

2b. The first and second intention of names: words signifying things and words signifying idea

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 29, A 1, REP 3 162a-163b; A 2, ANS 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4, ANS 170c-171b; Q 85, A 2, REP 2 453d-455b

23 HOBBS: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a; PART IV, 270a-b

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 79c; BK III, 150a

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH II 252d-254c passim; CH III, sect 11 257a-b; CH IV, sect 2 260b; CH V, sect 12 266d-267a; sect 14 267b-c; CH VI, sect 19 273b; sect 48-50 282b-d; CH XI, sect 10 302b; sect 24 305b-d

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 4b-c

53 JAMES: Psychology, 127b-128a

**19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 29, A 1, REP 3
162a-163b; A 2, ANS 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4, ANS 170c-171b; Q 85, A
2, REP 2 453d-455b**

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 29, A 1, REP 3 162a-163b

Article 1. *The Definition of "Person"*

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the definition of person given by Boëthis (*De Duab. Nat.*)¹ is insufficient — that is, “a person is an individual substance of a rational nature.”

Objection 1. For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But person signifies something singular. Therefore person is improperly defined.

Obj. 2. Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person is either first substance or second substance. If it is the former, the word individual is superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word individual is false, for there is contradiction of terms, since second substances are the genera or species. Therefore this definition is incorrect.

Obj. 3. Further, an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal" would not be a correct definition, since man is the name of a thing, and species is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word individual which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition.

Obj. 4. Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as Aristotle says.² But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word nature ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be essence.

Obj. 5. Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature, but it is not a person. Therefore person is not properly defined as above.

I answer that, Although the universal and particular are found in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual is found in the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself, whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance, for this particular whiteness is called "this" because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called *hypostases*,³ or first substances.

¹ Chap. 3 (PL 64, 1343).

² *Physics*, II, 1 (192^b21).

³ Cf. Boëthius, *De Duabus Nat.*, 3 (PL 64, 1344).

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in rational substances which have dominion over their own actions, and which are not only made to act, like others, but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the singulars of the rational nature have also a special name even among other substances, and this name is person.

Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of person as signifying the singular in the genus of substance and the term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.

Reply Obj. 1. Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet what belongs to the common notion of singularity can be defined; and so the Philosopher⁴ gives a definition of first substance, and in this way Boëthius defines person.

Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of some,⁵ the term substance in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term individual superfluously added, for by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is, since it is only a part. But where "individual" is added, the notion of being able to be assumed is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater — that is, by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when "individual" is added, it is restricted to first substance.

Reply Obj. 3. Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body, for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining things if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.

Reply Obj. 4. According to the Philosopher⁶ the word nature was first used to signify the "generation of living things," which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the "intrinsic principle of any kind of movement." In this sense he defines "nature."⁷ And since this kind of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And

⁴ *Categories*, 5 (2^a11).

⁵ Richard of St. Victor, *De Trin.*, IV, 4 (PL 196, 932); chap. 20 (943); Also, Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.*, II, 387 (QR I, 571).

⁶ *Metaphysics*, V, 4 (1014^b16).

⁷ *Physics*, II, 1 (192^b14).

as the essence of anything is completed by the form, so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the proper form of a thing. So in the definition of person, which means the singular in a determined genus, it is more correct to use the term nature than essence, because the latter is taken from being, which is most common.

Reply Obj. 5. The soul is a part of the human species, and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it.

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 29, A 2, ANS 163b-164b

Article 2. Whether "Person" is the Same as Hypostasis, Subsistence, and Essence?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that person is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence.

Objection 1. For Boëthius says (*De Duab. Nat.*)⁸ that "the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies person. Therefore person is altogether the same as hypostasis.

Obj. 2. Further, just as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in God, which implies that person and subsistence have the same meaning. Therefore person and subsistence mean the same.

Obj. 3. Further, Boëthius says (*Com. Præd.*)⁹ that οὐσία, which is the same as essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form. Now, that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called *hypostasis* and *person*. Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Duab. Nat.*)¹⁰ that "genera and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand." But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons, the latter are not the same as subsistences.

⁸ Chap. 3 (PL 64, 184).

⁹ *In Cat. Arist.*, Bk. I, chap. *De subst.* (PL 64, 184).

¹⁰ Chap. 3 (PL 64, 1344).

Obj. 5. Further, Boëthius says¹¹ that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called ὀυσιώσις — that is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs from the others.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher¹² substance is spoken of in two ways. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in this sense substance is called by the Greek οὐσία, which we may call essence. In another sense substance means a subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called suppositum. It is also called by three names signifying a reality — that is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called subsistence; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called a thing of nature; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called hypostasis, or substance. What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name person signifies in the genus of rational substances.

Reply Obj. 1. Among the Greeks, the term hypostasis, taken in the proper meaning of the word, signifies any individual of the genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature.

Reply Obj. 2. As we say three persons plurally in God, and three subsistences, so the Greeks say three hypostases. But because the word substance, which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to hypostasis, is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use subsistence for hypostasis, rather than substance.

Reply Obj. 3. Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the notion of man; but this soul, this flesh, and this bone belong to the notion of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the notion of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things

¹¹ *In Cat. Arist.*, (*loc. cit.*); cf. Albert the Great, *Sent.*, 1, d. XXIII, A. 4 (BO XXV, 591).

¹² *Metaphysics*, V, 8 (1017^b23).

composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity (Q. III, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4. Boëthius says¹³ that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprehended in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves subsist (except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things). To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside the notion of genera and species.

Reply Obj. 5. The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boëthius says (*De Trin.*):¹⁴ "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual being to the matter, and thus it is able to subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and ὀυσιώσις, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.

Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 30, A 4, ANS 170c-171b

Article 4. Whether This Term "Person" Can Be Common to the Three Persons?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that this term person cannot be common to the three persons.

Objection 1. For nothing is common to the three persons but the essence. But this term person does not signify the essence directly. Therefore it is not common to all three.

Obj. 2. Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable, as appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q. XXIX, A. 3, ANS. 4). Therefore this term person is not common to all the three persons.

Obj. 3. Further, if the name person is common to the three, it is common either really or logically. But it is not so really; otherwise the three persons would be one person. Nor again is it so logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is neither universal nor particular, neither genus nor species, as we proved above (Q. III, A. 5). Therefore this term person is not common to the three.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vii, 4)¹⁵ that when we ask, "Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is common to them.

¹³ *In Porphyrium*, Bk. I. "Mox de generibus," etc. (PL 64, 85).

¹⁴ Chap. 2 (PL 64, 1250).

¹⁵ PL 42, 940.

I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term person is common to the three when we say three persons; for when we say three men we show that man is common to the three. Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of the three, as also one essence.

What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject. Some¹⁶ have called it a community of negation, because the definition of person contains the word incommunicable. Others¹⁷ thought it to be a community of intention, as the definition of person contains the word individual; as we say that to be a species is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that person is not a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality.

We must therefore resolve that even in human things this name person is common by a community of notion not as genus or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms genus or species. The vague individual thing, as "some man," signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of being of singular things — that is, something self-subsisting distinct from others. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference — that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singular things, while this name person is not given to signify the individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name person is common in idea to the three divine persons.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is founded on a real community.

Reply Obj. 2. Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many.

Reply Obj. 3. Although this community is logical and not real, yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species, and because the divine persons have one being, whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being.

¹⁶ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, I, 6, 2 (fol. 10C).

¹⁷ See Alexander of Hales, *S. T.*, II, 389 (QR I, 573).

Article 2. Whether the Intelligible Species Abstracted from the Phantasm Is Related to Our Intellect As That Which Is Understood?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood.

Objection 1. For the understood in act is in the one who understands, since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood.

Obj. 2. Further, what is actually understood must be in something; otherwise it would be nothing. But it is not in the thing which is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the above mentioned intelligible species.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says¹⁸ that "words are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul, namely, the intelligible species, are what is actually understood.

On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is understood, but that by which the intellect understands.

I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellectual powers know only the impression made on them,¹⁹ as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the objects of science are the same. Therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with things outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood.²⁰ Secondly, it is untrue because it would lead to the opinion of the philosophers of antiquity who maintained that "whatever seems, is true,"²¹ and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the power knows its own impression only, it can judge

¹⁸ *Interpretation*, I (16^a3).

¹⁹ Protagoras and Heraclitus; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX, 3 (1047^a6); IV, 3 (1005^b25). Cf. St. Thomas, *In Meta.*, IX, 3; IV, 6.

²⁰ Cf. Q. LXXXIV, AA. 1, 4.

²¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV, 5, (1009^a8).

of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the knowing power. Consequently the knowing power will always judge of its own impression as such, and so every judgment will be true; for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste judges that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and likewise if anyone with a corrupt taste judges that honey is bitter, this would be true, for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands, which is proved thus. There is a twofold action,²² one which remains in the agent, for instance, to see and to understand, and another which passes into an external thing, for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which an act tending to something external proceeds is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated, so the form from which an action remaining in the agent proceeds is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect is turned back (*reflectitur*) upon itself, by the same reflection it understands both its own act of understanding and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily, but that which is primarily understood is the thing, of which the intelligible species is the likeness.

This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers,²³ who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle,²⁴ who says that "a stone is not in the soul, but the likeness of the stone," it follows that the soul knows the things which are outside of it, by means of its intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 1. The thing understood is in the one who understands by its own likeness, and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, just as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood, but rather that it is the likeness of it.

²² *Metaphysics*, IX, 8 (1050^a23).

²³ Empedocles and Plato, in Aristotle, *Soul*, I, 5 (409^b26); I, 2 (404^b17).

²⁴ *Soul*, III, 8 (431^b29).

Reply Obj. 2. In these words "the thing actually understood" there is a twofold meaning: the thing which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal" imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it falls to be understood, or to be abstracted, or to bear the intention of universality is only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted, or bears the intention of universality is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the colour of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the colour which is seen apart from the smell, it is clear that the colour which is seen is only in the apple; but that it be perceived apart from the smell is owing to the sight, since the likeness of colour and not of smell is in the sight. In like manner humanity which is understood is only in this or that man, but that humanity is apprehended without the individual conditions, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, happens to humanity according as it is perceived by the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the individual principles.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two operations in the sensitive part. One in regard to change only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being changed by the sensible. The other is formation, according as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion of the possible intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and then the possible intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, which is expressed by a word. Thus the notion signified by a word is its definition, and a proposition signifies the intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves, but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

23 HOBBS: *Leviathan*, PART I, 57d-58a; PART IV, 270a-b

Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a

When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it: *understanding* being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for ought I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding; though many think they understand then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind, and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions.

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of *inconstant* signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of virtues and vices: for one man calleth *wisdom* what another calleth *fear*; and one *cruelty* what another *justice*; one *prodigality* what another *magnanimity*; and one *gravity* what another *stupidity*, etc. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can metaphors and tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous because they profess their inconstancy, which the other do not.

Leviathan, PART IV, 270a-b

To know now upon what grounds they say there be essences abstract, or substantial forms, we are to consider what those words do properly signify. The use of words is to register to ourselves, and make manifest to others, the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Of which words, some are the names of the things conceived; as the names of all sorts of bodies that work upon the senses and leave an impression in the imagination: others are the names of the imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those ideas or mental images we have of all things we see or remember: and others again are names of names, or of different sorts of speech; as *universal*, *plural*, *singular*, are the names of names; and *definition*, *affirmation*, *negation*, *true*, *false*, *sylogism*, *interrogation*, *promise*, *covenant*, are the names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence or repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, "a man is a body," he intendeth that the name of *body* is necessarily consequent to the name of *man*, as being but several name of the same thing, *man*; which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word *is*. And as we use the verb *is*; so the Latins use their verb *est*, and the Greeks their *ἐστι* through all its declinations. Whether all other nations of the world have in their several languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need of it: for the placing of two names in

order may serve to signify their consequence, if it were the custom (for custom is it that gives words their force), as well as the words *is*, or *be*, or *are*, and the like.

24 RABELAIS: *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK II, 79c; BK III, 150a

Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 79c

The Small Vales or Drinking Money of the Indulgences.

*Præclarissimi juris utriusque Doctoris Maistre Pillotti, &c., Scrapfarthingi De Botchandis Glossæ Accursianæ Triflis Repetitio Enucidiluculidissima.*²⁵

*Stratagemata Francharchieri de Baniolet.*²⁶

*Franctopinus or Churlbumpkinus, De Re Militari cum Figuris Tevoti.*²⁷

*De Usu et Utilitate Flayandi Equos et Equas, authore Magistro nostro de Quebecu.*²⁸

The Sauciness of Country-Stewards.

*M. N. Rostocostjambedanese De Mustarda Post Prandium Servienda, libri quatuordecim, apostilati per M. Vaurillonis.*²⁹

The Couillage or Wench-tribute of Promoters.

*Jabolenus De Cosmographia Purgatorii.*³⁰

*Quæstio Subtilissima, utrum Chimæra in vacuo bombinans possit comedere secundas intentiones; et fuit debatuta per decem hebdomadas in Consilio Constantiensi.*³¹

The Bridle-champer of the Advocates.

*Smutchudlamenta Scoti.*³²

The Rasping and Hard-scraping of the Cardinals.

*De Calcaribus Removendis, Decades undecim, per M. Albericum de Rosata.*³³

*Ejusdem De Castrametandis Criminibus libri tres.*³⁴

The entrance of Anthony de Leve into the territories of Brazil.

²⁵ The overwhelmingly clear exposition, by the most renowned Doctor of Laws, Master Pillotus Scrapfathing, *Of the Patching Up of the Fiddle-faddle of the Gloss of Accursius*.

²⁶ *The Wiles of the Franc-Archers* of Baniolet.

²⁷ *Military Manual*, with diagrams by Tevot.

²⁸ *Treatise on the Custom and Benefit of Flaying Horses and Mares*, written by Our Master of Quebec.

²⁹ Fourteen books by Master Rostocostjambedanese, *On Serving Mustard after Dinner*; annotated by Master Vaurillon.

³⁰ Jabolenus, *The Cosmography of Purgatory*.

³¹ On the most subtle question: *Whether a Chimæra, humming in the Void, is able to eat Second Intentions* [the Reflex Universal], debated over a period of ten weeks by the Council of Constance.

³² The mumblings of Scotus.

³³ One hundred and ten volumes by Master Alberic, *On the Art of Keeping your Spurs clear of the Horse's Flanks*.

³⁴ Three books by the same author, *On Camping in the Hair* (Criminibus should read *crinibus*).

Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 150a

Let him alter, change, transform, and metamorphose himself into a hundred various shapes and figures, into a swan, a bull, a satyr, a shower of gold, or into a cuckoo, as he did when he unmaiden'd his sister Juno; into an eagle, ram or dove, as when he was enamoured of the virgin Phthia, who then dwelt in the Ægean territory; into fire, a serpent, yea, even into a flea, into epicurean and democratical atoms, or, more magistronostalistically, into those sly intentions of the mind, which in the school are called second notions, I'll — catch him in the nick, and take him napping. And would you know what I would do unto him? Even that which to his father Cœlum, Saturn did, — Seneca foretold it of me, and Lactantius hath confirmed it — what the goddess Rhea did to Athis. I would make him two stone lighter, rid him of his Cyprian cymbals, and cut so close and neatly by the breech, that there should not remain thereof so much as one —, so cleanly would I shave him: and disable him for ever from being pope, for *Testiculos non habet*.³⁵ Hold there, said Pantagruel; ho, soft, and fair my lad! Enough of that, — cast up, turn over the leaves, and try your fortune for the second time. Then did he fall upon this ensuing verse.

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK III, CH II 252d-254c passim; CH III, sect 11 257a-b; CH IV, sect 2 260b; CH V, sect 12 266d-267a; sect 14 267b-c; CH VI, sect 19 273b; sect 48-50 282b-d; CH XI, sect 10 302b; sect 24 305b-d

Human Understanding, BK III, CH II 252d-254c passim

Chap. II. *Of the Signification of Words*

1. *Words are sensible signs, necessary for communication of ideas.* Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how *words*, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a

³⁵ He has no testicles.

word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.

2. *Words, in their immediate signification, are the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them.* The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory or, as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but *the ideas in the mind of him that uses them*, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath: for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time, and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men's ideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

3. *Example of this.* This is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and the unlearned, use the words they speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth, stand for the ideas he has, and which he would express by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called *gold*, but the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow great weight: and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility: and then the word gold signifies to him a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it to: but it is evident that each can apply

it only to his own idea; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not.

4. *Words are often secretly referred, first to the ideas supposed to be in other men's minds.* But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.

First, *They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate:* for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine, whether the idea they, and those they discourse with have in their minds be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.

5. *To the reality of things.* Secondly, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but of things as really they are; therefore they often suppose the *words to stand also for the reality of things.* But this relating more particularly to substances and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in particular: though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds.

6. *Words by use readily excite ideas of their objects.* Concerning words, also, it is further to be considered:

First, that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts; there comes, by constant use, to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities, and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

7. *Words are often used without signification, and why.* Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet, because by familiar use from our cradles, we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not

always careful to examine or settle their significations perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand: therefore some, not only children but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea, and a designation that the one stands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.

8. *Their signification perfectly arbitrary, not the consequence of a natural connexion.* Words, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them. But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas, and that *by a perfect arbitrary imposition*, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of: and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word: which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them; this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.³⁶

Human Understanding, BK III, CH III, sect 11 257a-b

11. *General and universal are creatures of the understanding, and belong not to the real existence of things.* To return to general words: it is plain, by what has been said, that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether

³⁶ *Advancement of Learning*, ii. 14, 11.

words or ideas.³⁷ Words are general, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence,³⁸ even those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of man, is added to them.

Human Understanding, BK III, CH IV, sect 2 260b

2. *Names of simple ideas, and of substances intimate real existence.* First, the names of *simple ideas* and *substances*, with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify, intimate also some real existence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of *mixed modes* terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any further; as we shall see more at large in the following chapter.

Human Understanding, BK III, CH V, sect 12 266d-267a

12. *For the originals of our mixed modes, we look no further than the mind; which also shows them to be the workmanship of the understanding.*

Conformable also to what has been said concerning the essences of the species of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the understanding rather than the works of nature; conformable, I say, to this, we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no further. When we speak of *justice*, or *gratitude*, we frame to ourselves no imagination of anything existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look not further; as they do when we speak of a *horse*, or *iron*, whose specific ideas we consider not as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original patterns of those ideas. But in mixed modes, at least the most considerable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the original patterns as being in the mind, and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it is that these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a more particular name called *notions*;³⁹ as, by a peculiar right, appertaining to the understanding.

³⁷ Cf. Bk. IV. ch. xxi. § 4.

³⁸ Cf. § 13.

³⁹ Cf. Locke's *Second Letter to Stillingfleet*.

Human Understanding, BK III, CH V, sect 14 267b-c

14. *Names of mixed modes stand always for their real essences, which are the workmanship of our minds.* Another thing we may observe from what has been said is, That the names of mixed modes always signify (when they have any determined signification) the *real* essences of their species. For, these abstract ideas being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real existence of things, there is no supposition of anything more signified by that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed; which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that on which all the properties of the species depend, and from which alone they all flow: and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same; which, of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth, we shall see hereafter.⁴⁰

Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, sect 19 273b

19. *Our nominal essences of substances not perfect collections of the properties that flow from their real essences.* Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into species. But neither can this be done. For, being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude that that essence is not there, and so the thing is not of that species.⁴¹ We can never know what is the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that determined that species. By the word *gold* here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of matter; v.g. the last guinea that was coined. For, if it should stand here, in its ordinary signification, for that complex idea which I or any one else calls gold, i.e. for the nominal essence of gold, it would be jargon. So hard is it to show the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but words to do it by.

Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, sect 48-50 282b-d

48. *The abstract ideas of substances always imperfect, and therefore various.* But this is not all. It would also follow that the names of substances would not only have, as in truth they have, but would also be supposed to have different significations, as used by different men, which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality

⁴⁰ See Bk. IV. ch. ii. § 9; iv. §§ 5-10; vi.

⁴¹ Cf. Bk. II. ch. viii.

that were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given to it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify different things in different men: since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities, in substances of the same denomination, which others know nothing of.

49. *Therefore to fix their nominal species, a real essence is supposed.* To avoid this therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species, from which these properties all flow, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they, not having any idea of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence, without knowing what the real essence is, and this is that which men do when they speak of species of things, as supposing them made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.

50. *Which supposition is of no use.* For, let us consider, when we affirm that "all gold is fixed," either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, i.e., part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, "all gold is fixed," contains nothing but the signification of the term gold. Or else it means, that fixedness, not being a part of the definition of the gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case it is plain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance, having the real essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that, though this proposition — "gold is fixed" — be in that sense an affirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and so is of no real use or certainty. For let it be ever so true, that all gold, i.e. all that has the real essence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not, in this sense, *what is or is not gold?* For if we know not the real essence of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence, and so whether *it* be true gold or no.⁴²

Human Understanding, BK III, CH XI, sect 10 302b

10. *And distinct and conformable ideas in words that stand for substances.* In the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely *determined ideas*. In these the names must also be *conformable to things as they exist*; but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by.⁴³ This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about truth. And though it would be well, too, if it extended itself to common

⁴² Cf. ch. x. § 17.

⁴³ Cf. § 24; also Bk. IV. chh. iii. §§ 11-17; iv. 11-17.

conversation and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses: and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs: and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

Human Understanding, BK III, CH XI, sect 24 305b-d

24. *Ideas of substances must also be conformable to things.* Fourthly, But, though definitions will serve to explain the names of substances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. And therefore, in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea commonly received as the signification of that word, but must go a little further, and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For, since it is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex idea in other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for, therefore, to define their names right, natural history is to be inquired into, and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in discourse and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common, but confused, or very imperfect, idea to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them; but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex idea belonging to each specific name; and in discourse with others, (if we find them mistake us), we ought to tell what the complex idea is that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical verity, in that children, being taught words, whilst they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them. Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they are men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the language of their country, i.e. according to grammar rules of that language, do yet speak very

improperly of things themselves; and, by their arguing one with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much for the improvement of our knowledge how they are called.

45 LAVOISIER: *Elements of Chemistry*, PREF, 4b-c

To those bodies which are formed by the union of several simple substances we gave new names, compounded in such a manner as the nature of the substances directed; but, as the number of double combinations is already very considerable, the only method by which we could avoid confusion was to divide them into classes. In the natural order of ideas, the name of the class or genus is that which expresses a quality common to a great number of individuals: the name of the species, on the contrary, expresses a quality peculiar to certain individuals only. These distinctions are not, as some may imagine, merely metaphysical, but are established by nature. "A child," says the Abbé de Condillac, "is taught to give the name *tree* to the first one which is pointed out to him. The next one he sees presents the same idea, and he gives it the same name. This he does likewise to a third and a fourth, till at last the word *tree*, which he first applied to an individual, comes to be employed by him as the name of a class or a genus, an abstract idea, which comprehends all trees in general. But, when he learns that all trees serve not the same purpose, that they do not all produce the same kind of fruit, he will soon learn to distinguish them by specific and particular names." This is the logic of all the sciences and is naturally applied to chemistry.

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 127b-128a

The first of them arises from the misleading influence of speech. Language was originally made by men who were not psychologists, and most men to-day employ almost exclusively the vocabulary of outward things. The cardinal passions of our life, anger, love, fear, hate, hope, and the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual activity, to remember, expect, think, know, dream, with the broadest genera of æsthetic feeling, joy, sorrow, pleasure, pain, are the only facts of a subjective order which this vocabulary deigns to note by special words. The elementary qualities of sensation, bright, loud, red, blue, hot, cold, are, it is true, susceptible of being used in both an objective and a subjective sense. They stand for outer qualities and for the feelings which these arouse. But the objective sense is the original sense; and still to-day we have to describe a large number of sensations by the name of the object from which they have most frequently

been got. An orange color, an odor of violets, a cheesy taste, a thunderous sound, a fiery smart, etc., will recall what I mean. This absence of a special vocabulary for subjective facts hinders the study of all but the very coarsest of them. Empiricist writers are very fond of emphasizing one great set of delusions which language inflicts on the mind. Whenever we have made a word, they say, to denote a certain group of phenomena, we are prone to suppose a substantive entity existing beyond the phenomena, of which the word shall be the name. But the *lack* of a word quite as often leads to the directly opposite error. We are then prone to suppose that no entity can be there; and so we come to overlook phenomena whose existence would be patent to us all, had we only grown up to hear it familiarly recognized in speech.⁴⁴ It is hard to focus our attention on the nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness in the descriptive parts of most psychologies.

But a worse defect than vacuousness comes from the dependence of psychology on common speech. Naming our thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume that as the objects are, so the thought must be. The thought of several distinct things can only consist of several distinct bits of thought, or “ideas”; that of an abstract or universal object can only be an abstract or universal idea. As each object may come and go, be forgotten and then thought of again, it is held that the thought of it has a precisely similar independence, self-identity, and mobility. The thought of the object’s recurrent identity is regarded as the identity of its recurrent thought; and the perceptions of multiplicity, of coexistence, of succession, are severally conceived to be brought about only through a multiplicity, a coexistence, a succession, of perceptions. The continuous flow of the mental stream is sacrificed, and in its place an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, is preached, for the existence of which no good introspective grounds can be brought forward, and out of which presently grow all sorts of paradoxes and contradictions, the heritage of woe of students of the mind.

⁴⁴ In English we have not even the generic distinction between the-thing-thought-of and the-thought-thinking-it, which in German is expressed by the opposition between *Gedachtes* and *Gedanke*, in Latin by that between *cogitatum* and *cogitatio*.