

## CHAP. VII.

Now that I may more clearly demonstrate that every body is a certain spirit or life in its own nature, and that the same is a certain intelligent principle having knowledge, sense, love, desire, joy, and grief, as it is this or that way affected, and thus has activity and motion per se so that it can remove itself wherever it desires to be (I say in its own nature, in which it was originally created and as it shall be again when it shall be reduced to its primitive state and delivered from that confusion and vanity to which it is subject by reason of sin), I shall produce these following reasons.

§1. The first hereof shall be from the order of things, before mentioned, which I have already proved to be but three: namely, God the supreme or highest, Christ the medium or middle, and the creature the lowest in order. This creature is but one essence or substance as to nature or essence, as is above demonstrated, so that it only differs according to the manner of existence, among which one is corporality, of which also there are many degrees, so that a thing may more or less approach or recede from the state and condition of a body or a spirit. But because a spirit (of these two) is more excellent in the natural order of things, insofar as a creature is a spirit (if at any rate it does not otherwise degenerate), so much the nearer it approaches to God, who is the highest spirit. Hence a body may always be more and more spiritual, *ad infinitum*, because God who is the first and supreme spirit is infinite and does not, nor cannot, partake of the least corporality. Hence such is the nature of a creature, unless it degenerates, that it always draws nearer and nearer unto God in likeness. But because there is no being which is in every way contrary to God (*viz.*, there is no being which is infinitely and unchangeably evil, as God is infinitely and unchangeably good; nothing infinitely dark, as God is infinitely light; nor anything infinitely a body, having nothing of spirit, as God is infinitely a spirit, having nothing of body), hence it is manifest that no creature can become more and more a body, *ad infinitum*. Although a creature

may become more and more a spirit, ad infinitum, and nothing can become infinitely more dark, though it may become infinitely more light, for the same reason nothing can be evil ad infinitum, although it may become more and more good ad infinitum. And so indeed, in the very nature of things, there are limits or bounds to evil, but none to good. And after the same manner, every degree of sin or evil in the very nature of the thing has its punishment, grief, and chastisement annexed to it, by which the evil is again changed into good. This punishment or correction, although not presently perceived by the creature when it sins, still is reserved in those very sins that it commits and in its due time will appear. And then every sin will have its punishment, and so the pain and chastisement will be felt by the creature, and by that the creature will be again restored to its former state of goodness in which it was created and from which it cannot fall or slide anymore. Because by its great chastisement it has acquired a greater strength and perfection, and so ascends so far above that indifference of will, which it had before, to good or evil, that it wills only that which is good, nor is it able to will any evil.

And hence it may be inferred that all the creatures of God, which up till now degenerated and fell from their primitive goodness, must after certain periods be converted and restored, not only to as good but unto a better state than that in which they were created. For divine operation cannot cease, and hence it is the nature of every creature to be still in motion and always to change either from good to good, or from good into evil, or from evil again into good. And because it cannot proceed infinitely to evil, for there is no infinite example thereof, hence it must necessarily return or slide into eternal silence, which is contrary to its nature. But if it be said it goes into eternal torments, I answer, if by "eternal" you mean "an infinity of ages which shall never cease," that is impossible, because as we observe by continued experience and reason teaches us that of necessity every pain and torment excites or stirs up an operating spirit and life in everything which suffers. Because through pain and the enduring of it, every kind of crassness or grossness contracted in spirit or body is attenuated, and so the spirit captivated or detained in

that grossness or crassness is set free and made more spiritual, and consequently more active and operative, through suffering.

Now seeing that a creature cannot proceed infinitely to evil, nor slide down into inactivity or silence, nor yet also into mere eternal suffering, it uncontestably follows that it must at length return to good, and insofar as its suffering is greater, so much the sooner shall it return and be restored. And so we see how a thing (the same substance still remaining) may be marvelously changed in terms of the manners of its existence, so that a certain holy and blessed spirit, or angel of light, could by his voluntary action become a wicked and cursed spirit of darkness, which change, or metamorphosis, certainly is as great as if a spirit were changed into a body. And if it be here asked, do those spirits become more corporeal by their transgression than they were in their primitive state before they fell? I answer, yes, but because, as I have already shown, a spirit is capable of more and less corporality, although not infinitely, but in many degrees. Hence it is they could remain for many ages and have nothing of such a corporeal crassness as things in this visible world have, such as hard stones, metals, or the bodies of men and women. For certainly the bodies of the worst spirits do not have the crassness of any visible body, and yet all that grossness of visible bodies came from the fall of spirits from their first state. And so the spirits after long and various periods, could contract this grossness in themselves, although they could not together and at one and the same time fall into a universal grossness, so that the whole body of any fallen spirit should be in all its parts equally gross, but some parts become grosser and grosser, and the other corporeal parts of this spirit (which are its immediate vehicle with which it is most intimately united) retain a certain tenuousness without which the spirit could not be so moveable and active as otherwise it would. And with these subtler and more tenuous parts of the body, the principal spirit (together with its ministering spirits, as many of them as it can possibly gather together) departs out of those thicker parts of the body, which it leaves as so many cadaverous bodies, which are no longer fit to serve these spirits

in those operations which they exercise in their present state.

And we may observe this departure of the subtler and stronger spirits out of the harder and grosser parts of the body into the more soft and tenuous in certain spirituous liquors, which are congealed with great cold. Where the stronger spirits (forsaking the harder parts which are outward and chiefly exposed to the cold) gather themselves into the middle part of the body, which is always subtle and thin, so that only one drop of that liquor (which is not congealed, but remains still liquid in the innermost part of the congealed body) has in it the augmented force of all those parts which are congealed.

Thus, here is a two-fold grossness and hardness of bodies, the one palpable and visible to our external senses, the other invisible and impalpable, which nevertheless is as gross as the other. Indeed it is often grosser and harder, which may be truly perceived by the internal senses, although the external senses may be insensible of it. For the invisible and impalpable grossness or hardness is that which is proper to those bodies which are so small that our external senses cannot perceive them when nevertheless they are really exceedingly hard. Indeed, they are harder than any flint or metal, which we can handle with our hands. And out of these hard and small bodies, visible waters are for the most part composed, although they appear to us very soft, fluid, and tenuous, because of the great plentitude of certain other subtle bodies which continually agitate and move the hard particles, so that water seems to our gross senses to be one homogenous, simple, and uniform thing, although it consists of many heterogeneous and dissimilar or differing parts more than many other bodies. And many of these parts are exceedingly hard and stony, from which gravel proceeds bubbling forth, and all other little sands and stones, which have their origin and birth from the waters springing from the bottom of the earth. When those little stones, or stony particles of water, grow into visible sand and stones, after some time they again lose this hardness and become more soft and tenuous than when they belonged to the waters. For stones rot and are converted into soft

earth, and out of this proceed animals. Also putrefying stones do often become water again. But this water is of another species than the former, for one is petrifying, the other mollifying. As it is observed that from one mountain in Helvetia [Switzerland] two kinds of water flow: one where if drunk it causes (kidney) stones, and the other a proper remedy against it. So that one water is changed into a stone and the other water proceeds from that stone while it is in corruption, and so it alters and loses its former hardness. And so from this it may be better understood how the heart and spirit of a wicked person may be said to be hard and stony, because indeed their spirit has in it a real hardness, such as is found in those little stony particles of certain waters. Where, on the contrary, the spirits of good people are soft and tender, which internal softness and hardness of spirits we may also really feel and every good person does as sensibly perceive the same, just as the external hardness of gross bodies is discerned by the outward touch. But those who are dead in their sins do not have this sense of the hardness or softness of good or evil spirits, and therefore they call these only metaphorical speeches when indeed the things are really so in a proper and not a figurative sense.

§2. The second reason that created spirits are convertible into bodies, and bodies into spirits, I shall deduce from a serious and due consideration of the divine attributes, from which, as from a treasury of instructions, may be manifested the truth of all things. For since God is infinitely good, and communicates his goodness in infinite ways to his creatures, so that there is no creature which does not receive something of his goodness, and that very largely, and since the goodness of God is a living goodness, which has life, power, love, and knowledge in it, which he communicates to his creatures, how can it be that any dead thing should proceed from him, or be created by him, given the hypothesis of those who affirm that mere body or matter is wholly inconvertible to any degree of life or knowledge? It is truly said by some that God did not make death, and it is as true that he made no dead thing. For how can a dead thing depend on him who is infinitely life and



charity? Or how can any creature receive so vile and diminutive an essence that partakes nothing of life or knowledge, nor even be able to aspire to it—no not in the least degree—from him who is so infinitely liberal and good? Has not God created all his creatures for this end: that in him they might be blessed and enjoy his divine goodness in their several states and conditions? But how can this be without life or sense? Or how can any thing that lacks life enjoy divine goodness?

But we shall urge this argument a little further. The divine attributes are commonly and rightly distinguished into communicable and incommunicable. The incommunicable are that God is a being subsisting by himself, independent, unchangeable, absolutely infinite, and most perfect. The communicable are that he is a spirit, life, and light, that he is good, holy, just, wise, etc. But now none of these communicable attributes are not living, and indeed, life itself. And because every creature has a communication of some of God's attributes, now I ask, in which attribute is dead matter or a body that is incapable of life and sense forever? If it is said it agrees with God in entity, or that it is an essence, I answer, in God there is no dead being that he is or can be partake of. Where, therefore, shall this have its dead essence? Moreover, the entity or being of a thing is not properly an attribute of it, but an attribute is properly something that is predicated or affirmed of that being. Now what attributes or perfections can be attributed to dead matter, which do analogically answer to those that are in God? If we diligently inquire into this, we shall find none at all. For all his attributes are living, indeed, life itself. Moreover, since the creatures of God, insofar as they are creatures, ought necessarily to resemble their creator in some ways, now I ask, in what way is dead matter like God? If they say again in naked entity, I answer, there is none in God or his creatures, and so it is a mere nothing.

But touching on the other attributes of matter, viz., impenetrability, figurability, and mobility, certainly none of these have any place in God and so are not of his communicable attributes, but rather essential differences or attributes of diversity, whereby the creature as such is distinguished from God. Likewise also

mutability is of one of those differential attributes, since it cannot be said that mutability is of the communicable attributes of God. And in like manner, impenetrability, figurability, and mobility, do not pertain to the communicable attributes of God, but only to those in which the creatures differ from him. And since dead matter does not partake of any of the communicable attributes of God, we must certainly conclude that it is a mere nothing, a false fiction or chimera, and so a thing impossible.

If they say it has a metaphysical goodness and truth since every being is good and true, again, I ask: what is that goodness and truth? For if it has no participation with any of the communicable attributes of God, it will be neither good nor true, and so a mere fiction, as before was said. Moreover, since it cannot be said how dead matter in any way partakes of divine goodness, much less can it be shown how it always may be capable of acquiring a greater perfection, ad infinitum, which is the nature of all creatures, viz., to increase and infinitely advance towards a further perfection as is before demonstrated. But what further progress in goodness or perfection has dead matter? Because after it has suffered infinite changes of motion and figure, it is constrained always to remain dead as before, and if motion and figure contribute nothing to the receiving of life, then certainly it is never made the better. No, it is not in the least degree promoted in goodness. For suppose this dead matter had undergone all forms and been transmuted into all kinds of figures, even the most regular and exact, what could this profit matter or body since it lacks all life and sense? So let us suppose it to have undergone infinite kinds of motion, from slowness to swiftness. How is it better in its intrinsic improvement? For the argument speaks of intrinsic improvement, which is such an improvement as the nature of the thing itself requires and which is performed thereby. But a mere dead body, or matter, requires no kind of motion or figure, nor is perfected in itself more by one motion or figure than by another. For it is indifferent to all motions and figures whatsoever, and thus is not perfected or bettered by any of them. And then what advantage will it have from all these helps if it always remains a dead and impassible thing?

§3. My third reason is drawn from the great love and desire that the spirits or souls have towards bodies, and especially towards those with which they are united, and in which they have their habitation. But now the foundation of all love or desire, whereby one thing is carried to another, stands in this: that either they are of the same nature and substance with them, or like to them, or both; or that one has its being from the other, of which we have an example in all living creatures which bring forth their young, and in like manner in humans in how they love that which is born of them. For so also even wicked men and women (if they are not extremely perverse, and void of parental love) do love their children and cherish them with a natural affection, the cause of which certainly is this: that their children are of the same nature and substance, viz., as though they were parts of them. And if they are like them, either in body, spirit, or manners, thereby their love is the more increased.

So also we observe that animals of one species love one another more than those that are of a different species; where also cattle of one kind feed together, birds of a kind flock together, and fishes of a kind swim together, and so men rather converse with men than with any other creatures. But besides this particular love, there remains yet something of universal love in all creatures, one towards another, setting aside that great confusion which has fallen out since, by reason of transgression, which certainly must proceed from the same foundation, viz., in regard of their first substance and essence, they were all one and the same thing, and as it were parts and members of one body. Moreover, in every species of animals, we see how the male and female love one another, and in all their propagations (which are not monstrous, and contrary to nature) they respect each other, and that proceeds not only from the unity of nature, but also by reason of a certain eminent similitude or likeness between them. And both these foundations of love between a man and a woman are expressly mentioned in Genesis, but that which Adam spoke concerning his wife, this is bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh, etc., pertains unto the unity of nature, for she was taken out of him and was a part of him,

and therefore he loved her. Moreover also, concerning similitude, it is said there was no help found for him, or before his face, as it is in the Hebrew, (i.e.) Among all creatures he saw not his like, with whom he would converse, until Eve was made for him.

But there is yet another cause of love when beings that love each other are not one substance, but one gave being to the other, and is the proper and real cause thereof. And so it is in the case between God and creatures. For he gave to all beings life and motion, and therefore he loves all creatures. Neither can he not love them; indeed, at the same time when he seems to hate and be angry with them, his anger and what proceeds therefrom, viz., punishments and judgments, turns to their good because he perceives they have need of them. So, on the contrary, the creatures that have not wholly degenerated and lost all sense of God do love him. And this is a certain divine law and instinct, which he put in all rational creatures that they might love him, which is the fulfilling of the whole law. But those creatures that draw most near unto God in similitude or likeness do love him the more and are the more loved of him.

But if it is thought there is another principal cause of love, namely, goodness, which is the most vehement or powerful magnet of love, where God is above all the most to be loved because he is the best, which goodness is in some measure in creatures, either really or apparently, for which they are loved by their fellow-creatures, I answer that it must be granted indeed that goodness is a great, in fact the greatest, cause of love and the proper object of it. But this goodness is not a distinct cause from those put down before, but is comprehended in them. Why do we call a thing good? Because it either really or apparently pleases us, for the unity it has with us or which we have with it. Hence it comes to pass that good men love good men and not otherwise, for good men cannot love evil, nor evil men good men as such. There is no greater similitude than between good and good. The reason we call or esteem a thing good is this: that it benefits us, and that we are made partakers of its goodness, and so here the first cause of similitude is still militant. So likewise,

when one thing gives being to another, as when God and Christ give being to creatures (as from whom have every true essence proceeded), there is in like manner a certain similitude, for it is impossible that the creatures should not in some things be like their creator and agree with him in some attributes or perfections.

This being supposed a touchstone, we shall now return to our subject matter, i.e., to examine, whether spirits and bodies are of one nature and substance, and so convertible one into another. Therefore, I ask, what is the reason that the spirit or soul so loves the body with which it is united, and so unwillingly departs out of it that the souls of some have stayed with and attended on their bodies after the body was dead until it was corrupted and dissolved into dust? That the spirit or soul gave a distinct being to the body, or the body to the spirit, cannot be the reason of this love, since that would be creation, in a strict sense; but this, namely, to give being to things, is proper only to God and Christ. Therefore, it necessarily comes to happen because of that similitude they have one with another or some affinity in their natures. Or, if it be said, there is a certain goodness in the body which moves the spirit to love it; certainly this goodness must necessarily answer to something in the soul which is like it. Otherwise it could not be carried into it. Indeed, let them inform us what that goodness in the body is, which the soul does so fervently love. Or in what attributes or perfections a body is like a spirit, if a body is nothing but a dead trunk and a certain mass which is altogether incapable of any degree of life, and perfection.

If they say a body agrees with a spirit in respect of being, that is to say, as one has being so that the other has the same, this is already refuted in the former argument. For if this being has no attributes or perfections in which it may agree with the being of a spirit, then it is only a mere fiction. For God created no naked being, which should be a mere being and have no attributes that may be predicated of it. Besides also, "being" is only a logical notion or term, which logicians do call the most general kind of genus, which in the naked and abstracted notion of it is not in the things themselves, but only in the conception or human intellect. And

therefore every true being is a certain single nature of which it may be affirmed such and such attributes.

Now what are those attributes of body in which it resembles a spirit? Let us examine the principal attributes of body, as distinct from a spirit, according to those who argue that body and spirit are so infinitely distant in nature that one can never become the other. The attributes are these: that a body is impenetrable by all other bodies, so that the parts of it cannot penetrate each other; and there is another attribute of body, viz., to be discernible or divisible into parts. But the attributes of spirit (as they define it) are penetrability and indiscernibility, so that one spirit can penetrate another, also that a thousand spirits can stand together one within another and yet possess no more space than one spirit. Moreover, that a spirit is so simple and one in itself that it cannot be rent asunder or actually divided into separate parts. If now the attributes of body and spirit are compared with each other they are so far from being like each other, or having any analogy of nature (in which nevertheless the true foundation of love and unity does consist, as before was said), that they are plainly contrary. Indeed, nothing in the whole world can be conceived so contrary to anything as body and spirit in the opinion of these men. For there is a pure and absolute contrariety in all their attributes, because penetrability and impenetrability are more contrary to one another than black and white or hot and cold. For that which is black may become white, and that which is hot may become cold. But (as they say) that which is impenetrable cannot be made penetrable. God and creatures do not so infinitely differ in essence one from another as these doctors make body to differ from spirit. For there are many attributes in which God and the creatures agree together, but we can find none in which a body can in any way agree with a spirit, and thus with God, who is the highest and purest of spirits. Therefore, it can be no creature, but a mere non-entity or fiction. But as body and spirit are contrary in the attributes of penetrability and impenetrability, they are no less contrary in discernibility and indiscernibility.

But if they allow that body and spirit do agree in some attributes, like extension, mobility, and figurability,



so that spirit has extension and can reach from one place to another, and also can move itself from place to place and form itself into whatever figure it pleases, in which case it is like a body and a body like it. To this I answer: suppose the first, that a spirit can be extended (which yet many of them deny, indeed most who teach that body and spirit are essentially distinct), yet the extension of body and spirit, as they understand it, do differ wondrously. For the extension of body is always impenetrable. In fact, to be extended and impenetrable is only one real attribute with respect to body that is proposed in two mental and logical notions, or ways of speaking. For what is extension, unless the body (wherever it is) is impenetrable of its own proper parts? But remove this attribute of impenetrability from a body, and it cannot be conceived any longer as extended. Moreover, the extension of body and spirit, according to their notion, infinitely differ. For whatever extension a body has, it is so necessary and essential to it that it is impossible for it to be more or less extended. Nevertheless a spirit may be more or less extended, as they affirm. And since being moveable and figurable are only consequential attributes of extension (for a spirit is far more moveable and figurable than a body, because a spirit can move and form itself as a body cannot), the same reason that is good against the one, is good against the other also.

§4. But, secondly, how can they prove impenetrability is an essential attribute of body, or that penetrability is an essential attribute of spirit? Why may not body be more or less impenetrable, and spirit more or less penetrable, as it may and indeed does happen in all other attributes? For example, some body may be more or less heavy or light, condensed or rarefied, solid or liquid, hot or cold; then why may it not also be more or less penetrable, or impenetrable? If it be said that in all those other mutations we always observe that a body remains impenetrable, such as iron when it is heated red-hot, yet remains still impenetrable. I answer, I grant it may remain impenetrable of any other body of equal thickness, yet may, and is, entirely penetrated of a more subtle body—namely, of the fire which has entered into it and penetrated all its parts, whereby it is

made so soft and if the fire is stronger it begins wholly to melt. But if, against this, they object that the ingress of fire into the iron is not penetration in a philosophical sense, nor as they understand it, viz., as though the fire and iron did possess but one place, and so the one could be intrinsically present in the other, since the contrary is clear. The iron (if it be made candent or glowing hot) swells and acquires a greater bulk than when it is cold, and as it grows cold again returns to its former dimension. To this I answer: if they mean such a penetration, which we call intrinsic presence, viz., that one homogeneous substance should enter into another, both being of equal dimensions, and yet the bulk or quantity not increased, that seems wholly irrational. It would be a mere impossibility and contradiction to grant such an intimate presence in creatures, which only belongs to God and Christ as creators, whose prerogative it is to be intrinsically present in creatures, whereas no creature can have that intrinsic presence in its fellow creature because then it would cease to be a creature and obtain one of the incommunicable attributes of God and Christ, which is intrinsic presence. This (I say) is primarily to be attributed to God, and secondarily to Christ, in as much as he is a certain medium between God and creatures, and as he is partaker of mutability and immutability, of eternity and time; so he may be said to be partaker of body and spirit, and consequently of place and extension. For, in so much as his body is of another substance than the bodies of all other creatures (as he is the nearest beginning to God), it may be truly said he is intrinsically present in them, and yet not so as to be confounded with them.

For to suppose one creature intrinsically present in another, so as to be mingled and most perfectly united with it, and yet its quantity or extension not increased, confounds the creatures and makes two or more to be but one. According to this hypothesis, it may be said that the whole creation is reducible to the quantity of the least grain or dust because every part would be supposed to penetrate another and no greater extension follow than of one part. But if it is said that this only proves that spirits may be reduced into so small a space, but not bodies because bodies are impenetrable,

I answer that this is but begging the question, because they have not yet proved that body and spirit are distinct substances, which unless they are, it follows that one nature is no more penetrable than the other, according to their sense.

And indeed it seems very suited to reason that as times are each so extended into their due measures and extensions, they cannot exceed those bounds and so cannot be intrinsically present one with another; as, for example, the first day of the week cannot be present with the second day of the same week, nor the first hour of the day with the second, neither is the first minute of an hour present with the second minute because it is the nature and essence of time that it is successive and has parts one without another. Nevertheless, God is really and intrinsically present in all times and is not changed, which cannot be said of the creature, namely, that it is present in all or more times and not changed. For the creature is perpetually changed with times, since times are nothing else but the motion or change of the creature from one state or condition into another. And just as it is in the case of time, and creatures that are in time, so it is also in the case of place, bulk, or quantity. For just as in God there is no time, so also in him there is no bulk or corporeal quantity, but in creatures there is both time and corporeal quantity because otherwise they would be either God or nothing, which is impossible. For however much quantity, bulk, or extension any creature has, it retains the same, as something which is of its own essence, just as it is the essence of time to consist of more parts, and those again of more, and so ad infinitum. For it may be easily conceived how a lesser time is in a greater; for example, how many minutes are in an hour, and many hours in a day, and one hour does immediately touch the next but cannot be present in it. The same is to be understood of the creatures regarding their quantity or bulk. For indeed one creature may immediately touch another, but it cannot be present in all its parts, but only a lesser may be in a greater and a subtler in a grosser, and this is more properly penetration which agrees with bodies as well as spirits, as some body that is less gross may penetrate another that is more gross, but two bodies of an equal thickness cannot penetrate

each other. The same may be said of spirits that have their degrees of more or less grossness, just as bodies have. Neither is there any other difference between body and spirit (if body is not taken in their sense, who teach that it is a thing merely dead and void of life or a capacity there of, but in a proper sense: namely, that it is an excellent creature having life and sense, which either actually or potentially agrees to it), but that a body is the grosser part of a thing and spirit the subtler, and also spirit has its name from the air, which is the most subtle nature in this visible world. In the Kabbala Denudata, spirit is defined as a central nature having a faculty to send forth a sphere full of light and to enlarge or contract it, which properly seems to be Aristotle's *entelechia*; in addition, matter is defined as a naked center, or a point wanting radiation, which Aristotle understood by privation. From which we must conclude that the impenetrability of these creatures is to be understood of their centers: for the Hebrew word "Ruach," which signifies a spirit, signifies also air, and because air has a very swift motion, all swiftness of motion is imputed to the spirit in the moved body. Hence from popular ignorance when there is no motion perceived in certain bodies, they termed them dead, wanting both life and spirit. But indeed there is no body anywhere that does not have motion, and thus life and spirit. Therefore, every creature has its due quantity or extension, which it cannot exceed and in which also it cannot be diminished.

Neither does this hinder that we observe how some very small body may be extended into a space a thousand times greater than it had. Just as gunpowder, if it is set on fire, does marvelously extend itself, for all this extension is made by division of parts into parts, still less and less, which indeed do not fill all that space, so great as it seems, when meanwhile each part has neither greater nor lesser extension than it had before.

Supposing this is true, it must be concluded that all creatural spirits, which are present in bodies, are either in the pores of the said bodies or in certain concavities made there, as moles make in the earth, or else they cause the bodies to be puffed up and acquire a greater extension, as when fire copiously enters iron and it notably puffs up and extends the same. And although this



turgescency, or puffing up, of bodies cannot always be observed by our external senses, yet it cannot therefore be denied. For it is possible that a certain body may considerably grow or increase in its dimensions and become entirely greater, and yet this increase of magnitude may avoid all outward observation. Indeed, it may be so subtle that it cannot be expressed by numbers; as, for example, let us suppose some body, whose solidity or cube may contain 64 parts and another whose solidity contains 100, where the root of the former body whose cube is 64 is 4, so that the side of the body contains four longitudes of the parts so divided. But the side or root of the other body, whose cube is 100, can be expressed by no number because it is greater than 4 and less than 5, and no fraction can determine it. Therefore, bodies (as was said) may be considerably swollen or puffed up (if more spirits or subtler bodies enter into them) and yet so that our gross senses may judge them not at all greater.

Now we may come to the other attribute that is said to belong to body but not to spirit, viz., discernibility. If they understand by it that one body, even the least that can be conceived (if any such body can be conceived), may be divided, that is certainly impossible. For it is a contradiction in terms and supposes even the least body to be discernible into lesser parts. But if body is taken individually as one single body, it is indiscernible. And that which we call the discernibility of body means only this, namely, that we may divide one body from another, by placing some third body between them, and according to this sense, spirits are no less discernible than bodies. For although one single spirit cannot become two or more spirits, yet many spirits co-existing in one body are no less separable one from another than bodies are. For however bodies or spirits may be divided or separated one from another in the whole universe, yet they still remain united in this separation since the whole creation is still but one substance or entity without a vacuum in it. How then can any thing be separated from itself? I mean, from that which is its proper nature, as considered originally, or in its beginning or first being? But since there is a general unity of all creatures one with another, so that

none can be separated from his fellow-creatures, so there is a more special and particular unity between the parts of one particular species. As we see when the body is divided, or torn asunder, and the members removed one from another to a certain distance, so long as these members are not corrupted and changed into another species, they still send certain subtle particles one to another and to the body from where they came, and the body sends the like to them (which we call spirits and bodies, or just spirits, for they are either), by means of which the parts and members so apparently separated still retain a certain real unity and sympathy, as is manifest from sundry examples, and especially the two following ones. The first of which is this: a certain human lacking a nose ordered one to be made for him out of the flesh of another human, which was vitally stuck on (as a scion or graft is united with the trunk of the tree into which it is put). When the other human died and his body corrupted, this nose was likewise corrupted and fell from the body of this living human. The second example is of a human whose leg was cut off, which leg being removed some considerable distance from the rest of the body; when a certain surgeon cut it, this human complained of pains and showed in what part the said leg was wounded, which manifestly proves that there is a certain union of parts though separated at a great distance one from another.

And so also individuals of one species, or those who have a singular affinity in specie, have a union one with another, although locally distant, which is yet more manifest in humankind. For if two humans entirely love one another, they are by this love so united that no distance of place can divide or separate them. They are present (one with another) in spirit, so that there passes a continual efflux, or emanation of spirits, from the one to the other whereby they are bound together and united as with chains. So whatever a human loves, whether it is human or beast, a tree, or silver or gold, he is united with the same and his spirit passes into that very thing. And here is to be observed that though the spirit of humans is commonly spoken in the singular, as though it were but one thing, yet the said spirit is a certain composition of more, indeed

innumerable spirits. And just as the body is a composition of more bodies and has a certain order and government in all its parts, much more so is spirit, which is a great army of spirits in which there are distinct offices under one governing spirit. And so from hence it appears that impenetrability and indiscernibility are not more essential attributes of body than of spirit, because in one sense they are suitable to either, in another sense to neither.

But against this infiniteness of spirits in every spirit, and infiniteness of bodies in every body, it may be objected by saying: God made all things in number, weight, and measure. So there cannot be an infinite multitude of spirits in one human or an innumerable multitude of bodies in one body. But I answer that the infiniteness or innumerability of spirits and bodies is only to be understood in respect of the creature's understanding, so that they cannot be numbered nor the outward extension of body and spirit (that may happen in them) be measured by the knowledge of any creature. But that God has perfectly known the number and measure of all creatures is freely granted. And if God made all things in number, weight, and measure, then certainly every creature will have its number, weight, and measure, and thus we cannot say of any creature that it is but one single thing because it is a number, and number is a multitude, or more than one. And indeed the nature of a creature is such that it cannot be merely one single thing, because it ought to act or do something and so enjoy that goodness which is prepared for it by its creator. For example, let us suppose but one atom to be separated from its fellow-creatures; what can it do to perfect itself, or make itself greater or better? What can it see, hear, taste, or feel, either from within or without? It cannot have internal motion, because every motion has at least two ends or extremes, namely, the end from which and the end to which. And since this is but one atom or center, certainly it cannot have any motion within itself from which end or to which end, and consequently, since it cannot hear, see, taste, or feel from within, nor can it have it from other creatures from without. For if it ought to see, hear, feel, or taste any other creature, it is required to receive the

image of this creature within itself, which it cannot do because it is an atom, and an atom is so small that it can receive nothing within it. For as the organs of the external senses are composed of more parts, so also are the organs of the internal senses, and consequently all knowledge requires variety or multitude, which is the subject or receptacle, I mean all creaturely knowledge, where knowledge is received or excited from known things or objects (whereas the knowledge of God is not received or excited by creatures, but is originally in and from himself). Since, therefore, the objects of our knowledge are various, and every object sends its image into us and that image is a real being, it follows we have many images in us, which cannot be all received in an atom but need their distinct places in us in their distinct forms and figures. Otherwise there would not only follow a confusion, but many things would be present one to each other without any extension, which is repugnant to the nature of a creature. And although the objects of our knowledge are many, as for example, I am manifold, who receive so many images from those objects, yet from thence it does not follow that because I who know something am manifold that therefore I ought to behold one object as if it were many, so that seeing one human I should see many. For when many people see one human they do not behold that human as many humans, but as one human only. So when I look up and behold something with both my eyes (unless peradventure there be any confusion in my sight) they do not seem to me as two, but one. And if I could behold something with ten thousand eyes, as I do with two, certainly that thing, whether a horse or a human, would not seem otherwise to me than one alone.

Hence appears to us a great distinction between God and creatures. For he is one, and this is his perfection: that he needs nothing outside himself. But a creature, because it needs the assistance of its fellow creatures, ought to be manifold so that it may receive this assistance. For that which receives something is nourished by the same and so becomes a part of it, and therefore it is no more one but many, and in fact so many as there are things received and yet of a

greater multiplicity. Therefore, there is a certain society or fellowship among creatures in giving and receiving, whereby they mutually subsist one by another, so that one cannot live without another. For what creature in the whole world can be found that has no need of its fellow creature? Certainly none. Thus every creature which has life, sense, or motion ought to be a number or a multiplicity, indeed a number without number, or infinite in respect of any created intellect.

But if it is said, should not the central or governing spirit be one atom only, for otherwise how can it be called a center and the chief spirit, having dominion over the rest? I answer in the negative. For this center itself, or chief and governing spirit, is manifold, for the reasons before alleged, but it is called a center because all the other spirits concur to it as lines from all parts of the circumference do meet at the center and do again depart out or proceed from there. Indeed the unity of the spirits that compose or make up this center, or governing spirit, is more firm and tenacious than that of all the other spirits, which are, as it were, the angels or ministering spirits of their prince or captain. In fact, in humans this unity is so great that nothing can dissolve it (although the unity of the greatest plenty of ministering spirits which do not belong to the composition of this center may be dissolved). Hence it comes to pass that the soul of every human shall remain an entire everlasting soul, or be of endless duration, so that it may receive the proper fruit of its labor. The universal law of justice (which is written on everything) does require this, and is a most strong and indissolvable band to preserve this unity. For what is more congruous with this infinite justice and wisdom than this: that they who have joined together and consented to work either good or evil shall together receive their due reward and punishment, which cannot be if they should be dissipated or separated one from another? And the same reason does prove that the central spirits of all other creatures remain indissolvable, and that although new central spirits are continually formed in the production of things, yet no central spirit is dissolved, but only further promoted or diminished, according to the present dignity or indignity, capacity or incapacity thereof.

## CHAP. VIII.

§1. To prove that spirit and body differ not essentially, but gradually, I shall deduce my fourth argument from the intimate bond or union, which intercedes between bodies and spirits, by means of which the spirits have dominion over the bodies with which they are united, that they move them from one place to another and use them as instruments in their various operations.

For if spirit and body are so contrary one to another, so that a spirit is only life or a living and sensible substance, but a body a certain mass merely dead, a spirit penetrable and indiscernible, but a body impenetrable and discernible, which are all contrary attributes, what (I ask you) is that which does so join or unite them together? Or, what are those links or chains, whereby they have so firm a connection, and that for so long a space of time? Moreover also, when the spirit or soul is separated from the body, so that it no longer has dominion or power over it to move it as it had before, what is the cause of this separation? If it is said that the vital agreement the soul has with the body is the cause of the union, and that the body being corrupted is the reason the vital agreement ceases, I answer that we must first enquire in what this vital agreement does consist; for if they cannot tell us in what it does consist, they only trifle with empty words, which make a sound but lack a signification. For certainly in that sense which they take body and spirit in, there is no agreement at all between them; for a body is always a dead thing, void of life and sense, no less when the spirit is in it than when it is gone out of it: hence there is no agreement at all between them. And if there is any agreement that certainly will remain the same both when the body is sound and when it is corrupted. If they deny this because a spirit requires an organized body by means of which it performs its vital acts of the external senses, moves and transports the body from place to place, which organic action ceases when the body is corrupted, certainly by this the difficulty is not better solved. For why does the spirit require such an organized body? For example, why does it require a corporeal eye so wonderfully formed and organized that



I can see by it? Why does it need a corporeal light to see corporeal objects? Or, why is it requisite that the image of the object should be sent to it through the eye so it can see it? If the same were entirely nothing but a spirit, and in no way corporeal, why does it need so many several corporeal organs so far different from its nature? Furthermore, how can a spirit move its body, or any of its members, if a spirit (as they affirm) is of such a nature that no part of its body can in the least resist it, even as one body is able to resist another when it is moved by it, by reason of its impenetrability? For if a spirit could so easily penetrate all bodies, why does it not leave the body behind it when it is moved from place to place since it can so easily pass out without the least resistance? For certainly this is the cause of all motions that we see in the world, where one thing moves another, viz., because both are impenetrable in the sense said before. For were it not for this impenetrability one creature could not move another because this would not oppose that nor at all resist it; an example of which we have in the sails of a ship, by which the wind drives the ship, and so much the more vehemently, by how much the fewer holes, vents, and passages the wind finds in the sails. When, on the contrary, if instead of sails nets were expanded through which the wind would have a freer passage, certainly by these the ship would be but little moved, even if the wind blew with great violence. Hence we see how this impenetrability causes resistance and this makes motion. But if there were no impenetrability, as in the case of body and spirit, then there could be no resistance, and thus the spirit could make no motion in the body.

§2. And if it be objected that God is altogether incorporeal and intrinsically present in all bodies, and yet does move bodies wherever he pleases, and is the first mover of all things and yet nothing is impenetrable to him, I answer, this motion by which God moves a body does wonderfully differ from that manner by which the soul moves the body. For the will of God that gave being to bodies gave them motion also, so that motion itself is from God by whose will all motion happens. For as a creature cannot give being to itself, so neither can

it move itself; for in him we live, move, and have our being, so that motion and essence come from the same cause, that is, God the creator, who remains immovable in himself. Neither is he carried from place to place because he is equally present everywhere and gives being to creatures. But the case is far different when the soul moves the body, for the soul is not the author of motion, but only determines it to this or that particular thing, and the soul itself is moved, together with the body, from place to place. And if the body is imprisoned or held in chains, it cannot free or deliver itself out of prison or out of chains. Therefore, it would be a very unfit comparison if one should try to illustrate the motion the soul makes in the body by an example of God moving his creatures. Indeed, so great is the difference, it would be like a human trying to demonstrate how a carpenter builds a ship or a house by an example of God creating the first matter or substance, in which certainly there is as great a disparity or disproportion because God gave being to creatures, but a carpenter does not give being to the wood of which he builds a ship.

But no human can think because I have said that all motion of creatures is from God that therefore he is, or can be, the author or cause of sin. For although the moving power is from God, yet sin is not in the least from God, but from the creature who has abused this power and determined it to some other end than it ought. So that sin is ataxia, or an inordinate determination of motion or the power of moving from its due place, state, or condition to some other; just as a ship is moved by the wind but is governed by the mariner so that it goes to this or that place, although the mariner is not the author or cause of the wind, but the wind blowing, he makes either a good or a bad use of it, so he either brings the ship to the place intended, and so is commended, or else so manages it to shipwreck, for which he is blamed and worthy of punishment.

Moreover, why is the spirit or soul so amenable to corporal pains? For if, when it is united with the body, it has nothing of corporeity or a bodily nature, why is it grieved or wounded when the body is wounded, given it is of quite a different nature? For since the soul can

so easily penetrate a body, how can any corporeal thing hurt it? If it is said that only the body feels the pain, but not the soul, this is contrary to their own principles because they affirm that the body has neither life nor sense. But if it be granted that the soul is of one nature and substance with the body, although it is many degrees more excellent in regard of life and spirituality as also in swiftness of motion and penetrability and diverse other perfections, then all the aforesaid difficulties will vanish and it will be easily conceived how the body and soul are united together, and how the soul moves the body and suffers by it or with it.

§3. For we may easily understand how one body is united with another by that true agreement that one has with another in its own nature, and so the most subtle and spiritual body may be united with a body that is very gross and thick, by means of certain bodies partaking of subtlety and grossness according to diverse degrees consisting between two extremes. And these middle bodies are indeed the links and chains by which the soul, which is so subtle and spiritual, is conjoined with a body so gross; if these middle spirits cease or are absent, the union is broken or dissolved. So from the same foundation we may easily understand how the soul moves the body, viz., as one subtle body can move another gross and thick body. And since body itself is a sensible life, or an intellectual substance, it is no less clearly conspicuous how one body can wound, or grieve, or gratify, or please another: because things of one or alike nature can easily affect each other.

And by this argument we may reduce similar difficulties, viz., how spirits move spirits, and how some spirits strive and contend with other spirits, also concerning the unity, concord, and friendship which good spirits revere among themselves. For if all spirits could be intrinsically present one with another, how could they dispute or contend about place? And how can one expel or drive out another? And yet that there is such an expulsion and conflict of spirits, and especially of the good against the evil, some few who have been acquainted with their own hearts have experimentally known. If it is said that the spirit of God and Christ are

intrinsically present in all things, contend with, and make war against the devil and his spirit in the heart of a human, I answer that this is also a very unfit analogy if God and creatures are compared in their operations, for his ways are infinitely superior to ours. Yet nevertheless in this case there also remains a strong objection. For the spirits of God and Christ, when they strive against the devil, and the evil spirits in the heart of a human, do unite themselves with certain good spirits, whom they have sanctified and prepared for this union. And by these, as a vehicle or triumphant chariot, they contend against and encounter those malignant and wicked spirits. And insofar as these evil spirits contend against those good spirits in the heart of a human, they contend against God and Christ. These good spirits are the spirits of this faithful and pious human, who has become good when before he was evil. For God and Christ do help every pious human to prevail over the evil spirits in this conflict, but suffer the wicked and unfaithful to be captivated and overcome. For God helps none but those that fear, love, and obey him, and trust in his power, goodness, and truth, for with those he is united, and the good spirits of such men are as so many swords and darts by which those dark and unclean spirits are wounded and repulsed. But if it be asked how the soul of a human, which even in its greatest purity always partakes of corporeity even if it were in a state of the highest purity, can be united with God, who is a mere spirit, I answer that it is done by Jesus Christ, who is the true and proper medium between both. For Christ and the soul may be united without a medium, because of that great affinity and similitude between them, which those doctors cannot demonstrate who say spirit and body are of a nature so contrary one to another.

§4. I shall draw a fifth argument from what we observe in all visible bodies, as in earth, water, stones, wood, etc. What abundance of spirits is in all these things? For earth and water continually produce animals, as they have done from the beginning, so that a pool filled with water may produce fish, though none were ever put there to increase or breed. And since all other things do

more originally proceed from earth and water, it necessarily follows that the spirits of all animals were in the water. Therefore, it is said in Genesis that the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters, viz., that from it he might produce whatever was afterwards created.

§5. But if it is said that this argument does not prove that all spirits are bodies, but that all bodies have in them the spirits of all animals, so that every body has a spirit in it and likewise a spirit and body, and although they are thus united, yet they still remain different in nature one from another and so cannot be changed one into another, to this I answer that if every body, even the least, has in it the spirits of all animals and other things just as matter is said to have in it all forms, I ask, does a body actually have all those spirits in it or potentially only? If actually, how is it possible that so many spirits essentially distinct from body can actually exist in their distinct essences in so small a body (even in the least that can be conceived), unless it be by intrinsic presence, which is not communicable to any creature, as is already proved? For if all kinds of spirits are in any, even the least body, how does it come to pass that such an animal is produced of this body and not another? Indeed, how does it come to pass that all kinds of animals are not immediately produced out of one and the same body? This experience denies, for we see that nature keeps her order in all her operations, where one animal is formed of another and one species proceeds from another, and also when it ascends to a further perfection, as when it descends to a viler state and condition. But if they say that all spirits are contained in any body, not actually in their distinct essences but only “potentially,” as they say it, then it must be granted that the body and all those spirits are one and the same thing. That is, that a body may be turned into them, as when we say wood is potentially fire, as it can be turned into fire, and water is potentially air, as it may be changed into air.

Moreover, if spirits and bodies are so inseparably united that no body can be without a spirit, in fact not without many spirits, this is certainly a great argument that they are of one original nature and substance;

otherwise we could not conceive why in so many various and wonderful dissolutions and separations of things they should not at length be separated one from another as we see the subtler things may be separated from the grosser. But how is it that when a body is at length corrupted, out of this corruption another species of things is generated? So out of earth and water corrupted come animals, indeed stones if they putrefy or rot pass into animals. So dung, or other putrefied matter, generates animals, all of which have spirits. But how does corruption or dissolution of body tend to a new generation, and that indeed of animals? If it be said that the spirits of those animals are as it were loosened from their bonds, and set at liberty by this dissolution, and that then they can form or fashion themselves a new body out of the aforesaid matter by virtue of their plastic faculty, to this I reply, how did the primitive body so hold it captive? Was it because it was so hard and thick? If so, it will be manifest that those spirits are nothing else but subtle bodies because hardness and density of body could imprison them so they could not pass out. For if a spirit could as easily penetrate the hardest body, just as the softest and most fluid, it could as easily pass out of the one as the other; nor would there be need of death and corruption for a new life or generation. Therefore, this kind of captivity of spirits in some kind of hard bodies, and their deliverance from them when the bodies become soft, affords us a manifest argument that spirit and body are originally of one nature and substance, and that a body is nothing but a fixed and condensed spirit, and a spirit nothing but a subtle and volatile body.

And here is to be noted that in all hard bodies, as in stones whether common or precious, and so also in metals, herbs, trees, and animals, also in all human bodies, there do not only exist many spirits (which are as it were imprisoned in those gross bodies and united with them, and therefore cannot flow forth or fly out into other bodies until they have passed death or dissolution), but also many other very subtle spirits, which continually flow from them and, because of their subtlety, the hardness of the body (in which they lay hidden) cannot detain. And these spirits are the more



subtle productions or the sutures of the grosser spirits detained in the body. For although these are detained therein, yet they are not idle in their prison, but their bodies are as it were shops for them to work out those subtler spirits, which afterwards flow out in colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and diverse other powers and virtues. The gross body and the spirits contained therein are, as it were, the mother of those subtler spirits, who take the place of children. For nature still works to a further perfection of subtlety and spirituality, as this is the most natural property of all motion and operation. For all motion wears and divides, and so renders a thing subtle and spiritual. So even in humans' bodies the meat and drink is first changed into chyle, then into blood, and afterwards into spirits, which are nothing else but blood brought to perfection. And these spirits, whether good or bad, still advance to a greater subtlety or spirituality, and by these spirits which come from the blood, we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, and think, even meditate, love, hate, and do everything we do. And from them also comes the seed by which humankind is propagated, and from them especially proceeds the voice and speech of the human, which is full of spirits (formed in the heart) either good or evil, as Christ has taught that out of the plenty of the heart the mouth speaks, and that a good person out of the good treasure of their heart brings forth good things, etc. Also, that which goes into a person does not defile them, but it is that which proceeds out of them, for in like manner as they proceed from him, so shall they again return into him.

§6. And these are the proper angels, or ministering spirits, of a human (although there are other angels also, as well good or evil, which come unto men). Of which angels Christ speaks, where he speaks of those little ones that believe in him: their angels (he says) always behold the face of my heavenly father. Which are the angels of those believers, who become, as it were, like little infants.

§7. My sixth and last argument I shall deduce from certain texts of scripture and of the Old and New Testament, which do prove in plain and express words that

all things have life and do really live in some degree or measure. Acts 17. 27: It is said, he gives life to all things. Again, I. Tim. 6. 13: Of God it is said, that he quickens all things. And Luke 20. 38: He is not called the God of the dead, but of the living (which though is principally meant of humans, yet it is generally to be understood of all other creatures); viz., he is the God of all those things that have their regeneration and resurrection in their kind, no less than a human has in its kind. For death is not the annihilation of these things, but a change from one kind and degree of life to another, which also the Apostle proves and illustrates the resurrection of the dead by a grain of wheat, which being fallen into the ground, dies, and rises again exceeding fruitful.

### CHAP. IX.

§1. From what has been said and from diverse reasons given—that spirit and body are originally in their first substance but one and the same thing—it evidently appears that the philosophers (so called) which have taught otherwise, whether ancient or modern, have generally erred and laid an ill foundation in the very beginning where the whole house and superstructure is so feeble and indeed so unprofitable that the whole edifice and building must in time decay. From which absurd foundation have arisen very many gross and dangerous errors, not only in philosophy, but also in divinity (so called) to the great damage of mankind, hindrance of true piety, and contempt of God's most glorious name, as will easily appear not only from what has been already said but also from what shall be said in this chapter.

§2. And none can object that all this philosophy is nothing other than that of Descartes or Hobbes under a new mask. For, first, touching on the Cartesian philosophy, this says that every body is a mere dead mass, not only void of all kind of life and sense, but utterly incapable thereof to all eternity. This grand error is also to be imputed to all those who affirm body and spirit to be contrary things, and inconvertible one into another,

so as to deny a body all life and sense, which is quite contrary to the grounds of this our philosophy. Hence it is so far from being a Cartesian principle under a new mask that it may be truly said it is anti-Cartesian in regard of their fundamental principles. Although it cannot be denied that Descartes taught many excellent and ingenious things concerning the mechanical part of natural operations, and how all natural motions proceed according to rules and laws mechanical, even as indeed nature herself, i.e., the creature has an excellent mechanical skill and wisdom in itself (given it from God, who is the fountain of all wisdom) by which it operates, yet in nature and her operations they are far more than merely mechanical. And nature is not a mere organic body, like a clock, in which there is no vital principle of motion, but a living body having life and sense, which body is far more sublime than a mere mechanism or mechanical motion.

§3. But secondly, as to what pertains to Hobbes's opinion, this is yet more contrary to our philosophy than that of Descartes. For Descartes acknowledged God to be plainly immaterial and an incorporeal spirit. Hobbes affirms God himself to be material and corporeal, indeed nothing else but matter and body, and so confounds God and the creatures in their essences and denies that there is any essential distinction between them. These, and many more, are the worst consequences of the dictates of Hobbes's philosophy. To which may be added those of Spinoza, for Spinoza also confounds God and the creatures together, and makes but one being of both, all of which are diametrically opposite to the philosophy delivered by us here.

§4. But the false and feeble principles of some who have undertaken to refute the philosophy, so called, of Hobbes and Spinoza, have given them a greater advantage against themselves, so that they have not only in effect not refuted them, but exposed themselves more to contempt and laughter.

But if it be objected that our philosophy seems, at least, very like that of Hobbes because he taught that all creatures were originally one substance from the

lowest and most ignoble to the highest and noblest, from the smallest worm, insect, or fly to the most glorious angel, in fact, from the least dust or sand unto the most excellent of all creatures, and also that every creature is material and corporeal, indeed, matter and body itself, and thus their most noble actions are either material and corporeal or after a certain corporeal manner, now I answer to the first that I grant that all creatures are originally one substance from the lowest to the highest, and consequently convertible or changeable from one of their natures into another. And although Hobbes says the same, yet that is no prejudice against the truth of it, as neither are other parts of that philosophy where Hobbes affirms something that is true therefore a "Hobbesianism" or an opinion of Hobbes alone.

§5. Moreover, this principle is so far from defending them in their errors that nothing is strong enough to refute them. For example, the Hobbists argue that all things are one, because we see that all visible things may be changed one into another. Indeed, that all visible things may be changed into invisible things, as when water is made air and wood being burnt (for the greatest part) is changed into a certain invisible substance, which is so subtle that it escapes all observation of our senses. Add moreover that all invisible things may become visible, as when water proceeds from air, etc., and hence he concludes that nothing is so low that it cannot attain to sublimity.

But now that we may answer this argument, his adversaries generally deny the antecedent, and on the contrary affirm that no species of things is convertible into another. When wood is burnt, many say that the wood is composed of two substances, namely, matter and form, and that the matter remains the same but the form of the wood is destroyed or annihilated and a new form of fire is produced in this matter. So that according to them, there is a continual annihilation of real substances and productions of new ones in this world, but this is so frivolous, that many others deny it in the case of wood changed into fire and afterwards into smoke and ashes. Yet they still persist in the same error in other transmutations, as when wood is changed

into an animal, as we often see that from rotten wood and dung also living creatures are generated. But if they deny here that the wood is changed into an animal and say that wood is nothing but matter, yet matter has no life nor a capacity to life or sense, and therefore this animal which has life and sense ought to have it from elsewhere and must have a spirit or soul in it, that is not a part of its body nor proceed from it, but is sent to it.

But if it is asked of them from where this spirit is sent and who sends it, and why a spirit of this species is sent and not of another, here they are at a standstill and yield themselves to their adversaries.

Therefore our philosophy, before laid down, more strongly conduces to the refutation of the Hobbesian and Spinozian philosophy, viz., that all kinds of creatures may be changed one into another that the lowest may become the highest, and the highest (as considered originally in its own proper nature) may become the lowest, etc., according to that course and succession which divine wisdom has ordained: that one change may succeed another in a certain order; so that a must be first turned into b, before it can be turned into c, which must be turned into c, before it can be changed into d, etc.

But we deny the consequence, viz., that God and creatures are one substance. For in all transmutations of creatures from one species into another, as from a stone into earth, and from earth into grass, and from grass to a sheep, and from a sheep into human flesh, and from human flesh into the most servile spirits of a human, and from these into his noblest spirits, there can never be a progression or ascension made unto God, who is the highest of all beings and whose nature still infinitely excels a creature placed in his highest perfection. For the nature of God is in every way unchangeable, so that it does not admit of the least shadow of a change, though the nature of a creature is to be changeable.

§6. Secondly, if it be said by way of objection that according to this philosophy every creature is material and corporeal, in fact, body and matter itself, as Hobbes teaches, now I answer that “material” and “corporeal,” as well as “matter” and “body,” are here far otherwise understood than Hobbes understood it, and which was

never discovered to Hobbes or Descartes otherwise than in a dream. For what do they understand by matter and body? Or what attributes do they ascribe to them? None, certainly, but the following: extension and impenetrability, which nevertheless are but one attribute, to which also may be referred figurability and mobility. But, suppose those are distinct attributes, certainly this gains nothing, nor will ever help us to understand what that excellent substance is which they call body and matter. For they have never proceeded beyond the husk or shell nor ever reached the kernel; they only touch the superficies, never discerning the center, and were plainly ignorant of the noblest and most excellent attributes of that substance which they call “body” and “matter,” and understood nothing of them.

But if it is asked, what are those more excellent attributes? I answer that they are the following: spirit, or life, and light, under which I include a capacity of all kind of feeling, sense, and knowledge, love, joy, and fruition, and all kind of power and virtue, which the noblest creatures have or can have, so that even the vilest and most contemptible creature, even dust and sand, may be capable of all those perfections, through various and successive transmutations from the one into the other, which according to the natural order of things require long periods of time for their consummation, although the absolute power of God (if it had pleased him) could have accelerated or hastened all things and effected it in one moment. But this wisdom of God saw it to be more expedient that all things should proceed in their natural order and course, so that after this manner that fertility or fruitfulness, which he has endued every being with, may appear and the creatures have time by working still to promote themselves to a greater perfection, as the instruments of divine wisdom, goodness and power which operates in and with them. For in this the creature has the greater joy when it possesses what it has as the fruit of its own labor.

But this capacity of the aforementioned perfections is quite a distinct attribute from life, and understanding or knowledge quite distinct from the former, viz., extension and figure. And so also a vital action is plainly distinct from local or mechanical motion,



although it is not, nor cannot, be separated from it, but still uses the same, at least as its instrument, in all interaction with the creatures.

§7. I say that life and figure are distinct attributes of one substance, and as one and the same body may be transmuted into all kinds of figures, and as the more perfect figure includes that which is more imperfect, so one and the same body may be transmuted from one degree of life to another more perfect one, which always includes in it the inferior. We have an example of figure in a triangular prism, which is the first figure of all right-lined solid bodies, into which a body is convertible, and from this into a cube, which is a more perfect figure, and includes in it a prism. From a cube it may be turned into a more perfect figure, which comes nearer to a globe, and from this into another, which is yet nearer, and so it ascends from one figure, more imperfect, to another more perfect figure, *ad infinitum*. For here are no bounds, nor can it be said this body cannot be changed into a more perfect figure. But the meaning is that that body consists of plain right lines and this is always changeable into a more perfect figure, and yet can never reach to the perfection of a globe, although it always approaches nearer unto it. The case is the same in diverse degrees of life, which have indeed a beginning but no end. So that the creature is always capable of a further and more perfect degree of life, *ad infinitum*, and yet can never attain to be equal with God. For he is still infinitely more perfect than a creature in its highest elevation or perfection, even as a globe is the most perfect of all other figures, to which none can approach.

§8. And thus life and figure are distinct but not contrary attributes of one and the same substance, and figure serves the operations of life, as we see in the body of a human or beast, how the figure of the eye serves the sight, the figure of the ear the hearing, the figure of the mouth, teeth, lips, and tongue serve the speech, the figure of the hands and fingers serve to work, the figure of the feet to walk, and so the figures of all the other members have their use and very much conduce to the vital operations, which the spirit performs in these members.

Indeed the figure of the whole body is more commodious for the proper operations of human life than any other figure whatsoever is, or could be made, so that life and figure consist very well together in one body, or substance, where figure is an instrument of life, without which no vital operation can be performed.

§9. Likewise, local and mechanical motion (*i.e.* the carrying of body from place to place) is a manner or operation distinct from action or vital operation, although they are inseparable, so that a vital action can in no way be without all local motion because it is the instrument. So the eye cannot see unless light enters it, which is a motion and stirs up a vital action in the eye, which is seeing, and likewise in all other vital operations in the whole body. But an action of life is a far nobler and more divine manner of operation than local motion, and yet both agree to one substance and consist well together. For as the eye receives the light into itself from the object which it sees from without, so also it sends the same light to the object, and in this spirit and life is a vital action uniting the object and sight together.

Hence Hobbes, and all others who side with him, grievously err when they teach that sense and knowledge are no more than a reaction of corporeal particles one upon another, where, by reaction, he means no more than local and mechanical motion. But indeed sense and knowledge are things far more noble and divine than any local or mechanical motion of any particles whatsoever, for it is the motion or action of life which uses the other as its instrument, whose service consists in this: to stir up a vital action in the subject or perceiver. And like local motion which can be transmitted through diverse bodies, although very far distant from each other, which therefore are united without any new transition of body or matter; for example, when a beam of wood of an exceeding great length is moved by one extreme from the north to the south, the other extreme will necessarily be moved also and the action is transmitted through the whole beam without any particles of matter sent hither to promote motion from one extreme to the other because the beam itself is sufficient to transmit the said motion. In the same way, a vital action can proceed together with

local motion from one thing to another, and that too at a great distance, where there is an apt and fit medium to transmit it; and here we may observe a kind of divine spirituality or subtlety in every motion, and so in every action of life, which no created body or substance is capable of, viz., by intrinsic presence, which (as before is proved) agrees to no created substance and yet agrees to every motion or action whatsoever. For motion or action is not a certain matter or substance, but only a manner of its being, and therefore is intrinsically present in the subject of which there is a *modus*, or manner, and can pass from body to body, at a great distance, if it finds a fit medium to transmit it. And the stronger the motion, the further it reaches, so that when a stone is cast into standing waters, it causes a motion every way from the center to the circumference, forming circles still greater and greater at a great distance, in proportion to the length of time, till at last it vanishes from our sight. And then without doubt it makes yet more invisible circles for a longer space of time, which our dull senses cannot apprehend. And this motion is transmitted from the center to the circumference, not conveyed there by any body or substance carrying this motion with it from the stone. And the same is true of external light, since it is an action or motion stirred up by some illuminate body which may be transmitted through glass, crystal, or any other transparent body, without any substance, body, or matter conveyed from that illuminate body from where the said action proceeded. Not that I would deny that an abundance of subtle matter continually flows from all illuminate bodies, so that the whole substance of a burning candle is spent in such emanations. And this contains that motion or action which we call light. But this motion or action may be increased, for example, by a crystal where those subtle emanations of bodies may be restrained so that they cannot pass out at least in such abundance as may be sufficient to communicate the whole light. But seeing that crystal (which does so easily transmit the light) is so hard and solid, how can it receive so many bodies and transmit them so easily through it when other bodies, neither so hard nor solid, do let or resist it? For wood is neither as hard nor as solid as crystal, and yet crystal is transparent, but wood is not.

And certainly wood is more porous than crystal because it is less solid. Consequently the light does not enter by the pores of the crystal, but through its very substance and yet so as not to adhere to it, or make any swelling or increase in quantity, but by a certain intrinsic presence because it is not a body or substance but a mere action or motion. Now crystal is a fitter medium to receive this motion, which we call light, than wood is, and hence it is that it pervades or passes through that and not this.

There is a great diversity in the motion and operation of bodies, so every motion requires its proper medium to transmit it. Therefore, it is manifest that motion may be transmitted through diverse bodies by another kind of penetration than any body or matter (however subtle it is) is able to make; namely, by intrinsic presence. And if mere local or mechanical motion can do that, then certainly a vital action (which is a nobler kind of motion) can do the same, and if it can penetrate those bodies it passes through by intrinsic presence, then it may in one moment be transmitted from one body to another, or rather require no time at all. I mean motion or action itself requires not the least time for its transmission, although it is impossible that the body, in which the motion is carried from place to place, not have some time, either greater or lesser, according to the quality of body and vehemence of motion that carries it.

And therefore we see how every motion and action, considered in the abstract, has a wonderful subtlety or spirituality in it, beyond all created substances whatsoever, so that neither time nor place can limit it. And yet they are nothing else but modes or manners of created substances, viz., their strength, power and virtue, whereby they are extendible into great substances beyond what the substance itself can make.

And so we may distinguish extension into material and virtual, which two-fold extension every creature has. Material extension is that which matter, body, or substance has, as considered without all motion or action, and this extension (to speak properly) is neither greater nor lesser, because it would still remain the same. A virtual extension is a motion or action that a creature has whether immediately given from God or immediately received from its fellow creature. That which is immediately given from

God (from whom it also has its being) and which is the natural and proper effect of its essence, is in a more proper way of speaking, a proper motion of the creature proceeding from the innermost parts thereof, and therefore may be called internal motion as distinguished from external, which is only from another. And thus it may be called foreign. When this external motion endeavors to carry a body, or any thing, to a place where it has properly no natural inclination, then it is preternatural and violent, as when a stone is thrown up into the air, which motion being preternatural and violent, is plainly local and mechanical and in no way vital because it does not proceed from the life of the thing so moved. But every motion proceeding from the proper life and will of the creature is vital, and this I call a motion of life, which is not merely local and mechanical like the other, but has in it a life and vital virtue, and this is the virtual extension of a creature, which is either greater or lesser, according to the kind or degree of life wherewith the creature is endued. For when a creature arrives at a nobler kind and degree of life, it receives a greater power and virtue to move itself and transmit its vital motions to the greatest distance.

But how motion or action may be transmitted from one body to another is with many a matter of great debate because it is not a body or substance. If it be only a motion of body, how is it possible that it can pass properly into another body, since as a mere mode or manner, its essence consists in existing or be inherent in its own body? The answer to this objection, which seems to me best, is this: that motion is not propagated from one body to another by local motion because motion itself is not moved, but only moves the body in which it is. For if motion could be propagated by local motion, this motion would be propagated of another, and this again of another, and so ad infinitum, which is absurd. Therefore the manner of the propagation is (as it were) by real production or creation, so that just as God and Christ only can create the substance of a thing, whereas no creature can create or give being to any substance, not even as an instrument, so a creature, not of itself but in

subordination to God as his instrument, may give existence to motion and vital action. And so the motion in one creature may produce motion in another. And this is all a creature can do towards the moving itself or its fellow creatures, as being the instrument of God, by which motions a new substance is not created but only new species of things, so that creatures may be multiplied in their kinds, while one acts upon and moves another. And this is the whole work of the creature, or creation, as the instrument of God. But if it moves against his will, whose instrument it is, then it sins and is punished for it. But God (as before was said) is not the cause of sin, for when a creature sins, he abuses the power God has granted him, and so the creature is culpable and God entirely free from every spot or blemish of it.

If therefore we apply those things that have been already spoken of concerning the attributes of a body, viz., that it has not only quantity and figure, but life also, and is not only locally and mechanically but vitally moveable, and can transmit its vital action wherever it pleases, provided it has a medium aptly disposed, and if it has none it can extend itself by the subtle emanation of its parts, which is its fittest and most proper medium, to receive and transmit its vital action, hereby it will be easy to answer all the arguments whereby some endeavor to prove that a body is altogether incapable of sense and knowledge. And it may be easily demonstrated in what way some particular body may gradually advance to that perfection which is not merely the sense and knowledge that brutes have, but of any kind of perfection whatsoever that may be in any human or angel. So we may be able to understand the words of Christ, that God is able to raise up Abraham's children from stones, without flying to some strained metaphor. And if any one should deny this omnipotence of God, viz., that God is able to raise up Abraham's children from stones, that certainly would be the greatest presumption.

Finis.