Whether or not the treatment of the cognitions belonging to the concern of reason travels the secure course of a science is something which can soon be judged by its success. If after many preliminaries and preparations are made, a science gets stuck as soon as it approaches its end, or if in order to reach this end it must often go back and set out on a new path; or likewise if it proves impossible for the different co-workers to achieve unanimity as to the way in which they should pursue their common aim; then we may be sure that such a study is merely groping about, that it is still far from having entered upon the secure course of a science; and it is already a service to reason if we can possibly find that path for it, even if we have to give up as futile much of what was included in the end previously formed without deliberation.

2 That from the earliest times **logic** has traveled this secure course can be seen from the fact that since the time of Aristotle it has not had to go a single step backwards, unless we count the abolition of a few dispensable subtleties or the more distinct determination of its presentation, which improvements belong more to the elegance than to the security of that science. What is further remarkable about logic is that until now it has also been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore seems to all appearance to be finished and complete. For if some moderns have thought to enlarge it by interpolating **psychological** chapters about our different cognitive powers (about imagination, wit), or **metaphysical** chapters about the origin of cognition or the different kinds of certainty in accordance with the diversity of objects (about idealism, skepticism, etc.), or **anthropological** chapters about our prejudice (about their causes and remedies), then this proceeds only from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of this science. It is not an improvement but a deformation of the sciences when their boundaries are allowed to run over into one another; the boundaries of logic, however, are determined quite precisely by the fact that logic is the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking (whether this thinking be empirical or *a priori*, whatever origin or object it may have, and whatever contingent or natural obstacles it may meet with in our minds).

3 For the advantage that has made it so successful logic has solely its own limitation to thank, since it is thereby justified in abstracting—is indeed obliged to abstract—from all objects of cognition and all the distinctions between them; and in logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its own form. How much more difficult, naturally, must it be for reason to enter upon the secure path of a science if it does not have to do merely with itself, but has to deal with objects too; hence logic as a propadeutic constitutes only the outer courtyard, as it were, to the sciences; and when it comes to information, a logic may indeed be presupposed in judging about the latter, but its acquisition must be sought in the sciences properly and objectively so called.

4 Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized *a priori*, and this cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, either merely **determining** the object and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or else also **making** the object **actual**. The former is **theoretical**, the latter **practical** cognition of reason. In both the **pure** part, the part in which reason determines its object wholly *a priori*, must be expounded all by itself, however much or little it may contain, and that part that comes from other sources must not be mixed up with it; for it is bad economy to spend blindly whatever comes in without being able later, when the economy comes to a standstill, to distinguish the part of the revenue that can cover the expenses from the part that must be cut.

5 **Mathematics** and **physics** are the two theoretical cognitions of reason that are supposed to determine their objects *a priori*, the former entirely purely, the latter at least in part purely but also following the standards of sources of cognition other than reason.

6 **Mathematics** has, from the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable people the Greeks, traveled the secure path of a science. Yet it must not be thought that it was as easy for it as for logic—in which reason has to do only with itself—to find that royal path, or rather itself to open it up; rather, I believe that mathematics was left groping about for a long time (chiefly among the Egyptians), and that its transformation is to be ascribed to a **revolution**, brought about by the happy inspiration of a single man in an attempt from which the road to be taken onward could no longer be missed, and the secure course of a science was entered on and prescribed for all time and to an infinite extent. The history of this revolution in the way of thinking—which was far more important than the discovery of the way around the famous Cape—and of the lucky one who brought it about, has not been preserved for us. But the legend handed down to us by Diogenes Laertius—who names the reputed inventor of the smallest elements of geometrical demonstrations, even of those that, according to common judgment, stand in no need of proof—proves that the memory of the alteration wrought by the discovery of this new path in its earliest footsteps must have seemed exceedingly important to mathematicians, and was thereby rendered unforgettable. A new light broke upon the first person who demonstrated the isosceles triangle (whether he was called "Thales" or had some other name). For he found that what he had to do was not to trace what he saw in this figure, or even trace its mere concept, and read off, as it were, from the properties of the figure; but rather that he had to produce the latter from what he himself thought into the object and presented (through construction) according to *a priori* concepts, and that in order to know something securely *a priori* he had to ascribe to the thing nothing except what followed necessarily from what he himself had put into it in accordance with its concept.

7 It took natural science much longer to find the highway of science; for it is only about one and a half centuries since the suggestion of the ingenious Francis Bacon partly occasioned this discovery and partly further stimulated it, since one was already on its tracks—which discovery, therefore, can just as much be explained by a sudden revolution in the way of thinking. Here I will consider natural science only insofar as it is grounded on **empirical** principles.

8 When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or when Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be equal to that of a known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl's changed metals into calx and then changed the latter back into metal by first removing something and then putting it back again,* a light dawned on all those who study nature. They comprehended that reason has insight only into

* Here I am not following exactly the thread of the history of the experimental method, whose first beginnings are also not precisely known.

what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer it questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to no previously designed plan, can never connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles—yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them. Thus even physics owes the advantageous revolution in its way of thinking to the inspiration that what reason would not be able to know of itself and has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter (though not merely ascribe to it) in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature. This is how natural science was first brought to the secure course of a science after groping about for so many centuries.

9 **Metaphysics**—a wholly isolated speculative cognition of reason that elevates itself entirely above all instruction from experience, and that through mere concepts (not, like mathematics, through the application of concepts to intuition), where reason thus is supposed to be its own pupil—has up to now not been so favored by fate as to have been able to enter upon the secure course of a science, even though it is older than all other sciences, and would remain even if all the others were swallowed up by an all-consuming barbarism. For in it reason continuously gets stuck, even when it claims *a priori* insight (as it pretends) into those laws confirmed by the commonest experience. In metaphysics we have to retrace our path countless times, because we find that it does not lead where we want to go, and it is so far from reaching unanimity in the assertions of its adherents that it is rather a battlefield, and indeed one that appears to be especially determined for testing one's powers in mock combat; on this battlefield no combatant has ever gained the least bit of ground, nor has any been able to base any lasting possession on his victory. Hence there is no doubt that up to now the procedure of metaphysics has been a mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts.

10 Now why is it that here the secure path of science still could not be found? Is it perhaps impossible? Why then has nature afflicted our reason with the restless striving for such a path, as if it were one of reason's most important occupations? Still more, how little cause have we to place trust in our reason if in one of the most important parts of our desire for knowledge it does not merely forsake us but even entices us with delusions and in the end betrays us! Or if the path has merely eluded us so far, what indications may we use that might lead us to hope that in renewed attempts we will be luckier than those who have gone before us?

11 I should think that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what they now are through a revolution brought about all at once, were remarkable enough that we might reflect on the essential element in the change in the ways of thinking that has been so advantageous to them, and, at least as an experiment, imitate it insofar as their analog with metaphysics, as rational cognition, might permit. Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the **intuition** of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them *a priori*; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them *a priori*, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence *a priori*, which rule is expressed in concepts *a priori*, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. As for objects insofar as they are thought merely through reason, and necessarily at that, but that (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given in experience at all—the attempt to think them (for they must be capable of being thought) will provide a splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method of our way of thinking, namely that we can cognize of things *a priori* only what we ourselves have put into them.*

12 This experiment succeeds as well as we could wish, and it promises to metaphysics the secure course of a science in its first part, where it concerns itself with concepts *a priori* to which the corresponding objects appropriate to them can be given in experience. For after this alteration in our way of thinking we can very well explain the possibility of a cognition *a priori*, and what is still more, we can provide satisfactory proofs of the laws that are the *a priori* ground of nature, as the sum total of objects of experience—which were both impossible ac-

* This method, imitated from the method of those who study nature, thus consists in this: to seek the elements of pure reason in that **which admits of being confirmed or refuted through an experiment**. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially when they venture beyond all boundaries of possible experience, admit of no test by experiment with their **objects** (as in natural science): thus to experiment will be feasible only with **concepts** and **principles** that we assume *a priori* by arranging the latter so that the same objects can be considered from two different sides, **on the one side** as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and **on the other side** as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience. If we now find that there is agreement with the principle of pure reason when things are considered from this twofold standpoint, but that an unavoidable conflict of reason with itself arises with a single standpoint, then the experiment decides for the correctness of that distinction.

cording to the earlier way of proceeding. But from this deduction of our faculty of cognizing *a priori* in the first part of metaphysics, there emerges a very strange result, and one that appears very disadvantageous to the whole purpose with which the second part of metaphysics concerns itself, namely that with this faculty we can never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience, which is nevertheless precisely the most essential occupation of this science. But herein lies just the experiment providing a checkup on the truth of the result of that first assessment of our rational cognition *a priori*, namely that such cognition reaches appearances only, leaving the thing in itself as something actual for itself but uncognized by us. For that which necessarily drives us to go beyond the boundaries of experience and all appearances is the unconditioned, which reason necessarily and with every right demands in things in themselves for everything that is conditioned, thereby demanding the series of conditions as something completed. Now if we find that on the assumption that our cognition from experience conforms to the objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought at all without contradiction, but that on the contrary, if we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform to our way of representing, then the contradiction disappears; and consequently that the unconditioned must not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with them (insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things insofar as we are not acquainted with them, as things in themselves: then this would show that what we initially assumed only as an experiment is well grounded.* Now after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the supersensible, what still remains for us is to try whether there are not data in reason's practical data for determining that transcendent rational concept of the unconditioned, in such a way as to reach beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics, cognitions *a priori* that are possible, but only from a practical standpoint. By such procedures speculative reason has at least made room for such an extension, even if it had to leave it empty; and we remain at liberty, indeed we are called upon by reason to fill it if we can through practical data of reason.*

13 Now the concern of this critique of pure speculative reason consists in that attempt to transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics, undertaking an entire revolution according to the example of the geometers and natural scientists. It is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself; but it catalogs the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal structure. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity about it, that it can and should measure its own capacity according to the different ways for choosing the objects of its thinking, and also completely enumerate the manifold ways of putting problems before itself, so as to catalog the entire preliminary sketch of a whole system of metaphysics; because, regarding the first point, in *a priori* cognition nothing can be ascribed to the objects except what the thinking subject takes out of itself, and regarding the second, pure speculative reason is, in respect of principles of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle can be taken with certainty in **one** relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its **thoroughgoing** relation to the entire use of pure reason. But then metaphysics also has the rare good fortune, enjoyed by no other rational science that has to do with objects (for **logic** deals only with the form of thinking in general), which is that if by this critique it has been brought onto the secure course of a science, then it can fully embrace the entire field of cognitions belonging to it and thus can complete its work and lay it down for posterity as a principal framework that can never be enlarged, since it has to do solely with principles and the limitations on their use, which are determined by the principles themselves. Hence as a fundamental science, metaphysics is also bound to achieve this completeness, and we must be able to say of it: *nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum*.

14 But it will be asked: What sort of treasure is it that we intend to leave to posterity, in the form of a metaphysics that has been purified through criticism but thereby also brought into a changeless state? On a cursory overview of this work, one might believe that one perceives it to be only of **negative** utility, teaching us never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundaries of experience; and in fact that is its first usefulness. But this utility soon becomes **positive** when we become aware that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond its boundaries do not in fact result in **extending** our use of reason, but rather, if one considers them more closely, inevitably result in **narrowing** it by threatening to extend the boundaries of sensibility, to which these principles really belong, beyond everything, and so even to dislodge the use of pure (practical) reason. Hence a critique that limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent **negative**, but because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of reason, this critique is also in fact of **positive** and very important utility, as soon as we have convinced ourselves that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use), in which reason unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of sensibility, without needing any assistance from speculative reason, but in which it must also be made secure against any counteraction from the latter, in order not to fall into contradiction with itself. To deny that this service of criticism is of any **positive** utility would be as much as to say that the police are of no positive utility because their chief business is to put a stop to the violence that citizens have to fear from other citizens, so that each can carry on his own affairs in peace and safety. In the analytical part of the critique it is proved that space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and therefore only conditions of

* This experiment of pure reason has much in common with what the chemists sometimes call the experiment of reduction, or more generally the synthetic procedure. The analysis of the metaphysician separated pure *a priori* knowledge into two very heterogeneous elements, namely those of the things as appearances and the things in themselves. The dialectic once again combines them, in unison with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds that the unison will never come about except through that distinction, which is therefore the true one.

* In the same way, the central laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies established with certainty what Copernicus assumed at the beginning only as a hypothesis, and at the same time they proved the invisible force (of Newtonian attraction) that binds the universe, which would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not ventured, in a manner contradictory to the senses yet true, to seek for the observed movements not in the objects of the heavens but in their observer. In this Preface I propose the transformation in our way of thinking presented in criticism merely as a hypothesis, analogous to that other hypothesis, only in order to draw our notice to the first attempts at such a transformation, which are always hypothetical, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding.

the existence of the things as appearances, further that we have no concepts of the understanding and hence no elements for the cognition of things except insofar as an intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts, consequently that we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance; from which follows the limitation of all even possible speculative cognition of reason to mere objects of **experience**. Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot **cognize** these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to **think** them as things in themselves.* For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears. Now if we were to assume that the distinction between things as objects of experience and the very same things as things in themselves, which our critique has made necessary, were not made at all, then the principle of causality, and hence the mechanism of nature in determining causality, would be valid of all things in general as efficient causes. I would not be able to say of one and the same thing, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free and yet that it is simultaneously subject to natural necessity, i.e., that it is not free, without falling into an obvious contradiction; because in both propositions I would have taken the soul **in just the same meaning**, namely as a thing in general (as a thing in itself), and without prior critique, I could not have taken it otherwise. But if the critique has not erred in teaching that the object should be taken in a **twofold meaning**, namely as appearance or as thing in itself; if its deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding is correct, and hence the principle of causality applies only to things taken in the first sense, namely insofar as they are objects of experience, while things in the second meaning are not subject to it; then just the same will is thought of in the appearance (in visible actions) as necessarily subject to the law of nature and to this extent not free, while yet on the other hand it is thought of as belonging to a thing in itself as not subject to that law, and hence **free**, without any contradiction hereby occurring. Now although I cannot **cognize** my soul, considered from the latter side, through any speculative reason (still less through empirical observation), and hence I cannot **cognize** freedom as a property of any being to which I ascribe effects in the world of sense, because then I would have to cognize such an existence as determined, and yet not as determined in time (which is impossible, since I cannot support my concept with any intuition), nevertheless, I can **think** freedom to myself, i.e., the representation of it at least contains no contradiction in itself, so long as our critical distinction prevails between the two ways of representing (sensible and intellectual), along with the limitation of the pure concepts of the understanding arising from it, and hence that of the principles flowing from them. Now suppose that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will, citing *a priori* as **data** for this freedom certain original practical principles lying in our reason, which would be absolutely impossible without the presupposition of freedom, yet that speculative reason had proved that freedom cannot be thought at all, then that presupposition, namely the moral one, would necessarily have to yield to the other one, whose opposite contains an obvious contradiction; consequently **freedom** and with it morality (for the latter would contain no contradiction if freedom were not already presupposed) would have to give way to the **mechanism of nature**. But then, since for morality I need nothing more than that freedom should not contradict itself, that it should at least be thinkable that it should place no hindrance in the way of the **mechanism of nature** in the same action (taken in another relation), without it being necessary for me to have any further insight into it: the doctrine of morality asserts its place and the doctrine of nature its own, which, however, would not have occurred if criticism had not first taught us of our unavoidable ignorance in respect of the things in themselves and limited everything that we can **cognize** theoretically to mere appearances. Just the same sort of exposition of the positive utility of critical principles of pure reason can be given in respect to the concepts of **God** and of the **simple nature** of our **soul**, which, however, I forgo for the sake of brevity. Thus I cannot even **assume God**, **freedom and immortality** for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously **deprive** speculative reason of its pretension to extravagant insights; because in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of experience, then they would always actually transform it into an appearance, and thus declare all **practical extension** of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny **knowledge** in order to make room for **faith**; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic.—Thus even if it cannot be all that difficult to leave to posterity the legacy of a systematic metaphysics, constructed according to the critique of pure reason, this is still a gift deserving of no small respect; to see this, we need merely to compare the culture of reason that is set on the course of a secure science with reason's unfounded groping and frivolous wandering about without critique, or to consider how much better young people hungry for knowledge might spend their time than in the usual dogmatism that gives so early and so much encouragement to their complacent quibbling about things they do not understand, and things into which neither they nor anyone else in the world will ever have any insight, or even encourages them to launch on the invention of new thoughts and opinions, and thus to neglect to learn the well-grounded sciences; but we see it above all when we take account of the way criticism puts an end for all future time to objections against morality and religion in a **Socratic** way, namely by the clearest proof of the ignorance of the opponent. For there has always been some metaphysics or other to be met with in the world, and there will always continue to be one, and with it a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. Hence it is the first and most important occupation of philosophy to deprive dialectic once and for all of all disadvantageous influence, by blocking off the source of the errors.

15 With this important alteration in the field of the sciences, and with the **loss** of its hitherto imagined possessions that speculative reason must suffer, everything yet remains in the same advantageous state as it was before concerning the universal human concern and the utility that the world has so far drawn from the doctrines of pure reason, and the loss touches only the **monopoly of the**

* To **cognize** an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or *a priori* through reason). But I can **think** whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object' somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. But in order to ascribe objective validity to such a concept (real possibility, for the first sort of possibility was merely logical) something more is required. This "more," however, need not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie in practical ones.

schools and in no way the **interest of human beings**. I ask the most inflexible dogmatist whether the proof of the continuation of our soul after death drawn from the simplicity of substance, or the proof of freedom of the will against universal mechanism drawn from the subtle though powerless distinctions between subjective and objective practical necessity, or the proof of the existence of God drawn from the concept of a most real being (or from the contingency of what is alterable and the necessity of a first mover), have ever, after originating in the schools, been able to reach the public or have the least influence over its convictions? If that has never happened, and if it can never be expected to happen, owing to the unsuitability of the common human understanding for such subtle speculation; if rather the conviction that reaches the public, insofar as it rests on rational grounds, had to be effected by something else—namely, as regards the first point, on that remarkable predisposition of our nature, noticeable to every human being, never to be capable of being satisfied by what is temporal (since the temporal is always insufficient for the predispositions of our whole vocation) leading to the hope of a future life; in respect of the second point, the mere clear exposition of our duties in opposition to all claims of the inclinations leading to the consciousness of freedom; and finally, touching on the third point, the splendid order, beauty, and providence shown forth everywhere in nature leading to the faith in a wise and great author of the world—then this possession not only remains undisturbed, but it even gains in respect through the fact that now the schools are instructed to pretend to no higher or more comprehensive insight on any point touching the universal human concerns than the insight that is accessible to the great multitude (who are always most worthy of our respect), and to limit themselves to the cultivation of those grounds of proof alone that can be grasped universally and are sufficient from a moral standpoint. The alteration thus concerns only the arrogant claims of the schools, which would gladly let themselves be taken for the sole experts and guardians of such truths (as they can rightly be taken in many other parts of knowledge), sharing with the public only the use of such truths, while keeping the key to them for themselves (*quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri*). Yet care is taken for a more equitable claim on the part of the speculative philosopher. He remains the exclusive trustee of a science that is useful to the public even without their knowledge, namely the critique of reason; for the latter can never become popular, but also has no need of being so; for just as little as the people want to fill their heads with fine-spun arguments for useful truths, so just as little do the equally subtle objections against these truths ever enter their minds; on the contrary, because the school inevitably falls into both, as does everyone who raises himself to speculation, the critique of reason is bound once and for all to prevent, by a fundamental investigation of the rights of speculative reason, the scandal that sooner or later has to be noticed even among the people in the disputes in which, in the absence of criticism, metaphysicians (and among these in the end even clerics) inevitably involve themselves, and in which they afterwards even falsify their own doctrines. Through criticism alone can we sever the very root of **materialism**, **fatalism**, **atheism**, of freethinking **unbelief**, of **enthusiasm** and **superstition**, which can become generally injurious, and finally also of **idealism** and **skepticism**, which are more dangerous to the schools and can hardly be transmitted to the public. If governments find it good to concern themselves with the affairs of scholars, then it would accord better with their wise solicitude both for the sciences and for humanity if they favored the freedom of such a critique, by which alone the treatments of reason can be put on a firm footing, instead of supporting the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of public danger whenever someone tears apart their cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and hence the loss of which it can also never feel.

16 Criticism is not opposed to the **dogmatic procedure** of reason in its pure cognition as science (for science must always be dogmatic, i.e., it must prove its conclusions strictly *a priori* from secure principles); rather, it is opposed only to dogmatism, i.e., to the presumption of getting on solely with pure cognition from (philosophical) concepts according to principles, which reason has been using for a long time without first inquiring in what way and by what right it has obtained them. Dogmatism is therefore the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, **without an antecedent critique of its own capacity**. This opposition therefore must not be viewed as putting in a good word for that loquacious shallowness under the presumed name of popularity, or even of skepticism, which gives short shrift to all metaphysics; rather, criticism is the preparatory activity necessary for the advancement of metaphysics as a well-grounded science, which must necessarily be dogmatic, carried out systematically in accordance with the strictest requirement, hence according to scholastic rigor (and not in a popular way); for this requirement is one that it may not neglect, since it undertakes to carry out its business wholly *a priori* and thus to the full satisfaction of speculative reason. In someday carrying out the plan that criticism prescribes, i.e., in the future system of metaphysics, we will have to follow the strict method of the famous Wolff, the greatest among all dogmatic philosophers, who gave us the first example (an example by which he became the author of a spirit of well-groundedness in Germany that is still not extinguished) of the way in which the secure course of a science is to be taken, through the regular ascertainment of the principles, the clear determination of concepts, the attempt at strictness in the proofs, and the prevention of audacious leaps in inferences; for these reasons he had the skills for moving a science such as metaphysics into this condition, if only it had occurred to him to prepare the field for it by a critique of the organ, namely pure reason itself: a lack that is to be charged not so much to him as to the dogmatic way of thinking prevalent in his age; and for this the philosophers of his as of all previous times have nothing for which to reproach themselves. Those who reject his kind of teaching and simultaneously the procedure of the critique of pure reason can have nothing else in mind except to throw off the fetters of **science** altogether, and to transform work into play, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy.

17 **Concerning this second edition**, I have wanted, as is only proper, not to forgo the opportunity to remove as far as possible those difficulties and obscurities from which may have sprung several misunderstandings into which acute men, perhaps not without some fault on my part, have fallen in their judgment of this book. I have found nothing to alter either in the propositions themselves or in their grounds of proof, or in the form and completeness of the book's plan; this is to be ascribed partly to the long period of scrutiny to which I subjected them prior to laying it before the public; and partly to the constitution of the matter itself, namely to the nature of a pure speculative reason, which contains a truly articulated structure of members in which each thing is an organ, that is, in which everything is for the sake of each member, and each individual member is for the sake of all, so that even the least frailty, whether it be a mistake (an error)

or a lack, must inevitably betray itself, in its use. I hope this system will henceforth maintain itself in this unalterability. It is not self-conceit that justifies my trust in this, but rather merely the evidence drawn from the experiment showing that the result effected is the same whether we proceed from the smallest elements to the whole of pure reason or return from the whole to every part (for this whole too is given in itself through the final intention of pure reason in the practical); while the attempt to alter even the smallest part directly introduces contradictions not merely into the system, but into universal human reason. Yet in the **presentation** there is still much to do, and here is where I have attempted to make improvements in this edition, which should remove first, the misunderstanding of the Aesthetic, chiefly the one in the concept of time; second, the obscurity in the Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding, next the supposed lack of sufficient evidence in the proofs of the Principles of Pure Understanding, and finally the misinterpretation of the paralogisms advanced against rational psychology. My revisions of the mode of presentation* extend only to this point (namely, only to the end of the first chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic) and no further, because time was too short, and also in respect of the rest of the book no misunderstanding on the part of expert and impartial examiners has come my way, whom I have not been able to name with the praise due to them; but the attention I have paid to their reminders will be evident to them in the appropriate passages. This improvement, however, is bound up with a small loss for the reader, which could not be guarded against without making the book too voluminous: namely, various things that are not essentially required for the completeness of the whole had to be omitted or treated in an abbreviated fashion, despite the fact that some readers may not like doing without them, since they could still be useful in another respect; only in this way could I make room for what I hope is a more comprehensible presentation, which fundamentally alters absolutely nothing in regard to the propositions or even their grounds of proof, but which departs so far from the previous edition in the method of presentation that it could not be managed through interpolations. This small loss, which in any case can be compensated for, if anyone likes, by comparing the first and second editions, is, as I hope, more than compensated for by greater comprehensibility. In various public writings (partly in the reviews of some books, partly in special treatises) I have perceived with gratitude and enjoyment that the spirit of well-groundedness has not died out in Germany, but has only been drowned out for a short time by the fashionable noise of a freedom of thought that fancies itself ingenious, and I see that the thorny paths of criticism, leading to a science of pure reason that is scholastically rigorous but as such the only lasting and hence the most necessary science, has not hindered courageous and clear minds from mastering them. To these deserving men, who combine well-groundedness of insight so fortunately with the talent for a lucid presentation (something I am conscious of not having myself), I leave it to complete my treatment, which is perhaps defective here and there in this latter regard. For in this case the danger is not that I will be refuted, but that I will not be understood. For my own part, from now on I cannot let myself become involved in controversies, although I shall attend carefully to all hints, whether they come from friends or from opponents, so that I may utilize them, in accordance with this propaedeutic, in the future execution of the system. Since during these labors I have come to be rather advanced in age (this month I will attain my sixty-fourth year), I must proceed frugally with my time if I am to carry out my plan of providing the metaphysics both of nature and of morals, as confirmation of the correctness of the critique both of theoretical and practical reason; and I must await the illumination of those obscurities that are hardly to be avoided at the beginning of this work, as well as the defense of the whole, from those deserving men who have made it their own. Any philosophical treatise may find itself under pressure in particular passages (for it cannot be as fully armored as a mathematical treatise), while the whole structure of the system, considered as a

* The only thing I can really call a supplement, and that only in the way of proof, is what I have said at in the form of a new refutation of psychological **idealism**, and a strict proof (the only possible one, I believe) of the objective reality of outer intuition. No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely **on faith**, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof. Because there are some obscurities in the expressions of this proof between the third and sixth lines, I ask leave to alter this passage as follows: "**But this persisting element cannot be an intuition in me. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be determined**." Against this proof one will perhaps say: I am immediately conscious to myself only of what is in me, i.e., of my **representation** of external things; consequently it still remains undecided whether there is something outside me corresponding to it or not. Yet I am conscious through inner **experience** of **my existence in time** (and consequently also of its determinability in time), and this is more than merely being conscious of my representation; yet it is identical with the **empirical consciousness of my existence**, which is only determinable through a relation to something that, while being bound up with my existence, **is outside me**. This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and so it is experience and not fiction, sense and not imagination, that inseparably joins the outer with my inner sense; for outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside me; and its reality; as distinct from imagination, rests only on the fact that it is inseparably bound up with inner experience itself, as the condition of its possibility, which happens here. If I could combine a determination of my existence through **intellectual intuition** simultaneously with the **intellectual consciousness** of my existence, in the representation **I am**, which accompanies all my judgments and actions of my understanding, then no consciousness of a relation to something outside me would necessarily belong to this. But now that intellectual consciousness does to be sure precede, but the inner intuition, in which alone my existence can be determined, is sensible, and is bound to a condition of time; however, this determination, and hence inner experience itself, depends on something permanent, which is not in me, and consequently must be outside me, and I must consider myself in relation to it; thus for an experience in general to be possible, the reality of outer sense is necessarily bound up with that of inner sense, i.e., I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me to which my sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in time. Now which given intuitions actually correspond to outer objects, which therefore belong to outer **sense**, to which they are to be ascribed rather than to the imagination—that must be decided in each particular case according to the rules through which experience in general (even inner experience) is to be distinguished from imagination; which procedure is grounded always on the proposition that there actually is outer experience. To this the following remark can be added: The representation of something **persisting** in existence is not the same as a **persisting representation**; for that can be quite variable and changeable, as all our representations are, even the representations of matter, while still being related to something permanent, which must therefore be a thing distinct from all my representations and external, the existence of which is necessarily included in the **determination** of my own existence, which with it constitutes only a single experience, which could not take place even as inner if it were not simultaneously (in part) outer. The "How?" of this can be no more explained than we can explain further how we can think at all of what abides in time, whose simultaneity with what changes is what produces the concept of alteration.

unity, proceeds without the least danger; when a system is new, few have the adroitness of mind to gain an overview of it, and because all innovation is an inconvenience to them, still fewer have the desire to do so. Also, in any piece of writing apparent contradictions can be ferreted out if individual passages are torn out of their context and compared with each other, especially in a piece of informal discourse that in the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others cast a disadvantageous light on that piece of writing but that can be very easily resolved by someone who has mastered the idea of the whole. Meanwhile, if a theory is really durable, then in time the effect of action and reaction, which at first seemed to threaten it with great danger, will serve only to polish away its rough spots, and if men of impartiality, insight, and true popularity make it their business to do this, then in a short time they will produce even the required elegance.

Königsberg, in the month of April, 1787