5a. Natural things as signs of divinity

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis, 9:8-17 / Job, 12:7-9;37-41/ Psalms, 8; 19:1-4; 75:1; 104; 135:6-7;147:7-9-(D) Psalms, 8; 18:1-5; 74:2; 103;134:6-7; 146:7-9*

APOCRYPHA: *Wisdom of Solomon, 13:1-5-(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 13:1-5 / Ecclesiasticus, 42:15-43:33-(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 42:15- 43:37 / II Maccabees, 7:28-(D) OT, II Machabees, 7:28*

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew, 6:26-30 / Luke, 12:24-28/ Romans, 1:18-20*

6 THUCYDIDES: *Peloponnesian War, BK III, 438d-439a*

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things, BK II [589-660] 22c-23b; BK v [110-145] 62c-63a*

12 EPICTETUS: *Discourses, BK I, CH 16-17 121d-124a; BK III, CH I 177a-c*

12 AURELIUS*: Meditations, BK XII, SECT 28 310a*

16 KEPLER: *Epitome, BK IV, 853b-854a; 860a / Harmonies of the World, 1009b-1010a; 1049b1050a; 1061a; 1080b-1085b passim*

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God, UK XI, CH 24-28 335c-338d; BK XVI, CH 26 438c-439a*

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A 10, ANS and REP I 9c-l0c; Q 3, A I, REP 1-514b15b; Q 12, A 3, REP 2-3 52c-53b; Q 13, A 2 63c-64d; A 4, ANS 65c-66b; Q 27, A I, ANS 153b-154b; Q 34 185a-189a; Q 47, AI, ANS and REP 2 256a-257b; Q 65, A I, REP 3 339b-340b; Q 103, A I, ANS 528b-529a*

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART III, Q 12, A 3, REP 2 778b-779a; Q 60, A 2, ANS and REP I 848a-d; A 5, REP I 850b-851b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 2 1032b-1034b

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy,* PARADISE, XXVIII [1-78] 148d-149c

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan,* PART I, 78d-79a; 81a-c

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays,* 212a-c

28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation,* 421d; 490d-494a esp 491a-b, 492c-493a

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning,* 2c-4c; 38a; 41b-d / *New Atlantis,* 203a-b

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost,* BK VIII [II 4-13°] 234b-235a; BK IX [780-794] 264b; [990-1004] 269a; BK XI [181-207]303a-b

33 PASCAL: *Pensees,* 643-646 290b-291b; 652-657 292a-293a; 670 295a-b; 675 296b-297a; 693-736301b-317b

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge,* SECT 32 418d-419a; SECT 146-154 442a-444b passim, esp SECT 148 442b-d

37 FIELDING: *Tom Jones, 186c-d*

40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall, 81d; 346d-347a*

42 KANT: *Pure Reason, 187a-190a*

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART I, 228a-c; 235d-236c; 252a-255b; PART II, 263d-265c; 266a-267a; 268b-271c*

47 GOETHE: *Faust, PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b*

51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace, BK VI, 248d-249a*

**OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 9:8-17 / Job, 12:7-9;37-41/ Psalms, 8; 19:1-4; 75:1; 104; 135:6-7;147:7-9-(D) Psalms, 8; 18:1-5; 74:2; 103;134:6-7; 146:7-9**

*Genesis, 9:8-17*

**8**Then God said to Noah and to his sons with him: **9**“I now establish my covenant with you and with your descendants after you **10**and with every living creature that was with you—the birds, the livestock and all the wild animals, all those that came out of the ark with you—every living creature on earth. **11**I establish my covenant with you: Never again will all life be destroyed by the waters of a flood; never again will there be a flood to destroy the earth.”

**12**And God said, “This is the sign of the covenant I am making between me and you and every living creature with you, a covenant for all generations to come: **13**I have set my rainbow in the clouds, and it will be the sign of the covenant between me and the earth. **14**Whenever I bring clouds over the earth and the rainbow appears in the clouds, **15**I will remember my covenant between me and you and all living creatures of every kind. Never again will the waters become a flood to destroy all life. **16**Whenever the rainbow appears in the clouds, I will see it and remember the everlasting covenant between God and all living creatures of every kind on the earth.”

**17**So God said to Noah, “This is the sign of the covenant I have established between me and all life on the earth.”

*Job, 12:7-9;37-41*

**7**“But ask the animals, and they will teach you,  
    or the birds in the sky, and they will tell you;  
**8**or speak to the earth, and it will teach you,  
    or let the fish in the sea inform you.  
**9**Which of all these does not know  
    that the hand of the Lord has done this?

*Psalms, 8; 19:1-4; 75:1; 104; 135:6-7;147:7-9-(D) Psalms, 8; 18:1-5; 74:2; 103;134:6-7; 146:7-9*

*Psalms, 8*

**8**Unto the end, for the presses: a psalm of David.

**2**O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in the whole earth! For thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens.

**3**Out of the mouth of infants and of sucklings thou hast perfected praise, because of thy enemies, that thou mayst destroy the enemy and the avenger.

**4**For I will behold thy heavens, the works of thy fingers: the moon and the stars which thou hast founded.

**5**What is man that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man that thou visitest him?

**6**Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honour:

**7**And hast set him over the works of thy hands.

**8**Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover the beasts also of the fields.

**9**The birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, that pass through the paths of the sea.

**10**O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in all the earth!

*Psalms, 19:1-4*

**19**The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handywork.

**2**Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge.

**3**There is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard.

**4**Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world. In them hath he set a tabernacle for the sun,

*Psalms, 75:1*

**75**Unto thee, O God, do we give thanks, unto thee do we give thanks: for that thy name is near thy wondrous works declare.

*Psalms, 104*

**104**Bless the Lord, O my soul. O Lord my God, thou art very great; thou art clothed with honour and majesty.

**2**Who coverest thyself with light as with a garment: who stretchest out the heavens like a curtain:

**3**Who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters: who maketh the clouds his chariot: who walketh upon the wings of the wind:

**4**Who maketh his angels spirits; his ministers a flaming fire:

**5**Who laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not be removed for ever.

**6**Thou coveredst it with the deep as with a garment: the waters stood above the mountains.

**7**At thy rebuke they fled; at the voice of thy thunder they hasted away.

**8**They go up by the mountains; they go down by the valleys unto the place which thou hast founded for them.

**9**Thou hast set a bound that they may not pass over; that they turn not again to cover the earth.

**10**He sendeth the springs into the valleys, which run among the hills.

**11**They give drink to every beast of the field: the wild asses quench their thirst.

**12**By them shall the fowls of the heaven have their habitation, which sing among the branches.

**13**He watereth the hills from his chambers: the earth is satisfied with the fruit of thy works.

**14**He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man: that he may bring forth food out of the earth;

**15**And wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread which strengtheneth man's heart.

**16**The trees of the Lord are full of sap; the cedars of Lebanon, which he hath planted;

**17**Where the birds make their nests: as for the stork, the fir trees are her house.

**18**The high hills are a refuge for the wild goats; and the rocks for the conies.

**19**He appointed the moon for seasons: the sun knoweth his going down.

**20**Thou makest darkness, and it is night: wherein all the beasts of the forest do creep forth.

**21**The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God.

**22**The sun ariseth, they gather themselves together, and lay them down in their dens.

**23**Man goeth forth unto his work and to his labour until the evening.

**24**O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches.

**25**So is this great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts.

**26**There go the ships: there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to play therein.

**27**These wait all upon thee; that thou mayest give them their meat in due season.

**28**That thou givest them they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good.

**29**Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust.

**30**Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth.

**31**The glory of the Lord shall endure for ever: the Lord shall rejoice in his works.

**32**He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth: he toucheth the hills, and they smoke.

**33**I will sing unto the Lord as long as I live: I will sing praise to my God while I have my being.

**34**My meditation of him shall be sweet: I will be glad in the Lord.

**35**Let the sinners be consumed out of the earth, and let the wicked be no more. Bless thou the Lord, O my soul. Praise ye the Lord.

*Psalms, 135:6-7*

**6**Who established the earth above the waters: for his mercy endureth for ever.

**7**Who made the great lights: for his mercy endureth for ever.

*Psalms, 147:7-9*

**7**Sing unto the Lord with thanksgiving; sing praise upon the harp unto our God:

**8**Who covereth the heaven with clouds, who prepareth rain for the earth, who maketh grass to grow upon the mountains.

**9**He giveth to the beast his food, and to the young ravens which cry.

*Psalms, 8*

**8**Unto the end, for the presses: a psalm of David.

**2**O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in the whole earth! For thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens.

**3**Out of the mouth of infants and of sucklings thou hast perfected praise, because of thy enemies, that thou mayst destroy the enemy and the avenger.

**4**For I will behold thy heavens, the works of thy fingers: the moon and the stars which thou hast founded.

**5**What is man that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man that thou visitest him?

**6**Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honour:

**7**And hast set him over the works of thy hands.

**8**Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover the beasts also of the fields.

**9**The birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, that pass through the paths of the sea.

**10**O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in all the earth!

*Psalms, 18:1-5*

**18**I will love thee, O Lord, my strength.

**2**The Lord is my rock, and my fortress, and my deliverer; my God, my strength, in whom I will trust; my buckler, and the horn of my salvation, and my high tower.

**3**I will call upon the Lord, who is worthy to be praised: so shall I be saved from mine enemies.

**4**The sorrows of death compassed me, and the floods of ungodly men made me afraid.

**5**The sorrows of hell compassed me about: the snares of death prevented me.

*Psalms, 74:2*

**2**Remember thy congregation, which thou hast purchased of old; the rod of thine inheritance, which thou hast redeemed; this mount Zion, wherein thou hast dwelt.

*Psalms, 103*

**103**Bless the Lord, O my soul: and all that is within me, bless his holy name.

**2**Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all his benefits:

**3**Who forgiveth all thine iniquities; who healeth all thy diseases;

**4**Who redeemeth thy life from destruction; who crowneth thee with lovingkindness and tender mercies;

**5**Who satisfieth thy mouth with good things; so that thy youth is renewed like the eagle's.

**6**The Lord executeth righteousness and judgment for all that are oppressed.

**7**He made known his ways unto Moses, his acts unto the children of Israel.

**8**The Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy.

**9**He will not always chide: neither will he keep his anger for ever.

**10**He hath not dealt with us after our sins; nor rewarded us according to our iniquities.

**11**For as the heaven is high above the earth, so great is his mercy toward them that fear him.

**12**As far as the east is from the west, so far hath he removed our transgressions from us.

**13**Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him.

**14**For he knoweth our frame; he remembereth that we are dust.

**15**As for man, his days are as grass: as a flower of the field, so he flourisheth.

**16**For the wind passeth over it, and it is gone; and the place thereof shall know it no more.

**17**But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto children's children;

**18**To such as keep his covenant, and to those that remember his commandments to do them.

**19**The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth over all.

**20**Bless the Lord, ye his angels, that excel in strength, that do his commandments, hearkening unto the voice of his word.

**21**Bless ye the Lord, all ye his hosts; ye ministers of his, that do his pleasure.

**22**Bless the Lord, all his works in all places of his dominion: bless the Lord, O my soul.

*Psalms, 134:6-7*

**6**Whatsoever the Lord hath pleased he hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps.

**7**He bringeth up clouds from the end of the earth: he hath made lightnings for the rain. He bringeth forth winds out of his stores:

*Psalms, 146:7-9*

**7**Sing ye to the Lord with praise: sing to our God upon the harp.

**8**Who covereth the heaven with clouds, and prepareth rain for the earth. Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains, and herbs for the service of men.

**9**Who giveth to beasts their food: and to the young ravens that call upon him.

**APOCRYPHA: *Wisdom of Solomon, 13:1-5-(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 13:1-5 / Ecclesiasticus, 42:15-43:33-(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 42:15- 43:37 / II Maccabees, 7:28-(D) OT, II Machabees, 7:28***

*APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 13:1-5-(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 13:1-5*

**¹**Surely vain are all men by nature, who are ignorant of God, and could not out of the good things that are seen know him that is: neither by considering the works did they acknowledge the workmaster;

**2**But deemed either fire, or wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the violent water, or the lights of heaven, to be the gods which govern the world.

**3**With whose beauty if they being delighted took them to be gods; let them know how much better the Lord of them is: for the first author of beauty hath created them.

**4**But if they were astonished at their power and virtue, let them understand by them, how much mightier he is that made them.

**5**For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the maker of them is seen.

*Ecclesiasticus, 42:15-43:33-(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 42:15- 43:37*

**15**I will now remember the works of the Lord, and I will declare the things I have seen. By the words of the Lord are his works.

**16**The sun giving light hath looked upon all things, and full of the glory of the Lord is his work.

**17**Hath not the Lord made the saints to declare all his wonderful works, which the Lord Almighty hath firmly settled to be established for his glory?

**18**He hath searched out the deep, and the heart of men: and considered their crafty devices.

**19**For the Lord knoweth all knowledge, and hath beheld the signs of the world, he declareth the things that are past, and the things that are to come, and revealeth the traces of hidden things.

**20**No thought escapeth him, and no word can hide itself from him.

**21**He hath beautified the glorious works of his wisdom: and he Is from eternity to eternity, and to him nothing may be added,

**22**Nor can he be diminished, and he hath no need of any counsellor.

**23**O how desirable are all his works, and what we can know is but as a spark!

**24**All these things live, and remain for ever, and for every use all things obey him.

**25**All things are double, one against another, and he hath made nothing defective.

**26**He hath established the good things of every one. And who shall be filled with beholding his glory?

**43**The firmament on high is his beauty, the beauty of heaven with its glorious shew.

**2**The sun when he appeareth shewing forth at his rising, an admirable instrument, the work of the most High.

**3**At noon he burneth the earth, and who can abide his burning heat? As one keeping a furnace in the works of heat:

**4**The sun three times as much, burneth the mountains, breathing out fiery vapours, and shining with his beams, he blindeth the eyes.

**5**Great is the Lord that made him, and at his words he hath hastened his course.

**6**And the moon in all in her season, is for a declaration of times and a sign of the world.

**7**From the moon is the sign of the festival day, a light that decreaseth in her perfection.

**8**The month is called after her name, increasing wonderfully in her perfection.

**9**Being an instrument of the armies on high, shining gloriously in the Armament of heaven.

**10**The glory of the stars is the beauty of heaven; the Lord enlighteneth the world on high.

**11**By the words of the holy one they shall stand in judgment, and shall never fail in their watches.

**12**Look upon the rainbow, and bless him that made it: it is very beautiful in its brightness.

**13**It encompasseth the heaven about with the circle of its glory, the hands of the most High have displayed it.

**14**By his commandment he maketh the snow to fall apace, and sendeth forth swiftly the lightnings of his judgment.

**15**Through this are the treasures opened, and the clouds fly out like birds.

**16**By his greatness he hath fixed the clouds, and the hailstones are broken.

**17**At his sight shall the mountains be shaken, and at his will the south wind shall blow.

**18**The noise of his thunder shall strike the earth, so doth the northern storm, and the whirlwind:

**19**And as the birds lighting upon the earth, he scattereth snow, and the falling thereof, is as the coming down of locusts.

**20**The eye admireth at the beauty of the whiteness thereof, and the heart is astonished at the shower thereof.

**21**He shall pour frost as salt upon the earth: and when it freezeth, it shall become like the tops of thistles.

**22**The cold north wind bloweth, and the water is congealed into crystal; upon every gathering together of waters it shall rest, and shall clothe the waters as a breastplate.

**23**And it shall devour the mountains, and burn the wilderness, and consume all that is green as with fire.

**24**A present remedy of all is the speedy coming of a cloud, and a dew that meeteth it, by the heat that cometh, shall overpower it.

**25**At his word the wind is still, and with his thought he appeaseth the deep, and the Lord hath planted islands therein.

**26**Let them that sail on the sea, tell the dangers thereof: and when we hear with our ears, we shall admire.

**27**There are great and wonderful works: a variety of beasts, and of all living things, and the monstrous creatures of whales.

**28**Through him is established the end of their journey, and by his word all things are regulated.

**29**We shall say much, and yet shall want words: but the sum of our words is, He is all.

**30**What shall we be able to do to glorify him? for the Almighty himself is above all his works.

**31**The Lord is terrible, and exceeding great, and his power is admirable.

**32**Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for he will yet far exceed, and his magnificence is wonderful.

**33**Blessing the Lord, exalt him as much as you can: for he is above all praise.

**34**When you exalt him put forth all your strength, and be not weary: for you can never go far enough.

**35**Who shall see him, and declare him? and who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning?

**36**There are many things hidden from us that are greater than these: for we have seen but a few of his works.

**37**But the Lord hath made all things, and to the godly he hath given wisdom.

*II Machabees, 7:28*

**²⁸** I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven and the earth, and all that is therein, and consider that God made them of things that were not; and so was mankind made likewise.

**NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:26-30 / Luke, 12:24-28/ Romans, 1:18-20**

*Matthew, 6:26-30*

**26**Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns: and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?

**27**And which of you by taking thought, can add to his stature by one cubit?

**28**And for raiment why are you solicitous? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow: they labour not, neither do they spin.

**29**But I say to you, that not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed as one of these.

**30**And if the grass of the field, which is to day, and to morrow is cast into the oven, God doth so clothe: how much more you, O ye of little faith?

*Luke, 12:24-28*

**24**Consider the ravens, for they sow not, neither do they reap, neither have they storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them. How much are you more valuable than they?

**25**And which of you, by taking thought, can add to his stature one cubit?

**26**If then ye be not able to do so much as the least thing, why are you solicitous for the rest?

**27**Consider the lilies, how they grow: they labour not, neither do they spin. But I say to you, not even Solomon in all his glory was clothed like one of these.

**28**Now if God clothe in this manner the grass that is to day in the field, and to morrow is cast into the oven; how much more you, O ye of little faith?

*Romans, 1:18-20*

**18**For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men that detain the truth of God in injustice:

**19**Because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it unto them.

**20**For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable.

**6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 438d-439a**

CHAPTER XI

*Sixth Year of the War—Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece—Ruin of Ambracia*

Summer was now over. [87] The winter following, the plague a second time attacked the Athenians; for although it had never entirely left them, still there had been a notable abatement in its ravages. The second visit lasted no less than a year, the first having lasted two; and nothing distressed the Athenians and reduced their power more than this. No less than four thousand four hundred heavy infantry in the ranks died of it and three hundred cavalry, besides a number of the multitude that was never ascertained. At the same time took place the numerous earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, particularly at Orchomenus in the last-named country.

[88] The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians, with thirty ships, made an expedition against the islands of Aeolus; it being impossible to invade them in summer, owing to the want of water. These islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who live in one of them of no great size called Lipara; and from this as their headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. In Hiera the people in those parts believe that Hephaestus has his forge, from the quantity of flame which they see it send out by night, and of smoke by day. These islands lie off the coast of the Sicels and Messincse, and were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians laid waste their land, and as the inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to Rhegium. Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year of this war, of which Thucydides was the historian.

**12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things, BK II [589-660] 22c-23b; BK v [110-145] 62c-63a***

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things, BK II [589-660] 22c-23b*

And whenever a thing possesses in itself in larger measure many powers and properties, in that measure it shows that there are in it the greatest number of different kinds and varied shapes of first-beginnings. First of all the earth has in her first bodies out of which springs rolling coolness along replenish without fail the boundless sea, she has bodies out of which fires rise up; for in many spots the earth's crust is on fire and burns, though headstrong Aetna rages with fire of surpassing force. Then too she has bodies out of which she can raise for mankind goodly crops and joyous trees, out of which too she can supply to the mountain ranging race of wild beasts rivers, leaves, and glad pastures. Wherefore she has alone been named great mother of gods and mother of beasts and parent of our body.

600] Of her the old and learned poets of the Greeks have sung, that borne aloft on high raised seat in a chariot she drives a pair of lions, teaching that the great earth hangs in the expanse of air and that earth cannot rest on earth. To her chariot they have yoked wild beasts, because a brood however savage ought to be tamed and softened by the kind offices of parents. They have encircled the top of her head with a mural crown, because fortified in choice positions she sustains towns; adorned with which emblem the image of the divine mother is carried now-a-days through wide lands in awe-inspiring state. Her different nations after old-established ritual term Idaean mother, and give for escort Phrygian bands, because they tell that from those lands corn first began to be produced throughout the world. They assign her Galli,¹ because they would show by this type that they who have done violence to the divinity of the mother and have proved ungrateful to their parents, are to be deemed unworthy to bring a living offspring into the borders of light. Tight-stretched tambourines and hollow cymbals resound all round to the stroke of their open hands, and horns menace with hoarse-sounding music, and the hollow pipe stirs their minds in Phrygian mood. They carry weapons before them, emblems of furious rage, meet to fill the thankless souls and godless breasts of the rabble with terror for the divinity of the goddess. Therefore when first borne in procession through great cities she mutely enriches mortals with a blessing not expressed in words, they strew all her path with brass and silver presenting her with bounteous alms, and scatter over her a snow-shower of roses, o'ershadowing the mother and her troops of attendants. Here an armed band to which the Greeks give the name of Phrygian Curetes, in that it haply joins in the game of arms and springs up in measure all dripping with blood, shaking with its nodding the frightful crests upon the head, represents the Dictaean Curetes who, as the story is, erst drowned in Crete that infant cry of Jove, when the young band about the young babe in rapid dance arms in hand to measured tread beat brass on brass, that Saturn might not get him to consign to his devouring jaws and stab the mother to the heart with a neverhealing wound. For these reasons they escort in arms the Great Mother, or else because they mean by this sign that the goddess preaches to men to be willing with arms and valour to defend their country and be ready to be a safeguard and an ornament to their parents.

644] All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told, is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme of repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favours nor moved by anger. And here if any one thinks proper to call the sea Neptune and corn Ceres and chooses rather to misuse the name of Bacchus than to utter the term that belongs to that liquor, let us allow him to declare that the earth is mother of the gods, if he only forbear in earnest to stain his mind with foul religion. The earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it brings them forth in many ways into the light of the sun.

¹The eunuch priests of the cult of Cybele.

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things, BK v [110-145] 62c-63a*

110] But before I shall begin on this question to pour forth decrees of fate with more sanctity and much more certainty than the Pythia who speaks out from the tripod and laurel of Phoebus, I will clearly set forth to you many comforting topics in learned language; lest held in the yoke of religion you haply suppose that earth and sun and heaven, sea, stars, and moon must last for ever with divine body; and therefore think it right that they after the fashion of the giants should all suffer punishment for their monstrous guilt, who by their reasoning displace the walls of the world and seek to quench the glorious sun of heaven, branding immortal things in mortal speech; though in truth these things are so far from possessing divinity and are so unworthy of being reckoned in the number of gods, that they may be thought to afford a notable instance of what is quite without vital motion and sense. For it is quite impossible to suppose that the nature and judgement of the mind can exist with any body whatever; even as a tree cannot exist in the ether nor clouds in the salt sea, nor can fishes live in the fields nor blood exist in woods nor sap in stones. Where each thing can grow and abide is fixed and ordained. Thus the nature of the mind cannot come into being alone without the body nor exist far away from the sinews and blood. But if (for this would be much more likely to happen than that) the force itself of the mind might be in the head or shoulders or heels or might be born in any other part of the body, it would after all be wont to abide in one and the same man or vessel. But since in our body even it is fixed and seen to be ordained where the soul and the mind can severally be and grow, it must still more strenuously be denied that it can abide out of the body and the living room altogether in crumbling clods of earth or in the fire of the sun or in water or in the high borders of ether. These things therefore are not possessed of divine sense, since they cannot be quickened with the vital feeling.

**12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 16-17 121d-124a; BK III, CH I 177a-c**

12 EPICTETUS: *Discourses, BK I, CH 16-17 121d-124a*

Chapter 16. *Of providence*

Do not wonder if for other animals than man all things are provided for the body, not only food and drink, but beds also, and they have no need of shoes nor bed materials, nor clothing; but we require all these additional things. For, animals not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit for them to be made so as to need other things. For consider what it would be for us to take care not only of ourselves, but also about cattle and asses, how they should be clothed, and how shod, and how they should eat and drink. Now as soldiers are ready for their commander, shod, clothed and armed: but it would be a hard thing for the chiliarch¹ to go round and shoe or clothe his thousand men; so also nature has formed the animals which are made for service, all ready, prepared, and requiring no further care. So one little boy with only a stick drives the cattle.

But now we, instead of being thankful that we need not take the same care of animals as of ourselves, complain of God on our own account; and yet, in the name of Zeus and the gods, any one thing of those which exist would be enough to make a man perceive the providence of God, at least a man who is modest and grateful. And speak not to me now of the great things, but only of this, that milk is produced from grass, and cheese from milk, and wool from skins. Who made these things or devised them? "No one," you say. Oh, amazing shamelessness and stupidity!

Well, let us omit the works of nature and contemplate her smaller acts. Is there anything less useful than the hair on the chin? What then, has not nature used this hair also in the most suitable manner possible? Has she not by it distinguished the male and the female? does not the nature of every man forthwith proclaim from a distance, "I am a man; as such approach me, as such speak to me; look for nothing else; see the signs"? Again, in the case of women, as she has mingled something softer in the voice, so she has also deprived them of hair (on the chin). You say: "Not so; the human animal ought to have been left without marks of distinction, and each of us should have been obliged to proclaim, 'I am a man.' " But how is not the sign beautiful and becoming and venerable? how much more beautiful than the cock's comb, how much more becoming than the lion's mane? For this reason we ought to pre-serve the signs which God has given, we ought not to throw them away, nor to confound, as much as we can, the distinctions of the sexes.

Are these the only works of providence in us? And what words are sufficient to praise them and set them forth according to their worth? For if we had understanding, ought we to do anything else both jointly and severally than to sing hymns and bless the deity, and to tell of his benefits? Ought we not when we are digging and ploughing and eating to sing this hymn to God? "Great is God, who has given us such implements with which we shall cultivate the earth: great is God who has given us hands, the power of swallowing, a stomach, imperceptible growth, and the power of breathing while we sleep." This is what we ought to sing on every occasion, and to sing the greatest and most divine hymn for giving us the faculty of comprehending these things and using a proper way. Well then, since most of you have become blind, ought there not to be some man to fill this office, and on behalf of all to sing the hymn to God? For what else can I do, a lame old man, than sing hymns to God? If then I was a nightingale, I would do the part of a nightingale: if I were a swan, I would do like a swan. But now I am a rational creature, and I ought to praise God: this is my work; I do it, nor will I desert this post, so long as I am allowed to keep it; and I exhort you to join in this same song.

Chapter 17. *That the logical art is necessary* Since reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either, then, this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end.² Reason therefore is analysed by itself. "Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like." Will you then hear about those things? Hear.

¹Tribune.

²Marcus Aurelius, xi. I.

But if you should say, “I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely," and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, " Distinguish," I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, "It is more urgent." This is the reason, I suppose, why they¹ place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?

In this case, then, if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully anything else? "Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit." But it is a thing which can measure corn. "Logic also produces no fruit." As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this? What then is the wondrous thing? To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right. "But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature." Who then tells us what it is? They say that it is Chrysippus. I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says; I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus. "Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue." What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs?

I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, "Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give." The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets them: "Man," he says, "you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion,

unimpeded." Well, then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion except another desire and aversion? But, you object: "If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so-and-so than to die. In this matter, then, it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will.² For if God had made that part of Himself, which He took from Himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by Himself or by another, He would not then be God nor would He be taking care of us as He ought. "This," says the diviner, "I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God." For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.

¹Stoic teachers.

²Compare Epictetus, iv. I.

12 EPICTETUS: *Discourses, BK III, CH I 177a-c*

yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one? Is this your business? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Corinth and perchance a prefect of the city, or chief of the youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well, and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your hairs plucked out? To please whom and for what purpose? And when you have begotten children, will you introduce them also into the state with the habit of plucking their hairs? A beautiful citizen, and senator and rhetorician. We ought to pray that such young men be born among us and brought up.

Do not so, I entreat you by the Gods, young man: but when you have once heard these words, go away and say to yourself, "Epictetus has not said this to me; for how could he? but some propitious God through him: for it would never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger." You say, "No." But, if a crow by his croaking signifies anything to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God through the crow; and if he signifies anything through a human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and concerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through the noblest messenger? What else is it which the

poet says:

*For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent*

*Hermes the careful watcher, Argus' slayer,*

*The husband not to \ill nor wed the wife.¹*

Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy yourself about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are will; and if your will is beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men Alcibiades: "Try, then, to be beautiful." What does he say to him? "Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs." Nothing of that kind. But "Adorn your will, take away bad opinions." "How with the body?" Leave it as it is by nature. Another has looked after these things: intrust them to him. "What then, must a man be uncleaned?" Certainly not; but what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. You say no: but let us also pluck out the lion's mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock's comb for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog.

¹Homer, Odyssey, i. 37.

**12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK XII, SECT 28 310a**

28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods or how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshipest them, I answer, in the first place, they may be seen even with the eyes; 1 in the second place neither have I seen even my own soul and yet I honour it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate them.

**16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 853b-854a; 860a / Harmonies of the World, 1009b-1010a; 1049b1050a; 1061a; 1080b-1085b passim**

16 KEPLER: *Epitome, BK IV, 853b-854a*

Even though the true movements are to be left singly to the single planets, nevertheless these movements do not move by themselves nor by the revolutions of spheres—for there are no solid spheres—but the sun in the centre of the world, revolving around the centre of its body and around its axis, by this revolution becomes the cause of the single planets going around.

Further, even though the planets are really eccentric to the centre of the sun: nevertheless there are no other smaller circles called epicycles, which by their revolution vary the intervals between the planet and the sun; but the bodies themselves of the planets, by an inborn force [*vi insite*], furnish the occasion for this variation.

*What, then, will the material of Book IV be?*

Book IV will contain celestial physics itself, or the form and proportions of the fabric of the world and the true causes of the movements. This will be the primary function of the astronomer—as we said in Book i, folium 5, namely, the demonstration of his hypotheses.

*Review the principal parts of Book IV.*

There will be three principal parts of Book IV.

The first is on the bodies themselves; the second, on the movements of those bodies; the third, on the real accidents of the movements.

For the first part will teach the conformation of the whole universe, its division into parts or principal regions; the place of the sun at its centre; the number, magnitude, and order or position of the planetary spheres; and lastly, the ratios of all the bodies of the world to one another.

The second part will teach the revolution of the sun around its axis, and its effect in making the planets revolve; the causes of the proportionality of the movements among themselves, *i.e*., of the periodic [437] times; the immobility of the centre of the sun and the annual movement of the centre of the Earth around the sun; the revolution of the Earth around its axis and its effect in making the moon revolve; the additional help in moving the moon given by the light of the sun; and what the causes of the proportions between the day, month, and year are.

The third part will disclose the causes of the threefold irregularity of the altitude, longitude, and latitude in the single planets—and how these irregularities are doubled in the moon by the force of the illumination from the sun.

PART I

1. On the Principal Parts of the World

*[438] What do you judge to be the lay-out of the principal parts of the world?*

The Philosophy of Copernicus reckons up the principal parts of the world by dividing the figure of the world into regions. For in the sphere, which is the image of God the Creator and the Archetype of the world—as was proved in Book I—there are three regions, symbols of the three persons of the Holy Trinity—the centre, a symbol of the Father; the surface, of the Son; and the intermediate space, of the Holy Ghost. So, too, just as many principal parts of the world have been made—the different parts in the different regions of the sphere: the sun in the centre, the sphere of the fixed stars on the surface, and lastly the planetary system in the region intermediate between the sun and the fixed stars.

16 KEPLER: *Epitome, BK IV, 860a*

regions and would cause alternations while it itself remained perfectly simple. And it is surprising that some people use jokingly the similitude of light at the centre of the lamp, as it is a very apt similitude, least fitted to satirize this opinion but suited rather to painting the power of this argument.

*Harmonies of the World, 1009b-1010a*

After the model of the most correct astronomical doctrine of today, and the hypothesis not only of Copernicus but also of Tycho Brahe, whereof either hypotheses are today publicly accepted as most true, and the Ptolemaic as outmoded.

*I commence a sacred discourse, a most true hymn to God the Founder, and I judge it to be piety, not to sacrifice many hecatombs of bulls to Him and to burn incense of innumerable perfumes and cassia, but first to learn myself, and afterwards to teach others too, how great He is in wisdom, how great in power, and of what sort in goodness. For to wish to adorn in every way possible the things that should receive adornment and to envy no thing its goods—this I put down as the sign of the greatest goodness, and in this respect I praise Him as good that in the heights of His wisdom He finds everything whereby each thing may be adorned to the utmost and that He can do by his unconquerable power all that he has decreed.*

Galen, on the Use of Parts. Book III

PROEM

[268] As regards that which I prophesied two and twenty years ago (especially that the five regular solids are found between the celestial spheres), as regards that of which I was firmly persuaded in my own mind before I had seen Ptolemy's *Harmonies*, as regards that which I promised my friends in the title of this fifth book before I was sure of the thing itself, that which, sixteen years ago, in a published statement, I insisted must be investigated, for the sake of which I spent the best part of my life in astronomical speculations, visited Tycho Brahe, [269] and took up residence at Prague: finally, as God the Best and Greatest, Who had inspired my mind and aroused my great desire, prolonged my life and strength of mind and furnished the other means through the liberality of the two Emperors and the nobles of this province of Austria-on-the-Anisana: after I had discharged my astronomical duties as much as sufficed, finally, I say, I brought it to light and found it to be truer than I had even hoped, and I discovered among the celestial movements the full nature of harmony, in its due measure, together with all its parts unfolded in Book iii—not in that mode wherein I had conceived it in my mind (this is not last in my joy) but in a very different mode which is also very excellent and very perfect. There took place in this intervening time, wherein the very laborious reconstruction of the movements held me in suspense, an extraordinary augmentation of my desire and incentive for the job, a reading of the *Harmonies* of Ptolemy, which had been sent to me in manuscript by John George Herward, Chancellor of Bavaria, a very distinguished man and of a nature to advance philosophy and every type of learning. There, beyond my expectations and with the greatest wonder, I found approximately the whole third book given over to the same consideration of celestial harmony, fifteen hundred years ago. But indeed astronomy was far from being of age as yet; and Ptolemy, in an unfortunate attempt, could make others subject to despair, as being one who, like Scipio in Cicero, seemed to have recited a pleasant Pythagorean dream rather than to have aided philosophy. But both the crudeness of the ancient philosophy and this exact agreement in our meditations, down to the last hair, over an interval of fifteen centuries, greatly strengthened me in getting on with the job. For what need is there of many men? The very nature of things, in order to reveal herself to mankind, was at work in the different interpreters of different ages, and was the finger of God—to use the Hebrew expression; and here, in the minds of two men, who had wholly given themselves up to the contemplation of nature, there was the same conception as to the configuration of the world, although neither had been the other's guide in taking this route. But now since the first light eight months ago, since broad day three months ago, and since the sun of my wonderful speculation has shone fully a very few days ago: nothing holds me back. I am free to give myself up to the sacred madness, I am free to taunt mortals with the frank confession that I am stealing the golden vessels of the Egyptians, in order to build of them a temple for my God, far from the territory of Egypt. If you pardon me, I shall rejoice; if you are enraged, I shall bear up. The die is cast, and I am writing the book—whether to be read by my contemporaries or by posterity matters not. Let it await its reader for a hundred years, if God Himself has been ready for His contemplator for six thousand years.

*Harmonies of the World, 1049b-1050a*

9. THE GENESIS OF THE ECCENTRICITIES IN THE SINGLE PLANETS

FROM THE PROCUREMENT OF THE CONSONANCES

BETWEEN THEIR MOVEMENTS

Accordingly, since we see that the universal harmonies of all six planets cannot take place by chance, especially in the case of the extreme movements, all of which we see concur in the universal harmonies—except two, which concur in harmonies closest to the universal—and since much less can it happen by chance that all the pitches of the system of the octave (as set up in Book iii) by means of harmonic divisions are designated by the extreme planetary movements, but least of all that the very subtle business of the distinction of the celestial consonances into two modes, the major and minor, should be the outcome of chance, without the special attention of the Artisan: accordingly it follows that the Creator, the source of all wisdom, the everlasting approver of order, the eternal and superexistent geyser of geometry and harmony, it follows, I say, that He, the Artisan of the celestial movements Himself, should have conjoined to the five regular solids the harmonic ratios arising from the regular plane figures, and out of both classes should have formed one most perfect archetype of the heavens: in order that in this archetype, as through the five regular solids the shapes of the spheres shine through on which the six planets are carried, so too through the consonances, which are generated from the plane figures, and deduced from them in Book iii, the measures of the eccentricities in the single planets might be determined so as to proportion the movements of the planetary bodies; and in order that there should be one tempering together of the ratios and the consonances, and that the greater ratios of the spheres should yield somewhat to the lesser ratios of the eccentricities necessary for procuring the consonances, and conversely those in especial of the harmonic ratios which had a greater kinship with each solid figure should be adjusted to the planets— in so far as that could be effected by means of consonances. And in order that, finally, in that way both the ratios of the spheres and the eccentricities of the single planets might be born of the archetype simultaneously, while from the amplitude of the spheres and the bulk of the bodies the periodic times of the single planets might result.

*Harmonies of the World, 1061a*

semitones, and lemmas; for then, as has been said in Book iii. Chapter 8, two dieses proximately succeed one another in two pitches. The other argument is that in the distinction into kinds, the laws of the diesis are proper but not at all those of the semitone. Accordingly, there had to be greater consideration of the diesis than of the semitone. It is inferred from everything that the private ratio of the upper planet ought to be 2916: 3125 or approximately 14: 15, and that of the lower, 243: 250 or approximately 35 : 36.

*Harmonies of the World, 1080b-1085b passim*

Accordingly let this do for our envoi concerning the work of God the Creator. It now remains that at last, Avith my eyes and hands removed from the tablet of demonstrations and lifted up towards the heavens, I should pray, devout and supplicating, to the Father of lights: *O Thou Who dost by the light of nature promote in us the desire for the light of grace, that by its means Thou mayest transport us into the light of glory, I give thanks to Thee, O Lord Creator, Who hast delighted me with Thy makings and in the works of Thy hands have I exulted. Behold! now, I have completed the work of my profession, having employed as much power of mind as Thou didst give to me; to the men who are going to read those demonstrations I have made manifest the glory of Thy works, as much of its infinity as the narrows of my intellect could apprehend. My mind has been given over to philosophizing most correctly: if there is anything unworthy of Thy designs brought forth by me—a worm born and nourished in a wallowing place of sins—breathe into me also that which Thou dost wish men to know, that I may make the correction: If I have been allured into rashness by the wonderful beauty of Thy works, or if I have loved my own glory among men, while I am advancing in the work destined for Thy glory, be gentle and merciful and pardon me; and finally deign graciously to effect that these demonstrations give way to Thy glory and the salvation of souls and nowhere be an obstacle to that.*

10. EPILOGUE CONCERNING THE SUN, BY WAY OF CONJECTURE¹

From the celestial music to the hearer, from the Muses to Apollo the leader of the Dance, from the six planets revolving and making consonances to the Sun at the centre of all the circuits, immovable in place but rotating into itself. For although the harmony is most absolute between the extreme planetary movements, not with respect to the true speeds through the ether but with respect to the angles which are formed by joining with the centre of the sun the termini of the diurnal arcs of the planetary orbits ; while the harmony does not adorn the termini, i.e., the single movements, in so far as they are considered in themselves but only in so far as by being taken together and compared with one another, they become the object of some mind; and although no object is ordained in vain, without the existence of some thing which may be moved by it, while those angles seem to presuppose some action similar to our eyesight or at least to that sense-perception whereby, in Book IV, the sublunary nature perceived the angles of rays formed by the planets on the Earth: still it is not easy for dwellers on the Earth to conjecture what sort of sight is present in the sun, what eyes there are, or what other instinct there is for perceiving those angles

¹See Kepler's commentary on this epilogue in the Epitome, page 850-51.

even without eyes and for evaluating the harmonies of the movements entering into the antechamber of the mind by whatever doorway, and finally what mind there is in the sun. None the less, however those things may be, this composition of the six primary spheres around the sun, cherishing it with their perpetual revolutions and as it were adoring it (just as, separately, four moons accompany the globe of Jupiter, two Saturn, but a single moon by its circuit encompasses, cherishes, fosters the Earth and us its inhabitants, and ministers to us) and this special business of the harmonies, which is a most clear footprint of the highest providence over solar affairs, now being added to that consideration, [324] wrings from me the following confession: not only does light go out from the sun into the whole world, as from the focus or eye of the world, as life and heat from the heart, as every movement from the King and mover, but conversely also by royal law these returns, so to speak, of every lovely harmony are collected in the sun from every province in the world, nay, the forms of movements by twos flow together and are bound into one harmony by the work of some mind, and are as it were coined money from silver and gold bullion ; finally, the curia, palace, and praetorium or throne-room of the whole realm of nature are in the sun, whatsoever chancellors, palatines, prefects the Creator has given to nature: for them, whether created immediately from the beginning or to be transported hither at some time, has He made ready those seats. For even this terrestrial adornment, with respect to its principal part, for quite a long while lacked the contemplators and enjoyers, for whom however it had been appointed; and those seats were empty. Accordingly the reflection struck my mind, what did the ancient Pythagoreans in Aristotle mean, who used to call the centre of the world (which they referred to as the “fire” but understood by that the sun) “the watchtower of Jupiter," Διος φλακήν; what, likewise, was the ancient interpreter pondering in his mind when he rendered the verse of the Psalm as: ''He has placed His tabernacle in the sun."

But also I have recently fallen upon the hymn of Proclus the Platonic philosopher (of whom there has been much mention in the preceding books), which was composed to the Sun and filled full with venerable mysteries, if you excise that one κλῦθ (hear me) from it; although the ancient interpreter already cited has explained this to some extent, viz., in invoking the sun, he understands Him Who has placed His tabernacle in the sun. For Proclus lived at a time in which it was a crime, for which the rulers of the world and the people itself inflicted all punishments, to profess Jesus of Nazareth, God Our Savior, and to contemn the gods of the pagan poets (under Constantine, Maxentius, and Julian the Apostate). Accordingly Proclus, who from his Platonic philosophy indeed, by the natural light of the mind, had caught a distant glimpse of the Son of God, that true light which lighteth every man coming into this world, and who already knew that divinity must never be sought with a superstitious mob in sensible things, nevertheless perferred to seem to look for God in the sun rather than in Christ a sensible man, in order that at the same time he might both deceive the pagans by honoring verbally the Titan of the poets and devote himself to his philosophy, by drawing away both the pagans and the Christians from sensible beings, the pagans from the visible sun, the Christians from the Son of Mary, because, trusting too much to the natural light of reason, he spit out the mystery of the Incarnation; and finally that at the same time he might take over from them and adopt into his own philosophy whatever the Christians had which was most divine and especially consonant with Platonic philosophy.¹ And so the accusation of the teaching of the Gospel concerning Christ is laid against this hymn of Proclus, in its own matters: let that Titan keep as his private possessions χρυσά ηνία [golden reins] and ένα θησαυροφυλάκιο φωτός, ένα κάθισμα στη μέση του αιθέρα, ένας λαμπερός κύκλος στην καρδιά του κόσμου [a treasury of light, a seat at the midpart of the ether, a radiant circle at the heart of the world], which visible aspect Copernicus too bestows upon him; let him even keep his κυκλική οδήγηση αρμάτων [cyclical chariot-drivings], although according to the ancient Pythagoreans he does not possess them but in their place Διος φλακήν [the centre, the watchtower of Zeus]—which doctrine, misshapen by the forgetfulness of ages, as by a flood, was not recognized by their follower Proclus; let him also keep his γεννημένος απόγονος [offspring born] of himself, and whatever else is of nature; in turn, let the philosophy of Proclus yield to Christian doctrines, [325] let the sensible sun yield to the Son of Mary, the Son of God, Whom Proclus addresses under the name of the Titan, Ω Κύριε, που κρατάς το κλειδί του ελατηρίου που υποστηρίζει τη ζωή [O lord, who dost hold the key of the life-supporting spring], and that [thou didst fulfill all things with thy mind-awakening foresight], and that immense power over the μοίρες [fates], and things which were read of in no philosophy before the promulgation of the Gospel², the demons dreading him as their threatening scourge, the demons lying in ambush for souls, για να ξεφύγουν από την προσοχή της γεμάτη φως αίθουσα του υψηλού πατέρα [in order that they might escape the notice of the light-filled hall of the lofty father]; and who except the Word of the Father is that εικόνα του πατρόν πατέρα, με την εκδήλωση του οποίου από μια άφατη μητέρα έπαυσε η αμαρτία των στοιχείων που μεταβλήθηκαν το ένα στο άλλο [image of the all-begetting father, upon whose manifestation from an ineffable mother the sin of the elements changing into one another ceased], according to the following: The Earth was unwrought and a chaotic mass, and darkness was upon the face of the abyss, and God divided the light from the darkness, the waters from the waters, the sea from the dry land; and: all things were made by the very Word. Who except Jesus of Nazareth the Son of God, ο ποιμένας των ψυχών [the shepherd of souls], to whom η προσευχή ενός δακρυσμένου παρακλητού [the prayer of a tearful suppliant] is to be offered, in order that He cleanse us from sins and wash us of the filth της γενιάς [of generation]—as if Proclus acknowledged the fomes of original sin—and guard us from punishment and evil, κάνοντας ήπιο το γρήγορο μάτι της δικαιοσύνης [by making mild the quick eye of justice], namely, the wrath of the Father? And the other things we read of, which are as it were taken from the hymn of Zacharias (or, accordingly, was that hymn a part of the διασκορπίζοντας τη δηλητηριώδη, ανθρωποκαταστροφική ομίχλη [dispersing the poisonous, man-destroying mist], viz., in order that He may give to souls living in darkness and the shadows of death the Άγιο Φως [holy light] and ακλόνητη ευτυχία από την υπέροχη ευσέβεια [unshaken happiness from

¹It was the judgment of the ancients concerning his book Metroace that in it he set forth, not without divine rapture, his universal doctrine concerning God; and by the frequent tears of the author apparent in it all suspicion was removed from the hearers. None the less this same man wrote against the Christians eighteen epichiremata, to which John Philoponus opposed himself, reproaching Proclus with ignorance of Greek thought, which none the less he had undertaken to defend. That is to say, Proclus concealed those things which did not make for his own philosophy.

²Nevertheless in Suidas some similar things are attributed to ancient Orpheus, nearly equal to Moses, as if his pupil; see too the hymns of Orpheus, on which Proclus wrote commentaries.

lovely piety]; for that is to serve God in holiness and justice all our days.

Accordingly, let us separate out these and similar things and restore them to the doctrine of the Catholic Church to which they belong. But let us see what the principal reason is why there has been mention made of the hymn. For this same sun which διώχνει την πλούσια ροή της αρμονίας από ψηλά [sluices the rich flow of harmony from on high]—so too Orpheus κάνοντας κίνηση την αρμονική πορεία του κόσμου [making move the harmonious course of the world]—the same, concerning whose stock Phoebus about to rise τραγουδά υπέροχα πράγματα στη λύρα του και νανουρίζει για ύπνο το βαρύ κύμα της γενιάς [sings marvellous things on his lyre and lulls to sleep the heavy-sounding surge of generation] and in whose dance Paean is the partner, χτυπώντας την ευρεία σάρωση της αθώας αρμονίας [striking the wide sweep of innocent harmony]—him, I say, does Proclus at once salute in the first verse of the hymn as βασιλιάς της πνευματικής φωτιάς [king of intellectual fire]. By that commencement, at the same time, he indicates what the Pythagoreans understood by the word of fire (so that it is surprising that the pupil should disagree with the masters in the position of the centre) and at the same time he transfers his whole hymn from the body of the sun and its quality and light, which are sensibles, to the intelligibles, and he has assigned to that πνευματική φωτιά [intellectual fire] of his—perhaps the artisan fire of the Stoics—to that created God of Plato, that chief or self-ruling mind, a royal throne in the solar body, confounding into one the creature and Him through Whom all things have been created. But we Christians, who have been taught to make better distinctions, know that this eternal and uncreated ''Word," Which was ''with God'^ and Which is contained by no abode, although He is within all things, excluded by none, although He is outside of all things, took up into unity of person flesh out of the womb of the most glorious Virgin Mary, and, when the ministry of His flesh was finished, occupied as His royal abode the heavens, wherein by a certain excellence over and above the other parts of the world, viz., through His glory and majesty. His celestial Father too is recognized to dwell, and has also promised to His faithful, mansions in that house of His Father: as for the remainder concerning that abode, we believe it superfluous to inquire into it too curiously or to forbid the senses or natural reasons to investigate that which the eye has not seen nor the ear heard and into which the heart of man has not ascended; but we duly subordinate the created mind—of whatsoever excellence it may be—to its Creator, and we introduce neither God-intelligences with Aristotle and the pagan philosophers nor armies of innumerable planetary spirits with the Magi, nor do we propose that they are either to be adored or summoned to intercourse with us by theurgic superstitions, for we have a careful fear of that; but we freely inquire by natural reasons what sort of thing each mind is, especially if in the heart of the world [326] there is any mind bound rather closely to the nature of things and performing the function of the soul of the world—or if also some intelligent creatures, of a nature different from human perchance do inhabit or will inhabit the globe thus animated (see my book on the New Star, Chapter 24, ''On the Soul of the World and Some of Its Functions"). But if it is permissible, using the thread of analogy as a guide, to traverse the labyrinths of the mysteries of nature, not ineptly, I think, will someone have argued as follows: The relation of the six spheres to their common centre, thereby the centre of the whole world, is also the same as that of συζητητική διάνοια [discussive intellection] to διαισθητική διάνοια [intuitive intellection], according as these faculties are distinguished by Aristotle, Plato, Proclus, and the rest; and the relation of the single planets' revolutions in place around the sun to the αμετάβλητο [unvarying] rotation of the sun in the central space of the whole system (concerning which the sun-spots are evidence; this has been demonstrated in the Commentaries on the Movement of Mars) is the same as the relation of to πολλαπλούς λόγους αναλογικότητας με την πιο απλή νόηση του νου, that of the manifold discourses of ratiocination to the most simple intellection of the mind. For as the sun rotating into itself moves all the planets by means of the form emitted from itself, so too—as the philosophers teach—mind, by understanding itself and in itself all things, stirs up ratiocinations, and by dispersing and unrolling its simplicity into them, makes everything to be understood. And the movements of the planets around the sun at their centre and the discourses of ratiocinations are so interwoven and bound together that, unless the Earth, our domicile, measured out the annual circle, midway between the other spheres—changing from place to place, from station to station—never would human ratiocination have worked its way to the true intervals of the planets and to the other things dependent from them, never would it have constituted astronomy. (See the Optical Part of Astronomy, Chapter 9.)

On the other hand, in a beautiful correspondence, simplicity of intellection follows upon the stillness of the sun at the centre of the world, in that hitherto we have always worked under the assumption that those solar harmonies of movements are defined neither by the diversity of regions nor by the amplitude of the expanses of the world. As a matter of fact, if any mind observes from the sun those harmonies, that mind is without the assistance afforded by the movement and diverse stations of his abode, by means of which it may string together ratiocinations and discourse necessary for measuring out the planetary intervals. Accordingly, it compares the diurnal movements of each planet, not as they are in their own orbits but as they pass through the angles at the centre of the sun. And so if it has knowledge of the magnitude of the spheres, this knowledge must be present in it a priori, without any toil of ratiocination: but to what extent that is true of human minds and of sublunary nature has been made clear above, from Plato and Proclus.

Under these circumstances, it will not have been surprising if anyone who has been thoroughly warmed by taking a fairly liberal draft from that bowl of Pythagoras which Proclus gives to drink from in the very first verse of the hymn, and who has been made drowsy by the very sweet harmony of the dance of the planets begins to dream (by telling a story he may imitate Plato's Atlantis and, by dreaming, Cicero's Scipio) : throughout the remaining globes, which follow after from place to place, there have been disseminated discursive or ratiocinative faculties, whereof that one ought assuredly to be judged the most excellent and absolute which is in the middle position among those globes, viz., in man's earth, while there dwells in the sun simple intellect, ενώ στον ήλιο κατοικεί η απλή διάνοια,, the source, whatsoever it may be, of every harmony.

For if it was Tycho Brahe's opinion concerning that bare wilderness of globes that it does not exist fruitlessly in the world but is filled with inhabitants: with how much greater probability shall we make a conjecture as to God's works and designs even for the other globes, from that variety which we discern in this globe of the Earth. For He Who created the species which should inhabit the waters, beneath which however there is no room for the air [327] which living things draw in; Who sent birds supported on wings into the wilderness of the air; Who gave white bears and white wolves to the snowy regions of the North, and as food for the bears the whale, and for the wolves, birds' eggs; Who gave lions to the deserts of burning Libya and camels to the wide-spread plains of Syria, and to the lions an endurance of hunger, and to the camels an endurance of thirst: did He use up every art in the globe of the Earth so that He was unable, every goodness so that he did not wish, to adorn the other globes too with their fitting creatures, as either the long or short revolutions, or the nearness or removal of the sun, or the variety of eccentricities or the shine or darkness of the bodies, or the properties of the figures wherewith any region is supported persuaded?

Behold, as the generations of animals in this terrestrial globe have an image of the male in the dodecahedron, of the female in the icosahedron—whereof the dodecahedron rests on the terrestrial sphere from the outside and the icosahedron from the inside: what will we suppose the remaining globes to have, from the remaining figures? For whose good do four moons encircle Jupiter, two Saturn, as does this our moon this our domicile? But in the same way we shall ratiocinate concerning the globe of the sun also, and we shall as it were incorporate conjectures drawn from the harmonies, et cetera—which are weighty of themselves—with other conjectures which are more on the side of the bodily, more suited for the apprehension of the vulgar. Is that globe empty and the others full, if everything else is in due correspondence? If as the Earth breathes forth clouds, so the sun black smoke? If as the Earth is moistened and grows under showers, so the sun shines with those combusted spots, while clear flamelets sparkle in its all fiery body. For whose use is all this equipment, if the globe is empty? Indeed, do not the senses themselves cry out that fiery bodies dwell here which are receptive of simple intellects, and that truly the sun is, if not the king, at least the της πνευματικής φωτιάς [of intellectual fire]?

**18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, UK XI, CH 24-28 335c-338d; BK XVI, CH 26 438c-439a**

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God, UK XI, CH 24-28 335c-338d*

"Who made it?" "By what means?" "Why?" that it should be replied, "God," "By the Word," "Because it was good"—as to these three answers, it is very questionable whether the Trinity itself is thus mystically indicated, that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, or whether there is some good reason for this acceptation in this passage of Scripture,—this, I say, is questionable, and one can't be expected to explain everything in one volume.

Chap. 24. *Of the divine Trinity, and the indications of its presence scattered everywhere among its works*

We believe, we maintain, we faithfully preach, that the Father begat the Word, that is, Wisdom, by which all things were made, the only begotten Son, one as the Father is one, eternal as the Father is eternal, and, equally with the Father, supremely good; and that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit alike of Father and of Son, and is Himself consubstantial and co-eternal with both; and that this whole is a Trinity by reason of the individuality¹ of the persons, and one God by reason of the indivisible divine substance, as also one Almighty by reason of the indivisible omnipotence; yet so that, when we inquire regarding each singly, it is said that each is God and Almighty; and, when we speak of all together, it is said that there are not three Gods, nor three Almighties, but one God Almighty; so great is the indivisible unity of these Three, which requires that it be so stated. But, whether the Holy Spirit of the Father and of the Son, who are both good, can be with propriety called the goodness of both, because He is common to both, I do not presume to determine hastily. Nevertheless, I would have less hesitation in saying that He is the holiness of both, not as if He were a divine attribute merely, but Himself also the divine substance, and the third person in the Trinity. I am the rather emboldened to make this statement, because, though the Father is a spirit, and the Son a spirit, and the Father holy, and the Son holy, yet the third person is distinctively called the Holy Spirit, as if He were the substantial holiness consubstantial with the other two. But if the divine goodness is nothing else than the divine holiness, then certainly it is a reasonable studiousness and not presumptuous intrusion to inquire whether the same Trinity be not hinted at in an enigmatical mode of speech, by which our inquiry is stimulated, when it is written who made each creature, and by what means, and

¹Proprietas.

why. For it is the Father of the Word who said, "Let there be." And that which was made when He spoke was certainly made by means of the Word. And by the words, "God saw that it was good," it is sufficiently intimated that God made what was made not from any necessity, nor for the sake of supplying any want, but solely from His own goodness, i.e., because it was good. And this is stated after the creation had taken place, that there might be no doubt that the thing made satisfied the goodness on account of which it was made. And if we are right in understanding that this goodness is the Holy Spirit, then the whole Trinity is revealed to us in the creation. In this, too, is the origin, the enlightenment, the blessedness of the holy city which is above among the holy angels. For if we inquire whence it is, God created it; or whence its wisdom, God illumined it; or whence its blessedness, God is its bliss. It has its form by subsisting in Him; its enlightenment by contemplating Him; its joy by abiding in Him. It is; it sees; it loves. In God's eternity is its life; in God's truth its light; in God's goodness its joy.

Chap. 25. *Of the division of philosophy into three parts*

As far as one can judge, it is for the same reason that philosophers have aimed at a threefold division of science, or rather, were enabled to see that there was a threefold division (for they did not invent, but only discovered it), of which one part is called physical, another logical, the third ethical. The Latin equivalents of these names are now naturalized in the writings of many authors, so that these divisions are called natural, rational, and moral, on which I have touched slightly in the eighth book. Not that I would conclude that these philosophers, in this threefold division, had any thought of a trinity in God, although Plato is said to have been the first to discover and promulgate this distribution, and he saw that God alone could be the author of nature, the bestower of intelligence, and the kindler of love by which life becomes good and blessed. But certain it is that, though philosophers disagree regarding the nature of things, and the mode of investigating truth, and of the good to which all our actions ought to tend, yet in these three great general questions all their intellectual energy is spent. And though there be a confusing diversity of opinion, every man striving to establish his own opinion in regard to each of these questions, yet no one of them all doubts that nature has some cause, science some method, life some end and aim. Then, again, there are three things which every artificer must possess if he is to effect anything—nature, education, practice. Nature is to be judged by capacity, education by knowledge, practice by its fruit. I am aware that, properly speaking, fruit is what one enjoys, use [practice] what one uses. And this seems to be the difference between them, that we are said to enjoy that which in itself and irrespective of other ends delights us; to use that which we seek for the sake of some end beyond. For which reason the things of time are to be used rather than enjoyed, that we may deserve to enjoy things eternal; and not as those perverse creatures who would fain enjoy money and use God—not spending money for God's sake, but worshipping God for money's sake. However, in common parlance, we both use fruits and enjoy uses. For we correctly speak of the "fruits of the field," which certainly we all use in the present life. And it was in accordance with this usage that I said that there were three things to be observed in a man, nature, education, practice. From these the philosophers have elaborated, as I said, the threefold division of that science by which a blessed life is attained: the natural having respect to nature, the rational to education, the moral to practice. If, then, we were ourselves the authors of our nature, we should have generated knowledge in ourselves, and should not require to reach it by education, i.e., by learning it from others. Our love, too, proceeding from ourselves and returning to us, would suffice to make our life blessed, and would stand in need of no extraneous enjoyment. But now. since our nature has God as its requisite author, it is certain that we must have Him for our teacher that we may be wise; Him, too, to dispense to us spiritual sweetness that we may be blessed.

Chap. 26. *Of the image of the supreme Trinity, which we find in some sort in human nature even in its present state*

And we indeed recognize in ourselves the image of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be very far removed from Him—being neither co-eternal, nor, to say all in a word, consubstantial with Him—is yet nearer to Him in nature than any other of His works and is destined to be yet restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance. For we are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of us—colours, e.g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft objects by touching—of all which sensible objects it is the images resembling them but not themselves which we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the objects. But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, "What if you are deceived?" For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? But, since they are true and real, who doubts that when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and real? Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing?

Chap. 27. *Of existence, and knowledge of it, and the love of both*

And truly the very fact of existing is by some natural spell so pleasant, that even the wretched are, for no other reason, unwilling to perish; and, when they feel that they are wretched, wish not that they themselves be annihilated, but that their misery be so. Take even those who, both in their own esteem and in point of fact, are utterly wretched and who are reckoned so, not only by wise men an account of their folly, but by those who count themselves blessed, and who think them wretched because they are poor and destitute—if any one should give these men an immortality, in which their misery should be deathless, and should offer the alternative that if they shrank from existing eternally in the same misery they might be annihilated and exist nowhere at all, nor in any condition, on the instant they would joyfully, nay exultantly, make election to exist always, even in such a condition, rather than not exist at all. The well-known feeling of such men witnesses to this. For when we see that they fear to die, and will rather live in such misfortune than end it by death, is it not obvious enough how nature shrinks from annihilation? And, accordingly, when they know that they must die, they seek, as a great boon, that this mercy be shown them, that they may a little longer live in the same misery, and delay to end it by death. And so they indubitably prove with what glad alacrity they would accept immortality, even though it secured to them endless destruction. What! do not even all irrational animals, to whom such calculations are unknown, from the huge dragons down to the least worms, all testify that they wish to exist, and therefore shun death by every movement in their power? Nay, the very plants and shrubs, which have no such life as enables them to shun destruction by movements we can see, do not they all seek in their own fashion to conserve their existence, by rooting themselves more and more deeply in the earth, that so they may draw nourishment and throw out healthy branches towards the sky? In fine, even the lifeless bodies, which want not only sensation but seminal life, yet either seek the upper air or sink deep, or are balanced in an intermediate position, so that they may protect their existence in that situation where they can exist in most accordance with their nature.

And how much human nature loves the knowledge of its existence, and how it shrinks from being deceived, will be sufficiently understood from this fact, that every man prefers to grieve in a sane mind, rather than to be glad in madness. And this grand and wonderful instinct belongs to men alone of all animals; for, though some of them have keener eyesight than ourselves for this world's light, they cannot attain to that spiritual light with which our mind is somehow irradiated, so that we can form right judgments of all things. For our power to judge is proportioned to our acceptance of this light. Nevertheless, the irrational animals, though they have not knowledge, have certainly something resembling knowledge; whereas the other material things are said to be sensible, not be cause they have senses, but because they are the objects of our senses. Yet among plants, their nourishment and generation have some resemblance to sensible life. However, both these and all material things have their causes hidden in their nature; but their outward forms, which lend beauty to this visible structure of the world, are perceived by our senses, so that they seem to wish to compensate for their own want of knowledge by providing us with knowledge. But we perceive them by our bodily senses in such a way that we do not judge of them by these senses. For we have another and far superior sense, belonging to the inner man, by which we perceive what things are just, and what unjust— just by means of an intelligible idea, unjust by the want of it. This sense is aided in its functions neither by the eyesight, nor by the orifice of the ear, nor by the air-holes of the nostrils, nor by the palate's taste, nor by any bodily touch. By it I am assured both that I am and that I know this; and these two I love and in the same manner I am assured that I love them.

Chap. 28. *Whether we ought to love the love itself with which we love our existence and our knowledge of it, that so we may more nearly resemble the image of the divine Trinity*

We have said as much as the scope of this work demands regarding these two things, to wit, our existence, and our knowledge of it, and how much they are loved by us, and how there is found even in the lower creatures a kind of likeness of these things, and yet with a difference. We have yet to speak of the love wherewith they are loved, to determine whether this love itself is loved. And doubtless it is ; and this is the proof. Because in men who are justly loved, it is rather love itself that is loved ; for he is not justly called a good man who knows what is good, but who loves it. Is it not then obvious that we love in ourselves the very love wherewith we love whatever good we love? For there is also a love wherewith we love that which we ought not to love ; and this love is hated by him who loves that wherewith he loves what ought to be loved. For it is quite possible for both to exist in one man. And this co-existence is good for a man, to the end that this love which conduces to our living well may grow, and the other, which leads us to evil may decrease, until our whole life be perfectly healed and transmuted into good. For if we were beasts, we should love the fleshly and sensual life, and this would be our sufficient good; and when it was well with us in respect of it, we should seek nothing beyond. In like manner, if we were trees, we could not, indeed, in the strict sense of the word, love anything; nevertheless we should seem, as it were, to long for that by which we might become more abundantly and luxuriantly fruitful. If we were stones, or waves, or wind, or flame, or anything of that kind, we should want, indeed, both sensation and life, yet should possess a kind of attraction towards our own proper position and natural order. For the specific gravity of bodies is, as it were, their love, whether they are carried downwards by their weight, or upwards by their levity. For the body is borne by its gravity, as the spirit by love, whithersoever it is borne.¹ But we are men, created in the image of our Creator, Whose eternity is true, and Whose truth is eternal, Whose love is eternal and true, and Who Himself is the eternal, true, and adorable Trinity, without confusion, without separation; and, therefore, while, as we run over all the works which He has established, we may detect, as it were, His footprints, now more and now less distinct even in those things that are beneath us, since they could not so much as exist, or be bodied forth in any shape, or follow and observe any law, had they not been made by Him Who supremely is, and is supremely good and supremely wise; yet in ourselves beholding His image, let us, like that younger son of the gospel, come to ourselves, and arise and return to Him from Whom by our sin we had departed. There our being will have no death, our knowledge no error, our love no mishap. But now, though we are assured of our possession of these three things, not on the testimony of others, but by our own consciousness of their presence and because we see them with our own most truthful interior vision, yet, as we cannot of ourselves know how long they are to continue, and whether they shall never cease to be, and what issue their good or bad use will lead to, we seek for others who can acquaint us of these things, if we have not already found them. Of the trustworthiness of these witnesses, there will, not now, but subsequently, be an opportunity of speaking. But in this book let us go on as we have begun, with God's help, to speak of the city of God, not in its state of pilgrimage and mortality, but as it exists ever immortal in the heavens— that is, let us speak of the holy angels who maintain their allegiance to God, who never were, nor ever shall be, apostate, between whom and those who forsook light eternal and became darkness, God, as we have already said, made at the first a separation.

¹Compare the Confessions, bk. xiii. 10.

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God, BK XVI, CH 26 438c-439a*

Chap. 26. *Of God's attestation to Abraham, by which He assures him, when now old, of a son by the barren Sarah, and appoints him the father of the nations, and seals his faith in the promise by the sacrament of circumcision*

After these things Ishmael was born of Hagar; and Abraham might think that in him was fulfilled what God had promised him. saying, when he wished to adopt his home-born servant, "This shall not be thine heir; but he that shall come forth of thee, he shall be thine heir."³ Therefore, lest he should think that what was promised was fulfilled in the handmaid's son, "when Abram was ninety years old and nine, God appeared to him, and said unto him. I am God; be well-pleasing in my sight, and be without complaint, and I will make my covenant between me and thee, and will fill thee exceedingly."⁴

Here there are more distinct promises about the calling of the nations in Isaac, that is, in the son of the promise, by which grace is signified, and not nature; for the son is promised from an old man and a barren old woman. For although God effects even the natural course of procreation, yet where the agency of God is manifest, through the decay or failure of nature, grace is more plainly discerned. And because this was to be brought about, not by generation, but by regeneration, circumcision was enjoined now, when a son was promised of Sarah. And by ordering all, not only sons, but also home-born and purchased servants to be circumcised, he testifies that this grace pertains to all. For what else does circumcision signify than a nature renewed on the putting off of the old? And what else does the eighth day mean than Christ. Who rose again when the week was completed, that is. after the Sabbath? The very names of the parents are changed: all things proclaim newness, and the new covenant is shadowed forth in the old. For what does the term old covenant imply but the concealing of the new? And what does the term new covenant imply but the revealing of the old? The laughter of Abraham is the exultation of one who rejoices, not the scornful laughter of one who mistrusts. And those words of his in his heart, "Shall a son be born to me that am an hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?" are not the words of doubt, but of wonder. And when it is said. "And I will give to thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land in which thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlast-

³Gen. 15. 4. ⁴Gen. 17. 1-22.

ing possession." if it troubles any one whether this is to be held as fulfilled, or whether its fulfilment may still be looked for. since no kind of earthly possession can be everlasting for any nation whatever, let him know that the word translated "everlasting" by our writers is what the Greeks term αιὼνιον which is derived from αιὼν, the Greek for saculum, an age. But the Latins have not ventured to translate this by secular, lest they should change the meaning into something widely different. For many things are called secular which so happen in this world as to pass away even in a short time; but what is termed αιὼνιον either has no end, or lasts to the very end of this world.

**19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A 10, ANS and REP I 9c-10c; Q 3, A I, REP 1-5 14b-15b; Q 12, A 3, REP 2-3 52c-53b; Q 13, A 2 63c-64d; A 4, ANS 65c-66b; Q 27, A I, ANS 153b-154b; Q 34 185a-189a; Q 47, AI, ANS and REP 2 256a-257b; Q 65, A I, REP 3 339b-340b; Q 103, A I, ANS 528b-529a***

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A 10, ANS and REP I 9c-l0c*

Article 10. *Whether in Holy Scripture a Word May Have Several Senses?*

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, topological or moral, and anagogical.

Objection 1. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no proof, but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore there cannot be several senses to a word in Holy Writ.

Obj. 2. Further. Augustine says (De util. cred. iii)⁴ that “the Old Testament has a fourfold division namely, according to history, etiology, analogy, and allegory.” Nov.- these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four different senses mentioned above.

Obj. 3. Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these four. On the contrary, Gregory says 1 Moral, xx, 1):⁵ "'Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery."

I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So. whereas in every other science things are signified bywords, this science has the property that the things signified by the words have themselves also a meaning. Therefore that first meaning whereby words signify

⁴PL 42, 63. 5 ⁵PL 76, 135.

things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That meaning whereby things signified by words have themselves also a meaning is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it.

Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says (Heb. 10. i) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says¹ the New Law itself is a figure of future glory. Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense. But so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense.

Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says² if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

Reply Obj. i. The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epist. xciii).³ Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.

Reply Obj. 2. These three—history, etiology, analogy—are grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds⁴ whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives—namely, on account of the hardness of men's hearts (Matt. 19. 8) ; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of S. Victor (Sacram. 1, 4)⁵ includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only—the historical, the allegorical, and the topological.

Reply Obj. 3. The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely, operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

¹De Eccl. Hier., v, 2 (PG 3, 501).

²Confessions, xii, 42 (PL 32, 844).

³Chap. 8 (PL 33, 334)-

⁴De Util. Cred., 3 (PL 42, 68).

⁵PL 176, 184; Cf. De Scriptur. et Scriptor. Sacris., III (PL 175, 11).

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 3, A I, REP 1-5 14b-15b*

QUESTION III

OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD

(*In Eight Articles*)

When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know what it is. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.

Therefore, we must consider (1) How He is not. (2) How He is known by us. (q. xii) (3) How He is named, (q. xiii).

Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying of Him whatever is unfitting to Him—namely, composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection, (q. iv) (3) His infinity, (q. vii) (4) His immutability, (q. ix) (5) His unity (q. xi).

Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body? (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident? (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?

Article I. *Whether God Is a Body?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that God is a body.*

Objection 1. For a body is that which has three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes three dimensions to God. for it is written : *He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea (Job 11. 8, 9).* Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 2. Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written : *Let us make man to our image and likeness* (Gen 1. 26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: *Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure i.e., the image of His substance* (Heb. 1.3). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. Hast thou an arm like God? (Job 40.4) ; and *The eyes of the Lord are upon the just* (Ps. 33. 16) ; and *The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength* (Ps. 117. 16). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 4. Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: I saw the Lord sitting (Isa. 6. 1), and *He standeth up to judge* (Isa. 3.13). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 5. Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term from which or to which. But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term to which, according to the words, *Come ye to Him and be enlightened* (Ps. 23.6), and as a term from which: *All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth* (Jer. 17. 13). Therefore God is a body.

*On the contrary*, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (4. 24) : *God is a spirit.*

I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (q. ii, a. 3), that God is the First Mover unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.

Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potency. For although in one and the same thing that passes from potency to act, the potency is prior in time to the act, nevertheless, absolutely speaking, act is prior to potency. For whatever is in potency can be reduced to act only by some being in act. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be anything in potency. But every body is in potency, because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity. it is therefore impossible that God should be a body.

Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings as is clear from what was said above (q. ii, a. 3). Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings, for a body must be either animate or inanimate, and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate in so far as it is a body. Otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.

Reply Obj. i. As we have said above (q. i, a. 9.), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the likenesses of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the likeness of corporeal quantity, it designates His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the excellence of His power over all things; by length, the duration of His being; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix.), ¹by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence, by length, the procession of His all-pervading power, by breadth, His overspreading all things, since, namely, all things lie under His protection.

¹Sect. 9 (PG 3, 913).

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 12, A 3, REP 2-3 52c-53b*

Article 3. *Whether the Essence of God Can Be Seen with the Bodily Eye?*

*We proceed thus to the Third Article*: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye.

Objection 1. For it is written (Job 19. 26): In my flesh I shall see . . . God, and (ibid. 42. 5), *With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.*

Obj. 2. Further. Augustine says² "Those eyes [namely of the glorified] will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever can see incorporeal things can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.

Obj. 3. Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written : I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, etc. (Isa. 6. 1). But an imaginary vision has its origin in sense, "for the imagination is moved by sense to act," as it is stated in the book on the Soul.³ Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid, Deum, Ep. cxlvii)⁴: "No one has ever seen God as He is, either in this life, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."

I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or power of the sensitive part. For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later (q. lxxviii. a. i). Now act is proportioned to that of which it is the act. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (q. in, a. i). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. The words, In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour, do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, *Now my eye seeth Thee*, are to be understood of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says : May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart may be enlightened (Eph. i. 17, 18).

²City of God, xxii, 2Q (PL 41, 799)-

³Aristotle, in, 3 (429\*1).

⁴Chap. 11 (PL 33, 609).

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have an altogether different power [namely the glorified eyes] , if they shall see that incorporeal nature"; and afterwards he explains this, saying: "It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made, but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the accidental object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some other knowing power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes—namely, from the clearness of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine brightness in the renewed body.

Reply Obj. 3. The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination produces some form representing God according to some mode of likeness, as in divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.

Article 4. *Whether Any Created Intellect by its Natural Powers Can See the Divine Essence?*

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article*: It seems that a created intellect can see the divine essence by its own natural power.

Objection 1. For Dionysius says {Div. Norn. iv)¹: An angel "is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore, since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the divine essence.

Obj. 2. Further, what is supremely visible is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he understand God.

¹Sect. 22 (PG3, 724).

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 13, A 2 63c-64d*

Article 2. *Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Substantially?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially.

Objection 1. For Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 9):¹ ''Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nam. I)²: "You will find a chorus of all the holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denominations of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything does not signify anything pertaining to its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi)³: "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

I answer that, Negative names applied to God or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at ail signify His substance. but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God. such as good, wise, and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God rather than to place anything in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing, and the same in like manner applies to other names;

¹PG 94.833-

²Sect. 4 (PG 3. 589).

³Chap. 4 (PL 42. 927).

and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.¹ Others² say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures; thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things ; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, since He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body, takes away the notion that He is being in potency only as is prime matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, because it signifies only the cause of health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say that He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine —namely, that these names signify the divine substance and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it was shown above (q. tv, a. 2) that God possesses beforehand in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself absolutely and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness to it, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (q. iv, A. 3), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore these names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as

creatures represent it imperfectly.

¹Guide, I, 58 (FR 82).

²Alan of Lille, Theol. Reg., Reg. 21, 26 (PL 210, 631, 633).

So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil," but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God," and in a higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good because He causes goodness, but rather, on the contrary, He pours out goodness in things because He is good, according to what Augustine says,³ "Because He is good, we are."

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, since by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is, but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply Obj. 2. In the signification of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance this name "stone" {lapis) is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot (Iαdit pedem): but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner, so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession. But nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the processions themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the senses were, "life proceeds from Him," but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

Reply Obj. 3. We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him according as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

Article 3. *Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Properly?*

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It seems that no name is applied properly to God.

Objection 1. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures, as was explained above (a. i). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

³Christian Doctrine, 1, 32 (PL 34, 32).

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, A 4, ANS 65c-66b*

Article 4. *Whether Xames Applied to God Are Synonymous?*

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article*: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names.

Objection 1. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God: for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

Obj. 2. Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is an empty idea. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one. it seems also that these ideas are ideas to no purpose.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea, and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas: and thus they are synonymous.

On the contrary. All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say. "venture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God." or the like, and yet it is written. O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name (Jer. 32. 18).

I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand if we said that these names are used to remove or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that 'here are different ideas as regards the diverse thing denied of God. or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above (a. 2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (aa. 1, 2) that they have diverse meanings. For the notion signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, while in creatures they are received divided and multiplied. As, therefore, to the different perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions. Therefore, although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that thing under many and different aspects they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing, because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The many aspects of these names are not empty and worthless, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply Obj. 3. The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality and yet many in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, just as things represent Him in a manifold way.

Article. 5. *Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated of Them?*

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It seems that what is said of God and creatures is said of them univocally.

Objection 1. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one ; for if the name dog be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally—namely, of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinity. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced is an univocal agent; and thus what is said of God and creatures is predicated univocally.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 27, A I, ANS 153b-154b*

Article I. *Whether There is Procession in God?*

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God.

Objection 1. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing subject to motion, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God.

Obj. 2. Further, everything which proceeds differs from that from which it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity, but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.

Obj. 3. Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown above (q. ii, A. 3). Therefore in God there is no procession.

On the contrary, Our Lord says, From God I proceeded ('John 8. 42).

I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which pertain to procession.

This procession has been differently understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect proceeding from its cause. And this is the way in which Arius took it,¹ saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God, and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is the true God (I John 5. 20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost? (I Cor. 6. 19.) Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative.

Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it, in which sense it was understood by Sabellius.² who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, The Son cannot of Himself do anything (John 5. 19); and many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son.

Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act ; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself. But since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This appears most conspicuously in the intellect, the action of which namely, to understand, remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the thing understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that thing. This conception is signified by the spoken word, and it is

¹See Augustine, De Hacres, 49 (PL 42, 39)-

²Ibid., sect. 41 (42,32).

called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.

As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the likeness of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; although even the likenesses derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement, or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect ; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source from which it proceeds, whereas whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source from which it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent, since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine act of understanding is the very supreme perfection of God (q. xiv, a. 1), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity.

Reply Obj. 3. To proceed from a principle so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle is irreconcilable with the notion of a first principle; but an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the notion of a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the notion of such a principle is included the conception of his art; and it would be included in the notion of the first principle were the builder the first principle. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the artificer to artificial things*.*

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 34 185a-189a*

QUESTION XXXIV

Of the person of the son

(*In Three Articles*)

We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son—namely, Son, Word, and Image. The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image.

Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son? (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?

Article I. *Whether Word in God Is a Personal Name?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name.

Objection 1. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But "Word is applied to God metaphorically," as Origen says¹ on (John 1. 1), In the beginning was the Word. Therefore Word is not a personal name in God.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10),² "The Word is knowledge with love"; and according to Anselm (Monól.),³ to speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought. But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.

¹PG 14, 59.

²PL 42, 969.

³Chap. 63 (PL 158, 208).

Obj. 3. Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm (ibid, lxii), as the Father is intelligent, the Son intelligent, and the Holy Ghost intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and not in a personal sense.

Obj. 4. Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which do His Word (Ps. 148. 8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 2):⁴ "As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is." But Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word.

I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential name. To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning, while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher,⁵ vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as stated in the book on the Soul.⁶ The vocal sound, which has no signification, cannot be called a word : hence the exterior vocal sound is called a word because it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Thus, therefore first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word ; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De Fide Orthod. i, 13),⁷ saying that "word is called the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendour," which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart," which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the angel"—that is, the messenger "of intelligence," which is the second kind. Word is also used in a

⁴PL 42, 936.

⁵Interpretation, 1 (16ᵃ 3).

⁶Aristotle, 11, 8 (420^2).

⁷PG 94, 857.

fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are accustomed to say, "this is the word I have said to you," or "which the king has commanded," alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command.

Now word is taken properly in God as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10):¹ "Whoever can understand the word not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word." The concept itself of the heart has the nature of proceeding from something other than itself—namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence Word, according as we use the term properly of God, signifies something proceeding from another, which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, since the divine persons are distinguished by origin (q. xxvii, Introd.; q. xxxii, a. 3). Hence the term "Word," according as we use the term properly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally only.

Reply Obj. 1. The Arians, who sprang from Origen,² declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavoured to maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word this is not to be understood in a proper sense, lest the idea of the Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it as to remain within him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its proper sense. For if a thing be called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, which is said personally.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally except word alone, for word alone signifies that which

¹PL42, 1071.

²In Joann., 11 (PG 14, 109).

emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is put in act by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the intellect in act what being is to being in act, since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 2)³ that the Word is "begotten wisdom," for it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called "begotten knowledge." Thus also can be explained how to speak is in God to see by thought, since the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought. Still the term thought does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16)⁴: "Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists properly in the search after truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (loc. cit.) takes thought in an improper sense for contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3. As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is "to speak." Hence, as the Word is not common to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i):⁵ "That co-eternal Word is understood as not alone in God." On the other hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; but in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the Word, so that thus the whole Trinity is spoken in the Word,

³PL 42, 936.

⁴PL 42, 1079.

⁵PL 42, 933.

and likewise also all creatures ; just as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term speak improperly for the act of understanding, whereas they differ from each other; for "to understand" means only the relation of the intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which relation no notion of origin is conveyed, but only a certain informing of our intellect, according as our intellect is put in act by the form of the thing understood. In God. however, it means complete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was proved above (q. xiv, aa. 2, 4). But to speak means chiefly the relation to the word conceived, for to speak is nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it signifies a relation to the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is speaker in God. although each Person understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.

Reply Obj. 4. The term word is taken there figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect to which they are ordained by the word conceived of the divine wisdom ; just as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word.

Article 2. *Whether "Word" Is Proper Name of the Son?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It would seem that Word is not the proper name of the Son.

Objection 1. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.

Obj. 2. Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word. He proceeds from the Father by way only of utterance, which is the heresy of Valentine, as appears from Augustine (De Hceres. xi).¹

Obj. 3. Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper name, it signifies some property of His ; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned.

¹PL 42, 28.

Obj. 4. Further. Whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son. and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.

Obj. 5. Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1. 3) : Bearing all things by the word of His power, from which Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, ii)² that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi. 2):³ "By Word we understand the Son alone."

I answer that, Word, said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect is called the Son; and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (q. xxvii, a. 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.

Reply Obj. 1. To be and to understand are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intelligible being does not belong to our nature. But in God to be and to understand are one and the same ; hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His, but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must be something subsistent, for whatever is in the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i, 18):⁴ that "the Word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are powers of the soul."

Reply Obj. 2. The error of Valentine was condemned, not, as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi),⁵ but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Augustine (De Hceres, loc. cit.).

Reply Obj. 3. In the term Word the same property is signified as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 2):⁶ "Word and Son express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names which are attributed to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is coeternal. He is called the Splendour; to show that He is altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is

²PG 29, 732.

³PL 42, 925.

⁴Chap. 13 (PG 94, 857).

⁵PL 10, 162.

⁶PL 42, 936.

called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one name.

Reply Obj. 4. To be intelligent belongs to the Son in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God. since to understand is said of God essentially, as stated above, (a. i, Ans. 2, 3). Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent not as producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding, because in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.

Reply Obj. 5. When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the word of His power," word is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence a gloss says¹ that "word" is here taken to mean command, since by the effect of the power of the Word things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks improperly and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost, in the sense that everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He manifests the Son.

Article 3. *Whether the Name "Word" Signifies Relation to Creatures?*

*We proceed thus to the Third Article*: It would seem that the name Word does not signify relation to creatures.

Objection 1. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally, as we have stated (a. i). Therefore Word does not signify relation to creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever signifies relation to creatures is said of God in time; as Lord and Creator. But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not signify relation to the creature.

Obj. 3. Further, Word signifies relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore if it signifies relation to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the creature.

Obj. 4. Further, Ideas are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word signifies relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.

Obj. 5. Further, if Word signifies relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures

¹Glossa interl., on Heb. i. 3 (vi, 134T) ; Glossa Lombardi, on Heb. 1.3 (PL 192, 406).

are known by God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings, which appears to be false.

On the contrary, Augustine says (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 63 ),² that the name Word "signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power."

I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things. His unique Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures. And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures ; and therefore it is said (Ps. 32. 9): He spake, and they were made, because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes.

Reply Obj. 1. The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person, for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name of a divine person as regards the personal relation does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures so far as the essence is included in its meaning; for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son. so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten. And in this way the name Word implies relation to creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but which remains in the agent—as to know and to will; such are not applied to God in time. And this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that the names which imply relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time, but only those names are

²PL 40, 54.

applied in time which imply relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect.

Reply Obj. 3. Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures.

Reply Obj. 4. The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God, and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify relation to the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, since God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature. And so there is only one Word in God, and that a personal one.

Reply Obj. 5. God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about non-beings are the same because the Word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). l Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but of nonbeings is expressive and manifestive.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 47, AI, ANS and REP 2 256a-257b*

QUESTION XLVII

Of the distinction of things in

GENERAL

(*In Three Articles*)

After considering the production of creatures in being we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be threefold—first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil (q. xlviii); thirdly of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature (q. l).

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry : (i) The multitude or distinction of things. (2) Their inequality. (3) The unity of the world.

Article I. *Whether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God.

Objection 1. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (q. xi, a. 4). Therefore He produces but one effect.

Obj. 2. Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplary cause of His effect, as was said above (q. xliv, A. 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.

Obj. 3. Further, the means are proportioned to the end. But the end of the creature is one — namely, the divine goodness, as was shown above (q. xliv, a. 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.

On the contrary, It is said (Gen. 1.4, 7) that God divided the light from the darkness, and divided waters from waters. Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.

I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, 1 who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together; 2 and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by drawing out what is mixed up in matter.

1 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, 2 (194ᵃ20); 11, 4 (196ᵃ24); in, 4 (203ᵃ34).

2 Cf. Ibid., III, 4 (203ᵃ23).

But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above (q. xliv, a. 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter, but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.

Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as did Avicenna,³ who said that God by understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence, in which, since it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition of potency and act, as will appear later (q. l, a. 2, Ans. 3). And so the first intelligence, in so far as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potency it produced the body of the heavens, which causes movement, and in so far as it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens.

But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was shown above (q. xlv, a. 5) that to create pertains to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone—namely, all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.

Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided; and hence the whole universe together participates the divine

³Meta. ix, 4 (104va); cf. I, 7 (73rb).

goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.

And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God, which is the conception of His wisdom; and this is what we read in Genesis (i. 3, 4): God said: Be light made. . . . And He divided the light from the darkness.

Reply Obj. 1. The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (q. xix, a. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above (q. XV, a. 2), it follows that, although He is one, He can make many things.

Reply Obj. 2. This reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature perfectly represents the first exemplar, which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things.

Reply Obj. 3. In speculative things the means of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God. And hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.

Article 2. *Whether the Inequality of Things Is from God?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God.

Objection 1. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.

Obj. 2. Further, equality is the effect of unity¹. But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.

Obj. 3. Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.

¹Aristotle, Metaphysics, v, 15 (1021ᵃ12).

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 65, A I, REP 3 339b-340b*

Article I. *Whether Corporeal Creatures Are From God?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.

Objection 1. For it is said (Eccles. 3. 14): I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever. But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said (II Cor. 4. 18): The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. Therefore God did not make visible bodies.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said (Gen. 1. 31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways, as may be seen in serpents, in the sun's heat, and other like things. Now a thing is called evil in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

Obj. 3. Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle says (II Cor. 4. 18): While we look not at the things which are seen. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145. 6) : Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.

I answer that, Certain heretics maintain¹ that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of the Apostle (II Cor. 4. 4), The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers. But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however different otherwise. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him. Of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, Whose god is their belly (Phil. 3. 19).

Reply Obj. 1. All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards

¹The Manichees. See above, Q. xlix, a. 3.

their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure wtih respect to their substance, though they are changeable in other respects, such as place ; for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's words, The things which are seen are temporal, though true even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards consisting in these visible things are temporal, while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before (ibid. 17) : It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory.

Reply Obj. 2. Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but particular and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by their nature, but by the good they themselves can derive from them, everything which is harmful to themselves seems evil absolutely. For they do not consider that what is in some way injurious to one person to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.

Reply Obj. 3. Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. 1. 20). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wisd. 14. II) : Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise. And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica, Q 103, A I, ANS 528b-529a*

Article I. *Whether the World Is Governed by Anyone?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone.

Objection 1. For it pertains to those things which move or work for an end to be governed. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end, for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.

Ob). 2. Further, those things are governed which are moved towards some thing. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

Obj. 3. Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. 14. 3): But Thou, Father, governest all things by Thy Providence. And Boethius says (De Consol iii, 9):¹ Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."

I answer that, Certain philosophers of old denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance.² But such an opinion can be shown to be impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves. For we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best, which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end, which is to govern. Therefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed. For instance, if we enter a well ordered house we gather from it the intention of him who put it in order, as Cicero says (De Nat. Deorum, ii),³ quoting Aristotle. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (q. xliv, a. 4; q. lxv, a. 2), was the cause of the production of things in being. For as it pertains to the best to produce the best, it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it pertains to the Divine goodness, to lead things to their end just as it brought things into being. And this is to govern.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures;

and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed to it by another, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Therefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

Reply Obj. 2. In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter, and

¹PL 63, 758.

²Democritus and Epicurus; cf. Q. xxii, a. 2.

³Chap. 5(DD iv, in).

something belonging to movement, according as under movement we include operation. And" things need governing as to both, because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (q. civ, a. i).

Reply Obj. 3. The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, since that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man over and above their nature is somewhat violent. Therefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

**20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART III, Q 12, A 3, REP 2 778b-779a; Q 60, A 2, ANS and REP I 848a-d; A 5, REP I 850b-851b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 2 1032b-1034b**

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART III, Q 12, A 3, REP 2 778b-779a

Article 3. *Whether Christ Learned Anything from Man?*

*We proceed thus to the Third Article*: It would seem that Christ learned something from man.

Objection I. For it is written (Luke 2. 46, 47) that. They found Him in the temple in the midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions. But to ask questions and to reply pertains to a learner. Therefore Christ learned something from man.

Obj. 2. Further, to acquire knowledge from a man's teaching seems more noble than to acquire it from sensible things, since in the soul of the man who teaches the intelligible species are in act, but in sensible things the intelligible species are only in potency. Now Christ received experimental knowledge from sensible things, as stated above (a. 2; Q. ix, A. 4). Much more, therefore, could He receive knowledge by learning from men.

Obj. 3. Further, by experimental knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but advanced in it, as was said above (a. 2). But anyone hearing words which mean something may learn something he does not know Therefore Christ could learn from men something He did not know by this knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 55. 4): Behold, I have given Him for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the Gentiles. Now a master is not taught, but teaches. Therefore Christ did not receive any knowledge by the teaching of any man.

I answer that, In any genus that which is the first mover is not moved according to the same species of movement, just as the first principle of change is not itself changed. Now Christ is established by God the Head of the Church — indeed, of all men, as was said above (q. viii., a. 3), so that not only all might receive grace through Him, but that all might receive the doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence He Himself says (John 18. 37): For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth. And thus it did not befit His dignity that He should be taught by any man.

Reply Obj. 1. As Origen says (Horn, xix in Luc.):² "Our Lord asked questions not in order to learn anything, but in order to teach by questioning. For from the same well of knowledge came the question and the wise reply." Hence the Gospel goes on to say that all that heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His answers.

Reply Obj. 2. Whoever learns from man does not receive knowledge immediately from the intelligible species which are in his mind, but through sensible words, which are signs of intelligible concepts. Now as words formed by a man are signs of his intellectual knowledge, so are creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. Hence it is written (Ecclus. i. 10) that God poured wisdom out upon all His works. Hence, just as it is better to be taught by God than by man, so it is better to receive our knowledge from sensible creatures and not by man's teaching.

Reply Obj. 3. Jesus advanced in experimental knowledge, as in age, as stated above (a. 2). Now as a fitting age is required for a man to acquire knowledge by discovery, so also that he may acquire it by being taught. But our

²Translation of Jerome (PG 13, 1851; cf. PL 26, 240).

Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age, and hence He did not give ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine until such time as He was able to have reached that grade of knowledge by way of experience. Hence Gregory says {Sup. Ezech. Lib. i, Hom. ii):¹ "In the twelfth year of His age He deigned to question men on earth, since in the course of reason, the word of doctrine is not vouchsafed before the age of perfection."

¹PL 76, 796.

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART III, Q 60, A 2, ANS and REP I 848a-d

Article 2. *Whether Every Sign of a Holy Thing Is a Sacrament?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

Objection I. For all sensible creatures are signs of sacred things, according to Rom. i. 20: The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made. And yet all sensible things cannot be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever was done under the Old Law was a figure of Christ Who is the Holy of Holies (Dan. 9. 24), according to I Cor. 10. II : All {these) things happened to them in figure; and Col. 2. 17: Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's. And yet not all that was done by the Fathers of the old Testament, not even all the ceremonies of the Law, were sacraments, but only in certain special cases, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. CI, A. 4). Therefore it seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

Obj. 3. Further, even in the New Testament many things are done in sign of some sacred thing, yet they are not called sacraments; such as sprinkling with holy water, the consecration of an altar, and the like. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the thing defined. Now some³ define a sacrament as being "the sign of a sacred thing"; moreover, this is clear from the passage quoted above (a. i) from Augustine. Therefore it seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to come to the unknown by means of the known. Consequently a sacrament properly so called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to man, so that properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, is defined as being the sign of a holy thing so far as it makes men holy.

Reply Obj. i. Sensible creatures signify something holy—namely. Divine wisdom and goodness in so far as these are holy in themselves, but not in so far as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be called sacraments as we understand sacraments now.

Reply Obj. 2. Some things pertaining to the Old Testament signified the holiness of Christ considered as holy in Himself. Others signified His holiness considered as the cause of our holiness; thus the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified Christ's Sacrifice whereby we are made holy, and such things are properly styled sacraments of the Old Law.

Reply Obj. 3. Names are given to things considered in reference to their end and state of completeness. Now a disposition is not an end, whereas perfection is. Consequently things that signify disposition to holiness are not called sacraments, and with regard to these the objection is verified: only those are called sacraments which signify the perfection of holiness in man.

³Cf. Lanfranc, Dc Corp. et Sang. Dom., xii (PL 150, 422); Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacr., i, ix, 2 (PL 176, 317); Peter Lombard, Sent., iv, d. i, chap. 2 (QR ii, 745); Albert the Great, In Sent., iv, dist. i. A. i, Q. 2 (QR iv, 14); Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol., iv, Q. i, m. i (iv, ara); Bonaventure, In Sent., iv, d. i, A. i, Q. 2 (QR iv, 14).

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART III, A 5, REP I 850b-851b

Article 5. *Whether Determinate Things Are Required for a Sacrament?*

*We proceed thus to the Fifth Article*: It seems that determinate things are not required for a sacrament.

Objection, i. For sensible things are required in sacraments for the purpose of signification, as stated above (a. 4). But nothing hinders the same thing being signified by various sensible things; thus in Holy Scripture God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone (II Kings 22. 2; Zach. 3. 9; I Cor. 10. 4; Apoc. 4. 3), sometimes by a lion (Isa. 31. 4; Apoc. 5. 5), sometimes by the sun (Isa. 60. 19, 20; Malach. 4. 2), or by something similar. Therefore it seems that various things can be suitable to the same sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not required for the sacraments.

Obj. 2. Further, the health of the soul is more necessary than that of the body. But in bodily medicines, which are ordered to the health of the body, one thing can be substituted for another which happens to be wanting. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are spiritual remedies ordered to the health of the soul, can one thing be substituted for another when this happens to be lacking.

Obj. 3. Further, it is not fitting that the salvation of men be restricted by the Divine Law, still less by the Law of Christ, Who came to

save all. But in the state of the Law of nature determinate things were not required in the sacraments, but were put to that use through a vow, as appears from Gen. 28. 20, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore it seems that man should not have been restricted, especially under the New Law, to the use of any determinate thing in the sacraments.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (John 3. 5); Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.

I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things may be considered, namely, the worship of God, and the sanctification of man, the former of which pertains to man in relation to God, and the latter pertains to God in relation to man. Now it is not for anyone to determine that which is in the power of another but only that which is in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for man to decide what things should be used for his sanctification, but this should be determined by Divine institution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by which man is sanctified according to I Cor. 6. II, You are washed, you are sanctified, we must use those things which are determined by Divine institution.

Reply Obj. i. Though the same thing can be signified by various signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means of the sensible things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what things are to be employed for the purpose of signification in this or that sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. Sensible things are endowed with natural powers conducive to the health of the body, and therefore if two of them have the same power it does not matter which we use. Yet they are ordained to sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally, but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore it was necessary that God should determine the sensible things to be employed in the sacraments.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (Contra Faust, xix, 16),¹ various sacraments suit different times, just as different times are signified by different parts of the verb, namely, present, past, and future. Consequently, just as under the state of the Law of nature man was moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship God, so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary for a law to be given from without; both because the Law of nature had become obscured by man's sins, and in order to signify more expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified. And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men have to make use in the sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation narrowed thereby, because the things which need to be used in the sacraments are either in everyone's possession or can be had with little trouble.

Article 6. *Whether Words Are Required for the Significance of the Sacraments?*

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article*: It seems that words are not required for the signification of the sacraments.

Objection i. For Augustine says {Contra Faust, xix, 16):² "What else is a corporal sacrament but a kind of visible word?" Therefore to add words to the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same as to add words to words. But this is superfluous. Therefore words are not required besides the sensible things in the sacraments.

¹PL 42, 356.

²PL 42, 356.

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART III,SUPPL, Q 92, A 2 1032b-1034b

Article 2. *Whether After the Resurrection the Saints Will See God With the Eyes of the Body?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body.

Objection i. Because the glorified eye has greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes (Job 42. 5) : With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee. Much more therefore will the glorified eye be able to see God in His essence.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Job 19. 26): In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour (Vulg., —my God). Therefore in heaven God will be seen with the eyes of the body.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified eyes, expresses himself as follows:¹ "A greater power will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or eagles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these animals they can see only corporeal things), but to see even incorporeal things," Now any power that is capable of knowing incorporeal things can be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified eyes will be able to see God.

Obj. 4. Further, The disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can see corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the incorporeal. And consequently the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 5. Further, Gregory, commenting on Job 4. 16, There stood one whose countenance I knew not, says {Moral, v, 34):² "Man who had he been willing to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh, became, by sinning, carnal even in mind." Now through becoming carnal in mind, "he thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by the images of bodies (ibid.).'' Therefore when he will be spiritual in the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection), he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 6. Further, Man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.

Obj. 7. Further, Even as God is present to the intellect by His essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will be all in all (I Cor. 15. 28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union of His essence with the intellect. Therefore He will also be visible to the sense.

¹City of God, xxii, 29 (PL 41, 799).

²PL 75, 712.

On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Luke I. II, There appeared to him an angel, says:¹ "God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch." Therefore God will by no means be visible to the bodily sense.

Further, Jerome, commenting on Isa. 6. i, I saw the Lord sitting, says;² "The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the mind, of which it is said: 'Blessed are the pure in heart.' "

Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, Ep. cxlvii, 23):³ "An incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye." But God is supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.

Further, Augustine says {De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii, 11):⁴ "No man hath seen God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic life, in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the corporeal sight." Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed, wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.

Further, According to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 4),⁵ "man is said to be made to God's image in that he is able to see God." But man is in God's image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh. Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.

I answer that, A thing is perceived by the senses of the body in two ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceived directly if it can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper sensible, for instance colour in relation to the sight, and sound in relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since whatever is received into a thing is in it after the mode of the recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to their magnitude, and consequently magnitude and all that follows on it, such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.

An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense, neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is joined to those things that act on sense directly; for instance Socrates, the son of Diares, a friend, and the

¹PL 15, 1624.

²PL 24, 94.

³PL 33, 621.

⁴PL 33, 609.

⁵PL 42, 1040.

like which are known per se by the intellect in the universal, and in the particular are the object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this kind, although per accidens, when the apprehensive power (whose province it is to know per se this thing known), from that which is sensed per se, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse (thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks). Otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even accidentally.

I say then that God can in no way be seen with the eyes of the body, or perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen per se, neither here, nor in heaven; for if that which belongs to sense as such be removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that which belongs to sight as sight be removed from sight, there will be no sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and sight as such a sense perceives colour, it is impossible for the sight to perceive that which is neither colour nor magnitude, unless we call it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically the same in the glorified body as in a non-glorified body, it win be impossible for it to see the Divine essence as a thing per se visible ; yet it will see it as is visible per accidens, because on the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by Augustine,⁶ as is clear if we take note of his words, for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see that they live."

Reply Obj. i. This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye, of which the Apostle says (Eph. I. 18): The eyes of our (Vulg., —your) heart enlightened.

Reply Obj. 2. The passage quoted does not

⁶City of God, xxii, 29 (PL 47, 800).

mean that we are to see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall see God.

Reply Obj. 3. In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before: "Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall see that incorporeal nature"; and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly a greater power," etc., and afterwards he explains himself.

Reply Obj. 4. All knowledge results from some kind of abstraction from matter. Therefore the more a corporeal form is abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle of knowledge, in so far as it is separated from matter, and a form existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge. Therefore the spiritual eye, from which the obstacle to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal object; but it does not follow that the corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as participating in matter, is able to know perfectly incorporeal objects of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 5. Although the mind that has become carnal cannot think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends, it must always apprehend it corporeally; therefore it cannot know things which cannot be apprehended corporeally.

Reply Obj. 6. Happiness is the perfection of man as man. And since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul, it follows that man's happiness does not chiefly consist other than in an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind of overflow, as explained above (q. Lxxxv, A. i). Yet our body will have a certain Happiness from seeing God in sensible creatures, and especially in Christ's body.

Reply Obj. 7. The intellect can perceive spiritual things, whereas the eyes of the body cannot; therefore the intellect will be able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body will not.

**21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy,* PARADISE, XXVIII [1-78] 148d-149c**

CANTO XXVIII

After she who imparadises my mind had disclosed the truth counter to the present life of wretched mortals; as one who sees in a mirror the flame of a torch which is lighted behind him, ere he has it in sight or in thought, and turns round to see if the glass tell him the truth, and sees that it accords with it as the note with its measure; so my memory recollects that I did, looking into the beautiful eyes, wherewith Love made the cord to capture me. And when I turned, and mine were touched by what is apparent in that sphere whenever one gazes fixedly on its circling, I saw a Point which was raying out light so keen that the sight on which it blazes must needs close because of its intense keenness. And whatever star seems smallest from here would seem a moon if placed beside it, as star with star is placed.

22. Perhaps as near as a halo seems to girdle the light which paints it, when the vapor that bears it is most dense, at such distance around the Point a circle of fire was whirling so rapidly that it would have surpassed that motion which most swiftly girds the world; and this was girt around by another, and that by the third, and the third then by the fourth, by the fifth the fourth, and then by the sixth the fifth. Thereon the seventh followed, so widespread now in compass that the messenger of Juno entire would be narrow to contain it. So the eighth and the ninth; and each was moving more slowly, according as it was in number more distant from the unit. And that one had the clearest flame from which the Pure Spark was least distant; I believe because it partakes more of Its truth.

40. My Lady, who saw me deeply suspense in heed, said: "On that Point Heaven and all nature are dependent. Look on that circle which is most conjoined to It, and know that its motion is so swift because of the burning love whereby it is spurred." And I to her: "If the world were disposed in the order which I see in those wheels, that which is set before me would have satisfied me; but in the world of sense the revolutions may be seen so much the more divine as they are more remote from the centre. Wherefore if my desire is to have end in this marvellous and angelic temple, which has for confine only love and light, I need yet to hear why the example and the exemplar go not in one fashion, because by myself I contemplate this in vain." "If thy fingers are insufficient for such a knot, it is no wonder, so hard has it become through not being tried."

61. Thus my Lady; then she said: "Take that which I shall tell thee, if thou wouldest be satisfied and sharpen thy wit about it. The corporeal circles are wide or narrow according to the more or less of virtue which is diffused through all their parts. Greater goodness must work greater weal; the greater body, if it has its parts equally complete, contains the greater weal. Hence this one, which sweeps along with itself all the rest of the universe, corresponds to the circle which loves most, and knows most. Therefore, if thou draw thy measure round the virtue, not round the appearance of the beings which seem circular to thee, thou wilt see m each heaven a marvellous agreement with its Intelligence, of greater to more and of smaller to less."

**23 HOBBES: *Leviathan,* PART I, 78d-79a; 81a-c**

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan,* PART I, 78d-79a

Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true, being unable to detect the impossibility. And credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that ignorance itself, without malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies and tell them, and sometimes also to invent them.

Anxiety for the future time disposeth men to inquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage. Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of Him in their mind answerable to His nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there which men call fire and is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of Him in his mind.

And they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancy their gods. By which means it hath come to pass that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible is the natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.

And this seed of religion, having been observed by many, some of those that have observed it have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws; and to add to it, of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events by which they thought they should best be able to govern others and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers.

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan,* PART I, 81a-c

human politics; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine politics; and containeth precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort were all the founders of Commonwealths, and the lawgivers of the Gentiles: of the latter sort were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Saviour, by whom have been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God.

And for that part of religion which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a god or devil; or by their poets feigned to be animated, inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the world was a god by the name of Chaos.

The heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds, were so many gods.

Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a leek, were deified. Besides that, they filled almost all places with spirits called demons: the plains, with Pan and Panises, or Satyrs; the woods, with Fauns and Nymphs; the sea, with Tritons and other Nymphs; every river and fountain, with a ghost of his name and with Nymphs; every house, with its Lares, or familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with ghosts and spiritual officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with larvae, lemures, ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of fairies and bugbears. They have also ascribed divinity, and built temples, to mere accidents and qualities; such as are time, night, day, peace, concord, love, contention, virtue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall or withholding that good, or evil, for or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own wit, by the name of Muses; their own ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own lust, by the name of Cupid; their own rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions to incubi and succubae: insomuch as there was nothing which a poet could introduce as a person in his poem which they did not make either a god or a devil. The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for religion, which is men's ignorance of causes, and there by

**25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays,* 212a-c**

will not fail to lift up their hands towards heaven if you give them a good thrust with a sword in the breast; and when fear or sickness has abated and deadened the licentious fervour of this giddy humour, they will readily return, and very discreetly suffer themselves to be reconciled to the public faith and examples. A doctrine seriously digested is one thing; quite another thing are those superficial impressions which, springing from the disorder of an unhinged understanding, float at random and uncertainly in the fancy. Miserable and senseless men, who strive to be worse than they can!

The error of paganism and the ignorance of our sacred truth made the great soul of Plato, but great only in human greatness, fall yet into this other vicious mistake, "that children and old men are most susceptible of religion," as if it sprang and derived its reputation from our weakness. The knot that ought to bind the judgment and the will, that ought to restrain the soul and join it to the creator, should be a knot that derives its foldings and strength, not from our considerations, from our reasons and passions, but from a divine and supernatural constraint, having but one form, one face, and one lustre, which is the authority of God and His divine grace. Now, our heart and soul being governed and commanded by faith, 'tis but reason that they should muster all our other faculties, for as much as they are able to perform, to the service and assistance of their design. Neither is it to be imagined that all this machine has not some marks imprinted upon it by the hand of the mighty architect, and that there is not in the things of this world, some image, that in some measure resembles the workman who has built and formed them. He has in His stupendous works left the character of His divinity, and 'tis our own weakness only that hinders us from discerning it. 'Tis what He Himself is pleased to tell us, that He manifests His invisible operations to us, by those that are visible; Sebonde applied himself to this laudable study, and demonstrates to us that there is not any part or member of the world that disclaims or derogates from its maker. It were to do a wrong to the divine goodness, did not the universe consent to our belief; the heavens, the earth, the elements, our bodies, and our souls, all these concur to this, if we can but find out the way to use them. They instruct us if we are capable of instruction; for this world is a most sacred temple, into which man is introduced, there to contemplate statues, not the works of a mortal hand, but such as the divine purpose has made the objects of sense, the sun, the stars, the waters, and the earth, to represent those that are intelligible to us. "The invisible things of God," says St. Paul, "from the creation of the world, His eternal power and Godhead," are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.

*Atque adeo jaciem coeli non invidet orbi*

*Ipse Deus, vultusque suos, corpusque recludit*

*Semper volvendo; seque ifsum inculcat, et offert;*

*Ut bene cognosci possit, doceatque videndo*

*Qualis eat, doceatque suas attendere leges.¹*

¹And God Himself does not envy to men the seeing heaven's face; but ever revolving, He still renews its face and body to our view; and Himself so inculcates into our minds that we may well know Him, instructing us by seeing Him what He is, how He moves, and to obey His laws.—Manilius, iv. 907.

**28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation,* 421d; 490d-494a esp 491a-b, 492c-493a**

28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation,* 421d

EXERCISE 49. The inquiry into the efficient cause of the chick is one of great difficulty

The discussion of the efficient cause of the chick is, as we have said, sufficiently difficult, and all the more in consequence of the various titles by which it has been designated. Aristotle, indeed, recites several efficient causes of animals, and numerous controversies have arisen on the subject among writers (these having been particularly hot between medical authors and Aristotelians) who have come into the arena with various explanations, both of the nature of the efficient cause and of the mode of its operation.

And indeed the Omnipotent Creator is nowhere more conspicuous in his works, nowhere is his divinity more loudly proclaimed, than in the structure of animals. And though all know and admit that the offspring derives its origin from male and female, that an egg is engendered by a cock and a hen, and that a pullet proceeds from an egg, still we are not informed either by the medical schools or the sagacious Aristotle, as to the manner in which the cock or

28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation,* 490d-494a

But that this may be made still more certain let me be permitted to digress a little from my subject, and, in a few words, to show what is meant by the word "spirit," and what by the phrases "superior in action to the forces of the elements," "to have the properties of another body, and that more divine than those bodies which are called elements," and "the nature inherent in this spirit which answers to the essence of the stars."

We have already had occasion to say something both of the nature of "spirit" and "the vital principle," and we shall here enter into the subject at greater length. There are three bodies—simple bodies—which seem especially entitled to receive the name, at all events, to perform the office of "spirit," viz., fire, air, and water, each of which, by reason of its ceaseless flux and motion, expressed by the words flame, wind, and flood, appears to have the properties of life, or of some other body. Flame is the flow of fire, wind the flow of air, stream or flood the flow of water. Flame, like an animal, is self-motive, self-nutrient, self-augmentative, and is the symbol of our life. It is therefore that it is so universally brought into requisition in religious ceremonies: it was guarded by priestesses and virgins in the temples of Apollo and Vesta as a sacred thing, and from the remotest antiquity has been held worthy of divine worship by the Persians and other ancient nations; as if God were most conspicuous in flame, and spoke to us from fire as He did to Moses of old. Air is also appropriately spoken of as "spirit," having received the title from the act of respiration. Aristotle himself admits, "that there is a kind of life, and birth, and death of the winds."¹ Finally, we speak of a running stream as "living water."

These three, therefore, inasmuch as they have a kind of life, appear to act superiorly to the forces of the element, and to share in a more divine nature; they were, therefore, placed among the number of the divinities by the heathen. When any excellent work or process appeared, surpassing the powers of the naked elements, it was held as proceeding from some more divine agent. "To act with power superior to the powers of the elements," therefore, and, on that account, "to share in the properties of some more divine thing, which does not derive its origin from the elements," appear to have the same signification.

The blood, in like manner, "acts with powers superior to the powers of the elements" in the fact of its existence, in the forms of primordial and innate heat, in semen and spirit, and its producing all the other parts of the body in succession; proceeding at all times with such foresight and understanding, and with definite ends in view, as if it employed reasoning in its

¹On the Generation of Animals, iv. lo. chapter.

acts. Now this it does not, in so far as it is elementary, and as deriving its origin from fire, but in so far as it is possessed of plastic powers and endowed with the gift of the vegetative soul, as it is the primordial and innate heat, and the immediate and competent instrument of life. Το αίμα είναι η ζωντανή αρχή του ανθρώπου, λέει ο Suidas: The blood is the living principle of man, says Suidas; and the same thing is true of all animals; an opinion which Virgil seems to have wished to express when he says:

*Una eademque via sanguisque animusque*

*sequuntur.*

And by one path the blood and life flowed out.

The blood, therefore, by reason of its admirable properties and powers, is "spirit." It is also celestial; for nature, the soul, that which answers to the essence of the stars, is the inmate of the spirit, in other words, it is something analogous to heaven, the instrument of heaven, vicarious of heaven.

In this way all natural bodies fall to be considered under a twofold point of view, viz., either as they are specially regarded, and are comprehended within the limits of their own proper nature, or are viewed as the instruments of some more noble agent and superior power; For as regards their peculiar powers, there is, perhaps, no doubt but that all things subject to generation by birth, and to death and decay, derive their origin from the elements, and perform their offices agreeably to their proper standard; but in so far as they are the instruments of a more excellent agent, and are governed by that, not acting of their own proper nature, but by the regimen of another; therefore is it, therein is it, that they seem to participate with another and more divine body, and to surpass the powers of the ordinary elements.

In the same way, too, is the blood the animal heat, in so far, namely, as it is governed in its actions by the soul; for it is celestial as subservient to heaven; and divine, because it is the instrument of God the great and good. But this we have already spoken of above, where we have shown that male and female were the instruments of the sun, heaven, and Supreme Preserver, when they served for the generation of the more perfect animals.

The inferior world, according to Aristotle, is so continuous and connected with the superior orbits, that all its motions and changes appear to take their rise and to receive direction from thence. In that world, indeed, which the Greeks called κὀσμοϛ from its order and beauty, inferior and corruptible things wait upon superior and incorruptible things; but all are still subservient to the will of the supreme, omnipotent, and eternal Creator.

They, therefore, who think that nothing composed of the elements can show powers of action superior to the forces exercised by these, unless they at the same time partake of some other and more divine body, and on this ground conceive the spirits they evoke as constituted partly of the elements, partly of a certain ethereal and celestial substance—these persons, I say, appear to me to reason indifferently. In the first place you will scarcely find any elementary body which in acting does not exceed its proper powers: air and water, the winds and the ocean, when they waft navies to either India and round this globe, and often by opposite courses, when they grind, bake, dig, pump, saw timber, sustain fire, support some things, overwhelm others, and suffice for an infinite variety of other and most admirable offices—who shall say that they do not surpass the powers of the elements ? In like manner what does not fire accomplish? in the kitchen, in the furnace, in the laboratory, softening, hardening, melting, subliming, changing, in an infinite variety of ways! What shall we say of it when we see iron itself produced by its agency?—iron "that breaks the stubborn soil, and shakes the earth with war!" — iron that in the magnet (to which Thales therefore ascribed a soul) attracts other iron, "subdues all other things, and seeks besides I know not what inane," as Pliny¹ says; for the steel needle only rubbed with the loadstone still steadily points to the great cardinal points; and when our clocks constantly indicate the hours of the day and night—shall we not admit that all of these partake of something else, and that of a more divine nature, than the elements? And if in the domain and rule of nature so many excellent operations are daily effected surpassing the powers of the things themselves, what shall we not think possible within the pale and regimen of nature, of which all art is but imitation? And if, as ministers of man, they effect such admirable ends, what, I ask, may we not expect of them, when they are instruments in the hand of God?

We must, therefore, make the distinction and say, that whilst no primary agent or prime efficient produces effects beyond its powers, every instrumental agent may exceed its own

¹Hist. nat. XXXVI. 16.

proper powers in action; for it acts not merely by its own virtue, but by the virtue of a superior efficient.

They, consequently, who refuse such remarkable faculties to the blood, and go to heaven to fetch down I know not what spirits, to which they ascribe these divine virtues, cannot know, or at all events, cannot consider that the process of generation, and even of nutrition, which indeed is a kind of generation, for the sake of which they are so lavish of admirable properties, surpasses the powers of those very spirits themselves, nor of the spirits only, but of the vegetative, aye, even the sensitive, and I will venture to add, the rational soul. Powers, did I say ? It far exceeds even any estimate we can form of the rational soul; for the nature of generation, and the order that prevails in it, are truly admirable and divine, beyond all that thought can conceive or understanding comprehend.

That it may, however, more clearly appear that the remarkable virtues which the learned attribute to the spirits and the innate heat belong to the blood alone, besides what has already been spoken of as conspicuous in the egg before any trace of the embryo appears, as well as in the perfect and adult faetus, the few following observations are made by way of further illustration, and for the sake of the diligent inquirer. The blood considered absolutely and by itself, without the veins, in so far as it is an elementary fluid, and composed of several parts — of thin and serous particles, and of thick and concrete particles called cruor—possesses but few, and these not very obvious virtues. Contained within the veins, however, inasmuch as it is an integral part of the body, and is animated, regenerative, and the immediate instrument and principal seat of the soul, inasmuch, moreover, as it seems to partake of the nature of another more divine body, and is transfused by divine animal heat, it obtains remarkable and most excellent powers, and is analogous to the essence of the stars. In so far as it is spirit, it is the hearth, the Vesta, the household divinity, the innate heat, the sun of the microcosm, the fire of Plato; not because like common fire it lightens, burns, and destroys, but because by a vague and incessant motion it preserves, nourishes, and aggrandizes itself. It further deserves the name of spirit, inasmuch as it is radical moisture, at once the ultimate and the proximate and the primary aliment, more abundant than all the other parts; preparing for and administering to these the same nutriment with which itself is fed, ceaselessly permeating the whole body, cherishing and keeping alive the parts which it has fashioned and added to itself, not otherwise assuredly than the superior stars, the sun and moon especially, in maintaining their own proper orbits, continually vivify the stars that are beneath them.

Since the blood acts, then, with forces superior to the forces of the elements, and exerts its influence through these forces or virtues, and is the instrument of the Great Workman, no one can ever sufficiently extol its admirable, its divine faculties. In the first place, and especially, it is possessed by a soul which is not only vegetative, but sensitive and motive also; it penetrates everywhere and is ubiquitous; abstracted, the soul or the life too is gone, so that the blood does not seem to differ in any respect from the soul or the life itself {anima); at all events, it is to be regarded as the substance whose act is the soul or the life. Such, I say, is the soul, which is neither wholly corporeal nor yet wholly incorporeal; which is derived in part from abroad, and is partly produced at home; which in one way is part of the body, but in another way is the beginning and cause of all that is contained in the animal body, viz., nutrition, sense, and motion, and consequently of life and of death alike; for whatever is nourished, is itself vivified, and vice versa. In like manner, that which is abundantly nourished increases; what is not sufficiently supplied shrinks; what is perfectly nourished preserves its health; what is not perfectly nourished falls into disease. The blood, therefore, even as the soul, is to be regarded as the cause and author of youth and old age, of sleep and waking, and also of respiration; all the more and especially as the first instrument in natural things contains the internal moving cause within itself. It therefore comes to the same thing, whether we say that the soul and the blood, or the blood with the soul, or the soul with the blood, performs all the acts in the animal organism.

We are too much in the habit, neglecting things, of worshipping specious names. The word blood, signifying a substance, which we have before our eyes, and can touch, has nothing of grandiloquence about it; but before such titles as spirits, and calidum innatum or innate heat, we stand agape. But the mask removed, as the error disappears, so does the idle admiration. The celebrated stone, so much vaunted for its virtues by Pipinus to Migaldus, seems to have filled not only them but also Thuanus, an excellent historian, with wonder and admiration Let me be allowed to append the riddle: "Lately," says he, "there was brought from the East Indies to our king a stone, which we have seen, wonderfully radiant with light and effulgence, the whole of which, as if burning and in flames, was resplendent with an incredible brilliancy of light. Tossed hither and thither, it filled the ambient air with beams that were scarcely bearable by any eyes. It was also extremely impatient of the earth; if you essayed to cover it, it forthwith and of itself burst forth with violence, and mounted on high. No man could by any art contain or inclose it in any confined place; on the contrary, it appears to delight in free and spacious places. It is of the highest purity, of the greatest brightness, and is without stain or blemish. It has no certain shape, but a shape uncertain and changing every moment. Of the most consummate beauty, it suffers no one to touch it; and if you persist too long or obstinately, it will do you injury, as I have observed it repeatedly to do in no trifling measure. If anything be by chance taken from it by persevering efforts, it is (strange to say) made nothing less thereby. Its custodier adds further, that its virtues and powers are useful in a great variety of ways, and even—especially to kings—indispensably necessary; but these he declines to reveal without 'being first paid a large reward." The author might have added of this stone that it was neither hard nor soft, and exhibited a variety of forms and colours, and had a singular trick of trembling and palpitating, and like an animal—although itself inanimate— consumed a large quantity of food every day for its nutrition or sustenance. Further, that he had heard from men worthy of credit, that this stone had formerly fallen from heaven to earth; that it was the frequent cause of thunder and lightning, and was still occasionally engendered from the solar beams refracted through water.

Who would not admire so remarkable a stone, or believe that it acted with a force superior to the forces of the elements, that it participated in the nature of another body, and possessed an ethereal spirit ? especially when he found that it responded in its proportions to the essence of the sun. But with Fernelius¹ for (Edipus, we find the whole enigma resolving itself into "Flame."

In the same way, did I paint the blood under the garb of a fable, and gave it the title of the philosopher's stone, and propose all its wonderful faculties and operations in enigmatical languagc, many would doubtless think a great deal of it; they would readily believe that it could act with powers superior to those of the elements, and they would not unwillingly allow it to be possessed of another and more divine body.

¹De abdit. rer. caus., II. 27.

28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation,* esp 491a-b

body, and that more divine than those bodies which are called elements," and "the nature inherent in this spirit which answers to the essence of the stars."

We have already had occasion to say something both of the nature of "spirit" and "the vital principle," and we shall here enter into the subject at greater length. There are three bodies—simple bodies—which seem especially entitled to receive the name, at all events, to perform the office of "spirit," viz., fire, air, and water, each of which, by reason of its ceaseless flux and motion, expressed by the words flame, wind, and flood, appears to have the properties of life, or of some other body. Flame is the flow of fire, wind the flow of air, stream or flood the flow of water. Flame, like an animal, is self-motive, self-nutrient, self-augmentative, and is the symbol of our life. It is therefore that it is so universally brought into requisition in religious ceremonies: it was guarded by priestesses and virgins in the temples of Apollo and Vesta as a sacred thing, and from the remotest antiquity has been held worthy of divine worship by the Persians and other ancient nations; as if God were most conspicuous in flame, and spoke to us from fire as He did to Moses of old. Air is also appropriately spoken of as "spirit," having received the title from the act of respiration. Aristotle himself admits, "that there is a kind of life, and birth, and death of the winds."¹ Finally, we speak of a running stream as "living water."

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¹On the Generation of Animals, iv. lo. chapter.

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28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation,* 492c-493a

They, consequently, who refuse such remarkable faculties to the blood, and go to heaven to fetch down I know not what spirits, to which they ascribe these divine virtues, cannot know, or at all events, cannot consider that the process of generation, and even of nutrition, which indeed is a kind of generation, for the sake of which they are so lavish of admirable properties, surpasses the powers of those very spirits themselves, nor of the spirits only, but of the vegetative, aye, even the sensitive, and I will venture to add, the rational soul. Powers, did I say ? It far exceeds even any estimate we can form of the rational soul; for the nature of generation, and the order that prevails in it, are truly admirable and divine, beyond all that thought can conceive or understanding comprehend.

That it may, however, more clearly appear that the remarkable virtues which the learned attribute to the spirits and the innate heat belong to the blood alone, besides what has already been spoken of as conspicuous in the egg before any trace of the embryo appears, as well as in the perfect and adult faetus, the few following observations are made by way of further illustration, and for the sake of the diligent inquirer. The blood considered absolutely and by itself, without the veins, in so far as it is an elementary fluid, and composed of several parts — of thin and serous particles, and of thick and concrete particles called cruor—possesses but few, and these not very obvious virtues. Contained within the veins, however, inasmuch as it is an integral part of the body, and is animated, regenerative, and the immediate instrument and principal seat of the soul, inasmuch, moreover, as it seems to partake of the nature of another more divine body, and is transfused by divine animal heat, it obtains remarkable and most excellent powers, and is analogous to the essence of the stars. In so far as it is spirit, it is the hearth, the Vesta, the household divinity, the innate heat, the sun of the microcosm, the fire of Plato; not because like common fire it lightens, burns, and destroys, but because by a vague and incessant motion it preserves, nourishes, and aggrandizes itself. It further deserves the name of spirit, inasmuch as it is radical moisture, at once the ultimate and the proximate and the primary aliment, more abundant than all the other parts; preparing for and administering to these the same nutriment with which itself is fed, ceaselessly permeating the whole body, cherishing and keeping alive the parts which it has fashioned and added to itself, not otherwise assuredly than the superior stars, the sun and moon especially, in maintaining their own proper orbits, continually vivify the stars that are beneath them.

**30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning,* 2c-4c; 38a; 41b-d / *New Atlantis,* 203a-b**

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning,* 2c-4c

I. 1. In the entrance to the former of these, to clear the way, and as it were to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the dignity of learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacit objections; I think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance; but ignorance severally disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines; sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politiques; and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.

2. I hear the former sort say, that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution: that the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man: that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and therefore where it entereth into a man it makes him swell; "Scientia inflat”:¹ that Salomon gives a censure, "That there is no end of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the flesh"; and again in another place, "That in spacious knowledge there is much contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety":² that Saint Paul gives a caveat, "That we be not spoiled through vain philosophy":³ that experience demonstrates how learned men have been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.

3. To discover then the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear these men do not observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge of nature and universality,

¹“Knowledge puffs up."

²Eccles. 12. 12, and 1. 18.

³I Cor. 8. 1.

a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him, according unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall: but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon God's commandments, which was the form of the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much less extend the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of God; and therefore Salomon, speaking of the two principal senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that "the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing":¹ and if there be no fulness, then is the continent greater than the content: so of knowledge itself, and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after that Kalendar or Ephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes; and concludeth thus: "God hath made all things beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their seasons: Also he hath placed the world in man's heart, yet cannot man find out the work which God worketh from the beginning to the end":² declaring not obscurely, that God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees, which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed. And although he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of nature, which he calleth "The work which God worketh from the beginning to the end," is not possible to be found out by man; yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind, but may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness of life, ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other inconveniences, whereunto the condition of man is subject. For that nothing parcel of the world is denied to man's inquiry and invention, he doth in another place rule over, when he saith, "The spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth the inwardness of all secrets." If then such be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that

¹Eccles, 1. 8.

²Eccles. 3. 2.

there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of venom or malignity, and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so sovereign, is charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to the former clause: for so he saith, "Knowledge bloweth up, but charity buildeth up";³ not unlike unto that which he delivereth in another place: "If I spake," saith he, "with the tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it were but as a tinkling cymbal"; not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and angels, but because, if it be severed from charity, and not referred to the good of men and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthy glory, than a meriting and substantial virtue. And as for that censure of Salomon, concerning the excess of writing and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from knowledge; and that admonition of Saint Paul, "That we be not seduced by vain philosophy"; let those places be rightly understood, and they do indeed excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby human knowledge is confined and circumscribed; and yet without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal nature of things; for these limitations are three: the first, that we do not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality; the second, that we make application of our knowledge, to give ourselves repose and contentment, and not distaste or repining: the third, that we do not presume by the contemplation of nature to attain to the mysteries of God. For as touching the first of these, Salomon doth excellently expound himself in another place of the same book, where he saith: "I saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from darkness; and that the wise man's eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the fool roundeth about in darkness: but withal I learned, that the same mortality involveth them both."⁴ And for the second, certain it is, there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an impres

³I Cor. 8. 1.

⁴Eccles. 2. 13, 14.

sion of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum, whereof Heraclitus the profound said, "Lumen siccum optima anima";¹ but it becometh lumen madidum, or maceratum,² being steeped and infused in the humours of the affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over: for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain philosophy: for the contemplation of God's creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God, no perfect knowledge, but wonder which is broken knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly said by one of Plato's school, "That the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then again it obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense discover natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine."³ And hence itis true that it hath proceeded, that divers great learned men have been heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God, which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job asked of his friends: "Will you lie for God, as one man will do for another, to gratify him ?"⁴ For certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes:⁵ and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards God; and nothing else but to offer to the author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie. But further, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a further proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion. For in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on further, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair.⁶ To conclude therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain, that a man can search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in the book of God's works, divinity or philosophv; but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or proficience in both; only let men beware that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling: to use, and not to ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together.

¹"The dry light is the best soul."

²A light saturated with moisture.

³Philo Judaeus, De Somnis, p. 41.

⁴Job, 13. 7.

⁵Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, 1. 2; Butler, The Analogy of Religion, 1. 2.

⁶Iliad, Bk. viii. 19; and also Plato, Theatetus, Bk. 1. 153.

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning,* 38a

3. The third, which is history of providence, containeth that excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and his secret will: which though it be so secure, as for the most part it is not legible to the natural man;¹ no, nor many times to those that behold it from the tabernacle; yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and the confuting of those which are without God in the world, to write it in such text and capital letters that, as the prophet saith, "He that runneth by may read it";² that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's judgements, and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable events and examples of God's judgements, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings: and this is a work which hath passed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

¹J. Cor. 2.

²Eph. 2; and Hab. 2.

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning,* 41b-d

VI. I. This science being therefore first placed as a common parent like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, "omnes caelicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes"³ we may return to the former distribution of the three philosophies, divine, natural, and human. And as concerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God: but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the superstitious, because no light

³Virgil, AEneid, Bk. vi. 787. "All dwellers in the heaven and upper sky."

of nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For as all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image, so it is of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the maker, but not his image. And therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only "the work of his hands" ; neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man.⁴ Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and enforce the acknowledgement of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled by divers. But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgement not safe: "Da fidei quae fidei sunt.”⁵ For the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: "That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven." So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or to submit the mysteries of God to our reason ; but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess: whereunto I have digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary

and fabulous philosophy.⁶

2. Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted. For although the Scripture saith, "Let no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth not," &c, yet notwithstanding, if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them,⁷ either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of a creature,

⁴Ps. 8. 3, 102. 25, and others.

⁵"Give unto faith the things that are faith’s."

⁶Iliad, Bk. ix.

⁷Col. 11. 5, 18.

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning, New Atlantis,* 203a-b

boats to go nearer to this marvellous sight. But when the boats were come within about sixty yards of the pillar they found themselves all bound, and could go no further, yet so as they might move to go about, but might not approach nearer: so as the boats stood all as in a theatre, beholding this light, as an heavenly sign. It so fell out, that there was in one of the boats one of our wise men, of the Society of Salomon's House; which house or college, my good brethren, is the very eye of this kingdom, who having awhile attentively and devoutly viewed and contemplated this pillar and cross, fell down upon his face; and then raised himself upon his knees, and lifting up his hands to Heaven, made his prayers in this manner:

“ 'Lord God of Heaven and Earth; Thou hast vouchsafed of Thy grace, to those of our order, to know Thy works of creation, and the secrets of them; and to discern (as far as appertained to the generations of men) between divine miracles, works of Nature, works of art, and impostures and illusions of all sorts. I do here acknowledge and testify before this people, that the thing which we now see before our eyes is Thy finger, and a true miracle. And forasmuch as we learn in our books that Thou never workest miracles, but to a divine and excellent end (for the laws of nature are Thine own laws, and Thou exceedest them not but upon great cause), we most humbly beseech Thee to prosper this great sign, and to give us the interpretation and use of it in mercy; which Thou dost in some part secretly promise, by sending it unto us.' “

"When he had made his prayer, he presently found the boat he was in movable and unbound; whereas all the rest remained still fast; and taking that for an assurance of leave to approach, he caused the boat to be softly and with silence rowed towards the pillar. But ere he came near it, the pillar and cross of light broke up, and cast itself abroad, as it were, into a firmament of many stars, which also vanished soon after, and there was nothing left to be seen but a small ark, or chest of cedar, dry, and not wet at all with water, though it swam. And in the fore-end of it, which was towards him, grew a small green branch of palm; and when the wise man had taken it with all reverence into his boat, it opened of itself, and there were found in it a book and a letter, both written in fine parchment, and wrapped in sindons of linen. The book contained all the canonical books of the Old and New Testament, according as you have them (for we know well what the churches with you receive), and the Apocalypse itself; and some other books of the New Testament, which were not at that time written, were nevertheless in the book. And for the letter, it was in these words:

**32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost,* BK VIII [114-130] 234b-235a; BK IX [780-794] 264b; [990-1004] 269a; BK XI [181-207]303a-b**

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost,* BK VIII [114-130] 234b-235a

By Numbers that have name. But this I urge,

Admitting Motion in the Heav'ns, to shew

Invalid that which thee to doubt it mov'd;

Not that I so affirm, though so it seem

To thee who hast thy dwelling here on Earth.

God to remove his wayes from human sense,

Plac'd Heav'n from Earth so farr, that earthly sight, 120

If it presume, might erre in things too high,

And no advantage gaine. What if the Sun

Be Center to the World, and other Starrs

By his attractive vertue and thir own

Incited, dance about him various rounds?

Thir wandring course now high, now low, then hid,

Progressive, retrograde, or standing still,

In six thou seest, and what if sev'nth to these

The Planet Earth, so stedfast though she seem,

Insensibly three different Motions move? 130

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost,* BK IX [780-794] 264b

So saying, her rash hand in evil hour 780

Forth reaching to the Fruit, she pluck'd, she eat:

Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat

Sighing through all her Works gave signs of woe,

That all was lost. Back to the Thicket slunk

The guiltie Serpent, and well might, for Eve

Intent now wholly on her taste, naught else

Regarded, such delight till then, as seemd,

In Fruit she never tasted, whether true

Or fansied so, through expectation high

Of knowledg, nor was God-head from her thought. 790

Greedily she ingorg'd without restraint,

And knew not eating Death: Satiate at length,

And hight'nd as with Wine, jocond and boon,

Thus to her self she pleasingly began.

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost,* BK IX [990-1004] 269a

So saying, she embrac'd him, and for joy 990

Tenderly wept, much won that he his Love

Had so enobl'd, as of choice to incurr

Divine displeasure for her sake, or Death.

In recompence (for such compliance bad

Such recompence best merits) from the bough

She gave him of that fair enticing Fruit

With liberal hand: he scrupl'd not to eat

Against his better knowledge, not deceav'd,

But fondly overcome with Femal charm.

Earth trembl'd from her entrails, as again 1000

In pangs, and Nature gave a second groan,

Skie lowr'd, and muttering Thunder, som sad drops

Wept at compleating of the mortal Sin

Original; while Adam took no thought,

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost,* BK XI [181-207]303a-b

So spake, so wish'd much humbl'd Eve, but Fate

Subscrib'd not; Nature first gave Signs, imprest

On Bird, Beast, Aire, Aire suddenly eclips'd

After short blush of Morn; nigh in her sight

The Bird of Jove, stoopt from his aerie tour,

Two Birds of gayest plume before him drove:

Down from a Hill the Beast that reigns in Woods,

First Hunter then, pursu'd a gentle brace,

Goodliest of all the Forrest, Hart and Hinde;

Direct to th' Eastern Gate was bent thir flight. 190

Adam observ'd, and with his Eye the chase

Pursuing, not unmov'd to Eve thus spake.

O Eve, some furder change awaits us nigh,

Which Heav'n by these mute signs in Nature shews

Forerunners of his purpose, or to warn

Us haply too secure of our discharge

From penaltie, because from death releast

Some days; how long, and what till then our life,

Who knows, or more then this, that we are dust,

And thither must return and be no more. 200

Why else this double object in our sight

Of flight pursu'd in th' Air and ore the ground

One way the self-same hour? why in the East

Darkness ere Dayes mid-course, and Morning light

More orient in yon Western Cloud that draws

O're the blew Firmament a radiant white,

And slow descends, with somthing heav'nly fraught.

**33 PASCAL: *Pensees,* 643-646 290b-291b; 652-657 292a-293a; 670 295a-b; 675 296b-297a; 693-736 301b-317b**

33 PASCAL: *Pensees,* 643-646 290b-291b

643. Isaiah 51. The Red Sea an image of the Redemption. Ut sciatis quod filius hominis habet potestatem remittendi peccata . . . tibi dico: Surge.¹ God, wishing to show that He could form a people holy with an invisible holiness, and fill them with an

¹Mark 2. 10, 1 1. "But that ye may know that the son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins ... I say unto thee, Arise."

eternal glory, made visible things. As nature is an image of grace, He has done in the bounties of nature what He would do in those of grace, in order that we might judge that He could make the invisible, since He made the visible excellently.

Therefore He saved this people from the deluge; He has raised them up from Abraham, redeemed them from their enemies, and set them at rest.

The object of God was not to save them from the deluge, and raise up a whole people from Abraham, only in order to bring them into a rich land.

Arid even grace is only the type of glory, for it is not the ultimate end. It has been symbolised by the law, and itself symbolises [glory]. But it is the type of it, and the origin or cause.

The ordinary life of men is like that of the saints. They all seek their satisfaction and differ only in the object in which they place it; they call those their enemies who hinder them, etc. God has then shown the power which He has of giving invisible blessings, by that which He has shown Himself to have over things visible.

644. Types.—God, wishing to form for Himself an holy people, whom He should separate from all other nations, whom He should deliver from their enemies and should put into a place of rest, has promised to do so and has foretold by His prophets the time and the manner of His coming. And yet, to confirm the hope of His elect, He has made them see in it an image through all time, without leaving them devoid of assurances of His power and of His will to save them. For, at the creation of man, Adam was the witness, and guardian of the promise of a Saviour, who should be born of woman, when men were still so near the creation that they could not have forgotten their creation and their fall. When those who had seen Adam were no longer in the world, God sent Noah whom He saved, and drowned the whole earth by a miracle which sufficiently indicated the power which He had to save the world, and the will which He had to do so, and to raise up from the seed of woman Him whom He had promised. This miracle was enough to confirm the hope of men.

The memory of the Deluge being so fresh among men, while Noah was still alive, God made promises to Abraham, and, while Shem was still living, sent Moses, etc. . . .

645. Types—God, willing to deprive His own of perishable blessings, created the Jewish people in order to show that this was not owing to lack of power.

646. The Synagogue did not perish, because it was a type. But, because it was only a type, it fell into servitude. The type existed till the truth came, in order that the Church should be always visible, either in the sign which promised it, or in substance.

33 PASCAL: *Pensees,* 652-657 292a-293a

652. Particular Types.—A double law, double tables of the law, a double temple, a double captivity.

653. Types.—The prophets prophesied by symbols of a girdle, a beard, and burnt hair, etc.

654. Difference between dinner and supper. In God the word does not differ from the intention, for He is true; nor the word from the effect, for He is powerful; nor the means from the effect, for He is wise. St. Bernard, Ultimo Sermo in Missam.

St. Augustine, City of God, v. 10. This rule is general. God can do everything, except those things which, if He could do, He would not be almighty, as dying, being deceived, lying, etc.

Several Evangelists for the confirmation of the truth; their difference useful.

The Eucharist after Lord's Supper. Truth after the type.

The ruin of Jerusalem, a type of the ruin of the world, forty years after the death of Jesus. "I know not," as a man, or as an ambassador (Mark 13.32; Matthew 24.36.)

Jesus condemned by the Jews and the Gentiles.

The Jews and the Gentiles typified by the two sons. St. Augustine City of God, xx. 29.

655. The six ages, the six Fathers of the six ages, the six wonders at the beginning of the six ages, the six mornings at the beginning of the six ages.

656. Adam forma futuri.¹ The six days to form the one, the six ages to form the other. The six days, which Moses represents for the formation of Adam, are only the picture of the six ages to form Jesus Christ and the Church. If Adam had not sinned, and Jesus Christ had not come, there had been only one covenant, only

¹Rom. 5.14. "The figure of him that was to come."

one age of men, and the creation would have been represented as accomplished at one single time.

657. Types.—The Jewish and Egyptian peoples were plainly foretold by the two individuals whom Moses met; the Egyptian beating the Jew, Moses avenging him and killing the Egyptian, and the Jew being ungrateful.

33 PASCAL: *Pensees,* 670 295a-b

670. Types.—The Jews had grown old in these earthly thoughts, that God loved their father Abraham, his flesh and what sprung from it; that on account of this He had multiplied them and distinguished them from all other nations, without allowing them to intermingle; that, when they were languishing in Egypt, He brought them out with all these great signs in their favour; that He fed them with manna in the desert, and led them into a very rich land; that He gave them kings and a well-built temple, in order to offer up beasts before Him, by the shedding of whose blood they should be purified; and that, at last, He was to send them the Messiah to make them masters of all the world, and foretold the time of His coming.

The world having grown old in these carnal errors, Jesus Christ came at the time foretold, but not with the expected glory; and thus men did not think it was He. After His death, Saint Paul came to teach men that all these things had happened in allegory; that the kingdom of God did not consist in the flesh, but in the spirit; that the enemies of men were not the Babylonians, but the passions; that God delighted not in temples made with hands, but in a pure and contrite heart; that the circumcision of the body was unprofitable, but that of the heart was needed; that Moses had not given them the bread from heaven, etc.

But God, not having desired to reveal these things to this people who were unworthy of them and having, nevertheless, desired to foretell them, in order that they might be believed, foretold the time clearly, and expressed the things sometimes clearly, but very often in figures, in order that those who loved symbols might consider them and those who loved what was symbolised might see it therein.

All that tends not to charity is figurative.

The sole aim of the Scripture is charity.

All which tends not to the sole end is the type of it. For since there is only one end, all which does not lead to it in express terms is figurative.

God thus varies that sole precept of charity to satisfy our curiosity which seeks for variety, by that variety which still leads us to the one thing needful. For one thing alone is needful, and we love variety; and God satisfies both by these varieties, which lead to the one thing needful.

The Jews have so much loved the shadows and have so strictly expected them that they have misunderstood the reality, when it came in the time and manner foretold.

The Rabbis take the breasts of the Spouse for types, and all that does not express the only end they have, namely, temporal good.

And Christians take even the Eucharist as a type of the glory at which they aim.

33 PASCAL: *Pensees,* 675 296b-297a

675. .. . And yet this Covenant, made to blind some and enlighten others, indicated in those very persons, whom it blinded, the truth which should be recognized by others. For the visible blessings which they received from God were so great and so divine that He indeed appeared able to give them those that are invisible and a Messiah.

For nature is an image of Grace, and visible miracles are images of the invisible. Utsciatis . . . tibi dico: Surge.²

Isaiah says that Redemption will be as the passage of the Red Sea.

God has, then, shown by the deliverance from Egypt, and from the sea, by the defeat of kings, by the manna, by the whole genealogy of Abraham, that He was able to save, to send down bread from heaven, etc. ; so that the people hostile to Him are the type and the representation of the very Messiah whom they know not, etc.

He has, then, taught us at last that all these things were only types and what is "true freedom," a "true Israelite," "true circumcision," "true bread from heaven," etc.

In these promises each one finds what he has most at heart, temporal benefits or spiritual, God or the creatures; but with this difference, that those who therein seek the creatures find them, but with many contradictions, with a prohibition against loving them, with the command to worship God only, and to love Him only, which is the same thing, and, finally, that the Messiah came not for them; whereas those who therein seek God find Him, without any contradiction, with

²Mark 2.10,11. "That ye may know ... I say unto thee: Arise."

the command to love Him only, and that the Messiah came in the time foretold, to give them the blessings which they ask.

Thus the Jews had miracles and prophecies, which they saw fulfilled, and the teaching of their law was to worship and love God only; it was also perpetual. Thus it had all the marks of the true religion; and so it was. But the Jewish teaching must be distinguished from the teaching of the Jewish law. Now the Jewish teaching was not true, although it had miracles and prophecy and perpetuity, because it had not this other point of worshipping and loving God only.

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693. When I see the blindness and the wretchedness of man, when I regard the whole silent universe and man without light, left to himself and, as it were, lost in this corner of the universe, without knowing who has put him there, what he has come to do, what will become of him at death, and incapable of all knowledge, I become terrified, like a man who should be carried in his sleep to a dreadful desert island and should awake without knowing where he is and without means of escape. And thereupon I wonder how people in a condition so wretched do not fall into despair. I see other persons around me of a like nature. I ask them if they are better informed than I am. They tell me that they are not. And thereupon these wretched and lost beings, having looked around them and seen some pleasing objects, have given and attached themselves to them. For my own part, I have not been able to attach myself to them, and, considering how strongly it appears that there is something else than what I see, I have examined whether this God has not left some sign of Himself.

I see many contradictory religions, and consequently all false save one. Each wants to be believed on its own authority, and threatens unbelievers. I do not therefore believe them. Every one can say this; every one can call himself a prophet. But I see that Christian religion wherein prophecies are fulfilled; and that is what every one cannot do.

694. And what crowns all this is prediction, so that it should not be said that it is chance which has done it?

Whosoever, having only a week to live, will not find out that it is expedient to believe that all this is not a stroke of chance . . .

Now, if the passions had no hold on us, a week and a hundred years would amount to the same thing.

695. Prophecies.—Great Pan is dead.

696. Susceperunt verbum cum omni aviditate, scrutantes Scripturas, si ita se haberent¹

697. Prodita lege. Impleta cerne. Implenda collige.²

698. We understand the prophecies only when we see the events happen. Thus the proofs of retreat, discretion, silence, etc., are proofs only to those who know and believe them.

Joseph so internal in a law so external.

Outward penances dispose to inward, as humiliations to humility. Thus the . . .

699. The synagogue has preceded the church; the Jews, the Christians. The prophets have foretold the Christians; Saint John, Jesus Christ.

700. It is glorious to see with the eyes of faith the history of Herod and of Caesar.

701. The zeal of the Jews for their law and their temple (Josephus, and Philo the Jew, Ad Caium). What other people had such a zeal? It was necessary they should have it.

Jesus Christ foretold as to the time and the state of the world. The ruler taken from the thigh, and the fourth monarchy. How lucky we are to see this light amidst this darkness!

How fine it is to see, with the eyes of faith, Darius and Cyrus, Alexander, the Romans, Pompey and Herod working, without knowing it, for the glory of the Gospel!

702. Zeal of the Jewish people for the law, especially after there were no more prophets.

703. While the prophets were for maintaining the law, the people were indifferent. But, since there have been no more prophets, zeal has succeeded them.

¹Acts 17. 1 1. "They received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether those things were so."

²"Read what has been announced. See what has been accomplished. Meditate on what is to be done."

704. The devil troubled the zeal of the Jews before Jesus Christ, because he would have been their salvation, but not since. The Jewish people scorned by the Gentiles; the Christian people persecuted.

705. Proof.—Prophecies with their fulfilment; what has preceded and what has followed Jesus Christ.

706. The prophecies are the strongest proof of Jesus Christ. It is for them also that God has made most provision; for the event which has fulfilled them is a miracle existing since the birth of the Church to the end. So God has raised up prophets during sixteen hundred years, and, during four hundred years afterwards, He has scattered all these prophecies among all the Jews, who carried them into all parts of the world. Such was the preparation for the birth of Jesus Christ, and, as His Gospel was to be believed by all the world, it was not only necessary that there should be prophecies to make it believed, but that these prophecies should exist throughout the whole world, in order to make it embraced by the whole world.

707. But it was not enough that the prophecies should exist. It was necessary that they should be distributed throughout all places and preserved throughout all times. And, in order that this agreement might not be taken for an effect of chance, it was necessary that this should be foretold.

It is far more glorious for the Messiah that the Jews should be the spectators and even the instruments of His glory, besides that God had reserved them.

708. Prophecies.—The time foretold by the state of the Jewish people, by the state of the heathen, by the state of the temple, by the number of years.

709. One must be bold to predict the same thing in so many ways. It was necessary that the four idolatrous or pagan monarchies, the end of the kingdom of Judah, and the seventy weeks, should happen at the same time, and all this before the second temple was destroyed.

710. Prophecies.—If one man alone had made a book of predictions about Jesus Christ, as to the time and the manner, and Jesus Christ had come in conformity to these prophecies, this fact would have infinite weight.

But there is much more here. Here is a succession of men during four thousand years, who, consequently and without variation, come, one after another, to foretell this same event. Here is a whole people who announce it and who have existed for four thousand years, in order to give corporate testimony of the assurances which they have and from which they cannot be diverted by whatever threats and persecutions people may make against them. This is far more important.

711. Predictions of particular things.—They were strangers in Egypt, without any private property, either in that country or elsewhere. [There was not the least appearance, either of the royalty which had previously existed so long, or of that supreme council of seventy judges which they called the Sanhedrin and which, having been instituted by Moses, lasted to the time of Jesus Christ. All these things were as far removed from their state at that time as they could be], when Jacob, dying, and blessing his twelve children, declared to them, that they would be proprietors of a great land, and foretold in particular to the family of Judah, that the kings, who would one day rule them, should be of his race; and that all his brethren should be their subjects; [and that even the Messiah, who was to be the expectation of nations, should spring from him; and that the kingship should not be taken away from Judah, nor the ruler and law-giver of his descendants, till the expected Messiah should arrive in his family].

This same Jacob, disposing of this future land as though he had been its ruler, gave a portion to Joseph more than to the others. "I give you," said he, "one part more than to your brothers." And blessing his two children, Ephraim and Manasseh, whom Joseph had presented to him, the elder, Manasseh, on his right, and the young Ephraim on his left, he put his arms crosswise, and placing his right hand on the head of Ephraim, and his left on Manasseh, he blessed them in this manner. And, upon Joseph's representing to him that he was preferring the younger, he replied to him with admirable resolution: "I know it well, my son; but Ephraim will increase more than Manasseh." This has been indeed so true in the result that, being alone almost as fruitful as the two entire lines which composed a whole kingdom, they have been usually called by the name of Ephraim alone.

This same Joseph, when dying, bade his children carry his bones with them when they should go into that land to which they only came two hundred years afterwards.

Moses, who wrote all these things so long before they happened, himself assigned to each family portions of that land before they entered it, as though he had been its ruler. [In fact he declared that God was to raise up from their nation and their race a prophet, of whom he was the type; and he foretold them exactly all that was to happen to them in the land which they were to enter after his death, the victories which God would give them, their ingratitude towards God, the punishments which they would receive for it, and the rest of their adventures.] He gave them judges who should make the division. He prescribed the entire form of political government which they should observe, the cities of refuge which they should build, and . . .

712. The prophecies about particular things are mingled with those about the Messiah, so that the prophecies of the Messiah should not be without proofs, nor the special prophecies without fruit.

713. Perpetual captivity of the Jews.—Jer. 11. 11: "I will bring evil upon Judah from which they shall not be able to escape."

Types.—Is. 5: "The Lord had a vineyard, from which He looked for grapes; and it brought forth only wild grapes. I will therefore lay it waste, and destroy it; the earth shall only bring forth thorns, and I will forbid the clouds from [raining] upon it. The vineyard of the Lord is the house of Israel, and the men of Judah His pleasant plant. I looked that they should do justice, and they bring forth only iniquities."

Is. 8: "Sanctify the Lord with fear and trembling; let Him be your only dread, and He shall be to you for a sanctuary, but for a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to both the houses of Israel, for a gin and for a snare to the inhabitants of Jerusalem; and many among them shall stumble against that stone, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and perish. Hide my words, and cover my law for my disciples.

"I will then wait in patience upon the Lord that hideth and concealeth Himself from the house of Jacob."

Is. 29: "Be amazed and wonder, people of Israel; stagger and stumble, and be drunken, but not with wine; stagger, but not with strong drink. For the Lord hath poured out upon you the spirit of deep sleep. He will close your eyes; He will cover your princes and your prophets that have visions." (Daniel xii: "The wicked shall not understand, but the wise shall understand." Hosea, the last chapter, the last verse, after many temporal blessings, says: "Who is wise, and he shall understand these things?" etc.) "And the visions of all the prophets are become unto you as a sealed book, which men deliver to one that is learned, and who can read; and he saith, I cannot read it, for it is sealed. And when the book is delivered to them that are not learned, they say, I am not learned.

"Wherefore the Lord said, Forasmuch as this people with their lips do honour me, but have removed their heart far from me,"—there is the reason and the cause of it; for if they adored God in their hearts, they would understand the prophecies, —"and their fear towards me is taught by the precept of man. Therefore, behold, I will proceed to do a marvellous work among this people, even a marvellous work and a wonder; for the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and their understanding shall be [hid]."

Prophecies. Proofs of Divinity.—Is. 41: "Shew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods: we will incline our heart unto your words. Teach us the things that have been at the beginning, and declare us things for to come.

"By this we shall know that ye are gods. Yea, do good or do evil, if you can. Let us then behold it and reason together. Behold, ye are of nothing, and only an abomination, etc. Who," (among contemporary writers), "hath declared from the beginning that we may know of the things done from the beginning and origin? that we may say, You are righteous. There is none that teacheth us, yea, there is none that declareth the future."

Is. 42: "I am the Lord, and my glory will I not give to another. I have foretold the things which have come to pass, and things that are to come do I declare. Sing unto God a new song in all the earth.

"Bring forth the blind people that have eyes and see not, and the deaf that have ears and hear not. Let all the nations be gathered together. Who among them can declare this, and shew us former things, and things to come? Let them bring forth their witnesses, that they may be justified; or let them hear, and say, It is truth.

"Ye are my witnesses, saith the Lord, and my servant whom I have chosen; that ye may know and believe me, and understand that I am He.

"I have declared, and have saved, and I alone have done wonders before your eyes: ye are my witnesses, said the Lord, that I am God.

"For your sake I have brought down the forces of the Babylonians. I am the Lord, your Holy One and Creator.

"I have made a way in the sea, and a path in the mighty waters. I am He that drowned and destroyed for ever the mighty enemies that have resisted you.

"Remember ye not the former things, neither consider the things of old.

"Behold, I will do a new thing; now it shall spring forth; shall ye not know it?

I will even make a way in the wilderness, and rivers in the desert.

"This people have I formed for myself; I have established them to shew forth my praise, etc.

"I, even I, am He that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake, and will not remember thy sins. Put in remembrance your ingratitude: see thou, if thou mayest be justified. Thy first father hath sinned, and thy teachers have transgressed against me."

Is. 44.: "I am the first, and I am the last, saith the Lord. Let him who will equal himself to me, declare the order of things since I appointed the ancient people, and the things that are coming. Fear ye not: have I not told you all these things? Ye are my witnesses."

Prophecy of Cyrus.—Is. 45. 4: "ForJacob's sake, mine elect, I have called thee by thy name."

Is. 45. 21: "Come and let us reason together. Who hath declared this from ancient time? Who hath told it from that time? Have not I, the Lord"?

Is. 46: "Remember the former things of old, and know there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure."

Is. 42: "Behold, the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare; before they spring forth I tell you of them."

Is. 48. 3: "I have declared the former things from the beginning; I did them suddenly; and they came to pass. Because I know that thou art obstinate, that thy spirit is rebellious, and thy brow brass; I have even declared it to thee before it came to pass: lest thou shouldst say that it was the work of thy gods, and the effect of their commands.

"Thou hast seen all this; and will not ye declare it? I have shewed thee new things from this time, even hidden things, and thou didst not know them. They are created now, and not from the beginning; I have kept them hidden from thee; lest thou shouldst say, Behold, I knew them.

"Yea, thou knewest not; yea, thou heardest not; yea, from that time that thine ear was not opened : for I knew that thou couldst deal very treacherously, and wast called a transgressor from the womb."

Reprobation of the Jews and conversion of the Gentiles.—Is. 65: "I am sought of them that asked not for me; I am found of them that sought me not; I said, Behold me, behold me, behold me, unto a nation that did not call upon my name.

"I have spread out my hands all the day unto an unbelieving people, which walketh in a way that was not good, after their own thoughts; a people that provoketh me to anger continually by the sins they commit in my face; that sacrificed! to idols, etc.

"These shall be scattered like smoke in the day ofmy wrath, etc.

"Your iniquities, and the iniquities of your fathers, will I assemble together, and will recompense you for all according to your works.

"Thus saith the Lord, As the new wine is found in the cluster, and one saith, Destroy it not, for a blessing is in it [and the promise of fruit]: for my servants' sake I will not destroy all Israel.

"Thus I will bring forth a seed out of Jacob and out of Judah, an inheritor of my mountains, and mine elect and my servants shall inherit it, and my fertile and abundant plains; but I will destroy all others, because you have forgotten your God to serve strange gods. I called, and ye did not answer; I spake, and ye did not hear; and ye did choose the thing which I forbade.

"Therefore thus saith the Lord, Behold, my servants shall eat, but ye shall be hungry; my servants shall rejoice, but ye shall be ashamed; my servants shall sing for joy of heart, but ye shall cry and howl for vexation of spirit.

"And ye shall leave your name for a curse unto my chosen: for the Lord shall slay thee, and call His servants by another name, that he who blesseth himself in the earth shall bless himself in God, etc., because the former troubles are forgotten.

"For, behold, I create new heavens and a new earth; and the former things shall not be remembered, nor come into mind.

"But be ye glad and rejoice for ever in that which I create; for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy.

"And I will rejoice in Jerusalem and joy in my people; and the voice of weeping shall no more be heard in her, nor the voice of crying.

"Before they call, I will answer; and while they are yet speaking, I will hear. The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, and the lion shall eat straw like the bullock; and dust shall be the serpent's meat. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain."

Is. 56. 3: "Thus saith the Lord, Keep ye judgment, and do justice: for my salvation is near to come, and my righteousness to be revealed.

"Blessed is the man that doeth this, that keepeth the Sabbath, and keepeth his hand from doing any evil.

"Neither let the strangers that have joined themselves to me, say, God will separate me from His people. For thus saith the Lord: Whoever will keep my Sabbath, and choose the things that please me, and take hold of my covenant; even unto them will I give in mine house a place and a name better than that of sons and of daughters: I will give them an everlasting name, that shall not be cut off"

Is. 59. 9: "Therefore for our iniquities is justice far from us: we wait for light, but behold obscurity; for brightness, but we walk in darkness. We grope for the wall like the blind; we stumble at noonday as in the night: we are in desolate places as dead men.

"We roar all like bears, and mourn sore like doves; we look for judgment, but there is none; for salvation, but it is far from us."

Is. 66. 18: "But I know their works and their thoughts; it shall come that I will gather all nations and tongues, and they shall see my glory.

"And I will set a sign among them, and I will send those that escape of them unto the nations, to Africa, to Lydia, to Italy, to Greece, and to the people that have not heard my fame, neither have seen my glory. And they shall bring your brethren."

Jer. 7. Reprobation of the Temple: "Go ye unto Shiloth, where I set my name at the first, and see what I did to it for the wickedness of my people. And now, because ye have done all these works, saith the Lord, I will do unto this house, wherein my name is called upon, wherein ye trust, and unto the place which I gave to your priests, as I have done to Shiloth." (For I have rejected it, and made myself a temple elsewhere.)

"And I will cast you out of my sight, as I have cast out all your brethren, even the seed of Ephraim." (Rejected for ever.) "Therefore pray not for this people."

Jer. 7. 22: "What avails it you to add sacrifice to sacrifice? For I spake not unto your fathers, when I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices. But this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey and be faithful to my commandments, and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people." (It was only after they had sacrificed to the golden calf that I gave myself sacrifices to turn into good an evil custom.)

Jer. 7. 4: "Trust ye not in lying words, saying, The temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord, are these."

714. The Jews witnesses for God. Is. 43. 9; 44. 8. Prophecies fulfilled.—I Kings 13. 2. I Kings 22. 16. Joshua 6. 26. I Kings 16. 34. Deut. 23.

Malachi i. 11. The sacrifice of the Jews rejected, and the sacrifice of the heathen, (even out of Jerusalem,) and in all places. Moses, before dying, foretold the calling of the Gentiles, Deut. 32. 21 and the reprobation of the Jews.

Moses foretold what would happen to each tribe.

Prophecy.—"Your name shall be a curse unto mine elect, and I will give them another name."

"Make their heart fat," and how? by flattering their lust and making them hope to satisfy it.

715. Prophecy.—Amos and Zechariah. They have sold the just one, and therefore will not be recalled. Jesus Christ betrayed.

They shall no more remember Egypt. See Is. 43. 16, 17, 18, 19. Jer. 23. 6, 7.

Prophecy.—The Jews shall be scattered abroad. Is. 27. 6. A new law, Jerem. 31.32.

Malachi. Grotius. The second temple glorious. Jesus Christ will come. Haggai 2. 7, 8, 9, 10.

The calling of the Gentiles. Joel 2. 28. Hosea 2. 24. Deut. 32. 21. Malachi 1. 11.

716. Hosea 3.—Is. 42. 48. 44. 60. 61. last verse. "I foretold it long since that they might know that it is I." Jaddus to Alexander.

717. [Prophecies.—The promise that David will always have descendants. Jer. 13. 13.]

718. The eternal reign of the race of David, II Chron., by all the prophecies, and with an oath. And it was not temporally fulfilled. Jer. 23. 20.

719. We might perhaps think that, when the prophets foretold that the sceptre should not depart from Judah until the eternal King came, they spoke to flatter the people and that their prophecy was proved false by Herod. But to show that this was not their meaning and that, on the contrary, they knew well that this temporal kingdom should cease, they said that they would be without a king and without a prince, and for a long time. Hosea 3. 4.

720. Non habemus regem nisi Casarem.¹ Therefore Jesus Christ was the Messiah, since they had no longer any king but a stranger, and would have no other.

721. We have no king but Caesar.

722. Daniel 2: "All thy soothsayers and wise men cannot shew unto thee the secret which thou hast demanded. But there is a God in heaven who can do so, and that hath revealed to thee in thy dream what shall be in the latter days." (This dream must have caused him much misgiving.)

"And it is not by my own wisdom that I have knowledge of this secret, but by the revelation of this same God, that hath revealed it to me, to make it manifest in thy presence.

"Thy dream was then of this kind. Thou sawest a great image, high and terrible, which stood before thee. His head was of gold, his breast and arms of silver, his belly and his thighs of brass, his legs of iron, his feet part of iron and part of clay. Thus thou sawest till that a stone was cut out without hands, which smote the image upon his feet, that were of iron and of clay, and brake them to pieces. "Then was the iron, the clay, the brass, the silver, and the gold broken to pieces together, and the wind carried them away; but this stone that smote the image became a great mountain, and filled the whole earth. This is the dream, and now I will give thee the interpretation thereof.

"Thou who art the greatest of kings, and to whom God hath given a power so vast that thou art renowned among all peoples, art the head of gold which thou hast seen. But after thee shall arise another kingdom inferior to thee, and another third kingdom of brass, which shall bear rule over all the earth.

"But the fourth kingdom shall be strong as iron, and even as iron breaketh in pieces and subdueth all things, so shall this empire break in pieces and bruise all.

"And whereas thou sawest the feet and toes, part of clay and part of iron, the kingdom shall be divided; but there shall be in it of the strength of iron and of the weakness of clay.

"But as iron cannot be firmly mixed with clay, so they who are represented by the iron and by the clay, shall not cleave one to another though united by marriage.

"Now in the days of these kings shall God set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed, nor ever be delivered up to other people. It shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever, according as thou sawest that the stone was cut out of the mountain without hands, and that it fell from the mountain, and brake in pieces the iron, the clay, the silver, and the gold. God hath made known to thee what shall come to pass hereafter. This dream is certain, and the interpretation thereof sure.

"Then Nebuchadnezzar fell upon his face towards the earth," etc. Daniel 8. 8. "Daniel having seen the combat of the ram and of the he-goat, who vanquished him and ruled over the earth, whereof the principal horn being broken four others came up toward the four winds of heaven, and out of one of them came forth a little horn, which waxed exceedingly great toward the south,

¹John 19.15. "We have no king but Caesar."

and toward the east, and toward the land of Israel, and it waxed great even to the host of heaven; and it cast down some of the stars, and stamped upon them, and at last overthrew the prince, and by him the daily sacrifice was taken away, and the place of his sanctuary was cast down.

"This is what Daniel saw. He sought the meaning of it, and a voice cried in this manner, 'Gabriel, make this man to understand the vision.' And Gabriel said:

"The ram which thou sawest is the king of the Medes and Persians, and the hegoat is the king of Greece, and the great horn that is between his eyes is the first king of this monarchy.

"Now that being broken, whereas four stood up for it, four kingdoms shall stand up out of the nation, but not in his power.

"And in the latter time of their kingdom, when iniquities are come to the full, there shall arise a king, insolent and strong, but not by his own power, to whom all things shall succeed after his own will; and he shall destroy the holy people, and through his policy also he shall cause craft to prosper in his hand, and he shall destroy many. He shall also stand up against the Prince of princes, but he shall perish miserably, and nevertheless by a violent hand."

Daniel 9. 20. "Whilst I was praying with all my heart, and confessing my sin and the sin of all my people, and prostrating myself before my God, even Gabriel, whom I had seen in the vision at the beginning, came to me and touched me about the time of the evening oblation, and he informed me and said, O Daniel, I am now come forth to give thee the knowledge of things. At the beginning of thy supplications I came to shew that which thou didst desire, for thou are greatly beloved: therefore understand the matter, and consider the vision. Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to abolish iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness; to accomplish the vision and the prophecies, and to anoint the Most Holy. (After which this people shall be no more thy people, nor this city the holy city. The times of wrath shall be passed, and the years of grace shall come for ever.)

"Know therefore, and understand, that, from the going forth of the commandment to restore and to build Jerusalem unto the Messiah the Prince, shall be seven weeks, and three score and two weeks." (The Hebrews were accustomed to divide numbers, and to place the small first. Thus, 7 and 62 make 69. Of this 70 there will then remain the 70th, that is to say, the 7 last years of which he will speak next.) "The street shall be built again, and the wall, even in troublous times. And after three score and two weeks," (which have followed the first seven. Christ will then be killed after the sixty-nine weeks, that is to say, in the last week), "the Christ shall be cut off, and a people of the prince that shall come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary, and overwhelm all, and the end of that war shall accomplish the desolation."

"Now one week," (which is the seventieth, which remains), "shall confirm the covenant with many, and in the midst of the week," (that is to say, the last three and a half years), "he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abominations he shall make it desolate, even until the consummation, and that determined shall be poured upon the desolate." Daniel n. "The angel said to Daniel: There shall stand up yet," (after Cyrus, under whom this still is), "three kings in Persia," (Cambyses, Smerdis, Darius);

"and the fourth who shall then come," (Xerxes) "shall be far richer than they all, and far stronger, and shall stir up all his people against the Greeks.

"But a mighty king shall stand up," (Alexander), "that shall rule with great dominion, and do according to his will. And when he shall stand up, his kingdom shall be broken, and shall be divided in four parts toward the four winds of heaven," (as he had said above, 7. 6; 8. 8), "but not his posterity; and his successors shall not equal his power, for his kingdom shall be plucked up, even for others besides these," (his four chief successors).

"And the king of the south," (Ptolemy, son of Lagos, Egypt), "shall be strong; but one of his princes shall be strong above him, and his dominion shall be a great dominion," (Seleucus, King of Syria. Appian says that he was the most powerful of Alexander's successors).

"And in the end of years they shall join themselves together, and the king's daughter of the south," (Berenice, daughter of Ptolemy Philadelphus, son of the other Ptolemy), "shall come to the king of the north," (to Antiochus Deus, King of Syria and of Asia, son of Seleucus Lagidas), "to make peace between these princes.

"But neither she nor her seed shall have a long authority; for she and they that brought her, and her children, and her friends, shall be delivered to death." (Berenice and her son were killed by Seleucus Callinicus.)

"But out of a branch of her roots shall one stand up," (Ptolemy Euergetes was the issue of the same father as Berenice), "which shall come with a mighty army into the land of the king of the north, where he shall put all under subjection, and he shall also carry captive into Egypt their gods, their princes, their gold, their silver, and all their precious spoils," (if he had not been called into Egypt by domestic reasons, says Justin, he would have entirely stripped Seleucus); "and he shall continue several years when the king of the north can do nought against him.

"And so he shall return into his kingdom. But his sons shall be stirred up, and shall assemble a multitude of great forces," (Seleucus Ceraunus, Antiochus the Great). "And their army shall come and overthrow all; wherefore the king of the south shall be moved with choler, and shall also form a great army, and fight him," (Ptolemy Philopator against Antiochus the Great at Raphia), "and conquer; and his troops shall become insolent, and his heart shall be lifted up," (this Ptolemy desecrated the temple; Josephus): "he shall cast down many ten thousands, but he shall not be strengthened by it. For the king of the north," (Antiochus the Great), "shall return with a greater multitude than before, and in those times also a great number of enemies shall stand up against the king of the south," (during the reign of the young Ptolemy Epiphanes); "also the apostates and robbers of thy people shall exalt themselves to establish the vision; but they shall fall." (Those who abandon their religion to please Euergetes, when he will send his troops to Scopas; for Antiochus will again take Scopas, and conquer them.) "And the king of the north shall destroy the fenced cities, and the arms of the south shall not withstand, and all shall yield to his will; he shall stand in the land of Israel, and it shall yield to him. And thus he shall think to make himself master of all the empire of Egypt," (despising the youth of Epiphanes, says Justin). "And for that he shall make alliance with him, and give his daughter" (Cleopatra, in order that she may betray her husband. On which Appian says that, doubting his ability to make himself master of Egypt by force, because of the protection of the Romans, he wished to attempt it by cunning). "He shall wish to corrupt her, but she shall not stand on his side, neither be for him. Then he shall turn his face to other designs, and shall think to make himself master of some isles," (that is to say, seaports), "and shall take many," (as Appian says).

"But a prince shall oppose his conquests," (Scipio Africanus, who stopped the progress of Antiochus the Great, because he offended the Romans in the person of their allies), "and shall cause the reproach offered by him to cease. He shall then return into his kingdom and there perish, and be no more." (He was slain by his soldiers.)

"And he who shall stand up in his estate," (Seleucus Philopator or Soter, the son of Antiochus the Great), "shall be a tyrant, a raiser of taxes in the glory of the kingdom," (which means the people), "but within a few days he shall be destroyed, neither in anger nor in battle. And in his place shall stand up a vile person, unworthy of the honour of the kingdom, but he shall come in cleverly by flatteries. All armies shall bend before him; he shall conquer them, and even the prince with whom he has made a covenant. For having renewed the league with him, he shall work deceitfully, and enter with a small people into his province, peaceably and without fear. He shall take the fattest places, and shall do that which his fathers have not done, and ravage on all sides. He shall forecast great devices during his time."

723. Prophecies.—The seventy weeks of Daniel are ambiguous as regards the term of commencement, because of the terms of the prophecy; and as regards the term of conclusion, because of the differences among chronologists. But all this difference extends only to two hundred years.

724. Predictions.—That in the fourth monarchy, before the destruction of the second temple, before the dominion of the Jews was taken away, in the seventieth week of Daniel, during the continuance of the second temple, the heathen should be instructed, and brought to the knowledge of the God worshipped by the Jews; that those who loved Him should be delivered from their enemies, and filled with His fear and love.

And it happened that in the fourth monarchy, before the destruction of the second temple, etc., the heathen in great number worshipped God, and led an angelic life. Maidens dedicated their virginity and their life to God. Men renounced their pleasures. What Plato could only make acceptable to a few men, specially chosen and instructed, a secret influence imparted by the power of a few words, to a hundred million ignorant men.

The rich left their wealth. Children left the dainty homes of their parents to go into the rough desert. (See Philo the Jew.) All this was foretold a great while ago. For two thousand years no heathen had worshipped the God of the Jews; and at the time foretold, a great number of the heathen worshipped this only God. The temples were destroyed. The very kings made submission to the cross. All this was due to the Spirit of God, which was spread abroad upon the earth. No heathen, since Moses until Jesus Christ, believed according to the very Rabbis. A great number of the heathen, after Jesus Christ, believed in the books of Moses, kept them in substance and spirit, and only rejected what was useless.

725. Prophecies.—The conversion of the Egyptians (Isaiah 19. 19); an altar in Egypt to the true God.

726. Prophecies.—In Egypt. Pugio Fidei, p. 659. Talmud:

"It is a tradition among us, that, when the Messiah shall come, the house of God, destined for the dispensation of His Word, shall be full of filth and impurity; and that the wisdom of the scribes shall be corrupt and rotten. Those who shall be afraid to sin, shall be rejected by the people, and treated as senseless fools."

Is. xlix: "Listen, O isles, unto me, and hearken, ye people, from afar: The Lord hath called me by my name from the womb of my mother; in the shadow of His hand hath He hid me, and hath made my words like a sharp sword, and said unto me, Thou art my servant in whom I will be glorified. Then I said, Lord, have I laboured in vain? have I spent my strength for nought? yet surely my judgment is with Thee, O Lord, and my work with Thee. And now, saith the Lord, that formed me from the womb to be His servant, to bring Jacob and Israel again to Him, Thou shalt be glorious in my sight, and I will be thy strength. It is a light thing that thou shouldst convert the tribes of Jacob; I have raised thee up for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the ends of the earth. Thus saith the Lord to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers, Princes and kings shall worship thee, because the Lord is faithful that hath chosen thee.

"Again saith the Lord unto me, I have heard thee in the days of salvation and of mercy, and I will preserve thee for a covenant of the people, to cause to inherit the desolate nations, that thou mayest say to the prisoners: Go forth; to them that are in darkness show yourselves, and possess these abundant and fertile lands. They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor sun smite them; for he that hath mercy upon them shall lead them, even by the springs of waters shall he guide them, and .make the mountains a way before them. Behold, the peoples shall come from all parts, from the east and from the west, from the north and from the south. Let the heavens give glory to God; let the earth be joyful; for it hath pleased the Lord to comfort His people, and He will have mercy upon the poor who hope in Him.

"Yet Zion dared to say: The Lord hath forsaken me, and hath forgotten me. Can a woman forget her child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb? but if she forget, yet will not I forget thee, O Sion. I will bear thee always between my hands, and thy walls are continually before me. They that shall build thee are come, and thy destroyers shall go forth of thee. Lift up thine eyes round about, and behold; all these gather themselves together, and come to thee. As I live, saith the Lord, thou shalt surely clothe thee with them all, as with an ornament. Thy waste and thy desolate places, and the land of thy destruction shall even now be too narrow by reason of the inhabitants, and the children thou shalt have after thy barrenness shall say again in thy ears: The place is too strait for me: give place to me that I may dwell. Then shalt thou say in thy heart: Who hath begotten me these, seeing I have lost my children, and am desolate, a captive, and removing to and fro? and who brought up these? Behold, I was left alone; these, where had they been? And the Lord shall say to thee: Behold, I will lift up mine hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people; and they shall bring thy sons in their arms and in their bosoms. And kings shall be their nursing fathers, and queens their nursing mothers; they shall bow down to thee with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord; for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me. Shall the prey be taken from the mighty? But even if the captives be taken away from the strong, nothing shall hinder me from saving thy children, and from destroying thy enemies; and all flesh shall know that I am the Lord, thy Saviour and thy Redeemer, the mighty One of Jacob.

"Thus saith the Lord: What is the bill of this divorcement, wherewith I have put away the synagogue? and why have I delivered it into the hand of your enemies? Is it not for your iniquities and for your transgressions that I have put it away?

"For I came, and no man received me; I called and there was none to hear. Is my arm shortened, that I cannot redeem?

"Therefore I will show the tokens of mine anger; I will clothe the heavens with darkness, and make sackcloth their covering.

"The Lord hath given me the tongue of the learned that I should know how to speak a word in season to him that is weary. He hath opened mine ear, and I have listened to Him as a master.

"The Lord hath revealed His will, and I was not rebellious.

"I gave my body to the smiters, and my cheeks to outrage; I hid not my face from shame and spitting. But the Lord hath helped me; therefore I have not been confounded.

"He is near that justifieth me; who will contend with me? who will be mine adversary, and accuse me of sin, God himself being my protector?

"All men shall pass away, and be consumed by time; let those that fear God hearken to the voice of His servant; let him that languisheth in darkness put his trust in the Lord. But as for you, ye do but kindle the wrath of God upon you; ye walk in the light of your fire and in the sparks that ye have kindled. This shall ye have of mine hand; ye shall lie down in sorrow.

"Hearken to me, ye that follow after righteousness, ye that seek the Lord: look unto the rock whence ye are hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence ye are digged. Look unto Abraham, your father, and unto Sarah that bare you: for I called him alone, when childless, and increased him. Behold, I have comforted Zion, and heaped upon her blessings and consolations.

"Hearken unto me, my people, and give ear unto me; for a law shall proceed from me, and I will make my judgment to rest for a light of the Gentiles."

Amos viii. The prophet, having enumerated the sins of Israel, said that God had sworn to take vengeance on them.

He says this: "And it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that I will cause the sun to go down at noon, and I will darken the earth in the clear day ; and I will turn your feasts into mourning, and all your songs into lamentation.

"You all shall have sorrow and suffering, and I will make this nation mourn as for an only son, and the end therefore as a bitter day. Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the Lord. And they shall wander from sea to sea, and from the north even to the east; they shall run to and fro to seek the word of the Lord, and shall not find it.

"In that day shall the fair virgins and young men faint for thirst. They that have followed the idols of Samaria, and sworn by the god of Dan, and followed the manner of Beersheba, shall fall, and never rise up again."

Amos 3. 2: "Ye only have I known of all the families of the earth for my people."

Daniel 12. 7. Having described all the extent of the reign of the Messiah, he says: "All these things shall be finished, when the scattering of the people of Israel shall be accomplished."

Haggai 2. 4: "Ye who, comparing this second house with the glory of the first, despise it, be strong, saith the Lord, be strong, O Zerubbabel, and O Jesus, the high priest, be strong, all ye people of the land, and work. For I am with you, saith the Lord of hosts; according to the word that I covenanted with you when ye came out of Egypt, so my spirit remaineth among you. Fear ye not. For thus saith the Lord of hosts: Yet one little while, and I will shake the heavens, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land," (a way of speaking to indicate a great and an extraordinary change); "and I will shake all nations, and the desire of all the Gentiles shall come; and I will fill this house with glory, saith the Lord.

"The silver is mine, and the gold is mine, saith the Lord," (that is to say, it is not by that that I wish to be honoured; as it is said elsewhere: All the beasts of the field are mine, what advantages me that they are offered me in sacrifice?). "The glory of this latter house shall be greater than of the former, saith the Lord of hosts; and in this place will I establish my house, saith the Lord.

"According to all that thou desiredst in Horeb in the day of the assembly, saying, Let us not hear again the voice of the Lord, neither let us see this fire any more, that we die not. And the Lord said unto me, Their prayer is just. I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him. And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he will speak in my name, I will require it of him."

Genesis 49: "Judah, thou art he whom thy brethren shall praise, and thou shalt conquer thine enemies; thy father's children shall bow down before thee. Judah is a lion's whelp: from the prey, my son, thou art gone up, and art couched as a lion, and as a lioness that shall be roused up.

"The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering of the people be."

727. During the life of the Messiah. AEnigmatis. Ezek. 17.

His forerunner. Malachi 3.

He will be born an infant. Is. 9.

He will be born in the village of Bethlehem. Micah 5. He will appear chiefly in Jerusalem and will be a descendant of the family of Judah and of David.

He is to blind the learned and the wise, Is. 6. 8. 29. etc.; and to preach the Gospel to the lowly, Is. 29; to open the eyes of the blind, give health to the sick, and bring light to those that languish in darkness. Is. 61.

He is to show the perfect way, and be the teacher of the Gentiles. Is. 55; 43.1—7. The prophecies are to be unintelligible to the wicked, Dan. 12; Hosea 14. 10; but they are to be intelligible to those who are well informed.

The prophecies, which represent Him as poor, represent Him as master of the nations. Is. 52. 14, etc.; 53; Zech. 9. 9.

The prophecies, which foretell the time, foretell Him only as master of the nations and suffering, and not as in the clouds nor as judge. And those, which represent Him thus as judge and in glory, do not mention the time. When the Messiah is spoken of as great and glorious, it is as the judge of the world, and not its Redeemer.

He is to be the victim for the sins of the world. Is. 39. 53. etc.

He is to be the precious corner-stone. Is. 28. 16.

He is to be a stone of stumbling and offence. Is. viii. Jerusalem is to dash against this stone.

The builders are to reject this stone. Ps. 1 17. 22.

God is to make this stone the chief corner-stone.

And this stone is to grow into a huge mountain and fill the whole earth. Dan. 2. So He is to be rejected, despised, betrayed (Ps. 108. 8), sold (Zech. 11. 12), spit upon, buffeted, mocked, afflicted in innumerable ways, given gall to drink (Ps. 68), pierced (Zech. 12), His feet and His hands pierced, slain, and lots cast for His raiment.

He will rise again (Ps. 15) the third day (Hosea 6. 3).

He will ascend to heaven to sit on the right hand. Ps. no.

The kings will arm themselves against Him. Ps. 2.

Being on the right hand of the Father, He will be victorious over His enemies.

The kings of the earth and all nations will worship Him. Is. lx.

The Jews will continue as a nation. Jeremiah.

They will wander, without kings, etc. (Hosea 3), without prophets (Amos), looking for salvation and finding it not (Isaiah).

Calling of the Gentiles by Jesus Christ. Is. 52. 15; 55. 5; 60. etc. Ps. 81. Hosea 1.9: "Ye are not my people, and I will not be your God, when ye are multiplied after the dispersion. In the places where it was said, Ye are not my people, I will call them my people."

728. It was not lawful to sacrifice outside of Jerusalem, which was the place that the Lord had chosen, nor even to eat the tithes elsewhere. Deut. 12. 5, etc.; Deut. 14. 23, etc.; 15. 20; 16. 2, 7, n, 15.

Hosea foretold that they should be without a king, without a prince, without a sacrifice, and without an idol; and this prophecy is now fulfilled, as they cannot make a lawful sacrifice out of Jerusalem.

729. Predictions.—It was foretold that, in the time of the Messiah, He should come to establish a new covenant, which should make them forget the escape from Egypt (Jer. 23. 5; Is. 43. 10); that He should place His law not in externals, but in the heart; that He should put His fear, which had only been from without, in the midst of the heart. Who does not see the Christian law in all this?

730. . . . That then idolatry would be overthrown; that this Messiah would cast down all idols and bring men into the worship of the true God. That the temples of the idols would be cast down, and that among all nations and in all places of the earth. He would be offered a pure sacrifice, not of beasts. That He would be king of the Jews and Gentiles. And we see this king of the Jews and Gentiles oppressed by both, who conspire His death; and ruler of both, destroying the worship of Moses in Jerusalem, which was its centre, where He made His first Church; and also the worship of idols in Rome, the centre of it, where He made His chief Church.

731. Prophecies.—That Jesus Christ will sit on the right hand, till God has subdued His enemies.

Therefore He will not subdue them Himself.

732. ". . . Then they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, saying, Here is the Lord, for Godshall make Himself known to all."

". . . Your sons shall prophesy." "I will put my spirit and my fear in your heart." All that is the same thing. To prophesy is to speak of God, not from outward proofs, but from an inward and immediate feeling.

733. That He would teach men the perfect way. And there has never come, before Him nor after Him, any man who has taught anything divine approaching to this.

734. .. . That Jesus Christ would be small in His beginning, and would then increase. The little stone of Daniel.

If I had in no wise heard of the Messiah, nevertheless, after such wonderful predictions of the course of the world which I see fulfilled, I see that He is divine. And, if I knew that these same books foretold a Messiah, I should be sure that He would come; and seeing that they place His time before the destruction of the second temple, I should say that He had come.

735. Prophecies.—That the Jews would reject Jesus Christ, and would be rejected of God, for this reason, that the chosen vine brought forth only wild grapes. That the chosen people would be fruitless, ungrateful, and unbelieving, populum non credentem et contradicentem.¹ That God would strike them with blindness, and in full noon they would grope like the blind; and that a forerunner would go before Him.

736. Transfixerunt.² Zech. 12. 10.

That a deliverer should come, who would crush the demon's head, and free His people from their sins, ex omnibus iniquitatibus;³ that there should be a New Covenant, which would be eternal; that there should be another priesthood after the order of Melchisedek, and it should be eternal; that the Christ should be glorious, mighty, strong, and yet so poor that He would not be recognised, nor taken for what He is, but rejected and slain; that His people who denied Him should no longer be His people; that the idolaters should receive Him, and take refuge in Him; that He should leave Zion to reign in the centre of idolatry; that nevertheless the Jews should continue for ever; that He should be of Judah, and when there should be no longer a king.

¹Is. 65. 2. "Arebellious people, which walketh in a way that was not good."

²"They have pierced."

³Ps. 130. 8. "from all his iniquities."

**35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge,* SECT 32 418d-419a; SECT 146-154 442a-444b passim, esp SECT 148 442b-d**

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge,* SECT 32 418d-419a

32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge,* SECT 146-154 442a-444b passim

146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist."

147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible.

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;—A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man—if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do—but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light.

150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every one of us."

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62 ; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself." Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 3 1 . Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings.

154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures?

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge,* esp SECT 148 442b-d

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;—A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man—if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do—but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.

**37 FIELDING: *Tom Jones, 186c-d***

Chapter 15

A brief history of Europe; and a curious

discourse between Mr. Jones and the Man

of the Hill

"In Italy the landlords are very silent. In France they are more talkative, but yet civil. In Germany and Holland they are generally very impertinent. And as for their honesty, I believe it is pretty equal in all those countries. The laquais a louange are sure to lose no opportunity of cheating you; and as for the postilions, I think they are pretty much alike all the world over. These, sir, are the observations on men which I made in my travels; for these were the only men I ever conversed with. My design, when I went abroad, was to divert myself by seeing the wondrous variety of prospects, beasts, birds, fishes, insects, and vegetables, with which God has been pleased to enrich the several parts of this globe; a variety which, as it must give great pleasure to a contemplative beholder, so doth it admirably display the power, and wisdom, and goodness of the Creator. Indeed, to say the truth, there is but one work in his whole creation that doth him any dishonour, and with that I have long since avoided holding any conversation."

"You will pardon me," cries Jones; "but I have always imagined that there is in this very work you mention as great variety as in all the rest; for, besides the difference of inclination, customs and climates have, I am told, introduced the utmost diversity into human nature."

**40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall, 81d; 346d-347a***

40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall, 81d*

The theology of Zoroaster was darkly comprehended by foreigners, and even by the far greater number of his disciples; but the most careless observers were struck with the philosophic simplicity of the Persian worship. "That people," says Herodotus,¹² "rejects the use of temples, of altars, and of statues, and smiles at the folly of those nations who imagine that the gods are sprung from, or bear any affinity with, the human nature. The tops of the highest mountains are the places chosen for sacrifices. Hymns and prayers are the principal worship; the Supreme God who fills the wide circle of Heaven is the object to whom they are addressed." Yet, at the same time, in the true spirit of a polytheist, he accuses them of adoring Earth, Water, Fire, the Winds, and the Sun and Moon. But the Persians of every age have denied the charge, and explained the equivocal conduct, which might appear to give a colour to it. The elements, and more particularly Fire, Light, and the Sun, whom they called Mithra, were the objects of their religious reverence, because they considered them as the purest symbols, the noblest productions, and the most powerful agents of the Divine Power and Nature.¹³

40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall, 346d-347a*

The inferior gods might sometimes condescend to animate the statues, and to inhabit the temples, which were dedicated to their honour. They might occasionally visit the earth, but the heavens were the proper throne and symbol of their glory. The invariable order of the sun, moon, and stars was hastily admitted by Julian as a proof of their eternal duration; and their eternity was a sufficient evidence that they were the workmanship, not of an inferior deity, but of the Omnipotent King. In the system of the Platonists the visible was a type of the invisible world. The celestial bodies, as they were informed by a divine spirit, might be considered as the objects the most worthy of religious worship. The Sun, whose genial influence pervades and sustains the universe, justly claimed the adoration of mankind, as the bright representative of the Logos, the lively, the rational, the beneficent image of the intellectual Father.²¹

**42 KANT: *Pure Reason, 187a-190a***

Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof

If, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other mode—that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of the phenomena of the present world, their constitution and disposition, and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall term the physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be insufficient, speculative reason cannot present us with any satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea.

It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding sections, that an answer to this question will be far from being difficult or unconvincing. For how can any experience be adequate with an idea? The very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient being is so immeasurably great, so high above all that is empirical, which is always conditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and in vain seek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned, while examples, nay, even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical synthesis. If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions, it must be a member of the empirical series, and, like the lower members which it precedes, have its origin in some higher member of the series. If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the chain, and cogitate it as an intelligible being, apart from the series of natural causes—how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter from the former? All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensuous world, and, apart from them, are without significance. The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations —even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without power of expression—all the more eloquent that it is dumb. Everywhere around us we observe a chain of causes and effects, of means and ends, of death and birth; and, as nothing has entered of itself into the condition in which we find it, we are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself suggests the same inquiry regarding its cause, and thus the universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of contingencies, there exists something that is primal and self-subsistent—something which, as the cause of this phenomenal world, secures its continuance and preservation.

This highest cause—what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of the content of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate its magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible. But this supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is there to prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible? This we can easily do, although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract conception, by representing this being to ourselves as containing in itself, as an individual substance, all possible perfection—a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands parsimony in principles, which is free from self contradiction, which even contributes to the extension of the employment of reason in experience, by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and system, and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience.

This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the principle of which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again reacts upon this idea—its cause; and thus our belief in a divine author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction.

For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind, unceasingly elevated by these considerations, which, although empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle speculation; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned author of all.

But although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits, apart from favour or support by other arguments. Nor can it injure the cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist, and to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the properties of a belief that brings calm and content into the mind, without prescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then, that the physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to the ontological argument—to which it serves merely as an introduction, and that, consequently, this argument contains the only possible ground of proof (possessed by speculative reason) for the existence of this being.

The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow: i. We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and existing in a whole of a content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2. This arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world—it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the world. 4. The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic edifice—an inference which all our observation favours, and all principles of analogy support. In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain products of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature to bend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or a watch, that the same kind of causality— namely, understanding and will—resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal possibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and superhuman art—a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither of these opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark that it must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of cause at all, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the analogy subsisting between nature and such products of design—these being the only products whose causes and modes of organization are completely known to us. Reason would be unable to satisfy her own requirements, if she passed from a causality which she does know, to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation which she does not know.

According to the physico-theological argument, the connection and harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that is. of the substance of the world. To establish the truth of the latter opinion, it would be necessary to prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony and order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the product of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art. This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are subject. Thus this argument is utterly insufficient for the task before us—a demonstration of the existence of an all-sufficient being. If we wish to prove the contingency of matter, we must have recourse to a transcendental argument, which the physico-theological was constructed expressly to avoid.

We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a disposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the existence of a cause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain certain determinate qualities, and it must therefore be regarded as the conception of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so on. in one word, all perfection — the conception, that is, of an all-sufficient being. For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable power and excellence, give us no determinate conception of the thing, nor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself. They merely indicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and the observer, who compares it with himself and with his own power of comprehension, and are mere expressions of praise and reverence, by which the object is either magnified, or the observing subject depreciated in relation to the object. Where we have to do with the magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we can discover no determinate conception, except that which comprehends all possible perfection or completeness, and it is only the total (omnitudo) of reality which is completely determined in and through its conception alone.

Now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to declare that he has a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude of the world he contemplates bears (in its extent as well as in its content) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design in the world to the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world to the absolute unity of a Supreme Being. Physico-theology is therefore incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause of the world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology—a theology which is itself to be the basis of religion.

The attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the path of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the physico-theological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge the abyss?

After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power, wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we can advance no further, we leave the argument on empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and conformity to aims that are observable in it. From this contingency we infer, by the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence of something absolutely necessary; and, still advancing, proceed from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or determining conception thereof—the conception of an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing in its undertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument; and, as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise, it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at first professed to have no connection with this faculty and to base its entire procedure upon experience alone.

The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon it, with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass into the region of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their determinate conception—into the possession of which they have come, they know not how — over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience —though in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience.

Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being; and as besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all.

**46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART I, 228a-c; 235d-236c; 252a-255b; PART II, 263d-265c; 266a-267a; 268b-271c***

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART I, 228a-c*

The complement to the abstraction Brahm must then be looked for in the concrete complex of things; for the principle of the Hindu religion is the manifestation of diversity. These then, fall outside that abstract unity of thought, and as that which deviates from it, constitute the variety found in the world of sense, the variety of intellectual conceptions in an unreflected sensuous form. In this way the concrete complex of material things is isolated from spirit, and, presented in wild distraction, except as re-absorbed in the pure ideality of Brahm. The other deities are therefore things of sense: mountains, streams, beasts, the sun, the moon, the Ganges. The next stage is the concentration of this wild variety into substantial distinctions, and the comprehension of them as a series of divine persons. Vishnu, Siva, Mahadeva are thus distinguished from Brahma. In the embodiment Vishnu, are presented those incarnations in which God has appeared as man, and which are always historical personages, who effected important changes and new epochs. The power of procreation is likewise a substantial embodiment; and in the excavations, grottos and pagodas of the Hindus, the lingam is always found as symbolizing the male, and the lotus the female vis procreandi.

With this duality, abstract unity on the one side and the abstract isolation of the world of sense on the other side, exactly corresponds the double form of worship, in the relation of the human subjectivity to God. The one side of this duality of worship, consists in the abstraction of pure self-elevation—the abrogation of real self-consciousness ; a negativity which is consequently manifested, on the one hand, in the attainment of torpid unconsciousness—on the other hand, in suicide and the extinction of all that is worth calling life, by self-inflicted tortures. The other side of worship consists in a wild tumult of excess; when all sense of individuality has vanished from consciousness by immersion in the merely natural, with which individuality thus makes itself identical—destroying its consciousness of distinction from nature. In all the pagodas, therefore, prostitutes and dancing girls are kept, whom the Brahmans instruct most carefully in dancing, in beautiful postures and attractive gestures, and who have to comply with the wishes of all comers at a fixed price. Theological doctrine, relation of religion to morality, is here altogether out of the question. On the one hand love, heaven, in short, everything spiritual, is conceived by the fancy of the Hindu; but on the other hand, his conceptions have an actual sensuous embodiment, and he immerses himself by a voluptuous intoxication in the merely natural. Objects of religious worship are thus either disgusting forms produced by art, or those presented by nature. Every bird, every monkey is a present god, an absolutely universal existence. The Hindu is incapable of holding fast an object in his mind by means of rational predicates assigned to it, for this requires reflection. While a universal essence is wrongly transmuted into sensuous objectivity, the latter is also driven from its definite character into universality—a process whereby it loses its footing and is expanded to indefiniteness.

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART I, 235d-236c*

With the Persian Empire we first enter on continuous history. The Persians are the first historical people; Persia was the first empire that passed away. While China and India remained stationary, and perpetuate a natural vegetative existence even to the present time, this land has been subject to those developments and revolutions, which alone manifest a historical condition. The Chinese and the Indian Empires assert a place in the historical series only on their own account and for us. But here in Persia first arises that light which shines itself, and illuminates what is around; for Zoroaster's "light" belongs to the world of consciousness— to spirit as a relation to something distinct from itself. We see in the Persian world a pure exalted unity, as the essence which leaves the special existences that inhere in it, free ; as the light, which only manifests what bodies are in themselves; a unity which governs individuals only to excite them to become powerful for themselves—to develop and assert their individuality. Light makes no distinctions: the sun shines on the righteous and the unrighteous, on high and low, and confers on all the same benefit and prosperity. Light is vitalizing only in so far as it is brought to bear on something distinct from itself, operating upon and developing that. It holds a position of antithesis to darkness, and this antithetical relation opens out to us the principle of activity and life. The principle of development begins with the history of Persia. This therefore constitutes strictly the beginning of world-history; for the grand interest of spirit in history, is to attain an unlimited immanence of subjectivity—by an absolute antithesis to attain complete harmony.

Thus the transition which we have to make, is only in the sphere of the Idea, not in the external historical connection. The principle of this transition is that the universal essence, which we recognized in Brahm, now becomes perceptible to consciousness—becomes an object and acquires a positive import for man. Brahm is not worshipped by the Hindus : he is nothing more than a condition of the individual, a religious feeling, a non-objective existence; a relation, which for concrete vitality is that of annihilation. But in becoming objective, this universal essence acquires a positive nature: man becomes free, and thus occupies a position face to face as it were with the highest being, the latter being made objective for him. This form of universality we see exhibited in Persia, involving a separation of man from the universal essence ; while at the same time the individual recognizes himself as identical with that essence. In the Chinese and Indian principle, this distinction was not made. We found only a unit of the spiritual and the natural. But spirit still involved in nature has to solve the problem of freeing itself from the latter. Rights and duties in India are intimately connected with special classes, and are therefore only peculiarities attaching to man by the arrangement of nature. In China this unity presents itself under the conditions of paternal government. Man is not free there; he possesses no moral element, since he is identical with the external command. In the Persian principle, unity first elevates itself to the distinction from the merely natural ; we have the negation of that unreflecting relation which allowed no exercise of mind to intervene between the mandate and its adoption by the will. In the Persian principle this unity is manifested as light, which in this case is not simply light as such, the most universal physical element, but at the same time also spiritual purity—the good. Speciality, the involvement with limited nature, is consequently abolished. Light, in a physical and spiritual sense, imports, therefore, elevation— freedom from the merely natural. Man sustains a relation to light, to the abstract good, as to something objective, which is acknowledged, reverenced, and evoked to activity by his will. If we look back once more, and we cannot do so too frequently, on the phases which we have traversed in arriving at this point, we perceive in China the totality of a moral whole, but excluding subjectivity;—this totality divided into members, but without independence in its various portions. We found only an external arrangement of this political unity. In India, on the contrary, distinctions made themselves prominent ; but the principle of separation was unspiritual. We found incipient subjectivity, but hampered with the condition, that the separation in question is insurmountable; and that spirit remains involved in the limitations of nature, and is therefore a self-contradiction. Above this purity of castes is that purity of light which we observe in Persia; that abstract good, to which all are equally able to approach, and in which all equally may be hallowed. The unity recognized therefore, now first becomes a principle, not an external bond of soulless order. The fact that everyone has a share in that principle, secures to him personal dignity.

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART I, 252a-255b*

This basis of the life of the Egyptians determines moreover the particular tenor of their religious views. A controversy has long been waged respecting the sense of meaning of the Egyptian religion. As early as the reign of Tiberius, the Stoic Chaeremon, who had been in Egypt, explains it in a purely materialistic sense. The new Platonists take a directly opposite view, regarding all as symbols of a spiritual meaning, and thus making this religion a pure idealism. Each of these representations is one-sided. Natural and spiritual powers are regarded as most intimately united—(the free spiritual import, however, has not been developed at this stage of thought)—but in such a way, that the extremes of the antithesis were united in the harshest contrast. We have spoken of the Nile, of the sun, and of the vegetation depending upon them. This limited view of nature gives the principle of the religion, and its subject-matter is primarily a history. The Nile and the sun constitute the divinities, conceived under human forms; and the course of nature and the mythological history is the same. In the winter solstice the power of the sun has reached its minimum, and must be born anew. Thus also Osiris appears as born; but he is killed by Typhon, his brother and enemy, the burning wind of the desert. Isis, the earth, from whom the aid of the sun and of the Nile has been withdrawn, yearns after him : she gathers the scattered bones of Osiris, and raises her lamentation for him, and all Egypt bewails with her the death of Osiris, in a song which Herodotus calls Maneros. Maneros he reports to have been the only son of the first king of the Egyptians, and to have died prematurely; this song being also the Linus-Song of the Greeks, and the only song which the Egyptians have. Here again pain is regarded as something divine, and the same honour is assigned to it here as among the Phoenicians. Hermes then embalms Osiris ; and his grave is shown in various places. Osiris is now judge of the dead, and lord of the kingdom of the shades. These are the leading ideas. Osiris, the sun, the Nile; this triplicity of being is united in one knot. The sun is the symbol, in which Osiris and the history of that god are recognized, and the Nile is likewise such a symbol. The concrete Egyptian imagination also ascribes to Osiris and Isis the introduction of agriculture, the invention of the plough, the hoe, etc.; for Osiris gives not only the useful itself—the fertility of the earth—but, moreover, the means of making use of it. He also gives men laws, a civil order and a religious ritual; he thus places in men's hands the means of labour, and secures its result. Osiris is also the symbol of the seed which is placed in the earth, and then springs up—as also of the course of life. Thus we find this heterogeneous duality, the phenomena of nature and the spiritual, woven together into one knot.

The parallelism of the course of human life with the Nile, the sun, and Osiris, is not to be regarded as a mere allegory—as if the principle of birth, of increase in strength, of the culmination of vigour and fertility, of decline and weakness, exhibited itself in these different phenomena, in an equal or similar way ; but in this variety imagination conceived only one subject, one vitality. This unity is, however, quite abstract: the heterogeneous element shows itself therein as pressing and urging, and in a confusion which sharply contrasts with Greek perspicuity. Osiris represents the Nile and the sun: sun and Nile are, on the other hand, symbols of human life—each one is signification and symbol at the same time; the symbol is changed into signification, and this latter becomes symbol of that symbol, which itself then becomes signification. None of these phases of existence is a type without being at the same time a signification; each is both ; the one is explained by the other. Thus there arises one pregnant conception, composed of many conceptions, in which each fundamental nodus retains its individuality, so that they are not resolved into a general idea. The general idea—the thought itself, which forms the bond of analogy—does not present itself to the consciousness purely and freely as such, but remains concealed as an internal connection. We have a consolidated individuality, combining various phenomenal aspects; and which on the one hand is fanciful, on account of the combination of apparently disparate material, but on the other hand internally and essentially connected, because these various appearances are a particular prosaic matter of fact.

Besides this fundamental conception, we observe several special divinities, of whom Herodotus reckons three classes. Of the first he mentions eight gods; of the second twelve; of the third an indefinite number, who occupy the position towards the unity of Osiris of specific manifestations. In the first class, fire and its use appears as Phtha, also as Knef, who is besides represented as the Good Genius; but the Nile itself is held to be that Genius, and thus abstractions are changed into concrete conceptions. Ammon is regarded as a great divinity, with whom is associated the determination of the equinox: it is he, moreover, who gives oracles. But Osiris is similarly represented as the founder of oracular manifestations. So the procreative power, banished by Osiris, is represented as a particular divinity. But Osiris is himself this procreative power. Isis is the earth, the moon, the receptive fertility of nature. As an important element in the conception Osiris, Anubis (Thoth)—the Egyptian Hermes—must be specially noticed. In human activity and invention, and in the economy of legislation, the spiritual, as such, is embodied; and becomes in this form, which is itself determinate and limited, an object of consciousness. Here we have the spiritual, not as one infinite, independent sovereignty over nature, but as a particular existence, side by side with the powers of nature—characterized also by intrinsic particularity. And thus the Egyptians had also specific divinities, conceived as spiritual activities and forces ; but partly intrinsically limited—partly contemplated under natural symbols.

The Egyptian Hermes is celebrated as exhibiting the spiritual side of their theism. According to Iamblichus, the Egyptian priests immemorially prefixed to all their inventions the name Hermes: Eratosthenes, therefore, called his book, which treated of the entire science of Egypt, Hermes. Anubis is called the friend and companion of Osiris. To him is ascribed the invention of writing, and of science generally —of grammar, astronomy, mensuration, music, and medicine. It was he who first divided the day into twelve hours: he was moreover the first lawgiver, the first instructor in religious observances and objects, and in gymnastics and orchestics; and it was he who discovered the olive. But, notwithstanding all these spiritual attributes, this divinity is something quite other than the god of thought. Only particular human arts and inventions are associated with him. Not only so; but he entirely falls back into involvement in existence, and is degraded under physical symbols. He is represented with a dog's head, as an imbruted god; and besides this mask, a particular natural object is bound up with the conception of this divinity ; for he is at the same time Sirius, the dog-star. He is thus as limited in respect of what he embodies, as sensuous in the positive existence ascribed to him. It may be incidentally remarked, that as ideas and nature are not distinguished from each other, in the same way the arts and appliances of human life are not developed and arranged so as to form a rational circle of aims and means. Thus medicine, deliberation respecting corporeal disease, as also the whole range of deliberation and resolve with regard to undertakings in life, was subjected to the most multifarious superstition in the way of reliance on oracles and magic arts. Astronomy was also essentially astrology, and medicine an affair of magic, but more particularly of astrology. All astrological and sympathetic superstition may be traced to Egypt.

Egyptian worship is chiefly zoolatry. We have observed the union here presented between the spiritual and the natural: the more advanced and elevated side of this conception is the fact that the Egyptians, while they observed the spiritual as manifested in the Nile, the sun, and the sowing of seed, took the same view of the life of animals. To us zoolatry is repulsive. We may reconcile ourselves to the adoration of the material heaven, but the worship of brutes is alien to us; for the abstract natural element seems to us more generic, and therefore more worthy of veneration. Yet it is certain that the nations who worshipped the sun and the stars by no means occupy a higher grade than those who adore brutes, but contrariwise; for in the brute world the Egyptians contemplate a hidden and incomprehensible principle. We also, when we contemplate the life and action of brutes, are astonished at their instinct, the adaptation of their movements to the object intended, their restlessness, excitability, and liveliness; for they are exceedingly quick and discerning in pursuing the ends of their existence, while they are at the same time silent and shut up within themselves. We cannot make out what it is that "possesses" these creatures, and cannot rely on them. A black tom-cat, with its glowing eyes and its now gliding, now quick and darting movement, has been deemed the presence of a malignant being—a mysterious reserved spectre : the dog, the canary-bird, on the contrary, appear friendly and sympathizing. The lower animals are the truly incomprehensible. A man cannot by imagination or conception enter into the nature of a dog, whatever resemblance he himself might have to it; it remains something altogether alien to him. It is in two departments that the so-called incomprehensible meets us—in living nature and in spirit. But in very deed it is only in nature that we have to encounter the incomprehensible ; for the being manifest to itself is the essence, spirit: spirit understands and comprehends spirit. The obtuse self-consciousness of the Egyptians, therefore, to which the thought of human freedom is not yet revealed, worships the soul as still shut up within and dulled by the physical organization, and sympathizes with brute life. We find a veneration of mere vitality among other nations also: sometimes expressly, as among the Hindus and all the Mongolians ; sometimes in mere traces, as among the Jews: "Thou shalt not eat the blood of animals, for in it is the life of the animal." The Greeks and Romans also regarded birds as specially intelligent, believing that what in the human spirit was not revealed, the incomprehensible and higher, was to be found in them. But among the Egyptians this worship of beasts was carried to excess under the forms of a most stupid and non-human superstition. The worship of brutes was among them a matter of particular and detailed arrangement: each district had a brute deity of its own—a cat, an ibis, a crocodile, etc. Great establishments were provided for them; beautiful mates were assigned them; and, like human beings, they were embalmed after death. The bulls were buried, but with their horns protruding above their graves; the bulls embodying Apis had splendid monuments, and some of the pyramids must be looked upon as such. In one of those that have been opened, there was found in the most central apartment a beautiful alabaster coffin; and on closer examination it was found that the bones inclosed were those of the ox. This reverence for brutes was often carried to the most absurd excess of severity. If a man killed one designedly, he was punished with death ; but even the undesigned killing of some animals might entail death. It is related, that once when a Roman in Alexandria killed a cat, an insurrection ensued, in which the Egyptians murdered the aggressor. They would let human beings perish by famine, rather than allow the sacred animals to be killed, or the provision made for them trenched upon. Still more than mere vitality, the universal vis vita of productive nature was venerated in a phallus-worship ; which the Greeks also adopted into the rites paid by them to Dionysus. With this worship the greatest excesses were connected.

The brute form is, on the other hand, turned into a symbol: it is also partly degraded to a mere hieroglyphical sign. I refer here to the innumerable figures on the Egyptian monuments, of sparrow-hawks or falcons, dung-beetles, scarabaei, etc. It is not known what ideas such figures symbolized, and we can scarcely think that a satisfactory view of this very obscure subject is attainable. The dung-beetle is said to be the symbol of generation, of the sun and its course; the Ibis, that of the Nile's overflowing; birds of the hawk tribe, of prophecy, of the year, of pity. The strangeness of these combinations results from the circumstance that we have not, as in our idea of poetical invention, a general conception embodied in an image; but, conversely, we begin with a concept in the sphere of sense, and imagination conducts us into the same sphere again. But we observe the conception liberating itself from the direct animal form, and the continued contemplation of it; and that which was only surmised and aimed at in that form, advancing to comprehensibility and conceivableness. The hidden meaning, the spiritual, emerges as a human face from the brute. The multiform sphinxes, with lions' bodies and virgins' heads —or as male sphinxes (ἀνδρὁσϕιγγεϛ) with beards—are evidence supporting the view, that the meaning of the spiritual is the problem which the Egyptians proposed to themselves; as the enigma generally is not the utterance of something unknown, but is the challenge to discover it—implying a wish to be revealed. But conversely, the human form is also disfigured by a brute face, with the view of giving it a specific and definite expression. The refined art of Greece is able to attain a specific expression through the spiritual character given to an image in the form of beauty, and does not need to deform the human face in order to be understood. The Egyptians appended an explanation to the human forms, even of the gods, by means of heads and masks of brutes; Anubis, e.g., has a dog's head, Isis, a lion's head with bull's horns, etc. The priests, also, in performing their functions, are masked as falcons, jackals, bulls, etc.; in the same way the surgeon, who has taken out the bowels of the dead (represented as fleeing, for he has laid sacrilegious hands on an object once hallowed by life) ; so also the embalmers and the scribes. The sparrow-hawk, with a human head and outspread wings, denotes the soul flying through material space, in order to animate a new body. The Egyptian imagination also created new forms—combinations of different animals: serpents with bulls' and rams' heads, bodies of lions with rams' heads, etc.

We thus see Egypt intellectually confined by a narrow, involved, close view of nature, but breaking through this; impelling it to self-contradiction, and proposing to itself the problem which that contradiction implies. The principle does not remain satisfied with its primary conditions, but points to that other meaning and spirit which lies concealed beneath the surface. In the view just given, we saw the Egyptian spirit working itself free from natural forms. This urging, powerful spirit, however, was not able to rest in the subjective conception of that view of things which we have now been considering, but was impelled to present it to external consciousness and outward vision by means of art. For the religion of the Eternal One—the formless—art is not only unsatisfying, but, since its object essentially and exclusively occupies the thought, something sinful. But spirit, occupied with the contemplation of particular natural forms—being at the same time a striving and plastic Spirit—changes the direct, natural view, e.g., of the Nile, the sun, etc., to images, in which spirit has a share. It is, as we have seen, symbolizing spirit ; and as such, it endeavors to master these symbolizations, and to present them clearly before the mind. The more enigmatical and obscure it is to itself, so much the more does it feel the impulse to labour to deliver itself from its imprisonment, and to gain a clear objective view of itself.

It is the distinguishing feature of the Egyptian spirit, that it stands before us as this mighty taskmaster. It is not splendour, amusement, pleasure, or the like that it seeks. The force which urges it is the impulse of self-comprehension; and it has no other material or ground to work on, in order to teach itself what it is, to realize itself for itself, than this working out its thoughts in stone ; and what it engraves on the stone are its enigmas—these hieroglyphs. They are of two kinds: hieroglyphs proper, designed rather to express language, and having reference to subjective conception; and a class of hieroglyphs of a different kind, viz., those enormous masses of architecture and sculpture, with which Egypt is covered. While among other nations history consists of a series of events—as, e.g., that of the Romans, who century after century, lived only with a view to conquest, and accomplished the subjugation of the world—the Egyptians raised an empire equally mighty—of achievements in works of art, whose ruins prove their indestructibility, and which are greater and more worthy of astonishment than all other works of ancient or modern time.

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART II, 263d-265c*

In tracing up the rudiments of Greek culture, we first recall attention to the fact, that the physical condition of the country does not exhibit such a characteristic unity, such a uniform mass, as to exercise a powerful influence over the inhabitants. On the contrary, it is diversified, and produces no decided impression. Nor have we here the unwieldy unity of a family or national combination; but, in the presence of scenery and displays of elemental power broken up into fragmentary forms, men's attention is more largely directed to themselves, and to the extension of their immature capabilities. Thus we see the Greeks, divided and separated from each other, thrown back upon their inner spirit and personal energy, yet at the same time most variously excited and cautiously circumspect. We behold them quite undetermined and irresolute in the presence of nature, dependent on its contingencies, and listening anxiously to each signal from the external world; but, on the other hand, intelligently taking cognizance of and appropriating that outward existence, and showing boldness and independent vigour in contending with it. These are the simple elements of their culture and religion. In tracing up their mythological conceptions, we find natural objects forming the basis—not en masse, however; only in dissevered forms. The Diana of Ephesus (that is, nature as the universal mother), the Cybele and Astarte of Syria—such comprehensive conceptions remained Asiatic, and were not transmitted to Greece. For the Greeks only watch the objects of nature, and form surmises respecting them ; inquiring, in the depth of their souls, for the hidden meaning. According to Aristotle's dictum, that philosophy proceeds from wonder, the Greek view of nature also proceeds from wonder of this kind. Not that in their experience, spirit meets something extraordinary, which it compares with the common order of things; for the intelligent view of a regular course of nature, and the reference of phenomena to that standard, do not yet present themselves ; but the Greek spirit was excited to wonder at the natural in nature. It does not maintain the position of stupid indifference to it as something existing, and there an end of it ; but regards it as something in the first instance foreign, in which, however, it has a presentiment of confidence, and the belief that it bears something within it which is friendly to the human spirit, and to which it may be permitted to sustain a positive relation. This wonder, and this presentiment, are here the fundamental categories; though the Hellenes did not content themselves with these moods of feelings but projected the hidden meaning, which was the subject of the surmise, into a distinct conception as an object of consciousness. The natural holds its place in their minds only after undergoing some transformation by spirit—not immediately. Man regards nature only as an excitement to his faculties, and only the spiritual which he has evolved from it can have any influence over him. Nor is this commencement of the spiritual apprehension of nature to be regarded as an explanation suggested by us; it meets us in a multitude of conceptions formed by the Greeks themselves. The position of curious surmise, of attentive eagerness to catch the meaning of nature, is indicated to us in the comprehensive idea of Pan. To the Greeks, Pan did not represent the objective whole, but that indefinite neutral ground which involves the element of the subjective ; he embodies that thrill which pervades us in the silence of the forests; he was, therefore, especially worshipped in sylvan Arcadia: (a "panic terror" is the common expression for a groundless fright). Pan, this thrill-exciting being, is also represented as playing on the flute ; we have not the bare internal presentiment, for Pan makes himself audible on the seven-reeded pipe. In what has been stated we have, on the one hand, the indefinite, which, however, holds communication with man; on the other hand, the fact that such communication is only a subjective imagining, an explanation furnished by the percipient himself. On the same principle the Greeks listened to the murmuring of the fountains, and asked what might be thereby signified; but the signification which they were led to attach to it was not the objective meaning of the fountain, but the subjective— that of the subject itself, which further exalts the Naiad to a Muse. The naiads, or fountains, are the external, objective origin of the Muses. Yet the immortal songs of the Muses are not that which is heard in the murmuring of the fountains; they are the productions of the thoughtfully listening spirit, creative while observant. The interpretation and explanation of nature and its transformations, the indication of their sense and import, is the act of the subjective spirit; and to this the Greeks attached the name μαντεία. The general idea which this embodies, is the form in which man realizes his relationship to nature. μαντεία has reference both to the matter of the exposition and to the expounder who divines the weighty import in question. Plato speaks of it in reference to dreams, and to that delirium into which men fall during sickness; an interpreter, μάντιϛ, is wanted to explain these dreams and this delirium. That nature answered the questions which the Greek put to her, is in this converse sense true, that he obtained an answer to the questions of nature from his own spirit. The insight of the seer becomes thereby purely poetical; spirit supplies the signification which the natural image expresses. Everywhere the Greeks desired a clear presentation and interpretation of the natural. Homer tells us, in the last book of the Odyssey, that while the Greeks were overwhelmed with sorrow for Achilles, a violent agitation came over the sea: the Greeks were on

the point of dispersing in terror, when the experienced Nestor arose and interpreted the phenomenon to them. Thetis, he said, was coming, with her nymphs, to lament for the death of her son. When a pestilence broke out in the camp of the Greeks, the priest, Calchas, explained that Apollo was incensed at their not having restored the daughter of his priest Chryses when a ransom had been offered. The oracle was originally interpreted exactly in this way. The oldest oracle was at Dodona, (in the district of the modern Janina). Herodotus says that the first priestesses of the temple there, were from Egypt; yet this temple is stated to be an ancient Greek one. The rustling of the leaves of the sacred oaks was the form of prognostication there. Bowls of metal were also suspended in the grove. But the sounds of the bowls dashing against each other were quite indefinite, and had no objective sense ; the sense, the signification, was imparted to the sounds only by the human beings who heard them. Thus also the Delphic priestesses, in a senseless, distracted state, in the intoxication of enthusiasm (μανία), uttered unintelligible sounds; and it was the μάντιϛ who gave to these utterances a definite meaning. In the cave of Trophonius the noise of subterranean waters was heard, and apparitions were seen : but these indefinite phenomena acquired a meaning only through the interpreting, comprehending spirit. It must also be observed, that these excitements of spirit are in the first instance external, natural impulses. Succeeding them are internal changes taking place in the human being himself—such as dreams, or the delirium of the Delphic priestess—which require to be made intelligible by the μάντιϛ. At the commencement of the Iliad, Achilles is excited against Agamemnon, and is on the point of drawing his sword ; but on a sudden he checks the movement of his arm, and recollects himself in his wrath, reflecting on his relation to Agamemnon. The poet explains this by saying that it was Pallas-Athene (wisdom or consideration) that restrained him. When Ulysses among the Phaeacians, has thrown his discus farther than the rest, and one of the Phaeacians shows a friendly disposition towards him, the poet recognizes in him Pallas-Athene. Such an explanation denotes the perception of the inner meaning, the sense, the underlying truth; and the poets were in this way the teachers of the Greeks —especially Homer. μαντεία in fact is poesy, not a capricious indulgence of fancy, but an imagination which introduces the spiritual into the natural—in short, a richly intelligent perception. The Greek spirit, on the whole, therefore, is free from superstition, since it changes the sensuous into the sensible—the intellectual, so that decisions are derived from spirit; although superstition comes in again from another quarter, as will be observed when impulsions from another source than the spiritual, are allowed to tell upon opinion and action.

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART II, 266a-267a*

Traces of such foreign rudiments may be generally discovered, (Creuzer, in his Symbolik, dwells especially on this point). The amours of Zeus appear indeed as something isolated, extraneous, adventitious, but it may be shown that foreign theogonic representations form their basis. Hercules is, among the Hellenes, that spiritual humanity which by native energy attains Olympus through the twelve far-famed labours: but the foreign idea that lies at the basis is the sun, completing its revolution through the twelve signs of the zodiac. The mysteries were only such ancient rudiments, and certainly contained no greater wisdom than already existed in the consciousness of the Greeks. All Athenians were initiated in the mysteries—Socrates excepted, who refused initiation, because he knew well that science and art are not the product of mysteries, and that wisdom never lies among arcana. True science has its place much rather in the open field of consciousness.

In summing up the constituents of the Greek spirit, we find its fundamental characteristic to be that the freedom of spirit is conditioned by and has an essential relation to some stimulus supplied by nature. Greek freedom of thought is excited by an alien existence; but it is free because it transforms and virtually reproduces the stimulus by its own operation. This phase of spirit is the medium between the loss of individuality on the part of man (such as we observe in the Asiatic principle, in which the spiritual and divine exists only under a natural form), and infinite subjectivity as pure certainty of itself— the position that the ego is the ground of all that can lay claim to substantial existence. The Greek spirit as the medium between these two, begins with nature, but transforms it into a mere objective form of its (spirit's) own existence; spirituality is therefore not yet absolutely free; not yet absolutely self-produced— is not self-stimulation. Setting out from surmise and wonder, the Greek spirit advances to definite conceptions of the hidden meanings of nature. In the subject itself too, the same harmony is produced. In man, the side of his subjective existence which he owes to nature is the heart, the disposition, passion, and variety of temperament : this side is then developed in a spiritual direction to free individuality ; so that the character is not placed in a relation to universally valid moral authorities, assuming the form of duties, but the moral appears as a nature peculiar to the individual—an exertion of will, the result of disposition and individual constitution.

This stamps the Greek character as that of individuality conditioned by beauty, which is produced by spirit, transforming the merely natural into an expression of its own being. The activity of spirit does not yet possess in itself the material and organ of expression, but needs the excitement of nature and the matter which nature supplies: it is not free, self-determining spirituality, but mere naturalness formed to spirituality— spiritual individuality. The Greek spirit is the plastic artist, forming the stone into a work of art. In this formative process the stone does not remain mere stone—the form being only superinduced from without; but it is made an expression of the spiritual, even contrary to its nature, and thus transformed. Conversely, the artist needs for his spiritual conceptions, stone, colours, sensuous forms to express his idea. Without such an element he can no more be conscious of the idea himself, than give it an objective form for the contemplation of others; since it cannot in thought alone become an object to him. The Egyptian spirit also was a similar labourer in matter, but the natural had not yet been subjected to the spiritual. No advance was made beyond a struggle and contest with it; the natural still took an independent position and formed one side of the image, as in the body of the Sphinx. In Greek beauty the sensuous is only a sign, an expression, an envelope, in which spirit manifests itself.

It must be added, that while the Greek spirit is a transforming artist of this kind, it knows itself free in its productions; for it is their creator, and they are what is called the "work of man." They are, however, not merely this, but eternal truth—the energizing of spirit in its innate essence, and quite as really not created as created by man. He has a respect and veneration for these conceptions and images—this Olympian Zeus, this Pallas of the Acropolis—and in the same way for the laws, political and ethical, that guide his actions. But he, the human being, is the womb that conceived them, he the breast that suckled them, he the spiritual to which their grandeur and purity are owing. Thus he feels himself calm in contemplating them, and not only free in himself, but possessing the consciousness of his freedom; thus the honour of the human is swallowed up in the worship of the divine. Men honour the divine in and for itself, but at the same time as their deed, their production, their phenomenal existence; thus the divine receives its honour through the respect paid to the human, and the human in virtue of the honour paid to the divine.

Such are the qualities of that beautiful individuality, which constitutes the centre of the Greek character. We must now consider the several radiations which this idea throws out in realizing itself. All issue in works of art, and we may arrange under three heads : the subjective work of art, that is, the culture of the man himself; the objective work of art, i.e., the shaping of the world of divinities; lastly, the political work of art, the form of the Constitution, and the relations of the individuals who compose it.

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History, PART II, 268b-271c*

Chapter 2. *The Objective Work of Art*

If the subject of song as thus developed among the Greeks is made a question, we should say that its essential and absolute purport is religious. We have examined the idea embodied in the Greek spirit; and religion is nothing else than this idea made objective as the essence of being. According to that idea, we shall observe also that the divine involves the vis natura only as an element suffering a process of transformation to spiritual power. Of this natural element, as its origin, nothing more remains than the accord of analogy involved in the representation they formed of spiritual power; for the Greeks worshipped God as spiritual. We cannot, therefore, regard the Greek divinity as similar to the Indian—some power of nature for which the human shape supplies only an outward form. The essence is the spiritual itself, and the natural is only the point of departure. But on the other hand, it must be observed, that the divinity of the Greeks is not yet the absolute, free spirit, but spirit in a particular mode, fettered by the limitations of humanity—still dependent as a determinate individuality on external conditions. Individualities, objectively beautiful, are the gods of the Greeks. The divine spirit is here so conditioned as to be not yet regarded as abstract spirit, but has a specialized existence— continues to manifest itself in sense; but so that the sensuous is not its substance, but is only an element of its manifestation. This must be our leading idea in the consideration of the Greek mythology, and we must have our attention fixed upon it so much the more firmly, as—partly through the influence of erudition, which has whelmed essential principles beneath an infinite amount of details, and partly through that destructive analysis which is the work of the abstract understanding—this mythology, together with the more ancient periods of Greek history, has become a region of the greatest intellectual confusion.

In the idea of the Greek spirit we found the two elements, nature and spirit, in such a relation to each other, that nature forms merely the point of departure. This degradation of nature is in the Greek mythology the turning point of the whole—expressed as the war of the gods, the overthrow of the Titans by the race of Zeus. The transition from the Oriental to the Occidental spirit is therein represented, for the Titans are the merely physical, natural existences, from whose grasp sovereignty is wrested. It is true that they continue to be venerated, but not as governing powers ; for they are relegated to the verge of the world. The Titans are powers of Nature, Uranus, Gaea, Oceanus, Selene, Helios, etc. Chronos expresses the dominion of abstract time, which devours its children. The unlimited power of reproduction is restrained, and Zeus appears as the head of the new divinities, who embody a spiritual import, and are themselves spirit.¹ It is not possible to express this transition more

¹See Hegel's Vorles, über die Philos. der Religion, II. p. 102, sqq. (2d edition).

distinctly and naively than in this myth; the new dynasty of divinities proclaim their peculiar nature to be of a spiritual order.

The second point is, that the new divinities retain natural elements, and consequently in themselves a determinate relation to the powers of nature, as was previously shown. Zeus has his lightnings and clouds, and Hera is the creatress of the natural, the producer of crescent vitality. Zeus is also the political god, the protector of morals and of hospitality. Oceanus, as such, is only the element of nature which his name denotes. Poseidon has still the wildness of that element in his character; but he is also an ethical personage; to him is ascribed the building of walls and the production of the Horse. Helios is the sun as a natural element. This light, according to the analogy of spirit, has been transformed to self-consciousness, and Apollo has proceeded from Helios. The name Λύκειος points to the connection with light ; Apollo was a herdsman in the employ of Admetus, but oxen not subjected to the yoke were sacred to Helios : his rays, represented as arrows, kill the python. The idea of light as the natural power constituting the basis of the representation, cannot be dissociated from this divinity; especially as the other predicates attached to it are easily united with it, and the explanations of Müller and others, who deny that basis, are much more arbitrary and far-fetched. For Apollo is the prophesying and discerning god—light, that makes everything clear. He is, moreover, the healer and strengthener ; as also the destroyer, for he kills men. He is the propitiating and purifying god, e.g., in contravention of the Eumenides, the ancient subterrene divinities, who exact hard, stern justice. He himself is pure ; he has no wife, but only a sister, and is not involved in various disgusting adventures, like Zeus; moreover, he is the discerner and declarer, the singer and leader of the dances, as the sun leads the harmonious dance of stars. In like manner, the naiads became the Muses. The mother of the gods, Cybele, continuing to be worshipped at Ephesus as Artemis, is scarcely to be recognized as the Artemis of the Greeks, the chaste huntress and destroyer of wild beasts. Should it be said that this change of the natural into the spiritual is owing to our allegorizing, or that of the later Greeks, we may reply, that this transformation of the natural to the spiritual is the Greek spirit itself. The epigrams of the Greeks exhibit such advances from the sensuous to the spiritual. But the abstract understanding cannot comprehend this blending of the natural with the spiritual.

It must be further observed, that the Greek gods are to be regarded as individualities—not abstractions, like "knowledge," "unity," "time," "heaven," "necessity." Such abstractions do not form the substance of these divinities ; they are no allegories, no abstract beings, to which various attributes are attached, like the Horatian

"necessitas clavis trabalibus." As little are the divinities symbols, for a symbol is only a sign, an adumbration of something else. The Greek gods express of themselves what they are. The eternal repose and clear intelligence that dignifies the head of Apollo, is not a symbol, but the expression in which spirit manifests itself, and shows itself present. The gods are personalities, concrete individualities: an allegorical being has no qualities, but is itself one quality and no more. The gods are, moreover, special characters, since in each of them one peculiarity predominates as the characteristic one; but it would be vain to try to bring this circle of characters into a system. Zeus, perhaps, may be regarded as ruling the other gods, but not with substantial power; so that they are left free to their own idiosyncrasy. Since the whole range of spiritual and moral qualities was appropriated by the gods, the unity, which stood above them all, necessarily remained abstract ; it was therefore formless and unmeaning fact—necessity, whose oppressive character arises from the absence of the spiritual in it; whereas the gods hold a friendly relation to men, for they are spiritual natures. That higher thought, the knowledge of unity as God—the One Spirit—lay beyond that grade of thought which the Greeks had attained.

With regard to the adventitious and special that attaches to the Greek gods, the question arises, where the external origin of this adventitious element is to be looked for. It arises partly from local characteristics, the scattered condition of the Greeks at the commencement of their national life, fixing as this did on certain points, and consequently introducing local representations. The local divinities stand alone, and occupy a much greater extent than they do afterwards, when they enter into the circle of the divinities, and are reduced to a limited position ; they are conditioned by the particular consciousness and circumstances of the countries in which they appear. There are a multitude of Herculeses and Zeuses, that have their local history like the Indian gods, who also at different places possess temples to which a peculiar legend attaches. A similar relation occurs in the case of the Catholic saints and their legends ; though here, not the several localities, but the one Mater Dei supplies the point of departure, being afterwards localized in the most diversified modes. The Greeks relate the liveliest and most attractive stories of their gods, to which no limit can be assigned, since rich fancies were always gushing forth anew in the living spirit of the Greeks. A second source from which adventitious specialities in the conception of the gods arose is that worship of nature, whose representations retain a place in the Greek myths, as certainly as they appear there also in a regenerated and transfigured condition.

The preservation of the original myths, brings us to the famous chapter of the "mysteries," already mentioned. These mysteries of the Greeks present something which, as unknown, has attracted the curiosity of all times, under the supposition of profound wisdom. It must first be remarked that their antique and primary character, in virtue of its very antiquity, shows their destitution of excellence—their inferiority; that the more refined truths are not expressed in these mysteries, and that the view which many have entertained is incorrect, viz., that the unity of God, in opposition to polytheism, was taught in them. The mysteries were rather antique rituals; and it is as unhistorical as it is foolish to assume that profound philosophical truths are to be found there; since, on the contrary, only natural ideas—ruder conceptions of the metamorphoses occurring everywhere in nature, and of the vital principle that pervades it—were the subjects of those mysteries. If we put together all the historical data pertinent to the question, the result we shall inevitably arrive at will be that the mysteries did not constitute a system of doctrines, but were sensuous ceremonies and exhibitions, consisting of symbols of the universal operations of nature, as, e.g., the relation of the earth to celestial phenomena. The chief basis of the representations of Ceres and Proserpine, Bacchus and his train, was the universal principle of nature; and the accompanying details were obscure stories and representations, mainly bearing on the universal vital force and its metamorphoses. An analogous process to that of nature, spirit has also to undergo; for it must be twice-born, i.e., abnegate itself; and thus the representations given in the mysteries called attention, though only feebly, to the nature of spirit. In the Greeks they produced an emotion of shuddering awe; for an instinctive dread comes over men, when a signification is perceived in a form, which as a sensuous phenomenon does not express that signification, and which therefore both repels and attracts— awakes surmises by the import that reverberates through the whole, but at the same time a thrill of dread at the repellent form, AEschylus was accused of having profaned the mysteries in his tragedies. The indefinite representations and symbols of the mysteries, in which the profound import is only surmised, are an element alien to the clear pure forms, and threaten them with destruction; on which account the gods of art remain separated from the gods of the mysteries, and the two spheres must be strictly dissociated.

Most of their gods the Greeks received from foreign lands, as Herodotus states expressly with regard to Egypt, but these exotic myths were transformed and spiritualized by the Greeks; and that part of the foreign theogonies which accompanied them, was, in the mouth of the Hellenes, worked up into a legendary narrative which often redounded to the disadvantage of the divinities. Thus also the brutes which continued to rank as gods among the Egyptians were degraded to external signs, accompanying the spiritual god. While they have each an individual character, the Greek gods are also represented as human, and this anthropomorphism is charged as a defect. On the contrary (we may immediately rejoin), man as the spiritual constitutes the element of truth in the Greek gods, which rendered them superior to all elemental deities, and all mere abstractions of the One and Highest Being. On the other side it is alleged as an advantage of the Greek gods that they are represented as men—that being regarded as not the case with the Christian God. Schiller says:

*While the gods remained more human,*

*The men were more divine.*

But the Greek gods must not be regarded as more human than the Christian God. Christ is much more a man: he lives, dies, suffers death on the cross, which is infinitely more human than the humanity of the Greek idea of the beautiful. But in referring to this common element of the Greek and the Christian religions, it must be said of both that, if a manifestation of God is to be supposed at all, his natural form must be that of spirit, which for sensuous conception is essentially the human ; for no other form can lay claim to spirituality. God appears indeed in the sun, in the mountains, in the trees, in everything that has life ; but a natural appearance of this kind is not the form proper to spirit: here God is cognizable only in the mind of the percipient. If God himself is to be manifested in a corresponding expression, that can only be the human form : for from this the spiritual beams forth. But if it were asked: Does God necessarily manifest himself? The question must be answered in the affirmative; for there is no essential existence that does not manifest itself. The real defect of the Greek religion, as compared with the Christian, is, therefore, that in the former the manifestation constitutes the highest mode in which the divine being is conceived to exist—the sum and substance of divinity; while in the Christian religion the manifestation is regarded only as a temporary phase of the divine. Here the manifested God dies, and elevates himself to glory; only after death is Christ represented as sitting at the right hand of God. The Greek god, on the contrary, exists for his worshippers perennially in the manifestation— only in marble, in metal or wood, or as figured by the imagination.

But why did God not appear to the Greeks in the flesh? Because man was not duly estimated, did not obtain honour and dignity, till he had more fully elaborated and developed himself in the attainment of the freedom implicit in the aesthetic manifestation in question; the form and shaping of the divinity therefore continued to be the product of individual views. One element in spirit is that it produces itself — makes itself what it is : and the other is that it is originally free—that freedom is its nature and its idea. But the Greeks, since they had not attained an intellectual conception of themselves, did not yet realize spirit in its universality, had not the idea of man and the essential unity of the divine and human nature according to the Christian view. Only the self-reliant, truly subjective spirit can bear to dispense with the phenomenal side, and can venture to assign the divine nature to spirit alone. It then no longer needs to inweave the natural into its idea of the spiritual, in order to hold fast its conception of the divine, and to have its unity with the divine, externally visible; but while free thought thinks the phenomenal, it is content to leave it as it is ; for it also thinks that union of the finite and the infinite, and recognizes it not as a mere accidental union, but as the absolute—the eternal idea itself. Since subjectivity was not comprehended in all its depth by the Greek spirit, the true reconciliation was not attained in it, and the human spirit did not yet assert its true position. This defect showed itself in the fact of fate as pure subjectivity appearing superior to the gods ; it also shows itself in the fact, that men derive their resolves not yet from themselves, but from their oracles. Neither human nor divine subjectivity, recognized as infinite, has as yet, absolutely decisive authority.

*Chapter 3. The Political Work of Art*

The state unites the two phases just considered, viz., the subjective and the objective work of art. In the state, spirit is not a mere object, like the deities, nor, on the other hand, is it merely subjectively developed to a beautiful physique. It is here a living, universal spirit, but which is at the same time the self-conscious spirit of the individuals composing the community.

The democratical constitution alone was adapted to the spirit and political condition in question. In the East we recognized despotism, developed in magnificent proportions, as a form of government strictly appropriate to the dawn land of history. Not less adapted is the democratical form in Greece, to the part assigned to it in the same great drama. In Greece, viz., we have the freedom of the individual, but it has not yet advanced to such a degree of abstraction, that the subjective unit is conscious of direct dependence on the substantial principle—the state as such. In this grade of freedom, the individual will is unfettered in the entire range of its vitality, and embodies that substantial principle, according to its particular idiosyncrasy. In Rome, on the other hand, we shall observe a harsh sovereignty dominating over the individual members of the state ; as also in the German Empire, a monarchy, in which the individual is connected with and has devoirs to perform not only in regard to the monarch, but to the whole monarchical organization.

**47 GOETHE: *Faust, PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b***

Who dare name Him?

And who avow:

"I believe in Him"?

Who feels and would 3435

Have hardihood

To say: "I don't believe in Him"?

The All-Enfolder,

The All-Upholder,

Enfolds, upholds He not 3440

You, me, Himself?

Do not the heavens over-arch us yonder?

Does not the earth lie firm beneath?

Do not eternal stars rise friendly

Looking down upon us? 3445

Look I not, eye in eye, on you,

And do not all things throng

Toward your head and heart,

Weaving in mystery eternal,

Invisible, visible, near to you? 3450

Fill up your heart with it, great though it is,

And when you're wholly in the feeling, in its bliss,

Name it then as you will,

Name it Happiness! Heart! Love! God!

I have no name for that! 3455

Feeling is all in all;

Name is but sound and smoke,

Beclouding Heaven's glow.

Margaret. That's all quite nice and good to know;

Much the same way the preacher talks of it, 3460

Only in words that differ just a bit.

Faust. Wherever the light of Heaven doth shine,

All hearts repeat it, everywhere, and each

In its own speech;

Then why not I in mine? 3465

Margaret. To hear it thus, it's passable, and still I doubt it;

In spite of it all there is some hitch about it,

For you have no Christianity.

**51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 248d-249a**

I have had a long and instructive talk alone with Brother V., who advised me to hold fast by Brother A. Though I am unworthy, much was revealed to me. Adonai is the name of the creator of the world. Elohim is the name of the ruler of all. The third name is the name unutterable which means the All. Talks with Brother V. strengthen, refresh, and support me in the path of virtue. In his presence doubt has no place. The distinction between the poor teachings of mundane science and our sacred all-embracing teaching is clear to me. Human sciences dissect everything to comprehend it, and kill everything to examine it. In the holy science of our order all is one, all is known in its entirety and life. The Trinity—the three elements of matter— are sulphur, mercury, and salt. Sulphur is of an oily and fiery nature; in combination with salt by its fiery nature it arouses a desire in the latter by means of which it attracts mercury, seizes it, holds it, and in combination produces other bodies. Mercury is a fluid, volatile, spiritual essence. Christ, the Holy Spirit, Him! . . .