3c. The types of equivocation

3c(2) The same word used with varying degrees of generality and specificity: the broad and narrow meaning of a word

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK V, CH 1-2 376a-378c / *Poetics*, CH 21 [1457^{b}7-16] 693b

Ethics, BK V, CH 1-2 376a-378c

1

1129^{a} With regard to justice and injustice we must consider (1) what kind of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our investigation shall follow the same course as the preceding discussions.

We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is not true of the sciences and the faculties as of states of character. A faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but a state of character which is one of two contraries does *not* produce the contrary results; e.g. as a result of health we do not do what is the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say a man walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy man would.

Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for (A) if good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known, and (B) good condition is known from the things that are in good condition, and they from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is necessary both that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh and that the wholesome should be that which causes firmness in flesh. And it follows for the most part that if one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be ambiguous; e.g. if 'just' is so, that 'unjust' will be so too.

Now 'justice' and 'injustice' seem to be ambiguous, but because their different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the meanings are far apart, e.g. (for here the difference in outward form is great) as the ambiguity in the use of *κλείς* for the collar-bone of an animal and for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as a starting-point, then, the various meanings of 'an unjust man'. Both the lawless man and the grasping and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair.

1129^{b} Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with goods—not all goods, but those with which prosperity and adversity have to do, which taken absolutely are always good, but for a particular person are not always good. Now men pray for and pursue these things; but they

should not, but should pray that the things that are good absolutely may also be good for them, and should choose the things that *are* good for them. The unjust man does not always choose the greater, but also the less—in the case of things bad absolutely; but because the lesser evil is itself thought to be in a sense good, and graspingness is directed at the good, therefore he is thought to be grasping. And he is unfair; for this contains and is common to both.

Since the lawless man was seen[1] to be unjust and the law-abiding man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society. And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery nor to gratify one's lust), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well. This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and 'neither evening nor morning star'[2] is so wonderful; and proverbially 'in justice is every virtue comprehended'.[3] And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to **1130**[a] their neighbour. This is why the saying of Bias is thought to be true, that 'rule will show the man'; for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men and a member of a society. For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's good',[4] because it is related to our neighbour; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner. Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards another; for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but virtue entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire. What the

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[1] [a]32-[b]1.

[2] Euripides, fr. from *Melanippe* (Nauck, fr. 486).

[3] Theognis, 147.

[4] Plato, *Republic* 343.

difference is between virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are the same but their essence is not the same; what, as a relation to one's neighbour, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without qualification, virtue.

2

But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which is a *part* of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain. Similarly it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are concerned.

That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts wrongly indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws away his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to help a friend with money through meanness), when a man acts graspingly he often exhibits none of these vices,—no, nor all together, but certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame him) and injustice. There is, then, another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and a use of the word 'unjust' which answers to a part of what is unjust in the wide sense of 'contrary to the law'. Again if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, he is unjust by reason of his making gain by his act. Again, all other unjust acts are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wickedness, e.g. adultery to self-indulgence, the desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, physical violence to anger; but if a man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness but injustice. Evidently, therefore, there is apart from injustice in the wide sense another, 'particular', injustice which shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition **1130**[b] falls within the same genus; for the significance of both consists in a relation to one's neighbour, but the one is concerned with honour or money or safety—or that which includes all these, if we had a single name for it—and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain; while the other is concerned with all the objects with which the good man is concerned.

It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must try to grasp its genus and differentia.

The unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and the just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful answers the afore-mentioned sense of injustice. But since the unfair and the unlawful are not the same, but are different as a part is from its whole (for all that is unfair is unlawful, but not all that is unlawful is unfair), the unjust and injustice in the sense of the unfair are not the same as but different from the former

kind, as part from whole; for injustice in this sense is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and similarly justice in the one sense of justice in the other. Therefore we must speak also about particular justice and particular injustice, and similarly about the just and the unjust. The justice, then, which answers to the whole of virtue, and the corresponding injustice, one being the exercise of virtue as a whole, and the other that of vice as a whole, towards one's neighbour, we may leave on one side. And how the meanings of 'just' and 'unjust' which answer to these are to be distinguished is evident; for practically the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole; for the law bids us practise every virtue and forbids us to practise any vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole are those of the acts prescribed by the law which have been prescribed with a view to education for the common good. But with regard to the education of the individual as such, which makes him without qualification a good *man*, we must determine later[5] whether this is the function of the political art or of another; for perhaps it is not the same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken at random.
Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (B) one is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions between **1131**[a] man and man. Of this there are two divisions; of transactions (1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary—voluntary such transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary (*a*) some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (*b*) others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.

Poetics, CH 21 [1457[b]*7-16] 693b*

Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship';[6] for lying at anchor is the 'standing' of a particular kind of thing. That from species to genus in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought',[7] where 'ten thousand',

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[5] 1179[b]20-1181[b]12. *Politics*, 1276[b]16-1277[b]32, 1278[a]40-[b]5, 1288[a]32-[b]2, 1333[a]11-16, 1337[a]11-14.
[6] *Odyssey*, I. 185, XXIV. 308.
[7] *Iliad.*, II. 272.

which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic ‘a large number’. That from species to species in ‘Drawing the life with the bronze’,[8] and in ‘Severing with the enduring bronze’;[9] where the poet uses ‘draw’ in the sense of ‘sever’ and ‘sever’ in that of ‘draw’, both words meaning to ‘take away’ something.

18 AUGUSTINE: *Christian Doctrine*, BK III, CH 34-35 670c-672d

Chap. 34. *The fourth rule of Tichonius*

47. The fourth rule of Tichonius is about *species and genus*. For so he calls it, intending that by species should be understood a part, by genus the whole of which that which he calls species is a part: as, for example, every single city is a part of the great society of nations: the city he calls a species, all nations constitute the genus. There is no necessity for here applying that subtilty of distinction which is in use among logicians, who discuss with great acuteness the difference between a part and a species. The rule is of course the same, if anything of the kind referred to is found in Scripture, not in regard to a single city, but in regard to a single province, or tribe, or kingdom. Not only, for example, about Jerusalem, or some of the cities of the Gentiles, such as Tyre or Babylon, are things said in Scripture whose significance oversteps the limits of the city, and which are more suitable when applied to all nations; but in regard to Judea also, and Egypt, and Assyria, or any other nation you choose to take which contains numerous cities, but still is not the whole world, but only a part of it, things are said which pass over the limits of that particular country, and apply more fitly to the whole of which this is a part; or, as our author terms it, to the genus of which this is a species. And hence these words have come to be commonly known, so that even uneducated people understand what is laid down specially, and what generally, in any given Imperial command. The same thing occurs in the case of men: things are said of Solomon, for example, the scope of which reaches far beyond him, and which are only properly understood when applied to Christ and His Church, of which Solomon is a part.[10]

48. Now the species is not always overstepped, for things are often said of such a kind as evidently apply to it also, or perhaps even to it exclusively. But when Scripture, having up to a certain point been speaking about the species, makes a transition at that point from the species to the genus, the reader must then be carefully on his guard against seeking in the species what he can find much better and more surely in the genus. Take, for example, what the prophet Ezekiel says: “When the house of Israel dwelt in

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[8] Empedocles, Κα*θαρμοί*; cf. fr. 143, Diels.
[9] Empedocles, Κα*θαρμοί*; cf. fr. 143, Diels.
[10] II Sam. 7. 14-16.

their own land, they defiled it by their own way, and by their doings: their way was before me as the uncleanness of a removed woman. Wherefore I poured my fury upon them for the blood that they had shed upon the land, and for their idols wherewith they had polluted it: and I scattered them among the heathen, and they were dispersed through the countries: according to their way, and according to their doings, I judged them." [11] Now it is easy to understand that this applies to that house of Israel of which the apostle says, "Behold Israel after the flesh";[12] because the people of Israel after the flesh did both perform and endure all that is here referred to. What immediately follows, too, may be understood as applying to the same people. But when the prophet begins to say, "And I will sanctify my great name, which was profaned among the heathen, which ye have profaned in the midst of them; and the heathen shall know that I am the Lord," [13] the reader ought now carefully to observe the way in which the species is overstepped and the genus taken in. For he goes on to say: "And I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes. For I will take you from among the heathen, and gather you out of all countries, and will bring you into your own land. Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and I will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my commandments, and do them. And ye shall dwell in the land that I gave to your fathers; and ye shall be my people, and I will be your God. I will also save you from all your uncleannesses." [14] Now that this is a prophecy of the New Testament, to which pertain not only the remnant of that one nation of which it is elsewhere said, "For though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, yet a remnant of them shall be saved," [15] but also the other nations which were promised to their fathers and our fathers; and that there is here a promise of that washing of regeneration which, as we see, is now imparted to all nations, no one who looks into the matter can doubt. And that saying of the apostle, when he is commending the grace of the New Testament and its excellence in comparison with the Old, "Ye are our epistle... written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart," [16] has an evident reference to this place where the prophet says, "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an

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[11] Ezek. 36. 17-19.
[12] I Cor. 10. 18.
[13] Ezek. 36. 23.
[14] Ezek. 36. 23-29.
[15] Isa. 10. 22.
[16] II Cor. 3. 2, 3.

heart of flesh." [17] Now the heart of flesh from which the apostle's expression, "the fleshy tables of the heart," is drawn, the prophet intended to point out as distinguished from the stony heart by the possession of sentient life; and by sentient he understood intelligent life. And thus the spiritual Israel is made up, not of one nation, but of all the nations which were promised to the fathers in their seed, that is, in Christ.

49. This spiritual Israel, therefore, is distinguished from the carnal Israel which is of one nation, by newness of grace, not by nobility of descent, in feeling, not in race; but the prophet, in his depth of meaning, while speaking of the carnal Israel, passes on, without indicating the transition, to speak of the spiritual, and although now speaking of the latter, seems to be still speaking of the former; not that he grudges us the clear apprehension of Scripture, as if we were enemies, but that he deals with us as a physician, giving us a wholesome exercise for our spirit. And therefore we ought to take this saying, "And I will bring you into your own land," and what he says shortly afterwards, as if repeating himself, "And ye shall dwell in the land that I gave to your fathers," not literally, as if they referred to Israel after the flesh, but spiritually, as referring to the spiritual Israel. For the Church, without spot or wrinkle, gathered out of all nations, and destined to reign for ever with Christ, is itself the land of the blessed, the land of the living; and we are to understand that this was given to the fathers when it was promised to them for what the fathers believed would be given in its own time was to them, on account of the unchangeableness of the promise and purpose, the same as if it were already given; just as the apostle, writing to Timothy, speaks of the grace which is given to the saints: "Not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began; but is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour." [18] He speaks of the grace as given at a time when those to whom it was to be given were not yet in existence; because he looks upon that as having been already done in the arrangement and purpose of God, which was to take place in its own time, and he himself speaks of it as now made manifest. It is possible, however, that these words may refer to the land of the age to come, when there will be a new heaven and a new earth, wherein the unrighteous shall be unable to dwell. And so it is truly said to the righteous, that the land itself is theirs, no part of which will belong to the unrighteous; because it is the same as if it were itself given, when it is firmly settled that it shall be given.

Chap. 35. *The fifth rule of Tichonius*

50. The fifth rule Tichonius lays down is one he designates *of times*—a rule by which we can frequently discover or conjecture quantities of time which are not expressly mentioned in Scripture. And he says that this rule applies

[17] Ezek. 38, 26.
[18] II Tim. 1. 9, 10.

in two ways: either to the figure of speech called *synecdoche*, or to legitimate numbers. The figure synecdoche either puts the part for the whole, or the whole for the part. As, for example, in reference to the time when, in the presence of only three of His disciples, our Lord was transfigured on the mount, so that His face shone as the sun, and His raiment was white as snow, one evangelist says that this event occurred "after eight days," [19] while another says that it occurred "after six days." [20] Now both of these statements about the number of days cannot be true, unless we suppose that the writer who says "after eight days," counted the latter part of the day on which Christ uttered the prediction and the first part of the day on which he showed its fulfillment as two whole days; while the writer who says "after six days," counted only the whole unbroken days between these two. This figure of speech, which puts the part for the whole, explains also the great question about the resurrection of Christ. For unless to the latter part of the day on which He suffered we join the previous night, and count it as a whole day, and to the latter part of the night in which He arose we join the Lord's day which was just dawning, and count it also a whole day, we cannot make out the three days and three nights during which He foretold that He would be in the heart of the earth. [21]
51. In the next place, our author calls those numbers *legitimate* which Holy Scripture more highly favors such as seven, or ten, or twelve, or any of the other numbers which the diligent reader of Scripture soon comes to know. Now numbers of this sort are often put for time universal; as for example, "Seven times in the day do I praise Thee," means just the same as "His praise shall continually be in my mouth." [22] And their force is exactly the same, either when multiplied by ten, as seventy and seven hundred (whence the seventy years mentioned in Jeremiah may be taken in a spiritual sense for the whole time during which the Church is a sojourner among aliens);[23] or when multiplied into themselves, as ten into ten gives one hundred, and twelve into twelve gives one hundred and forty-four, which last number is used in the Apocalypse to signify the whole body of the saints.[24] Hence it appears that it is not merely questions about times that are to be settled by these numbers, but that their significance is of much wider application, and extends to many subjects. That number in the Apocalypse, for example, mentioned above, has not reference to times, but to men.

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[19] Luke, 9. 28.
[20] Matt. 17. 1; Mark, 9, 2.
[21] Matt. 12. 40.
[22] Cf. Ps. 119. 164. with 34. 2.
[23] Jer. 25. 11.
[24] Rev. 7. 4.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 27, A 2, ANS 154c-155b; Q 67, A 1 349d-350b; A 2, REP 3 350b-351a; Q 68, A 4 358b-359b; Q 115, A 2, ANS 587c-588c

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 27, A 2, ANS 154c-155b

Article 2. *Whether Any Procession in God Can Be Called Generation?*

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the procession which is in God cannot be called generation.

Objection 1. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.

Obj. 2. Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained (A. 1). But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God.

Obj. 3. Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-subsisting (Q. III, A. 4), it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): "*This day have I begotten Thee.*"

I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things.

So in this manner the procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation: from a conjoined principle (as above described); by way of likeness because the

conception of the intellect is a likeness of the thing understood; and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His being are the same, as shown above (Q. XIV, A. 4). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation, and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act; in which sense it is not found in God.

Reply Obj. 2. The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands (Q. XIV, A. 4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "*The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was brought forth.*" (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not, however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (Q. IV, A. 2).

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 67, A 1 349d-350b

Article 1. *Whether the Word Light Is Used in Its Proper Sense in Speaking of Spiritual Things?*

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that light is used in its proper sense in spiritual things.

Objection 1. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* iv, 28)[25] that in spiritual things "light is better and surer; and that Christ is not called Light in the same

[25] PL 34, 415.

sense as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, and the latter figuratively."
Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv)[26] includes Light among the intelligible names of God. But such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters.
Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5. 13): *All that is made manifest is light.* But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Fid.* ii)[27] that Splendour is among those things which are said of God metaphorically.
I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways—that is to say, either in its original application or according to custom. This is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "See how it tastes," or smells, or is hot. Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: *Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God* (Matt. 5. 8). And thus it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to knowledge of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (*loc. cit.*). But if taken according to the usage of speech, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.
The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said.

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 67, A 2, REP 3 350b-351a

Article 2. *Whether Light is a Body?*

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that light is a body.
Objection 1. For Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii, 5)[28] that "light takes the first place among bodies." Therefore light is a body.
Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says[29] that light is a species of fire. But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.
Obj. 3. Further, to be borne, to be divided, to be reflected, is proper to bodies; and all these are attributed to light and its rays. Moreover, different

[26] Sect. 5 (PG 3, 700).
[27] Prol. (PL 16, 584).
[28] PL 32, 1279.
[29] *Topics,* V, 5 (134^{b}29).

rays of light, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.*),[30] are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies. Therefore light is a body.

On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore light is not a body.

I answer that, Light cannot be a body, which appears in three ways. First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies, of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place, since contiguity requires distinction of place.

The second reason is from the nature of movement. For if light were a body, illumination would be the local motion of a body. Now no local motion of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the end, whereas illumination is instantaneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local motion of a body.

The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves round with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before.

Since, therefore, these things go against not only reason, but also the sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act—in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.

Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle refers to light as fire existing in its proper matter; just as fire in aerial matter is called flame, or in earthly matter is called *coal*.

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[30] II, 4 (PG 3, 641).

Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances brought in by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he mentions them as probable opinions of other writers.

Reply Obj. 3. All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because "motion from place to place is naturally the first of movements," as is proved in the *Physics,*[31] we use terms belonging to local motion in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is extended from the idea of place, to that of all contraries, as is said in the *Metaphysics.*[32]

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 68, A 4 358b-359b

Article 4. *Whether There Is Only One Heaven?*

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that there is only one heaven.

Objection 1. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.* But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven.

Obj. 2. Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves.[33] Therefore there is but one heaven.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then, they are many, there must be some common motion by reason of which each is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148. 4): *Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens.*

I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one heaven (*Hom.* iv *in Gen.*),[34] and that the words *heavens of heavens* are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (*Hom.* iii *in Hexaëm.*),[35] whom Damascene follows (*De Fid. Orth.* ii),[36] says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called

[31] Aristotle, VIII, 7 (260ª28).
[32] Aristotle, X, 4 (1055ª9).
[33] *Heavens,* 1, 9 (279ª7).
[34] PG 53, 41.
[35] PG 29, 56.
[36] Chap. 6 (PG 94, 880, 884).

birds of heaven. But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one.

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous[37]; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the eight heavens, are the spheres of the planets.

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (*ibid*.) holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was *rapt to the third heaven* (2 Cor. 12. 2).

But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region, Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens.[38] The higher region of fire he calls "the fiery heaven"; the lower, "the Olympian heaven" from a lofty mountain of that name; the higher region of air he calls, from its brightness, "the ethereal heaven," the lower, the "aerial." When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus.

Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, *I will ascend into heaven*, whereby the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual goods, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according to Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*),[39] in the words, *Your reward is very great in heaven* (Matt. 5. 12).

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[37] This and the following names are found in *Glossa ordin.,* on Gen. 1. 1 (1, 23F); Bede, *In Pentat.,* Bk. I, on Gen. 1. 1 (PL 91, 192); on the names, disposition and number of the heavens, see Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.,* I-II, n. 266 (QR II, 327); Albert, *In Sent.,* II, d. XV, A. 3 (BO XXVII, 275); *Summa de Creatur.,* Pt. I, tr. 3, Q. 10 (BO XXXIV, 415); Bonaventure, *In Sent.,* II, d. ii, dub. 2 (QR II, 85). Cf. Denifle, *Chartularium,* n. 128 (I, 171).

[38] Bede, *In Pentat.,* on Gen. 1. 1 (PL 91, 192).

[39] I, 5 (PL 34, 1237).

Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to which Augustine (*De Gen. ad lit.* xii)[40] expounds Paul's rapture *to the third heaven.*
Reply Obj. 1. The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one centre may have many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heavens.
Reply Obj. 2. The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one.
Reply Obj. 3. All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 115, A 2, ANS 587c-588c

Article 2. *Whether There Are Any Seminal Principles in Corporeal Matter?*

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that there are no seminal principles in corporeal matter.
Objection 1. For principle (*ratio*) implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal principles in corporeal matter.
Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*De Trin.* iii, 8, 9)[41] says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not principles, are what can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal principles in corporeal matter.
Obj. 3. Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter, since, as we have said above, it does not pertain to matter to act (A. 1, ANS. 2, 4). Therefore there are no seminal principles in corporeal matter.
Obj. 4. Further, there are said to be certain causal principles (Augustine, *De Gen. ad lit.* vi, 14)[42] which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal principles are not causal principles, for miracles are outside the scope of seminal principles, but not of causal principles. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal principles in corporeal matter.
On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii, 8):[43] "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."

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[40] Chap. 28, 29, 34 (PL 34, 478, 479, 482).
[41] PL 42, 876, 878.
[42] PL 34, 349; cf. also Bonaventure, *In Sent.*, II, d. 18, A. 1, Q. 2(QR II, 438).
[43] PL 42, 875.

I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says.[44] Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect, and so the word nature has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, nature, as the Philosopher says,[45] was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word nature has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of seminal principles (*seminales rationes*) to all those active and passive powers which are the principles of natural generation and movement.[46]

These active and passive powers may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* vi, 10),[47] they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as exemplar ideas. Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in universal causes. Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in particular causes. Fourthly, they are in the seeds produced from animals and plants. And these again are related to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

Reply Obj. 1. There active and passive powers (virtues) of natural things, though not called principles (*rationes*) by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be called so in respect of their origin, according as they are the effect of the exemplar ideas (*rationes ideales*).

Reply Obj. 2. These active and passive principles are in certain parts of corporeal things, and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.

Reply Obj. 3. The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word seed covers both active and passive principles.

Reply Obj. 4. From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal principles, it is easy to gather that they are also causal principles, just as seed is a kind of cause; for he says (*De Trin.* iii, 9)[48] that, "as a mother is

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[44] *Soul*, II, 4 (416^b23).
[45] *Metaphysics,* V, 4 (1014^b16).
[46] *De Trin.*, III, 8 (PL 42, 875).
[47] PL 34, 346.
[48] PL 42, 878.

pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn beings." Nevertheless, the exemplar ideas can be called causal principles, but not, strictly speaking, seminal principles, because seed is not a separate principles, and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal principles. Likewise neither are miracles wrought which are outside the scope of the passive principles so implanted in the creature that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active principles, and the passive potencies which are ordered to such active principles, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal principles.

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 49, A 1 1b-2b; PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS and REP 2 424b-425a; Q 186, A 1, ANS 650c-651d

Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 1 1b-2b

Article 1. *Whether Habit Is a Quality?*

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that habit is not a quality.

Objection 1. For Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, *qu*. 73):[49] "This word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'To have.'" But "To have" pertains not only to quality, but also to the other categories, for we speak of ourselves as having quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Obj. 2. Further, habit is considered as one of the predicaments, as may be clearly seen in the *Book on the Predicaments.*[50] But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Obj. 3. Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the *Book on the Predicaments.*[51] Now disposition is "the order of that which has parts," as stated in the *Metaphysics.*[52] But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says, in the *Book on the Predicaments,*[53] that "habit is a quality which it is difficult to change."

I answer that, This word *habitus* (habit) is derived from *habere* (to have). Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, according as man, or any other thing, is said to have something; in another way, according as a particular thing is ordered (*se habet*) in a certain way either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.

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[49] PL 40, 84.
[50] Aristotle, *Categories,* 8 (8^b26).
[51] *Ibid.* (9^a10).
[52] Aristotle, V, 19 (1022^b1).
[53] *Categories*, 8 (9^a3).

Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is had, is common to different genera. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the post-predicaments,[54] so called because they result from the different genera of things; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and the like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the haver and that which is had; as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation; as for instance a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or a passion, but something after the manner of action or passion; thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered. Therefore the Philosopher says[55] that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had," as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which is called the predicament of Habit, of which the Philosopher says[56] that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed."

But if "to have" be taken according as a thing is ordered in regard to itself or to something else, in that case habit is a quality, since this mode of having is in respect of some quality; and of this the Philosopher says[57] that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another; thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. therefore we must say that habit is a quality.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes "to have" in the general sense, for in this sense it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver and that which is had, and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3. Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts. But this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say: namely, "either as to place or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his *Commentary on the Predicaments,*[58] "he includes all dispositions:—bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament Position, which is the order of parts in a place. "When he says 'as to power,' he includes all

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[54] *Ibid.*, 15 (15^b17).
[55] *Metaphysics,* v, 20 (1022^b4).
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Metaphysics,* v, 20 (1022^b10).
[58] *In Cat.*, VIII (CG VIII, 240.30).

those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as undeveloped science and virtue. "And when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.

Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS and REP 2 424b-425a

Article 2. *Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things?*

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things.

Objection 1. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv, I)[59] that "knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. I, A. 1). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.

Obj. 2. Further, The gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Rom. 1. 20, *the invisible things of God ... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.* If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also knowledge of Divine things.

On the contrary, Augustine says[60]: "The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."

I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing is formed chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the judgment about a second cause be formed through the first cause. Nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause. Therefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause is the first and most perfect judgment.

Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of "definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper" terms.

Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment, as stated above (A. 1, Reply 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from

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[59] PL 42, 1037.

[60] *Ibid.*

the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom. For a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that cause; and a wise man absolutely, is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is called wisdom, while the knowledge of human things is called knowledge (*scientia*), this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.

Reply Obj. 1. Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought to believe, pertains to the gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them, pertains to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of the term. It is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. I, A. 1), every cognitive habit regards formally the means through which things are known, and materially, the things that are known through the means. And since that which is formal is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter (*materia naturalis*) from mathematical principles, are counted rather among the mathematical sciences as being more like to them, though as to their matter they have more in common with the natural sciences; and for this reason it is stated in the *Physics*[61] that they are "more akin to physics (*magis naturales*)." Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to knowledge, to which it belongs formally, rather than to wisdom, to which it belongs materially; and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this pertains to wisdom rather than to knowledge.

Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 186, A 1, ANS 650c-651d

Article 1. *Whether Religion Implies a State of Perfection?*

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of perfection.

Objection 1. For that which is necessary for salvation does not seem to pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound (*religamur*) to the one true God," as

[61] Aristotle, II, 2 (194ª7).

Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* 55),[62] or because it takes its name from "our returning (*religimus*) to God Whom we had lost by neglecting Him," according to Augustine.[63] Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, Religion according to Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii, 53)[64] is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the divine nature." Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of state, as stated above (Q. XL, A. 2; Q. CLXXXIII, A. 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, The state of perfection is distinct from the state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 4. Further, Religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is said in the Decrees (VII, Q. 1, cap. *Hoc nequaquam*):[65] "The holy synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance should by no means rise again to the episcopate." Now a place of repentance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* vi)[66] places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of perfection.

On the contrary, In the *Conferences of the Fathers* (*Collat.* i. 7)[67] abbot Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation, reading and other acts of virtue in order by these degrees to mount to the perfection of charity." Now things pertaining to human acts are specified and named from the intention of the end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection. Moreover Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* vi)[68] that those who are called servants of God by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXLI, A. 2) that which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of fortitude is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of temperance by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now religion as stated above (Q. LXXXXI, A. 2; A. 3,

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[62] PL 32, 172.
[63] *City of God,* X, 3 (PL 41, 280).
[64] DD 1, 165.
[65] Gratian, *Decretum*, Pt. II (RF 1, 585).
[66] Sect. 1 (PG 3, 529).
[67] Cassianus (PL 49, 489).
[68] Sect. 3 (PG 3, 532).

Reply 2) is a virtue by which a man offers something to the service and worship of God. Therefore those who give themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust to God, are called religious antonomastically. Hence Gregory says (*Hom.* viii *in Ezech.*):[69] "Some there are who keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess." Now the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated above (Q. CLXXXIV, A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. To offer something to the worship of God is necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's possessions, to the worship of God belongs to perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXXXI, A. 1, Reply 1; A. 4, Reply 1 and 2) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which, in so far as these are referred to God's service and honour, become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in the state of perfection are called religious.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (*On the contrary*) religion denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matt. 19. 21, *If thou wilt be perfect,* etc., says (*Tract.* XV *in Matt.*)[70] that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him to all the virtues." Thus all are not perfect in religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.

Reply Obj. 4. The religious state was instituted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises by means of which the obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Therefore since it pertains to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, Q. II, cap. *Admonere*)[71] a man who had killed his wife is counselled to enter a monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather than to do public penance while remaining in the world.

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[69] Bk. II (PL 76, 1037).
[70] PG 13, 1301.
[71] Gratian, *Decretum,* Pt. II. (RF 1, 1152).

39 SMITH: *Wealth of Nations*, BK II, 123b-d

Secondly, as the machines and instruments of a trade, etc., which compose the fixed capital either of an individual or of a society, make no part either of the gross or of the net revenue of either; so money, by means of which the whole revenue of the society is regularly distributed among all its different members, makes itself no part of that revenue. The great wheel of circulation is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by means of it. The revenue of the society consists altogether in those goods, and not in the wheel which circulates them. In computing either the gross or the net revenue of any society, we must always, from their whole annual circulation of money and goods, deduct the whole value of the money, of which not a single farthing can ever make any part of either.

It is the ambiguity of language only which can make this proposition appear either doubtful or paradoxical. When properly explained and understood, it is almost self-evident.

When we talk of any particular sum of money, we sometimes mean nothing but the metal pieces of which it is composed; and sometimes we include in our meaning some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for it, or to the power of purchasing which the possession of it conveys. Thus when we say that the circulating money of England has been computed at eighteen millions, we mean only to express the amount of the metal pieces, which some writers have computed, or rather have supposed to circulate in that country. But when we say that a man is worth fifty or a hundred pounds a year, we mean commonly to express not only the amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, but the value of the goods which he can annually purchase or consume. We mean commonly to ascertain what is or ought to be his way of living, or the quantity and quality of the necessaries and conveniencies of life in which he can with propriety indulge himself.

When, by any particular sum of money, we mean not only to express the amount of the metal pieces of which it is composed, but to include in its signification some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for them, the wealth or revenue which it in this case denotes, is equal only to one of the two values which are thus intimated somewhat ambiguously by the same word, and to the latter more properly than to the former, to the money's worth more properly than to the money.

Thus if a guinea be the weekly pension of a particular person, he can in the course of the week purchase with it a certain quantity of subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements. In proportion as this quantity is great or small, so are his real riches, his real weekly revenue. His weekly revenue is certainly not equal both to the guinea, and to what can be purchased with it, but only to one or other of those two equal values; and to the latter

more properly than to the former, to the guinea's worth rather than to the guinea.
If the pension of such a person was paid to him, not in gold, but in a weekly bill for a guinea, his revenue surely would not so properly consist in the piece of paper, as in what he could get for it. A guinea may be considered as a bill for a certain quantity of necessaries and conveniencies upon all the tradesmen in the neighbourhood. The revenue of the person to whom it is paid, does not so properly consist in the piece of gold, as in what he can get for it, or in what he can exchange it for. If it could be exchanged for nothing, it would, like a bill upon a bankrupt, be of no more value than the most useless piece of paper.

43 MILL: *Utilitarianism*, 447b-d

Chapter 2

What Utilitarianism Is

A passing remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong, use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the philosophical opponents of utilitarianism, for even the momentary appearance of confounding them with any one capable of so absurd a misconception; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the contrary accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its grossest form, is another of the common charges against utilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of persons, and often the very same persons, denounce the theory “as impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility.” Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things. Yet the common herd, including the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word utilitarian, while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment; as though it implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use is the only one in which

the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning. Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this utter degradation.[72]

54 FREUD: *General Introduction*, 509d

There is still something to be said on the subject of wood. It is not easy to see why wood should have come to represent a woman or mother, but here a comparison of different languages may be useful to us. The German word *Holz* (wood) is said to be derived from the same root as the Greek ὕλη, which means *stuff*, raw material. This would be an instance of a process which is by no means rare, in that a general name for material has come finally to be applied to a particular material only. Now, in the Atlantic Ocean, there is an island named Madeira, and this name was given to it by the Portuguese when they discovered it, because at that time it was covered with dense forests; for in Portuguese the word for wood is *madeira*. But you cannot fail to notice that this *madeira* is merely a modified form of the Latin *materia*, which again signifies material in general. Now *materia* is derived from *mater*=mother, and the material out of which anything is made may be conceived of as giving birth to it. So, in the symbolic use of wood to represent woman or mother, we have a survival of this old idea.

[72] The author of this essay has reason for believing himself to be the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use. He did not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Galt's *Annals of the Parish.* After using it as a designation for several years, he and others abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as a name for one single opinion, not a set of opinions—to denote the recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying it—the term supplies a want in the language, and offers, in many cases, a convenient mode of avoiding tiresome circumlocution.