AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

SECTION 1

SBN 5

Of the Different Species of Philosophy

1 MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us *feel* the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

SBN 6

2 The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and

even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.

3 It is certain, that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian. *SBN 7*

4 This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.

5 The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is still more *SBN 8*

despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company, and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining.

6 Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or security of his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, *SBN 9* and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to *draw* too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries will meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

7 Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without opposition, his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings, or what is commonly called *metaphysics*, we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf.

8 We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage, which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object, which they set before us. An artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking, *SBN 10* who, besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the workings of the passions, and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a VENUS or an HELEN. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.

9 Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtilty, in the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar gradations.

10 Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the *SBN 11* gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads

through the avenues of science and learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some minds as with some bodies, which, being endowed with vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs be delightful and rejoicing.

11 But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chaced from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their legal sovereigns.

12 But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For, besides that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of atchieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its

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powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom. *SBN 13*

13 Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflection, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflection. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and enquiry. This task of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.

14 Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection; and consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which *SBN 14*

lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some instances, especially late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those, who, with so much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately concerned?

But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phænomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and œconomy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily atchieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This last conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their passion for some one general principle; it must, however, be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly

SBN 15

to be resolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind.

16 What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance. *SBN 16*

17 But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And still more happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error!

SECTION 2

SBN 17

Of the Origin of Ideas

1 EVERY one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could *almost* say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landscape. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.

2 We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man, in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affec- *SBN 18*
tions, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them.

3 Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS or IDEAS. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term *impression*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or

hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above-mentioned.

4 Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction.

5 But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, *gold*, and *mountain*, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones. *SBN 19*

6 To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient. *First*, When we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find, that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning *an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being*, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert, that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this

source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression or lively perception, which corresponds to it. SBN 20

7 *Secondly*, If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find, that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense, in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A LAPLANDER or NEGROE has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion, that belongs to his species; yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that other beings may possess many senses, of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us, in the only manner, by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and sensation.

8 There is, however, one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his SBN 21

senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: And this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.

9 Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure: The mind has but a slender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though *SBN 22* without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: The limits between them are more exactly determined: Nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, *from what impression is that supposed idea derived?* And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.[1]

[1] It is probable, that no more was meant by those, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were *SBN 22* copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by *innate*? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by *innate* be meant, *cotemporary to our birth*, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word *idea*, seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by Locke and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate?

But admitting these terms, *impressions* and *ideas*, in the sense above explained, and understanding by *innate*, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we assert, that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Locke was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other subjects.

SECTION 3

SBN 23

Of the Association of Ideas

1 It is evident, that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something, which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person, who broke the thread of discourse, might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: A certain proof, that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.

2 Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are *SBN 24* connected together; I do not find, that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, *Resemblance*, *Contiguity* in time or place, and *Cause* or *Effect*.

3 That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original:[2] The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others:[3] And if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.[4] But that this

[2] Resemblance. [3] Contiguity. [4] Cause and Effect. *SBN 24*

enumeration is compleat, and that there are no other principles of association, except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and examine carefully the principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is compleat and entire.

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

SECTION 1

5.1 **Moral philosophy]** *Moral* philosophy is the study of *human* nature (including the inner life of the mind and human behaviour), whereas *natural* philosophy is the study of *physical* nature. Perception, conception, reasoning, taste, and judgement are within the scope of moral philosophy. 'Moral philosophy', 'moral reasoning', and the 'moral sciences' were used to refer to the full range of topics concerned with the mind and spirit, as well as conduct and character. Cf. *THN*, Introduction 10.

5.1 **science of human nature]** See Hume's stated objective in *THN* (Introduction 6–7; cf. *Abstract* 1–3) of developing a science of human nature, including an attempt to ground all other sciences in a theory of human nature. Some of Hume's predecessors had proposed that moral philosophy could employ the experimental method used in natural philosophy to account for the moral phenomena of the mind. See George Turnbull (1698–1749; regent at Marischal College, Aberdeen), *Principles*, title page, epistle dedicatory, preface, and introduction to pt. 1 (a post-*THN* work); and English poet Alexander Pope (1688–1744), *Essay on Man*, epistle 1. In *Opticks* 3.1 Isaac Newton[B] himself made the suggestion that his method could be applied to moral philosophy.

5.1 **two different manners]** See the final lines of *THN* (3.3.6.6) and the annotations below, especially ann. 8.15.

5.5 **taste]** 'Taste' is a properly cultivated faculty of mind that enables a person to reach good judgements about what is appropriate, excellent, beautiful, and the like. Hume writes extensively about taste in 'Of the Standard of Taste' and *EPM* 1.3–4, 1.10, 7.4, 7.28, Appx. 3.10. Much was written in the 18th century about taste. Joseph

Addison,[B] citing authors mentioned by Hume, defines 'Taste in Writing' as 'that Faculty . . . which discerns the Beauties of an Author with Pleasure, and the Imperfections with Dislike' (*Spectator* 409; cf. 412–18). Irish statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke (1729–97)—writing in a manner reminiscent of Hume, but a few years after Hume published *EHU*—defined taste as follows: 'I mean by the word Taste no more than that faculty, or those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgement of the works of imagination and the elegant arts' (*Philosophical Enquiry*, introduction, 13). See also two wide-ranging essays in the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and D'Alembert, 7: 761–7: 'Goût', by François Marie Arouet de Voltaire,[B] and an incomplete article, 'Essai sur le goût', by French lawyer and political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755).

5.5 **sentiment]** 'Sentiment' is an inner sensing, feeling, or emotion—for example, anger, approval, disgust, sympathy, or compassion. The term was a key concept in moral and aesthetic treatises of Hume's period. English encyclopaedist Ephraim Chambers (d. 1740) defines taste as 'a general Name for all the ideas consequent on the operations of the mind, and even for the operations themselves' (*Cyclopædia*, 'thought'). 'Sentiment', like 'taste', was sometimes used to refer to judgement and opinion.

5.9 **eloquence]** Principles of eloquence were closely studied during Hume's period. In 'Of Eloquence' and elsewhere Hume mentions the achievements of Demosthenes[B] and Cicero[B] and the writings of Quintilian (1st c. AD) and 'Longinus' (a work of unknown authorship). For allusions to Demosthenes and 'Longinus', see *EPM* 5.11; 7.4, 12; 8.7; Appx. 4.5. 'Longinus' was considered by many the premier figure in rhetoric, the field that studies eloquence (a 1733 edition was in the Hume Library). Works on rhetoric by Cicero, Quintilian, and Aristotle[B] were basic reading in this field during the years in which Hume wrote *EHU*. A philosophy course in rhetoric at the University of Edinburgh surveyed precisely these writings (Henderson, 'Short Account', 373). Adam Smith (1723–90) also began to lecture on rhetoric in 1748. For references to influential conceptions in the 18th century, see Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'eloquence' (designating Demosthenes and Cicero as the 'princes of ancient eloquence'); Aberdeen professor of divinity George Campbell (1719–96), *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (especially 1.1–4) and *Lectures . . . on Pulpit Eloquence*; and Scottish clergyman and rhetorician Hugh Blair (1718–1800), *Lectures on Rhetoric* 25–34, the latter citing classical sources that formed the cornerstone of discussions in the 18th century. A negative appraisal of the power of eloquence is found in English hymnwriter and philosopher Isaac Watts (1674–1748), *Logick: or, The Right Use of Reason* 2.3.2.

5.10 **easy and obvious]** This first species has as its objective influencing action by taste and sentiment. Cicero,[B] La Bruyère,[B] and Addison[B]—mentioned by Hume immediately below—are probably to be classified in this group. In *THN* Hume characterized his philosophy as 'abstruse' and not 'easy and obvious' (Introduction 3, 1.3.12.20, 1.4.2.46, 3.1.1.1); see also *EHU* 1.3, 16.

5.19 **other species of philosophers]** Probable members of this 'species' are Aristotle,[B] Nicolas Malebranche,[B] and John Locke,[B] as mentioned by Hume immediately below. Several philosophers had proposed the objective of a scientific philosophy; Hume was familiar, for example, with Malebranche's view that 'Of all human sciences, the science of man is the most worthy' (*Search after Truth*, preface, p. xxv; see also 4.6.2). However, Hume suggests a wider conception of accurate and abstruse philosophy than the early modern conception of a science of man.

5.21 **subject of speculation]** Some of Hume's comments, in this first section of *EHU*, on the 'delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind' (and his concentration throughout on the understanding) are reminiscent of passages in Locke.[B] English philosopher Lord Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Locke's student, wrote that 'How little regard soever may be shown to that moral speculation or inquiry which we call the study of ourselves, it must, in strictness, be yielded that all knowledge whatsoever depends upon this previous one' (*Characteristics*, 'Miscellaneous Reflections' 4.1 (274)).

5.26 **criticism]** literary and related forms of criticism of the arts; also the art of judging discourse and writing (see also 1.15).

6.31 **Cicero[B]]** In 'Of the Standard of Taste' 26, Hume comments that 'The abstract philosophy of Cicero has lost its credit: The vehemence of his oratory is still the object of our admiration'. See also 'Of Eloquence' 3, 14, 16–17; and 'Of Tragedy' 8.

6.31 **Aristotle[B]]** Aristotle's influence waned under the force of criticisms levelled since the Renaissance, and serious proponents of Aristotelianism were few in number by the time Hume wrote *EHU*. Reasons explaining this decay that are congenial to Hume's views had been offered by Francis Bacon,[B] *Novum organum* 46–7; French priest and philosopher Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), *Exercises Against the Aristotelians*, which contains a useful summary in its preface; and English philosopher and clergyman Joseph Glanvill (1636–80), *Scepsis scientifica* 18–22. For an indignant dismissal of Aristotle, see English preacher John Webster (1610–82), *Academiarum examen* 6–7. Locke[B] may have initiated some of the prevailing opposition to Aristotelian logic.

6.31 **La Bruyere[B]]** Jean de La Bruyère was a French prose stylist, satirist, and moralist who used bold metaphors and similes in his epigrammatic maxims, short stories, character sketches, and short moral essays. Hume praised La Bruyère as a 'fine Writer' and refers to his 'De l'homme' in *Les caractères* in correspondence of 10 Jan. 1743 (*Letters*, 1: 46) with Irish philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746).

6.33 **Malebranche[B]]** Nicolas Malebranche was trained in Aristotelianism and became immersed in Cartesian philosophy and its reconciliation to Church doctrine. Although some readers commend him for an elegant and careful style, other readers find his writing inelegant and meticulous.

6.34 **Addison**[B]] Hume is evidently referring to the periodical essays of Addison, which were widely read at the time. Some commentators maintain that his style elevated the essay to new levels of excellence in organization, simplicity, and precision. Hume begins 'Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing' by quoting Addison on 'fine writing'. At *EPM* 6.8 Hume refers to an 'elegant writer'—a clear allusion to Addison (see Box, 'An Allusion'; cf. *DIS* 2.9).

6.34 **Locke**[B]] Locke wrote his major philosophical works in an abstract and studied, although generally clear and precise, style. In editions of *EHU* prior to 1756 Hume appended a note specifying that his comment 'is not intended any way to detract from the Merit of Mr. *Locke*, who was really a great Philosopher, and a just and modest Reasoner. 'Tis only meant to shew the common Fate of such abstract Philosophy' (*Philosophical Essays*, 1748 edn., p. 5 n.).

7.2 **the sciences]** According to *THN* Introduction 4–5, these sciences included mathematics, natural philosophy, natural religion, logic, morals, criticism, and politics.

7.6 **polite letters]** literature exhibiting refined taste and quality of style. In his *History of England* (vol. 6, ch. 71) Hume lists poetry, eloquence, and history as among the 'branches of polite letters'. Polite authors often reinforced the standards of cultured society in matters of taste, manners, morals, and religion. Such authors include Addison,[B] Pope, Henry Fielding, and Richard Steele. See also Hume's essays 'Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion' and 'Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing'.

7.16 **bounds of human understanding]** For additional comments on these bounds, see *Abstract* 27; *THN* 1.2.1.2; *Dialogues* 1.3; *EHU* 1.2; 7.24, 28; 8.22; 12.25 (also ann. 11.1 and 28.4 below). At *EHU* 5.1 Hume indicates that academic scepticism influenced his views on this subject. Modern writers known to Hume who discuss the limits of the understanding include Bacon,[B] *Novum organum* 41–54, 101–4; French essayist and philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533–92), 'On Experience' and 'That it is Madness to Judge the True and the False from our own Capacities' (*Essays* 13, 27); Locke,[B] *Essay*, Epistle to the Reader, 1.1.4–7, 4.3; Malebranche,[B] *Search after Truth* 3.1.2.1, 5; Scottish mathematician and natural philosopher John Keill (1671–1721), *An Introduction to the True Astronomy*, preface, pp. iv–vi; Antoine Arnauld[B] and Pierre Nicole,[B] *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, first part, ch. 1; Pierre Bayle,[B] *Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B]; and Glanvill, *Scepsis scientifica* 6.6.

8.15 **anatomist . . . painter]** Hume presented himself in correspondence with Hutcheson as an 'anatomist' in moral philosophy, not a 'painter' (*Letters*, 1: 32–3). Beginning at *THN* 1.4.6.23, Hume characterized his philosophy as an anatomy of the human mind; and in *Abstract* 2 he repeated that his objective was to 'anatomize human nature in a regular manner', rather than to commend virtue or to develop a broad metaphysical theory. At *THN* 3.3.6.6 Hume uses this distinction to explain his work and its potential practical importance. See also *THN* 2.1.12.2; *Abstract* 2.

9.16 **superstitions]** 'Superstition' commonly refers, in Hume's usage, to extravagant practices and related beliefs. His paradigm in the case of a supernatural religion is Roman Catholicism. By contrast, the characteristic vice of Protestantism is enthusiasm. See ann. 110.25; *NHR* 12.22; and Hume's 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm'. See also English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) on the differences between religion and superstition, *Leviathan* 6.36, 11.26; and the condemnation of superstition by English philosopher Anthony Collins (1676–1729), *Discourse of Free-Thinking*, 35 ff.

10.29 **mental geography]** Compare Locke,[B] *Essay* 1.1.1–2, 6.

11.1 **compass of human understanding]** Locke[B] introduces the last chapter in his *Essay* 4.21 ('Of the Division of the Sciences') by speaking of 'All that can fall within the compass of Humane Understanding'.

11.6 **late ones, of success]** In *THN* Introduction 7 (note) and *Abstract* 2 Hume mentions Locke,[B] Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler as among 'some late philosophers in *England*, who have begun to use experimental reasoning to put the science of man on a new footing'. In the text of *THN* Introduction 7 Hume suggests that Francis Bacon[B] was the father of experimental physics.

11.11 **so intimately concerned]** The first two editions of *EHU* (*Philosophical Essays* of 1748 and 1750) contained at this point an additional note acknowledging the influence of Hutcheson and expressing an indebtedness to the *Sermons* of English philosopher and bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752). *EHU*, 1748 edn. (pp. 15–16); see the Editorial Appendix below.

11.16 **phænomena]** In natural philosophy this term refers to any appearance, effect, or operation of a natural body. More generally, it means any appearance or effect present to the mind or any observed operation of the mind. The term dates from ancient philosophy and science, especially Greek astronomy. Many modern philosophers and scientists used the term, including Bacon,[B] Hobbes, Gassendi, Descartes,[B] Kepler, Boyle, Glanvill, Keill, and Newton.[B] Hume follows the tradition that associates the term with the experimental method.

11.17 **philosopher . . . arose]** The reference is to Newton,[B] who used the term 'phænomena' in *Mathematical Principles*, bk. 3, to characterize the planetary movements. His fourth rule formulates the methodological principle that immediately observable phenomena must alone constitute the foundation of astronomy. The extent of Hume's familiarity with Newton's writings is unknown, but he likely knew the preface, definitions, axioms, general scholium, and rules of reasoning in *Mathematical Principles*—as well as the preface to the second edition by English mathematician Roger Cotes (1682–1716) and scattered parts of the *Opticks*. The interpretation of Newton found in *EHU* was commonplace in the mid-18th century (see ann. 26.6, 28.24, 29.27, and n. 16).

Hume's tribute to Newton in the *History of England* (ch. 71) is unparalleled in comparison to the praise he extends to other writers he esteems: 'In Newton this

island may boast of having produced the greatest and rarest genius that ever rose for the ornament and instruction of the species. . . . His reputation at last broke out with a lustre, which scarcely any writer, during his own life-time, had ever before attained' (6: 542). See also the praise in Hume's early essay (withdrawn after 1742), 'Of the Middle Station of Life' 8, and ann. n. 16, n. 17, and n. 33.

11.34 **Moralists . . . critics, logicians . . . politicians]** Hume views various writers in moral philosophy—Hobbes, in particular—as having such shortcomings. 'Logicians' are those who teach reasoning and explain the nature of reasoning; see a parallel section in *THN* Introduction 5, where Hume characterizes 'the end of logic' as to 'explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas'. 'Politicians' are those skilled in governing a political state. (On 'criticism', see ann. Section 1.2.)

12.24 **abstruse philosophy]** See ann. 5.10 on Hume's characterization of his philosophy as abstruse. Although he sometimes speaks disparagingly of 'abstruser studies of logic and metaphysics' (see *EPM* 1.4, 5.3, Appx. 1.10), he does not depreciate the importance of abstruse reasoning in difficult areas of philosophy. See 'abstruse philosophy' at *THN* 3.1.1.1.

SECTION 2

SECTION 2] This section shows similarities to *THN* 1.1.1–3.

13.2 **perceptions of the mind]** At *THN* 1.2.6.7 (cf. 1.1.1.1) Hume says that 'nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion'. At *THN* 1.1.2.1 he says that impressions of sensation arise 'in the soul originally, from unknown causes', and that the examination of such matters belongs to 'anatomists and natural philosophers' rather than to moral philosophers. Prominent works known to Hume on such problems include Locke,[B] *Essay*, Epistle, 1.1.8, 2.1.23, 2.8.8, 4.1.1; and Arnauld[B] and Nicole,[B] *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, first part, chs. 1–2. For Berkeley,[B] Malebranche,[B] and other possible sources, see ann. 13.28. See also Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1, especially canons 2–3; and French philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–80), *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge* 1.2.1 (a copy of the 1746 edition is in the Hume Library).

13.4 **sensation . . . imagination . . . force and vivacity]** This theory about phenomenal differences in forcefulness and vivacity may be indebted to Malebranche[B] (himself perhaps indebted to Descartes[B]). Malebranche distinguished three types of sensations: the strong and lively (*sensations fortes et vives*), the weak and languid (*sensations faibles et languissantes*), and those in between (*Search after Truth* 1.12.3–5). He maintained that the senses and the imagination differ in degree, with images tending to be comparatively weak and languid. Berkeley[B] analyses 'ideas of sense' as 'more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind' (*Principles* 1.30, 33). In *THN* (1.1.1.3 ff.) Hume uses the language of force and vivacity as well as

surrogate terms such as *liveliness*, *violence*, *vigour*, *firmness*, *intensity*, *solidity*, *forcible*, and *real*.

13.28 IDEAS . . . IMPRESSIONS] A discussion of this distinction appears in *THN*, beginning at 1.1.1.1. For an 18th-century explication of the terms, see Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'idea', 'impression', 'imagination', and 'sensation'. For accounts that may have influenced Hume, see Greek authority on scepticism Sextus Empiricus (2nd–3rd c. AD), *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.19–22 (chs. 10–11); Malebranche,[B] *Search after Truth* 1.1.1, 3.2.1; Locke,[B] *Essay* 2.1.1–24, 2.8.7–8, 2.29.2–4, 4.1.1–2, 4.21.4; Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1, especially canons 1–4, 15; Berkeley,[B] *Principles*, 1.1, 4, 8, 30, 33, 39; Arnauld[B] and Nicole,[B] *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, first part, chs. 1–2, 6 (Buroker, 25–31, 39–40). See also a controversy between Malebranche and Arnauld (especially Arnauld, *On True and False Ideas* 3–6), and reflections by Bayle[B] on these authors in *Nouvelles de la republique des lettres*, Mois d'Avril 1684, art. 2, 'Réponse de l'auteur de la *Recherche de la Verité* au livre de m. Arnaud' (*Œuvres diverses*, 25–7). Locke's theory had numerous critics, though none who proposed precisely Hume's modification.

14.4 **may seem more unbounded]** Compare Locke,[B] *Essay* 2.12.1–2, and other passages in Locke listed immediately below.

14.7 **imagination . . . compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing]** Similar facility and tasks had been assigned to the imagination or a related function of mind by Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1, canons 3–5; Addison,[B] *Spectator* 411–19; Locke,[B] *Essay* 1.4.20; 2.1.1–5; 2.2.2; 2.7.10; 2.12.1–2, 8; and Hobbes, *Leviathan* 2–3. Hume's conceptions and terminology are reminiscent of Addison's visual images and Locke's language of 'compounded'.

14.20 **golden mountain]** Compare *THN* 1.2.2.8. The example of a golden mountain was common in philosophical discussions of the role of the imagination in compounding ideas. See Hobbes, *Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy* 3.4 (*Works*, 4: 11) and *Elements of Philosophy* 25.9 (*Works*, 1: 400); Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1, canon 3; Malebranche,[B] *Search after Truth* 3.2.1; Arnauld[B] and Nicole,[B] *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, first part, chs. 1–2 (Buroker, 28, 32); Berkeley,[B] *Three Dialogues*, dial. 2 (224).

14.24 **outward or inward sentiment]** On the point about 'all the materials' and thinking as 'derived' (and the role of experience), see Locke,[B] *Essay* 2.1.1–5, 2.2.2, 2.9.15.

14.30 **simple ideas]** Compare Locke,[B] *Essay* 2.2.1–3, 2.12.1–8, 3.4.7.

15.3 **organ . . . sensation]** Organs of sensation are sensory capacities in the body, such as touch and vision. At *THN* 2.1.5.6 (cf. 2.2.11.16) Hume speaks of 'organs of the human mind' to point to the structure and faculties of the mind. See his mixed physical–psychological uses of 'organ' in *EHU* 1.8, 7.9–12, 7.21, 12.6.

15.5 **blind man . . . deaf man]** Compare *THN* 1.1.1.9. Locke[B] presents a subtle example and set of conclusions in *Essay* 1.4.20; see also 2.2.2, 2.4.5, 2.9.8, 3.4.11.

Related claims are in Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1, canon 2; Arnauld[B] and Nicole,[B] *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, first part, ch. 1 (Buroker, 28); Newton,[B] *Mathematical Principles* 3 (Motte–Cajori, 545).

15.10 **Laplander]** Lapland is in Scandinavia above the Arctic Circle, ranging over northern Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the Kola Peninsula of north-west Russia. For a discussion of 'Laplanders' and a possible source, see *NHR* 4.3, where Hume refers to French playwright and comedian Jean-François Regnard (1655–1709), *Journey to Lapland*. Regnard describes Laplanders as naïve and addicted to magic, superstition, and paganism.

15.33 **particular shade of blue]** Compare Hume's similar treatment of this problem in *THN* 1.1.1.10.

16.5 **general maxim]** The axiom or fundamental principle that simple ideas are always derived from correspondent impressions was introduced at *EHU* 2.6.

16.13 **determinate idea]** Compare Locke,[B] *Essay* 3.10.2 and Epistle to the Reader, 12–13.

16.18 **employed without any meaning]** Compare *THN* 1.1.7.14, 1.2.5.21, 1.3.14.14, 1.4.7.5; *EHU* 7.26. For related views by Hume's predecessors, see Bacon,[B] *Novum organum* 59–60; Hobbes, *Leviathan* 4.12–13, 20–1; 5.5, 8–15; 8.27; Locke,[B] *Essay* 3.2.4–8, 3.10.2–4; Berkeley,[B] *Alciphron* 7.1–2; Arnauld[B] and Nicole,[B] *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, first part, ch. 11 (Buroker, 58–60); and Samuel Clarke,[B] *Discourse*, prop. 6, in *Works*, 2: 659, 663–4.

n. 1 **innate ideas]** In Locke[B] the human mind has inborn *capacities* for knowledge but no inborn *ideas*. For Locke's criticism of defenders of innate ideas, see *Essay* 1.2.1, 5, 8, 14–17, 21–4; 1.3.15–19. See, similarly, *THN* 1.1.1.12; and see 1.3.14.6, 10. However, in his *Abstract* Hume expresses a perceived difference between his views and Locke's: 'he comprehends all our perceptions under the term of idea, in which sense it is false, that we have no innate ideas. For it is evident our stronger perceptions or impressions are innate, and that natural affection, love of virtue, resentment, and all the other passions, arise immediately from nature' (*Abstract* 6).

English philosopher and diplomat Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648) is the only figure explicitly criticized by Locke (*Essay* 1.3.15 ff.) on innate ideas, although several British philosophers held views relevantly similar to those that Locke criticizes. In *De veritate* (119–21, 132, 139–40, 289 ff.), the work cited by Locke, Lord Herbert argued that the human mind is endowed by nature with certain principles or beliefs called 'common notions' that are immediately apprehended, necessary for experience, irrefutable, and denied only by madmen.

n. 1 **loose sense, by Locke[B] and others]** See Locke, *Essay*, bk. 2. Others whose theories have spawned a variety of interpretations include Descartes[B] (*Meditations* 3, 6; *Objections and Replies* 2, 3, 5); Hobbes (*Elements of Philosophy . . . concerning Body* 25.1 ff., in *Works*, 1: 389 ff.); Berkeley[B] (*Principles* 1.5, 56, 97; *Dialogues* 3; *Theory of*

Vision 53, 78, 99, 135); and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,[B] *New Essays* 2.1–13 (a work not published until 1765).

n. 1 **schoolmen]** These scholastic theologians and medieval philosophers had been attacked in Locke,[B] *Essay* 3.4.8–10 and 3.10.6–8; see the caustic observations in Hobbes, *Leviathan* 1.5, 2.9, 5.15, 8.27, 12.31, 46.13–30; and Webster, *Academiarum examen* 2–3 (with a response by English clergyman and philosopher John Wilkins (1614–72) and English clergyman and mathematician Seth Ward (1617–89), *Vindiciæ academiarum*). See Hume's comment at *EHU* 8.27 and *EPM* 9.2 on *schools*.

SECTION 3

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS] In the first two editions Hume's title was 'Of the Connexion of Ideas'. For his earlier view, see *THN* 1.1.4, 'Of the connexion or association of ideas' (and the following three sections of *THN*).

A capacity for connecting ideas—so that the awareness of one type of idea naturally results in attention to another—was a recurrent topic of interest. Chambers provides a representative definition (*Cyclopædia*, 'association', invoking Locke[B]): 'Association *of Ideas*, is where two or more ideas, constantly and immediately follow or succeed one another in the mind, so that one shall almost infallibly produce the other; whether there be any natural relation between them, or not. Where there is a real affinity or connection in ideas, it is the excellency of the mind, to be able to collect, compare, and range them.'

Hume is informed by Locke's discussion (*Essay* 2.33; added in the 4th edn.), which bears a chapter title identical to Hume's. Another likely influence is the account of natural connection in Malebranche,[B] *Search after Truth* 2.1.5.1–2, 2.2.2. Berkeley's discussions of various relationships among ideas also seem to anticipate Hume. Many writers cited Locke, who was the first to write specifically on the topic. Although Locke considers a different range of topics than does Hume, and generally treats association as hindering understanding, he also holds that 'Some of our *Ideas* have a natural Correspondence and Connexion one with another' (2.33.5).

17.1 **principle of connexion]** Locke[B] and Hume would have known the discussion in Hobbes (*Leviathan* 3.1–11), which treats association as a mechanistic function of mind. In addition to Malebranche,[B] Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley,[B] discussion that either supports or denies the existence of association and principles of connection had appeared in Turnbull (*Principles*, 1: 81–96); English clergyman and philosopher John Gay (1699–1745), *Preliminary Dissertation*, especially pp. xxxi–xxxii; and philosopher and bishop Edmund Law (1703–87), *An Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity*, 45–6.

In *THN* 1.1.4.1–2 Hume analyses what he here calls principles of connection in terms of 'qualities, from which this association arises'. See also *THN* 1.3.6.13, as well as general discussions of association in *THN* 1.3.3–8, 14; 2.1.4.

17.8 **at adventures]** without design or by chance. The distinction plays a role in Hobbes, who uses the language of 'unguided, without design' in *Leviathan* 3.3. Locke[B] similarly speaks of some connections of ideas as 'owing to Chance' (*Essay* 2.33.5, 7), and characterizes trains of ideas as irrational, loose, and independent. Even under these 'loose and free' conditions, Locke thought that some regular connections exist.

17.23 **class all the principles]** In the final paragraph of his *Abstract* Hume notes that any claim he has to originality in *THN* depends on the use he has made of these principles of association.

18.3 **run over several instances]** Other examples are found in *THN*, following the section on association (1.1.4). In one sequence of examples (1.3.8–9) Hume mentions instances of religious beliefs—such as the way in which religious images enhance Roman Catholic beliefs (an example of resemblance)—that are notably similar to passages and examples at *EHU* 5.14–22.