justice to my 35*

*it self could not always be so ordered, as to make perfect Propositions, which yet by the Words
printed in Italick, may be easily guessed at?*

(1-35) *The . . . understood.] 2-5 (1) Second] 4-5 | New 2-3 (likewise Coste)*
 (35)-12(12) *There . . . understood.] add. 5. In 2-4, five paragraphs followed 'every where
rightly understood.', which in 5 were placed instead in a footnote at II. xxviii. 11 (see pp.
354-5 below).*

The Epistle to the Reader

Reader and my self, to conclude, that either my Book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those, who peruse it with that Attention and Indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the Pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or else that I have writ mine so obscurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be that Truth, 'tis my self only am affected thereby, and therefore I shall be far from troubling my Reader with what I think might be said, in answer to those several Objections I have met with, to Passages here and there of my Book. Since I perswade my self, that he who thinks them of Moment enough to be concerned, whether they are true or false, will be able to see, that what is said, is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my Doctrine, when I and my Opposer come both to be well understood.

If any, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have publish'd their censures of my Essay, with this honour done to it, that they will not suffer it to be an Essay, I leave it to the publick to value the obligation they have to their critical Pens, and shall not wast my Reader's time, in so idle or ill natur'd an employment of mine, as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others in so hasty a confutation of what I have Written.

The Booksellers preparing for the fourth Edition of my Essay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the Reader, that besides several corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran through the whole Book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon said, was this:

Clear and distinct Ideas are terms, which though familiar and frequent in Men's Mouths, I have reason to think every one, who uses, does not perfectly understand. And possibly 'tis but here and there one, who gives

(5-6) self . . . far] W | self, 5-6 (12) v. 11(35), n. (13-19) If . . . Written.] 2-5
 (13) any] 5 | any other Authors 2-4 (16) Reader's] 5 | Readers 2-4 (19) Residue of Epistle not in 2-3, which instead conclude: 'Besides what is already mentioned, this Second Edition has the Summaries of the several §§. not only Printed, as before, in a Table by themselves, but in the Margent too. And at the end there is now an Index added. These two, with a great number of short additions, amendments, and alterations are advantages of this Edition, which the Bookseller hopes will make it sell. For as to the larger additions and alterations, I have obliged him, and he has promised me to print them by themselves, so that the former Edition may not be wholly lost to those who have it, but by the inserting in their proper places the passages that will be reprinted alone, to that purpose, the former Book may be made as little defective as is possible.' Coste adds paragraph: 'C'est là ce que je jugeai nécessaire de dire sur la seconde Edition de cet Ouvrage, et voici ce que je suis obligé d'ajouter présentement.' (20-5) The . . . understood.] 4-5 (20) the] 5 | this 4 (21) leisure,] 5 | leisure 4 (22) I thought it] 5 | it may be 4 (23) bad] 5 | have 4 was] 5 | is 4 (24) it was] 5 | I think 4 mention] 5 | mention here 4 ran] 5 | runs 4 (25-6) What . . . this:] add. 5 (27)-14(14) Clear . . . Impression.] 4-5

himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself, or others precisely mean by them; I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct Men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the Mind, and consequently determined, i.e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This I think may fitly be called a determinate or determin'd Idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the Mind, and so determined there, it is annex'd, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the Mind, or determinate Idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a simple Idea, I mean that simple appearance, which the Mind has in its view, or perceives in it self, when that Idea is said to be in it: By determined, when applied to a complex Idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex Ideas, joyn'd in such a proportion and situation, as the Mind has before its view, and sees in it self when that Idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a Man gives a name to it. I say should be: because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his Language, as to use no Word, till he views in his Mind the precise determined Idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in Men's thoughts and discourses.

I know there are not Words enough in any Language to answer all the variety of Ideas, that enter into Men's discourses and reasonings. But this binders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his Mind a determined Idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annex'd during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct Ideas: 'Tis plain his are not so: and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination.

Upon this Ground I have thought determined Ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistake, than clear and distinct: and where Men have got such determined Ideas of all, that they reason, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their Doubts and Disputes at an end. The greatest part of the Questions and Controversies that perplex Mankind depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of Words, or (which is the same) indetermined Ideas, which they are made to stand for. I have made choice of these

(4) By] 5 | And by 4
4-5

(6) there] 5 | there, 4

(12) simple Idea] edit. | simple Idea

The Epistle to the Reader

terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the Mind, which it perceives and has before it distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this Idea thus determined, i.e. which the Mind has in it self, and knows, and sees there be determined without any change to that name, and that name 5 determined to that precise Idea. If Men had such determined Ideas in their enquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own enquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the Disputes and Wranglings they have with others.

Besides this the Bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the 10 Reader, that there is an addition of two Chapters wholly new; the one of the Association of Ideas, the other of Enthusiasm. These with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves after the same manner, and for the same purpose as was done when this Essay had the Second Impression.

15 In this fifth Edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21 Chapter of the second Book, which any one, if he thinks it worth the while, may, with a very little Labour, transcribe into the Margent of the former Edition.

(14) v. 12(27), n.

(15-18) In . . . Edition.] add. 5

(15) altered;] edit. | altered, 5

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¹ This Table (which is not included in Coste or in W), and the following Table with summaries of sections of chapters, preceded the main text of the Essay in 2–5, but were placed after it in 1. ² Relations] 1–3, 5 (likewise Coste) | Relation 4 ^{3–3} Of . . . Diversity.] add. 2–5. The chapters here numbered 28, . . . , 32 in 2–5 are numbered 27, . . . , 31, respectively, in 1. ^{4–4} 33. . . Ideas.] add. 4–5 ⁵ 7. Of Particles.] edit.; om. 1–5

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¹ The chapters here numbered 8, . . . , 11 are in the Table in 1–5 numbered 7, . . . , 10, respectively (cf. p. 15, n. 5). ² 19. Of Enthusiasm.] add. 4–5. The chapters here numbered 20, 21 in 4–5 are numbered 19, 20, respectively, in 1–3.

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¹⁻¹ *What . . . for.] 2-5 | Apology for Idea. 1*

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21. These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.
 22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.
 23. The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.
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¹ no¹ add. 2-5 ²⁻² No . . . introduc'd.] add. 2-5 ³ Sections here numbered 21, . . . , 25 in 2-5 are numbered 20, . . . , 24, respectively, in 1. ⁴ Cf. heading in text, ad loc. ⁵ Minds] 2-5 | Minds about sensible Ideas, 1 ⁶ Reflection later] 2-5 | Reflexion had later 1 ⁷ for this] 2-5 | for, First, it 1 ⁸ It] 2-5 | Secondly, It 1 ⁹ If] 2-5 | Thbirdly, If 1 ¹⁰ Impossible] 2-5 | Fourthly, Impossible 1 ¹¹ That] 2-5 | Fifthly, That 1 ¹² Upon this] 2-5 | Sixthly, Upon their 1 ¹³ On] 2-5 | Sevently, On 1 ¹⁴ If] 2-5 | Eightly, If 1 ¹⁵ How] 2-5 | Ninthly, How 1 ¹⁶ That] 2-5 | Tenthly, That 1

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² *Reflection] Reflexion 1-3*

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¹ 10.] 2-5 | 9. 1

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¹ This entry for § 24 is in 1-5 (but not in Coste), although they contain no § 24 in the text of Cb. xiv. ² §§ 28-32 in Cb. xiv in 1-5 ³ Bodies] 2-5 | Body 1

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¹ 4. *Modes of Colours.] edit. (likewise Coste)* | 7. *Modes of Colours. [placed after 'Modes of Tastes']* 1-5 ² 5, 6. *Modes of Tastes.] edit. | 4. [5. 1] Modes of Tastes. 1-5.* (*Coste '5, 6. Modes des Saveurs et des Odeurs.'*) (*Tastes 1, Trastes 2-5*) ³ 7. *Why . . . Names.] edit. (likewise Coste)* | 8. *Why . . . Names. 1-5*

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¹ *These] 1–4 | The 5 2 Passions] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | Passion 4–5 3 Relatives] 2–5 | Relation 1 (likewise Coste) 4 8.] 2–5 | 8–12. 1 5 Under-standing] 2–5 | the Understanding 1 6 12. Liberty what.] add. 2–5 7 belongs] 2–5 | belong 1 8 25, 26, 27.] 2–5 | 25–28. 1*

^{9–9} *v. p. 25, left-hand column, ad fin.*

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¹⁰ *any] 2–4 | a 5 11 Uneasiness] 2–3, 5 | uneasiness 4 12 determiner] 2–3, 5 | determines 4*

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¹ all] add. 4-5 (not in Coste) ² Thinking,] 5 | Thinking 1-4 ³ Idea] 1-4 | Ideas 5

- 10, 11. *The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.*
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¹ Relations] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | Relation 4–5
(see Glossary, s.v.)

² than] 1–3, 5 | then 4
³ and] edit. (likewise Coste) | of 1–5

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^{1—1} Of . . . Identity.] add. 2—5. Chapters numbered xxvii, . . . , xxxi in 1 are numbered xxviii, . . . , xxxii, respectively, in 2—5. ² Good] 1—3, 5 | good 4
³ these] 1—4 | the 5 | ⁴ ordinarily] 5 (likewise in margin ad loc. 2—5) | ordinary 1—4
⁵ Relation,] 1—3, 5 | Relation/ 4 | ⁶ to, be] 1—3, 5 (likewise Coste) | to be, 4
⁷ and] 1—4 | and some 5

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7. *Laws.*
8. *Divine Law the Measure of Sin and Duty.*
9. *Civil Law, the Measure of Crimes and Innocence.*
- 10, 11. *Philosophical Law, the Measure of Virtue and Vice.*
12. *Its Inforcements, Commendation, and Discredit.*
13. *These three Laws the Rules of moral Good² and Evil.*
- 14, 15. *Morality is the Relation of Actions to these³ Rules.*
16. *The denominations of Actions often mislead us.*
17. *Relations innumerable.*
18. *All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.*
19. *We have ordinarily⁴ as clear (or clearer) Notion of the Relation,⁵ as of its Foundation.*
20. *The Notion of the Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compared to, be⁶ true or false.*

CHAPTER XXIX

Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas.

SECTION

1. *Ideas some clear and⁷ distinct, others obscure and confused.*
2. *Clear and Obscure, explained by Sight.*
3. *Causes of Obscurity.*
4. *Distinct and confused, what.*
5. *Objection.*

6. Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.
7. Defaults which make Confusion. First, complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones.
8. Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.
9. Thirdly, Or are mutable and¹ undetermined.
10. Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.
11. Confusion concerns always two Ideas.
12. Causes of Confusion.
13. Complex Ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.
14. This if not beeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.
15. Instances² in Eternity.
- 16, 17. ——Divisibility of Matter.

CHAPTER XXX Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

SECTION

1. Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes.
2. Simple Ideas all real.
3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations.
4. Mixed Modes made of consistent Ideas are real.
5. Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of Things.

CHAPTER XXXI Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

SECTION

1. Adequate Ideas, are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.
2. Simple Ideas all adequate.

3. Modes are all adequate.
- 4, 5. Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.
- 6, 7. Ideas of Substances, as refer'd to real Essences not adequate.
- 8-11. Ideas of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.
12. Simple Ideas ἔκτυπα, and adequate.
13. Ideas of Substances are ἔκτυπα, inadequate.
14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

CHAPTER XXXII Of true and false Ideas.

SECTION

1. Truth and Falshood properly belongs to Propositions.
2. Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.
3. No Idea as an appearance in the Mind true or false.
4. Ideas referred to any thing may be true or false.
5. Other Mens Ideas, real Existence, and supposed real Essences, are what Men usually refer their Ideas to.
- 6-8. The Cause of such references.
9. Simple Ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so.
10. Ideas of mixed Modes most liable to be false in this Sence.
11. Or at least to be thought false.
12. And why.
13. As referred to real Existences, none of our Ideas can be false, but those of Substances.
- 14-16. First, Simple Ideas in this Sence not false, and why.

¹ and] 1-3 (likewise Coste) | or 4-5

² Instances] 2-5 | Instance 1 (likewise Coste)

15. Though one Man's Idea of Blue should be different from another's.
17. Secondly, Modes not false.
18. Thirdly, ¹Ideas of Substances, when false.⁻¹
19. Truth or falsehood always supposes affirmation or negation.
20. Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.
21. But are false, First, when judged agreeable to another Man's Idea without being so.
22. Secondly, when judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.
23. Thirdly, When judged adequate without being so.
24. Fourthly, When judged to represent the real Essence.
25. Ideas when false.
26. More properly to be called Right or Wrong.
27. Conclusion.

2-CHAPTER XXXIII Of the Association of Ideas.

SECTION

1. Something unreasonable in most Men.
2. Not wholly from Self-Love.
3. Nor from Education.
4. A degree of Madness.
5. From a wrong connection of Ideas.
6. This connection how made.
- 7, 8. Some Antipathies an effect of it.
9. A great cause of Errors.
- 10-12. Instances.
13. Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind, which Reason cannot.
- 14-16. Farther Instances of the Effect³ of the Association of Ideas.
17. Its influence on intellectual Habits.
18. Observable in different Sects.⁻²

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

Of Words or Language in general.

SECTION

1. Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.
2. To make them signs of Ideas.
- 3, 4. To make general Signs.
5. Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas.
6. Distribution.

CHAPTER II

Of the Signification of Words.

SECTION

1. Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.
- 2, 3. Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.
4. Words often secretly referred, First, to the Ideas in other Men's Minds.

¹⁻¹ Ideas . . . false] 2-5 | Ideas of Substances are false, when the Combination is made of simple Ideas that do never co-exist; or has in it the negation of any one that does constantly coexist ¹
²⁻² CHAPTER XXXIII . . . different Sects.] add. 4-5 ³ Effect] edit. | Offices
 4 | Effects 5. (Coste '14. Cinquième exemple . . . 15. Autres exemples. 16. Exemple . . .?)

5. *Secondly, To the reality of Things.*
6. *Words by use readily excite Ideas.*
7. *Words often used without signification.*
8. *Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.*

CHAPTER III Of general Terms.

SECTION

1. *The greatest part of Words general.*
2. *For every particular thing to have a name is impossible.*
- 3, 4. *And useless.*
5. *What things have proper names.*
- 6–8. *How general Words are made.*
9. *General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.*
10. *Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.*
- II. *General and universal are Creatures of the Understanding.*
12. *Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species.*
13. *They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their Foundation in the similitude of things.*
14. *Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence.*
15. *Real and nominal Essence.*
16. *Constant connexion between the Name and nominal Essence.*
17. *Supposition that Species are distinguished by their real Essences useless.*
18. *Real and nominal Essence the same in simple Ideas and Modes, different in Substances.*
19. *Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.*
20. *Recapitulation.*

CHAPTER IV Of the Names of simple Ideas.

SECTION

- I. *Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar.*
2. *First, Names of simple Ideas and Substances, intimate real Existence.*
3. *Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always both real and nominal Essence.*
4. *Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas undefinable.*
5. *If all were definable, 'twould be a process in infinitum.*
6. *What a Definition is.*
7. *Simple Ideas why undefinable.*
- 8, 9. *Instances Motion.*
10. *Light.*
11. *Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explained.*
- 12, 13. *The contrary shewed in complex Ideas by instances of a Statue and Rainbow.*
14. *The Names of complex Ideas when to be made intelligible by Words.*
15. *Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas least doubtful.*
16. *Fifthly, Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea prædicamentali.*
17. *Sixtly, Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbitrary.*

CHAPTER V Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

SECTION

- I. *They stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.*

2. First, The Ideas they stand for, are made by the Understanding.
3. Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.
4. How this is done.
5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence.
6. Instances Murther, Incest, Stabbing.
7. But still subservient to the end of Language.
8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a Proof.
9. This shews Species to be made for Communication.
- 10, 11. In mixed Modes 'tis the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.
12. For the Originals of mixed Modes, we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding.
13. Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shews the reason why they are so compounded.
14. Names of mixed Modes stand always for their real Essences.
15. Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.
16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject.

CHAPTER VI

Of the Names of Substances.

SECTION

- I. The common Names of Substances stand for sorts.

¹ instance] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | instances 4–5
² 2–5 | Distinguishing them by substantial Forms, not pretended to but in this part of the World.
 [paragraph-break] Substances distinguished into Species, by their obvious appearances before substantial Forms were thought of. 1

2. The Essence of each sort is the abstract Idea.
3. The nominal and real Essence different.
- 4–6. Nothing essential to Individuals.
- 7, 8. The nominal Essence bounds the Species.
9. Not the real Essence which we know not.
10. Not substantial forms which we know less.
11. That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species, farther evident from Spirits.
12. Whereof there are probably numberless Species.
13. The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice.
- 14–18. Difficulties against a certain number of real Essences.
19. Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect Collections of Properties.
21. But such a Collection as our Name stands for.
22. Our abstract Ideas are to us the measures of Species, instance¹ in that of Man.
23. Species not distinguished by Generation.
24. Not by substantial Forms.²
25. The specifick Essences are made by the Mind.
- 26, 27.³ Therefore very various and uncertain.
28. But not so arbitrarily as mixed Modes.
29. Though very imperfect.
30. Which yet serves for common Converse.
31. But makes several Essences signified by the same Name.

² Not by substantial Forms.]

³ 26, 27.] edit. (likewise Coste) | 26. 1–5. The entries in the Table of Contents in 1–5 for §§ 27–51 are, generally, wrongly applied—to the immediately preceding section (e.g. the entry for § 28 is numbered '27.); the Table in

32. *The more general our Ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.*
33. *This all accommodated to the end of Speech.*
34. *Instance in Cassuaries.*
35. *Men make the Species, instance Gold.*
- 36, 37.¹ *Though Nature make the Similitude.*
38. *Each abstract Idea is an Essence.*
39. *Genera and Species, in order to naming, instance Watch.*
40. *Species of artificial Things less confused than natural.*
41. *Artificial Things of distinct Species.*
42. *Substances alone have proper Names.*
43. *Difficulty to treat of Words with Words.*
- 44, 45. *Instance of mixed Modes in Kineah and Niouph.*
- 46, 47. *Instance of Substances in Zahab.*
48. *Their Ideas imperfect,² and therefore various.*
49. *Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is supposed.*
50. *Which Supposition is of no use.*
51. *Conclusion.*

CHAPTER VII

Of Particles.

SECTION

1. *Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.*
2. *In them consists the art of well speaking.*

1–5 lists separate entries numbered 27., . . . , 42.; 43., 44. (*together*); 45., 46. (*together*); 48., 49., 50. (*each separately*). Also, in 2–5, these entries, so numbered, are incompatible with at least some of the marginal summaries in the body of the Essay. The present edition here adopts (as in Coste) the arrangement of the marginal summaries first given in 4.

¹ The Table of Contents in 1–5 lists separate entries (numbered 35. and 36.) for these §§ 36 and 37: ‘Though Nature make the Similitude.’ and ‘And continues it in the races of Things.’, respectively. ² imperfect] 1–4 | perfect 5

- 3, 4. *They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.*
5. *Instance in But.*
6. *This Matter but lightly touched here.*

CHAPTER VIII

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

SECTION

1. *Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.*
2. *They shew the difference of our Ideas.*

CHAPTER IX

Of the Imperfection of Words.

SECTION

1. *Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.*
2. *Any Words will serve for recording.*
3. *Communication by Words, Civil or Philosophical.*
4. *The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.*
5. *Causes of their Imperfection.*
6. *The Names of mixed Modes doubtful. First, because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.*
7. *Secondly, Because they have no Standards.*

8. Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.
9. The way of Learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness.
10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.
12. Names of Substances referr'd.¹ First, to real Essences that can not be known.
- 13, 14. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.
15. With this Imperfection, they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical use.
16. Instance Liquor of Nerves.
17. Instance Gold.
18. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful.
19. And next to them simple Modes.
20. The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Substances.
21. Why this Imperfection charged upon Words.
- 22, 23. This should teach us Moderation, in imposing our own Sence of old Authors.
7. Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this.
8. Calling it Subtilty.
9. This Learning very little benefits³ Society.
10. But destroys⁴ the Instruments of Knowledge and Communication.
11. As useful as to confound the sound of the Letters.
12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice.
13. And ought not to pass for Learning.
14. Fourthly,⁵ taking them for Things.
15. Instance in Matter.
16. This makes Errors lasting.
17. Fifthly,⁶ setting them for what they cannot signifie.
18. V. g. putting them for the real Essences of Substances.
19. Hence we think every change of our Idea in Substances, not to change the Species.
20. The Cause of this Abuse,⁷ a Supposition of Nature's working always regularly.
21. This Abuse contains two false Suppositions.
22. Sixthly,⁸ a Supposition that Words have a certain and evident signification.
23. The Ends of Language, First, To convey our Ideas.
24. Secondly, To do it with quickness.
25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of Things.
- 26-31. How Men's Words fail in all these.
32. How in Substances.
33. How in Modes and Relations.
34. Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.

CHAPTER X

Of the Abuse of Words.

SECTION

1. Abuse of Words.
- 2, 3. First, Words without any, or without clear² Ideas.
4. Occasioned by learning Names before the Ideas they belong to.
5. Secondly, Unsteady Application of them.
6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity by wrong Application.

¹ Names . . . referr'd.] add. 2-5

² clear] add. 2-5

³ benefits] 2-5 | benefited 1

⁴ destroys] 2-5 | destroy'd 1

⁵ Fourthly,] 2-5 | Fourthly, Abuse, 1

⁶ Fifthly,] 2-5 | Fifthly, Abuse, 1

2-5 | Fifthly, Abuse 1

⁷ Abuse] 1-3, 5 | abuse 4

⁸ Sixthly,] 2-5 | Sixthly, Abuse, 1

CHAPTER XI

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections¹ and Abuses.

SECTION

1. They are worth seeking.
2. Are not easie.
3. But yet necessary to Philosophy.
4. Misuse of Words the cause of great Errors.
5. Obstinacy.
6. And Wrangling.
7. Instance Bat and Bird.
8. First, Remedy to use no Word without an Idea.
9. Secondly, To have² distinct Ideas annexed to them in Modes.
10. And distinct and conformable in Substances.
11. Thirdly, Propriety.
12. Fourthly, To make known their meaning.
13. And that three ways.

14. First, In simple Ideas by synonymous terms or shewing.
15. Secondly, In mixed Modes by definition.
16. Morality capable of Demonstration.
17. Definitions can make moral Discourses clear.
18. And is the only way.
19. Thirdly, In Substances, by shewing and defining.
- 20, 21. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing.
22. The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition.
23. A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits.
24. Ideas also of Substances must be conformable to Things.
25. Not easie to be made so.
26. Fifthly, By³ Constancy in their signification.
27. ⁴When the variation is to be explain'd.⁻⁴

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I

Of Knowledge in general.

SECTION

1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas.
2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas.
3. This Agreement four-fold.
4. First, Of Identity or Diversity.
5. Secondly, Relative.⁵
6. Thirdly, Of Co-existence.
7. Fourthly, Of real Existence.

8. Knowledge actual or habitual.
9. Habitual Knowledge two-fold.

CHAPTER II

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

SECTION

1. Intuitive.
2. Demonstrative.
3. Depends on Proofs.
4. But not so easie.
5. Not without precedent doubt.
6. Not so clear.

¹ Imperfections] 4-5 | Imperfection 1-3

³ By] 4-5 | by 2-3 | Remedy, 1

² To have] 5 | to have 2-4 | Have 1

⁴⁻⁴ When... explain'd] 2-5 | Where it ought to be explained, when varied 1

⁵ Relative] 1-4 | Relation 5

7. *Each step must have intuitive Evidence.*
8. *Hence the mistake ex præcogniti, et præconcessis.*
9. *Demonstration not limited to quantity.*
- 10-13. *Why it has been so thought.*
14. *Sensitive Knowledge of particular Existence.*
15. *Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas are so.*

CHAPTER III

Of the Extent¹ of Humane Knowledge.

SECTION

1. *First, No farther than we have Ideas.*
2. *Secondly, No farther than we can perceive their² Agreement or Disagreement.*
3. *Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends it self not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.*
4. *Fourthly, Nor demonstrative Knowledge.*
5. *Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.*
6. *Sixthly, Our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas.*
7. *How far our Knowledge reaches.*
8. *First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity, as far as our Ideas.*
9. *Secondly, Of Co-existence a very little way.*
10. *Because the connexion between most simple Ideas is unknown.*
11. *Especially of Secondary Qualities.*
- 12-14. *And farther, because all connexion between any secondary and primary Qualities is undiscoverable.*

¹ Extent] 1-2, 5 | extent 3-4
² their] 1-3 | the 4-5
⁴ it] 1-3 (likewise Coste) | its 4-5

15. *Of Repugnancy to co-exist larger.*
16. *Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.*
17. *Of the Spirits yet narrower.*
18. *Thirdly, Of other Relations it is not easie to say how far. Morality capable of Demonstration.*
19. *Two Things have made moral Ideas thought uncapable of Demonstration. Their Complexedness, and want of sensible Representations.*
20. *Remedies of those Difficulties.*
21. *Fourthly, Of real Existence we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's,³ sensible of some few other Things.*
22. *Our Ignorance great.*
23. *First, One Cause of it⁴ want of Ideas, either such as we have no Conception of, or such as particularly we have not.*
24. *Because of their Remoteness, or,*
25. *Because of their Minuteness.*
26. *Hence no Science of Bodies.*
27. *Much less of Spirits.*
28. *Secondly, Want of a discoverable connexion between Ideas we have.*
29. *Instances.*
30. *Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas.*
31. *Extent in respect of Universality.*

CHAPTER IV

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

SECTION

1. *Objection, Knowledge placed in Ideas may be all bare Vision.*
- 2, 3. *Answer, Not so, where Ideas agree with Things.*

³ God's,] 1 | God's / 2-5

4. As, First, All simple Ideas do.
5. Secondly, All complex Ideas, excepted.¹
6. Hence the Reality of mathematical Knowledge.
7. And of moral.
8. Existence not required to make it real.
9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.
10. Mis-naming disturbs not the Certainty of the Knowledge.
11. Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us.
12. So far as they agree with those, so far our Knowledge concerning them is real.
13. In our Enquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species supposed set out by Names.
- 14-17. Objection against a Changeling, being something between Man and Beast, answered.
18. Recapitulation.

CHAPTER V

Of Truth in general.

SECTION

1. What Truth is.
2. A right joining, or separating² of Signs; i.e. Ideas or Words.
3. Which make mental or verbal Propositions.
4. Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.
5. Being nothing but the joining,³ or separating Ideas without Words.
6. When mental Propositions con-

- tain real Truth, and when verbal.
7. Objection against verbal Truth, that it may be thus all chimerical.⁴
8. Answered,⁵ real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things.
9. Falshood is the joining³ of Names otherwise than their Ideas agree.
10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large.
11. Moral and metaphysical Truth.

CHAPTER VI

Of universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

SECTION

1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.
2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of Truth and of Knowledge.
4. No Proposition can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mentioned is not known.
5. This more particularly concerns Substances.
6. The Truth of few universal Propositions concerning Substances, is to be known.
7. Because Co-existence of Ideas in few Cases to be known.
- 8, 9. Instance in Gold.
10. As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far universal propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,
- 11, 12. The Qualities,⁶ which make our

¹ excepted] 2-5 | except of Substances 1

³ joining] 1-3 5, | joyning 4

⁵ Answered,] 5 | Answered 1-4

² separating] 1-3, 5 | seperating 4

⁴ all chimerical] edit. | alchimerical 1-5

⁶ Qualities,] 1-3 | Qualities 4-5

- complex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived Causes.*
13. *Judgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledge.*
 14. *What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances.*
 15. *Whilst our Ideas of Substances contain not their real Constitutions, we can make but few general certain Propositions concerning them.*
 16. *Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions.*

CHAPTER VII Of Maxims.

SECTION

1. *They are self-evident.*
2. *Wherein that Self-evidence consists.*
3. *Self-evidence not peculiar to received Axioms.*
4. *First, As to Identity and Diversity, all Propositions are equally self-evident.*
5. *Secondly, In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propositions.*
6. *Thirdly, In other Relations we may have.*
7. *Fourthly, Concerning real Existence we have none.*
8. *These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge.*
- 9, 10. *Because they are not the Truths the first known.*
11. *What use these general Maxims have.*
12. *Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of Words, may prove contradictions.*
13. *Instance in Vacuum.*
14. *They prove not the Existence of Things without us.*

15. *Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.*
- 16–18. *Instance in Man.*
19. *Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and distinct Ideas.*
20. *Their use dangerous where our Ideas are confused.*

CHAPTER VIII

Of trifling Propositions.

SECTION

1. *Some Propositions bring no increase to our Knowledge.*
- 2, 3. *As First, Identical Propositions:*
4. *Secondly, When a part of any complex Idea is predicated of the whole.*
5. *As part of the definition of the defined.*
6. *Instance Man and Palfry.*
7. *For this teaches but the signification of Words.*
8. *But no real Knowledge.*
9. *General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.*
10. *And why.*
11. *Thirdly, Using¹ Words variously, is trifling with them.*
12. *Marks of Verbal Propositions.*
13. *First, Predication in abstract.*
13. *Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.*

CHAPTER IX
Of our Knowledge of Existence.

SECTION

1. *General certain Propositions concern not Existence.*
2. *A threefold Knowledge of Existence.*
3. *Our Knowledge of our own Existence is intuitive.*

¹ Using] 1, 5 | using 2–4

CHAPTER X

Of the Existence of a GOD.

SECTION

1. *We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a GOD.*
2. *Man knows that he himself is.*
3. *He knows also, that Nothing can not produce a Being, therefore something eternal.*
4. *That eternal Being must be most powerful.*
5. *And most knowing.*
6. *And therefore GOD.*
7. *Our Idea of a most perfect Being not the sole proof of a GOD.*
8. *Something from Eternity.*
9. *Two sorts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.*
10. *Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.*
- II, 12. *Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.*
13. *Whether material or no.*
14. *Not material, First, Because every particle of Matter is not cogitative.*
15. *Secondly, One Particle alone of Matter, cannot be cogitative.*
16. *Thirdly, A System of incogitative Matter, cannot be cogitative.¹*
17. *Whether in Motion, or at rest.*
- 18, 19. *Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.*

CHAPTER XI

Of the Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

SECTION

1. *Is to be had only by Sensation.*
2. *Instance whiteness of this Paper.*
3. *This tho' not so certain as*

¹ *cogitative] 1–3, 5 | Cogitative 4*

- demonstration, yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the existence of Things without us.*
4. *First, Because we cannot have them but by the inlet of the Senses.*
 5. *Because an Idea from actual Sensation, and another from Memory, are very distinct Perceptions.*
 6. *Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual Sensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects.*
 7. *Fourthly, Our Senses assist one another's Testimony of the Existence of outward things.*
 8. *This certainty is as great as our Condition needs.*
 9. *But reaches no farther than actual Sensation.*
 10. *Folly to expect Demonstration in every thing.*
 11. *Past Existence is known by Memory.*
 12. *The Existence of Spirits not knowable.*
 13. *Particular Propositions concerning Existence are knowable.*
 14. *And general Propositions concerning abstract Ideas.*

CHAPTER XII

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

SECTION

1. *Knowledge is not from Maxims.*
2. *The occasion of that Opinion.*
3. *But from the comparing clear and distinct Ideas.*
4. *Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.*

5. *This no certain way to Truth.*
6. *But to compare clear compleat Ideas under steddy Names.*
7. *The true Method of advancing Knowledge, is by considering our abstract Ideas.*
8. *By which, Morality also may be made clearer.*
9. *But Knowledge¹ of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience.*
10. *This may procure us convenience, not Science.*
11. *We are fitted for moral Knowledge and natural Improvements.*
12. *But must beware of Hypotheses and wrong Principles.*
13. *The true use of Hypotheses.*
14. *Clear and distinct Ideas with settled Names, and the finding of those which shew their Agreement, or Disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our Knowledge.*
15. *Mathematicks an instance of it.*

CHAPTER XIII

Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

SECTION

1. *Our Knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.*
2. *The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.*
3. *Instance in numbers.²*

CHAPTER XIV

Of Judgment.

SECTION

1. *Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.*

¹ *Knowledge] 1, 5 | knowledge 2–4 Instances in number.*

2. *What use to be made of this twilight Estate.*
3. *Judgment supplies the want of Knowledge.*
4. *Judgment is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it.*

CHAPTER XV

Of Probability.

SECTION

1. *Probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible Proofs.*
2. *It is to supply the want of Knowledge.*
3. *Being that which makes us presume things to be true, before we know them to be so.*
4. *The grounds of Probability are two; conformity with our own Experience, or the Testimony of others Experience.*
5. *In this all the agreements pro and con ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment.*
6. *They being capable of great variety.*

CHAPTER XVI

Of the Degrees of Assent.

SECTION

1. *Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of Probability.*
2. *These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content ourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a degree of Assent.*

² *Instance in numbers.] edit. (likewise Coste) | Instances in Numbers.*

¹ *Knowledge] 1, 5 | knowledge 2–4 Instances in number.*

² *Instance in numbers.] edit. (likewise Coste) | Instances in Numbers.*

¹ *Coste adds 'Et dans la Religion naturelle.'*

3. *The ill consequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made.*
4. *The right use of it is mutual Charity and forbearance.*
5. *Probability is either of matter of fact or speculation.*
6. *The concurrent experience of all other Men with ours, produces assurance approaching to Knowledge.*
7. *Unquestionable Testimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence.*
8. *Fair Testimony,¹ and the nature of the Thing indifferent, produces also confident belief.*
9. *Experience and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees of Probability.*
10. *Traditional Testimonies, the farther removed,² the less their Proof.*
- II. *Yet History is of great use.*
12. *In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.*
13. *One case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony.*
14. *The bare Testimony of Revelation is the highest certainty.*
6. *Serves not to encrease our Knowledge, but fence with it.*
7. *Other Helps should be sought.*
8. *We reason about Particulars.*
9. *First, Reason fails us for want of Ideas.*
10. *Secondly, Because of obscure and imperfect Ideas.*
11. *Thirdly, For³ want of Intermediate Ideas.*
12. *Fourthly, Because of wrong Principles.*
13. *Fifthly, Because of doubtful terms.*
14. *Our highest degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning.*
15. *The next is Demonstration by reasoning.*
16. *To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable reasoning.*
17. *Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment.*
18. *Consequences of Words, and Consequences of Ideas.*
19. *Four sorts of Arguments: First, Ad Verecundiam.*
20. *Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam.*
21. *Thirdly, Ad Hominem.*
22. *Fourthly, Ad Judicium.*
23. *Above, contrary, and according to Reason.*
24. *Reason and Faith not opposite.*

CHAPTER XVII

Of Reason.

SECTION

1. *Various significations of the Word Reason.*
2. *Wherein Reasoning consists.*
3. *Its four parts.*
4. *Syllogism not the great Instrument of Reason.*
5. *Helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability.*

CHAPTER XVIII

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

SECTION

1. *Necessary to know their Boundaries.*
2. *Faith and Reason what, as contra-distinguished.*
3. *No new simple Idea can be*

¹ *Testimony,*] 1–3, 5 | *Testimony* 4

³ *For]* 1–3, 5 | *for* 4

² *farther removed,*] 2–5 | *more their removed* 1

- conveyed by traditional Revelation.*
4. *Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason, but not with the same certainty that Reason doth.*
 5. *Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason.*
 6. *Traditional Revelation much less.*
 7. *Things above Reason.*
 8. *Or not contrary to Reason, if revealed, are matter of Faith.*
 9. *Revelation, in matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.*
 10. *In matters where Reason can afford certain knowledge that is to be hearkened¹ to.*
 11. *If the boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm, or extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted.*

CHAPTER XIX

² Of Enthusiasm.

SECTION

1. *Love of Truth necessary.*
2. *A forwardness to dictate, whence.*
3. *Force of Enthusiasm.*
4. *Reason and Revelation.*
5. *Rise of Enthusiasm.*
- 6, 7. *Enthusiasm.*
- 8, 9. *Enthusiasm mistaken for seeing and feeling.*
10. *Enthusiasm how to be discovered.*
11. *Enthusiasm fails of Evidence, that the Proposition is from GOD.*
12. *Firmness of Perswasion no Proof that any Proposition is from GOD.*
13. *Light in the Mind, what.*

¹ *bearkneden*] 1, 5 | *bearkneden* 2-4 ²⁻² *Of . . . Revelation.] add. 4-5. The Chapters numbered xx and xxi in 4-5 are numbered xix and xx, respectively, in 1-3.*

14. *Revelation must be judg'd by Reason.*
15. *Belief no Proof of Revelation.²*

CHAPTER XX

Of wrong Assent, or Errour.

SECTION

1. *Causes of Errour.*
2. *First, Want of Proofs.*
3. *Obj. What shall become of those who want them, answered.*
4. *People hindred from Enquiry.*
5. *Secondly, Want of Skill to use them.*
6. *Thirdly, Want of Will to use them.*
7. *Fourthly, Wrong measures of Probability, wherof.*
- 8-10. *First, Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.*
11. *Secondly, Received Hypothesis.*
12. *Thirdly, Predominant Passions.*
13. *The means of evading Probabilities, 1st. Supposed fallacy.*
14. *2dly. Supposed Arguments for the contrary.*
15. *What Probabilities determine the Assent.*
16. *Where it is in our power to suspend it.*
17. *Fourthly, Authority.*
18. *Men not in so many Errours as is imagined.*

CHAPTER XXI

Division of the Sciences.

SECTION

1. *Three sorts.*
2. *First, Physica.*
3. *Secondly, Practica.*
4. *Thridly, Σημιωτική.*
5. *This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge.*

BOOK I

CHAPTER I^r

Introduction.

§ 1. SINCE it is the *Understanding* that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleness, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it self: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own Object. But whatever be the Difficulties, that lie in the way of this Enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the Dark to our selves; sure I am, that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds; all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Understandings, will not only be very pleasant; but bring us great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the search of other Things.

§ 2. This, therefore, being my *Purpose* to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent; I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any *Ideas* in our Understandings; and whether those *Ideas* do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no. These are Speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way, in the Design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to

§ 1. *An Enquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful.*² § 2. *Design.*

¹ In 1–5, ‘OF **Humane Understanding**’ is printed above ‘BOOK I. CHAP. I.’, separated by a rule.

Coste treats this Chapter as an introduction to the whole following work (‘AVANT-PROPOS. Dessein de l’Auteur dans cet Ouvrage.’) and makes Bk. I begin with the original Ch. ii, with a consequent renumbering of the original Chs. iii and iv as Chs. ii and iii.

² This marginal summary, in common with all subsequent marginal summaries unless an editorial indication to the contrary is given, add. 2–5.

consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemploy'd my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if, in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any
 5 Account of the Ways, whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Perswasions, which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted some where or other
 10 with such Assurance, and Confidence, that he that shall take a view of the Opinions of Mankind, observe their Opposition, and at the same time, consider the Fondness, and Devotion wherewith they are embrac'd; the Resolution, and Eagerness, wherewith they are maintain'd, may perhaps have Reason to suspect, That either there
 15 is no such thing as Truth at all; or that Mankind hath no sufficient Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it.

§ 3. It is therefore worth while, to search out the *Bounds* between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Measures, in things, whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our
 20 Assent, and moderate our Perswasions. In Order whereunto, I shall pursue this following Method.

First, I shall enquire into the *Original* of those *Ideas*, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the
 25 Understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew, what *Knowledge* the Understanding hath by those *Ideas*; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds
 30 of *Faith*, or *Opinion*: whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of *Assent*.

§ 4. If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I
 35 can discover the Powers thereof; *how far* they reach; to what things they are in any Degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind of Man, to

§ 3. *Method.* § 4. *Useful to know the extent of our Comprehension.*

be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether; and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an Affectation of 5 an universal Knowledge, to raise Questions, and perplex our selves and others with Disputes about Things, to which our Understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or distinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any Notions at all. If we can find out, how 10 far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State.

§ 5. For though the *Comprehension* of our Understandings, comes 15 exceeding short of the vast Extent of Things; yet, we shall have Cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge, he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the Inhabitants of this our Mansion. Men have Reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for 20 them, since he has given them (as St. Peter says,) *πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν*, Whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniences of Life, and Information of Virtue;* and has put within the reach of their Discovery the comfortable Provision for this Life and the Way that leads to a better. How short soever their Knowledge may come 25 of an universal, or perfect Comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties. Men may find Matter sufficient to busy their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight, and Satisfaction; if 30 they will not boldly quarrel with their own Constitution, and throw away the Blessings their Hands are fill'd with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We shall not have much Reason to complain of the narrowness of our Minds, if we will but employ

§ 5. Our Capacity suited to our State and Concerns.

(21) St.] **1-3, 5** | S. **4**

says,) edit. | says,

(22) Conveniences] **1-4** |

Conveniences **5**

(24) the . . . Life] **2-5** | the Provisions, that may support, or

sweeten this Life, **1**

(28) sight] **2-5** | Discovery **1**

them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as Childish Peevishness, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us,

5 because there are some Things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Business by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sun-shine. The Candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this,

10 ought to satisfy us: And we shall then use our Understandings right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion, that they are suited to our Faculties; and upon those Grounds, they are capable of being propos'd to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require Demonstration, and demand Certainty, where

15 Probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-what as wisely as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to fly.

20 § 6. When we know our own *Strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of Success: And when we have well survey'd the *Powers* of our own Minds, and made some Estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our Thoughts on work at all, in Despair of knowing any thing; nor on the other side question every thing, and disclaim all Knowledge, because some Things are not to be understood.

25 'Tis of great use to the Sailor to know the length of his Line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the Ocean. 'Tis well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such Places, as are necessary to direct his Voyage, and caution him against running upon Shoals, that may ruin him. Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his

30 Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things escape our Knowledge.

§ 7. This was that which gave the first *Rise* to this Essay con-

§ 6. *Knowledge of our Capacity a cure of Scepticism and Idleness.* § 7. *Occasion of this Essay.*

(9) Coste₂ adds a reference, in a marginal note, to Prov. 20: 27.

(36) escape] 4-5 |

scape 1-3

cerning the Understanding. For I thought that the first Step towards satisfying several Enquiries, the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure Possession of Truths, that most concern'd us, whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of *Being*, as if all that boundless Extent, were the natural, and undoubted Possession of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its Decisions, or that escaped its Comprehension. Thus Men, extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into those depths, where they can find no sure Footing; 'tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions, and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism. Whereas were the Capacities of our Understandings well considered, the Extent of our Knowledge once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the Bounds between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things; between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and employ their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other.

§ 8. Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occasion of this Enquiry into humane Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word *Idea*, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.

§ 8. What Idea stands for.

(6) secure] 1—4 | sure 5. (**Coste** 'la possession tranquille et assurée') (33) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotations from the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's First Letter, p. 93, Locke's Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 63, etc., and Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 353, etc.; prefaced by 'This modest Apology of our Author could not procure him the free use of the Word *Idea*. But great offence has been taken at it, and it has been censured as of dangerous Consequence: To which you may here see what he Answers'.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *Ideas* in Men's Minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and Men's Words and Actions will satisfy him, that they are in others.

Our first Enquiry then shall be, how they come into the Mind.

CHAPTER II

No innate Principles in the Mind.

s § 1. IT is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain *innate Principles*; some primary Notions, *Kouai ἔννοιαι*, Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince
 10 unprejudiced Readers of the falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this Discourse) how Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such
 15 Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the *Ideas* of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the
 20 Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the Mind.

But because a Man is not permitted without Censure to follow
 25 his own Thoughts in the search of Truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common Road: I shall set down the Reasons, that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excuse for my Mistake, if I be in one, which I leave to be consider'd by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace Truth, where-ever
 30 they find it.

§ 1. *The way shewn how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.*

§ 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both *Speculative* and *Practical* (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all Mankind: which therefore they argue, must needs be the constant Impressions, which the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings, and which they bring s into the World with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

§ 3. This Argument, drawn from *Universal Consent*, has this Mis-
fortune in it, That if it were true in matter of Fact, that there were
certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove 10
them innate, if there can be any other way shewn, how Men may
come to that Universal Agreement, in the things they do consent
in; which I presume may be done.

§ 4. But, which is worse, this Argument of Universal Consent,
which is made use of, to prove innate Principles, seems to me a 15
Demonstration that there are none such: Because there are none to
which all Mankind give an Universal Assent. I shall begin with the
Speculative, and instance in those magnified Principles of Demon-
stration, *Whosoever is, is;* and *'Tis impossible for the same thing to be,*
and not to be; which of all others I think have the most allow'd Title 20
to innate. These have so settled a Reputation of Maxims universally
received, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one
should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, That these
Propositions are so far from having an universal Assent, that there
are a great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not so much as 25
known.

§ 5. For, first 'tis evident, that all *Children*, and *Ideots*, have not
the least Apprehension or Thought of them: and the want of that is
enough to destroy that universal Assent, which must needs be the
necessary concomitant of all innate Truths: it seeming to me near a 30
Contradiction, to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul,
which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any
thing, being nothing else, but the making certain Truths to be
perceived. For to imprint any thing on the Mind without the

§ 2. *General Assent the great Argument.*

§ 3. *Universal Consent proves nothing innate.*

§ 4. *What is, is;* and *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.*

§ 5. *Not on the Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Ideots, etc.*

Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore Children and *Ideots* have Souls, have Minds, with those Impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these Truths, which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such Impressions. For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted, How can they be innate? And if they are Notions imprinted, How can they be unknown? To say a Notion is imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this Impression nothing. No Proposition can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may; then, by the same Reason, all Propositions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since if any one can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: for a Man may live long, and die at last in Ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impression contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be, every one of them, innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate Principles. For no Body, I think, ever denied, that the Mind was capable of knowing several Truths. The Capacity, they say, is innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be, between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing in respect of their Original: They must all be innate, or all adventitious: In vain shall a Man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate Notions in the Understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of Truths) mean such Truths to be in the Understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these Words (*to be in the Understanding*) have any Propriety, they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the Understanding, and, not to be understood; to be in the Mind, and, never to be

perceived, is all one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind or Understanding. If therefore these two Propositions, *Whatsoever is, is;* and, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,* are by Nature imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them: Infants, and all that have Souls must necessarily have them in their Understandings, s know the Truth of them, and assent to it.

§ 6. To avoid this, 'tis usually answered, that all Men know and assent to them, *when they come to the use of Reason*, and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer,

§ 7. Doubtful Expressions, that have scarce any signification, go 10 for clear Reasons to those, who being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For to apply this Answer with any tolerable Sence to our present Purpose, it must signify one of these two things; either, That as soon as Men come to the use of Reason, these supposed native Inscriptions come to be 15 known, and observed by them: Or else, that the Use and Exercise of Men's Reasons assists them in the Discovery of these Principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

§ 8. If they mean that by the *Use of Reason* Men may discover these Principles; and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; 20 their way of arguing will stand thus, (*viz.*) That whatever Truths Reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the Mind; since that universal Assent, which is made the Mark of them, amounts to no more but this; That by the use of Reason, we are capable to come to a certain 25 Knowledge of, and assent to them; and by this Means there will be no difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and Theorems they deduce from them: All must be equally allow'd innate, they being all Discoveries made by the use of Reason, and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know, if he 30 apply his Thoughts rightly that Way.

§ 9. But how can these Men think the *Use of Reason* necessary to discover Principles that are supposed innate, when Reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else, but the Faculty of deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propositions, that are already 35

§§ 6, 7. *That Men know them when they come to the use of Reason, answered.* § 8. *If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.* §§ 9–11. *'Tis false that Reason discovers them.*

(17) assists] 2–5 | assist 1 (18) makes] 2er–5 | make 1–2 to them.] Coste adds 'Or ceux à qui j'ai à faire, ne sçauroient montrer par aucune de ces deux choses qu'il y ait des Principes innés.' (32) these] 4–5 | those 1–3

known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of Reason to discover, unless as I have said, we will have all the certain Truths, that Reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of Reason necessary to make our Eyes discover
5 visible Objects, as that there should be need of Reason, or the Exercise thereof, to make the Understanding see, what is Originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the Understanding, before it be perceived by it. So that to make Reason discover those Truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of Reason discovers to a Man,
10 what he knew before; and if Men have these innate, impressed Truths Originally, and before the use of Reason, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the use of Reason, 'tis in effect to say, that Men know, and know them not at the same time.

§ 10. 'Twill here perhaps be said, That Mathematical Demonstrations, and other Truths, that are not innate, are not assented to,
15 as soon as propos'd, wherein they are distinguish'd from these Maxims, and other innate Truths. I shall have occasion to speak of Assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, That these Maxims,
20 and Mathematical Demonstrations are in this different; That the one has need of Reason using of Proofs, to make them out, and to gain our Assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, That it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge,
25 which requires the *Use of Reason* for the Discovery of these general Truths: Since it must be confessed, that in their Discovery, there is no Use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, is a
30 deduction of our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of Nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of those Principles to depend on the labour of our Thoughts. For all Reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any tolerable Sence be suppos'd,
35 that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to discover it?

§ 11. Those who will take the Pains to reflect with a little attention on the Operations of the Understanding, will find, that this ready Assent of the Mind to some Truths, depends not, either on
(10) these] 1-4 | those 5 (39)-53(1) not . . . or] 2-5 | not either on native Inscription, nor 1

native Inscription, or the *Use of Reason*; but on a Faculty of the Mind quite distinct from both of them as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our Assent to these Maxims, if by saying, that *Men know and assent to them, when they come to the Use of Reason*, be meant, That the use of Reason assists us in the Knowledge of these Maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

§ 12. If by knowing and assenting to them, *when we come to the use of Reason* be meant, that this is the time, when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as soon as Children come to the use of Reason, they come also to know and assent to these Maxims; this also is false, and frivolous. First, It is false. Because it is evident, these Maxims are not in the Mind so early as the use of Reason: and therefore the coming to the use of Reason is falsely assigned, as the time of their Discovery. How many instances of the use of Reason may we observe in Children, a long time before they have any Knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be?* and a great part of illiterate People, and Savages, pass many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propositions. I grant Men come not to the Knowledge of these general and more abstract Truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of Reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after they come to the use of Reason, those general abstract Ideas are not framed in the Mind, about which those general Maxims are, which are mistaken for innate Principles, but are indeed Discoveries made, and Verities introduced, and brought into the Mind by the same Way, and discovered by the same Steps, as several other Propositions, which no Body was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore a Necessity, that Men should come to the use of Reason, before they get the Knowledge of those general Truths: but deny, that Men's coming to the use of Reason is the time of their Discovery.

§ 13. In the mean time, it is observable, that this saying, that Men know, and assent to these Maxims, *when they come to the use of*

§ 12. *The coming to the use of Reason, not the time we come to know these Maxims.* § 13. *By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.*

(1) v. 52(39), n.
(22) innate,] 2-5 | innate / 1

(16) a] 1-4; om. 5
(27), and] 2-5 | and 1

(19) Age] 1T.er, 2-5 | Ages 1
(32) get] 1-2, 4-5 | get to 3

Reason, amounts in reality of Fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of before the use of Reason, but may possibly be assented to sometime after, during a Man's Life; but when, is uncertain: And so may all other knowable Truths, as well as these, which therefore have no Advantage, nor distinction from others, by this Note of being known when we come to the use of Reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

§ 14. But *Secondly*, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the *Use of Reason*; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the Supposition of it self is false. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is Originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its first Constitution, because it comes first to be observed, and assented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has quite a distinct Province, begins to exert it self? And therefore, the coming to the use of Speech, if it were supposed the time, that these Maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much Truth, as the time when Men come to the use of Reason) would be as good a Proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate because Men assent to them, when they come to the use of Reason. I agree then with these Men of innate Principles, that there is no Knowledge of these general and self-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exercise of Reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of Reason, is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and, if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any Truth be meant by this Proposition, That Men *assent to them when they come to the use of Reason*, is no more but this, That the making of general abstract Ideas, and the Understanding of general Names, being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty, and growing up with it, Children commonly get not those general Ideas, nor learn the Names that stand for them, till having for a good while exercised their Reason about familiar and more particular Ideas, they are by their ordinary Discourse and Actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational Conversation. If assenting to these Maxims, when Men come to the use of Reason, can be true in any other Sence, I desire it

§ 14. *If coming to the use of Reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.*

(3) after,] 2-5 | after 1 (11) [1st] as] 1-4 | so 5 (25) and . . . [2nd] that]
4-5 | and that if it were, 3 | and that if it were, that 1-2

may be shewn; or at least, how in this, or any other Sence it proves them innate.

§ 15. The Senses at first let in particular *Ideas*, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by Degrees learns the use of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furnish'd with *Ideas* and Language, the Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the use of Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials, that give it Employment, increase. But though the having of general *Ideas*, and the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together: yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The Knowledge of some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that shews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about *Ideas*, not innate, but acquired: It being about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses. In *Ideas* thus got, the Mind discovers, That some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of Memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and receive distinct *Ideas*. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of Words; or comes to that, which we commonly call the *use of Reason*. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the *Ideas* of Sweet and Bitter (*i.e.* That Sweet is not Bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) That Worm-wood and Sugar-plumbs, are not the same thing.

§ 16. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven, till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got the Name and *Idea* of Equality: and then upon the explaining those Words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the Truth of that Proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an innate Truth, nor was his Assent wanting, till then, because he wanted the *Use of Reason*; but the Truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his Mind the clear and distinct *Ideas*, that these Names stand for: And then, he knows the Truth of that Proposition,

§§ 15, 16. *The steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.*

(7) In] 2-5 | By 1 (18) and which] 1-4 | which 5 (19) In . . . discovers]
Coste 'C'est en refléchissant sur ces idées . . . que l'Esprit juge'. (30) the]
1-4; om. 5

upon the same Grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, That a Rod and Cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same Grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, as shall be more fully shewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general *Ideas*, about which those Maxims are; or to know the Signification of those general Terms, that stand for them; or to put together in his Mind, the *Ideas* they stand for: the later also will it be, before he comes to assent to those Maxims, whose Terms, with the *Ideas* they stand for, being no more innate, than those of a Cat or a Weasel, he must stay till Time and Observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a Capacity to know the Truth of these Maxims, upon the first Occasion, that shall make him put together those *Ideas* in his Mind, and observe, whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those Propositions. And therefore it is, That a Man knows that Eighteen and Nineteen, are equal to Thirty Seven, by the same self-Evidence, that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three: Yet, a Child knows this, not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of Reason: but because the *Ideas* the Words Eighteen, Nineteen, and Thirty seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those, which are signify'd by One, Two, and Three.

§ 17. This Evasion therefore of general Assent, when Men come to the use of Reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed-innate, and other Truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, Men have endeavoured to secure an universal Assent to those they call Maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to, as soon as proposed, and the Terms they are propos'd in, understood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as soon as they hear and understand the Terms, assent to these Propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since Men never fail, after they have once understood the Words, to acknowledge them for undoubted Truths, they would inferr, That certainly these Propositions were first lodged in the Understanding, which, without any teaching, the Mind at very first Proposal, immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

§ 17. *Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.*

(4-5) shall be more fully shewn] 4-5 | we shall more fully shew 1-3 (19) this
2-5 | that 1 (25) other] Coste 'plusieurs autres'

§ 18. In Answer to this, I demand whether ready *assent*, given to a Proposition *upon first hearing*, and understanding the Terms, be a certain mark of an innate Principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a Proof of them: If it be said, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such Propositions to be innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate Principles. For upon the same ground (*viz.*) of Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, That Men would have those Maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several Propositions about Numbers, to be innate: And thus, *That One and Two are equal to Three*, *That Two and Two are equal to Four*, and a multitude of other the like Propositions in Numbers, that every Body assents to, at first hearing, and understanding the Terms, must have a place amongst these innate Axioms. Nor is this the Prerogative of Numbers alone, and Propositions made about several of them: But even natural Philosophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propositions, which are sure to meet with Assent, as soon as they are understood. *That two Bodies cannot be in the same place*, is a Truth, that no Body any more sticks at, than at this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; *That White is not Black*, *That a Square is not a Circle*, *That Yellowness is not Sweetness*: These, and a Million of other such Propositions, as many at least, as we have distinct Ideas, every Man in his Wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the Names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If then these Men will be true to their own Rule, and have *Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms*, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many innate Propositions, as Men have distinct Ideas; but as many as Men can make Propositions, wherein different Ideas are denied one of another. Since every Proposition, wherein one different Idea is denied of another, will as certainly find Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, as this general one, *It is impossible for the same to be, and not to be*; or that which is the Foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, *The same is not different*: By which Account, they will have Legions of innate Propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other.

§ 18. *If such an Assent be a mark of innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetness is not Bitterness; and a thousand the like must be innate.*

(11) innate: And thus, [2-5] | innate, 1 (20) this] 2-5 | that 1 (26) then]
1-4; om. 5 (36) Propositions] 1-3, 5 (likewise Coste) | Proposition 4

But since no Proposition can be innate, unless the *Ideas*, about which it is, be innate, This will be, to suppose all our *Ideas* of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Figures, etc. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience. Universal and ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the Terms, is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not on innate Impressions, but on something else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several Propositions, which no Body was yet so extravagant, as to pretend to be innate.

10 § 19. Nor let it be said, That those more particular self-evident Propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, *That One and Two are equal to Three; That Green is not Red*, etc. are received as the Consequences of those more universal Propositions, which are look'd on as innate Principles: since any one, who will but take the
 15 Pains to observe what passes in the Understanding, will certainly find, That these, and the like less general Propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to, by those, who are utterly ignorant of those more general Maxims; and so, being earlier in the Mind than those (as they are called) first Principles, cannot owe to them
 20 the Assent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.

§ 20. If it be said, that these Propositions, *viz.* *Two and Two are equal to Four; Red is not Blue*, etc. are not general Maxims, nor of any great use. I answer, That makes nothing to the Argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understanding. For if that be the
 25 certain mark of innate, whatever Proposition can be found, that receives general assent, as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate Proposition, as well as this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, they being upon this Ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that
 30 makes this Maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract *Ideas*, being more strangers to our first Apprehensions, than those of more particular self-evident Propositions; and therefore, 'tis longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing Understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified
 35 Maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

§ 19. *Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.* § 20. *One and One, equal to Two, etc. not general nor useful, answered.*

(1) Proposition] 1–3, 5 (likewise **Coste**) | Propositions 4 | (3) Figures] 1–4 |
 Figure 5 (36) in 1–4 | to 5 (l. below 36: § 19.) In **Coste** this summary is
 applied to §§ 19 and 20.

§ 21. But we have not yet done with *assenting to Propositions at first bearing and understanding their Terms*; 'tis fit we first take notice, That this, instead of being a mark, that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: Since it supposes, that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these Principles, till they are propos'd 5 to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these Truths, till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, What need they be propos'd, in order to gaining assent; when, by being in the Understanding, by a natural and original Impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? Or, doth the 10 proposing them, print them clearer in the Mind, than Nature did? If so, then the Consequence will be, That a Man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, That these Principles may be made more evident to us by other's teaching, than Nature has made them by Impression: 15 which will ill agree with the Opinion of innate Principles, and give but little Authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other Knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that Men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident Truths, upon their 20 being proposed: But it is clear, that whosoever does so, finds in himself, That he then begins to know a Proposition, which he knew not before; and which from thenceforth he never questions: not because it was innate; but, because the consideration of the 25 Nature of the things contained in those Words, would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing, and understanding the terms, must pass for an innate Principle, every well grounded Observation drawn from particulars into a general Rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only 30 sagacious Heads light at first on these Observations, and reduce them into general Propositions, not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance, and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing Men have made them, unobserving Men, when they are propos'd to them, cannot refuse their assent to. 35

§ 22. If it be said, The Understanding hath an *implicit Knowledge*

§ 21. *These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.* § 22. *Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.*

of these Principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing, (as they must, who will say, That they are in the Understanding before they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a Principle imprinted on the Understanding Implicitly; unless it be
 5 this, That the Mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such Propositions. And thus all Mathematical Demonstrations, as well as first Principles, must be received as native Impressions on the Mind: which, I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a Proposition, than assent to it, when
 10 demonstrated. And few Mathematicians will be forward to believe, That all the Diagrams they have drawn, were but Copies of those innate Characters, which Nature had engraven upon their Minds.

§ 23. There is I fear this farther weakness in the foregoing Argument, which would perswade us, That therefore those Maxims
 15 are to be thought innate, which Men *admit at first hearing*, because they assent to Propositions, which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument or Demonstration, but a bare Explication or Understanding of the Terms. Under which, there seems to me to lie this fallacy; That Men are supposed not to
 20 be *taught*, nor to *learn* any thing *de novo*; when in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For first it is evident, they have learned the Terms and their Signification: neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired Knowledge in the case: The *Ideas* themselves, about which
 25 the Proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So, that in all Propositions that are assented to, at first hearing; the Terms of the Proposition, their standing for such *Ideas*, and the *Ideas* themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is
 30 remaining in such Propositions, that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that Proposition, whose Terms or *Ideas* were either of them innate. We by degrees get *Ideas* and Names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to Propositions, made in such Terms, whose signification we have
 35 learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Disagreement we can perceive in our *Ideas*, when put together, is expressed, we at first

§ 23. *The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.*

hearing assent; though to other Propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning *Ideas*, not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For though a Child quickly assent to this Proposition, *That an Apple is not Fire*; when, by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the Ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his Mind, and has learnt that the Names *Apple* and *Fire* stand for them: yet, it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same Child will assent to this Proposition, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*. Because, that though, perhaps, the Words are as easie to be learnt: yet the signification of them, being more large, comprehensive, and abstract, than of the Names annexed to those sensible things, the Child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind those general *Ideas*, they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any Child assent to a Proposition, made up of such general Terms: but as soon as ever he has got those *Ideas*, and learn'd their Names, he forwardly closes with the one, as well as the other of the forementioned Propositions; and with both for the same Reason; (*viz.*) because he finds the *Ideas* he has in his Mind, to agree or disagree, according as the Words standing for them, are affirmed, or denied one of another in the Proposition. But if Propositions be brought to him in Words, which stand for *Ideas* he has not yet in his Mind: to such Propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For Words being but empty sounds, any farther than they are signs of our *Ideas*, we cannot but assent to them, as they correspond to those *Ideas* we have, but no farther than that. But the shewing by what Steps and Ways Knowledge comes into our Minds, and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the Business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one Reason, that made me doubt of those innate Principles.

§ 24. To conclude this Argument of universal Consent, I agree with these Defenders of innate Principles, That if they are *innate*, they must needs have *universal assent*. For that a Truth should be innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a

§ 24. *Not innate, because not universally assented to.*

Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these Men's own Confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to, by those who understand not the Terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet
 s never heard, nor thought of those Propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of Mankind. But were the Number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby shew these Propositions not to be innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.

§ 25. But that I may not be accused, to argue from the thoughts
 10 of Infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what passes in their Understandings, before they express it; I say next, That these two general Propositions are not the Truths, that *first possess the Minds* of Children; nor are antecedent to all acquired, and adventitious Notions: which if they were innate, they must needs
 15 be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time, when Children begin to think, and their Words and Actions do assure us, that they do so. When therefore they are capable of Thought, of Knowledge, of Assent, can it rationally be supposed, they can be ignorant of those Notions that Nature has
 20 imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagin'd, with any appearance of Reason, That they perceive the Impressions from things without; and be at the same time ignorant of those Characters, which Nature it self has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious Notions, and be ignorant of those,
 25 which are supposed woven into the very Principles of their Being, and imprinted there in indelible Characters, to be the Foundation, and Guide of all their acquired Knowledge, and future Reasonings? This would be, to make Nature take Pains to no Purpose; Or, at least, to write very ill; since its Characters could not be read by
 30 those Eyes, which saw other things very well: and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of Truth, and the Foundations of all our Knowledge, which are not first known, and without which, the undoubted Knowledge of several other things may be had. The Child certainly knows, that the *Nurse* that feeds it, is neither the *Cat*
 35 it plays with, nor the *Blackmoor* it is afraid of; That the *Wormseed* or *Mustard* it refuses, is not the *Apple* or *Sugar* it cries for: this it is

§ 25. *These Maxims not the first known.*

(12) **Coste** adds a marginal note expressing them; they are the italicized sentences at 57 (33-5).

certainly and undoubtedly assured of: But will any one say, it is by Virtue of this Principle, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, that it so firmly assents to these, and other parts of its Knowledge? Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehension of that Proposition at an Age, wherein yet 'tis plain, it knows a great many other Truths? He that will say, Children join these general abstract Speculations with their sucking Bottles, and their Rattles, may, perhaps, with Justice be thought to have more Passion and Zeal for his Opinion; but less Sincerity and Truth, than one of that Age.

§ 26. Though therefore there be several general Propositions, that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to Men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract *Ideas*, and Names standing for them: yet they not being to be found in those of tender Years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent Persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate: It being impossible, that any Truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one, who knows any thing else. Since, if they are innate Truths, they must be innate thoughts: there being nothing a Truth in the Mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any *innate Truths*, they *must necessarily be the first of any thought on*; the first that appear there.

§ 27. That the general Maxims, we are discoursing of, are not known to Children, *Ideots*, and a great part of Mankind, we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident, they have not an universal assent, nor are general Impressions. But there is this farther Argument in it against their being innate: That these Characters, if they were native and original Impressions, *should appear fairest and clearest in those Persons, in whom yet we find no Footsteps of them*: And 'tis, in my Opinion, a strong Presumption, that they are not innate; since they are least known to those, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most Force and Vigour. For *Children, Ideots, Savages, and illiterate People*, being of all others the least corrupted by Custom, or borrowed Opinions; Learning, and Education, having not cast their Native thoughts into new Moulds; nor by super-inducing foreign

§ 26. *And so not innate.* § 27. *Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shews it self clearest.*

and studied Doctrines, confounded those fair Characters Nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine, that in their Minds these innate Notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as 'tis certain the thoughts of Children do. It might very well
 5 be expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to Naturals; which being stamped immediately on the Soul (as these Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Men's Principles,
 10 That all these native Beams of Light (were there any such) should in those, who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out in their full Lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of Pleasure, and abhorrence of Pain. But alas, amongst *Children, Ideots, Savages*, and the grossly *Illiterate*,
 15 what general Maxims are to be found? What universal Principles of Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those Objects, they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their Senses the frequentest and strongest Impressions. A Child knows his Nurse, and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-
 20 things of a little more advanced Age: And a young Savage has, perhaps, his Head fill'd with Love and Hunting, according to the fashion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect these abstract Maxims, and reputed Principles of Sciences, will I fear, find himself mistaken.
 25 Such kind of general Propositions, are seldom mentioned in the Huts of *Indians*: much less are they to be found in the thoughts of *Children*, or any Impressions of them on the Minds of *Naturals*. They are the Language and Business of the Schools, and Academies of learned Nations, accustomed to that sort of Conversation, or
 30 Learning, where Disputes are frequent: These Maxims being suited to artificial Argumentation, and useful for Conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of Truth, or advancement of Knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of Knowledge, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, *l. 4. c. 7.*
 35 § 28. I know not how absurd this may seem to the Masters of Demonstration: And probably, it will hardly down with any Body

§ 28. Recapitulation.

(10) these] 2-5 | the 1
reputed] 2-5 | or the 1

(18) Impressions] 2-5 | Impression 1 (23-4) and
(28) Language and Business] 2-5 | Discourses 1

at first Hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of censure till I have been heard out in the sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better Judgments. And since I impartially search after Truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced, that I have been too fond of my own ^s Notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when Application and Study have warmed our Heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground, to think these two famed speculative Maxims innate: since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find, is no ¹⁰ other, than what several Propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: And since the assent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural Inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if *these first Principles of Knowledge and Science, are* ¹⁵ found not to be innate, no other speculative Maxims can (I suppose) with better Right pretend to be so.

(1-2) a . . . heard] 2-5 | you a little to lay by your prejudice, and suspend your censure, till you have heard me 1 (10) and] 2-5 | Since 1 (12) that] add, 2-5

CHAPTER IV

*Other Considerations concerning innate Principles,
both speculative and practical.*

§ 1. HAD those, who would perswade us, that there are innate
30 Principles, not taken them together in gross; but considered,

§ 1. *Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate.*

(9) truth] 2-5 | unalterable truth 1 (17) desire] 1, 3-5 | desired 2 (26) is]
1-4; om. 5

separately, the parts, out of which those Propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the *Ideas*, which made up those Truths, were not, it was impossible, that the Propositions, made up of them, should be innate, or our Knowledge of them be born with us. For if the *Ideas* 5 be not *innate*, there was a time, when the Mind was without those Principles; and then, they will not be innate, but be derived from some other Original. For, where the *Ideas* themselves are not, there can be no Knowledge, no Assent, no Mental, or Verbal Propositions about them.

§ 2. If we will attentively consider new born *Children*, we shall have little Reason, to think, that they bring many *Ideas* into the World with them. For, bating, perhaps, some faint *Ideas*, of Hunger, and Thirst, and Warmth, and some Pains, which they may *have* felt in the Womb, there is *not* the least appearance of any settled *Ideas* at 10 all in them; especially of *Ideas*, answering the Terms, which make up those *universal Propositions*, that are esteemed innate Principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, *Ideas* come into their Minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what Experience, and the Observation of things, that come in their way, furnish 15 them with; which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not Original Characters, stamped on the Mind.

§ 3. *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, is certainly (if there be any such) an innate Principle. But can any one think, or will any one say, that *Impossibility* and *Identity*, are two innate *Ideas*? 20 Are they such as all Mankind have, and bring into the World with them? And are they those, that are the first in Children, and antecedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a Child an *Idea* of *Impossibility* and *Identity*, before it has of 25 *White* or *Black*; *Sweet* or *Bitter*? And is it from the Knowledge of this Principle, that it concludes, that Wormwood rubb'd on the Nipple, hath not the same Taste, that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual Knowledge of *impossibile est idem esse, et non esse*, that makes a Child distinguish between its Mother and a Stranger; or, that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the Mind regulate 30 it self, and its assent by *Ideas*, that it never yet had? Or the 35

§§ 2, 3. Ideas, especially those belonging to Principles, not born with Children.

(11) attentively] 4-5 | attently 1-3 (25) two] 1-3 | too 4-5 (32) hath]
 4-5 | is 1-3 (l. below 36) In Coste, § 3 has the marginal summary 'Preuve de la
 même vérité.'

Understanding draw Conclusions from Principles, which it never yet knew or understood? The Names *Impossibility* and *Identity*, stand for two *Ideas*, so far from being *innate*, or born with us, that I think it requires great Care and Attention, to form them right in our Understandings. They are so far from being brought into the World with us; so remote from the thoughts of Infancy and Childhood, that, I believe, upon Examination, it will be found, that many grown Men want them.

§ 4. If *Identity* (to instance in that alone) be a native Impression; and consequently so clear and obvious to us, that we must needs know it even from our Cradles; I would gladly be resolved, by one of Seven, or Seventy Years old, Whether a Man, being a Creature, consisting of Soul and Body, be the same Man, when his Body is changed? Whether *Euphorbus* and *Pythagoras*, having had the same Soul, were the same Man, though they lived several Ages asunder? Nay, Whether the Cock too, which had the same Soul, were not the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our *Idea of sameness*, is not so settled and clear, as to deserve to be thought *innate* in us. For if those innate *Ideas*, are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be the Subjects of universal, and undoubted Truths; but will be the unavoidable Occasion of perpetual Uncertainty. For, I suppose, every one's *Idea of Identity*, will not be the same, that *Pythagoras*, and Thousands others of his Followers, have: And which then shall be the true? Which innate? Or are there two different *Ideas of Identity*, both innate?

§ 5. Nor let any one think, that the Questions, I have here proposed, about the *Identity* of Man, are bare, empty Speculations; which if they were, would be enough to shew, That there was in the Understandings of Men no innate Idea of Identity. He, that shall, with a little Attention, reflect on the Resurrection, and consider, that Divine Justice shall bring to Judgment, at the last Day, the very same Persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this Life, will find it, perhaps, not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same Man, or wherein *Identity* consists: And will not be forward to think he, and every one, even Children themselves, have naturally a clear *Idea of it*.

§§ 4, 5. *Identity an Idea not innate.*

(21) the] 1-4; om. 5

§ 6. Let us examine that Principle of Mathematicks, *viz.* *That the whole is bigger than a part.* This, I take it, is reckon'd amongst innate Principles. I am sure it has as good a Title, as any, to be thought so; which yet, no Body can think it to be, when he considers the *Ideas* it comprehends in it, *Whole* and *Part*, are perfectly Relative; but the Positive *Ideas*, to which they properly and immediately belong, are Extension and Number, of which alone, *Whole* and *Part*, are Relations. So that if *Whole* and *Part* are innate *Ideas*, Extension and Number must be so too, it being impossible to have an *Idea* of a Relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, Whether the Minds of Men have naturally imprinted on them the *Ideas* of Extension and Number, I leave to be considered by those, who are the Patrons of innate Principles.

§ 7. That *God is to be worshipped*, is, without doubt, as great a Truth as any can enter into the mind of Man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical Principles. But yet, it can by no means be thought innate, unless the *Ideas* of *God*, and *Worship*, are innate. That the *Idea*, the Term *Worship* stands for, is not in the Understanding of Children, and a Character stamped on the Mind in its first Original, I think, will be easily granted, by any one, that considers how few there be, amongst grown Men, who have a clear and distinct Notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to say, that Children have this practical Principle innate, *That God is to be worshipped*; and yet, that they know not what that Worship of God is, which is their Duty. But to pass by this.

§ 8. If any *Idea* can be imagin'd innate, the *Idea of God* may, of all others, for many Reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive, how there should be innate Moral Principles, without an innate *Idea* of a *Deity*: Without a Notion of a Law-maker, it is impossible to have a Notion of a Law, and an Obligation to observe it. Besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and left branded upon the Records of History, hath not Navigation discovered, in these latter Ages, whole Nations, at the Bay of Soldania (α), in Brasil (β), in Boranday (γ), and the Caribee Islands, etc. amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a

§ 6. *Whole and Part not innate Ideas.* § 7. *Idea of Worship not innate.* §§ 8–11. *Idea of GOD not innate.*

(α) Rhoe apud Thevenot, p. 2.

(γ) Martinieri $\frac{2}{3} \frac{1}{2}$. Terry $\frac{17}{545}$ & $\frac{2}{545}$. Ovington $\frac{489}{606}$.

(β) Jo. de Lery, c. 16.

(34) in Boranday (γ),] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

(4 ll. below 35: (γ)) Note add. 4–5

God, no Religion. *Nicolaus del Techo in literis, ex Paraquaria de Caaignuarum conversione*, has these Words (δ), *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere, quod Deum, et Homini animam significet, nulla sacra habet, nulla Idola.* These are Instances of Nations where uncultivated Nature has
 s been left to it self, without the help of Letters, and Discipline, and the Improvements of Arts and Sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoy'd these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the Idea, and Knowledge of God. 'Twill I doubt not be a Surprise to
 10 others, as it was to me, to find the *Siamites* of this number. But for this, let them consult the King of *France's* late Envoy thither (ε), who gives no better account of the *Chineses* themselves (ζ). And if we will not believe *La Loubere*, the Missionaries of *China*, even the Jesuits themselves, the great Encomiasts of the *Chineses*, do all to a Man
 15 agree and will convince us that the Sect of the *Litterati*, or *Learned*, keeping to the old Religion of *China*, and the ruling Party there, are all of them *Atheist*. Vid. *Navarette* in the Collection of Voyages, Vol. the First, and *Historia cultus Sinensium*. And, perhaps, if we should, with attention, mind the Lives, and Discourses of People not so far
 20 off, we should have too much Reason to fear, that many, in more civilized Countries, have no very strong, and clear Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds; and that the Complaints of Atheism, made from the Pulpit, are not without Reason. And though only some profligate Wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet, perhaps, we
 25 should hear, more than we do, of it, from others, did not the fear of the Magistrate's Sword, or their Neighbour's Censure, tie up Peoples Tongues; which, were the Apprehensions of Punishment, or Shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their *Atheism*, as their Lives do.

(δ) *Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaignuarum* $\frac{4}{7}3$.

(ε) *La Loubere du Royaume de Siam. T. I. c. 9. sect. 15. & c. 20. sect. 22. & c. 22. sect. 6.*

(ζ) *Ib. T. I. c. 20. sect. 4. & c. 23.*

(1) , no Religion] add. 4-5. (Not in Coste) (2) conversione, has these Words
 (8).] 4-5 | conversione, has these words (γ), 2-3 | conversione haec habet. 1 (4)
Idola.] 2-5 | Idola. Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaignuarum $\frac{4}{7}3$. 1 (4-12) These
 . . . themselves (ζ).] add. 4-5. (Not in Coste) (4) These] 5er | There 4-5
 (12-18) And . . . *Sinensium.] add. 5* (23) Pulpit] 2-5 | Pulpits 1 (29) 5
 adds, in a footnote, a quotation from *Locke's* Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester,
 pp. 447, etc.; prefaced by 'On this Reasoning of the Author against Innate Ideas,
 great blame hath been laid; because it seems to invalidate an Argument commonly
 used to prove the Being of a God, viz. *Universal Consent*: To which our Author
 Answers,' (I. below 29) Note (δ) in 4-5 is marked (γ) in 2-3. (2 II. below
 29) Note (ε) add. 4-5 (3 II. below 29) Note (ζ) add. 4-5

§ 9. But had all Mankind, every where, a *Notion of a God*, (whereof yet History tells us the contrary) it would *not* from thence follow, that the *Idea* of him was *innate*. For, though no Nation were to be found without a Name, and some few dark Notions of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural Impressions on the Mind, no more than the Names of Fire, or the Sun, Heat, or Number, do prove the *Ideas* they stand for, to be innate, because the Names of those things, and the *Ideas* of them, are so universally received, and known amongst Mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a Name, or the absence of such a Notion out of Men's Minds, any Argument against the Being of a God, any more, than it would be a Proof, that there was no Load-stone in the World, because a great part of Mankind, had neither a Notion of any such thing, nor a Name for it; or be any shew of Argument to prove, that there are no distinct and various species of Angels, or intelligent Beings above us, because we have no *Ideas* of such distinct species, or names for them: For Men, being furnished with Words, by the common Language of their own Countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of *Ideas* of those things, whose Names, those they converse with, have occasion frequently to mention to them: and if it carry with it the Notion of Excellency, Greatness, or something extraordinary; if Apprehension and Concernment accompany it; if the Fear of absolute and irresistible Power set it on upon the Mind, the *Idea* is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the farther; especially if it be such an *Idea*, as is agreeable to the common light of Reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledge, as that of a God is. For the visible marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power, appear so plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a *Deity*: And the influence, that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the Minds of all, that have but once heard of it, is so great, and carries such a weight of Thought and Communication with it, that it seems stranger to me, that a whole Nation of Men should be any where found so brutish, as to want the Notion of a God; than that they should be without any Notion of Numbers, or Fire.

§ 10. The Name of God being once mentioned in any part of the World, to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible Being, the

(16-17) species, or names for them:] 2-5 | species. 1

(24) [1st] the] add. 2-5

suitableness of such a Notion to the Principles of common Reason, and the Interest Men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide; and continue it down to all Generations: though yet the *general reception of this Name, and some imperfect and unsteady Notions, conveyed thereby* to the unthinking part of Mankind, *prove not the Idea to be innate*; but only that they, who made the Discovery, had made a right use of their Reason, thought maturely of the Causes of things, and traced them to their Original; from whom other less considering People, having once received so important a Notion, it could not easily be lost again.

§ 11. This is all could be inferr'd from the Notion of a *God*, were it to be found universally in all the Tribes of Mankind, and generally acknowledged, by Men grown to maturity in all Countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a *God*, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which if it be sufficient to prove the *Idea of God, innate*, will as well prove the *Idea of Fire, innate*; since, I think, it may truly be said, That there is not a Person in the World, who has a Notion of a *God*, who has not also the *Idea of Fire*. I doubt not, but if a Colony of young Children should be placed in an Island, where no Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of such a thing, nor Name for it, how generally soever it were received, and known in all the World besides; and, perhaps too, their Apprehensions would be as far removed from any Name, or Notion of a *God*, till some one amongst them had employed his Thoughts, to enquire into the Constitution and Causes of things, which would easily lead him to the Notion of a *God*; which having once taught to others, Reason, and the natural Propensity of their own Thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

§ 12. Indeed it is urged, That it is *suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint, upon the Minds of Men, Characters and Notions of himself*, and not to leave them in the dark, and doubt, in so grand a Concernment; and also by that means, to secure to himself the Homage and Veneration, due from so intelligent a Creature as Man; and therefore he has done it.

35 This Argument, if it be of any Force, will prove much more than

§ 12. *Suitable to GOD's Goodness, that all Men should have an Idea of Him, therefore naturally imprinted by Him; answer'd.*

those, who use it in this case, expect from it. For if we may conclude, that *God* hath done for Men, all that Men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove, not only, that God has imprinted on the Minds of Men an *Idea* of himself; but that he hath plainly stamp'd there, in fair Characters, 5 all that Men ought to know, or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will and Affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think it better for Men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after Knowledge, as St. *Paul* tells us all Nations did after God, *Acts* 10 XVII. 27. than that their Wills should clash with their Understandings, and their Appetites cross their Duty. The *Romanists* say, 'Tis best for Men, and so, suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible Judge of Controversies on Earth ; and therefore there is one: and I, by the same Reason, say, 'Tis better for 15 Men that every Man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether by the force of this Argument they shall think, that every Man is so. I think it a very good Argument, to say, the infinitely wise God hath made it so: And therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much Confidence of our own *Wisdom*, to say, I think it 20 best, and therefore God hath made it so; and in the matter in Hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a Topick, that God hath done so, when certain Experience shews us, that he hath not. But the Goodness of God hath not been wanting to Men without such Original Impressions of Knowledge, or *Ideas* stamped on the Mind: since he 25 hath furnished Man with those Faculties, which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a Being; and I doubt not but to shew, that a Man by the right use of his natural Abilities, may, without any innate Principles, attain the Knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued Man with those Faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more obliged by his Goodness, to implant those innate Notions in his Mind, than that having given him Reason, Hands, and Materials, he should build him Bridges, or Houses; which some People in the World, however of good parts, do either totally want, 30 or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without *Ideas* of 35

(8) Affections] 2er-5 | Affection 1-2

(12-18) The . . . so] not in *Coste*.(14) there] 1-3, 5 (likewise *Coste*) | their 4

(18) it] 1-2, 4-5 | it is 3 (like-

(34) Houses;) 1-3, W | Houses 4 | Houses, 5. (*Coste* has a full

stop.) (35) parts,) 1-3, 5 | parts 4

God, and Principles of Morality; or at least have but very ill ones. The reason in both cases being, That they never employ'd their Parts, Faculties, and Powers, industriously that way, but contented themselves with the Opinions, Fashions, and Things of their
 5 Country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born at the Bay of *Soldania*, possibly our Thoughts, and Notions, had not exceeded those brutish ones of the *Hotentots* that inhabit there: And had the *Virginia King Apochancana*, been educated in *England*, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a Divine,
 10 and as good a Mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him, and a more improved *English-man*, lying barely in this, That the exercise of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes, and Notions of his own Country, and never directed to any other, or farther Enquiries: And if he had not any *Idea* of a God, it was only
 15 because he pursued not those Thoughts, that would have led him to it.

§ 13. I grant, That if there were any *Ideas* to be found imprinted on the Minds of Men, we have reason to expect, it should be the *Notion of his Maker*, as a mark GOD set on his own Workmanship, to mind
 20 Man of his dependance and Duty; and that herein should appear the first instances of humane Knowledge. But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in Children? And when we find it there, How much more does it resemble the Opinion, and Notion of the Teacher, than represent the True God? He that shall observe in
 25 Children, the progress whereby their Minds attain the knowledge they have, will think, that the Objects they do first, and most familiarly converse with, are those that make the first impressions on their Understandings: Nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. It is easie to take notice, how their Thoughts enlarge them-
 30 selves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible Objects, to retain the *Ideas* of them in their memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways put them together. How by these means they come to frame in their minds an *Idea* Men have of a Deity, I shall hereafter shew.

35 § 14. Can it be thought, that the *Ideas* Men have of God, are the Characters, and Marks of Himself, engraven in their minds by his own finger, when we see, that in the same Country, under one and
 §§ 13-16. Ideas of GOD various in different Men.

(9) educated] 1-3, 5 | Educated 4
 'Exercice') (34) Men have] add. 5

(12) [1st] the] 1-3; om. 4-5. (Coste

the same Name, *Men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent Ideas*, and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a Name, or Sound, will scarce prove an innate Notion of Him.

§ 15. What true or tolerable Notion of a *Deity*, could they have, who acknowledged, and worshipped hundreds? Every Deity, that they owned above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him, and a proof, that they had no true Notion of God, where Unity, Infinity, and Eternity, were excluded. To which if we add their gross Conceptions of Corporeity, expressed in their Images, and Representations of their Deities; the Amours, Marriages, Copulations, Lusts, Quarrels, and other mean Qualities, attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think, that the heathen World, *i.e.* the greatest part of mankind, had such *Ideas* of God in their minds, as he himself, out of care, that they should not be mistaken about him, was Author of. And this universality of consent, so much argued, if it prove any native impressions, 'twill be only this: That God imprinted on the minds of all Men, speaking the same Language, a Name for Himself, but not any *Idea*: Since those People, who agreed in the Name, had at the same time, far different apprehensions about the thing signified. If they say, That the variety of Deities worshipped by the heathen World, were but figurative ways of expressing the several Attributes of that incomprehensible Being, or several parts of his Providence: I answer, What they might be in their original, I will not here enquire; but that they were so in the Thoughts of the Vulgar, I think no body will affirm: And he that will consult the Voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other Testimonies) will find, that the Theology of the Siamites, professedly owns a plurality of Gods: Or, as the *Abbé de Choisy* more judiciously remarks, in his *Journal du Voyage de Siam*, 107, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§ 15 [bis]. If it be said, That *wise Men* of all Nations came to have true Conceptions of the Unity and Infinity of the *Deity*, I grant it. But then this,

First, Excludes universality of Consent in any thing, but the name, for those wise Men being very few, perhaps one of a thousand, this universality is very narrow.

(8) were] 1er-5 | were always 1
(likewise Coste) | Abbe 4-5

(28) a] add. 4-5

(32)

(29) Abbé] 1-3

In 1-5, this section is numbered 15, as is the preceding one; in Coste, it is numbered 16.

Secondly, It seems to me plainly to prove, That the truest and best Notions Men had of God, were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their Faculties: since the wise and considerate Men of the World, by a right and careful s employment of their Thoughts and Reason, attained true Notions in this, as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of Men, making the far greater number, took up their Notions, by chance, from common Tradition and vulgar Conceptions, without much beating their Heads about them. And if it be a reason to 10 think *the notion of God innate*, because all wise Men had it, Virtue too must be thought innate; for that also wise Men have always had.

§ 16. This was evidently the case of all *Gentilism*: Nor hath even amongst *Jews*, *Christians*, and *Mahometans*, who acknowledge but One God, this Doctrine, and the care is taken in those Nations to 15 teach Men, to have true Notions of a GOD, prevailed so far, as to make Men to have the same, and true *Ideas* of Him. How many, even amongst us, will be found upon enquiry, to fancy him in the shape of a Man, sitting in Heaven; and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him? Christians, as well as Turks, have had 20 whole Sects owning, and contending earnestly for it, That the Deity was corporeal and of humane shape: And though we find few amongst us, who profess themselves *Anthropomorphites*, (though some I have met with, that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his business, may find amongst the ignorant, and uninstructed 25 Christians, many of that Opinion. Talk but with Country-people, almost of any Age; or young People, almost of any condition, and you shall find, that though the Name of GOD be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions they apply this Name to, are so odd, low, and pitiful, that no body can imagine, they were taught by a rational Man; much less, that they were Characters writ by the finger of God Himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the Goodness 30 of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these *Ideas* of Himself, than that he hath sent us into the World, with Bodies unclothed; and that there is no Art or Skill born with us. For being 35 fitted with Faculties to attain these, it is want of Industry, and Consideration in us, and not of Bounty in Him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain, that there is a God, as that the opposite Angles,

(8) Conceptions,] 1-3, 5 | Conceptions 4 (10) too] add. 2-5 (12) This section is treated in Coste as a paragraph in the section there numbered 16 (v. 93(32), n.).
 (21) few] 5 | few now 1-4 (26) People . . . condition] 2-5 | people almost any where 1 (30) Characters] 1er-5 | the Characters 1

made by the intersection of two strait Lines, are equal. There was never any rational Creature, that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these Propositions, that could fail to assent to them: Though yet it be past doubt, that there are many Men, who having not applied their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal Consent, such an one I easily allow: But such an universal Consent as this, proves not the *Idea of God*, no more than it does the *Idea of such Angles, innate.*

§ 17. Since then though the knowledge of a *GOD*, be the most natural discovery of humane Reason, yet the *Idea of him*, is *not innate*, as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other *Idea* found, that can pretend to it: since if God had set any impression, any character on the Understanding of Men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform *Idea* of Himself, as far as our weak Capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an Object. But our minds being, at first, void of that *Idea*, which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate Characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

§ 18. I confess, there is another *Idea*, which would be of general use for Mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the *Idea of Substance*, which we neither have, nor can have, by *Sensation* or *Reflection*. If Nature took care to provide us any *Ideas*, we might well expect it should be such, as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to our selves: But we see on the contrary, that since by those ways, whereby other *Ideas* are brought into our Minds, this is not, We have no such *clear Idea* at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word *Substance*, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what; (*i.e.* of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive) *Idea*, which we take to be the *substratum*, or support, of those *Ideas* we do know.

§ 19. Whatever then we talk of innate, either *speculative*, or

§ 17. If the Idea of *GOD* be not innate, no other can be supposed innate. § 18. Idea of Substance not innate. § 19. No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.

(4) it] 1-4; om. 5

(14) set . . . character] 2-5 | left any natural impres-

sions 1

(15-16) clear and uniform *Idea*] 2-5 | Characters 1

(28) whereby]

1-3, 5 | where by 4

(31-2) particular distinct positive] add. 4-5

practical *Principles*, it may, with as much probability, be said, That a Man hath 100*l.* sterling in his Pocket, and yet denied, that he hath there either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of which the Sum is to be made up; as to think, that certain Propositions are innate, when the *Ideas* about which they are, can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given, doth *not* at all prove, that the *Ideas* expressed in them, are *innate*: For in many cases, however the *Ideas* came there, the assent to Words expressing the agreement, or disagreement, of such *Ideas*, will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true *Idea* of *God*, and *Worship*, will assent to this Proposition, That God is to be worshiped, when expressed, in a Language he understands: And every rational Man, that hath not thought on it to day, may be ready to assent to this Proposition to morrow; and yet millions of Men may be well supposed to want one, or both, of those *Ideas* to day. For if we will allow Savages, and most Country-people, to have *Ideas* of *God* and *Worship* (which conversation with them, will not make one forward to believe) yet I think, few Children can be supposed to have those *Ideas*, which therefore they must begin to have sometime or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that Proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing, no more proves the *Ideas* to be innate, than it does, That one born blind (with Cataracts, which will be couched to morrow) had the innate *Ideas* of the Sun, or Light, or Saffron, or Yellow; because when his Sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this Proposition, That the Sun is lucid, or that Saffron is yellow: And therefore if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the *Ideas* innate, it can much less the Propositions made up of those *Ideas*. If they have any innate *Ideas*, I would be glad to be told, what, and how many they are.

§ 20. To which let me add: If there be any innate *Ideas*, any *Ideas*, in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on; they must be lodg'd in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by Remembrance; *i.e.* must be known, when they are remembred, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember is to

§ 20. No innate Ideas in the memory.

(2) denied,] 4-5 | deny 1-3 (3) there] 1-4; om. 5 (15) of] 1-3; om.
4-5 (31)-98(25) The whole of this section add. 2-5

perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived before: without this, whatever *Idea* comes into the mind is new, and not remembred: This consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that, which distinguishes Remembred from all other ways of Thinking. Whatever *Idea* was 5 never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever *Idea* is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an *Idea* without memory, the *Idea* appears perfectly 10 new and unknown before to the Understanding: Whenever the memory brings any *Idea* into actual view, it is with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a Stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every ones observation: And then I desire an instance of an *Idea*, pretended to be innate, 15 which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an *Idea*, he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever *Idea* comes into the mind without that consciousness is not remembred, or comes not 20 out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance. For what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppose a Child had the use of his Eyes till he knows and distinguishes Colours; but then Cataracts shut the Windows, 25 and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark; and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the *Ideas* of colours, he once had. This was the case of a blind Man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small Pox when he was a Child, and had no more notion of colours, than one born Blind. I ask whether any one can say this 30 Man had then any *Ideas* of colours in his mind, any more than one born Blind? And I think no body will say, that either of them had in his mind any *Idea* of colours at all. His cataracts are couch'd, and then he has the *Ideas* (which he remembers not) of colours, *de novo*, by his restor'd sight, convey'd to his mind, and that without any 35 consciousness of a former acquaintance. And these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these *Ideas* of colours, which when out of view can be reviv'd with a consciousness

(10) an] 5 | any 2-4

(15) [2nd] an] 5 | any 2-4

(16) hereafter] 2-3, 5 | here after 4

of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this is, that whatever *Idea* being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be
 5 in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory, which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembred. If therefore there be any innate *Ideas*, they must be in the memory, or else no where in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can
 10 be reviv'd without any impression from without, and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembred, i.e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant, and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not
 15 in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new, and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in it self, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate *Ideas* in the mind
 20 before impression from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. I would fain meet with the Man, who when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time remembred any of them: And to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are *Ideas* in the mind, that are not in the memory; I desire him to explain himself, and
 25 make what he says intelligible.

§ 21. Besides what I have already said, there is another Reason, why I doubt, that neither these, nor any other Principles are innate. I that am fully perswaded, that the infinitely Wise GOD made all Things in perfect Wisdom, cannot satisfy my self, why he should
 30 be supposed to print upon the minds of Men, some universal *Principles*; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern *Speculation*, are of no great use; and those that concern *Practice*, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other *Truths*, not allowed to be innate. For to what purpose should Characters be graven
 35 on the Mind, by the Finger of God, which are not clearer there, than those, which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguish'd from them? If any one thinks there are such innate *Ideas* and

§ 21. *Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.*

(3) mind, is there] 2er, 4-5 | mind, there 3 | mind 2
 mind: 4 (18) [2nd] it] 2-4 | its 5 (25) p. 96(31), n. (14) mind; 2-3, 5 |
 (26) 21] 2-5 | 20 1

Propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness, are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us, which they are; and then every one will be a fit Judge, whether they be so, or no. Since if there be such innate *Ideas* and Impressions, plainly different from all our other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate Maxims, I have spoken already; of their usefulness, I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§ 22. To conclude, some *Ideas* forwardly offer themselves to all Men's Understandings; and some sorts of Truths result from any *Ideas*, as soon as the mind puts them into Propositions: Other Truths require a train of *Ideas* placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered, and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: But the truth is, *Ideas* and Notions are no more born with us, than Arts and Sciences; though some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our Faculties, more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received: Though that too, be according as the Organs of our Bodies, and Powers of our Minds, happen to be employ'd; *God having fitted Men with faculties and means, to discover, receive, and retain Truths, accordingly as they are employ'd*. The great difference that is to be found in the Notions of Mankind, is, from the different use they put their Faculties to, whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of Assent, by lazily enslaving their Minds, to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow: Others employing their Thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their Thoughts loose, in the search of other Enquiries. Thus, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones, is a Truth, as certain as any thing can be; and I think more evident, than many of those Propositions, that go for Principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their

§ 22. Difference of Men's Discoveries depends upon the different application of their Faculties.

(6) our] 1-4; om. 5
ceive] 2-5 | observe 1

(10) 22] 2-5 | 21 1
(24) Notions] 1er-5 | Notion 1

(11) and] 1-4; om. 5
(37) who] add. 2-5

(22) re-

Thoughts on work about such Angles: And he that certainly knows this Proposition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other Propositions, in Mathematicks it self, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical Truths, he
 5 stopp'd his Thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the Being of a Deity; for though there be no Truth, which a Man may more evidently make out to himself, than the Existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things, as he finds them, in this World, as they minister
 10 to his Pleasures and Passions, and not make enquiry a little farther into their Causes, Ends, and admirable Contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being: And if any Person hath, by talk, put such a Notion into his head, he may, perhaps, believe it: But if
 15 he hath never *examined* it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter, than his, who having been told, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration; and may yield his assent as to a probable Opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his
 20 Faculties, if carefully employ'd, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to shew how much our *knowledge depends upon the right use of those Powers Nature hath bestowed upon us*, and how little upon such innate Principles, as are in vain supposed to be in all Mankind for their direction; which all Men
 25 could not but know, if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose: And which since all Men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.

§ 23. What censure, doubting thus of innate Principles, may
 30 deserve from Men, who will be apt to call it, pulling up the old foundations of Knowledge and Certainty, I cannot tell: I perswade my self, at least, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to Truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business, either to quit, or follow any Authority in the
 35 ensuing Discourse: Truth has been my only aim; and where-ever that has appeared to lead, my Thoughts have impartially followed,

§ 23. *Men must think and know for themselves.*

(18) to] **1-4**; om. 5
add. **2-5**

(29) 23] **2-5** | 22 **1**

(23) such innate Principles, as] **2-5** | those innate Principles, which **1** (25) not but] **1-4** | but not **5** (26-8) : And . . . such] (31) foundations] **2-5** | foundation **1**

without minding, whether the footsteps of any other lay that way, or no. Not that I want a due respect to other Mens Opinions; but after all, the *greatest reverence is due to Truth*; and, I hope, it will not be thought arrogance, to say, That, perhaps, we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative *Knowledge*, if we sought it in the Fountain, *in the consideration of Things themselves*; and made use rather of our own Thoughts, than other Mens to find it. For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other Mens Eyes, as to know by other Mens Understandings. So much as we our selves consider and comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of real and true Knowledge. The floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was Science, is in us but Opiniatrety, whilst we give up our Assent only to rever-
 end Names, and do not, as they did, employ our own Reason to understand those *Truths*, which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing Man, but no body ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the Opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's Principles, without examining them, made not him a Philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the Sciences, every one has so much, as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreads; which however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock, who gathers them. Such borrowed Wealth, like Fairy-money, though it were Gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but Leaves and Dust when it comes to use.

§ 24. When Men have found some general Propositions that could not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was, I know, *a short and easy way to conclude them innate*. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopp'd the enquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once stiled innate: And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be Masters and Teachers, to make this the Principle of *Principles*, That Principles must not be questioned: For having once established this Tenet, That there are innate Principles, it put their Followers upon a

§ 24. Whence the Opinion of innate Principles.

(20-1) will hardly make any body] 2-5 | can make no body 1 (28) 24] 2-5 |
 23 1

necessity of receiving some Doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put them upon believing and taking them upon trust, without farther examination: In which posture of blind Credulity, they might be
 5 more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of Men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles, and Teacher of unquestionable Truths; and to make a Man swallow that for an innate Principle,
 10 which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them. Whereas had they examined the ways, whereby Men came to the knowledge of many universal *Truths*, they would have found them to result in the minds of Men, from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of
 15 those Faculties, that were fitted by Nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employ'd about them.

§ 25. *To shew how the Understanding proceeds herein, is the design of the following Discourse;* which I shall proceed to, when I have first premised, that hitherto to clear my way to those foundations, which, I
 20 conceive are the only true ones, whereon to establish those Notions we can have of our own Knowledge, it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the Reasons I had to doubt of innate Principles: And since the Arguments which are against them, do, some of them, rise from common received Opinions, I have been forced to take
 25 several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whose Task it is to shew the falsehood, or improbability, of any Tenet; it happening in Controversial Discourses, as it does in assaulting of Towns; where, if the ground be but firm, whereon the Batteries are erected, there is no farther enquiry of whom it is
 30 borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this Discourse, designing to raise an Edifice uniform, and consistent with it self, as far as my own Experience and Observation will assist me, I hope, to erect it on such a Basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with props and
 35 buttresses, leaning on borrowed or begg'd foundations: Or at least,

§ 25. Conclusion.

(17) 25] 2-5 | 24 1 (22) give] 2-5 | give you 1 (33-4) to . . . that]
 2-5 | to lay the foundation so, that the rest will easily depend upon it: And 1
 (l. below 35) *In Coste*, ‘Conclusion du Premier Livre.’ is in the Table of Contents, but
 ‘Conclusion.’ is the marginal summary.

if mine prove a Castle in the Air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the Reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allow'd the Privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my Principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that ^s I shall say for the Principles I proceed on, is, that I can only *appeal* to Mens own unprejudiced *Experience*, and Observation, whether they be true, or no; and this is enough for a Man who professes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own Conjectures, concerning a Subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design, ¹⁰ than an unbias'd enquiry after Truth.

(2) I warn the Reader] 2-5 | I tell you before-hand, you are 1 ^{(3-4) I . . .}
others] 2-5 | you will suffer me, as others have done 1 ^{(7) Observation]}
2-5 | Observations 1 ^{(10) lying somewhat in the dark]} 2-5 | not very
obvious 1

BOOK II

CHAPTER I

Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

- § 1. EVERY Man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and that which his Mind is employ'd about whilst thinking, being the *Ideas*, that are there, 'tis past doubt, that Men have in their Minds several *Ideas*, such as are those expressed by the words, *Whiteness*,
5 *Hardness*, *Sweetness*, *Thinking*, *Motion*, *Man*, *Elephant*, *Army*, *Drunkenness*, and others: It is in the first place then to be enquired, How he comes by them? I know it is a received Doctrine, That Men have native *Ideas*, and original Characters stamped upon their Minds, in their very first Being. This Opinion I have at large examined
10 already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the fore-going Book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn, whence the Understanding may get all the *Ideas* it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own Observation and Experience.
15 § 2. Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge?
20 To this I answer, in one word, From *Experience*: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about *external, sensible Objects*; or
about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of
25 thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the *Ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

§ 1. Idea is the Object of Thinking. § 2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.

(1. above 1) Coste adds, before full stop, ‘; et où l'on examine par occasion si l'Ame de l'Homme pense toujours’. (2) employ'd] 1-4 | apply'd 5 (11) shewn] 2-5 | shewed 1

§ 3. First, *Our Senses*, conversant about particular sensible Objects, do convey into the Mind, several distinct *Perceptions* of things, according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them: And thus we come by those *Ideas*, we have of *Yellow*, *White*, *Heat*, *Cold*, *Soft*, *Hard*, *Bitter*, *Sweet*, and all those which we call ₅ sensible qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external Objects convey into the mind what produces there those *Perceptions*. This great Source, of most of the *Ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and derived by them to the Understanding, I call *SENSATION*. ₁₀

§ 4. Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with *Ideas*, is the *Perception of the Operations of our own Minds* within us, as it is employ'd about the *Ideas* it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the Understanding with another set of *Ideas*, ₁₅ which could not be had from things without: and such are, *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Believing*, *Reasoning*, *Knowing*, *Willing*, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our ₂₀ Understandings, as distinct *Ideas*, as we do from Bodies affecting our *Senses*. This Source of *Ideas*, every Man has wholly in himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd ₂₅ internal Sense. But as I call the other *Sensation*, so I call this *REFLECTION*, the *Ideas* it affords being such only, as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By *REFLECTION* then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof, there come to be *Ideas* ₃₀ of these Operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, *viz.* External, Material things, as the Objects of *SENSATION*; and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of *REFLECTION*, are, to me, the only Originals, from whence all our *Ideas* take their beginnings. The term *Operations* here, I use in a large ₃₅ sense, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about

§ 3. *The Objects of Sensation one Source of Ideas.* § 4. *The Operations of our Minds, the other Source of them.*

its *Ideas*, but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§ 5. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities*, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us: And the *Mind furnishes the Understanding with Ideas of its own Operations*.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several Modes, Combinations, and Relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original *Ideas* he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his *Senses*; or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his *Reflection*: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see, that he has not *any Idea in his Mind, but what one of these two have imprinted*; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

§ 6. He that attentively considers the state of a *Child*, at his first coming into the World, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of *Ideas*, that are to be the matter of his future Knowledge. 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnished with them: And though the *Ideas* of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint themselves, before the Memory begins to keep a Register of Time and Order, yet 'tis often so late, before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary *Ideas*, till he were grown up to a Man. But all that are born into the World being surrounded with Bodies, that perpetually and diversly affect them, variety of *Ideas*, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. *Light*, and *Colours*, are busie at hand every where, when the Eye is but

§ 5. All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these. § 6. Observable in Children.

(6) produce] 2-5 | produced 1 (7) Paragraph break here in 5, not in 1-4.
(9) Modes, Combinations, and Relations] 4-5 | modes, and the Compositions made
out of them 1-3 (14) Senses; 4-5 | Senses, 1-3 (18) these] 2-5 | those 1
(31-2) all . . . World] add. 4-5 (33) them] 4-5 | us 1-3 (35) at] 5 | and
at 1-4

open; *Sounds*, and some *tangible Qualities* fail not to solicite their proper Senses, and force an entrance to the Mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, That if a Child were kept in a place, where he never saw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man, he would have no more *Ideas* of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his Childhood never tasted an Oyster, or a Pine-Apple, has of those particular Relishes.

§ 7. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple *Ideas* from without, according as the *Objects*, they converse with, afford greater or less variety; and from the Operation of their Minds within, according as they more or less *reflect* on them. For, though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear *Ideas* of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them *attentively*, he will no more have clear and distinct *Ideas* of all the *Operations of his Mind*, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular *Ideas* of any Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The Picture, or Clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused *Idea* of all the Parts they are made up of, till he *applies himself with attention*, to consider them each in particular.

§ 8. And hence we see the Reason, why 'tis pretty late, before most Children get *Ideas* of the Operations of their own Minds; and some have not any very clear, or perfect *Ideas* of the greatest part of them all their Lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough, to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting *Ideas*, till the Understanding turns inwards upon it self, *reflects on its own Operations*, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be

§ 7. *Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.* § 8. *Ideas of Reflexion later, because they need Attention.*

(10) less] **1er-5** | lesser **1** (28) clear distinct] **2-5** | clear and distinct, **1** (, 'om. **1T.er**) (29) turns] **2-5** | turn **1** it] **4-5** | its **1-3** reflects] **2-5** | and reflect **1** (30) makes] **2-5** | make **1** (30)-108(4) Children . . . without] **2-5** | Whereas Children at their first coming into the World, seek particularly after nothing, but what may ease their Hunger, or other Pain: but take all other Objects as they come, are generally pleased with all new ones, that are not painful **1**

delighted with the variety of changing Objects. Thus the first Years are usually employ'd and diverted in looking abroad. Men's Business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper Years; and some scarce ever at all.

§ 9. To ask, *at what time a Man has first any Ideas*, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having *Ideas*, and Perception being the same thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of *Ideas* in it self constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as actual Extension is from the Body; which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a Man's *Ideas*, is the same, as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul. For by this Account, Soul and its *Ideas*, as Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

§ 10. But whether the Soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after the first Rudiments of Organisation, or the beginnings of Life in the Body, I leave to be disputed by those, who have better thought of that matter. I confess my self, to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate *Ideas*, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the Soul *always to think*, than for the Body always to move; the perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the Body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations: And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper Action of the Soul; yet it is not necessary, to suppose, that it should be always thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps*;^{*} but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of Man. We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think,

§ 9. *The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to perceive.*

§ 10. *The Soul thinks not always; for this wants Proofs.*

(2-3) . Men's . . . acquaint] 4er-5 | , and acquainting 2-4 (4) v. 107(30), n. (9) perceive; . . . Ideas] 5 | perceive, . . . Ideas 1-4 (10) Coste 'Je sais bien qu'il y a une Opinion qui pose'; Coste, 'Je sais bien que certains Philosophes assent' and appends a note 'Les Cartesiens' on 'certains Philosophes'. (11) [2nd] it] 3-5 | its 1-2 (15, 16) its] add. 2-5 (18) of] 1-4 | or 5 (22) Ideas] 2-5 | its Ideas 1 (23); the] 5 : the 1-4 (25) one of its Operations] 2-5 | Operation 1 (29) of] 4-5 | of all 1-3 (likewise Coste)

* Ps. 121: 4.

and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is something in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience informs us. For to say, that actual thinking is essential to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg, what is in Question, 5 and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident Proposition. But whether this, *That the Soul always thinks*, be a self-evident Proposition, that every Body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to Mankind. 'Tis doubted whether I thought all last night, or no; the Question being about a matter of 10 fact, 'tis begging it, to bring, as a proof for it, an Hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute: by which way one may prove any thing, and 'tis but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and 'tis sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he, that would not deceive himself, 15 ought to build his Hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his Hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so: which way of proving, amounts to this, That I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I my self 20 cannot perceive, that I always do so.

But Men in love with their Opinions, may not only suppose what is in question, but alledge wrong matter of fact. How else could any one make it an *inference* of mine, *that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep*. I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because 25 he is not sensible of it in his sleep; But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it. 30

§ 11. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake: But whether

§ 11. *It is not always conscious of it.*

(6) Reason] 2-5 | Reasons 1 (9-30) 'Tis . . . it.] add. 2-5 (23-5) but . . . sleep.] **Coste** 'mais encore de faire dire à ceux qui ne sont pas de leur avis, toute autre chose que ce qu'ils ont dit effectivement. C'est ce que j'ai éprouvé dans cette occasion; car il s'est trouvé un Auteur qui ayant lù la première Edition de cet Ouvrage, et n'étant pas satisfait de ce que je viens d'avancer contre l'opinion de ceux qui soutiennent que l'Ame pense toujours, me fait dire, qu'une chose cesse d'exister parce que nous ne sentons pas qu'elle existe pendant notre sommeil. Etrange conséquence qu'on ne peut m'attribuer sans avoir l'Esprit rempli d'une aveugle préoccupation!'

sleeping without dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration; it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the *Soul* doth *think in a sleeping Man*, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible, that the Soul can, whilst the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoyments, and Concerns, its Pleasure or Pain apart, which the Man is not conscious of, nor partakes in: It is certain, that *Socrates* asleep, and *Socrates* awake, is not the same Person; but his Soul when he sleeps, and *Socrates* the Man consisting of Body and Soul when he is 15 waking, are two Persons: Since waking *Socrates*, has no Knowledge of, or Concernment for that Happiness, or Misery of his Soul, which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happiness, or Misery of a Man in the *Indies*, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly 20 away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.

§ 12. The Soul, during sound Sleep, thinks, say these Men. *Whilst it thinks* and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of Delight or 25 Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and *it must necessarily be conscious of its own Perceptions*. But it has all this apart: The sleeping Man, 'tis plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the Soul of *Castor*, whilst he is sleeping, retired from his Body, which is no impossible Supposition for the Men I have here to do 30 with, who so liberally allow Life, without a thinking Soul to all other Animals. These Men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, That the Body should live without the Soul; nor that the Soul should subsist and think, or have Perception, even Perception of Happiness or Misery, without the Body. Let us then, 35 as I say, suppose the Soul of *Castor* separated, during his Sleep, from

§ 12. *If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two Persons.*

(8) me] 1-2, 4-5 | be 3 (12) in:] 5 | in. 3-4 | in, 1-2 (14) sleeps] 1-3, 5 |
Sleeps 4 (31) it] 2-5 | it is 1 (33) should . . . have] 2-5 | subsists and
thinks, or has 1

his Body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chuses for its Scene of Thinking, the Body of another Man, *v.g.* *Pollux*, who is sleeping without a Soul: For if *Castor's* Soul can think whilst *Castor* is asleep, what *Castor* is never conscious of, 'tis no matter what Place it chuses to think in. We have here then the Bodies of two Men with only one Soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the Soul still thinking in the waking Man, whereof the sleeping Man is never conscious, has never the least Perception. I ask then, Whether *Castor* and *Pollux*, thus, with only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one, what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct Persons, as *Castor* and *Hercules*; or, as *Socrates* and *Plato* were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same Reason, they make the Soul and the Man two Persons, who make the Soul think apart, what the Man is not conscious of. For, I suppose, no body will make Identity of Persons, to consist in the Soul's being united to the very same numerical Particles of matter: For if that be necessary to Identity, 'twill be impossible, in that constant flux of the Particles of our Bodies, that any Man should be the same Person, two days, or two moments together.

§ 13. Thus, methinks, every drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine, who teach, That the Soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who do at any time *sleep without dreaming*, can never be convinced, That their Thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

§ 14. 'Twill perhaps be said, That the *Soul thinks*, even in the soundest *Sleep*, but the *Memory retains it not*. That the Soul in a sleeping Man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking Man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better Proof than bare Assertion, to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men, do, during all their Lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could

§ 13. *Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.* § 14. *That Men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.*

remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of their Sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man, that was bred a Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never dream'd in his Life, till he had that Fever, he was then newly recovered of, which was about the Five or Six and Twentieth Year of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At least every one's Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples enough of such, as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.

§ 15. *To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking:* and the Soul in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass, which constantly receives variety of Images, or *Ideas*, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them; the Looking-glass is never the better for such *Ideas*, nor the Soul for such Thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man, the materials of the Body are employ'd, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of Thoughts, is retained by the impressions that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; but that in the *thinking of the Soul*, which is not perceived in a sleeping Man, there the Soul thinks apart, and *making no use of the Organs of the Body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory* of such Thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, I answer farther, That whatever *Ideas* the Mind can receive, and contemplate without the help of the Body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can retain without the help of the Body too, or else the Soul, or any separate Spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recal them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reasonings, and Contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They, who make the Soul a thinking Thing at this rate, will not make it a much more noble Being, than those do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the subtlest parts of Matter. Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Impressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether

§ 15. *Upon this Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.*

(28) lay them up] 4 | lay up them 5 | record them 1-3 (29) occasion] 5 | any occasion 1-4. (*Coste* 'dans l'occasion') (32) at . . . rate,] 2-4 |, at . . . rate, 5 | , at . . . rate 1

as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things, for mean or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a Faculty, as the power of Thinking, that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being, to be so idly and uselessly employ'd, at least $\frac{1}{4}$ part of its time here, as to think constantly, without rememb'ring any of those Thoughts, without doing any good to it self or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and sensless matter, any where in the Universe, made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

§ 16. 'Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception, whilst we are *asleep*, and retain the memory of those *Thoughts*: but how *extravagant* and incoherent for the most part they are; how little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being, those who are acquainted with Dreams, need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less rationally than when conjointly with it, or no: If its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations.

§ 17. Those who so confidently tell us, That the Soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those *Ideas* are, that are in the Soul of a Child, before, or just at the union with the Body, before it hath received any by *Sensation*. The *Dreams* of sleeping Men, *are*, as I take it, all *made up of the waking Man's Ideas*, though, for the most part, oddly put together. 'Tis strange, if the Soul has *Ideas* of its own, that it derived not from *Sensation* or *Reflexion*, (as it must have, if it thought before it received any impressions from the Body) that it should never, in its private

§ 16. On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflexion, of which there is no appearance. § 17. If I think when I know it not, no body else can know it.

(10) it] 4-5 | its 1-3
5 (likewise Coste) | than 4

(21) than] 1T.er, 2-5 | then, 1

(22) then] 1-3,

thinking, (so private, that the Man himself perceives it not) retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the Man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable, that the Soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those *Ideas* it borrowed not from *Sensation* or *Reflection*, or at least preserve the memory of none, but such, which being occasioned from the Body, must needs be less natural to a Spirit? 'Tis strange, the Soul should never once in a Man's whole life, recal over any of its pure, native Thoughts, and those *Ideas* it had before it borrowed any thing from the Body; never bring into the waking Man's view, any other *Ideas*, but what have a tangue of the Cask, and manifestly derive their Original from that union. If it always thinks, and so had *Ideas* before it was united, or before it received any from the Body, 'tis not to be supposed, but that during sleep, it recollects its native *Ideas*, and during that retirement from communicating with the Body, whilst it thinks by it self, the *Ideas*, it is busied about, should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in it self, undervived from the Body or its own Operations about them: which since the waking Man never remembers, we must from this Hypothesis conclude, either that the Soul remembers something that the Man does not; or else that Memory belongs only to such *Ideas*, as are derived from the Body, or the Minds Operations about them.

§ 18. I would be glad also to learn from these Men, who so confidently pronounce, that the humane Soul, or which is all one, that a Man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, *how they come to know, that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it.* This, I am afraid, is to be sure, without proofs; and to know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect, a confused Notion, taken up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths, that either their own Evidence forces us to admit, or common Experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always

§ 18. How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident Proposition, it needs proof.

(3) reasonable] 5 | reason 1-4 (12) and] add. 4-5 (17), sometimes at least,] 1T.er, 2-5 | sometimes, at least 1 (18) which it had] 4-5 | it had 1T.er, 2-3 | had 1 (21-3) either . . . them] 2-5 | that Memory belongs only to Ideas, derived from the Body, and the Operations of the Mind about them, or else that the Soul remembers something that the Man does not 1 (28) This,] 1-3, W | This 4-5 (31) forces] 4-5 | force 1-3

retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible, that the Soul may not always think; and much more probable, that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to it self the next moment after, that it had thought.

§ 19. To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man not to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two Persons in one Man: And if one considers well these Men's way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion, that they do so. For they who tell us, that the Soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a Man always thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? Or a Man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of Jargon in others. If they say, The Man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, His Body is extended, without having parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing *thinks without being conscious of it*, or perceiving, that it does so. They who talk thus, may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis, say, That a Man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: Whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, That a Man is always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, How they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man's own mind. Can another Man perceive, that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not my self? No Man's Knowledge here, can go beyond his Experience. Wake a Man out of a sound sleep, and ask him, What he was that moment thinking on. If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable Diviner of Thoughts, that can assure him, that he was thinking: May he not with more reason assure him, he was not asleep? This is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot be less than Revelation, that discovers to another, Thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there my self: And they must needs have a penetrating sight, who can certainly see, that I think, when I cannot perceive

§ 19. *That a Man should be busie in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.*

(6) not to perceive] W | not perceive 1-4 | to perceive 5 (8) considers]
 4-5 | consider 1-3 should] 5 | shall 1-4 (15) a body] 2-5 | any thing 1
 (17), or] 2-5 | ; without 1 (l. below 34) Marginal summary not in Coste,
 which applies the summary for § 18 also to § 19.

it my self, and when I declare, that I do not; and yet can see, that Dogs or Elephants do not think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us, that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the *Rosecrucians*; it seeming
 5 easier to make ones self invisible to others, than to make another's thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But 'tis but defining the Soul to be a substance, that always thinks, and the business is done. If such a definition be of any Authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make many Men suspect, That they
 10 have no Souls at all, since they find a good part of their Lives pass away without thinking. For no Definitions, that I know, no Suppositions of any Sect, are of force enough to destroy constant Experience; and, perhaps, 'tis the affectation of knowing beyond
 15 what we perceive, that makes so much useless dispute, and noise, in the World.

§ 20. I see no Reason therefore to believe, that the *Soul thinks before the Senses have furnish'd it with Ideas* to think on; and as those are increased, and retained; so it comes, by Exercise, to improve its Faculty of thinking in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by
 20 compounding those *Ideas*, and reflecting on its own Operations, it increases its Stock as well as Facility, in remembring, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.

§ 21. He that will suffer himself, to be informed by Observation and Experience, and not make his own Hypothesis the Rule of
 25 Nature, will find few Signs of a Soul accustomed to much thinking in a new born Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational Soul should think so much, and not reason at all. And he that will consider, that Infants, newly come into the World, spend the greatest part of their time in Sleep,
 30 and are seldom awake, but when either Hunger calls for the Teat, or some Pain, (the most importunate of all Sensations) or some other violent Impression on the Body, forces the mind to perceive, and

§§ 20–3. *No Ideas but from Sensation or Reflection, evident, if we observe Children.*

(1) when I declare, that] 2–5 | declare, That 1 (2) Dogs or Elephants]
 2–5 | a Dog, or an Elephant, 1 when] 2–5 | though 1 (3) so.] *Coste*, adds
 in a footnote: 'Il paraît visiblement par cet endroit, que c'est à Des Cartes et à ses
 Disciples qu'en veut M. Locke dans tout ce Chapitre.' (8) a] 1–4; om. 5
 (32) Impression on the Body] 4–5 | Idea 1–3 (l. below 32) *Coste* has separate
 marginal summaries for §§ 20 and 21, they being, respectively, 'L'Ame n'a aucune idée
 que par Sensation ou par Reflexion,' and 'C'est ce que nous pouvons observer
 évidemment dans les Enfants.'

attend to it. He, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find Reason to imagine, That a *Fætus in the Mother's Womb*, differs not much from the State of a Vegetable; but passes the greatest part of its time without Perception or Thought, doing very little, but sleep in a Place, where it needs not seek for Food, and is surrounded with Liquor, always equally soft, and near of the same Temper; where the Eyes have no Light, and the Ears, so shut up, are not very susceptible of Sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of Objects, to move the Senses.

§ 22. Follow a *Child* from its Birth, and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the Mind by the Senses comes more and more to be furnished with *Ideas*, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time, it begins to know the Objects, which being most familiar with it, have made lasting Impressions. Thus it comes, by degrees, to know the Persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from Strangers; which are Instances and Effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the *Ideas* the Senses convey to it: And so we may observe, how the Mind, by degrees, improves in these, and advances to the Exercise of those other Faculties of *Enlarging, Compounding, and Abstracting* its *Ideas*, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these, of which, I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§ 23. If it shall be demanded then, *When a Man begins to have any Ideas?* I think, the true Answer is, When he first has any *Sensation*. For since there appear not to be any *Ideas* in the Mind, before the Senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that *Ideas* in the Understanding, are coeval with *Sensation*; which is such an Impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the Understanding. 'Tis about these Impressions made on our Senses by outward Objects, that the Mind seems first to employ it self in such Operations as we call *Perception, Rememb'reng, Consideration, Reasoning*, etc.

§ 24. In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own *Operations*, about the *Ideas* got by *Sensation*, and thereby stores it self with a new

§ 24. *The original of all our Knowledge.*

(29-30) produces some Perception] 4-5 | makes it be taken notice of 1-3
 (30-33) 'Tis . . . etc.] add. 5 (34)-118(2) In . . . Impressions] 5 | The
 Impressions then, 1-4 (I. below 35) *The original of all our Knowledge.*] 4-5 | No
 Ideas but from *Sensation* or *Reflection*, evident, if we observe Children. 2-3

set of *Ideas*, which I call *Ideas of Reflection*. These are the *Impressions* that are made on our *Senses* by outward Objects, that are extrinsical to the Mind; and *its own Operations*, proceeding from Powers intrinsical and proper to it self, which when reflected on by 5 it self, become also Objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, *the Original of all Knowledge*. Thus the first Capacity of Humane Intellect, is, That the mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made on it; either, through the *Senses*, by outward Objects; or by its own Operations, when it *reflects* on them. This is the first step a Man 10 makes towards the Discovery of any thing, and the Groundwork, whereon to build all those Notions, which ever he shall have naturally in this World. All those sublime Thoughts, which towre above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it self, take their Rise and Footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the mind 15 wanders, in those remote Speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those *Ideas*, which *Sense* or *Reflection*, have offered for its Contemplation.

§ 25. In this Part, the *Understanding* is meerly *passive*; and whether or no, it will have these Beginnings, and as it were materials of 20 Knowledge, is not in its own Power. For the Objects of our *Senses*, do, many of them, obtrude their particular *Ideas* upon our minds, whether we will or no: And the Operations of our minds, will not let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man, can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These 25 *simple Ideas*, when offered to the mind, *the Understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which, the Objects set before it, do therein produce*. As the Bodies that surround us, do diversly affect 30 our Organs, the mind is forced to receive the Impressions; and cannot avoid the Perception of those *Ideas* that are annexed to them.

§ 25. *In the reception of simple Ideas, the Understanding is for the most part passive.*

(2) *v. 117(34), n.* (3) *Mind;] 5 | Mind, 1-4* (3-6) *proceeding . . . Thus]*
5 | about the [these 1-3] Impressions, reflected on by it [its 1-3] self, as proper
Objects to be contemplated by it, are, I conceive, the Original of all Knowledge; and 1-4
(13) it] 4-5 | its 1-3 (27) *in] 1-4; om. 5* (*I. below 31) for the most part*)
4-5 | most of all 2-3

CHAPTER II

Of simple Ideas.

§ 1. THE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed, concerning the *Ideas* we have; and that is, That *some* of them are *simple*, and *some complex*.

Though the Qualities that affect our Senses, are, in the things 5 themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet 'tis plain, the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed. For though the Sight and Touch often take in from the same Object, at the same time, different *Ideas*; as a Man sees at once Motion and Colour; the 10 Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax: Yet the simple *Ideas* thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly distinct, as those that come in by different Senses. The coldness and hardness, which a Man feels in a piece of *Ice*, being as distinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lily; or as the taste of 15 Sugar, and smell of a Rose: And there is nothing can be plainer to a Man, than the clear and distinct Perception he has of those simple *Ideas*; which being each in it self uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform Appearance*, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different *Ideas*. 20

§ 2. These simple *Ideas*, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways above mentioned, *viz.* *Sensation* and *Reflection*. When the Understanding is once stored with these simple *Ideas*, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, and so can 25 make at Pleasure new complex *Ideas*. But it is not in the Power of the most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness or

§ 1. *Uncompounded Appearances.* §§ 2, 3. *The mind can neither make nor destroy them.*

(11) feels] 1-4 | feel 5 (23) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotation from Locke's First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 35, etc.; prefaced by 'Against this, that the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind only by Sensation and Reflection, the Bishop of Worcester makes Use of the Idea of *Substance* in these Words: If the Idea of Substance be grounded upon plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by Sensation, or Reflection, so we may be certain of something which we have not by those Ideas. To which our Author answers: ...'

variety of Thought, to *invent or frame one new simple Idea* in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the Understanding, *destroy* those that are there. The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Understanding, being muchwhat the
 5 same, as it is in the great World of visible things; wherein his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter, or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being. The same
 10 inability, will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his Understanding any simple *Idea*, not received in by his Senses, from external Objects; or by reflection from the Operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any
 15 Taste, which had never affected his Palate; or frame the *Idea* of a Scent, he had never smelt: And when he can do this, I will also conclude, that a blind Man hath *Ideas* of Colours, and a deaf Man true distinct Notions of Sounds.

§ 3. This is the Reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible to God, to make a Creature with other Organs, and more
 20 ways to convey into the Understanding the notice of Corporeal things, than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to Man: Yet I think, it is *not possible*, for any one to *imagine* any other *Qualities* in Bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides Sounds, Tastes, Smells, visible and
 25 tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senses, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the Fifth Sense, had been as far from our Notice, Imagination, and Conception, as now any *belonging to a Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth Sense*, can possibly be: which, whether yet some other Creatures, in some other Parts of
 30 this vast, and stupendious Universe, may not have, will be a great Presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things; but will consider the Immensity of this Fabrick, and the great variety, that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think,
 35 that in other Mansions of it, there may be other, and different intelligent Beings, of whose Faculties, he has as little Knowledge or Apprehension, as a Worm shut up in one drawer of a Cabinet, hath of the Senses or Understanding of a Man; Such Variety and Excellency, being suitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker.

(12) ; or by reflection] 4-5 |, or 1-3

I have here followed the common Opinion of Man's having but five Senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but either Supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

CHAPTER III

Of Ideas of one Sense.

§ 1. THE better to conceive the *Ideas*, we receive from Sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways, whereby they make their Approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceptible by us.

First then, There are some, which come into our minds *by one Sense only*.

Secondly, There are others, that convey themselves into the mind ¹⁰ *by more Senses than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the mind *by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection*.

We shall consider them apart under these several Heads. ¹⁵

First, There are *some Ideas, which have admittance only through one Sense*, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and Colours, as white, red, yellow, blue; with their several Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the Eyes: All kinds of Noises, Sounds, and Tones only by the Ears: The several Tastes and Smells, by the Nose and Palate. And if these Organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits, to convey them from without to their Audience in the Brain, the mind's Presence-room (as I may so call it) are any of them so disordered, as not to perform their Functions, they have no Postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the Understanding.

§ 1. *Division of simple Ideas.* § 1 (16). Ideas of one Sense.

(1) Opinion] 1, 3-5 | Opinions 2 (20) kinds] 1-4 | kind 5 (*I. below 27*)
Division of simple Ideas.] 4-5 | *As Colours of Seeing, Sounds of Hearing.* 2-3 Ideas of
one Sense.] 4; not in 2-3, 5

The most considerable of those, belonging to the Touch, are Heat and Cold, and Solidity; all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible Configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more, or less firm adhesion of the Parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§ 2. I think, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple Ideas, belonging to each Sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we would, there being a great many *more* of them belonging to most of the Senses, *than we have Names for*. The variety of Smells, which are as many almost, if not more than Species of Bodies in the World, do most of them want Names. *Sweet* and *Stinking* commonly serve our turn for these Ideas, which in effect, is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a Rose, and Violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct Ideas. Nor are the different Tastes that by our Palates we receive Ideas of, much better provided with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sowr, Harsh, and Salt, are almost all the Epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of Relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of Creatures, but in the different Parts of the same Plant, Fruit, or Animal. The same may be said of Colours and Sounds. I shall therefore in the account of simple Ideas, I am here giving, content my self to set down only such, as are most material to our present Purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the Ingredients of our complex Ideas, amongst which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I shall treat of in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER IV

Of Solidity.

§ 1. THE Idea of Solidity we receive by our Touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in Body, to the entrance of any other

§ 2. Few simple Ideas have Names.

§ 1. We receive this Idea from touch.

(15) by . . . of] 4-5 | are in Nature 1-3
Bitter and Sowre, Harsh 1-3

(16) Bitter, Sowr, Harsh,] 4-5 |
(16-17) the Epithets] add. 4-5
(17) that numberless] 4-5 | all the 1-3
(19) , Fruit,] add. 4-5
(20) Colours and Sounds] 4-5 | Colour and Sound 1-3
(28) which] add. 4-5
(l. below 28:
§2.) 2-4; om. 5

Body into the Place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no *Idea*, which we receive more constantly from Sensation, than *Solidity*. Whether we move, or rest, in what Posture soever we are, we always feel something under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther sinking downwards; and the Bodies which we daily handle, make us 5 perceive, that whilst they remain between them, they do by an insurmountable Force, hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call *Solidity*. I will not dispute, whether this acceptation of the Word 10 *solid* be nearer to its Original Signification, than that which Mathematicians use it in: It suffices, that I think, the common Notion of Solidity will allow, if not justify, this use of it; but if any one think it better to call it *Impenetrability*, he has my Consent. Only I have thought the Term *Solidity*, the more proper to express this *Idea*, not 15 only because of its vulgar use in that Sense; but also, because it carries something more of positive in it, than *Impenetrability*, which is negative, and is, perhaps, more a consequence of *Solidity*, than *Solidity* it self. This of all other, seems the *Idea* most intimately connected with, and essential to Body, so as no where else to be 20 found or imagin'd, but only in matter: and though our Senses take no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause a Sensation in us; Yet the Mind, having once got this *Idea* from such grosser sensible Bodies, traces it farther; and considers it, as well as Figure, in the minutest Particle of Matter, that can exist; and finds 25 it inseparably inherent in Body, where-ever, or however modified.

§ 2. This is the *Idea* belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it to fill space. The *Idea* of which filling of space, is, That where we imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid Substances; and, will 30 for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another in a strait Line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them in a Line, not parallel to that which they move in. This *Idea* of it the Bodies, which we ordinarily handle, sufficiently furnish us with. 35

§ 2. *Solidity fills Space.*

(5) which] add. 4-5 (18) negative,] 5 | negative; 1-4 (21) and] 4-5 |
 which 1-3 (22) it] add. 4-5 (32) removes] 4-5 | remove 1-3 (33)
 which] add. 4-5 (34), which] add. 4-5 ('; om. 5)

§ 3. This Resistance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so great, That no force, how great soever, can surmount it. All the Bodies in the World, pressing a drop of Water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the Resistance,
 5 which it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our *Idea of Solidity* is distinguished both from *pure space*, which is capable neither of Resistance nor Motion; and from the ordinary *Idea of Hardness*. For a Man may conceive two Bodies at a distance, so as they may approach
 10 one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their Superficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear *Idea of Space without Solidity*. For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular Body) I ask, Whether a Man cannot have the *Idea of* the motion of one single Body alone, without any other succeeding
 15 immediately into its Place? I think, 'tis evident he can: the *Idea of Motion* in one Body, no more including the *Idea of Motion* in another, than the *Idea of a square Figure* in one Body includes the *Idea of a square Figure* in another. I do not ask, Whether Bodies do so exist, that the motion of one Body cannot really be without the
 20 motion of another. To determine this either way, is to beg the Question for, or against a *Vacuum*. But my Question is, Whether one cannot have the *Idea of one Body moved*, whilst others are at rest? And, I think, this no one will deny: If so, then the Place it deserted, gives us the *Idea of pure Space without Solidity*, whereinto
 25 another Body may enter, without either Resistance or Protrusion of any thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the space it filled in the Tube is certainly the same, whether any other Body follows the motion of the Sucker or no: nor does it imply a contradiction, That upon the motion of one Body, another, that is only
 30 contiguous to it, should not follow it. The necessity of such a motion, is built only on the Supposition, That the World is full; but not on the distinct *Ideas of Space and Solidity*: which are as different, as Resistance and not Resistance, Protrusion and not Protrusion. And that Men have *Ideas of Space without Body*, their very Disputes
 35 about a *Vacuum* plainly demonstrate, as is shewed in another Place.

§ 3. *Distinct from Space.*

(2) which] add. 4-5 (4-5), which] add. 4-5 ('; om. 5)
 (15) Place?] 4-5 | Place; which, 2-3 | Place? which, 1 Place. As 5

(8) from] add. 4-5 (36) Place.] 1-4 |

§ 4. *Solidity* is hereby also *differenced from Hardness*, in that Solidity consists in repletion, and so an utter Exclusion of other Bodies out of the space it possesses; but Hardness, in a firm Cohesion of the parts of Matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its Figure. And indeed, Hard and Soft ⁵ are Names that we give to things, only in relation to the Constitutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us, which will put us to Pain, sooner than change Figure by the pressure of any part of our Bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which changes the Situation of its parts upon an easie, and unpainful ¹⁰ touch.

But this Difficulty of changing the Situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more Solidity to the hardest Body in the World, than to the softest; nor is an Adamant one jot more solid than Water. For though the two ¹⁵ flat sides of two pieces of Marble, will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if there be a Diamond between them: yet it is not, that the parts of the Diamond are more solid than those of Water, or resist more; but because the parts of Water, being more easily separable from each ²⁰ other, they will by a side-motion be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble: But if they could be kept from making Place, by that side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of Marble, as much as the Diamond; and 'twould be as impossible by any force, to surmount their Resistance, as to surmount the Resistance of the parts ²⁵ of a Diamond. The softest Body in the World will as invincibly resist the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest, that can be found, or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft Body well ³⁰ with Air or Water, will quickly find its Resistance: And he that thinks, that nothing but Bodies, that are hard, can keep his Hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial, with the Air inclosed in a Football. The Experiment, I have been told was made at *Florence*, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with ³⁵

§ 4. *From Hardness.*

(6) Names . . . relation] 4-5 | , as apprehended by us, only relative Terms, 1-3

(7) own] add. 4-5 (18) a Diamond] 2-5 | an Adamant 1 (19) Diamond]

2-5 | Adamant 1 (33) a trial] 2-5 | an Experiment 1 (34)-126(8)

The . . . it.] add. 2-5

Water, and exactly closed, farther shews the solidity of so soft a body as Water. For the golden Globe thus filled, being put into a Press, which was driven by the extreme force of skrews, the water made it self way through the pores of that very close metal, and finding no room for a nearer approach of its Particles within, got to the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before the sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the Engine, that squeezed it.

§ 5. By this *Idea of Solidity*, is the Extension of Body distinguished from the Extension of Space. The Extension of Body being nothing, but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable Parts; and the Extension of Space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immovable Parts. *Upon the Solidity of Bodies also depends their mutual Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion.* Of pure Space then, and Solidity, there are several (amongst which, I confess my self one) who persuade themselves, they have clear and distinct *Ideas*; and that they can think on Space, without any thing in it, that resists, or is protruded by Body. This is the *Idea* of pure Space, which they think they have as clear, as any *Idea* they can have of the Extension of Body: the *Idea* of the distance, between the opposite Parts of a concave Superficies, being equally as clear, without, as with the *Idea* of any solid Parts between: and on the other side, they persuade themselves, That they have, distinct from that of pure Space, the *Idea* of something that fills Space, that can be protruded by the impulse of other Bodies, or resist their Motion. If there be others, that have not these two *Ideas* distinct but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not, how Men, who have the same *Idea*, under different Names, or different *Ideas*, under the same Name, can, in that case, talk with one another, any more than a Man, who not being blind, or deaf, has distinct *Ideas* of the Colour of Scarlet, and the sound of a Trumpet, could discourse concerning Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man, I mention in another Place, who fancied, that the *Idea* of Scarlet was like the sound of a Trumpet.

§ 6. If any one asks me, *What this Solidity is*, I send him to his Senses to inform him: Let him put a Flint, or a Foot-ball between

§ 5. *On Solidity depends Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion.* § 6. *What it is.*

(3) by] 5 | with 2-4

(8) p. 125(34), n.

(14) *Impulse*] edit. | *impulse* 1-5

(18-20) Body . . . Body:] 4-5 | Body; whereof they think they have as clear an *Idea*, as of the Extension of Body, 1-3 (22-3) they . . . Space,] 4-5 | That they have 1-3 (34) asks] 4-5 | ask 1-3 (l. below 35: § 5.) *Marginal summary not in Coste here, but only in his Table of Contents.*

his Hands; and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him, what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explain to me, what Extension or Motion is, which, perhaps, ⁵ seems much easier. The simple *Ideas* we have are such, as experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour, by Words, to make them clearer in the Mind, we shall succeed no better, than if we went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's mind, by talking; and to discourse into him the *Ideas of Light and Colours.* ¹⁰ The Reason of this, I shall shew, in another Place.

CHAPTER V

Of simple Ideas of divers Senses.

THE *Ideas* we get by more than one Sense, are of *Space*, or *Extension*, *Figure*, *Rest*, and *Motion*: For these make perceptible impressions, both on the Eyes and Touch; and we can receive and convey into our Minds the *Ideas* of the Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest ¹⁵ of Bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAPTER VI

Of simple Ideas of Reflection.

§ I. THE Mind receiving the *Ideas*, mentioned in the foregoing Chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon it self, and observes its own Actions about those *Ideas* it has, takes from ²⁰ thence other *Ideas*, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.

§ I. *Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas.*

(6) we have are] 4-5 | are 3 | we have 1-2 (15) [2nd] the] 1-4 | our 5
 (19) Chapters] 2er-5 | Chapter 1-2 (22) as] 1er-5 |
 as of 1 [2nd] it] 4-5 | its 1-3

§ 2. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent, that every one that pleases, may take notice of 'em in himself, are these two:

*Perception, or Thinking, and
Volition, or Willing.*

5

The Power of Thinking is called the *Understanding*, and the Power of Volition is called the *Will*, and these two Powers or Abilities in the Mind are denominated *Faculties*. Of some of the Modes of these simple *Ideas* of Reflection, such as are *Remembrance*, *Discerning*,
10 *Reasoning*, *Judging*, *Knowledge*, *Faith*, etc. I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

CHAPTER VII

Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.

§ 1. THERE be other simple *Ideas*, which convey themselves into the Mind, by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection, *viz.*

15

Pleasure, or Delight, and its opposite.

Pain, or Uneasiness.

Power.

Existence.

Unity.

§ 2. *Delight, or Uneasiness*, one or other of them join themselves to almost all our *Ideas*, both of Sensation and Reflection: And there is scarce any affection of our Senses from without, any retired thought of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us *pleasure* or *pain*. By *Pleasure* and *Pain*, I would be understood to signify, whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our Minds, or any thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we call it Satisfaction, Delight, Pleasure, Happiness, etc. on the one side; or Uneasiness, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguish, Misery, etc.

§ 2. *The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from Reflection.*

§§ 1-6. *Pleasure and Pain.*

(3) 'em] add. 4-5

(6-8) The . . . *Faculties.*] 2-5 | The power in the Mind of producing these Actions we denominate Faculties, and are called the *Understanding*, and the *Will*. 1

on the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the *Ideas of Pleasure* and *Pain*, Delight or Uneasiness; which are the Names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of *Ideas*.

§ 3. The infinite Wise Author of our being, having given us the power over several parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at rest, as we think fit; and also by the motion of them, to move our selves, and other contiguous Bodies, in which consists all the Actions of our Body: Having also given a power to our Minds, in several Instances, to chuse, amongst its *Ideas*, which it will think on, and to pursue the enquiry of this or that Subject with consideration and attention, to excite us to these Actions of thinking and motion, that we are capable of, has been pleased to join to several Thoughts, and several Sensations, a *perception of Delight*. If this were wholly separated from all our outward Sensations, and inward Thoughts, we should have no reason to preferr one Thought or Action, to another; Negligence, to Attention; or Motion, to Rest. And so we should neither stir our Bodies, nor employ our Minds; but let our Thoughts (if I may so call it) run a drift, without any direction or design; and suffer the *Ideas* of our Minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them. In which state Man, however furnished with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature, and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore pleased our Wise Creator, to annex to several Objects, and to the *Ideas* which we receive from them, as also to several of our Thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several Objects, to several degrees, that those Faculties which he had endowed us with, might not remain wholly idle, and unemploy'd by us.

§ 4. *Pain* has the same efficacy and use to set us on work, that Pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid that, as to pursue this: Only this is worth our consideration, That *Pain is often produced by the same Objects and Ideas, that produce Pleasure* in us. This their near Conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of admiring the Wisdom and Goodness of our Maker, who

(5) infinite] 4-5 | infinitely 1-3 (8) other] 1-4 | our 5 (9) Having]
 2-5 | He having 1 (13) has] 2-5 | he has 1 (14) If this] 2-5 | This if
 it 1 were] 1-4 | where 5 (21) their] 1, 4-5 | there 2-3 (25-6) to the
Ideas which] 4-5 | the *Ideas* 1-3 (28) which] add. 4-5 (32) [1st] this] 2-5
 | the other 1 (33) Pain is] 4-5 | Pain is 2-3 | it is 1

designing the preservation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the application of many things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do; and as advices to withdraw from them. But he, not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every 5 part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain to those very *Ideas*, which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it, proves no ordinary torment: and the most pleasant of all sensible Objects, Light it self, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond 10 a due proportion to our Eyes, causes a very painful sensation. Which is wisely and favourably so ordered by Nature, that when any Object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder the instruments of Sensation, whose Structures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before 15 the Organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper Functions for the future. The consideration of those Objects that produce it, may well perswade us, That this is the end or use of pain. For though great light be insufferable to our Eyes, yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them: because 20 that causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious Organ unharmed, in its natural state. But yet excess of Cold, as well as Heat, pains us: because it is equally destructive to that temper, which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the several functions of the Body, and which consists in a moderate 25 degree of warmth; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our Bodies, confin'd within certain bounds.

§ 5. Beyond all this, we may find another reason *why* God hath scattered up and down *several degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the things that environ and affect us*; and blended them together, in almost 30 all that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with; that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him, *with whom there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.**

35 § 6. Though what I have here said, may not, perhaps, make the *Ideas of Pleasure and Pain* clearer to us, than our own Experience does,

(3) that] add. 4-5 (12) vehemency] 4-5 | vehemence 1-3 (20) [1st] that]
 1-4 | the 5 (24) and] add. 4-5 (31) compleat] 2-3 | compleat 4 |
 compleat 1, 5 (32) which] 4-5 | of 1. (*Neither in 2-3*)

* Ps. 16: 11.

which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the Reason, why they are annexed to so many other *Ideas*, serving to give us due sentiments of the Wisdom and Goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all Things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries: The knowledge and ^s veneration of Him, being the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the proper business of all Understandings.

§ 7. *Existence* and *Unity*, are two other *Ideas*, that are suggested to the Understanding, by every Object without, and every *Idea* within. When *Ideas* are in our Minds, we consider them as being ¹⁰ actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have *Existence*: And whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real Being, or *Idea*, suggests to the Understanding, the *Idea of Unity*.

§ 8. *Power* also is another of those simple *Ideas*, which we receive ¹⁵ from *Sensation and Reflection*. For observing in our selves, that we can, at pleasure, move several parts of our Bodies, which were at rest; the effects also, that natural Bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our Senses, we both these ways get the *Idea of Power*. ²⁰

§ 9. Besides these, there is another *Idea*, which though suggested by our Senses, yet is more constantly offered us, by what passes in our own Minds; and that is the *Idea of Succession*. For if we look immediately into our selves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our *Ideas* always, whilst we are awake, or have ²⁵ any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming, without intermission.

§ 10. These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most considerable of those *simple Ideas* which the Mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by ³⁰ the two forementioned ways of *Sensation and Reflection*.

Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the World; that extends its thoughts often, even beyond the utmost expansion of ³⁵ 35

§ 7. *Existence and Unity*. § 8. *Power*. § 9. *Succession*. § 10. *Simple Ideas the Materials of all our Knowledge*.

(16) selves,] 5 | selves, that we do, and can think; and 1-4
will look 1-4 (26) thought,] 1T.er, 2-4 | thought 1, 5
1-3 (35) often,] 2-5 | often 1

(23) look] 5 |
(30) is] 4-5 | are

Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible *Inane*. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any *simple Idea*, which is not *received from* one of those *Inlets* before-mentioned, or any *complex Idea* not made out of those *simple ones*. Nor will it be so strange, to

s think these few simple *Ideas* sufficient to employ the quickest Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all that various Knowledge, and more various Fancies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we consider how many Words may be made out of the various composition of 24 Letters; or if going one step farther,

10 we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made, with barely one of the above-mentioned *Ideas*, viz. Number, whose stock is inexhaustible, and truly infinite: And what a large and immense field, doth Extension alone afford the Mathematicians?

CHAPTER VIII

Some farther Considerations concerning our simple Ideas.

§ 1. CONCERNING the simple *Ideas* of Sensation 'tis to be considered, That whatsoever is so constituted in Nature, as to be able, by affecting our Senses, to cause any perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Understanding a simple *Idea*; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of, by our discerning Faculty, it is by the Mind looked on

20 and considered there, to be a real *positive Idea* in the Understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation in the subject.

§ 2. Thus the *Idea* of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, White and Black, Motion and Rest, are equally clear and *positive Ideas* in

25 the Mind; though, perhaps, some of the *causes* which produce them, are barely *privations* in those Subjects, from whence our Senses derive those *Ideas*. These the Understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct *positive Ideas*, without taking notice of the Causes that produce them: which is an enquiry not belonging to the

30 *Idea*, as it is in the Understanding; but to the nature of the things

§§ 1-6. *Positive Ideas from privative Causes.*

(2-3) is not *received*] 4-5 | it *received not* 1-3 (11) the above-mentioned]
 2-5 | these 1 (13) Extension] 1er-5 | Excursion 1 (17) thereby] 1-2,
 4-5 | hereby 3

existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive, and know the *Idea* of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the Superficies, to make any Object appear White or Black.

§ 3. A Painter or Dyer, who never enquired into their causes, hath the *Ideas* of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his Understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the Philosopher, who hath busied himself in considering their Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause positive or privative; and the *Idea of Black* is no less *positive* in his Mind, than that of White, *however the cause* of that Colour in the external Object, may be *only a privation*.

§ 4. If it were the design of my present Undertaking, to enquire into the natural Causes and manner of Perception, I should offer this as a reason *why a privative cause might*, in some cases at least, *produce a positive Idea, viz.* That all Sensation being produced in us, only by different degrees and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variously agitated by external Objects, the abatement of any former motion, must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new *Idea*, which depends only on a different motion of the animal Spirits in that Organ.

§ 5. But whether this be so, or no, I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own Experience, whether the shadow of a Man, though it consists of nothing but the absence of Light (and the more the absence of Light is, the more discernible is the shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cause as clear and positive an *Idea* in his mind, as a Man himself, though covered over with clear Sun-shine? And the Picture of a Shadow, is a positive thing. Indeed, we have *negative Names*, which stand not directly for positive *Ideas*, but for their absence, such as *Insipid, silence, Nihil*, etc. which Words denote positive *Ideas*; *v.g. Tast, Sound, Being*, with a signification of their absence.

§ 6. And thus one may truly be said to see Darkness. For supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected,

(25) every one's] 1-3, 5 | ever ones 4
1-3, 4er, 5 | thing 4

(30) And] 1-3, 5 | and 4 thing.]
(33-4) which . . . absence.] 4-5 | to which there be no positive *Ideas*; but they consist wholly in negation of some certain *Ideas*, as *Silence, Invisible*; but these *signifie* not any *Ideas* in the Mind, but their *absence*.

'tis certain one may see the Figure of it, or it may be Painted; or whether the Ink, I write with, makes any other *Idea*, is a Question. The privative causes I have here assigned of positive *Ideas*, are according to the common Opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any *Ideas* from a privative cause, till it be determined, *Whether Rest be any more a privation than Motion.*

§ 7. To discover the nature of our *Ideas* the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are *Ideas* or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are modifications of matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in us: that so we *may not* think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the Images and *Resemblances* of something inherent in the subject; most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the Names, that stand for them, are the likeness of our *Ideas*, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

§ 8. Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call *Idea*; and the Power to produce any *Idea* in our mind, I call *Quality* of the Subject wherein that power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the power to produce in us the *Ideas* of *White*, *Cold*, and *Round*, the Powers to produce those *Ideas* in us, as they are in the Snow-ball, I call *Qualities*; and as they are Sensations, or Perceptions, in our Understandings, I call them *Ideas*: which *Ideas*, if I speak of sometimes, as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.

§ 9. Qualities thus considered in Bodies are, First such as are utterly inseparable from the Body, in what estate soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as Sense constantly finds in every particle of Matter, which has bulk enough to be

§§ 7, 8. *Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.* §§ 9, 10. *Primary and Secondary Qualities.*

(1) [2nd] or] 4—5 | and 1—3 (2) makes] 4—5 | make 1—3 (3) privative] 1—3,
 5er (likewise **Coste**) | private 4—5 (10) modifications of matter] add. 2—5
 (15) them,] 1—3 | them 4—5 (27)—135(14) Qualities . . . produce] 4—5 | Concerning these Qualities, we may, I think, observe these *primary* ones in Bodies, that produce 1—3 (27) **Coste** ‘Cela posé, l'on doit distinguer dans les Corps deux sortes de Qualitez.’ (28) inseparable] 5 (and v. next note) | inseparable 4
 (28)—135(13) such . . . certain Number.] This passage preceded by ‘These, which I call original or primary Qualities of Body, are wholly inseparable from it; and’ constitutes § 10 in 1—3. (I. below 31: §§ 9, 10.) and Secondary] 2—3 (likewise **Coste**); om. 4—5, but in their Table of Contents.

perceived, and the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of Matter, though less than to make it self singly be perceived by our Senses. *v.g.* Take a grain of Wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still *Solidity*, *Extension*, *Figure*, and *Mobility*; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a Mill, or Pestel, or any other Body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extension, Figure, or Mobility from any Body, but only makes two, or more distinct separate masses of Matter, of that which was but one before, all which distinct masses, reckon'd as so many distinct Bodies, after division make a certain Number. These I call *original* or *primary Qualities* of Body, which I think we may observe to produce simple Ideas in us, *viz.* Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and Number.

§ 10. 2dly, Such *Qualities*, which in truth are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their *primary Qualities*, *i.e.* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of their insensible parts, as Colours, Sounds, Tasts, etc. 20 These I call *secondary Qualities*. To these might be added a third sort which are allowed to be barely Powers though they are as much real Qualities in the Subject, as those which I to comply with the common way of speaking call *Qualities*, but for distinction *secondary Qualities*. For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or consistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a quality in Fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new *Idea* or Sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the same primary Qualities, *viz.* The Bulk, Texture, and Motion of its insensible parts. 25

§ 11. The next thing to be consider'd, is how *Bodies* produce

§§ 11, 12. How *primary Qualities* produce their Ideas.

(10-13) two . . . a] 2-5 | two distinct Bodies, or more, of one, which altogether after division have their 1 (13, 14) *v. 134(27, 28), nn.* (15-16) Figure . . . Number 4-5 | Motion or Rest, Number and Figure 1-3. (*Coste* 'la figure, le nombre, le mouvement ou le repos') (15) Rest,] 1-3, 5 | Rest 4 (17-30) 2dly . . . parts] 4-5 (17) 2dly,] 5 | 2dly, 4 (29) Texture,] edit. | Texture] 4-5 (31)-136(2) produce . . . in.] 4-5 | operate one upon another, and that is manifestly by impulse, and nothing else. It being impossible to conceive, that Body should operate on what it does not touch, (which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not) or when it does touch, operate any other [other om. 2-3] way than by [without 2-3 | than by 1] Motion. 1-3 (*Coste* like 2-3)

Ideas in us, and that is manifestly *by impulse*, the only way which we can conceive Bodies operate in.

§ 12. If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when they produce *Ideas* in it; and yet we perceive *these original Qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 'tis evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our Nerves, or animal Spirits, by some parts of our Bodies, to the Brains or the seat of Sensation, there to *produce in our Minds the particular Ideas we have of them*. And since the Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion of Bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance *by the sight*, 'tis evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some *Motion*, which produces these *Ideas*, which we have of them in us.

§ 13. After the same manner, that the *Ideas* of these original Qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the *Ideas of secondary Qualities* are also *produced*, viz. *by the operation of insensible particles on our Senses*. For it being manifest, that there are Bodies, and good store of Bodies, each whereof is so small, that we cannot, by any of our Senses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the Particles of the Air and Water, and other extremely smaller than those, perhaps, as much smaller than the Particles of Air, or Water, as the Particles of Air or Water, are smaller than Pease or Hail-stones. Let us suppose at present, that the different Motions and Figures, Bulk, and Number of such Particles, affecting the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different Sensations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies, v.g. that a Violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures, and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their Motions, causes the *Ideas* of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of that Flower to be produced in our Minds. It being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such *Ideas* to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he should annex the *Idea* of Pain to the motion of a piece of

§§ 13, 14. How Secondary.

(2) p. 135(31), n. (3) then] 4-5 | then Bodies cannot operate at a distance; if 1-3 (likewise Coste) (7) Brains or] 2-5 (Brains, 5) | Brains, 1 (13), which add. 4-5 (18) is 1-4 | are 5 (19) Senses,] 1-3 | Senses 4-5 (21) [2nd] smaller] 4-5 | less 1-3 (24) Bulk,] 1-3 | Bulk/ 4-5 (27-30) that . . . be] 2-5 | a Violet, by which impulse of those insensible Particles of Matter of different figures and bulks, and in a different Degree and Modification, we may have the *Ideas* of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of a Violet 1 (31) impossible] 1er-5 | conceived impossible 1

Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that *Idea* hath no resemblance.

§ 14. What I have said concerning *Colours* and *Smells*, may be understood also of *Tastes* and *Sounds*, and other the like sensible Qualities; which, whatever reality we, by mistake, attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us, and depend on those primary Qualities, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of parts; as I have said. 5

§ 15. From whence I think it is easie to draw this Observation, That the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the Ideas, produced in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our Ideas, existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them, only a Power to produce those Sensations in us: And what is Sweet, Blue, or Warm in Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the insensible Parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call so. 10 15

§ 16. Flame is denominated Hot and Light; Snow White and Cold; and Manna White and Sweet, from the Ideas they produce in us. Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those Bodies, that those Ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by most Men be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he, that will consider, that the same Fire, that at one distance produces in us the Sensation of Warmth, does at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different Sensation of Pain, ought to bethink himself, what Reason he has to say, That his Idea of Warmth, which was produced in him by the Fire, is actually in the Fire; and his Idea of Pain, which the same Fire produced in him the same way, is not in the Fire. Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and Pain not, when it produces the one and the other Idea in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number, and Motion of its solid Parts? 20 25 30

§ 17. The particular Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the parts of Fire, or Snow, are really in them, whether any ones Senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called real Qualities, because 35

§§ 15-22. Ideas of primary Qualities are resemblances; of secondary, not.

(7) depend] 1-3 | depend 4-5 (8) Texture,] 1-3 | Texture 4-5 as I have said]
 4-5 | and therefore I call them Secondary Qualities 1-3 (17) Parts . . . we]
 2-5 ('; not in 2-3) | Parts, in the Bodies themselves we 1 (28) Fire] 1-3, 5 |
 Fier 4 (35) because] add. 4-5

they really exist in those Bodies. But *Light, Heat, Whiteness, or Coldness, are no more really in them, than Sickness or Pain is in Manna.* Take away the Sensation of them; let not the Eyes see Light, or Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not Taste, nor the Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds, as they are such particular *Ideas*, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their Causes, *i.e.* Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts.

§ 18. A piece of *Manna* of a sensible Bulk, is able to produce in us the *Idea* of a round or square Figure; and, by being removed from one place to another, the *Idea* of Motion. This *Idea* of Motion represents it, as it really is in the *Manna* moving: A Circle or Square are the same, whether in *Idea* or Existence; in the Mind, or in the *Manna*: And this, both *Motion and Figure are really in the Manna*, whether we take notice of them or no: This every Body is ready to agree to. Besides, *Manna* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of its Parts, has a Power to produce the Sensations of Sickness, and sometimes of acute Pains, or Gripings in us. That these *Ideas* of *Sickness and Pain are not in the Manna*, but Effects of its Operations on us, and are no where when we feel them not: This also every one readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think, that *Sweetness and Whiteness are not really in Manna*; which are but the effects of the operations of *Manna*, by the motion, size, and figure of its Particles on the Eyes and Palate; as the Pain and Sickness caused by *Manna*, are confessedly nothing, but the effects of its operations on the Stomach and Guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its insensible parts; (for by nothing else can a Body operate, as has been proved:) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and thereby produce in the Mind particular distinct *Ideas*, which in it self it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and Stomach, and thereby produce distinct *Ideas*, which in it self it has not. These *Ideas* being all effects of the operations of *Manna*, on several parts of our Bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion of its parts, why those produced by the Eyes and Palate, should rather be thought to be really in the *Manna*, than those produced by the Stomach and Guts; or why the Pain and Sickness, *Ideas* that are the effects of *Manna*, should be thought to be no-where, when they are not felt; and yet the Sweetness and Whiteness, effects of the same *Manna* on other parts of the Body, by ways equally as

(9) *Idea*] 2-5 | *Ideas* 1 (22) *size*] *Coste* 'la situation' (25) *size*] *Coste* 'la contexture'
 (32) *size*] *Coste* 'la situation' (38) *equally*] 2-5 | *equal* 1

unknown, should be thought to exist in the *Manna*, when they are not seen nor tasted, would need some Reason to explain.

§ 19. Let us consider the red and white colours in *Porphyre*: Hinder light but from striking on it, and its Colours Vanish; it no longer produces any such *Ideas* in us: Upon the return of Light, it produces these appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the *Porphyre*, by the presence or absence of Light; and that those *Ideas* of whiteness and redness, are really in *Porphyre* in the light, when 'tis plain *it has no colour in the dark?* It has, indeed, such a Configuration of Particles, both Night and Day, as are apt by the Rays of Light rebounding from some parts of that hard Stone, to produce in us the *Idea* of redness, and from others the *Idea* of whiteness: But whiteness or redness are not in it at any time, but such a texture, that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.

§ 20. Pound an Almond, and the clear white *Colour* will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet *Taste* into an oily one. What real Alteration can the beating of the Pestle make in any Body, but an Alteration of the *Texture* of it?

§ 21. *Ideas* being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an Account, how the same Water, at the same time, may produce the *Idea* of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the other: Whereas it is impossible, that the same Water, if those *Ideas* were really in it, should at the same time be both Hot and Cold. For if we imagine *Warmth*, as it is *in our Hands*, to be *nothing but a certain sort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or animal Spirits*, we may understand, how it is possible, that the same Water may at the same time produce the Sensation of Heat in one Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that never producing the *Idea* of a square by one Hand, which has produced the *Idea* of a Globe by another. But if the Sensation of Heat and Cold, be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute Parts of our Bodies, caused by the Corpuscles of any other Body, it is easie to be understood, That if that motion be greater in one Hand, than in the other; if a Body be applied to the two Hands, which has in its minute Particles a greater motion, than in those of one of the Hands, and a less, than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one Hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause the different Sensations of Heat and Cold, that depend thereon.

§ 22. I have in what just goes before, been engaged in Physical Enquiries a little farther than, perhaps, I intended. But it being necessary, to make the Nature of Sensation a little understood, and to make the *difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas produced by them in the Mind*, to be distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; I hope, I shall be pardoned this little Excursion into Natural Philosophy, it being necessary in our present Enquiry, to distinguish the *primary, and real Qualities* of Bodies, which are always in them, (*viz.* Solidity, Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Rest; and are sometimes perceived by us, *viz.* when the Bodies they are in, are big enough singly to be discerned) from those *secondary and imputed Qualities*, which are but the Powers of several Combinations of those primary ones, when they operate, without being distinctly discerned; whereby we also may come to know what *Ideas* are, and what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the Bodies, we denominate from them.

§ 23. The *Qualities* then that are in *Bodies* rightly considered, are of *Three sorts*.

20 *First*, The *Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion, or Rest* of their solid Parts; those are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that size, that we can discover them, we have by these an *Idea* of the thing, as it is in it self, as is plain in artificial things. These I call *primary Qualities*.

25 *Secondly*, The *Power* that is in any Body, *by Reason of its insensible primary Qualities*, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our Senses, and thereby *produce in us the different Ideas* of several Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tasts, etc. These are usually called *sensible Qualities*.

30 *Thirdly*, The *Power* that is in any Body, *by Reason of the particular Constitution of its primary Qualities*, to make such a *change* in the *Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of another Body*, as to make it operate on our Senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the

§ 23. *Three sorts of Qualities in Bodies.*

(6) impossible] 1-3, 5 | Impossible 4 (21) those] 4-5 | these 1-3 (25) by] 1-3 | by 4-5 (l. below 33) This marginal summary, in 4-5, replaces Ideas of primary Qualities are resemblances; of secondary, not? that is in 2-3.

Sun has a Power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid. These are usually called Powers.

The First of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly called *real Original*, or *primary Qualities*, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or no: and upon their different Modifications it is, that the secondary Qualities depend.

The other two, are only Powers to act differently upon other things, which Powers result from the different Modifications of those primary Qualities.

§ 24. But though *these two later sorts of Qualities are Powers barely*, 10 and nothing but Powers, relating to several other Bodies, and resulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities; yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For *the Second sort, viz.* The Powers to produce several *Ideas* in us by our Senses, *are looked upon as real Qualities, in the things thus affecting us*: But *the Third sort* 15 *are call'd, and esteemed barely Powers. v.g. the Idea of Heat, or Light,* which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are commonly thought *real Qualities*, existing in the Sun, and something more than mere Powers in it. But when we consider the Sun, in reference to Wax, which it melts or blanches, we look upon the Whiteness 20 and Softness produced in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but Effects produced by *Powers* in it: Whereas, if rightly considered, these Qualities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me when I am warmed, or enlightened by the Sun, are no otherwise in the Sun, than the changes made in the Wax, when it is blanched or 25 melted, are in the Sun. They are all of them equally Powers in the Sun, depending on its primary Qualities; whereby it is able in the one case, so to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of some of the insensible parts of my Eyes, or Hands, as thereby to produce in me the *Idea of Light or Heat*; and in the other, it is able so to alter 30 the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the insensible Parts of the Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct *Ideas* of White and Fluid.

§§ 24, 25. *The 1st. are Resemblances. The 2d. thought Resemblances, but are not. The 3d. neither are nor are thought so.*

(2) These . . . Powers.] add. 4-5. (Not in Coste) are] edit. | are 4-5 (16)
 Powers.] 1-3 | Powers, 4-5 (19) mere] 2-5 (meer 5) | barely 1 (22) it:
 Whereas] 2-5 | it: whilst yet we look on Light and Warmth to be *real Qualities*,
 something more than bare Powers in the Sun. Whereas 1 (30) Idea of Light]
 5 | Ideas of Light 4 | Ideas of Light, 1-3 (l. below 33) This marginal summary, in
 4-5, replaces 'Reason of our mistake in this.' that is in 2-3.

§ 25. The Reason, *Why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities, and the other only for bare Powers*, seems to be, because the Ideas we have of distinct Colours, Sounds, etc. containing nothing at all in them, of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the Effects of these primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senses to operate in their Production; and with which, they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is, that we are so forward to imagine, that those Ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the Objects themselves: Since Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure, or Motion of parts in their Production; nor can Reason shew, how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure, and Motion, should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blue, or Yellow, etc. But in the other Case, in the Operations of Bodies, changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the Quality produced, hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of Power. For though receiving the Idea of Heat, or Light, from the Sun, we are apt to think, 'tis a Perception and Resemblance of such a Quality in the Sun: yet when we see Wax, or a fair Face, receive change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine, that to be the Reception or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we find not those different Colours in the Sun it self. For our Senses, being able to observe a likeness, or unlikeness of sensible Qualities in two different external Objects, we forwardly enough conclude the Production of any sensible Quality in any Subject, to be an Effect of bare Power, and not the Communication of any Quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible Quality in the thing that produced it. But our Senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness between the Idea produced in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it, we are apt to imagine, that our Ideas are resemblances of something in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers, placed in the Modification of their primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

§ 26. To conclude, beside those before mentioned *primary Qualities* in Bodies, viz. Bulk, Figure, Extension, Number, and

§ 26. *Secondary Qualities two-fold; First, Immediately perceptible; Secondly, Meditately perceptible.*

Motion of their solid Parts; all the rest, whereby we take notice of Bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else, but several Powers in them, depending on those primary Qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our Bodies, to produce several different *Ideas* in us; or else by operating on other Bodies, so to change their primary Qualities, as to render them capable of producing *Ideas* in us, different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called *Secondary Qualities, immediately perceptible*: The latter, *Secondary Qualities, mediately perceptible*.

10

(8) think,] 1-3, 5 | think 4
in himself in 1

(9) latter] 2-5 | later 1

(21) in] 2-5 |

CHAPTER XXIII

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

§ 1. THE Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple *Ideas*, conveyed in by the *Senses*, as they are found in exterior things, or by *Reflection* on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple *Ideas* go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple *Idea*, which indeed is a complication of many *Ideas* together; Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple *Ideas* can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose some *Substratum*, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call *Substance*.

§ 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his *Notion of pure Substance in general*, he will find he has no other *Idea* of it at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple *Ideas* in us; which Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he were demanded, what is it, that that Solidity and Extension

§ 1. Ideas of Substances how made. § 2. Our Idea of Substance in general.

(1) are which] 4-5 | are, 1-3
(13) together;] 4 | together: 1-3, 5

(12) simple] 1T.er, 2-5 | single 1
(16) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotations

from the Bishop of Worcester's Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity, p. 236, and Locke's Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 27, etc.; prefaced by "This Section, which was intended only to shew how the Individuals of distinct Species of Substances came to be look'd upon as simple *Ideas*, and so to have simple Names, viz. from the supposed simple *Substratum* or *Substance*, which was look'd upon as the thing it self in which inhereth, and from which resulted that Complication of *Ideas* by which it was represented to us, hath been mistaken for an Account of the *Idea* of Substance in general; and as such hath been reprehended in these Words: . . . To which Objection of the Bishop of Worcester, our Author answers thus:"

(21) . If] 4-5 | : And if 1-3

- inhere in, he would not be in a much better case, than the *Indian* before mentioned; who, saying that the World was supported by a great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know
 5 what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use Words without having clear and distinct *Ideas*, we talk like Children; who, being questioned, what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That it is *something*;
 10 which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by Children or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct *Idea* of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The *Idea* then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being
 15 nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that Support *Substantia*; which, according to the true import of the Word, is in plain *English*,
standing under, or upholding.
- 20 § 3. An obscure and relative *Idea* of Substance in general being thus made, we come to have the *Ideas of particular sorts of Substances*, by collecting such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are by Experience and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal
 25 Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come to have the *Ideas* of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, etc. of which Substances, whether any one has any other clear *Idea*, farther than of certain simple *Ideas* coexisting together, I appeal to every one's own Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qualities, observable in Iron, or a
 30 Diamond, put together, that make the true complex *Idea* of those Substances, which a Smith, or a Jeweller, commonly knows better

§ 3. Of the sorts of Substances.

(2) mentioned] **Coste** adds marginal reference to II. xiii. 19. (4) was, a] 5 | was a 4 | was, A 1-3 (9) it is something] 4-5 | it is something 1er, 2-3 | is something 1 (11) know] 2-5 | knew 1 (19) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotations from *Locke's Letter to the Bishop of Worcester*, pp. 6, etc., and his Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 381; prefaced by 'From this Paragraph, there hath been raised an Objection by the Bishop of Worcester, as if our Author's Doctrine here concerning *Ideas*, had almost discarded Substance out of the World. His Words in this second Paragraph being brought to prove, that he is one of the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, that have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. To which our Author replies.'

than a Philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other *Idea* of those Substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple *Ideas* which are to be found in them; only we must take notice, that our complex *Ideas* of Substances, besides all these simple *Ideas* they are made up of, have always the confused ⁵ *Idea* of *something* to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a *thing* having such or such Qualities, as Body is a *thing* that is extended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit a *thing* capable of thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we ¹⁰ say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed always *something* besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other observable *Ideas*, though we know not what it is.

§ 4. Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of ¹⁵ corporeal Substances, as *Horse*, *Stone*, etc. though the *Idea*, we have of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those several simple *Ideas* of sensible Qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called *Horse* or *Stone*, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we ²⁰ suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; *which Support we denote by the name Substance*, though it be certain, we have no clear, or distinct *Idea* of that *thing* we suppose a Support.

§ 5. The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz.* Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, etc. which we concluding not to ²⁵ subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other *Substance*, which we call *Spirit*; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other *Idea* or Notion, of Matter, but *something* wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do ³⁰ subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein *Thinking*, *Knowing*, *Doubting*, and a power of Moving, etc. do subsist, *We have as clear a Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body*; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the *Substratum* to those simple *Ideas* we have from without; and the other supposed ³⁵ (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the *Substratum* to those

§ 4. No clear Idea of Substance in general. § 5. As clear an Idea of Spirit, as Body.

(3) which] add. 4-5
4-5 | Nature, or Substance 1-3

(21) existing] 2-5 | to exist 1

(33) Substance]

Operations, which we experiment in our selves within. 'Tis plain then, that the *Idea* of corporeal *Substance* in Matter is as remote from our Conceptions, and Apprehensions, as that of Spiritual *Substance*, or *Spirit*; and therefore from our not having any notion of the *Substance* of Spirit, we can no more conclude its non-Existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the Existence of Body: It being as rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the *Substance* of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the *Substance* of a Spirit.

§ 6. Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of *Substance* in general, all *the Ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of Substances*, are nothing but several Combinations of simple *Ideas*, co-existing in such, though unknown, Cause of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. 'Tis by such Combinations of simple *Ideas* and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of *Substances* to our selves; such are the *Ideas* we have of their several species in our Minds; and such only do we, by their specifick Names, signify to others, *v.g. Man, Horse, Sun, Water, Iron*, upon hearing which Words, every one who understands the Language, frames in his Mind a Combination of those several simple *Ideas*, which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common Subject, which inheres not in any thing else. Though in the mean time it be manifest, and every one upon Enquiry into his own thoughts, will find that he has no other *Idea* of any *Substance*, *v.g. let it be Gold, Horse, Iron, Man, Vitriol, Bread*, but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities, which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition of such a *Substratum*, as gives as it were a support to those Qualities, or simple *Ideas*, which he has observed to exist united together. Thus the *Idea* of the *Sun*, What is it, but an aggregate of those several simple *Ideas*, Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a

§ 6. Of the sorts of Substances.

(7-8) have . . . distinct] 4-5 ('clear and distinct' *not in Coste*) | cannot know its Essence, as 'tis called, or have no 1-3 (9-10) have . . . Spirit] 4-5 ('clear and distinct' *not in Coste*) | know not its Essence, or have no *Idea* of a Spiritual Substance 1-3 (11) secret and] not in Coste (12) sorts of] add. 4-5 (16-17) sorts of *Substances*] 4-5 | Substances 1-3 (18) species] 4-5 | sorts 1-3 (29) inhere,] 2-5 | inhere 1 (32) the *Sun*] 4-5 | the Sun 1T.er, 2-3 | Sun 1 those] 4-5 | these 1-3

certain distance from us, and, perhaps, some other: as he who thinks and discourses of the *Sun*, has been more or less accurate, in observing those sensible Qualities, *Ideas*, or Properties, which are in that thing, which he calls the *Sun*.

§ 7. For he has the perfectest *Idea* of any of the particular sorts of *Substance*, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple *Ideas*, which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its active Powers, and passive Capacities; which though not simple *Ideas*, yet, in this respect, for brevity's sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing Iron, is one of the *Ideas* of the Complex one of that substance we call a *Load-stone*, and a Power to be so drawn is a part of the Complex one we call *Iron*; which Powers pass for inherent Qualities in those Subjects. Because every *Substance* being as apt, by the Powers we observe in it, to change some sensible Qualities in other Subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple *Ideas*, which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible Qualities introduced into other Subjects, discover to us those Powers, which do thereby mediately affect our Senses, as regularly, as its sensible Qualities do it immediately, *v.g.* we immediately by our Senses perceive in *Fire* its Heat and Colour; which are, if rightly considered, nothing but Powers in it, to produce those *Ideas* in us: We also by our Senses perceive the colour and brittleness of *Charcoal*, whereby we come by the Knowledge of another Power in *Fire*, which it has to change the colour and consistency of *Wood*. By the former *Fire* immediately, by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the Qualities of *Fire*, and so make them a part of the complex *Ideas* of it. For all those Powers, that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible Qualities, in those Subjects, on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible *Ideas*, therefore it is, that I have reckoned these Powers amongst the simple *Ideas*, which make the complex ones of the sorts of *Substances*; though these Powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex *Ideas*. And in this looser sence, I crave leave to be understood, when I

§ 7. Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.

(4) *Sun.*] 4-5 | *Sun.* 1-3 | *Sun?* 1T.er (5-6) [2nd] of . . . *Substance*] 4-5 | par-ticular Substance 1-3 (8) not] 4-5 | not strictly 1-3 (16) which] add. 4-5 (26) latter] 2-5 | later 1 (I. below 35) Powers] 2-4 | Power 5

name any of these *Potentialities amongst the simple Ideas*, which we recollect in our Minds, when we think of particular *Substances*. For the Powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct Notions of the several sorts of Substances.

§ 8. Nor are we to wonder, that *Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances*; since their secondary Qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex *Idea* of the several sorts of them. For our Senses failing us, in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities, as the characteristical Notes and Marks, whereby to frame *Ideas* of them in our Minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary Qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare Powers. For the Colour and Taste of *Opium*, are, as well as its soporifick or anodyne Virtues, meer Powers depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different Operations, on different parts of our Bodies.

§ 9. *The Ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal Substances*, are of these three sorts. *First*, The *Ideas* of the primary Qualities of things, which are discovered by our Senses, and are in them even when we perceive them not, such are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion of the parts of Bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. *Secondly*, The sensible secondary Qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the Powers, those Substances have to produce several *Ideas* in us by our Senses; which *Ideas* are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its Cause. *Thirdly*, The aptness we consider in any Substance, to give or receive such alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Substance so altered, should produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before, these are called active and passive Powers: All which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple *Ideas*. For whatever

§ 8. *And why.* § 9. *Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Substances.*

(4) the several sorts of] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste) (7) Qualities] Coste adds marginal reference to II. viii. (12) parts] 1–2, 4–5 | part 3 (16) shewn] Coste adds marginal reference to II. viii. 13. (21) '§ 9.' add. 2–5 (26) take notice of] 4–5 | perceive 1–3 (likewise Coste)

alteration a *Load-stone* has the Power to make in the minute Particles of Iron, we should have no Notion of any Power it had at all to operate on Iron, did not its sensible Motion discover it; and I doubt not, but there are a thousand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle, have a Power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, 5 because they never appear in sensible effects.

§ 10. Powers therefore, justly *make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances*. He, that will examine his complex *Idea* of Gold, will find several of its *Ideas*, that make it up, to be only Powers, as the Power of being melted, but of not spending it self in the Fire; of 10 being dissolved in *Aqua Regia*, are *Ideas*, as necessary to make up our complex *Idea* of Gold, as its Colour and Weight: which if duly considered, are also nothing but different Powers. For to speak truly, Yellowness is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold, to produce that *Idea* in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due Light: 15 and the Heat, which we cannot leave out of our *Idea* of the Sun, is no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into Wax. These are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating, by the Motion and Figure of its insensible Parts, so on a Man, as to make him have the *Idea* of Heat; and so on Wax, as to make it capable to 20 produce in a Man the *Idea* of White.

§ 11. Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of 25 Gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This Microscopes plainly discover to us: for what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is by thus augmenting the acuteness of our Senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus 30 altering, as it were, the proportion of the Bulk of the minute parts of a coloured Object to our usual Sight, produces different *Ideas*, from what it did before. Thus Sand, or pounded Glass, which is opaque,

§ 10. *Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.*

§ 11. *The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.*

(3) it;] 1-3, 5 | it, 4 (10) not spending it self] 4-5 | keeping its weight
1-3 (17) into] 2-5 | in 1 (19) Parts,] 2-3, 5 | Parts 4 | Parts; 1
 (1. below 33: § 10.) 4-5. In 2-3, the marginal summary for § 10 is the same as that for
 § 11 in 4-5, whereas in Coste § 10 comes under the same marginal summary as that for § 9.

and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid in a Microscope; and a Hair seen this way, loses its former Colour, and is in a great measure pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling Colours, such as appear from the refraction of Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies.

- 5 Blood to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good Microscope, wherein its lesser parts appear, shews only some few Globules of Red, swimming in a pellucid Liquor; and how these red Globules would appear, if Glasses could be found, that yet could magnify them 1000, or 10000 times more, is uncertain.
- 10 § 12. The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our Senses, Faculties, and Organs, to the conveniences of Life, and the Business we have to do here. We are able, by our Senses, to know, and distinguish things; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our Uses, and several ways to accommodate
 15 the Exigences of this Life. We have insight enough into their admirable Contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire, and magnify the Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this, which is suited to our present Condition, we want not Faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended,
 20 we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the Comprehension of any finite Being. We are furnished with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator, and the Knowledge of our Duty; and we are fitted well enough with
 25 Abilities, to provide for the Conveniences of living: These are our Business in this World. But were our Senses alter'd, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward Scheme of things would have quite another Face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our Being, or at least well-being in this
 30 part of the Universe, which we inhabit. He that considers, how little our Constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this Air, not much higher than that we commonly breath in, will have reason to be satisfied, that in this Globe of Earth allotted for our Mansion, the all-wise Architect has suited our Organs, and the Bodies, that
 35 are to affect them, one to another. If our Sense of Hearing were but 1000 times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract

§ 12. Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State.

(4) appear] 1-2, 4-5 | appears 3 (10) infinite] 2-5 | infinitely 1 (14) [3rd] to] add. 4-5 (23) Creatures] 1-2, 4-5 | Creature 3 (likewise Coste)
 (30), which] add. 4-5 (35) them,] 2-5 | them 1

us. And we should in the quietest Retirement, be less able to sleep or meditate, than in the middle of a Sea-fight. Nay, if that most instructive of our Senses, Seeing, were in any Man 1000, or 100000 times more acute than it is now by the best Microscope, things several millions of times less than the smallest Object of his sight now, would then be visible to his naked Eyes, and so he would come nearer the Discovery of the Texture and Motion of the minute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get *Ideas* of their internal Constitutions: But then he would be in a quite different World from other People: Nothing would appear the same to him, and others: The visible *Ideas* of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, Whether he, and the rest of Men, could discourse concerning the Objects of Sight; or have any Communication about Colours, their appearances being so wholly different. And, perhaps, such a quickness and tenderness of Sight could not endure bright Sun-shine, or so much as open Day-light; nor take in but a very small part of any Object at once, and that too only at a very near distance. And if by the help of such Microscopical Eyes, (if I may so call them,) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute Sight would not serve to conduct him to the Market and Exchange; If he could not see things, he was to avoid, at a convenient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible Qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the Configuration of the minute Particles of the Spring of a Clock, and observe upon what peculiar Structure and Impulse its elastick Motion depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: But if Eyes so framed, could not view at once the Hand, and the Characters of the Hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what a-Clock it was, their Owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance of the Parts of the Machin, made him lose its use.

§ 13. And here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine, *viz.* That since we have some Reason, (if there be any Credit to be given to the report of things, that our Philosophy

§ 13. *Conjecture about Spirits.*

(1) us.] 4-5 | us? 1-3 (4) times] add. 4-5. (*Coste* ‘dix mille fois’)
 (5-6) things . . . [2nd] would] 4-5 | he would see things 1000 or 100000 less than
 he does now, and so 1-3 (23) , at] 1er-5 | at 1 (24) ; nor] 1-4 |, nor 5

cannot account for,) to imagine, that Spirits can assume to themselves Bodies of different Bulk, Figure, and Conformation of Parts. Whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can so frame, and shape to themselves Organs of 5Sensation or Perception, as to suit them to their present Design, and the Circumstances of the Object they would consider. For how much would that Man exceed all others in Knowledge, who had but the Faculty so to alter the Structure of his Eyes, that one Sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of Vision, 10which the assistance of Glasses (casually at first light on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his Eye to all sorts of Objects, as to see, when he pleased, the Figure and Motion of the minute Particles in the Blood, and other juices of Animals, as distinctly, as he does, at other times, the shape and 15motion of the Animals themselves. But to us in our present State, unalterable Organs, so contrived, as to discover the Figure and Motion of the minute parts of Bodies, whereon depend those sensible Qualities, we now observe in them, would, perhaps, be of no ad-
20vantage. God has no doubt made us so, as is best for us in our present Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the Bodies, that surround us, and we have to do with: And though we cannot by the Faculties we have, attain to a perfect Knowledge of Things; yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-mentioned, which are our great Concernment. I beg my Reader's 25Pardon, for laying before him so wild a Fancy, concerning the ways of Perception in Beings above us: But how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the Knowledge of Angels, but after this manner, some way or other, in proportion to what we find and observe in our selves. And though we cannot 30but allow, that the infinite Power and Wisdom of God, may frame Creatures with a thousand other Faculties, and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have: Yet our Thoughts can go no farther than our own, so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very Guesses, beyond the *Ideas* received from our own Sensation and Reflection. The Supposition at least, that Angels do sometimes 35assume Bodies, needs not startle us, since some of the most ancient, and most learned Fathers of the Church, seemed to believe, that they had Bodies: And this is certain, that their state and way of Existence is unknown to us.

§ 14. But to return to the Matter in hand, the *Ideas* we have of Substances, and the ways we come by them; I say our *specifick Ideas of Substances* are nothing else but a *Collection of a certain number of simple Ideas, considered as united in one thing.* These *Ideas of Substances*, though they are commonly called simple Apprehensions, and the Names of them simple Terms; yet in effect, are complex and compounded. Thus the *Idea* which an *English*-man signifies by the Name *Swan* is white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the Water, and making a certain kind of Noise, and, perhaps, to a Man, who has long observed those kind of Birds, some other Properties, which all terminate in sensible simple *Ideas*, all united in one common subject.

§ 15. Besides the complex *Ideas* we have of material sensible Substances, of which I have last spoken, by the simple *Ideas* we have taken from those Operations of our own Minds, which we experiment daily in our selves, as Thinking, Understanding, Willing, Knowing, and Power of beginning Motion, etc. co-existing in some Substance, we are able to frame the complex *Idea of an immaterial Spirit.* And thus by putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking, Perceiving, Liberty, and Power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception, and notion of immaterial Substances, as we have of material. For putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking and Willing, or the Power of moving or quieting corporeal Motion, joined to Substance, of which we have no distinct *Idea*, we have the *Idea of an immaterial Spirit*; and by putting together the *Ideas* of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with Substance, of which likewise we have no positive *Idea*, we have the *Idea of Matter.* The one is as clear and distinct an *Idea*, as the other: The *Idea of Thinking*, and moving a Body, being as clear and distinct *Ideas*, as the *Ideas* of Extension, Solidity, and being moved. For our *Idea of Substance*, is equally obscure, or none at all, in both; it is but a supposed, I know not what, to support those *Ideas*, we call Accidents. It is for want of reflection, that we are apt to think, that

§ 14. Complex Ideas of Substances. § 15. Idea of spiritual Substances, as clear as of bodily Substances.

(2) *specifick* add. 4-5
subject] add. 4-5
(26) an immaterial] add. 4-5

(7) signifies] 2-5 | signified 1 (12-13), all . . .
(16) which] add. 2-5 (19) an immaterial] 4-5 | a 1-3
(34)-306(8) It . . . Being.] add. 4-5

our Senses shew us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the Corporeal and Spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, *etc.* that there is some Corporeal Being without me, the
 5 Object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some Spiritual Being within me, that sees and hears. This I must be convinced cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be without an immaterial thinking Being.

§ 16. By the complex *Idea* of extended, figured, coloured, and all
 10 other sensible Qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the *Idea* of the Substance of Body, as if we knew nothing at all: *Nor* after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine we have with Matter, and the many Qualities *Men* assure themselves they perceive and know in Bodies, will it, perhaps, upon examination
 15 be found, that they have any *more*, or *clearer*, primary Ideas belonging to Body, than they have belonging to immaterial Spirit.

§ 17. The primary Ideas we have peculiar to Body, as contradistinguished to Spirit, are the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating Motion by impulse. These, I think,
 20 are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body: for Figure is but the consequence of finite Extension.

§ 18. The Ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to Spirit, are Thinking, and Will, or a power of putting Body into motion by Thought, and, which is consequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but
 25 communicate its Motion by impulse, to another Body, which it meets with at rest; so the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The Ideas of Existence, Duration, and Mobility, are common to them both.

§ 19. There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I
 30 make Mobility belong to Spirit: For having no other Idea of Motion, but change of distance, with other Beings, that are considered as at rest; and finding that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate, but where they are; and that Spirits do operate at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite
 35 Spirits: (for of the infinite Spirit, I speak not here.) For my Soul being a real Being, as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of

§ 16. No Idea of abstract Substance.
 §§ 19–21. Spirits capable of Motion.

§ 17. The Cohesion of solid Parts, and impulse, the primary Ideas of Body.
 § 18. Thinking and Motivity, the primary Ideas of Spirit.

changing distance with any other Body, or Being, as Body it self; and so is capable of Motion. And if a Mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two Points; one may certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance between two Spirits; and so conceive their Motion, their approach, 5 or removal, one from another.

§ 20. Every one finds in himself, that his Soul can think, will, and operate on his Body, in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a Body, or in a place, an hundred Miles distant from it. No Body can imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at *Oxford*, 10 whilst he is at *London*; and cannot but know, that being united to his Body, it constantly changes place all the whole Journey, between *Oxford* and *London*, as the Coach, or Horse does, that carries him; and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in motion: Or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear *Idea* 15 enough of its motion, its being separated from the Body in death, I think, will: For to consider it as going out of the Body, or leaving it, and yet to have no *Idea* of its motion, seems to me impossible.

§ 21. If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none, for Spirits are not *in Loco*, but *Ubi*; I suppose that way 20 of talking, will not now be of much weight to many, in an Age, that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived, by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible *English*; and then 25 from thence draw a reason to shew that immaterial Spirits are not capable of Motion. Indeed, Motion cannot be attributed to GOD, not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an Infinite Spirit.

§ 22. Let us compare then our complex *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit, with our complex *Idea* of Body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one, than in the other, and in which most. Our *Idea* of Body, as I think, is an extended solid Substance, capable of communicating Motion by impulse: and our *Idea* of our Soul, as an

§ 22. Idea of Soul and Body compared.

(1) distance] 2-5 | of distance 1 (9) [2nd] a] add. 2-5 (17) as . . .
 leaving] 2-5 |, to go out of the Body, or leave 1 (20) in] 1-3 | in 4-5
 (20) in . . . *Ubi*] *Coste* adds a linguistic note on these Latin expressions. (24) that
 it is] add. 4-5 (25) English] 5 | English 1-4 (26) immaterial] add. 4-5
 (27) Indeed,] 1-3 | Indeed 4-5 attributed] 1-4 | attribute 5 (28) an
 immaterial] 4-5 | a Spirit 1-3 (29) an immaterial] add. 4-5. (*Not in Coste*)
 (33)-308(i) Soul . . . Spirit,] 4-5 | Souls, 1-3

immaterial Spirit, is of a Substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting Motion in Body, by Will, or Thought. These, I think, are *our complex Ideas of Soul and Body, as contra-distinguished*; and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know that People, whose Thoughts are immersed in Matter, and have so subjected their Minds to their Senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which, perhaps, is true: But I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

§ 23. If any one says, he knows not what 'tis thinks in him; he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks; I answer, Neither knows he how he is extended; how the solid parts of Body are united, or cohere together to make Extension. For though the pressure of the Particles of Air, may account for the *cohesion of several parts of Matter*, that are grosser than the Particles of Air, and have Pores less than the Corpuscles of Air; yet the weight, or pressure of the Air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the Particles of Air themselves. And if the pressure of the Æther, or any subtler Matter than the Air, may unite, and hold fast together the parts of a Particle of Air, as well as other Bodies; yet it cannot make Bonds for it self, and hold together the parts, that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materia subtilis*. So that that Hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by shewing, that the parts of sensible Bodies are held together, by the pressure of other external insensible Bodies, reaches not the parts of the Æther it self; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other Bodies are held together, by the external pressure of the Æther, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark, concerning the cohesion of the parts of the Corpuscles of the Æther it self: which we can neither conceive without parts, they being Bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other Bodies.

§§ 23-7. Cohesion of solid parts in Body, as hard to be conceived as Thinking in a Soul.

(1) v. 307(33), n.

(11) one says] 1-3 | ones say 4 | one say 5

§ 24. But in truth, *the pressure of any ambient Fluid*, how great soever, *can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of Matter*. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished Superficies, one from another in a Line perpendicular to them, as in the Experiment of two polished Marbles: Yet it can never, in the least, hinder the separation by a Motion, in a Line parallel to those Surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of Space, deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of Bodies so joined, no more, than it would resist the motion of that Body, were it on all sides environed by that Fluid, and touched no other Body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of Bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the *Æther* be the adequate cause of cohesion, where-ever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation, (as has been shewed,) therefore in every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of Matter, there could be no more cohesion, than of two polished Surfaces, which will always, notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a Fluid, easily slide one from another. So that, perhaps, how clear an *Idea* soever we think we have of the Extension of Body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his Mind, may have reason to conclude, That 'tis *as easie* for him to have a clear Idea, *how the Soul thinks, as how Body is extended*. For since Body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the *extension* of Body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of Thinking, and how it is performed.

§ 25. I allow, it is usual for most People to wonder, how any one should find a difficulty in what they think, they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of Bodies stick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning *Thinking*, and *voluntary Motion*: Do we not every moment experiment it in our selves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of Fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss, both in the

(7) those Surfaces] 4-5 | those Superficies 2-3 | these Superficies 1
Surfaces,] 4-5 | Superficies; 1-3 (18) Sur-

(20) another.] 4-5 | another: 1-3

one, and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of Body cohere, as how we our selves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of Gold, or Brass, (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the
 5 Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glass,) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of Mens arms cannot separate them: A considering Man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfie his own, or another Man's Understanding.

10 § 26. The little Bodies that compose that Fluid, we call *Water*, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who by a Microscope, (and yet I have heard of some, that have magnified to 10000; nay, to much above 100,000 times,) pretended to perceive their distinct Bulk, Figure, or Motion: And the Particles of *Water*
 15 are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these little Atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable.
 20 He that could find the Bonds, that tie these heaps of loose little Bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the Cement, that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a great, and yet unknown Secret: And yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension of Body (which is the
 25 cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could shew wherein consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those Bonds, or of that Cement, or of the least Particle of Matter that exists. Whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious Quality of Body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible, as
 30 any thing belonging to our Minds, and *a solid extended Substance, as hard to be conceived, as a thinking immaterial one*, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

§ 27. For to extend our Thoughts a little farther, that pressure, which is brought to explain the cohesion of Bodies, is as unintelligible, as the cohesion it self. For if Matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his Contemplation to the Extremities of the Universe, and there see what conceivable Hoops, what Bond he can imagine to hold this mass of Matter, in so close a

(31) immaterial] add. 4-5. (Not in Coste) (37) the] add. 2-5 (38) imagine]
 1-3, 5 | imagin 4

pressure together, from whence Steel has its firmness, and the parts of a Diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If Matter be finite, it must have its Extremes; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the Supposition and Abyss of infinite Matter, ⁵ let him consider, what light he thereby brings to the *cohesion* of Body; and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a Supposition, the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other: So far is our Extension of Body, (which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts,) from being clearer, or more ¹⁰ distinct, when we would enquire into the Nature, Cause, or Manner of it, than the *Idea* of Thinking.

§ 28. Another *Idea* we have of Body, is the power of *communication of Motion by impulse*; and of our Souls, the power of *exciting of Motion by Thought*. These *Ideas*, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, ¹⁵ every days experience clearly furnishes us with: But if here again we enquire how this is done, we are *equally in the dark*. For in the communication of Motion by impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinary case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of Motion out of ²⁰ one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and un- conceivable, as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by Thought; which we every moment find they do. The increase of Motion by impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have by daily experience clear evi- ²⁵ dence of Motion produced both by impulse, and by thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both. So that however we consider Motion, and its communication either from Body or Spirit, *the Idea which belongs to Spirit, is at least as clear, as that, that belongs to Body*. And if we con- ³⁰ sider the active power of Moving, or, as I may call it, *Motivity*, it is much clearer in Spirit than Body; since two Bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the *Idea* of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the Mind, every day, affords us *Ideas* of an active power of moving of Bodies; and ³⁵ therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not

§§ 28, 29. *Communication of Motion by Impulse, or by Thought, equally intelligible.*

(4) asunder] 1–3, 5 | a sunder 4
Coste adds marginal reference to II. xxi. 4.

(29) from] 2–5 | in 1

(34) motion]
(I. below 36) intelligible] **Coste**
 ‘inintelligible’

the proper attribute of Spirits, and passive power of Matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created Spirits are not totally separate from Matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure Spirit, *viz.* God, is only active; pure Matter is only passive; those Beings
 s that are both active and passive we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear *Ideas* belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Substance of each being equally unknown to us; and the *Idea* of Thinking in Spirit, as clear as of Extension in Body; and the communication of
 10 Motion by Thought, which we attribute to Spirit, is as evident, as that by impulse, which we ascribe to Body. Constant Experience makes us sensible of both of these, though our narrow Understandings can comprehend neither. For when the Mind would look beyond those original *Ideas* we have from Sensation or Reflection,
 15 and penetrate into their Causes, and manner of production, we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.

§ 29. To conclude, Sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended Substances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: Experience assures us of the Existence of such Beings; and that the
 20 one hath a power to move Body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear *Ideas*, both of the one, and the other. But beyond these *Ideas*, as received from their proper Sources, our Faculties will not reach. If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Causes,
 25 and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension, clearer than we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easie as the other; and there is no more difficulty, to conceive how a Substance we know not, should by thought set Body into motion, than how a Substance we know not, should by impulse set Body into
 30 motion. So that we are no more able to discover, wherein the *Ideas* belonging to Body consist, than those belonging to Spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple *Ideas* we receive from Sensation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts; beyond which, the Mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not
 35 able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would prie into the Nature and hidden Causes of those *Ideas*.

§ 30. So that, in short, *the Idea we have of Spirit, compared with the*

§ 30. Ideas of Body and Spirit compared.

(1-5) Hence . . . both.] add. 4-5

(14) those] 4-5 | these 1-3

Idea we have of Body, stands thus: The substance of Spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of Body, equally unknown to us: Two primary Qualities, or Properties of Body, *viz.* solid coherent parts, and impulse, we have distinct clear *Ideas* of: So likewise we know, and have distinct clear *Ideas* of two primary Qualities, or ⁵ Properties of Spirit, *viz.* Thinking, and a power of Action; *i.e.* a power of beginning, or stopping several Thoughts or Motions. We have also the *Ideas* of several Qualities inherent in Bodies, and have the clear distinct *Ideas* of them: which Qualities, are but the various modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts, and their ¹⁰ motion. We have likewise the *Ideas* of the several modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all which, are but the several modes of Thinking. We have also the *Ideas* of Willing, and Moving the Body consequent to it, and with the Body it self too; for, as has been shewed, Spirit is capable of Motion. ¹⁵

§ 31. Lastly, if this Notion of immaterial Spirit may have, perhaps, some difficulties in it, not easie to be explained, we have therefore no more reason to deny, or doubt the existence of such Spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt the existence of Body; because the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very ²⁰ hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained, or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of Spirit more perplexed, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very notion of Body includes in it; the divisibility *in infinitum* of any finite Extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent; Consequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing substance. ²⁵

§ 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but ³⁰ some few superficial *Ideas* of things, discovered to us only by the Senses from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experiments in it self within, have no Knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things, being destitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and ³⁵

§ 31. *The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of Body.*

§ 32. *We know nothing beyond our simple Ideas.*

(3) , or] 1-3, 5 | or 4 (4) impulse,] 1-3, 5 | impulse 4 (6) [2nd of] add.
 1er-5 (15) shewed] **Coste** adds marginal reference to §§ 19-21 of this chapter.
 (16) immaterial] add. 4-5. (Not in Coste) (18) therefore] 4-5 | thereby 1-3
 such] add. 4-5 (26-7) in our apprehensions] add. 3-5.

discovering in our selves Knowledge, and the power of voluntary Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid Parts, which is the Extension and Motion of Bodies; *we have as much Reason to be satisfied with our*
 5 *Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and the Existence of the one, as well as the other.* For it being no more a contradiction, that Thinking should exist, separate, and independent from Solidity; than it is a contradiction, that Solidity should exist, separate, and independent from Thinking, they being both but
 10 simple *Ideas*, independent one from another; and having as clear and distinct *Ideas* in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not, why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, *i.e.* immaterial, to exist; as a solid thing without Thinking, *i.e.* Matter, to exist; especially since it is no harder to conceive how Thinking
 15 should exist without Matter, than how Matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple *Ideas*, we have from Sensation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature of Things, we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity, Perplexedness and Difficulties; and can discover nothing farther, but
 20 our own Blindness and Ignorance. But which ever of these complex *Ideas* be clearest, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident, that the simple *Ideas* that make them up, are no other than what we have received from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our other *Ideas* of Substances, even of God himself.

25 § 33. For if we examine the *Idea* we have of the incomprehensible supreme Being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way; and that the complex *Ideas* we have both of God, and separate Spirits, are made up of the simple *Ideas* we receive from *Reflection*; *v.g.* having from what we experiment in our selves, got the *Ideas* of Existence
 30 and Duration; of Knowledge and Power; of Pleasure and Happiness; and of several other Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have, than to be without; when we would frame an *Idea* the most suitable we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our *Idea* of Infinity; and so putting them together, make our
 35 complex *Idea of God*. For that the Mind has such a power of enlarg-

§§ 33–5. Idea of God.

(5) immaterial] add. 4–5 (13), to] 1–3 | to 4–5 (21) immaterial] add.
 4–5. (Nor in Coste) (28) Reflection;] 1–3, 5 | Reflection, 4 (34) Infinity]
 Coste adds marginal reference to II. xvii.

ing some of its *Ideas*, received from Sensation and Reflection, has been already shewed.

§ 34. If I find, that I know some few things, and some of them, or all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an *Idea* of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to Number, 5 and thus enlarge my *Idea* of Knowledge, by extending its Comprehension to all things existing, or possible: The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i.e. all their Qualities, Powers, Causes, Consequences, and Relations, etc. till all be perfectly known, that is in them, or can any way relate to them, and thus frame the *Idea* of 10 infinite or boundless Knowledge: The same may also be done of Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the Duration of Existence, without beginning or end; and so frame the *Idea* of an eternal Being: The Degrees or Extent, wherein we ascribe Existence, Power, Wisdom, and all other Perfection, (which we can have any 15 *Ideas* of) to that Sovereign Being, which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best *Idea* of him our Minds are capable of; all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple *Ideas*, we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by 20 Reflection; or by our Senses, from exterior things, to that vastness, to which Infinity can extend them.

§ 35. For it is Infinity, which, joined to our *Ideas* of Existence, Power, Knowledge, etc. makes that complex *Idea*, whereby we represent to our selves the best we can, the supreme Being. For though in his own Essence, (which certainly we do not know, not 25 knowing the real Essence of a Peble, or a Fly, or of our own selves,) God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have no other *Idea* of him, but a complex one of Existence, Knowledge, Power, Happiness, etc. infinite and eternal: which are all distinct *Ideas*, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of 30 others; all which being, as has been shewn, originally got from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, go to make up the *Idea* or Notion we have of God.

§ 36. This farther is to be observed, that there is no *Idea* we attribute to God, bating Infinity, which is not also a part of our 35 complex *Idea* of other Spirits. Because being capable of no other simple *Ideas*, belonging to any thing but Body, but those which by

§ 36. No Ideas in our Complex one of Spirits, but those got from Sensation or Reflection.

(2) Shewed] Coste adds marginal reference to II. xi. 6 etc.
of;] 1-4 | Being. . . . of: 5

(14-18) Being: . . .

Reflection we receive from the Operation of our own Minds, we can attribute to Spirits no other, but what we receive from thence: And all the difference we can put between them in our Contemplation of Spirits, is only in the several Extents and Degrees of their Knowledge, Power, Duration, Happiness, *etc.* For that in our *Ideas*, as well of Spirits, as of other things, we are *restrained to those we receive from Sensation and Reflection*, is evident from hence, that in our *Ideas* of Spirits, how much soever advanced in Perfection, beyond those of Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any *Idea* of the manner, wherein they discover their Thoughts one to another: Though we must necessarily conclude, that separate Spirits, which are Beings that have perfecter Knowledge, and greater Happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their Thoughts, than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal Signs, and particularly Sounds, which are therefore of most general use, as being the best, and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate Communication, having no Experiment in our selves, and consequently, no Notion of it at all, we have no *Idea*, how Spirits, which use not Words, can with quickness; or much less, how Spirits that have no Bodies, can be Masters of their own Thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at Pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a Power.

§ 37. And thus we have seen, *what kind of Ideas we have of Substances of all kinds*, wherein they consist, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident.

First, That all our *Ideas* of the several sorts of Substances, are nothing but Collections of simple *Ideas*, with a Supposition of something, to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed something, we have no clear distinct *Idea* at all. Secondly, That all the simple *Ideas*, that thus united in one common *Substratum* make up our complex *Ideas* of the several sorts of Substances, are no other but such, as we have received from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. So that even in those, which we think, we are

§ 37. Recapitulation.

(11) separate] add. 4-5
4-5

(15) particularly] 1-3 (*likewise Coste*) | particular
(30-2) simple . . . other] 4-5 | complex *Ideas* we have of Substances, are
made up of no other simple *Ideas*, 1-3
edit. | several sorts of the Substances 4-5. (*Coste* ‘les *Idées complexes* que nous avons
de différentes sortes de substances’)

most intimately acquainted with, and come nearest the Comprehension of, our most enlarged Conceptions, cannot reach beyond those simple *Ideas*. And even in those, which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing, we can perceive in our selves by *Reflection*, or discover by *Sensation* 5 in other things, we can attain to nothing, but those simple *Ideas*, which we originally received from *Sensation* or *Reflection*, as is evident in the complex *Ideas* we have of Angels, and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the simple *Ideas*, that make up our complex 10 *Ideas* of Substances, when truly considered, are only Powers, however we are apt to take them for positive Qualities; v.g. the greatest part of the *Ideas*, that make our complex *Idea* of *Gold*, are Yellowness, great Weight, Ductility, Fusibility, and Solubility, in *Aqua Regia*, etc. all united together in an unknown *Substratum*; all which *Ideas*, are 15 nothing else, but so many relations to other Substances; and are not really in the *Gold*, considered barely in it self, though they depend on those real, and primary Qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness, differently to operate, and be operated on by several other Substances.

CHAPTER XXXI

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

§ 1. OF our real *Ideas* some are Adequate, and some are Inadequate. Those I call *Adequate*, which perfectly represent those Archetypes, which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate Ideas* are such, which are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those Archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

§ 2. First, That *all our simple Ideas are adequate*. Because being nothing but the effects of certain Powers in Things, fitted and ordained by GOD, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent, and adequate to those Powers: And we are sure they agree to the reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us the *Ideas*, which we call Whiteness, and Sweetness, we are sure there is a power in Sugar to produce those *Ideas* in our Minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each Sensation answering the Power, that operates on any of our Senses, the *Idea* so produced, is a real *Idea*, (and not a fiction of the Mind, which has no power to produce any simple *Idea*;) and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple *Ideas* are adequate. 'Tis true, the Things producing in us these simple *Ideas*, are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those *Ideas* were real Beings in them. For though Fire be call'd painful to the Touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the *Idea* of Pain; yet it is denominated also Light, and Hot; as if Light and Heat, were really something in the Fire, more than a power to excite these *Ideas* in us; and therefore are called *Qualities* in, or of the Fire. But these being nothing, in

§ 1. *Adequate Ideas, are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.* § 2. *Simple Ideas all inadequate.*

(2 ll. above 1) XXXI] 2-5 | XXX 1 (1) In Coste, 'Entre nos Idées réelles quelques-unes sont *complètes* et quelques autres *incomplètes*.'; notes are there appended on the italicized epithets, 'En Latin *adæquatæ*.' and '*Inadæquatæ*', respectively. (15) by it add. 4-5 (17-18) (and . . . *Idea*;) 5 | and . . . *Idea*; 4er (likewise Coste) | (and not a fiction of the Mind,) which . . . *Idea*; 1-4. (Coste adds 'comme nous l'avons déjà prouvé') (23) painful] Coste adds a linguistic marginal note. is] 4-5 | it 1-3

truth, but powers to excite such *Ideas* in us, I must, in that sense, be understood, when I speak of secondary *Qualities*, as being in Things; or of their *Ideas*, as being in the Objects, that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar Notions,
 5 without which, one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify nothing, but those Powers, which are in Things, to excite certain Sensations or *Ideas* in us. Since were there no fit Organs to receive the impressions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch; nor a Mind joined to those Organs to receive the *Ideas* of Light and Heat, by
 10 those impressions from the Fire, or the Sun, there would yet be no more Light, or Heat in the World, than there would be Pain if there were no sensible Creature to feel it, though the Sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount *Etna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity, and Extension, and the termination of it, Figure, with
 15 Motion and Rest, whereof we have the *Ideas*, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were any sensible Being to perceive them, or no: And therefore those we have reason to look on, as the real modifications of Matter; and such as are the exciting Causes of all our various Sensations from Bodies. But this being an
 20 Enquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to shew, what complex *Ideas* are *adequate*, and what not.

§ 3. *Secondly*, Our complex Ideas of Modes, being voluntary Collections of simple *Ideas*, which the Mind puts together, without reference to any real Archetypes, or standing Patterns, existing any
 25 where, *are*, and cannot but be *adequate Ideas*. Because they not being intended for Copies of Things really existing, but for Archetypes made by the Mind, to rank and denominate Things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of *Ideas*, and thereby that perfection which the Mind intended
 30 they should: So that the Mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the *Idea* of a Figure, with three sides meeting at three Angles, I have a complete *Idea*, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the Mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its *Idea*, is plain, in that it does not
 35 conceive, that any Understanding hath, or can have a more compleat or perfect *Idea* of that thing it signifies by the word *Triangle*,

§ 3. *Modes are all adequate.*

supposing it to exist, than it self has in that complex *Idea* of three Sides, and three Angles: in which is contained all that is, or can be essential to it, or necessary to complete it, where-ever or however it exists. But in our *Ideas* of *Substances*, it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy Things, as they really do exist; and to represent to our selves that Constitution, on which all their Properties depend, we perceive our *Ideas* attain not that Perfection we intend: We find they still want something, we should be glad were in them; and so are all *inadequate*. But *mixed Modes* and *Relations*, being Archetypes without Patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to it self. He that at first put together the *Idea* of Danger perceived, absence of disorder from Fear, sedate consideration of what was justly to be done, and executing of that without disturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his Mind that complex *Idea* made up of that Combination: and intending it to be nothing else, but what it is; nor to have in it any other simple *Ideas*, but what it hath, it could not also but be an *adequate Idea*: and laying this up in his Memory, with the name *Courage* annexed to it, to signify it to others, and denominate from thence any Action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a Standard to measure and denominate Actions by, as they agreed to it. This *Idea* thus made, and laid up for a Pattern, must necessarily be *adequate*, being referred to nothing else but it self, nor made by any other Original, but the Goodliking and Will of him, that first made this Combination.

§ 4. Indeed, another coming after, and in Conversation learning from him the word *Courage*, may make an *Idea*, to which he gives that name *Courage*, different from what the first Author applied it to, and has in his Mind, when he uses it. And in this case, if he designs, that his *Idea* in Thinking, should be conformable to the other's *Idea*, as the Name he uses in speaking, is conformable in sound to his, from whom he learned it, his *Idea* may be very wrong and *inadequate*. Because in this case, making the other Man's *Idea* the pattern of his *Idea* in thinking, as the other Man's Word, or Sound, is the pattern of his in speaking, his *Idea* is so far defective and *inadequate*, as it is distant from the Archetype and Pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it, which name he would have to be a sign of the other Man's *Idea*, (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed,) and of his

§§ 4, 5. *Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.*

own, as agreeing to it: to which if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§ 5. Therefore these *complex Ideas of Modes*, when they are referred by the Mind, and intended to correspond to the *Ideas* in the Mind of some other intelligent Being, expressed by the Names we apply to them, they *may be* very deficient, wrong, and *inadequate*. Because they agree not to that, which the Mind designs to be their Archetype, and Pattern: In which respect only, any *Idea of Modes* can be wrong, imperfect, or *inadequate*. And on this account, our *Ideas of mixed Modes* are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper Speaking, than knowing right.

§ 6. *Thirdly*, What *Ideas we have of Substances*, I have above shewed: Now those *Ideas* have in the Mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real Essence of each Species of Things. 2. Sometimes they are only design'd to be Pictures and Representations in the Mind, of Things that do exist, by *Ideas* of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these Copies of those Originals, and Archetypes, *are* imperfect and *inadequate*.

First, It is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances, stand for Things, as supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that Species: And Names standing for nothing but the *Ideas*, that are in Men's Minds, they must consequently referr their *Ideas* to such real Essences, as to their Archetypes. That Men (especially such as have been bred up in the Learning taught in this part of the World) do suppose certain specifick Essences of Substances, which each Individual in its several kind is made conformable to, and partakes of, is so far from needing proof, that it will be thought strange, if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specifick Names, they rank particular Substances under, to Things, as distinguished by such specifick real Essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted, whether he call'd himself Man, with any other meaning, than as having the real Essence of a Man? And yet if you demand, what those real Essences are, 'tis plain Men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the *Ideas* they

§§ 6, 7. *Ideas of Substances, as referr'd to real Essences not adequate.*

(12) shewed] **Coste** adds marginal reference to II. xxiii. (16-17) of those qualities]
add. 2-5 (18) those] 2-5 | their 1 (27) kind] 1-4 | kinds 5

have in their Minds, being referred to real Essences as to Archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being *adequate*, that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex *Ideas* we have of Substances, are, as it has been shewn, certain Collections of simple *Ideas*, that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex *Idea* cannot be the real Essence of any Substance; for then the Properties we discover in that Body, would depend on that complex *Idea*, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex *Idea* of three Lines, including a Space. But it is plain, that in our complex *Ideas* of Substances, are not contained such *Ideas*, on which all the other Qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common *Idea* Men have of *Iron*, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight, and Hardness; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this Property has no necessary connexion with that complex *Idea*, or any part of it: And there is no more reason to think, that malleableness depends on that Colour, Weight, and Hardness, than that that Colour, or that Weight depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real Essences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men should attribute the sorts of Things to such Essences. The particular parcel of Matter which makes the Ring I have on my Finger, is forwardly, by most Men, supposed to have a real Essence, whereby it is *Gold*; and from whence those Qualities flow, which I find in it, viz. its peculiar Colour, Weight, Hardness, Fusibility, Fixedness, and change of Colour upon a slight touch of Mercury, etc. This Essence, from which all these Properties flow, when I enquire into it, and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: the farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but Body, its real Essence, or internal Constitution, on which these Qualities depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size, and Connexion of its solid Parts; of neither of which, I having any distinct perception at all, I can have no *Idea* of its Essence, which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness; a greater weight than any thing I know of the same bulk; and a fitness to have its Colour

(1) [2nd] to add. 4-5 (4) it has been shewn] 4-5 | has been shewn 2-3 |
has been shewed 1. (*Coste* 'j'ai déjà montré') (18) or] 5 (*likewise Coste*) |
nor 1-4 (35) Essence] 4-5 | real Essence 1-3 (*likewise Coste*)

changed by the touch of Quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real Essence, and internal Constitution, on which these Properties depend, is not the Figure, Size, and Arangement or Connexion of its solid Parts, but something else, call'd its particular *form*; I am s farther from having any *Idea* of its real Essence, than I was before. For I have an *Idea* of Figure, Size, and Situation of solid Parts in general, though I have none of the particular Figure, Size, or putting together of Parts, whereby the Qualities above-mentioned are produced; which Qualities I find in that particular parcel of Matter, 10 that is on my Finger, and not in another parcel of Matter, with which I cut the Pen I write with. But when I am told, that something besides the Figure, Size, and Posture of the solid Parts of that Body, is its Essence, something called *substantial form*, of that, I confess, I have no *Idea* at all, but only of the sound *Form*; which is far enough 15 from an *Idea* of its real Essence, or Constitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real Essence of this particular Substance, I have also of the real Essence of all other natural ones: Of which Essences, I confess, I have no distinct *Ideas* at all; and I am apt to suppose others, when they examine their own Knowledge, will find in 20 themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

§ 7. Now then, when Men apply to this particular parcel of Matter on my Finger, a general Name already in use, and denominate it *Gold*, Do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that Name as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies, 25 having a real internal Essence; by having of which Essence, this particular Substance comes to be of that Species, and to be called by that Name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name, by which Things are marked, as having that Essence, must be referred primarily to that Essence; and consequently the *Idea* to which that name is 30 given, must be referred also to that Essence, and be intended to represent it. Which Essence, since they, who so use the Names, know not, their Ideas of *Substances* must be *all inadequate* in that respect, as not containing in them that real Essence, which the Mind intends they should.

35 § 8. *Secondly*, Those who, neglecting that useless Supposition of unknown real Essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the Substances, that exist in the World, by putting

§§ 8-11. Ideas of *Substances*, as Collections of their Qualities, are *all inadequate*.

(5) before.] 1-3 | before, 4 | before; 5
(32) not,] 1er-5 | not 1

(34) Mind] 1-4 | Minds 5

(7) putting] 1-3, 5 | putting 4

together the *Ideas* of those sensible Qualities, which are found co-existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of them, than those who imagine, they know not what real specifick Essences: yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate *Ideas* of those Substances, they would thus copy into their Minds: nor do those Copies, exactly, and fully, contain all that is to be found in their Archetypes. Because those Qualities, and Powers of Substances, whereof we make their complex *Ideas*, are so many and various, that no Man's complex *Idea* contains them all. That our abstract *Ideas* of Substances, do not contain in them all the simple *Ideas*, that are united in the Things themselves, is evident, in that Men do rarely put into their complex *Idea* of any Substance, all the simple *Ideas* they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the signification of their specifick Names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specifick *Ideas* of the sorts of Substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple *Ideas* which are to be found in them: But these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specifick *Idea*, more than others that are left out, 'tis plain, that both these ways, *our Ideas of Substances* are deficient, and *inadequate*. The simple *Ideas* whereof we make our complex ones of Substances, are all of them (bating only the Figure and Bulk of some sorts) Powers; which being Relations to other Substances, we can never be sure that we know all the Powers, that are in any one Body, till we have tried what Changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other Substances, in their several ways of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one Body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate *Ideas* of any Substance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.

§ 9. Whosoever first light on a parcel of that sort of Substance, we denote by the word *Gold*, could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he observed in that lump, to depend on its real Essence, or internal Constitution. Therefore those never went into his *Idea* of that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex *Idea* of that Species. Which both are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes, after such a manner, and to produce in us that *Idea*, we call Yellow; and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal Scales, one against another. Another,

(22) Powers;] 1-3 (likewise Coste) | Powers 4 | Powers, 5 (23) that] add. 4-5
 (31), or] 4-5 | ; on its 1-3

perhaps, added to these, the *Ideas* of Fusibility, and Fixedness, two other passive Powers, in relation to the operation of Fire upon it; Another, its Ductility, and Solubility in *Aqua Regia*, two other Powers, relating to the operation of other Bodies, in changing its outward Figure or Separation of it, into insensible Parts. These, or part of these, put together, usually make the complex *Idea* in Men's Minds, of that sort of Body we call *Gold*.

§ 10. But no one, who hath considered the Properties of Bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt, that this, call'd *Gold*, has infinite other Properties, not contained in that complex *Idea*. Some, who have examined this Species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in *Gold*, all of them as inseparable from its internal Constitution, as its Colour, or Weight: And 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties, that are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred times as many *Ideas*, go to the complex *Idea* of *Gold*, as any one Man yet has in his; and yet, perhaps, that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes that that one Body is apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a Paradox to any one, who will but consider, how far Men are yet from knowing all the Properties of that one, no very compound Figure, a *Triangle*, though it be no small numbers, that are already by Mathematicians discovered of it.

§ 11. So that *all our complex Ideas of Substances are imperfect and inadequate*. Which would be so also in mathematical Figures, if we were to have our complex *Ideas* of them, only by collecting their Properties, in reference to other Figures. How uncertain, and imperfect, would our *Ideas* be of an *Ellipsis*, if we had no other *Idea* of it, but some few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain *Idea*, the whole Essence of that Figure, we from thence discover those Properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

§ 12. Thus the Mind has three sorts of abstract *Ideas*, or nominal Essences:

§ 12. *Simple Ideas* ἔκτυπα, and *adequate*.

(5) insensible] 2-5 | sensible 1 (17) , perhaps, that not] 4-5 | that not,
perhaps, 1-3. (*Coste* 'ce ne seroit peut-être pas') (24) though] 1-4 |
thought 5 numbers] 1-2, 4 | number 3, 5 (*likewise Coste*)

First, Simple Ideas, which are *ἔκτυπα*, or Copies; but yet certainly adequate. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in Things to produce in the Mind such a Sensation, that Sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the Effect of that Power. So the Paper I write on, having the Power, in the Light, (I speak according to the common Notion of Light,) to produce in me the Sensation, which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of such a Power, in something without the Mind; since the Mind has not the Power to produce any such *Idea* in it self, and being meant for nothing else but the Effect of such a Power, that simple *Idea* is real and *adequate*: the Sensation of White, in my Mind, being the Effect of that Power, which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly *adequate* to that Power; or else, that Power would produce a different *Idea*.

§ 13. Secondly, The complex Ideas of Substances are Ectypes, Copies too; but not perfect ones, not *adequate*: which is very evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever Collection of simple *Ideas* it makes of any Substance that exists, it cannot be sure, that it exactly answers all that are in that Substance. Since not having tried all the Operations of all other Substances upon it, and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or cause in other Substances, it cannot have an exact *adequate* Collection of all its active and passive Capacities; and so not have an *adequate* complex *Idea* of the Powers of any Substance, existing, and its Relations, which is that sort of complex *Idea* of Substances we have. And, after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex *Idea*, an exact Collection of all the secondary Qualities, or Powers of any Substance, we should not yet thereby have an *Idea* of the Essence of that Thing. For since the Powers, or Qualities, that are observable by us, are not the real Essence of that Substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatsoever of these Qualities, cannot be the real Essence of that Thing. Whereby it is plain, that our *Ideas* of Substances are not *adequate*; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Besides, a Man has no *Idea* of Substance in general, nor knows what Substance is in it self.

§ 14. Thirdly, Complex Ideas of Modes and Relations, are Originals,

§ 13. Ideas of Substances are *ἔκτυπα*, inadequate. § 14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

(9) it] 4-5 | its 1-3 (12) *adequate*] Coste adds a linguistic footnote. (14) '§ 13.'
add. 2-5 are] 1-3, 5 (likewise Coste) | or 4 (1. below 35: § 14.) Ideas] 2-3,
5 | Idea 4

and *Archetypes*; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any real Existence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such Collections of simple *Ideas*, that the Mind it self puts together, and such Collections, that each
5 of them contains in it precisely all that the Mind intends it should, they are Archetypes and Essences of Modes that may exist; and so are designed only for, and belong only to such Modes, as when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex *Ideas*. The *Ideas* therefore of Modes and Relations, cannot but be *adequate*.