PART I

OF MAN

CHAPTER I

Of SENSE

[1] Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first *singly*, and afterwards in *train*, or dependence upon one another. *Singly*, they are every one a *representation* or *appearance*, of some quality or other accident, of a body without us, which is commonly called an *object*. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body, and by diversity of working produceth diversity of appearances.

[2] The original of them all is that which we call SENSE. (For there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.) The rest are derived from that original.

[3] To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary to the business now in hand, and I have elsewhere written of the same at large.[1] Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

[4] The cause of sense is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch, or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself; which endeavour, because *outward*, seemeth to be some matter without. And this *seeming*, or *fancy*,* is that which men call *sense*; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a *light* or *colour figured*; to the ear, in a *sound*; to the nostril, in an *odour*; to the tongue and palate, in a *savour*; and to the rest of the body, in *heat*,

1. The only work Hobbes had published on this subject by 1651 was his *Tractatus opticus*, published by Mersenne in 1644 in his *Cogitata physico-mathematica*. But he had discussed it in two unpublished works (EL I, ii, and DCr xxv).

cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by *feeling*. All which qualities called *sensible* are in the object that causeth them but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but divers* motions (for motion produceth nothing but motion). But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light, and pressing the ear, produceth a din, so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies, or objects, that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are, where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.

[5] But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of *Aristotle*, teach another doctrine, and say, for the cause of *vision*, that the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a *visible species* (in English, a *visible show, apparition,* or *aspect*, or *a being seen*), the receiving whereof into the eye is *seeing*. And for the cause of *hearing*, that the thing heard sendeth forth an *audible species*, that is, an *audible aspect*, or *audible being seen*, which entering at the ear maketh *hearing*. Nay for the cause of *understanding* also, they say the thing understood sendeth forth *intelligible species*, that is, an *intelligible being seen*, which coming into the understanding makes us understand. I say not this as disapproving the use of universities; but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them, amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one.

Chapter II

Of Imagination

[1] That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same (namely, that nothing can change itself), is not so

easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude,* think everything else grows weary of motion and seeks repose of its own accord, little considering whether it be not some other motion wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves consisteth. From hence it is that the schools say heavy bodies fall downwards out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them, ascribing appetite and knowledge of what is good for their conservation (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, absurdly.

[2] When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time and by degrees, quite extinguish it. And as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after, so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal parts of a man, then when he sees, dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call *imagination*, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it *fancy*, which signifies *appearance*, and is as proper to one sense as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but *decaying sense*, and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.

[3] The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible, therefore the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day.

From whence it followeth that the longer the time is after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved, so that distance of time and of place hath one and the same effect in us. For as, at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim and without distinction of the smaller parts, and as voices grow weak and inarticulate, so also, after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak, and we lose (for example) of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This *decaying sense*, when we would express the thing itself (I mean *fancy* itself), we call *imagination*, as I said before; but when we would

express the *decay*, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called *memory*. So that *imagination* and *memory* are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names. *Memory.*

[4] Much memory, or memory of many things, is called *experience*. Again, imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at once or by parts at several times, the former (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is *simple imagination*; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is *compounded*; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a *Hercules* or an *Alexander* (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romances), it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other imaginations that rise in men (though waking) from the great impression made in sense, as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent* upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark (though awake) have the images of lines and angles before his eyes, which kind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into men's discourse.

Dreams.

[5] The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call *dreams*. And these also (as all other imaginations) have been before, either totally or by parcels, in the sense. And because[1] the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man's body, which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain and other organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the imaginations there formerly made appear as if a man were waking, saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new object which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must needs be more clear, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not often, nor constantly, think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions that I do waking, nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts dreaming as at other times, and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts, I am well satisfied that being awake I know I dream not, though when I dream, I think myself awake.

1. The English editions add here "in sense," which is not in OL and is probably a mistake.

[6] And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body, diverse distempers must needs cause different dreams. And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear and raiseth the thought and image of some fearful object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain, being reciprocal); and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same manner as natural kindness, when we are awake, causeth desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body, so also too much heat in those parts, while we sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations, the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and when we dream at another.

[7] The most difficult discerning of a man's dream from his waking thoughts is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept, which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts, and whose conscience is much troubled, and that sleepeth without the circumstances of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays himself to sleep, in case any uncouth* and exorbitant* fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of *Marcus Brutus* (one that had his life given him by *Julius Caesar*, and was also his favourite, and notwithstanding murdered him), how at *Philippi*, the night before he gave battle to *Augustus Caesar*, he saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision, but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him, which fear, as by degrees it made him wake, so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish; and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or anything but a vision. And this is no very rare accident; for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy only, or else the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they would not be known to haunt.

Apparitions or Visions.

[8] From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams and other strong fancies from vision and sense did arise the greatest part of the religion of the gentiles* in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude* people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For as for witches, I think not that their

witchcraft is any real power, but yet that they are justly punished, for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can, their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And for fairies and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly* men.[2]

Nevertheless, there is no doubt but God can make unnatural apparitions. But that he does it so often as men need to fear such things more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature, which he also can stay and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes that which they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

[9] And this ought to be the work of the schools; but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what imagination or the senses are) what they receive, they teach, some saying that imaginations rise of themselves and have no cause, others that they rise most commonly from the will, and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the Devil, or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive the species of things and deliver them to the common sense, and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

Understanding.

[10] The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature endued* with the faculty of imagining) by words or other voluntary signs is that we generally call *understanding*, and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom will understand the call or the rating* of his master; and so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man is the understanding *not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts,[3] by the sequel* and contexture* of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter [cf. v, 6].

2. Cf. the Latin Appendix, iii, 3–4; OL III, 560.

3. OL: "not only of the will, but also of the conceptions and thoughts of other men."

CHAPTER III

Of the Consequence or TRAIN *of Imaginations*

[1] By *Consequence*, or TRAIN of thoughts, I understand that succession of one thought to another which is called (to distinguish it from discourse in words) *mental discourse*.

[2] When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after, is not altogether so casual* as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense; and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense, insomuch as the former coming again to take place and be predominant, the latter followeth by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to pass in time that in the imagining of anything there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Train of Thoughts unguided.

[3] This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is *unguided, without design*, and inconstant, wherein there is no passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself, as the end and scope of some desire or other passion; in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent* one to another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men that are not only without company, but also without care of anything, though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony, as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man, or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the 30 pence which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time, for thought is quick.

Train of Thoughts regulated.

[4] The second is more constant, as being *regulated* by some desire, and design. For the impression made by such things as we desire or fear is strong and permanent, or (if it cease for a time) of quick return; so strong it is sometimes as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the end, by the greatness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way; which, observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out, *Respice finem*, that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

[5] The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds: one, when of an effect imagined, we seek the causes, or means that produce it; and this is common to man and beast. The other is when, imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but *seeking*, or the faculty of invention, which the Latins called *sagacitas*, and *solertia*; a hunting out of the causes of some effect, present or past, or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost, and from that place and time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain and limited time and place in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call *remembrance*, or calling to mind; the Latins call it *reminiscentia*, as it were a *re-conning** of our former actions.

Remembrance.

[6] Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a jewel, or as a spaniel ranges the field till he find a scent, or as a man should run over the alphabet to start a rhyme.

[7] Sometimes a man desires to know the event* of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a criminal re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before, having this order of thoughts: the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and

Prudence. the gallows. Which kind of thoughts is called *foresight*, and *prudence*, or *providence*, and sometimes *wisdom*, though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain: by how much one man has more experience of things past than another, by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The *present* only has a being in nature; things *past* have a being in the memory only; but things *to come* have no being at all, the *future* being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels* of actions past to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with *certainty enough.[1] And though it be called prudence when the event answereth our expectation, yet in its own nature it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at, for he hath most *signs* to guess by.

[8] A *sign* is the event antecedent of the consequent, and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been observed before; and the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of business has most signs whereby to guess at the future time, and consequently is the most prudent; and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and extemporary* wit, though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Signs.

[9] Nevertheless it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be beasts that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

[10] As prudence is a *presumption* of the *future*, contracted from the *experience* of time *past*, so there is a presumption of things past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war and then to ruin, upon the sight of the ruins of any other state will guess the like war and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future, both being grounded only upon experience.

Conjecture of the time past.

[11] There is no other act of man's mind that I can remember, naturally planted in him so as to need no other thing to the exercise of it but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are acquired and increased by study and industry, and of most men learned by instruction and

1. OL: "complete certainty."

discipline, and proceed all from the invention of words and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion, though by the help of speech and method the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.

[12] Whatsoever we imagine is *finite*. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call *infinite*. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of *God* is used, not to make us conceive him (for he is *incomprehensible*, and his greatness and power are unconceivable), but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before) we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once or by parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must conceive it in some place, and endued with some determinate magnitude, and which may be divided into parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once; for none of these things ever have, or can be, incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all) from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving schoolmen.[2]

Chapter IV
Of Speech

[1] The invention of *printing*, though ingenious, compared with the invention of *letters* is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of letters is not known. He that first brought them into *Greece*, men say, was

2. The schoolmen here attacked are those who defend the Roman interpretation of the eucharist, according to which the body of Christ is really present in what looks like bread (so that one body is present in many places at once, whenever priests celebrate mass in different places at the same time). At first the Anglican Church accepted the Roman doctrine, but controversy began early and continued till Hobbes' day. High-church Anglicans (like Bramhall and Cosin) affirmed the real presence, but denied that it had to be interpreted in the Roman way. See Horton Davies, *Worship and Theology in England*, I, iii, II, viii, Princeton UP, 1970.

Cadmus, the son of *Agenor*, king of Phoenicia. A profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction* of mankind, dispersed into so many and distant regions of the earth; and withal difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the divers motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech, whereby to make as many differences of characters to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of SPEECH, consisting of *names* or *appellations,* and their connexion, whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation, without which there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was **God* himself, that instructed *Adam* how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight;[1] for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion, and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of. For I do not find anything in the Scripture out of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered that **Adam* was taught the names of all[2] figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations, *much less[3] the names of words and speech, as *general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive*, all which are useful, and least of all, of *entity, intentionality, quiddity*, and other insignificant words of the School.

Original of Speech.

[2] But all this language gotten, and augmented by *Adam* and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of *Babel*, when by the hand of God every man was stricken, for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language [Genesis 11:1–9]. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world, it must needs be that the diversity of tongues that now is proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious.

[3] The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words; and that for two commodities,* whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts, which being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for *marks*, or *notes* of remembrance. Another

The use of Speech.

1. OL (more accurately reflecting Genesis 2:19–20): "Adam, who named the creatures which God presented to his sight."

2. OL: "Adam imposed names on every variety of."

3. OL: "much less that he imposed."

is when many use the same words to signify (by their connexion and order) one to another, what they conceive or think of each matter, and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called *signs*. Special uses of speech are these: first, to register what by cogitation we find to be the cause of anything, present or past, and what we find things present or past may produce or effect; which, in sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

[4] To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words, by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically, that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for, and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another; for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

Abuses of Speech.

[5] The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects consisteth in the imposing of *names* and the *connexion* of them.

[6] Of names, some are *proper*, and singular to one only thing, as *Peter, John, this man, this tree*; and some are *common* to many things, as *man, horse, tree*, every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things, in respect of all which together it is called an *universal*, there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.

Names Proper & Common.

Universal.

[7] One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accident; and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.

[8] And of names universal, some are of more, and some of less extent, the larger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the name *body* is of larger signification than the word *man*, and comprehendeth it; and the names *man* and *rational* are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take notice that by a name is not always understood, as in grammar, one only word, but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, *he that in his actions observeth the laws of his country*, make

but one name, equivalent to this one word, *just*.

[9] By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of speech at all (such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), he may by meditation compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown him, different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle, but only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three, and that that was all for which he named it a triangle, will boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever, and register his invention* in these general terms: *every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles* [Euclid, *Elements* I, 32]. And thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as an universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first, and makes that which was found true *here* and *now*, to be true in *all times* and *places*.

[10] But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool,* that could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as *one, two*, and *three*, may observe every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems there was a time when those names of number were not in use, and men were fain* to apply their fingers of one or both hands to those things they desired to keep account of, and that thence it proceeded that now our numeral words are but ten in any nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself and not know when he has done. Much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers, much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being, of mankind.

[11] When two names are joined together into a consequence or affirmation (as thus, *a man is a living creature*, or thus, *if he be a man, he is a living creature*), if the latter name, *living creature*, signify all that the former name, *man*, signifieth, then the affirmation or consequence is *true*; otherwise false. For *true* and *false* are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither *truth* nor *falsehood*. *Error* there may be, as when we expect that which

shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.

[12] Seeing then that *truth* consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise *truth* had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words; as a bird in lime twigs, the more he struggles the more belimed. And therefore in geometry (which is *the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind[4]) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations they call *definitions*, and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

Necessity of Definitions.

[13] By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors, and either to correct them where they are negligently set down, or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting *their first grounds,[5] know not which way to clear themselves, but spend time in fluttering over their books, as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in.

So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science; and in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse, from which proceed *all false and senseless tenets,[6] which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad, than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an *Aristotle*, a *Cicero*, or a *Thomas*, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

4. OL: "virtually the only precise science."

5. OL: "the principles of their masters."

6. OL: "the false and absurd opinions of the philosophers."

Subject to Names.

[14] *Subject to names* is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money *rationes*, and accounting *ratiocinatio*; and that which we in bills or books of account call *items*, they call *nomina*, that is *names*; and thence it seems to proceed that they extended the word *ratio* to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, *logos*, for both *speech* and *reason*; not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech; and the act of reasoning they called *syllogism*, which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents, their names are (to show that diversity) diversly wrested* and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads.

[15] First, a thing may enter into account for *matter* or *body*, as *living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet*, with all which names the word *matter*, or *body*, is understood, all such being names of matter.

[16] Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality which we conceive to be in it, as for *being moved*, for *being so long*, for *being hot*, &c; and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a little change or wresting we make a name for that accident which we consider, and for *living* put into the account *life*; for *moved, motion*; for *hot, heat*; for *long, length*, and the like; and all such names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another. These are called *names abstract*, because severed (not from matter, but) from the account of matter.

[17] Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies whereby we make such distinction, as when anything is *seen* by us, we reckon not the thing itself, but the *sight*, the *colour*, the *idea* of it in the fancy; and when anything is *heard*, we reckon it not, but the *hearing* or *sound* only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the ear; and such are names of fancies.

Use of Names Positive.

[18] Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names to *names* themselves and to *speeches*. For *general, universal, special, equivocal* are names of names. And *affirmation, interrogation, commandment, narration, syllogism, sermon, oration*, and many other such, are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names *positive*, which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned* by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or words and speech.

Negative Names with their Uses.

[19] There be also other names, called *negative*, which are notes to signify that a word is not the name of the thing in question, as these words *nothing, no man, infinite, indocible,* three want four*, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning, and

call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of anything, because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used. *Words insignificant.*

[20] All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by schoolmen, and puzzled philosophers.

[21] Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent, as this name, an *incorporeal body*, or (which is all one) an *incorporeal substance*,[7] and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say *a quadrangle is round*, the word *round quadrangle* signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words *in-poured virtue*, *in-blown virtue*, are as absurd and insignificant as a *round quadrangle*. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of *parole*, but by the name of *verbe* often; yet *verbe* and *parole* differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

[22] When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it, *understanding* being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech be peculiar to man (as for aught I know it is), then is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding, though many think they understand then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con* them in their mind. *Understanding.*

[23] What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind, and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions.

[24] The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of *inconstant* signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture* of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning a man must take heed of words which, besides the signification of *Inconstant names.*

7. Cf. the Latin Appendix, iii, 5–6; OL III, 561.

what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth *wisdom*, what another calleth *fear*; and one *cruelty*, what another *justice*; one *prodigality*, what another *magnanimity*; and one *gravity*, what another *stupidity*, &c.[8] And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes* of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy, which the other do not.

CHAPTER V
Of REASON, and SCIENCE

Reason what it is.

[1] When a man *reasoneth*, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total from *addition* of parcels, or conceive a remainder from *subtraction* of one sum from another; which (if it be done by words) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts to the name of the whole, or from the names of the whole and one part to the name of the other part. And though in some things (as in numbers) besides *adding* and *subtracting* men name other operations, as *multiplying* and *dividing*, yet they are the same; for multiplication is but adding together of things equal, and division, but subtracting of one thing as often as we can. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in *numbers*, so the geometricians teach the same in *lines, figures* (solid and superficial*), *angles, proportions, times*, degrees of *swiftness, force, power*, and the like; the logicians teach the same in *consequences of words*, adding together *two names* to make an *affirmation*, and *two affirmations* to make a *syllogism*; and *many syllogisms* to make a *demonstration*; and from the *sum*, or *conclusion*, of a *syllogism* they subtract one *proposition* to find the other. Writers of politics add together *pactions** to find men's *duties*; and lawyers, *laws* and *facts*, to find what is *right* and *wrong* in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for *addition* and *subtraction*, there also is place for *reason*; and where these have no place, there *reason* has nothing at all to do.

Reason defined.

[2] Out of all which we may define (that is to say determine) what that is which is meant by this word *reason*, when we reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but *reckoning*

8. Cf. Thucydides III, 82.

(that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts; I say *marking* them when we reckon by ourselves, and *signifying*, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men.

[3] And as in arithmetic, unpractised men must, and professors themselves may, often err and cast up false, so also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may deceive themselves and infer false conclusions; not but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art, but no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty, no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator or judge to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows or be undecided, for want of a right reason constituted by nature, so is it also in all debates of what kind soever. And when men that think themselves wiser than all others clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more but that things should be determined by no other men's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men as it is in play, after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion that suit whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own controversies, bewraying* their want of right reason by the claim they lay to it.

Right reason where.

[4] The use and end of reason is not the finding of the sum and truth of one or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions and settled significations of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last conclusion without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations on which it was grounded and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum, and not regarding how each bill is summed up by those that give them in account, nor what it is he pays for, he advantages himself no more than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountants' skill and honesty, so also in reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour, and does not know anything, but only believeth.

The use of Reason

[5] When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things (as when upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it), if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not, or that which he thought likely to have

Of Error and Absurdity

preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR, to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called *error*, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless speech. For error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come, of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound are those we call *absurd, insignificant*, and *nonsense*. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a *round quadrangle*, or *accidents of bread in cheese*, or *immaterial substances*, or of *a free subject*, *a free will*, or any *free*, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.

[6] I have said before (in the second chapter [¶10]) that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty: that when he conceived anything whatsoever, he was apt to inquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence: that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to general rules, called *theorems*, or *aphorisms*; that is, he can reason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all other things whereof one may be added unto or subtracted from another.

[7] But this privilege is allayed* by another, and that is by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject but man only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it that profess philosophy. For it is most true that *Cicero* saith of them somewhere:[1] that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

[8] The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method, in

Causes of Absurdity

that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions, that is, from settled significations of their words, as if they could cast account without knowing the value of the numeral words, *one, two*, and *three*.

[9] And whereas all bodies enter into account upon diverse considerations (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter [¶¶15–18]), these considerations being diversely named, diverse absurdities proceed from the confusion and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore,

[10] The second cause of absurd assertions I ascribe to the giving of names

1. *De divinatione* II, 119, cited also by Montaigne, *Essays*, II, xii ("Apology for Raymond Sebond," p. 408 in Frame's edition) and Descartes, *Discourse on Method* i (AT VI, 16).

of *bodies* to *accidents*, or of *accidents* to *bodies*, as they do that say *faith is infused* or *inspired*, when nothing can be *poured* or *breathed* into anything but body, and that *extension* is *body*, that *phantasms* are *spirits*, &c.

[11] The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the *accidents* of *bodies without us* to the *accidents* of our *own bodies*, as they do that say the *colour is in the body*, *the sound is in the air*, &c.

[12] The fourth, to the giving of the names of *bodies* to *names* or *speeches*, as they do that say that *there be things universal*, that *a living creature is genus*, or *a general thing*, &c.

[13] The fifth, to the giving of the names of *accidents* to *names* and *speeches*, as they do that say *the nature of a thing is its definition*, *a man's command is his will*, and the like.

[14] The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say (for example) in common speech *the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither*, *the proverb says this or that* (whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak), yet in reckoning and seeking of truth such speeches are not to be admitted.

[15] The seventh, to names that signify nothing, but are *taken up and learned by rote[2] from the schools, as *hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-now*, and the like canting of schoolmen.

[16] To him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account, wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have *good[3] principles. For who is so stupid as both to mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it when another detects his error to him?

[17] By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us, nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by industry, first in apt imposing of names, and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it men call SCIENCE. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable, *Science* is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another, by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time; because when we see how anything comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner, when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects. *Science*

2. OL: "blindly accepted."

3. OL: "true and clear."

[18] Children therefore are not endued with reason at all till they have attained the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree, yet it serves them to little use in common life, in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends, but specially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for *science*, or certain rules of their actions, they are so far from it that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring; but for other sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation are made believe by the women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

[19] But yet they that have no *science* are in better and nobler condition with their natural prudence than men that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes and of rules does not set men so far out of their way as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

[20] To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed* and purged from ambiguity; *reason* is the *pace*; increase of *science*, the *way*; and the benefit of mankind, the *end*. And on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui* [a fool's fire], and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.*

[21] As much experience is *prudence*, so is much science *sapience*. For though we usually have one name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins did always distinguish between *prudentia* and *sapientia*, ascribing the former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms, and another to have added to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can offend* or be offended by his adversary in every possible posture or guard; the ability of the former would be to the ability of the latter as prudence to sapience; both useful, but the latter infallible. But they that trusting only to the authority of books follow the blind blindly are like him that, trusting to the false rules of a master of fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary that either kills or disgraces him.

Prudence & Sapience, with their difference

[22] The signs of science are some, certain and infallible, some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth* the science of anything can teach the same, that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to an-

Signs of Science

other; uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, *and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must.[4] Signs of prudence are all uncertain, because to observe by experience and remember all circumstances that may alter the success is impossible. But in any business whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by, to forsake his own natural judgment and be guided by general sentences* read in authors (and subject to many exceptions) is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those men themselves that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their reading of politics and history, very few do it in their domestic affairs, where their particular interest is concerned, having prudence enough for their private affairs; but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit than the success of another's business.

CHAPTER VI

Of the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions, Commonly Called the PASSIONS, *and the Speeches by Which They Are Expressed*

[1] There be in animals two sorts of *motions* peculiar to them: one called *vital*, begun in generation and continued without interruption through their whole life, such as are the *course* of the *blood*, the *pulse*, the *breathing*, the *concoction*,* *nutrition, excretion*, &c, to which motions there needs no help of imagination; the other is *animal motion*, otherwise called *voluntary motion*, as to *go*, to *speak*, to *move* any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c, and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already said in the first and second chapters. And because *going, speaking*, and the like voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of *whither, which way*, and *what*, it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible, or the space it is moved in is (for the shortness of it) insensible, yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which

Motion Vital and Animal.

4. OL: "but on many other occasions are not as he says." Although the English editions have the reading reproduced here, the Latin seems to make better sense.

is moved over a greater space whereof that little one is part must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

Endeavour

[2] This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE or DESIRE, the latter being the general name, and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely *hunger* and *thirst*. And when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words, *appetite* and *aversion*, we have from the *Latins*, and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are *horme* and *aphorme*. For nature itself does often press upon men those truths which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all; but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion, which is but an absurd speech; for though words may be called metaphorical, bodies and motions cannot.

Appetite. Desire. Hunger. Thirst. Aversion.

[3] That which men desire they are also said to LOVE, and to HATE those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing, save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion we signify the absence, and by hate, the presence of the object.

Love. Hate.

[4] Of appetites and aversions some are born with men, as appetite of food, appetite of excretion and exoneration* (which may also and more properly be called aversions from somewhat they feel in their bodies) and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us or not.

[5] Those things which we neither desire nor hate we are said to *contemn*, CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility or contumacy* of the heart in resisting the action of certain things, and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects, or from want of experience of them.

Contempt.

[6] And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions; much less can all men consent* in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

[7] But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire that is it which he for his part calleth *good*; and the object of his hate and aversion, *evil*; and of his contempt, *vile* and *inconsiderable*. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth

Good. Evil.

them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth), or (in a commonwealth) from the person that representeth it, or from an arbitrator or judge whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

Pulchrum. Turpe.

[8] The Latin tongue has two words whose significations approach to those of good and evil, but are not precisely the same; and those are *pulchrum* and *turpe*. Whereof the former signifies that which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for *pulchrum* we say, in some things, *fair*; in others, *beautiful*, or *handsome*, or *gallant*, or *honourable*, or *comely*, or *amiable*; and for *turpe*, *foul*, *deformed*, *ugly*, *base*, *nauseous*, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the *mien*, or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds: good in the promise, that is *pulchrum*; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called *jucundum, delightful*; and good as the means, which is called *utile, profitable*; and as many of evil; for *evil* in promise is that they call *turpe*; evil in effect and end is *molestum, unpleasant, troublesome*; and evil in the means *inutile, unprofitable, hurtful.*

Delightful. Profitable. Unpleasant. Unprofitable.

[9] As in sense that which is really within us is (as I have said before) only motion caused by the action of external objects (but in appearence, to the sight, light and colour, to the ear, sound, to the nostril, odour, &c.), so when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavour, which consisteth in appetite or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the appearence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

Delight. Displeasure.

[10] This motion which is called appetite, and for the appearence of it *delight* and *pleasure*, seemeth to be a corroboration* of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight were not improperly called *jucunda (a juvando*, from helping or fortifying); and the contrary, *molesta, offensive*, from hindering and troubling the motion vital.

Pleasure.

Offence.

[11] *Pleasure*, therefore, or *delight*, is the appearence, or sense, of good; and *molestation** or *displeasure*, the appearence, or sense, of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or less displeasure and offence.

[12] Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present, and those may be called *pleasures of sense* (the word *sensual*, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws). Of this kind are all onerations* and exonerations of the body, as also all that is pleasant in the *sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch*. Others arise from the expec-

Pleasures of Sense.

tation that proceeds from foresight of the end or consequence of things, whether those things in the sense please or displease. And these are *pleasures of the mind* of him that draweth those consequences, and are generally called JOY. In the like manner displeasures are some in the sense, and called PAIN; others in the expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEF.

Pleasures of the Mind. Joy. Pain. Grief.

[13] These simple passions, called *appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy*, and *grief*, have their names for diverse considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.

Hope. [14] For *appetite* with an opinion of attaining is called HOPE.

Despair. [15] The same without such opinion, DESPAIR.

Fear. [16] *Aversion* with opinion of *hurt* from the object, FEAR.

Courage. [17] The same with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Anger. [18] Sudden *courage*, ANGER.

Confidence. [19] Constant *hope*, CONFIDENCE of ourselves.

Diffidence. [20] Constant *despair*, DIFFIDENCE of ourselves.

Indignation. [21] *Anger* for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by injury,* INDIGNATION.

Benevolence. Good Nature. [22] *Desire* of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. *If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.[1]

Covetousness. [23] *Desire* of riches, COVETOUSNESS, a name used always in signification of blame, because men contending for them are displeased with one another's attaining them, though the desire in itself be to be blamed or allowed, according to the means by which those riches are sought.

Ambition. [24] Desire of office or precedence, AMBITION, a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Pusillanimity. [25] *Desire* of things that conduce but a little to our ends, and fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.*

Magnanimity. [26] *Contempt* of little helps and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.*

Valour. [27] *Magnanimity* in danger of death or wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Liberality. [28] *Magnanimity* in the use of riches, LIBERALITY.

Miserableness. [29] *Pusillanimity*, in the same, WRETCHEDNESS, MISERABLENESS, or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.

Kindness. [30] *Love* of persons for society, KINDNESS.[2]

Natural Lust. [31] *Love* of persons for pleasing the sense only, NATURAL LUST.

1. Not in OL.
2. ¶¶30–33 have no analogue in OL.

[32] *Love* of the same, acquired from rumination, that is, imagination of pleasure past, LUXURY. *Luxury.*

[33] *Love* of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual, JEALOUSY. *The Passion of Love. Jealousy.*

[34] *Desire*, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact* of his own, REVENGEFULNESS. *Revengefulness.*

[35] *Desire* to know why, and how, CURIOSITY, such as is in no living creature but *man*, so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other *animals*, in whom the appetite of food and other pleasures of sense by predominance take away the care of knowing causes, which is a lust of the mind that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. *Curiosity.*

[36] **Fear* of power invisible, feigned* by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.[3] *Religion. Superstition. True Religion.*

[37] *Fear* without the apprehension of why or what, PANIC TERROR, called so from the fables, that make *Pan* the author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example, every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people. *Panic Terror.*

[38] *Joy* from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION*; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause. *Admiration.*

[39] *Joy* arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING; which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with *confidence*; but if grounded on the flattery of others, or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINGLORY; which name is properly given, because a well grounded *confidence* begetteth attempt, whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called *vain*. *Glory. Vain-Glory.*

3. OL: "Fear of invisible powers, whether those [powers] are feigned or publicly allowed from tales, is *religion*; if they are not publicly allowed, *superstition*. Moreover, when those powers are really such as we have allowed, *true religion*." OL avoids a problem the English version raises: how (consistently with iii, 12) can we imagine an invisible power? Hobbes defends his definition briefly in the Latin Appendix, iii, 9–10 (OL III, 563), where he gives a paraphrase which may make his meaning clearer. Also relevant is Hobbes' reply to Bramhall's criticism of DCv xvi, 1, in EW IV, 292–3.

Dejection. [40] *Grief* from opinion of want of power is called DEJECTION of mind.

[41] The *vain-glory* which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves (which we know are not) is most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons; and is corrected oftentimes by age and employment.

Sudden Glory. Laughter. [42] *Sudden glory* is the passion which maketh those *grimaces* called LAUGHTER, and is caused either by some sudden act of their own that pleaseth them, or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves, who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others from scorn, and compare themselves only with the most able.

Sudden Dejection. Weeping. [43] On the contrary, *sudden dejection* is the passion that causeth WEEPING, and is caused by such accidents as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power; and they are most subject to it that rely principally on helps external, such as are women and children. Therefore some weep for the loss of friends; others for their unkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation. But in all cases, both laughter and weeping are sudden motions, custom taking them both away. For no man laughs at old jests, or weeps for an old calamity.

Shame. Blushing. [44] *Grief* for the discovery of some defect of ability is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING, and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men is a sign of the love of good reputation and commendable; in old men it is a sign of the same, but because it comes too late, not commendable.

Impudence. [45] The *contempt* of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pity. [46] *Grief* for the calamity of another is PITY, and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING; and therefore for calamity arriving[4] from great wickedness, the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity, those have least pity that think themselves least obnoxious* to the same.

Cruelty. [47] *Contempt*, or little sense, of the calamity of others is that which men call CRUELTY, proceeding from security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms without other end of his own I do not conceive it possible.

[48] *Grief* for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce* our own abilities to equal or exceed

4. So the English editions read; but OL suggests "arising."

him, is called EMULATION; but joined with endeavour to supplant* or hinder a competitor, ENVY. *Emulation. Envy.*

[49] When in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one and the same thing arise alternately, and diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts, so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION. *Deliberation.*

[50] Therefore of things past, there is no *deliberation*, because manifestly impossible to be changed; nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so, because men know or think such deliberation vain. But of things impossible which we think possible, we may deliberate, not knowing it is in vain. And it is called *deliberation*, because it is a putting an end to the *liberty* we had of doing or omitting, according to our own appetite or aversion.

[51] This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears is no less in other living creatures than in man; and therefore beasts also deliberate.

[52] Every *deliberation* is then said to *end*, when that whereof they deliberate is either done or thought impossible, because till then we retain the liberty of doing or omitting, according to our appetite or aversion.

[53] In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL, the act (not the faculty) of *willing*. And beasts that have *deliberation* must necessarily also have *will*. The definition of the *will* given commonly by the Schools, that it is a *rational appetite*,[5] is not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a *voluntary act* is that which proceedeth from the *will*, and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here. *Will* therefore *is the last appetite in deliberating*. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do, yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination or appetite. For if the intervenient appetites make any action voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient aversions should make the same action involuntary; and so *The Will.*

5. Cf. Thomas (*Summa theologiae* Ia, qu. 59, a. 1). A clear case of Hobbes offering a definition he knows is not universally agreed on. That it is also essential to his political reasoning will be seen in the sequel. The act of agreeing to establish a sovereign will be no less voluntary because it proceeds from fear (cf. vi, 54, with xiv, 27), nor will subsequent acts of obedience to the sovereign.

one and the same action should be both voluntary and involuntary.

[54] By this it is manifest that not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing propounded, but also those that have their beginning from aversion or fear of those consequences that follow the omission are *voluntary actions.*

Forms of Speech in Passion.

[55] The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same and partly different from those by which we express our thoughts. And first, generally all passions may be expressed *indicatively*, as *I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command*; but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations (unless it be when they serve to make other inferences besides that of the passion they proceed from). Deliberation is expressed *subjunctively*, which is a speech proper to signify suppositions, with their consequences, as *if this be done, then this will follow*, and differs not from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words, but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. The language of desire and aversion is *imperative*, as *do this, forbear that*, which, when the party is obliged to do or forbear, is *command*; otherwise *prayer*, or else *counsel.* The language of vain-glory, of indignation, pity and revengefulness, *optative*; but of the desire to know there is a peculiar expression, called *interrogative*, as *what is it, when shall it, how is it done*, and *why so*? other language of the passions I find none; for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signify as speech, but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

[56] These forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations, of our passions; but certain signs they be not, because they may be used arbitrarily,* whether they that use them have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present are in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends or aims which we otherwise know the man to have.

[57] And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate, the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call *apparent* or *seeming good.* And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is *apparent* or *seeming evil*; so that he who hath by experience or reason the greatest and surest prospect of consequences deliberates best himself, and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

Good and Evil apparent.

Felicity.

[58] *Continual success* in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live *here;[6] because life itself is but motion, and can never be

6. Not in OL.

without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. *What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys that now are as incomprehensible as the word of school-men *beatifical vision* is unintelligible.[7]

Praise. Magnification. Makarismos.

[59] The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signify the power and greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called *makarismos*,* for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.

CHAPTER VII

Of the Ends, *or* Resolutions *of* DISCOURSE

[1] Of all *discourse* governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an *end*, either by attaining or by giving over. And in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.

[2] If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be, or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of *it will be* or *it will not be*, or *it has been* or *has not been*. All which is *opinion*. And that which is alternate appetite in deliberating concerning good and evil, the same is alternate opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of *past*, and *future*. And as the last appetite in deliberation is called the *will*, so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called the JUDGMENT, or *resolute* and *final sentence* of him that *discourseth*. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate in the question of good or bad is called *deliberation*, so the whole chain of opinions alternate in the question of true or false is called DOUBT.

Judgement, or Sentence final.

Doubt.

[3] No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact,* past or to come. For as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally sense, and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely, but only that if this be, that is, if this has been, that has been, if this shall be, that shall be, which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing.

7. Not in OL.

[4] And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another, which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was and ever will be reputed a very evil act for any man to speak against his *conscience*, or to corrupt or force another so to do, insomuch that the plea of conscience has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men vehemently in love with their own new opinions (though never so absurd), and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know, at most, but that they think so.[1]

Science.

Opinion.

Conscience.

[5] When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth and of whose honesty in not deceiving he doubteth not, and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing as the person, and the resolution is called BELIEF and FAITH; *faith*, *in* the man; *belief*, both *of* the man, and *of* the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions, one of the saying of the man, the other of his virtue. To *have faith in*, or *trust to*, or *believe a man*, signify the same thing, namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man; but to *believe what is said* signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase *I believe in*, as also the Latin *credo in* and the Greek *pisteuo eis*, are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put: *I believe him, I trust him, I have faith in him, I rely on him* (and in Latin *credo illi*, *fido illi*; and in Greek,

Belief.

Faith.

1. Cf. Hobbes' analysis with that of Calvin, for whom conscience is a sense of the moral law, implanted in man by God, so that he cannot escape knowledge of his own wrong-doing. (*Institutes* III, xix, 15–16; cf. Romans 2:14–16).

pisteuo auto); *and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.[2]

[6] But by *believing in*, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person, but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men, do so believe in God as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever; but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.[3]

[7] From whence we may infer that when we believe any saying, whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority and good opinion we have of him that hath said it, then is the speaker or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith; and the honour done in believing is done to him only. And consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church, whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if I should not believe all that is written by historians of the glorious acts of *Alexander* or *Caesar*, I do not think the ghost of *Alexander* or *Caesar* had any just cause to be offended, or anybody else but the historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a cow speak,[4] and we believe it not, we distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident that whatsoever we believe upon no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men only and their writings, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.

2. Not in OL. Calvin is one of the disputants, arguing against "the schools" that Christ (and not God) is the object of faith (*Institutes* III, ii, 1). Cf. also App. i, 1–2.

3. OL adds: "only Christians do." For Luther, by contrast, the faith which saves is trust in God. Cf. "The Freedom of a Christian," in *Martin Luther, Selections from his writings*, ed. by John Dillenberger, Doubleday/Anchor, pp. 59-60.

4. This is curious. Hobbes is alluding to Livy III, 10. As Tricaud points out, Livy does not there say that a cow spoke, but merely that it was believed that a cow had spoken ("a thing to which people had given no credence the year before"). So the example seems, as Tricaud says, not well chosen. Hobbes might, of course, have made his point by citing the analogous story of Balaam and the ass (Numbers 22:28–30), where an animal's speaking is presented as fact. But this would involve a different difficulty. Later (xxxiii, 4) Hobbes will deny the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, without identifying an alternative author. So it is unclear whom we would be trusting if we accept that story.

CHAPTER VIII

Of the VIRTUES *Commonly Called* INTELLECTUAL, *and Their Contrary* DEFECTS

[1] Virtue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence,* and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by *virtues* INTELLECTUAL are always understood such abilities of the mind as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a *good wit*, though the same word, WIT, be used also to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

Intellectual Virtue defined.

[2] These *virtues* are of two sorts: *natural* and *acquired*. By natural I mean not that which a man hath from his birth (for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little one from another and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues). But I mean that *wit* which is gotten by use only, and experience, without method, culture, or instruction. This NATURAL WIT consisteth principally in two things: *celerity of imagining* (that is, swift succession of one thought to another), and *steady direction* to some approved end. On the contrary a slow imagination maketh that defect or fault of the mind which is commonly called DULLNESS, *stupidity*, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

Wit, Natural, or Acquired.

Natural Wit.

[3] And this difference of quickness is caused by the difference of men's passions, that love and dislike, some one thing, some another; and therefore, some men's thoughts run one way, some another, and are held to and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be *like one another*, or in what they be *unlike*, or *what they serve for*, or *how they serve to such a purpose*, those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a *good wit*; by which, in this occasion, is meant a *good fancy*. But they that observe their differences and dissimilitudes, which is called *distinguishing*, and *discerning*, and *judging* between thing and thing, in case such discerning be not easy, are said to have a *good judgment*; and particularly in matter of conversation and business, wherein times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this virtue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, fancy without the help of judgment, is not commended as a virtue; but the latter, which is judgment and discretion, is commended for itself, without the

Good Wit, or Fancy. Good Judgment.

Discretion.

help of fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end, that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done, he that hath this virtue will be easily fitted with similitudes that will please, not only by illustration of his discourse and adorning it with new and apt metaphors, but also by the rarity of their invention. But without steadiness and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness, such as they have, that entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose by everything that comes in their thought, into so many and so long digressions and parentheses that they utterly lose themselves; which kind of folly I know no particular name for; but the cause of it is sometimes want of experience, whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare which doth not so to others, sometimes pusillanimity, by which that seems great to him which other men think a trifle, and whatsoever is new or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

[4] In a good poem, whether it be *epic* or *dramatic*, as also in *sonnets*, *epigrams*, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required, but the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the extravagancy,* but ought not to displease by indiscretion.

[5] In a good history the judgment must be eminent, because the goodness consisteth in the method, in the truth, and in the choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but only in adorning the style.

[6] In orations of praise and in invectives, the fancy is predominant, because the design is not truth, but to honour or dishonour, which is done by noble or by vile* comparisons. The judgment does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable or culpable.

[7] In hortatives and pleadings, as truth or disguise serveth best to the design in hand, so is the judgment or the fancy most required.

[8] In demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of truth, judgment does all, except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy. But for metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning were manifest folly.

[9] And in any discourse whatsoever, if the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a sign of want of wit; and so will it never when the discretion is manifest, though the fancy be never so ordinary.

[10] The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame or blame; which verbal discourse cannot do farther than the judgment shall approve of the time,

place, and persons. An anatomist or a physician may speak or write his judgment of unclean things, because it is not to please, but profit; but for another man to write his extravagant and pleasant fancies of the same is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himself before good company. And it is the want of discretion that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness of mind and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds and equivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters* of extraordinary fancy; but in a sermon, or in public, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no jingling* of words that will not be accounted folly; and the difference is only in the want of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is wanting, but discretion. Judgment therefore without fancy is wit, but fancy without judgment, not.

[11] When the thoughts of a man that has a design in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design, or what design they may conduce unto, if his observations be such as are not *Prudence.* easy or usual, this wit of his is called PRUDENCE, and dependeth on much experience, and memory of the like things and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of men as there is in their fancies and judgments, because the experience of men equal in age is not much unequal as to the quantity, but lies in different occasions, everyone having his private designs. To govern well a family and a kingdom are not different degrees of prudence, but different sorts of business, no more than to draw a picture in little, or as great or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A plain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his own house than a privy councillor in the affairs of another man.

[12] To prudence, if you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear or want, you have that crooked *Craft.* wisdom which is called CRAFT, which is a sign of pusillanimity. For magnanimity is contempt of unjust or dishonest helps. And that which the Latins call *versutia* (translated into English *shifting*) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity by engaging into a greater, as when a man robs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted craft (called *versutia* from *versura*, which signifies taking money at usury for the present payment of interest).

[13] As for *acquired wit* (I mean acquired by method and instruction), *Acquired Wit.* there is none but reason, which is grounded on the right use of speech, and produceth the sciences. But of reason and science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth chapters.

[14] The causes of this difference of wits are in the passions; and the difference of passions proceedeth, partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if the difference pro-

ceeded from the temper of the brain and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of men in their sight, hearing, or other senses, than in their fancies and discretions. It proceeds therefore from the passions, which are different, not only from the difference of men's complexions, but also from their difference of customs and education.

[15] The passions that most of all cause the differences of wit are principally: the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of power. For riches, knowledge, and honour are but several sorts of power.

[16] And therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things, but is, as men term it, indifferent, though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving offence, yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range abroad and find the way to the things desired; all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence; for as to have no desire is to be dead, so to have weak passions is dullness; and to have passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESS and *distraction*; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything than is ordinarily seen in others is that which men call MADNESS. *Giddiness.* *Madness.*

[17] Whereof there be almost as many kinds as of the passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion proceedeth from the evil constitution of the organs of the body or harm done them; and sometimes the hurt and indisposition of the organs is caused by the vehemence or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the madness is of one and the same nature.

[18] The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is either great *vain-glory*, which is commonly called *pride* and *self-conceit*, or great *dejection* of mind.

[19] Pride subjecteth a man to anger, the excess whereof is the madness called RAGE and FURY. And thus it comes to pass that excessive desire of revenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs and becomes rage; that excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also rage; excessive opinion of a man's own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form* and the like, becomes distraction and giddiness; the same, joined with envy, rage; vehement opinion of the truth of anything, contradicted by others, rage. *Rage.*

[20] Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears, which is a madness commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners,* as in haunting of solitudes and graves, in superstitious behaviour, and in fearing, some one, some another particular thing. In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour are called by the general name of *Melancholy.*

madness. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take the pains might enrol a legion. And if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the same.

[21] For example, though the effect of *folly in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired[1] be not visible always in one man by any very extravagant action that proceedeth from such passion, yet when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of madness can there be greater than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected and secured from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him, yet he is well assured that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as any other part of the same quantity, so also, though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two men, yet we may be well assured that their singular passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves is argument enough. *If some man in Bedlam* should entertain you with sober discourse, and you desire in taking leave to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility, and he should tell you he were God the Father, I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madness.[2]

[22] This opinion of inspiration, called commonly "private spirit," begins very often from some lucky finding of an error *generally held by others,[3] and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason they came to so singular a truth (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on), they presently admire themselves, as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

[23] Again, that madness is nothing else but *too much appearing[4] passion may be gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much is the same with that of madmen: some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but accord-

1. OL: "that madness in them that falsely think themselves to be inspired."

2. OL: "If a man in Bedlam says that he is God or Christ, who will not know why he is shut up there?"

3. OL: "in the theology commonly accepted."

4. OL: "a powerful and disproportionate."

ing to their several domineering passions; for the effect of the wine does but remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions. For (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen; which is a confession that passions unguided are for the most part mere madness.

[24] The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning the cause of madness, have been two. Some deriving them from the passions; some, from demons or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such strange and uncouth manner as madmen use* to do. The former sort, therefore, called such men madmen; but the latter called them, sometimes *demoniacs* (that is, possessed with spirits), sometimes *enurgumeni* (that is, agitated or moved with spirits), and now in *Italy* they are called not only *pazzi*, madmen, but also *spiritati*, men possessed.

[25] There was once a great conflux of people in *Abdera*, a city of the Greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of *Andromeda*, upon an extreme hot day; whereupon a great many of the spectators falling into fevers, had this accident* from the heat and from the tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce iambics, with the names of *Perseus* and *Andromeda*; which, together with the fever, was cured by the coming on of winter; and this madness was thought to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy.[5] Likewise there reigned a fit of madness in another Grecian city, which seized only the young maidens and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Devil. But one that suspected that contempt of life in them might proceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemn* also their honour, gave counsel to the magistrates to strip such as so hanged themselves, and let them hang out naked. This, the story says, cured that madness.[6] But on the other side, the same Grecians did often ascribe madness to the operation of the Eumenides or Furies, and sometimes of *Ceres, Phoebus*, and other gods; so much did men attribute to phantasms as to think them aereal living bodies, and generally to call them spirits.

And as the Romans in this held the same opinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews; for they called madmen prophets or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) demoniacs; and some of them called both prophets and demoniacs madmen; and some called the same man both

5. See Lucian, *How to Write History* §1.

6. See Plutarch, *The virtues of women (the Milesian women)*, and Aulus Gellius xv, 10.

demoniac and madman. But for the Gentiles it is no wonder, because diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural accidents were with them termed, and worshipped as, demons. So that a man was to understand by demon as well (sometimes) an ague as a devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion is somewhat strange. For neither *Moses* nor *Abraham* pretended to prophecy by possession of a spirit, but from the voice of God, or by a vision or dream; nor is there anything in his law, moral or ceremonial, by which they were taught there was any such enthusiasm,* or any possession. When God is said (Numb. 11:25) to take from the spirit that was in *Moses* and give to the 70 elders, *the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided.[7] The Scriptures, by the Spirit of God in man, mean a man's spirit, inclined to godliness. And where it is said (Exod. 28:3) "whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron" is not meant a spirit put into them that can make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit, and so other spirits, though not always, yet as often as the virtue or vice so styled is extraordinary and eminent. Neither did the other prophets of the Old Testament pretend enthusiasm, or that God spake in them, but to them, by voice, vision, or dream; and the *burden of the Lord* was not possession, but command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason but that which is common to all men, namely, the want of curiosity to search natural causes, and their placing felicity in the acquisition of the gross pleasures of the senses and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange and unusual ability or defect in a man's mind, unless they see withal* from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it natural; and if not natural, they must needs think it supernatural; and then what can it be but that either God or the Devil is in him?

And hence it came to pass, when our Saviour (Mark 3:21) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted* he was mad and went out to hold him; but the Scribes said he had *Beelzebub*,* and that was it by which he cast out devils, as if the greater madman had awed the lesser. And [from this it came to pass] that (John 10:20) some said "he hath a devil and is mad," whereas others, holding him for a prophet, said "these are not the words of one that hath a devil." So in the Old Testament he that came to anoint *Jehu* (2 Kings 9:11) was a prophet; but some of the company asked "Jehu, what came that madman for?" So that in sum, it is manifest

7. OL: "by the Spirit of God in that passage is not understood God's substance, for it is indivisible."

that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary manner was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good or evil spirit; except by the Sadducees, who erred so far on the other hand as not to believe there were at all any spirits (which is very near to direct atheism)[8] and thereby perhaps the more provoked others [OL: the Pharisees] to term such men demoniacs rather than madmen.

[26] But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them as if they were possessed, and not as if they were mad? *To which I can give no other kind of answer but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdom of God, and to prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects, leaving the world and the philosophy thereof to the disputation of men for the exercising of their natural reason.[9] Whether the earth's or sun's motion make the day and night, or whether the exorbitant actions of men proceed from passion or from the devil (so we worship him not), it is all one as to our obedience and subjection to God Almighty, which is the thing for which the Scripture was written.

As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease as to a person, it is the usual phrase of all that cure by words only, as Christ did (and enchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a devil or not). For is not Christ also said (Matt. 8:26) to have rebuked the winds? But because you may say winds are spirits, is not he said also (Luke 4:39) to rebuke a fever? Yet this does not argue that a fever is a devil. *And whereas many of those devils are said to confess Christ, it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise

8. Presumably denying the existence of spirits is 'near' to atheism because God is commonly said to be a spirit. (Cf. xxxiv, 4; why is this only *near* to atheism?) Hobbes himself comes 'near' the Sadducee position. Though he grants the existence of spirits, he denies that this implies what the schoolmen take it to imply, the existence of incorporeal substances. Cf. viii, 27, xii, 7, xxxiv, 3–4.

9. OL: "I reply that arguments taken from a manner of speaking are not solid. For how often does Sacred Scripture speak of the earth as immobile, though almost all philosophers today think there is very clear evidence that it moves. Scripture was written by the prophets and apostles to teach, not philosophy, which God leaves to the exercise of natural reason in contemplations and disputations, but piety and the way to eternal salvation." Galileo had similarly defended himself by arguing that we should regard the Bible as primarily intended to teach the way to salvation, not knowledge of nature. Cf. his *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina* (in *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo*, ed. by Stillman Drake, Anchor, 1957, pp. 181–182. Hobbes will revisit the question of Jesus' belief in possession by demons in xlv, 5–8.

than that those madmen confessed him.[10] And whereas our Saviour (Matt. 12:43) speaketh of an unclean spirit that, having gone out of a man, wandereth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none, and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himself, it is manifestly a parable alluding to a man that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts is vanquished by the strength of them, and becomes seven times worse than he was.[11] So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture that requireth a belief that demoniacs were any other thing but madmen.

[27] There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness, namely, that abuse of words whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the name of absurdity. And that is when men speak such words as, put together, have in them no signification at all, but are fallen upon by some through misunderstanding of the words they have received and repeat by rote, by others from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse* philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other egregious* persons counted idiots.

Insignificant Speech.

But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which, if any man require, let him take a Schoolman into his hands and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point (as the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free-will, &c.) into any of the modern tongues so as to make the same intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted withal* that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar.* What is the meaning of these words: "The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work?" They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of *Suarez'* first book, *Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God.* When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly in the question of transubstantiation, where after certain words spoken, they that say, the white*ness*, round*ness*, magni*tude*, quali*ty*, corruptibility, all which are incorporeal, &c. go out of the wafer, into the

10. OL has an entirely different thought: "Moreover, the same phrase does not always mean the same thing everywhere in Scripture. *In the beginning was the word* means the eternity of the word. *In the beginning God created heaven and earth* does not mean that heaven and earth existed from eternity."

11. This may be a text Hobbes interprets in an unconventional way. Cf. Calvin, *Institutes* I, xiv, 19.

body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those *nesses, tudes,* and *ties*, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by spirits they mean always things that being incorporeal are nevertheless moveable from one place to another.[12] So that this kind of absurdity may rightly be numbered amongst the many sorts of madness; and all the time that guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust,* they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but lucid intervals. And thus much of the virtues and defects intellectual.

CHAPTER IX[1]

Of the Several SUBJECTS *of* KNOWLEDGE

[1] There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds, whereof one is *knowledge of fact*, the other *knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another.* The former is nothing else but sense and memory, and is *absolute* knowledge, as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done; and this is the knowledge required in a witness. The latter is called *science*, and is *conditional*, as when we know that *if the figure shown be a circle, then any straight line through the center shall divide it into two equal parts.* And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher, that is to say, of him that pretends to reasoning.

[2] The register of knowledge of fact is called *history*. Whereof there be two sorts: one called *natural history*, which is the history of such facts, or effects of nature, as have no dependence on man's *will*, such as are the histories of *metals, plants, animals, regions*, and the like. The other is *civil history*, which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths.

[3] The registers of science are such *books* as contain the *demonstrations* of consequences of one affirmation to another, and are commonly called *books of philosophy*; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity

12. Calvin agrees with the schoolmen. Cf. *Institutes* I, xiv, 8.

1. This chapter reads so differently in OL that it is impractical to indicate the variations with notes. A translation of the Latin version follows immediately after the English. This chapter is part of Tricaud's case for a partial priority of the Latin L to the English, since (a) the two versions are so different that it is impossible to regard the Latin as a translation of the English, and (b) in comparing these two classifications of the sciences with those Hobbes gives in other works, it is difficult to regard the Latin version as later than the English. See Tricaud, pp. xxiv–xxv.


SCIENCE, that is, knowledge of consequences; which is called also PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the accidents of bodies natural; which is called NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the accidents common to all bodies natural; which are quantity, and motion.
Consequences from quantity, and motion indeterminate; which being the principles, or first foundation of philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima.
PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA.
Consequences from motion and quantity determined.
Consequences from quantity, and motion determined.
By Figure
By Number
Mathematics
GEOMETRY.
ARITHMETIC.
Consequences from the motion, and quantity of bodies in special.
Consequences from the motion and quantity of the greater parts of the world, as the earth and stars.
Cosmography
ASTRONOMY.
GEOGRAPHY.
Consequences from the motions of special kinds, and figures of body.
Mechanics, Doctrine of weight
Science of ENGINEERS.
ARCHITECTURE.
NAVIGATION.
PHYSICS or consequences from qualities.
Consequences from the qualities of bodies transient, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish, ... METEOROLOGY.
Consequences from the qualities of bodies permanent.
Consequences from the qualities of the stars.
Consequences from the light of the stars. Out of this, and the motion of the sun, is made the science of ..... SCIOGRAPHY.
Consequences from the influence of the stars ..... ASTROLOGY.[2]
Consequences of the qualities from liquid bodies;[3] that fill the space between the stars; such as are the air, or substances ethereal.
Consequences from the qualities of bodies terrestrial.
Consequences from the parts of the earth, that are without sense.
Consequences from the qualities of minerals, as stones, metals, &c.
Consequences from the qualities of vegetables.
Consequences from the qualities of animals.
Consequences from the qualities of animals in general.
Consequences from vision ..... OPTICS.
Consequences from sounds ..... MUSIC.
Consequences from the rest of the senses. .....
Consequences from the qualities of men in special.
Consequences from the passions of men.... ETHICS.
Consequences from speech.
In magnifying, vilifying, &c. POETRY.
In persuading ..... RHETORIC.
In reasoning ..... LOGIC.
In contracting ..... The Science of JUST and UNJUST.[4]
Consequences from the accidents of politic bodies; which is called POLITICS, and CIVIL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Of consequences from the institution of COMMONWEALTHS, to the rights, and duties of the body politic, or sovereign.
2. Of consequences from the same, to the duty and right of the subjects.

of the matter, and may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following table.

Chapter IX (OL)
On the Classification *of the* Sciences

[1] There are two kinds of knowledge. One is of fact, and is the knowledge proper to witnesses, the record of which is *history*. It is divided into *natural* and *civil*, neither of which pertains to our purpose. The other is of consequences, and is called science, the record of which is usually called *philosophy*. But since the subjects of the sciences are bodies, it is classified into species in the same way the bodies themselves are classified into species, i.e., so that the more universal precede the less. For the universal things are essential to the those belonging to the species, and therefore, the knowledge of the universals is essential to the knowledge of the species, so that the latter cannot be grasped except by the light of the former.

[2] The most general of the subjects of science is body, of which there are two accidents, *magnitude* and *motion*. So the first thing the philosopher seeks is to know what *motion* is and what *magnitude* is. This part of philosophy is usually called *first philosophy*.

[3] Next, definite magnitude, which is also called quantity, is defined either by *figure* or by *number*. Therefore, body defined by figure is the subject of that part of philosophy which is called *geometry*. The science of the parts of the body determined by number is called *arithmetic*.

[4] Motions are either *visible* or *invisible*, as, of course, are those in the most minute parts of bodies. The science of visible motions is the concern of those who study the secrets of machines and buildings.

[5] The invisible motions of the internal parts of body, which, because of their effects on our senses are called *qualities*, are the subject of *physics* or *natural philoso-*

2. Surprisingly, Hobbes lists astrology as a science; the treatment of astrology in xii, 19, seems rather skeptical. Apparently what Hobbes is skeptical of is judiciary astrology (the attempt to predict the future of individual humans from the motion of the stars), not astrology in general (the theory that celestial events exercise some influence on terrestrial events). Hobbes' fullest discussion is in *Thomas White's De Mundo Examined*, ch. xxxvi.

3. So read printed editions of *Leviathan*. Tricaud emends on the basis of the London ms.: "Consequences from the Qualities of *Liquid* Bodies . . ."

4. Note that the science of just and unjust is a branch of natural philosophy, not of civil philosophy. The structure of *Leviathan* reflects this, treating the laws of nature (xiv–xv) prior to the generation of the commonwealth (xvii). But cf. xviii, 6.

phy. There can be as many special sciences of this as there are senses of man; one of these is called *optics*, another *music*.

[6] Next, if we consider the body of the Universe throughout its parts, for example, the stars and sublunary bodies, from studying the motions of the stars as motions arises the science called *astronomy*.

[7] Since certain parts of the Universe do not persist, but sometimes appear in the intervals between large bodies and sometimes disappear, the study of those motions gives rise to the science of *meteorology*.

[8] Similarly, from the study of the parts of the earth, such as *minerals, vegetables,* and *animals*, arise as many particular sciences.

[9] Finally, from the study of man and his faculties arise the sciences of *ethics, logic, rhetoric,* and at last *politics* or *civil philosophy*.

[10] The subdivision of the individual subjects can give rise to innumerable other sciences, which it is neither easy nor necessary to enumerate.

Chapter X
Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, *and* Worthiness

[1] The power *of a man* (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain some future apparent good, and is either *original* or *instrumental.*

[2] *Natural power* is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind, as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. *Instrumental* are those powers which, acquired by these or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more, as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck. For the nature of power is in this point like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which, the further they go, make still the more haste.

[3] The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will, such as is the power of a commonwealth, or depending on the wills of each particular, such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants is power; to have friends is power; for they are strengths united.

[4] Also riches joined with liberality is power, because it procureth friends and servants; without liberality, not so, because in this case they defend not, but expose men to envy, as a prey.

[5] Reputation of power is power, because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection.

[6] So is reputation of love of a man's country (called popularity*) for the same reason.

[7] Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved or feared of many, or the reputation of such quality, is power, because it is a means to have the assistance and service of many.

[8] Good success is power, because it maketh reputation of wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on him.

[9] Affability of men already in power is increase of power, because it gaineth love.

[10] Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power; because to prudent men we commit the government of ourselves more willingly than to others.

[11] Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths where it has privileges; for in such privileges consisteth their power.

[12] Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.

[13] Form is power, because, being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

[14] The sciences are small power, because not eminent, and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.

[15] Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war, because they confer* to defence and victory, are power; and though the true mother of them be science, namely the mathematics, yet because they are brought into the light by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed (the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother) as his issue.

Worth.

[16] The *value* or WORTH of a man is, as of all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another. An able conductor of soldiers is of great price in time of war present or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man (as most men do) rate themselves at the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

[17] The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is commonly called honouring and dishonouring. To value a man at a high rate is to *honour* him; at a low rate is to *dishonour* him. But high and low, in

this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself.

[18] The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this value of him by the commonwealth is understood by offices of command, judicature, public employment, or by names and titles, introduced for distinction of such value.

Dignity.

To Honour and Dishonour.

[19] To pray to another for aid of any kind is *to* HONOUR, because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour.

[20] To obey is to honour, because no man obeys them whom they think have no power to help or hurt them. And consequently, to disobey is to *dishonour.*

[21] To give great gifts to a man is to honour him, because 'tis buying of protection and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts is to dishonour, because it is but alms, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps.

[22] To be sedulous* in promoting another's good, also to flatter, is to honour, as a sign we seek his protection or aid. To neglect is to dishonour.

[23] To give way or place to another in any commodity is to honour, being a confession of greater power. To arrogate is to dishonour.

[24] To show any sign of love or fear of another is to honour; for both to love and to fear is to value. To contemn, or less to love or fear than he expects, is to dishonour; for it is undervaluing.

[25] To praise, magnify, or call happy is to honour, because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity is to dishonour.

[26] To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency and humility, is to honour him, as signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonour.

[27] To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him, sign of opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust or not believe is to dishonour.

[28] To hearken to a man's counsel or discourse of what kind soever is to honour, as a sign we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to dishonour.

[29] To do those things to another which he takes for signs of honour, or which the law or custom makes so, is to honour, because in approving the honour done by others he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them is to dishonour.

[30] To agree with in opinion is to honour, as being a sign of approving his judgment and wisdom. To dissent is dishonour and an upbraiding of error, and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

[31] To imitate is to honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate one's enemy is to dishonour.

[32] To honour those another honours is to honour him, as a sign of approbation of his judgment. To honour his enemies is to dishonour him.

[33] To employ in counsel or in actions of difficulty is to honour, as a sign of opinion of his wisdom or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to dishonour.

[34] All these ways of honouring are natural, and as well within as without commonwealths. But in commonwealths, where he or they that have the supreme authority can make whatsoever they please to stand for signs of honour, there be other honours.

[35] A sovereign doth honour a subject with whatsoever title, or office, or employment, or action, that he himself will have taken for a sign of his will to honour him.

[36] The king of *Persia* honoured *Mordecai*, when he appointed* he should be conducted through the streets in the king's garment, upon one of the king's horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince before him proclaiming "thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour." [Esther 6:7–11] And yet another king of *Persia*, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service to wear one of the king's robes, gave him leave so to do, but with this addition, that he should wear it as the king's fool; and then it was dishonour. So that of civil honour the fountain is in the person of the commonwealth, and dependeth on the will of the sovereign, and is therefore temporary and called *civil honour*; such as are magistracy, offices, titles, and in some places, coats and scutcheons painted; and men honour such as have them, as having so many signs of favour in the commonwealth, which favour is power.

Honourable.

[37] *Honourable* is whatsoever possession, action, or quality is an argument and sign of power.

Dishonourable.

[38] And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many is honourable, as arguments of power. To be honoured of few or none, *dishonourable.*

[39] Dominion,* and victory, is honourable, because acquired by power; and servitude, for need or fear, is dishonourable.

[40] Good fortune (if lasting) honourable, as a sign of the favour of God. Ill fortune and losses, dishonourable. Riches are honourable, for they are power. Poverty, dishonourable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the conscience* of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are dishonourable.

[41] Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is honourable, as being the contempt of small difficulties and dangers. And irresolution, dishonourable, as a sign of too much valuing of little impedi-

ments and little advantages; for when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is pusillanimity.

[42] All actions and speeches that proceed or seem to proceed from much experience, science, discretion, or wit, are honourable; for all these are powers. Actions or words that proceed from error, ignorance, or folly, dishonourable.

[43] Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on something else, is honourable, because employment is a sign of power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonourable. For the gravity of the former is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandise; but of the latter, like the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand and other trash.

[44] To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good, is honourable, as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity is dishonourable.

[45] To be descended from conspicuous parents is honourable, because they the more easily attain the aids and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage is dishonourable.

[46] Actions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are honourable, as signs of magnanimity; for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity is dishonourable.[1]

[47] Covetousness of great riches and ambition of great honours are honourable, as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness, and ambition of little gains or preferments, is dishonourable.

[48] Nor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power) be just or unjust; for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their poems committing rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust or unclean acts: insomuch as nothing is so much celebrated in *Jupiter,* as his adulteries; nor in *Mercury,* as his frauds and thefts, of whose praises, in a hymn of *Homer,* the greatest is this: that being born in the morning, he had invented music at noon, and before night stolen away the cattle of *Apollo* from his herdsmen.

[49] Also amongst men, till there were constituted great commonwealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a pirate or a highway thief, but rather a lawful trade, not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all

1. This paragraph (interesting in connection with Hobbes' egoism) also raises the question what Hobbes means when he says something is honorable: is he expressing his own valuation, or merely reporting society's? Cf. ¶48.

other nations, as is manifest by the histories of ancient time.[2] And at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are and always will be honourable, though unlawful,[3] till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for them that make the challenge. For duels also are many times effects of courage; and the ground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking and of the fear of dishonour in one or both the combatants, who, engaged by rashness, are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace.

Coats of Arms.

[50] Scutcheons and coats of arms hereditary, where they have any eminent privileges, are honourable; otherwise not; for their power consisteth either in such privileges, or in riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of honour, commonly called gentry, has been derived from the ancient Germans. For there never was any such thing known where the German customs were unknown. Nor is it now anywhere in use where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient Greek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with such devices as they pleased, insomuch as an unpainted buckler was a sign of poverty and of a common soldier; but they transmitted not the inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the marks of their families; but they were the images, not the devices of their ancestors. Amongst the people of *Asia, Africa,* and *America,* there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans only had that custom; from whom it has been derived into *England, France, Spain,* and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the Romans or made their own conquests in these western parts of the world.

[51] For *Germany* being anciently (as all other countries in their beginnings) divided amongst an infinite number of little lords, or masters of families, that continually had wars one with another, those masters or lords (principally to the end they might, when they were covered with arms, be known by their followers, and partly for ornament) both painted their armour, or their scutcheon, or coat, with the picture of some beast or other thing, and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets. And this ornament, both of the arms and crest, descended by inheritance to their children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the old master, that is to say in Dutch, the *Here-alt* thought fit. But when many such families, joined together, made a greater monarchy, this duty of the Herealt to distinguish scutcheons, was made a

2. Cf. Thucydides I, 5–6.

3. In 1626 Richelieu had made duelling a capital offense in France; one reason Corneille's *Le Cid* was so controversial was that it seemed to sanction this practice.

private office apart. And the issue of these lords is the great and ancient gentry, which for the most part bear* living creatures noted for courage and rapine, or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisadoes, and other notes of war, nothing being then in honour but virtue military. Afterwards, not only kings, but popular commonwealths gave divers manners of scutcheons to such as went forth to the war or returned from it, for encouragement or recompense to their service. All which, by an observing reader, may be found in such ancient histories, Greek and Latin, as make mention of the German nation and manners in their times.

Titles of Honour.

[52] Titles of *Honour*, such as are duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honourable, as signifying the value set upon them by the sovereign power of the commonwealth, which titles were in old time titles of office and command, derived, some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French. Dukes, in Latin *duces*, being generals in war; counts, *comites*, such as bare the general company out of friendship and were left to govern and defend places conquered and pacified; marquises, *marchiones*, were counts that governed the marches, or bounds of the empire. Which titles of duke, count, and marquis came into the empire, about the time of *Constantine* the Great, from the customs of the German *militia*. But baron seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and signifies a great man, such as were the king's or prince's men, whom they employed in war about their persons, and seems to be derived from *vir*, to *ber* and *bar* (that signified the same in the language of the Gauls that *vir* in Latin), and thence to *bero* and *baro*, so that such men were called *berones*, and after *barones* (and in Spanish *varones*). But he that would know more particularly the original of titles of honour may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. *Selden's* most excellent treatise of that subject.[4] In process of time *these offices of honour, by occasion of trouble and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into mere titles, serving for the most part to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the commonwealth;[5] and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places wherein they

4. The reference is to *Titles of Honour* (1614) by John Selden (1584–1654), best known for his *Mare clausum* (1636), a defense of English claims to sovereignty over the North Sea and North Atlantic (replying to Grotius' assertion of the Dutch claim to freedom of the seas in *Mare liberum*). According to Aubrey (I, 369), Selden and Hobbes became close friends after the publication of *Leviathan*.

5. OL: "because the power of certain men in the kingdom of the English commonwealth was inconvenient, the powers associated with these titles ceased or were taken away, and in the end the titles were conferred on the rich or those who had deserved well, for no other reason than to make a distinction among the orders of citizens."

had neither possession nor command;[6] and other titles also were devised to the same end.

Worthiness. Fitness.

[53] WORTHINESS is a thing different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert, and consisteth in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy; which particular ability is usually named FITNESS or *Aptitude*.

[54] For he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and worthiest of riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them; any of which qualities being absent, one may nevertheless be a worthy man, and valuable for something else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment, that nevertheless can plead no right to have it before another, and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For merit presupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise, of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of contracts.

CHAPTER XI

Of the Difference of MANNERS

What is here meant by Manners.

[1] By *manners* I mean not here decency of behaviour, as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the *small morals,* but those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. To which end we are to consider that the felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such *Finis ultimus* (utmost aim) nor *Summum Bonum* (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life, and differ only in the way; which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions in divers men, and partly from the difference of the knowl-

6. This was the situation of the Devonshire family, whom Hobbes served most of his life.

edge or opinion each one has of the causes which produce the effect desired.

A restless desire of Power, in all men.

[2] So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.[1] And from hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by laws or abroad by wars; and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire, in some of fame from new conquest, in others of ease and sensual pleasure, in others of admiration or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind.

Love of Contention from Competition.

[3] Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war; because the way of one competitor to the attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Particularly, competition of praise inclineth to a reverence of antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead, to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Civil obedience from love of Ease.

[4] Desire of ease and sensual delight disposeth men to obey a common power, because by such desires a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own industry and labour. Fear of *death[2] and wounds disposeth to the same, and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition, as also all men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to continue the causes of war, and to stir up trouble and sedition; for there is no honour military but by war, nor any such hope to mend an ill game as by causing a new shuffle.

From fear of Death, or Wounds.

And from love of Arts.

[5] Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power. For such desire containeth a desire of leisure, and consequently protection from some other power than their own.

[6] Desire of praise disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them

1. Cf. Calvin: "I say that the nature of man is such that every man would be a lord and master over his neighbors and no man by his good will would be a subject." (*Sermons on the Book of Job*, London, 1574, Sermon 136, p. 718) If Calvin thinks all men have a natural desire for domination as an end in itself, perhaps Hobbes' view of human nature is more charitable.

2. OL: "violent death."

whose judgment they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the praises. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though after death there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being joys that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell, yet is not such fame vain, because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity, which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and anything that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

Love of Virtue from love of Praise.

[7] To have received from one to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love, but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige,[3] and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom, which is, to one's equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from one whom we acknowledge for superior inclines to love, because the obligation is no new depression*; and cheerful acceptation (which men call *gratitude*) is such an honour done to the obliger as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equal or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to love; for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid and service mutual; from whence proceedeth an emulation* of who shall exceed in benefiting, the most noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

Hate, from difficulty of Requiting great Benefits.

[8] To have done more hurt to a man than he [the doer] can, or is willing to, expiate,* inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge or forgiveness, both which are hateful.

And from Conscience of deserving to be hated.

[9] Fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate* or to seek aid by society; for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

Promptness to hurt, from Fear.

[10] Men that distrust their own subtlety are, in tumult and sedition, better disposed for victory than they that suppose themselves wise or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented) to strike first. And in sedition, men being always in the precincts of battle, to hold together and use all advantages of force is a better stratagem than any that can proceed from subtlety of wit.

And from distrust of their own wit.

3. Assuming that some people receive benefits without choosing to, this seems inconsistent with Hobbes' view that all obligation derives from some voluntary act of the person obliged (cf. xxi, 10).

[11] Vain-glorious men (such as, without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men) are inclined only to ostentation, but not to attempt, because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.

Vain undertaking from Vain-Glory.

[12] Vain-glorious men (such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves) are inclined to rash engaging, and in the approach of danger or difficulty, to retire if they can; because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved* with an excuse, than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

[13] Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of government are disposed to ambition, because without public employment in council or magistracy the honour of their wisdom is lost. And therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition; for eloquence seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others.

Ambition, from opinion of sufficiency.

[14] Pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, it is a sign the difference of motives, the one way and the other, are not great; therefore not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.

Irresolution from too great valuing of small matters.

[15] Frugality (though in poor men a virtue) maketh a man unapt to achieve such actions as require the strength of many men at once; for it weakeneth their endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigour by reward.

[16] Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide* in them that have it, because the former is seeming wisdom, the latter seeming kindness. Add to them military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhere and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former having given them caution against danger from him, the latter gives them caution against danger from others.

Confidence in others from Ignorance of the marks of Wisdom and Kindness.

[17] Want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth, a man to rely on the advice and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other whom they think wiser than themselves (and see not why he should deceive them).

And from Ignorance of natural causes.

[18] Ignorance of the signification of words, which is want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not, but also the errors, and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust; for

neither error nor non-sense can without a perfect understanding of words be detected.

And from want of Understanding.

[19] From the same it proceedeth that men give different names to one and the same thing from the difference of their own passions: as they that approve a private opinion,* call it opinion; but they that mislike it, heresy; and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion, but has only a greater tincture of choler.*[3a]

[20] From the same also it proceedeth that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between the one action of many men and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between one action of all the senators of *Rome* in killing *Catiline* and the many actions of a number of senators in killing *Caesar*; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion of one.

Adherence to Custom, from Ignorance of the nature of Right and Wrong.

[21] Ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust which it hath been the custom to punish, and that just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an example (or, as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent), like little children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners but the correction they receive from their parents and masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so, because, grown strong and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn, receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them; which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword; whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not, in that subject, what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit or lust. For I doubt not but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, *that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square*, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able.

Adherence to private men, From ignorance of the Causes of Peace.

[22] Ignorance of remote causes disposeth men to attribute all events to the causes immediate and instrumental; for these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to pass that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the public, discharge their anger upon the publicans (that is to say, farmers,* collectors, and other officers of the public revenue) and adhere to such as find fault

3a. This paragraph is omitted in the OL.

with the public government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the supreme authority, for fear of punishment or shame of receiving pardon.

Credulity from Ignorance of nature.

[23] Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities; for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true, being unable to detect the impossibility. And credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying; so that ignorance itself without malice is able to make a man both to believe lies and tell them, and sometimes also to invent them.

Curiosity to know, from Care of future time.

[24] Anxiety for the future time disposeth men to inquire into the causes of things, because the knowledge of them maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.

Natural Religion, from the same.

[25] Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect to seek the cause, and again the cause of that cause, till of necessity he must come to this thought at last: *that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal, which is it men call God.[4] So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal, though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive and assure himself there is somewhat there, which men call *fire* and is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have that see it; so also, by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man *may conceive[5] there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind.

[26] And they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself of *what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm[6] are inclined to suppose and feign unto themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also in the time of unexpected good success to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancy their gods. By which means it hath come to pass that, from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created

4. OL: "*that there is some eternal cause*, i.e., one to which no cause could be prior."

5. OL: "is certain."

6. OL: "whether or not there is some power by which they can be helped or harmed."

in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible is the natural seed of that which everyone in himself calleth religion, and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.

[27] And this seed of religion having been observed by many, some of those that have observed it have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws, and to add to it, of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events by which they thought they should best be able to *govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers.[7]

Chapter XII
Of Religion

Religion, in Man only.

[1] Seeing there are no signs nor fruit of *religion* but in man only, there is no cause to doubt but that the seed of *religion* is also only in man, and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other living creatures.

First, from his desire of knowing Causes.

[2] And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some more, some less, but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune.

From the consideration of the Beginning of things.

[3] Secondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

From his observation of the Sequel of things.

[4] Thirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts but the enjoying of their quotidian* food, ease, and lusts, as having little or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation and memory of the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see, man observeth how one event hath been produced by another, and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence, and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth, or trusteth to the authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.

The natural Cause of Religion, the Anxiety of the time to come.

[5] The two first, make anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto or shall arrive hereafter, it is impossible for a man who continually

7. OL: "induce others to serve them."

endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; so that every man, especially those that are over-provident,* are in an estate like to that of *Prometheus*. For as *Prometheus* (which, interpreted, is *the prudent man*) was bound to the hill *Caucasus* (a place of large prospect where an eagle, feeding on his liver, devoured in the day as much as was repaired in the night), so that man which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

Which makes them fear the Power of Invisible things.

[6] This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes (as it were in the dark), must needs have for object something. And therefore, when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse,* either of their good or evil fortune, but some *power* or agent *invisible*; in which sense, perhaps, it was that some of the old poets[1] said that the gods were at first created by human fear; which spoken of the gods (that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly into the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to this: that there must be *(as even the heathen philosophers confessed)[2] one first mover, that is, a first and an eternal cause of all things, which is that which men mean by the name of God; and all this without thought of their fortune, the solicitude whereof both inclines to fear and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods as there be men that feign them.

[7] And for the matter or substance of the invisible agents so fancied, they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other conceit but that it

1. Tricaud cites Statius (*Thebais* III, 661), and might have cited Lucretius (*De rerum natura* I, 50–135, 146–158). Hobbes makes an un-Lucretian exception for monotheistic religions here, but goes on to blur the distinction between monotheistic and polytheistic religions, noting that even "gentile" religions claim a divine revelation to the founder (¶20), and giving an account of the decline of religion which emphasizes natural causes as much for Christianity as for any pagan religion (¶¶23–32).

2. OL: "with the sounder of the ancient philosophers." Apparently a (rare) approving reference to Aristotle.

was the same with that of the soul of man, and that the soul of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth, or in a looking-glass to one that is awake; which men, not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real and external substances (and therefore call them ghosts, as the Latins called them *imagines* and *umbrae*, and thought them spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies), and [think] those invisible agents which they feared, to be like them, save that they appear and vanish when they please. *But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature, because though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as *spirit* and *incorporeal*, yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them[3]; and therefore, men that by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, choose rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above their understanding, than to define his nature by *spirit incorporeal*,[4] and then confess their definition to be unintelligible; or if they give him such a title, it is not *dogmatically*, with intention to make the divine nature understood, but *piously*, to honour him with attributes of significations as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.

And suppose them Incorporeal.

[8] Then, for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought their effects, that is to say, what immediate causes they used in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call *causing* (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by but by observing and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event any dependence or connexion at all; and therefore from the like things past they expect the like things to come, and hope for good or evil luck superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it; as the Athenians did (for their war at *Lepanto*) demand another *Phormio,* the Pompeian faction (for their war in *Africa*), another *Scipio;*[5] and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander-by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken (especially if the name of God be amongst

But know not the way how they effect anything.

3. OL: "But that the same thing might be both a *spirit* and *incorporeal* cannot be understood. For a spirit is determined by place and figure, i.e., by limits and some size of its own. Therefore, it is a body, however rarefied and imperceptible."

4. OL adds: "without the authority of Scripture."

5. Cf. Thucydides III, 7; Plutarch, *Life of Cato the Younger*, ch. 65. Both the Athenians and the Pompeian faction felt more hopeful with a leader bearing the same family name as one who had led them successfully before.

them, as charming and conjuring, the liturgy of witches), insomuch as to believe they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into anything.

But honour them as they honour men.

[9] Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers invisible, it can be no other but such expressions of their reverence as they would use towards men: gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of body, considerate addresses, *sober behaviour, premeditated words, swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing, but leaves them either to rest there, or for further ceremonies to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.[6]

And attribute to them all extraordinary events.

[10] Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand, *save that using to conjecture of the time to come by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics* of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from other men of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

Four things, Natural seeds of religion.

[11] And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes,* devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of *religion*,[7]

6. OL: "and other things of that kind. For bloody sacrifices are not a dictate of nature, since they were instituted in the beginning by commonwealths to support those performing the sacrifices. Nor does swearing seem to be natural worship, because outside the civil state there is no place for swearing. Natural reason does not suggest other forms of worship besides those I have mentioned; whatever is beyond that, it leaves to the laws of particular commonwealths." Note that neither the Latin nor the English characterizes worship as a *dictate* of reason, but only as a suggestion. This is consistent with Hobbes' omission of duties to God from his list of the laws of nature in chh. xiv–xv and his contention that the first four of the Ten Commandments are not part of the law of nature (xlii, 37), positions Bramhall used to support his contention that Hobbes was "no friend to religion" (*The Catching of Leviathan*, pp. 464, 569–70). These positions depart from the teaching of DCv (xvi, 10), where only two of the Ten Commandments are said not to be part of natural law.

7. Bramhall objected to this passage (and its analogue in DCv xvi, 1): "What is now become of that dictate or precept of reason concerning prayers, thanksgivings, oblations, sacrifices, if uncertain opinions, ignorance, fear, mistakes, the conscience of our own weakness and the admiration of natural events be the only seeds of religion." (*The Catching of Leviathan*, pp. 466–67) Hobbes replies in EW IV, 291–95).

which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men hath grown up into ceremonies so different that *those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another.[8]

Made different by culture.

[12] For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they that have nourished and ordered them according to their own invention. The other have done it by God's commandment and direction. But both sorts have done it with a purpose to make *those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society.[9] So that the religion of the former sort is a part of *human politics, and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects.[10] And the *religion of the latter sort is divine politics, and containeth precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God.[11] Of the former sort were all the founders of commonwealths and the lawgivers of the Gentiles; of the latter sort were *Abraham, Moses,* and our *blessed Saviour*, by whom have been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God.

The absurd opinion of Gentilism.

[13] And for that part of religion which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a god or devil, or by their poets feigned to be inanimated*, inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.

[14] The unformed matter of the world was a god, by the name of *Chaos.*

[15] The heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds were so many gods.

[16] Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a leek [were] deified. Besides that, they filled almost all places with spirits called *demons*: the plains, with *Pan* and *Panises*, or Satyrs; the woods, with Fawns and Nymphs; the sea, with Tritons and other Nymphs; every river and fountain, with a ghost of his name and with Nymphs; every house with its *Lares*, or familiars; every man with his *Genius*; hell with ghosts and spiritual officers, as *Charon, Cerberus,* and the *Furies*; and in the night time, all places with *larvae,* *lemures,* *ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of fairies and bugbears.* They have also ascribed divinity and built temples to mere accidents and qualities, such as are time, night, day, peace,

8. OL: "those which are approved by the law in one commonwealth are derided in another."

9. OL: "their initiates more obedient to themselves."

10. OL: "politics."

11. OL: "politics of the latter is a part of religion, and contains precepts such as are suitable for those who are admitted into the city of God."

concord, love, contention, virtue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like; which when they prayed for or against, they prayed to, as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall or withholding that good or evil for or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own wit, by the name of *Muses*; their own ignorance, by the name of *Fortune*; their own lust, by the name of *Cupid*; their own rage, by the name *Furies*; their own privy members, by the name of *Priapus*; and attributed their pollutions to *Incubi* and *Succubae*; insomuch as there was nothing which a poet could introduce as a person in his poem, which they did not make either a *god* or a *devil.*

[17] The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for religion, which is men's ignorance of causes, and thereby their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude* on their ignorance, instead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial gods: ascribing the cause of fecundity,* to *Venus*; the cause of arts, to *Apollo*; of subtlety and craft, to *Mercury*; of tempests and storms, to *Aeolus*; and of other effects, to other gods; insomuch as there was amongst the heathen almost as great variety of gods as of business.

[18] And to the worship which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards their gods, namely, oblations,* prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly named, the same legislators of the Gentiles have added their images (both in picture and sculpture) that the more ignorant sort (that is to say, the most part or generality of the people), thinking the gods for whose representation they were made were really included and (as it were) housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them; and [the Gentile legislators have] endowed them [the gods] with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses (that is, consecrated and made holy to those their idols, as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole islands); and have attributed to them, not only the shapes (some of men, some of beasts, some of monsters), but also the faculties and passions of men and beasts (as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation; and this not only by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of gods, but also by mixing with men and women, to beget mongrel gods and but inmates* of heaven, as *Bacchus, Hercules,* and others), besides anger, revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them (as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of power, or a cause of pleasure, and all such vices as amongst men are taken to be against law, rather than against honour).

[19] Lastly, to the prognostics of time to come, which are (naturally) but conjectures upon the experience of time past and (supernaturally) di-

vine revelation, the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended experience, partly upon pretended revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious ways of divination, and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless answers of the priests at *Delphi, Delos, Ammon,* and other famous oracles (which answers were made ambiguous by design, to own* the event both ways, or [were] absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous caverns), sometimes in the leaves of the Sybils (of whose prophecies (like those perhaps of *Nostradamus*, for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman republic), sometimes in the insignificant speeches of madmen (supposed to be possessed with a divine spirit, which possession they called enthusiasm; and these kinds of foretelling events were accounted theomancy, or prophecy), sometimes in the aspect of the stars at their nativity (which was called horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology), sometimes in their own hopes and fears (called thumomancy,* or presage*), sometimes in the prediction of witches that pretended conference with the dead (which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft, and is but juggling* and confederate knavery*), sometimes in the casual flight or feeding of birds (called augury), sometimes in the entrails of a sacrificed beast (which was *aruspicina*), sometimes in dreams, sometimes in croaking of ravens or chattering of birds, sometimes in the lineaments of the face (which was called metoposcopy) or (by palmistry) in the lines of the hand, in casual words (called *omina*), sometimes in monsters or unusual accidents (as eclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the like, which they called *portenta* and *ostenta*, because they thought them to portend or foreshow some great calamity to come), sometimes in mere lottery (as cross and pile,* counting holes in a sieve, dipping* of verses in *Homer* and *Virgil*), and innumerable other such vain conceits. So easy are men to be drawn to believe anything from such men as have gotten credit with them and can with gentleness and dexterity take hold of their fear and ignorance.

The designs of the Authors of the Religion of the Heathen.

[20] And therefore the first founders and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience and peace, have in all places taken care: first, to imprint in their minds a belief that those precepts which they gave concerning religion might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god or other spirit (or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily be received); so *Numa Pompilius* pretended to receive the

ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans from the nymph *Egeria;*[12] and the first king and founder of the kingdom of *Peru* pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the Sun;[13] and *Mahomet*, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost in form of a dove.[14] Secondly, they have had a care to make it believed that the same things were displeasing to the gods which were forbidden by the laws. Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals, by which they were to believe the anger of the gods might be appeased, and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness, earthquakes, and each man's private misery came from the anger of the gods, and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the forgetting or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. And though amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny that which in the poets is written of the pains and pleasures after this life, which divers of great authority and gravity in that state have in their *harangues* openly derided, yet that belief was always more cherished than the contrary.

[21] And by these and such other institutions, they obtained* in order to their end (which was the peace of the commonwealth) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to mutiny against their governors. And being entertained with the pomp and pastime of festivals and public games, made in honour of the gods, needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the state. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no scruple* of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of *Rome* itself, unless it had something in it that could not consist with their civil government; nor do we read that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews, who

12. Cf. Livy, *History of Rome* I, xix.

13. Cf. Garcilaso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Incas* (1609), tr. by Harold V. Livermore, Austin: U of Texas P, 1966, vol. I, pp. 40–43.

14. In Islamic tradition, it was the angel Gabriel who conveyed the divine revelation to Muhammad (cf. F. E. Peters, *Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, Princeton UP, 1990, I, 192–96), and most early Christian accounts of Islam report this accurately. That Muhammad claimed to have conversations with the Holy Ghost, who appeared to him in the form of a dove, is not accurate, though some anti-Islamic polemicists did tell stories in which Muhammad trained a dove to eat a grain of corn from the Prophet's ear, to simulate the Holy Ghost (this to explain why so many accepted Muhammad's claims). See Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West, the making of an image*, Edinburgh UP, 1962, pp. 27–32. Since Christian accounts of Islam typically give great prominence to the Islamic denial of the trinity, it is surprising that Hobbes would credit such stories.

(being the peculiar kingdom of God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.*

The true Religion, and the laws of God's kingdom the same.

[22] But where God himself by supernatural revelation planted religion, there he also made to himself a peculiar kingdom and gave laws, not only of behaviour towards himself, but also towards one another; and thereby in the kingdom of God, the policy and laws civil are a part of religion; and therefore the distinction of temporal and spiritual domination* hath there no place. It is true that God is king of all the earth; yet may he be king of a peculiar and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity therein than that he that hath the general command of the whole army should have withal a peculiar regiment or company of his own. God is king of all the earth by his power; but of his chosen people he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom of God, both by nature and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place.[15]

The causes of Change in Religion.

[23] From the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds or principles; which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible and supernatural; that can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions *may again be made to spring out of them by the culture of such men as for such purpose are in reputation.[16]

[24] For seeing all formed* religion is founded at first upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally, it followeth necessarily, when they that have the government of religion shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected, or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of divine revelation, that the religion which they desire to uphold must be suspected likewise; and (without the fear of the civil sword) contradicted and rejected.

Enjoining belief of Impossibilities.

[25] That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth a religion (or addeth to it when it is already formed) is the enjoining of a belief of contradictories; for *both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true;[17] and therefore to enjoin the belief of them is an argument of ignorance, which detects the author in that, and

15. The marginal note cites ch. xxxv, but it seems it ought also to have cited xxxi.

16. OL: "will spring from them, if suitable cultivators exist."

17. OL: "everyone, even the untutored, who do not know what a contradiction is, knows that of two contradictories one is false."

discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernatural; which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against natural reason.

Doing contrary to the Religion they establish.

[26] That which taketh away the reputation of sincerity is the doing or saying of such things as appear to be signs that what they require other men to believe is not believed by themselves; all which doings or sayings are therefore called scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks that make men to fall in the way of religion (as injustice, cruelty, profaneness,* avarice, and luxury). For who can believe that he that doth ordinarily such actions as proceed from any of these roots believeth there is any such invisible power to be feared as he affrighteth other men withal, for lesser faults?

[27] That which taketh away the reputation of love is the being detected of private ends; as when the belief they require of others conduceth, or seemeth to conduce, to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure pleasure, to themselves only, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

Want of the testimony of Miracles.

[28] Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling can be no other than the operation of miracles, *or true prophecy (which also is a miracle) or extraordinary felicity.[18] And therefore, to those points of religion which have been received from them that did such miracles, those that are added by such as approve not their calling by some miracle obtain no greater belief than what the custom and laws of the places in which they be educated[19] have wrought into them. For as in natural things men of judgment require natural signs and arguments, so in supernatural things they require signs supernatural (which are miracles) before they consent inwardly and from their hearts.

[29] All which causes of the weakening of men's faith do manifestly appear in the examples following. First, we have the example of the children of Israel, who (when *Moses*, that had approved his calling to them by miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of *Egypt*, was absent but 40 days) revolted from the worship of the true God recommended to them by him, and setting up (Exod. 32:1-2) a golden calf for their god, relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians, from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after *Moses, Aaron, Joshua*, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel (Judges 2:11.) were dead, another generation arose, and served *Baal*. So that miracles failing, faith also failed.

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18. Not in OL.

19. OL adds: "or an almost miraculous integrity [*sanctitas*]."

[30] Again, when the sons of *Samuel* (1 Sam. 8:3), being constituted by their father judges in *Bersabee*, received bribes and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their king in other manner than he was king of other people; and therefore cried out to *Samuel* to choose them a king after the manner of the nations. So that justice failing, faith also failed, insomuch as they deposed their God from reigning over them.

[31] And whereas in the planting of Christian religion, the oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman empire, and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles and Evangelists, a great part of that success may reasonably be attributed to the contempt into which the priests of the Gentiles of that time had brought themselves, by their uncleanness, avarice, and juggling between princes. Also the religion of the church of *Rome* was, partly for the same cause, abolished in *England* and many other parts of Christendom (insomuch as the failing of virtue in the pastors maketh faith fail in the people), and partly from bringing of the philosophy and doctrine of *Aristotle* into religion by the Schoolmen, from whence there arose so many contradictions and absurdities as brought the clergy into a reputation both of ignorance and of fraudulent intention, and inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own princes, as in *France* and *Holland*, or with their will, as in England.

[32] Lastly, amongst the points by the church of *Rome* declared necessary for salvation, there be so many manifestly to the advantage of the Pope (and of his spiritual subjects residing in the territories of other Christian princes) that were it not for the mutual emulation of those princes, they might without war or trouble exclude all foreign authority as easily as it has been excluded in *England*. For who is there that does not see to whose benefit it conduceth to have it believed that a king hath not his authority from Christ unless a bishop crown him? That a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry? That whether a prince be born in lawful marriage or not must be judged by authority from *Rome*? That subjects may be freed from their allegiance, if by the court of Rome the king be judged an heretic? That a king (as *Chilperic of France*) may be deposed by a pope (as Pope *Zachary*) for no cause, and his kingdom given to one of his subjects? That the clergy and regulars,* in what country soever, shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of their king in cases criminal? Or who does not see to whose profit redound the fees of private masses and vails* of purgatory, with other signs of private interest, enough to mortify the most lively faith if (as I said) the civil magistrate and custom did not more sustain it than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the

same cause, and that is, unpleasing priests, *and those not only amongst Catholics, but even in that church that hath presumed* most of reformation.[20]

Chapter XIII
Of the Natural Condition *of* Mankind, *As Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery*[1]

Men by nature Equal.

[1] Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend* as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination,* or by confederacy* with others that are in the same danger with himself.

[2] And as to the faculties of the mind—setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules called science (which very few have, and but in few things), as being not a native faculty (born with us), nor attained (as prudence) while we look after somewhat else—I find yet a greater equality amongst men

20. Omitted in OL. Clarendon professed to see here a reference to the Church of England (*Brief View*, p. 25). Certainly Archbishop Laud alienated many members of that church by his policies, which did lead to schism in the Church. But one central criticism of the Laudians was that they were too inclined to Romanism. I think it more natural to take the church that "presumed most of reformation" to be the Presbyterians, who, according to Hobbes, claimed to outdo the reformation both of Luther and of Calvin, departing as much from them as they had from the pope. (Cf. *Behemoth*, p. 136) In the ms. version Hobbes presented to Charles II this last clause is replaced by the following: "On whom men by common frailty are carried to execute their anger. They bear down not only religion, which they reduce to private fancy, but also the civil government that would uphold it, reducing it to the natural condition of private force."

1. OL: "Of the condition of mankind, as concerning their felicity in the present life."