Lecture 8

<2016-04-27 Wed>

Contents


Mei	nory Layout	1
Buf	fer Overflow	4
2.1	Vulnerability	4
	2.1.1 String Library Code	4
	2.1.2 Buffer Overflow Attack Example	4
2.2	Protection	7
	2.2.1 Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code	7
	2.2.2 System Level Protection	7
	2.2.3 Return-Oriented Programming Attacks	8
Floa	at	9
3.1	Fractional Binary Numbers	9
	3.1.1 example	10
		10
3.2	Floating Point Representation (IEEE Standard 754)	10
3.3	Normalized Values	11
	3.3.1 example	11
3.4	Denormalized Values	12
3.5	Special Values	13
	or contract the second of the	
	Buff 2.1 2.2 Float 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4	2.1.1 String Library Code 2.1.2 Buffer Overflow Attack Example 2.2 Protection 2.2.1 Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code 2.2.2 System Level Protection 2.2.3 Return-Oriented Programming Attacks Float 3.1 Fractional Binary Numbers 3.1.1 example 3.1.2 limitations 3.2 Floating Point Representation (IEEE Standard 754) 3.3 Normalized Values 3.3.1 example 3.4 Denormalized Values

1 Memory Layout

try memory layout example

• stack

- runtime stack (8MB limit)
- heap
 - dynamically allocated
 - malloc, calloc, new
- \bullet data
 - statically allocated data
 - e.g. global variables, ${\tt static}$ variables, string constants
- text / shared library
 - executable machine instructions
 - read-only



2 Buffer Overflow

2.1 Vulnerability

- when exceeding the memory size allocated for an array
- most common form
 - unchecked lengths on string inputs
 - * particularly for bounded character arrays on the stack

2.1.1 String Library Code

```
char *gets(char *dest) {
  int c = getchar();
  char *p = dest;
  while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
    *p++ = c;
    c = getchar();
  }
  *p = '\0';
  return dest;
}
```

- library implementation of unix function gets()
 - no way to specify limit on number of characters to read
- similar problem with other library functions
 - strcpy, strcat: copy strings of arbitrary length
 - scanf, fscanf, sscanf: when given %s conversion specification

2.1.2 Buffer Overflow Attack Example


- 1. Buffer Overflow Stack
 - overflowed buffer
 - corrupted return pointer

```
void echo() {
  char buf[4];
```

```
gets(buf);
puts(buf);
}

void call_echo() {
  echo();
}
```

Before call to gets



After call to gets

Stack Frame for call_echo					
00	00	00	00		
00	40	00	34		
33	32	31	30		
39	38	37	36		
35	34	33	32		
31	30	39	38		
37	36	35	34		
33	32	31	30		

buf

2. Code Injection Attack

```
int Q() {
  char buf[64];
  gets(buf);
  ...
  return ...;
```

```
}
void P() {
  Q();
}
```

Stack after call to gets () P stack frame by gets () exploit code Q stack frame

- input string contains byte representation of executable code
- overwrite return address A with address of buffer B
- when Q executes ret, will jump to exploit code

2.2 Protection

2.2.1 Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code

- fgets instead of gets
- strncpy instead of strcpy
- don't use scanf with %s as format string
 - use fgets to read the string
 - or use %ns as format string provided to scanf, where n is a suitable integer

2.2.2 System Level Protection

- randomized stack offsets
 - at start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
 - shifts stack address for entire program
 - makes it difficult for hackers to predict beginning of inserted code
- nonexecutable code segment
 - in traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either "readonly" or "writable"
 - * can execute anything readable
 - x86-64 added explicit "execute permission"
 - stack marked as non-executable
- stack canaries
 - place special value canary on stack beyond buffer
 - check for corruption before exiting function
 - GCC implementation
 - * enable with flag -fstack-protector

2.2.3 Return-Oriented Programming Attacks

- challenge
 - stack randomization makes it hard to predict buffer location
 - marking stack nonexecutable makes it hard to insert binary code
- alternative strategy
 - use existing code
 - * library code from stdlib
 - string together fragments to achieve overall desired outcome
 - does not overcome stack canaries
- construct program from gadgets
 - sequence of instructions ending in ret
 - * encoded by single byte 0x3c
 - code positions fixed from run to run
 - code is executable

1. Gadget Example

• use tail end of existing functions

```
long ab_plus_c(long a, long b, long c) {
  return a*b + c;
}
```


```
00000000004004d0 <ab_plus_c>:
4004d0: 48 0f af fe imul %rsi,%rdi
4004d4: 48 8d 04 17 lea (%rdi,%rdx,1),%rax
retq

rax ← rdi + rdx

Gadget address = 0x4004d4
```


• repurpose byte codes

```
void setval(unsigned *p) {
  *p = 3347663060u;
}
```



3 Float

3.1 Fractional Binary Numbers



- Representation
 - Bits to right of "binary point" represent fractional powers of 2
 - Represents rational number:

$$\sum_{k=-j}^{i} b_k \times 2^k$$

- bits to right of 'binary point' represent fractional powers of 2
- representation of rational numbers $\sum_{k=-j}^{i} b_k \times 2^k$

3.1.1 example

```
value | representation

5 + 3/4 ==> 101.11

2 + 7/8 ==> 10.111

1 + 7/16 ==> 1.0111
```

- observations
 - divide by 2 by shifting right (unsigned)
 - multiply by 2 by shifting left
 - number of the form 0.11111_2 are just below 1.0
 - * $\sum \frac{1}{2^i}$ goes to 1.0
 - * use notation 1.0 ϵ

3.1.2 limitations

- ullet can only reprsent numbers of the form $x/2^k$
 - other rational numbers have repeating bit representations
- just 1 setting of binary point within w bits
 - limited range of numbers

3.2 Floating Point Representation (IEEE Standard 754)

 \bullet numerical form

$$(-1)^{s}M2^{E}$$

- sign bit s, determines whether number is negative or positive
 - * most significant bit is sign bit s
- exponent E, weights value by power of 2
 - * exp field encodes E (but is not equal to E)
- significand M, is normally a fractional value $1.0 \le x < 2.0$
 - * frac field encodes M (but is not equal to M)

Single precision: 32 bits



Double precision: 64 bits



3.3 Normalized Values

- when $\exp \neq 00...0$ and $\exp \neq 11...1$
- \bullet exponent coded as a biased value: E = Exp Bias
 - Exp: unsigned value of exp field
 - Bias = 2^{k-1} 1, where k is number of exponent bits
 - * single precision: Bias = 127
 - · Exp: 1~254, E: -126~127
 - * double precision: Bias = 1023
 - · Exp: 1~2046, E: -1022~1023
- significand coded with implied leading 1: $M = 1.xxx...x_2$
 - xxx...x: bits of frac field
 - minimal when frac = 000...0
 - * M = 1.0
 - maximal when frac = 111...1
 - * M = 2.0 ϵ
- get extra leading bit for free

3.3.1 example

 15213_{10}

• as an integer 11101101101101₂

- as a float $1.1101101101101_2 \times 2^{13}$
 - significand
 - $*\ \mathtt{M} = 1.1101101101101_2$
 - $*\ \mathtt{frac} = 110110110110100000000000_2$
 - exponent
 - * E = 13
 - * Bias =127
 - * Exp = $140 = 10001100_2$
 - result

15213

11101101101101

1.1101101101101 * 2^13

Significand

M = 1.1101101101101

frac = 11011011011010000000000

Exponent

E = 13

Bias = 127

Exp = 140 = 10001100

Result

0 10001100 11011011011010000000000

3.4 Denormalized Values

- when $\exp = 000...0$
- ullet exponent value: E=1 Bias (instead of E=0 Bias)
- significand coded with implied leading 0: $M = 0.xxx...x_2$
 - xxx...x: bits of frac field
- $\exp = 000...0$, frac = 000...0


- represents zero value

- $\exp = 000...0$, $\operatorname{frac} \neq 000...0$
 - numbers closest to 0.0
 - equispaced

3.5 Special Values

- when $\exp = 111...1$
- $\exp = 111...1$, frac = 000...0
 - represents value ∞ (infinity)
 - operation that overflows
 - both positive and negative
 - e.g. $1.0/0.0 = -1.0/-0.0 = +\infty, 1.0/-0.0 = -\infty$
- $\exp = 111...1$, $\operatorname{frac} \neq 000...0$
 - Not-a-Number (NaN)
 - representation case when no numeric value can be determined
 - e.g. $\sqrt{-1}, \infty \infty, \infty \times 0$

3.6 Visualization



$$(-1)^s M 2^E$$