
## PL, meet Networking

Colin Scott, Andreas Wundsam, Scott Shenker

$$\vdash \{A\} \ c \ \{B\}$$



#### Overview


Symbolic execution -> detect policy-violations

Axiomatic semantics -> prove correctness

## Symbolic Execution

Goal: Which code path will be taken for a given input?


```
y = read()
y = 2 * y
if (y <= 12)
    fail()
else
    print("OK")</pre>
```



## Formalism for Networking

#### Networks:

$$G = (V, E)$$



#### Packets:

$$h \in \{0,1\}^{L} = H$$


0110110101101 1001101110110 10011110001...

\* Peyman et al., Header Space Analysis, NSDI '12

## Formalism for Networking

#### Routers:

$$T: (H \times E) \rightarrow (H \times E_{\phi})$$



## Formalism for Networking

#### Configuration:

Packet Forwarding:

$$\begin{aligned}
T_1 & \Psi^k(h,e) = \\
\Psi &= \{ & \dots & \Psi(\dots \Psi(\Psi(h,e))\dots \} \\
T_n & & & & & & & & & \\
T_n & & & & & & & & & \\
\end{aligned}$$

<sup>\*</sup> Peyman et al., Header Space Analysis, NSDI '12

Goal: Which network path will be taken for a given input?


- Compute  $\Psi$  from routing tables
- ■For each host:
  - ■Insert symbolic packet

 $\chi^L$ 


Iteratively apply

Ψ

■ End Result: Propagation Graph





## Brief Aside: Software-Defined Networking



### Example Policy-Violation


"Pepsi can't talk to Coca-Cola"






## Proving Correctness


Can we prove correctness of network software?



## GP Graph Programming

bridge(a, b, x, y, z: int)






where not edge(1,3)


<sup>\*</sup> Poskitt, Plump, Hoare Style Verification of Graph Programs

## GP Graph Programming



\* Poskitt, Plump, Hoare Style Verification of Graph Programs

## GP Graph Programming





\* Poskitt, Plump, Hoare Style Verification of Graph Programs

## GP Graph Coloring

```
main = init!; inc!
init(x: int)
inc(i, k, x, y: int)
        k
```

## Proving Correctness

Goal: Hoare-style axiomatic semantics to prove graph programs correct

## Proving Correctness

Assertions can range over anything (not just integers and booleans)

"there exists at least one non-looping edge"

$$\bullet \exists (x) \xrightarrow{k} y)$$

Sequential composition.

[comp] 
$$\frac{\{c\}\ P\ \{e\}\ Q\ \{d\}}{\{c\}\ P;\ Q\ \{d\}}$$

Rule of consequence.

[cons] 
$$c \Longrightarrow c' \frac{\{c'\} P \{d'\}}{\{c\} P \{d\}} d' \Longrightarrow d$$

As long as possible iteration.

$$[!] \frac{\{inv\} \mathcal{R} \{inv\}}{\{inv\} \mathcal{R}! \{inv \land \neg \mathsf{App}(\mathcal{R})\}}$$


Rule schema application.

[rule] 
$$\frac{}{\{\operatorname{Pre}(r,c)\}\ r\ \{c\}\}}$$

```
 [\text{rule}] = \frac{\{\text{Pre(init, e)}\} \text{ init } \{e\}}{\{e\} \text{ init } \{e\}}   [\text{rule}] = \frac{\{\text{Pre(inc, d)}\} \text{ inc } \{d\}}{\{e\} \text{ init! } \{e \land \neg \text{App}(\{\text{init}\})\}}   [\text{cons}] = \frac{\{c\} \text{ init! } \{d\}}{\{c\} \text{ init! } \{d\}}   [\text{!]} = \frac{\{d\} \text{ inc! } \{d \land \neg \text{App}(\{\text{inc}\})\}}{\{d\} \text{ inc! } \{d \land \neg \text{App}(\{\text{inc}\})\}}   [\text{comp}] = \frac{\{c\} \text{ init! } \{d\}}{\{c\} \text{ init! } \{d\} \text{ inc! } \{d \land \neg \text{App}(\{\text{inc}\})\}} 
                                                                                                       c = \neg \exists ((a) \mid type(a) \neq int)
                                                                                                   \begin{array}{lll} d & = & \forall ( \textcircled{a}, \exists ( \textcircled{a} \mid a = b\_c \land type(b, c) = int)) \\ e & = & \forall ( \textcircled{a}_{1}^{1}, \exists ( \textcircled{a}_{1}^{1} \mid type(a) = int) \lor \exists ( \textcircled{a}_{1}^{1} \mid a = b\_c \land type(b, c) = int)) \end{array}
              \neg App(\{init\}) = \neg \exists (\stackrel{\bullet}{X} | type(x) = int)
                     \neg \mathrm{App}(\{\mathtt{inc}\}) \quad = \quad \neg \exists (\underbrace{\mathtt{x_{-i}}}^{\mathtt{k}} \underbrace{\mathtt{y_{-i}}}^{\mathtt{k}}) \mid \mathsf{type}(\mathtt{i},\mathtt{k},\mathtt{x},\mathtt{y}) = \mathsf{int})
                             Pre(init, e) = \forall (X) | (X) |
                                                                                                                                                               \vee \exists (X) a = b_c \wedge type(b, c) = int)
                                   \operatorname{Pre}(\operatorname{inc},d) = \forall (\underbrace{x_{-i}}_{1}\underbrace{x_{-i}}_{2}\underbrace{a}_{3}| \operatorname{type}(i,k,x,y) = \operatorname{int},
                                                                                                                                                                \exists (\underbrace{x_{-i}}^{K}\underbrace{y_{-i}}^{k}\underbrace{a} \mid a = b_{-}c \land type(b, c) = int))
```

## Proving Correctness


Prove all the things!



## Summary


- PL techniques FTW!
- I adapted symbolic execution to find bugs in network software
- I demonstrated correctness proving for network algorithms

## Symbolic Headerspace




Goal: detect policy-violations

"Network doesn't do what I tell it to"




- Approach:
  - isomorphism
    between
    behavior of
    virtual view
    and physical
    network



#### **Network Behavior:**

$$\Omega = \Phi^{\infty}$$



"Packets' final locations"

## Policy compliance

# Qvirtual ~ Qphysical

"All paths in logical network should have a corresponding path in the physical network"

#### More GP constructs

Sequential composition:

P; Q

- If-then-else:
  if C then P else Q
- As-long-as-possible iteration:

P!

Set of rule schemata (none of which are applicable).

$$[ruleset_1] \frac{}{\{\neg App(\mathcal{R})\} \mathcal{R} \{false\}}$$

Set of rule schemata (when the non-applicability of a rule schema set is not implied by the precondition).

[ruleset<sub>2</sub>] 
$$\frac{\{c\} \ r_1 \ \{d\} \ \dots \ \{c\} \ r_n \ \{d\}}{\{c\} \ \{r_1, \dots, r_n\} \ \{d\}}$$