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# SAC Summer School 2020

## Polynomial Equations in Cryptology

Lecture by Antoine Joux  
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## Part 1

# Motivation and Background

- Generically (as problems in NP) by converting 3-SAT to Boolean systems
- Or directly from the description of the problem. Examples:

- RSA with exponent 3: Solve  $X^3 - m = 0 \pmod{N}$
- DES, writing the circuit as Boolean polynomials in the *Key* variables
- Path of 2-isogenies from  $j_0$  to  $j_\ell$ :

$$\Phi_2(j_0, j_1) = 0, \Phi_2(j_1, j_2) = 0, \dots, \Phi_2(j_{\ell-1}, j_\ell) = 0$$

- Discrete log:

$$(1 + x_0(g - 1)) \cdot (1 + x_1(g^2 - 1)) \cdots (1 + x_k(g^{2^k} - 1)) - h = 0 \pmod{G}$$

$$\text{with } x_i^2 - x_i = 0$$

- If the corresponding system is easy to solve, the system is broken
  - RSA with exponent 3 (many recipients):  
Solve  $X^3 - m = 0$  over  $\mathbf{Z}$
  - Unfiltered linear shift back shift registers  
Linear algebra over  $\text{GF}(2)$
  - Discrete log. and Isogenies between Drinfeld modules  
Linear algebra

- Many cases, plenty of parameters:
  - Over finite fields, over the reals/complex, over Rings
  - Linear vs. non-linear systems of equations
  - Number of variables
  - Sparse or dense systems
  - Arbitrary or structured solutions (such as « small » solutions)
  - Over or under-determined systems
  - One solution vs. all solutions
- We need to distinguish the easy from the hard cases
  - Main goal of this lecture



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## A review of easy cases

- Easiest and best known case
  - Linear systems  $A \cdot x = b$  are easy to solve (at most cubic in dimension)
  - Over any field. (Over rings, some care is required)
  - Either one solution or a compact description of all solutions
- Sparse linear systems can also be considered
  - Gaussian elimination becomes problematic
  - Instead, structured elimination and iterative algorithms are used

- Finding roots is efficient (in the degree of  $f$ )
- Remember that  $\forall \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p : \alpha^p = \alpha$ 
  - Thus, any root of  $f$  in  $\mathbb{F}_p$  is also a root of  $X^p - X \Rightarrow$  use (efficient) Gcd
- Also:  $X^p - X = X \cdot (X^{(p+1)/2} + 1) \cdot (X^{(p+1)/2} - 1) \Rightarrow$  Gcd again
- Complexity of most efficient methods follows  $\deg(f)^{3/2}$



- Basic idea is to

$$\text{write: } N = \prod_{i=1}^r p_i^{e_i}$$

- If  $N$  is square-free, just apply CRT
- Otherwise, Hensel lifting to get roots modulo  $p_1^2, p_1^3, \dots$
- However, requires a factoring algorithm !

- For the univariate case, find reals roots (and check if near an integer)
- With more variables, we have a Diophantine equation
  - In general, they are extremely hard to solve
- For the bivariate case, it remains difficult in general
  - Even special case of Thue's equations is already computationally intensive
- By contrast, over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  finding one solution of low degree polynomial equation in many variables, is usually easy (Guess and solve)

- Coppersmith's first algorithm find small solutions of a low-degree bivariate Diophantine equation
- Coppersmith's second algorithm find small solutions of a low degree univariate polynomial modulo  $N$  (without factoring)
- Based on lattice reduction (on some kind of Macaulay's matrix)



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## End of Part 1



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## Part 2

# Hard cases and algorithms

- Adding noise turns an easy problem into a seemingly hard one
- Can be transformed into a system of polynomial equation of higher degree
- Indeed, we have

$$AX + E = B \text{ with known } A, B \text{ and small } E$$

- Write the smallness condition as polynomial equations
- For example, if error are -1, 0 or 1 then

$$\forall i : x_i^3 - x_i = 0$$

- Larger errors require higher degree

- Sparsity seems to make things difficult
- Can be transformed into a system of polynomial equations of higher degree
- For example, take  $f(X) = X^{1025} + X^{69} + 1$  and write:  
$$X_1 - X^2 = 0, X_2 - X_1^2 = 0, \dots, X_{10} - X_9^2 = 0 \text{ and}$$
$$X_{10} \cdot X + X_6 \cdot X_2 \cdot X + 1 = 0$$

- This is a NP-hard problem
- Tons of applications:
  - Algebraic geometry, robotics, ...
- In crypto, we are mostly interested by equations over finite fields
  - Don't need to worry about precision or coefficients explosion
- The case of  $\text{GF}(2)$  is particularly interesting





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# Polynomial systems: the Boolean case

$$f_1(X_1, \dots, X_n) = 0$$

$$f_2(X_1, \dots, X_n) = 0$$

$$\vdots$$

$$f_m(X_1, \dots, X_n) = 0$$

Initial system: degree (at most)  $d$

$$X_1^2 + X_1 = 0$$

$$X_2^2 + X_2 = 0$$

$$\vdots$$

$$X_n^2 + X_n = 0$$

Implicit field equations (degree 2)

Three parameters:  $n$ ,  $m$  and  $d$

## Another application: Multivariate cryptography

- The hardness of boolean systems has been used as a building block
- **Main idea:** boolean equation systems with a trapdoor
  - $F(x)=y$  hard to solve for the public representation of  $F$
  - $F(x)=y$  easy to solve with the private representation
  - **Signature:** solve  $F(\text{signature})=\text{Hash}(\text{random}, \text{message})$
  - **Encryption:** recover unique secret with  $F(\text{secret})=\text{ciphertext}$
- Solving Boolean systems can break such systems
- Recovering the trapdoor offers another direction of attack

Private equation

$$F(X) = Y \text{ in } \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$$

Trapdoor

Take  $\alpha$  s.t.  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n} = \mathbb{F}_2[\alpha]$

$$\text{Write } X = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i \alpha^i$$

Express  $F$  as coordinates and mix

Public system

A priori, random looking

n eqs in n vars

Degree depends on F




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# Exhaustive Search

- A priori:  $2^n$  evaluations of the  $m$  polynomial functions
- Many optimisations
  - Evaluate  $f_{i+1}$  only for assignments OK on  $f_1, f_2, \dots, f_i$ 
    - Expected cost bounded by  $2^n + 2^{n-1} + \dots + 1 + (m - n) < m 2^n$
  - Evaluate in parallel (bitslicing) on length of CPU registers
  - Use Grey codes and modify only one variable between two evaluations
  - Use derivative to do the modification faster
- State-of-the-art software implementation in LibFes by Bouillaguet

# Grey codes (example on 4 bits)



- When changing  $x_i$  write  $F(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  as

$$F_0^{(i)}(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n) + x_i \cdot F_1^{(i)}(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)$$

- To update  $x_i$  we just need to add:

$$F_1^{(i)}(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)$$

- Note that this is a polynomial of lower degree
- Repeat the trick to also update those
- Note that  $F_1^{(i)}$  is a partial derivative of  $F$





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# Probabilistic polynomials

# Evaluation of probabilistic polynomials

- Introduced by Lokshtanov–Paturi–Tamaki–Williams–Yu (SODA 2017)
- Only looks at  $n$  (does not gain from overdetermination)

- Consider a random polynomial:

$$R_r = 1 + \sum_{i=1}^m r_i f_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

- Its value is 1 at any solution of the system and a random 0/1 elsewhere

## Evaluation of probabilistic polynomials (2)

- Take several random polynomials  $R_1, \dots, R_\ell$  of the form:

$$R_r = 1 + \sum_{i=1}^m r_i f_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

- The product

$$P = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} R_i$$

has value 1 at every solution and value 0 w.h.p at every non-solution

- Here, w.h.p. (with high probability) is  $1 - 2^{-\ell}$

## Evaluation of probabilistic polynomials (3)

- Now, split the variables in two groups:  $x_1, \dots, x_t$  and  $x_{t+1}, \dots, x_n$
- Now compute

$$Q = \sum_{a_1=0}^1 \sum_{a_2=0}^1 \cdots \sum_{a_t=0}^1 P(a_1, \dots, a_t, x_{t+1}, \dots, x_n)$$

- $Q(\alpha_{t+1}, \dots, \alpha_n)$  counts the parity of the number of n-uples ending with  $\alpha_{t+1}, \dots, \alpha_n$  where  $P$  takes value 1 (mostly solutions if  $t > \ell$ )
- We want to use this to find solution. Minor problem=multiple sols in block
  - Not a problem if unicity guaranteed
  - Otherwise, randomise  $Q$  again or add equations to force unicity [follow-up by Björklund-Kaski-Williams]

## Evaluation of probabilistic polynomials (4)

- We now have a methods that computes

$$Q = \sum_{a_1=0}^1 \sum_{a_2=0}^1 \cdots \sum_{a_t=0}^1 P(a_1, \cdots, a_t, x_{t+1}, \cdots, x_n)$$

then finds solutions in  $x_{t+1}, \cdots, x_n$  of  $Q = 1$

- It works by computing  $Q$  formally then doing fast evaluation at all points
- The exhaustive search part is reduced to  $2^{n-t}$
- Q-preparation cost is the number of monomials of degree  $\ell d$  in  $x_{t+1}, \cdots, x_n$
- With follow-up improvement, the full cost is  $O(2^{0.804n})$



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# Linearisation and Gröbner bases techniques

# Overdetermined systems and linearisation

- Degree  $d=2$ , assume  $m > n(n+1)/2$
- View each monomial  $x_i x_j$  as an independent variable
- We get a linear system of  $m$  equations in  $n(n+1)/2$  variables
- Easy to solve
  - And check the non-linear constraints  $x_i x_j = x_i \times x_j$
- Can a similar idea be used for  $m$  close to  $n$  ?

- A extension of linearisation was proposed by Kipnis, Shamir (1999)
- In a nutshell, multiply every equation by many monomials
- Use linearisation to solve this extended system
- It can be seen as a specialised rediscovery of Lazard's method (1983)
  - Computes Gröbner basis by doing linear algebra in Macaulay's matrix
  - In the Boolean case, adding field equations implicitly helps !
- A big difficulty is to predict the size of the matrix
  - Heuristic estimates give the expected complexity of the approach



## Some algebraic background

- The ideal generated by  $f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m$  in  $\mathbb{K}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$  is the set:

$$I(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m) = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i f_i \mid (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_m) \in \mathbb{K}[X_1, \dots, X_n]^m \right\}$$

- Every solution of the system is a zero of every polynomial in  $I(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m)$

- For every degree  $D$  we also define:

$$I_D(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m) = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i f_i \mid (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_m) \text{ s.t. } \forall i : \deg \mu_i f_i \leq D \right\}$$

- We see that  $I_D(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m)$  is a subset of  $I(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m)$
- However, in general,  $I_D$  doesn't contain all degree  $D$  polynomials of  $I$
- When it happens (for all  $D$ ) then  $(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m)$  is called a Gröbner basis of  $I$
- Furthermore, if  $I_D(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m)$  contains all degree  $D$  polynomials, then  $I_D(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m)$  is a Gröbner basis
- Note that  $I_D(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m)$  is a vector space, so any (linear) basis works
  - A smaller set called reduced Gröbner basis is usually used
- Furthermore, there always is a (possibly large)  $D$  that works

- Multiplying the initial polynomials by monomials gives a basis:

$$I_D(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m) = \left\langle \mu_i f_i \mid \mu_i \text{ monomial s.t. } \deg \mu_i f_i \leq D \right\rangle$$

- Macaulay's matrix is the matrix representation in the canonical basis  
i.e: its columns are indexed by monomials

its rows by labels  $\mu_i f_i$

- Linear algebra on the matrix with large enough D gives what we want:
  - Row echelon form => reduced Gröbner basis
  - Solution of the linear system + checks => solution of original problem
- Note that reducing modulo field equations reduces the number of monomials

# Macaulay's matrix example

	$xyz$	$xy$	$xz$	$yz$	$x$	$y$	$z$	$1$
$f_1$		1				1	1	1
$f_2$			1		1		1	1
$f_3$				1	1			1
$xf_1$			1		1			
$yf_1$		1		1				
$zf_1$	1			1				
$xf_2$								
$yf_2$	1	1		1		1		
$zf_2$								
$xf_3$	1							
$yf_3$		1		1		1		
$zf_3$			1	1			1	

$$\begin{cases} f_1 = xy + y + z + 1 \\ f_2 = xz + x + z + 1 \\ f_3 = yz + x + 1 \end{cases}$$

Empty line since  $f_2 = (x + 1)(z + 1)$

# Macaulay's matrix example (continued)

	$xyz$	$xy$	$xz$	$yz$	$x$	$y$	$z$	$1$
$f_1$		1				1	1	1
$f_2$			1		1		1	1
$f_3$				1	1			1
$xf_1$			1		1			
$yf_1$		1		1				
$zf_1$	1			1				
$xf_2$								
$yf_2$	1	1		1		1		
$zf_2$								
$xf_3$	1							
$yf_3$		1		1		1		
$zf_3$			1	1			1	

Kernel

$xyz$	$xy$	$xz$	$yz$	$x$	$y$	$z$	$1$
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1

Echelon form

$xyz$	$xy$	$xz$	$yz$	$x$	$y$	$z$	$1$
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Gröbner basis  $(x + 1, y, z + 1)$

## Predicting the degree $D$

- Studied intensively in Bardet's PhD thesis (under heuristic assumptions)

For degree 2 polynomials and  $m=n$  we have  $D \approx 0.09n$

This gives a complexity of  $O(2^{0.873n})$  assuming quadratic time lin.alg.

- $D$  decreases for over-determined systems with  $m = \alpha n$  it becomes

$$D \approx n \left( -\alpha + \frac{\left( 1 + \sqrt{2\alpha^2 - 10\alpha - 1 + 2(\alpha + 2)\sqrt{\alpha(\alpha + 2)}} \right)}{2} \right)$$

- BooleanSolve (Bardet Faugère, Salvy, Spaenlehauer)
  - Enumerate the values of  $0.55\alpha n$  variables then run GB
  - With  $\alpha < 1.82$  improves complexity to  $2^{(1-0.208\alpha)n}$
  - Not better in practice than exhaustive search
- Crossbred approach (J., Vitse)
  - Change linear algebra in Macaulay's matrix
    - Get polynomials which are linear in  $k$  variables (higher in the others)
  - Do exhaustive search of the  $n-k$  other variables
    - Solve the resulting linear system
    - Beats exhaustive search already for  $m=n=40$



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# SAT solvers



- Convert polynomials into clauses via extra variables
- Proposed by Gregory Bard (unpublished see his webpage)
- Implemented in Magma (calling minisat)
- Works especially well for sparse polynomials



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## End of Lecture